(E) KIRAS, James D. Irregular Warfare Terrorism and Insurgency

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Strategy in the 
Contemporary 
World 
An lntroduction to 
Strategic Studies 
FOURTH EDITION 
Edited by 
John Baylis 
jamesj. Wirtz 
Colin S. Gray 
OXFORD 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 
O X F O R D 
U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S 
G r e a t C l a r e n d o n S t r e e t , O x f o r d O X 2 6 D P , 
U n i t e d K i n g d o m 
O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s i s a d e p a r t m e n t o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f O x f o r d . 
l t f u r t h e r s t h e U n i v e r s i t y ' s o b j e c t i v e o f e x c e l l e n c e i n r e s e a r c h , s c h o l a r s h i p , 
a n d e d u c a t i o n b y p u b l i s h i n g w o r l d w i d e . O x f o r d i s a r e g i s t e r e d t r a d e m a r k o f 
O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s i n t h e U K a n d i n c e r t a i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s 
© O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 2 0 1 3 
© C h a p t e r 1 3 , S t e p h e n B i d d l e 2 0 1 3 
T h e m o r a l r i g h t s o f t h e a u t h o r s h a v e b e e n a s s e r t e d 
F i r s t E d i t i o n P u b l i s h e d 2 0 0 2 
S e c o n d E d i t i o n P u b l i s h e d 2 0 0 7 
T h i r d E d i t i o n P u b l i s h e d 2 0 1 O 
l m p r e s s i o n : 1 
A l i r i g h t s r e s e r v e d . N o p a r t o f t h i s p u b l i c a t i o n m a y b e r e p r o d u c e d , s t o r e d i n 
a r e t r i e v a l s y s t e m , o r t r a n s m i t t e d , i n a n y f o r m o r b y a n y m e a n s , w i t h o u t t h e 
p r i o r p e r m i s s i o n i n w r i t i n g o f O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , o r a s e x p r e s s l y p e r m i t t e d 
b y l a w , b y l i c e n c e o r u n d e r t e r m s a g r e e d w i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e r e p r o g r a p h i c s 
r i g h t s o r g a n i z a t i o n . E n q u i r i e s c o n c e r n i n g r e p r o d u c t i o n o u t s i d e t h e s c o p e o f t h e 
a b o v e s h o u l d b e s e n t t o t h e R i g h t s D e p a r t m e n t , O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , a t t h e 
a d d r e s s a b o v e 
Y o u m u s t n o t c i r c u l a t e t h i s w o r k i n a n y o t h e r f o r m 
a n d y o u m u s t i m p o s e t h i s s a m e c o n d i t i o n o n a n y a c q u i r e r 
B r i t i s h L i b r a r y C a t a l o g u i n g i n P u b l i c a t i o n D a t a 
D a t a a v a i l a b l e 
I S B N 9 7 8 - 0 - 1 9 - 9 6 9 4 7 8 - 5 
P r i n t e d i n G r e a t B r i t a i n b y 
A s h f o r d C o l o u r P r e s s L t d , G o s p o r t , H a m p s h i r e 
L i n k s t o t h i r d p a r t y w e b s i t e s a r e p r o v i d e d b y O x f o r d i n g o o d f a i t h a n d 
f o r i n f o r m a t i o n o n l y . O x f o r d d i s c l a i m s a n y r e s p o n s i b i l l t y f o r t h e m a t e r i a i s 
c o n t a i n e d i n a n y t h i r d p a r t y w e b s i t e r e f e r e n c e d i n t h i s w o r k . 
Irregular Warfare: 
Terrorism and lnsurgency 
JAMES D. KIRAS 
Chapter Contents 
lntroduction 174 
Subverting the System: The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare 176 
Protecting the System: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism 
in Theory and Practice 184 
Irregular Warfare Now and in the Future 189 
Conclusion 192 
• Reader's Guide 
Western democracies have had some difficu lty adjusting to the 'new reality' of global 
violent extremist terrorism and revolutionary violence. These difficulties are reflected 
in two themes that run through the long history of irregular warfare. The first is that 
ali types of irregular warfare, including terrorism and insurgency, are appealing to 
those who are seeking to change the status quo. But what role can politics possibly 
play for those who are wi lling to kill themselves and others for rewards in the after-
life? For reasons that will become clear in this chapter, global violent extremists and 
modern revolutionaries, including anarchists, share much in common with their his-
torical antecedents. The second theme is that conducting irregu lar warfare success-
fully to ach ieve change is a very challenging undertaking. Historical ly the balance 
sheet favours those who fight against terrorist and insurgent groups. For dissatisfied 
groups and individuais, however, irregu lar warfare wil l continue to be used as it offers 
the promise of change to right perceived injustices and wrongs. Irregular warfare is 
often the on ly practical method of vio lence that weaker elements can wear down, 
coerce, o r destroy their opponents to gain political power. 
1 7 4 
K I R A S 
l n t r o d u c t i o n 
A t t h e h e i g h t o f t h e p e r i o d i n i r r e g u l a r w a r f a r e k n o w n a s t h e ' w a r s o f n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n ' 
( 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 6 5 ) , j o u r n a l i s t R o b e r t T a b e r , w h o h a d s p e n t t i m e i n C u b a d u r i n g t h e r e v o l u t i o n 
t h e r e , s t a t e d t h a t 
t h e g u e r r i l l a f i g h t e r ' s w a r i s p o l i t i c a l a n d s o c i a l , h i s m e a n s a r e a t l e a s t a s p o l i t i c a l a s t h e y a r e 
m i l i t a r y , h i s p u r p o s e a l m o s t e n t i r e l y s o . T h u s w e m a y p a r a p h r a s e C l a u s e w i t z : G u e r r i l l a w a r i s 
t h e e x t e n s i o n o f p o l i t i c s b y m e a n s o f a r m e d c o n f l i c t . 
