How should central banks be - Binder 2012
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How should central banks be - Binder 2012


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Should the Central Bank Be?
scope.\u2003The\u2003other\u2003has\u2003not\u2003yet\u2003been\u2003broached:\u2003
possible\u2003conflicts\u2003of\u2003interest.
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can\u2003 treat\u2003 economies\u2003 of\u2003 scope\u2003 briefly:\u2003
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limiting\u2003bank\u2003lending\u2003when\u2003it\u2003was/is\u2003most\u2003needed.
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLVIII (March 2010)132
the\u2003CRA.\u2003Those\u2003three\u2003changes\u2003would\u2003reduce\u2003
the\u2003Fed\u2019s\u2003 range,\u2003 influence,\u2003and\u2003certainly\u2003 its\u2003
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