E m p h a s i s i n o r i g i n a l ; T a b e r ( 1 9 7 0 : 2 6 ) 
M o r e r e c e n t c r i t i q u e s s u g g e s t i d e n t i t y o r c u l t u r e e x p l a i n s u b s t a t e v i o l e n c e ; c o n f l i c t t o d a y i s , 
a s G e n e r a l R u p e r t S m i t h s u g g e s t s , ' w a r a m o n g s t t h e p e o p l e ' i n s t e a d . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e 
t e c h n o l o g i e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h g l o b a l i z a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e I n t e r n e t , a r e r e s h a p i n g p o l i t i c s a n d 
v i o l e n c e . 
T h e a i m o f t h i s c h a p t e r i s t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e s p i r i t o f C l a u s e w i t z i s s t i l l v e r y m u c h r e l -
e v a n t t o c u r r e n t a n d f u t u r e i r r e g u l a r c a m p a i g n s . H i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e c a n n o t b e s u m m a r i l y 
d i s m i s s e d . R e l i g i o u s , s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l , a n d e c o n o m i c f a c t o r s p r o v i d e t h e c o n t e x t t h a t s h a p e s t h e 
c o n d u c t o f i r r e g u l a r c o n f l i c t s . T e r r o r i s t s a n d i n s u r g e n t s , h o w e v e r , u l t i m a t e l y s e e k t o a c h i e v e a 
p o l i t i c a l r e s u l t f r o m t h e i r u s e o f f o r c e . T h e s e p o l i t i c a l r e s u l t s i n t u r n s e r v e g o a l s d e f i n e d b y 
s t a t e s f i g h t i n g i n s u r g e n c i e s o r t h o s e a s p i r i n g t o c h a n g e t h e s y s t e m t h r o u g h a r m e d c o n f l i c t . 
S u c h m o t i v e s a r e d i s c e r n a b l e e v e n i n t h e c a s e o f a i - Q a e d a a n d t h e r e s u r g e n c e o f t h e T a l -
i b a n i n A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e v e r y n a t u r e o f t h e e x t r e m i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f l s l a m i m p e d e s W e s t -
e r n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e v i o l e n c e . A s j o h a n n e s j a n s e n p o i n t s o u t ' l s l a m i c f u n d a m e n t a l i s m i s 
b o t h f u l l y p o l i t i c s a n d f u l l y r e l i g i o n . '( J a n s e n 1 9 9 7 : 1 ) . F o r W e s t e r n e r s , t h e a f f a i r s o f t h e c h u r c h 
a n d t h o s e o f t h e s t a t e a r e s e p a r a b l e w h i l e w i t h i n t h e m i l i t a n t S a l a f i s t s t r a i n o f l s l a m t h e y a r e 
n o t . l n d e e d a d h e r e n c e t o r e l i g i o u s t e n e t s b e c o m e s a f o r m o f g o v e r n a n c e . W h i l e r e l i g i o n 
j u s t i f i e s k i l l i n g a n d s u g g e s t s s p i r i t u a l r e w a r d s , l e a d e r s s u c h a s A y m a n a i - Z a w a h i r i s t r e s s p o l i t i -
c a l p o w e r a n d c o n t r o l : 
V i c t o r y o f l s l a m w i l l n e v e r t a k e p l a c e u n t i l a M u s l i m s t a t e i s e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e m a n n e r o f t h e 
P r o p h e t i n t h e h e a r t o f t h e l s l a m i c w o r l d , s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t h e L e v a n t , E g y p t , a n d t h e n e i g h b o r i n g 
s t a t e s o f t h e P e n í n s u l a a n d l r a q . 
a i - Z a w a h i r i ( 2 0 0 5 : 2 ) 
F r o m t h i s e s t a b l i s h e d p o l i t i c a l b a s e , t h e r e v o l u t i o n c a n c o n t i n u e t o s p r e a d . 
D e f i n i t i o n s 
T h e f i r s t p r o b l e m a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e s t u d y o f t e r r o r i s m a n d i r r e g u l a r w a r f a r e r e l a t e s t o t h e 
r e l a t i v e a n d s u b j e c t i v e l e n s e s t h a t o n e a p p l i e s t o t h e s u b j e c t . O n e c a n n o t s i m p l y c o m p a r e 
a c c i d e n t a l d e a t h f i g u r e s , s u c h a s t h o s e f r o m t r a f f i c f a t a l i t i e s , w i t h p u r p o s e f u l v i o l e n c e 
i n t e n d e d t o s p r e a d f e a r a m o n g t h e p o p u l o u s . C r i t i c s s u g g e s t t h a t t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f 
H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y ' s 2 0 1 2 b u d g e t o f $ 5 7 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s f a r e x c e e d s t h e n a t u r e a n d s c o p e o f 
t h e t h r e a t . M u c h o f t h e c o n f u s i o n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t e r r o r i s m a n d i r r e g u l a r w a r f a r e s t e m s 
f r o m t h e u s e o f e i t h e r v a l u e - l a d e n o r e m o t i v e l a n g u a g e . T h e t e r m ' f r e e d o m f i g h t e r ' s u g g e s t s 
IRREGULAR WARFARE: TERRORISM ANO INSURGENCV 
heroism while 'terrorist' conveys cowardice. The term 'guerrilla' still evokes the romance and 
adventure of rebell ion embodied by the iconic Ernesto 'Che' Guevara. There is also little 
agreement on what to call these types of violence: political violence, terrorism, irregular 
warfare, military operations other than war (MOOTW), low intensity conflict (LI C), people's 
war, revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare, hybrid warfare, among others. Terrorism and 
insurgency are still viewed at bestas a nuisance by many military professionals, ora form of 
'dirty war' at worst. The line between combatants and non-combatants is unclear, objectives 
unclear, and timeline for victory unknown. In addition, military forces conduct policing 
functions in this environment, with ali of the dangers but little glory. 
Irregular warfare, which is different in form but warfare nonetheless, describes types of 
violence conducted by substate actors including terrorism and insurgency (see Box 9.1 ). 
Terrorism is easily the most contentious and elusive type of violence to define. For the 
purposes of this chapter, terrorism is defined as the sustained use o f violence against symbolic 
or civifian targets by sma/1 groups for politica/ purposes, such as inspiring fear. drawing wide-
spread attention to a pofitica/ grievance, and/or provoking a draconian ar unsustainable 
response. 
Terrorism cannot result in change on its own. By provoking a response, terrorists hope that 
their opponent will overreact and reveal their true nature. Some debate exists over whether 
terrorism is a tactic within a broader strategy of insurgency o r whether groups can conduct a 
strategy ofterrorism (O'Neill 1990: 24). What separates terrorism from other forms of violence 
is that the acts committed are legitimized to a degree by their political nature. Hijacking, 
remate bombing, and assassination are criminal acts but the legal status of those who con-
duct them can change i f the violence is carried out for a recognized political cause. Two exam -
ples illustrate the point. The bombings conducted by Anarchists against monarchs in the late 
19th and early 20th century are considered acts of terrorism given their stated objective of 
changing the political environment. Any one of the number of hijackings of ships off the coast 
of Somalia and in the lndian Ocean, in contrast , are criminal acts as the motivation behind 
them is financiai gain. Problems exist in determining who recognizes the cause, beyond the 
terrorists themselves, as well as shifts in motive over time. Terrorists seek attention to generate 
domestic and international empathy and support for the cause that 'drove' them to arms. 
Defining insurgency is equally problematic. lnsurgency is perhaps best understood by first 
considering what it is not. lnsurgency is not conventional war or terrorism, for example, but 
it shares with them the use of force to achieve a political end. The crucial difference is the 
scope and scale of the violence. Terrorism rarely results in political change on its own while 
sox 9.1 T.E. Lawrence on Irregular Wartare 
Thomas Edward Lawrence, better known as 'Lawrence of Arabia', explained the essence of irregular 
warfare 
In fifty words: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy). time, and doctrine 
(the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical 
factors are in the end decisive, and in them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain. 
Lawrence, T.E. (1920), 'The Evolution of a Revolt,' The Army Quarterly. 1 (1 ), 69 
175 
1 7 6 
K I R A S 
i n s u r g e n c y a t t e m p t s t o b r i n g a b o u t c h a n g e t h r o u g h f o r c e o f a r m s . T h e p r i n c i p i e d i f f e r e n c e 
b e t w e e n i r r e g u l a r a n d c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r i s r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e : t h e l a t t e r i n v o l v e s a d v e r s a r i e s 
m o r e o r l e s s s y m m e t r i c i n e q u i p m e n t , t r a i n i n g , a n d d o c t r i n e . I n a n i n s u r g e n c y , t h e a d v e r s a r -
i e s a r e a s y m m e t r i c a n d t h e w e a k e r , a n d a l m o s t a l w a y s a s u b s t a t e g r o u p a t t e m p t s t o b r i n g 
a b o u t p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e b y a d m i n i s t e r i n g a n d f i g h t i n g m o r e e f f e c t i v e l y t h a n i t s s t a t e - b a s e d f o e 
t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f g u e r r i l l a t a c t i c s . T h e s e t a c t i c s a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y h i t - a n d - r u n r a i d s a n d 
a m b u s h e s a g a i n s t l o c a l s e c u r i t y f o r c e s . C o n f u s i o n o f t e n r e s u l t s f r o m i n s u r g e n t m o v e m e n t s 
u s i n g t e r r o r i s t t a c t i c s t o a c h i e v e l o c a l r e s u l t s . l n s u r g e n c y , u n l i k e t e r r o r i s m , i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y 
t h e s u p p o r t a n d m o b i l i z a t i o n o f a s i g n i f i c a n t p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . I n d i v i d u a l i n s u r -
g e n c i e s d i f f e r w i d e l y i n t e r m s o f c h a r a c t e r ( s o c i a l , c u l t u r a l , a n d e c o no m i c a s p e c t s ) a n d t y p e 
( r e v o l u t i o n a r y , p a r t i s a n , g u e r r i l l a , l i b e r a t i o n , o r c i v i l w a r ) b u t o b t a i n i n g p o w e r a n d p o l i t i c a l 
c o n t r o l i s t h e d e s i r e d o u t c o m e . F i n a l l y , e x t e r n a i p h y s i c a l a n d m o r a l s u p p o r t f o r a n i n s u r g e n t 
c a u s e i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r s u c c e s s . 
D e f i n i t i o n s a r e n o t t h e f i n a l w o r d o n a s u b j e c t b u t m e r e l y a c t a s g a t e w a y s . C a p r i c i o u s 
c a t e g o r i z a t i o n s c a n l e a d t o a m i s l e a d i n g a n d s e e m i n g l y i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i v i d e b e t w e e n f o r m s 
o f i r r e g u l a r c o n f l i c t . T e r r o r i s m a n d o t h e r f o r m s o f i r r e g u l a r w a r f a r e a r e p l a i n l y n o t t h e s a m e 
a c t i v i t y . B u t h o w d o e s o n e t h e n c l a s s i f y t h e s o - c a l l e d ' u r b a n g u e r r i l l a ' p h e n o m e n o n a n d i t s 
i d e o l o g i c a l i m p a c t o n t e r r o r i s t g r o u p s d u r i n g t h e 1 9 6 0 s ? I n a d d i t i o n , s o m e t e r r o r i s t g r o u p s 
a d o p t p a r a l l e l e f f o r t s t h a t a r e m o r e c o m m o n l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i n s u r g e n c i e s - h a v e t h e y 
n o w b e c o m e i n s u r g e n t s , d o t h e y r e m a i n t e r r o r i s t s , o r h a v e t h e y b e c o m e s o m e t h i n g e l s e ? 
T h e L e b a n e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n k n o w n a s H e z b o l l a h h a s u s e d t e r r o r i s t t a c t i c s ( k i d n a p p i n g s a n d 
s u i c i d e b o m b i n g s ) , i t f o u g h t b o t h l o n g a n d s h o r t g u e r r i l l a c a m p a i g n s a g a i n s t I s r a e l i f o r c e s 
{ 1 9 8 3 - 2 0 0 1 a n d 2 0 0 6 ) , b u t i t h a s a l s o p r o v i d e d s o c i a l w e l f a r e t o l o c a l c o m m u n i t i e s , e v e n i f 
f u n d e d b y S y r i a , l r a n , a n d i l l i c i t c o m m e r c i a l o p e r a t i o n s . U l t i m a t e l y , s o m e a r b i t r a r y d i s t i n c -
t i o n s m u s t b e m a d e i n o r d e r t o g r a s p t h e b u s i n e s s a t h a n d , w i t h o u t l o s i n g p e r s p e c t i v e o n 
t h e n u m e r o u s ' g r e y a r e a s ' e n d e m i c t o t h i s a n d o t h e r a r e a s o f s t r a t e g i c s t u d i e s . 
K e y p o i n t s 
• T e r r o r i s m i s a t a c t i c o f v i o l e n c e , c a n f o r m a s t r a t e g y o f v i o l e n c e a s w e l l , a n d i t d i f f e r s f r o m c r i m i n a l 
a c t s i n t h a t i t i s c o n d u c t e d f o r a p o l i t i c a l p u r p o s e . 
• l n s u r g e n c i e s d i f f e r f r o m t e r r o r i s m i n t h e d e g r e e o f p o p u l a r s u p p o r t f o r t h e c a u s e b e h i n d t h e 
v i o l e n c e , a s w e l l a s t h e s c o p e a n d s c a l e o f t h e m e a n s e m p l o y e d u s i n g g u e r r i l l a t a c t i c s . 
• T r y i n g t o s e p a r a t e t y p e s o f p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e t o o e x c l u s i v e l y i s p r o b l e m a t i c g i v e n h o w g r o u p s a n d 
c a m p a i g n s c h a n g e o v e r t i m e . 
S u b v e r t i n g t h e S y s t e m : T h e T h e o r y a n d P r a c t i c e 
o f I r r e g u l a r W a r f a r e 
T h o s e u n d e r t a k i n g i n s u r g e n c y a n d t e r r o r i s m a r e t r y i n g t o f i n d a w a y t o u s e t h e i r s t r e n g t h s 
s u c h a s m o b i l i t y , o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d r e l a t i v e a n o n y m i t y o r s t e a l t h , a g a i n s t t h e w e a k n e s s e s o f 
t h e i r m o r e p o w e r f u l a d v e r s a r y . B e r n a r d F a l i r e d u c e d t h i s e q u a t i o n e v e n f u r t h e r w h e n h e 
IRREGULAR WARFARE: TERRORISM ANO INSURGENCV 
suggested that 'When a country is being subverted, it is being out-administered, not out-
fought' (Fali 1998: 55). But subversion is a time-consuming and resource-intensive activity 
that does not guarantee success. In almost every case, the length of terrorist and irregular 
warfare campaigns is measured in decades not years. They achieve success by gaining an 
advantage over their adversaries in terms of time, space, legitimacy, and/ or support. 
These dimensions of conflict are not mutually exclusive and excellence in one dimension 
will not compensa te for drastic shortcomings in the others. Regardless of the space and time 
available, for example, a terrorist or insurgent campaign will almost always fail if it cannot 
attract substantial internai or international support. As in ali forms of strategy, insurgencies 
or terrorist campaigns are dialectical struggles between competing adversaries; outcomes 
are determined by the interaction between opponents (Gray 1999: 23-5). The goal for the 
irregular leader is to pit the organization's strengths against enemy weaknesses. The value 
ascribed by different writers to and perceived relationships between time, space, legitimacy, 
and support create substantial variations in the theories of irregular warfare. These theories 
often reflect the circumstances that are unique to specific conflicts, a fact that has contrib-
uted to failed government efforts to stop insurgents o r terrorists. The unconsidered applica-
tion of a theory based on a specific context to another conflict can lead to disaster. 
Time 
Time is the most important element required for the successful conclusion of an insurgent 
and terrorist campaign as it is a commodity that can be exchanged to make up for other 
weakness. With sufficient time, an insurgent group can organize, sap the resolve of its 
adversary, and build a conventional force capable of seizing contrai of the state. Mao 
organized time in his writings into three interrelated phases: the strategic defensive, the 
stalemate, and the strategic offensive (see Box 9.2). 
Each phase, carefully conducted, would lead one step closer to victory no matter how long 
it eventually takes. Mao once stated, for example (in 1963), that his forces had 'retreated in 
space but advanced in time.' He understood that the sequence of phases leading to victory 
was not necessarily linear; unforeseen circumstances could lead to setbacks and perhaps 
regression to a previous phase o f the insurgency. Endless struggle without an obvious victory 
would eventually lead to the exhaustion, collapse, or withdrawal of the enemy. The dimen-
sion of space works with time, providing insurgents with the leeway to manoeuvre and dem-
onstrates their superior legitimacy to the population. Perceived legitimacy in turn will 
generate internai and externai support for the insurgents. With popular support , insurgents 
will be able to raise a superior army, launch bolder attacks, and achieve victory. 
Many irregular campaigns result in deadlock after a period of time with neither si de able 
to conclude the conflict decisively. The Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTIE) waged insur-
gency within Sri Lanka for more than four decades; the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Co/ombia-Ejército de/ Pueb/o (FARC) has conducted insurgent and terrorist campaigns within 
Columbia for almost a half-century. Only very rarely does guerrilla struggle end quickly. The 
most famous quick insurgent success is the Cuban revolution (1957-1959). Led by Fidel Cas-
tro, this irregular war was concluded in just three years. A number of factors contributed to 
the rapid collapse of the government forces; in the vastmajority of cases, however, few states 
are as corrupt , inept, and fragile as the Batista regime in the late 1960s. 
177 
1 7 8 
K I R A S 
s o x 9 . 2 M a o ' s T l l r e e S t a g e s o f l n s u r g e n c y 
S t a g e I , S t r a t e g i c D e f e n s i v e 
T h i s p h a s e i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a v o i d a n c e a t a l i c o s t s o f p i t c h e d . s e t - p i e c e b a t t l e s . T a c t i c a l o f f e n s i v e s , 
w i t h l o c a l n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y , a r e c a r r i e d o u t t o f u r t h e r s t r e t c h e n e m y r e s o u r c e s . T h e m o r a l 
s u p e r i o r i t y o f t h e g u e r r i l l a s i s e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h t h e l o c a l p o p u l a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l i n d o c t r i n a t i o n i s c a r r i e d 
o u t , a n d n e w r e c r u i t s a r e t r a i n e d t o f i g h t a s i r r e g u l a r s i n r e m o t e , s a f e b a s e s . 
S t a g e 1 1 , S t a l e m a t e 
T h i s p h a s e b e g i n s t h e p r o l o n g e d b a t t l e t o a t t r i t t h e e n e m y ' s p h y s i c a l a n d m o r a l s t r e n g t h . G o v e r n m e n t 
c o n t r o l , i n t h e f o r m o f l o c a l o f f i c i a l s , i s t a r g e t e d a n d i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s k i l l e d o r f o r c e d t o l e a v e . W i t h 
g o v e r n m e n t p r e s e n c e i n r u r a l a r e a s n e u t r a l i z e d , t h e p o p u l a t i o n c a n b e d r a w n u p o n f o r m o r a l a n d 
p h y s i c a l s u p p o r t . T h a t s u p p o r t m u s t b e c h a n n e l l e d i n t o b u i l d i n g c a p a b l e , c o n v e n t i o n a l ' m a i n ' f o r c e s . 
S t a g e 1 1 1 , S t r a t e g i c O f f e n s i v e 
T h e e n d g a m e o f t h e c o n f l i c t , i n w h i c h p o p u l a r a n d m a i n f o r c e s c o n d u c t t h e b a t t l e o f m a n o e u v r e 
a n d u s e o v e r w h e l m i n g f o r c e t o d e s t r o y d e c i m a t e d e n e m y f o r c e s i n t h e i r d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s . 
T s e - T u n g , M a o ( 1 9 6 6 ) , S e l e c t e d M i l i t a r y W r i t i n g s o f M a o T s e - T u n g ( P e k i n g : F o r e i g n L a n g u a g e s P r e s s ) , 2 1 0 - 1 9 
S u c h b r i t t l e a d v e r s a r i e s a r e r a r e b u t l o c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s c a n c o n v i n c e i n s u r g e n t s o r t e r r o r -
i s t s t h a t t i m e w o r k s a g a i n s t t h e m . C a r l o s M a r i g h e l l a b e l i e v e d t h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n B r a z i l i n 
t h e 1 9 6 0 s d e m a n d e d a r e s p o n s e o t h e r t h a n o r g a n i z i n g a n d w a i t i n g f o r t h e r i g h t r e v o l u t i o n -
a r y c o n d i t i o n s . M a r i g h e l l a f a v o u r e d i m m e d i a t e a c t i o n a s h e b e l i e v e d t h e s t a t e g r e w s t r o n g e r 
e v e r y m o n t h w h i l e t h e B r a z i l i a n C o m m u n i s t P a r t y d i d l i t t l e b u t t a l k . B y t a k i n g a c t i o n , 
M a r i g h e l l a b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e ' u r b a n g u e r r i l l a s ' w o u l d b u i l d a c r i t i c a i m a s s f o r t h e g u e r r i l l a 
o r g a n i z a t i o n , c a t c h t h e B r a z i l i a n s t a t e a u t h o r i t i e s o f f - g u a r d , a n d p r o v o k e a n e x t r e m e 
r e s p o n s e . I n o t h e r w o r d s , h e b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s w i t h i n B r a z i l c a l l e d f o r r e v e r s i n g 
t h e t y p i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e g u e r r i l l a a n d t i m e . 
S p a c e 
S p a c e a l l o w s i r r e g u l a r s t o d e c i d e w h e r e a n d w h e n t o f i g h t . l f t h e i r a d v e r s a r y a p p e a r s i n 
o v e r w h e l m i n g n u m b e r s , i r r e g u l a r s c a n m a k e u s e o f s p a c e t o w i t h d r a w a n d f i g h t w h e n t h e 
o d d s a r e i n t h e i r f a v o u r . D e f e n d e r s a g a i n s t s e d i t i o n c a n n o t b e e v e r y w h e r e a t o n c e w i t h o u t 
s p r e a d i n g t h e i r f o r c e s t o o t h i n l y a n d i n v i t i n g a t t a c k f r o m l o c a l l y s u p e r i o r g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s . T h i s 
b e c o m e s p a r t i c u l a r l y p r o b l e m a t i c f o r t h o s e f i g h t i n g i r r e g u l a r s w h e n t h e y c r o s s s t a t e b o r d e r s 
o r o p e r a t e a c r o s s d i f f e r e n t g e o g r a p h i c d o m a i n s s u c h a s a i r , l a n d , a n d s e a . 
T h e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f f o r m i d a b l e t e r r a i n t h a t l i m i t s t h e m a n o e u v r e o f g o v e r n m e n t f o r c e s i s 
a p o t e n t w a y i n w h i c h l i g h t l y a r m e d a n d m o b i l e t e r r o r i s t s o r i n s u r g e n t s o f f s e t t h e i r r e l a t i v e 
w e a k n e s s e s i n t e c h n o l o g y , o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d n u m b e r s . l n s u r g e n t s h a v e o f t e n u s e d d i f f i c u l t t e r -
r a i n f o r t a c t i c a l a d v a n t a g e , o f t e n a g a i n s t f o e s i l i e q u i p p e d t o d e a l w i t h t h e c h a l l e n g e s p r e s e n t e d 
IRREGULAR WARFARE: TERRORISM ANO INSURGENCV 
by mountains, jungle, swamps, and even deserts. For example, Afghan Mujahidin guerrillas 
used mountainous terrain to ambush predominantly road-bound Soviet forces, just as their 
forefathers did against the British. Triple-canopy jungle limited US and South Vietnamese 
attempts to apply overwhelming manoeuvre and firepower against the Viet Cong and North 
Vietnamese forces. Urban terrain can also be an arduous obstacle as the Russians found in 
1994. Chechen guerrillas used buildings and narrow roads to offset their weakness and isolate 
and destroy Soviet formations during the battle for Grozny and lraqi insurgents tried to do the 
same in Fallujah a decade I ater. Terrain difficult for government forces provides insurgent forces 
with the opportunity to establish safe areas or bases from which to expand the struggle. 
Force-to-space ratios also influence the course and duration of insurgencies. lf much terri-
tory needs to be defended by a government, terrorists or insurgents can compensate for their 
operational or strategic inferiority by massing forces locally to achieve tactical superiority. 
Government forces often attempt to defend territory or resources that have political , eco-
nomic, social , and/or military value. For example, governments under siege often abandon the 
countryside in favour of more defensible cities and military bases. More often than not, states 
have the resources to protect many, but not every local target as their resources are stretched. 
Col. T. E. Lawrence, for instance, used the Arab force-to-space ratio advantage against the 
Turks to good effect during the Arab Revolt {1916-18). Given the amount of terrain to be 
covered, Lawrence calculated that the Turks would need 600,000 troops to prevent 'sedition 
putting up her head' across the entirety of the Transjordan, a figure six times larger than the 
forces available to the Turks {Lawrence 1920: 60). One of the most persistent criticisms against 
US and coalition leaders in defeating insurgency in Afghanistan and lraq is the lack of enough 
forces, including competent lraqi and Afghan ones, for the space of each country. 
Force-to-space ratio superiority does not require irregulars to operate over huge geo-
graphic area in order to be successful.In the case of the guerrilla campaign conducted 
against the British in Cyprus, the nationalist group EOKA was limited to a space little more 
than 3 per cent of that roamed by Lawrence's forces. EOKA's leader, George Grivas-Dighenis, 
based his strategy on the assumption that substantial numbers of British troops would 
attempt to put down the insurgency. EOKA members operated in small groups and con-
ducted ambushes, bombings, and assassinations. These actions convinced the British that 
the benefits of remaining in Cyprus were not worth the political and military price to be paid. 
Support 
Few insurgencies or terrorist campaigns succeed without some form of support . In addition 
to munitions, insurgents must also look after casualties and continually replenish their 
supplies, including food and water. In addition, they must constantly update their intelligence 
on the whereabouts and activities of government forces as well as train new recruits. Support, 
however, is interlinked with and inseparable from the legitimacy ofthe organization. Violence 
conducted without a comprehensible political purpose will generate little popular support. 
Without support, insurgents and terrorists will eventually succumb to the efforts of the state 
ora hostil e population. Clausewitz suggested that support, in the form of public opinion, was 
one of the centres of gravity in a popular uprising {Ciausewitz 1993: 720). 
lnsurgents and terrorists can look for support from both domestic (internai) and international 
{externai) sympathizers. Almost ali theorists agree that substantial popular support is required 
179 
1 8 0 
K I R A S 
t o c o m p e n s a t e f o r t h e r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e s t a t e . E v e n C a r l o s M a r i g h e l l a , w h o b e l i e v e d 
i n i t i a l l y t h a t u r b a n g u e r r i l l a s c o u l d f i n d a n d s e i z e t h e n e c e s s a r y r e s o u r c e s i n m a j o r t o w n s a n d 
c i t i e s t o s u s t a i n t h e s t r u g g l e , e v e n t u a l l y r e l e n t e d a n d r e c o g n i z e d t h e n e e d t o c u l t i v a t e r u r a l 
p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . D o m e s t i c s u p p o r t c a n b e f o r c e d f r o m t h e p o p u l a t i o n , u s i n g t e r r o r a n d i n t i m i -
d a t i o n , b u t l o n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e s s h o u l d n o t r e l y e x c l u s i v e l y o n s u c h m e a s u r e s . 
A l t h o u g h i t i s n o w a c l i c h é , M a o ' s a n a l o g y d e s c r i b i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e g u e r -
r i l l a a n d t h e p e o p l e i s s t i l l e v o c a t i v e . T h e g u e r r i l l a s w e r e l i k e n e d t o ' f i s h ' t h a t s w i m i n a ' s e a ' o f 
p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . W i t h o u t t h e s e a , t h e f i s h w i l l d i e . A d r a m a t i c e x a m p l e o f t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s 
o f f a i l i n g t o h a v e d o m e s t i c s u p p o r t i s t h e f a t e o f C h e G u e v a r a . G u e v a r a b e l i e v e d t h a t c o n d i -
t i o n s i n B o l i v i a i n 1 9 6 7 w e r e r i p e f o r a g u e r r i l l a i n s u r r e c t i o n l e d b y h i s ' f o c o ' ( s e e B o x 9 . 3 ) . 
H e o v e r e s t i m a t e d , h o w e v e r , t h e a m o u n t o f s u p p o r t h e c o u l d r e c e i v e f r o m l o c a l C o m m u -
n i s t s a n d f a r m e r s i n B o l i v i a . T h e B o l i v i a n C o m m u n i s t s w e r e h o s t i l e t o a d v i c e f r o m o u t s i d e r s 
o n h o w t o r u n t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e l o c a l p e a s a n t s w e r e i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e 
m e s s a g e p r e a c h e d b y G u e v a r a g i v e n g o v e r n m e n t s p o n s o r e d l a n d r e f o r m i n i t i a t i v e s t h a t 
a d d r e s s e d s o m e o f t h e i r g r i e v a n c e s . G u e v a r a a n d h i s ' f o c o ' l a c k e d p o p u l a r s u p p o r t ; t h e i n s u r -
g e n t s w e r e e i t h e r k i l l e d o r c a p t u r e d w i t h i n s e v e n m o n t h s o f t h e f i r s t s h o t s b e i n g f i r e d . 
S u p p o r t i s a l s o c o n t i n g e n t o n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s w i t h i n a s p e c i f i c c o u n t r y . A d a n g e r e x i s t s 
i n t r y i n g t o r e p r o d u c e s u c c e s s e l s e w h e r e u s i n g a p r e v i o u s l y e f f e c t i v e r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r m u l a 
w i t h o u t f i r s t i d e n t i f y i n g t h e s p e c i f i c b a s e o f p o t e n t i a l p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . T h e u p r i s i n g o f t h e 
u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t w a s c o n s i d e r e d a n e c e s s i t y i n M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t r e v o l u t i o n a r y t h e o r y b u t 
f a i l e d d i s m a l l y w h e n a t t e m p t e d i n C h i n a { 1 9 3 0 ) a n d V i e t n a m { 1 9 6 8 ) . T h e a g r a r i a n c h a r a c t e r 
o f C h i n a a n d V i e t n a m d o o m e d u r b a n r e v o l t s t o f a i l u r e ; i n b o t h s t a t e s m o s t o f t h e r u r a l p o p u -
l a t i o n w e r e p e a s a n t s . A s a r e s u l t , M a o T s e - T u n g a n d V i e t n a m e s e G e n e r a l V o N g u y e n G i a p 
r e s p e c t i v e l y m o d i f i e d t h e i r s t r a t e g i e s a n d e v e n t u a l l y s u c c e e d e d . 
E x t e r n a i s u p p o r t f o r i r r e g u l a r s l a r g e l y d e p e n d s o n b o t h t h e g e o g r a p h y o f t h e c o u n t r y a n d 
t h e p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s m a i n t a i n e d b y t h e i n s u r g e n t s o r t e r r o r i s t s . S u c h s u p p o r t c a n b e m a t e r i a l , 
i n t h e f o r m o f r e s o u r c e s o r c r o s s - b o r d e r s a n c t u a r i e s , o r m o r a l , i n t h e c a s e o f p o l i t i c a l r e c o g n i -
t i o n a n d l o b b y i n g . M a n y M a r x i s t t e r r o r i s t g r o u p s d u r i n g t h e 1 9 7 0 s , s u c h a s t h e G e r m a n R o t e 
A r m e e F a k t i o n , r e c e i v e d p h y s i c a l s u p p o r t f r o m S o v i e t U n i o n o r i t s c l i e n t s t a t e s . T a n g i b l e s u p -
p o r t i n c l u d e d m o n e y , a d v a n c e d w e a p o n s , a n d t r a i n i n g . l n s u r g e n t a n d t e r r o r i s t l e a d e r s i n 
c o u n t r i e s r a n g i n g f r o m t h e D u t c h E a s t l n d i e s { 1 9 5 0 , l a t e r b e c o m i n g l n d o n e s i a ) a n d B r i t i s h 
P a l e s t i n e { 1 9 4 8 , l a t e r b e c o m i n g I s r a e l ) r e c e i v e d e x t e r n a i s u p p o r t , a s p a r t o f a b a c k l a s h a g a i n s t 
c o l o n i a l i s m , t h a t t i p p e d t h e b a l a n c e i n t h e i r f a v o u r . S t a t e s h a r b o u r o r s u p p o r t t e r r o r i s t o r 
e o x 9 . 3 E r n e s t o ' C h e ' G u e v a r a a n d t h e T h e o r y o f t h e ' F o c o ' 
E r n e s t o ' C h e ' G u e v a r a d e l a S e r n a R o s a r i o ( 1 9 2 8 - 1 9 6 7 ) d e v e l o p e d ( a n d R e g i s D e b r a y e x p a n d e d o n ) 
t h e i d e a o f f o c o o r t h e c e n t r e o f g r a v i t y o f t h e g u e r r i l l a m o v e m e n t . P r a c t i c a l l y , t h e f o c o r e f e r s t o t h e 
i n i t i a l c r i t i c a / m a s s o f t h e g u e r r i l l a s , t h e v a n g u a r d o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n , f r o m w h i c h a l i e / s e i s d e r iv e d . 
P h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , t h e f o c o r e p r e s e n t s t h e p o l í t i c a / a n d m i l i t a r y ' h e a r t ' o f t h e i n s u r g e n c y a n d f r o m i t 
G u e v a r a a n d D e b r a y b e / i e v e t h a t t h e g u e r r i l l a m o v e m e n t i t s e / f c a n g e n e r a t e t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y v i c t o r y ( t h e t i t l e o f a b o o k b y D e b r a y r e f l e c t s t h i s s h i f t : T h e R e v o l u t i o n I n T h e 
R e v o l u t i o n ) . T h e y b e / i e v e t h a t g u e r r i l l a s u c c e s s w i / 1 e v e n t u a l l y ' i n s p i r e ' l o c a l p e a s a n t s t o c o m e t o 
s u p p o r t t h e m , a l / o w i n g t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n t o g r o w i n s t r e n g t h . 
IRREGULAR WARFARE: TERRORISM ANO INSURGENCV 
insurgent groups for reasons of political expediency and to suit their own policy objectives 
rather than genuine sympathy for the cause such groups espouse. The ruling authorities in 
Jordan and Afghanistan made decisions regarding the relative political cost of providing 
sanctuary for their respective 'guests': the Palestinians in Jordan (1970) and Osama bin Laden 
and ai-Qaeda under Taliban protection in Afghanistan (2001 ). In addition, irregulars can serve 
to fight proxy wars against their patron's rivais. For example, lran and lraq sponsored rival 
terrorist groups designed to conduct attacks against one another below the threshold of 
conventional war. With the regime of Saddam Hussein deposed, lran continues to provide 
support and sanctuary for terrorist groups operating against coalition and lraqi forces until 
their specific policy goals, namely a regime amenable to lranian influence, are met. More 
recently, the inability or unwillingness of Pakistani leaders to deal with Taliban and ai-Qaeda 
support structures in its Western tribal areas has been a source of tension for both its imme-
diate neighbour, Afghanistan, as well as its ostensible partners and allies fighting against vio-
lent extremism. 
Legitimacy 
lnsurgents and terrorists fighting irregular wars require internai o r externai support to sustain 
their struggle. Terrorists and insurgent leaders need to convey the reason for their actions or 
lose sympathy for its cause. They often seek to legitimize their use of violence and translate 
this into meaningful support for their cause by demonstrating moral superiority over those 
who represent the state; supplanting the functions of the state at the local levei; and, 
spreading a persuasive message. 
The moral superiority of the guerrillas is a cornerstone of ali irregular and terrorist theory 
especially those fuelled by religious zeal. lnsurgents derive support from the people and they 
often cultivate their relationship with them. Mao went so far as to outline a 'code of conduct' 
for the guerrillas, known as 'The Three Rules and Eight Remarks', as a way to demonstrate 
their moral superiority (see Box 9.4). 
The most important job of the guerrilla isto demonstrate this moral superiority in routine 
contact so that people differentiate the guerrillas from bandits or 'counter-revolutionaries'. 
Che Guevara insisted that the peasants understand that the guerrillas were as much social 
reformers as they were protectors of the people. 
Peasants who cooperate with the insurgents often face harsh retaliation from the govern-
ment but frequently this only further legitimizes the revolutionary cause. Abdul Haris Nasu-
tion, who fought against the Dutch in lndonesia from 1945-1949, suggested that government 
responses to subversion only served to drive the people further into the arms of the insur-
gents. Government brutality also allows insurgents to act as the avengers of the people, help-
ing to cement the ties between them. Carlos Marighella, for example, hoped that the actions 
ofthe Brazilian authorities would demonstrate conclusively that 
[the] government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and that it resorts simply to the 
physical liquidation of its opponents. The political situation in the country is transformed 
into a military situation in which the 'gorillas' appear more and more to be the ones 
responsible for violence, while the lives of the people grow worse. 
Marighella, 1969 
181 
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K I R A S 
s o x 9 . 4 M a o ' s ' T t i r e e R u l e s a n i : l E i g t i t R e m a r l < s ' 
R u l e s 
1 . A l i a c t i o n s a r e s u b j e c t t o c o m m a n d . 
2 . D o n o t s t e a l f r o m t h e p e o p l e . 
3 . B e n e i t h e r s e l f i s h n o r u n j u s t . 
R e m a r k s 
1 . R e p l a c e t h e d o o r w h e n y o u l e a v e t h e h o u s e . • 
2 . R o l I u p t h e b e d d i n g o n w h i c h y o u h a v e s l e p t . 
3 . B e c o u r t e o u s . 
4 . B e h o n e s t i n y o u r t r a n s a c t i o n s . 
5 . R e t u r n w h a t y o u b o r r o w . 
6 . R e p l a c e w h a t y o u b r e a k . 
7 . D o n o t b a t h e i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f w o m e n . 
8 . D o n o t w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y s e a r c h t h e p o c k e t b o o k s o f t h o s e y o u a r r e s t . 
* T h e t r a n s l a t o r t o t h i s e d i t i o n , r e t i r e d U S M a r i n e C o r p B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l S a m u e l B G r i f f i t h s , n o t e s t h a t ' I n s u m m e r , 
d o o r s w e r e f r e q u e n t l y l i f t e d o f f a n d u s e d a s b e d s . ' 
T s e - T u n g , M . ( 1 9 6 1 ) , M a o T s e - T u n g o n G u e r r i l l a W a r f a r e ( N e w Y o r k : P r a e g e r ) , 9 2 
O f c o u r s e , t h e a d m o n i t i o n s t o b e h a v e b e t t e r t h a n g o v e r n m e n t t r o o p s a r e o f t e n a p p l i e d 
o n l y t o t h o s e w h o a c t i v e l y a s s i s t i n s u r g e n t s i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e . I n a n u m b e r o f i r r e g u l a r 
c o n f l i c t s , g u e r r i l l a s a n d g o v e r n m e n t f o r c e s a l i k e r e g a r d e d a n u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o h e l p w i t h 
a i d i n g a n d a b e t t i n g t h e e n e m y . A b s o l u t e p o p u l a r s u p p o r t c a n n e v e r b e g u a r a n t e e d . P o p -
u l a t i o n s i n v a r i a b l y s p l i t i n t o w i l l i n g a s s i s t a n t s , s t a u n c h f o e s , a n d t h e u n d e c i d e d m a j o r i t y . 
T o h e l p m a k e u p t h e m i n d s o f t h o s e u n d e c i d e d , i n s u r g e n t s c a n d e m o n s t r a t e l e g i t i m a c y 
b y b e c o m i n g t h e d e f a c t o g o v e r n m e n t i n a r e a s u n d e r t h e i r c o n t r o l . T h i s c a n i n c l u d e t a k -
i n g ' p o s i t i v e m e a s u r e s ' s u c h a s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f s c h o o l s a n d c l i n i c s o r ' n e g a t i v e m e a -
s u r e s ' s u c h a s t a x c o l l e c t i o n . I n A f g h a n i s t a n , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e T a l i b a n h a v e u s e d a s y s t e m 
o f m o b i l e j u d g e s a s a p o s i t i v e m e a s u r e t o p r o v i d e s w i f t a n d i m p a r t i a l j u s t i c e , a s w e l l a s 
n e g a t i v e m e a s u r e s i n c l u d i n g t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f t a x e s , p u b l i c b e h e a d i n g s , a n d t h r e a t s o f 
v i o l e n c e t h r o u g h ' n i g h t l e t t e r s ' t o c e m e n t t h e i r c o n t r o l o v e r t h e p o p u l a t i o n . T h e u s e o f 
t e r r o r a s a n e g a t i v e m e a s u r e t o i n t i m i d a t e t h e p o p u l a t i o n i s a m a t t e r o f de b a t e b y i r r e g u -
l a r w a r f a r e p r a c t i t i o n e r s t o t h i s d a y . F o r C h e G u e v a r a , t e r r o r t a c t i c s w e r e u n j u s t i f i e d 
b e c a u s e t h e y i n v a r i a b l y d e l e g i t i m i z e t h e g u e r r i l l a ' s m e s s a g e . B o t h M a o a n d M a r i g h e l l a 
d i s a g r e e , n o t i n g t h a t a c t s o f t e r r o r m a y b e n e c e s s a r y t o c o n v i n c e t h e p o p u l a t i o n o f t h e 
o c c u p a t i o n a l h a z a r d s o f w o r k i n g f o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t , o r t o p r o v o k e a r e p r e s s i v e r e s p o n s e . 
N e g a t i v e m e a s u r e s b a c k e d b y p r o s e l y t i z i n g c a n b e a n e f f e c t i v e w a y o f l e g i t i m i z i n g t h e 
i n s u r g e n t c a u s e b y s h o w i n g c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t c a n n o l o n g e r p r o t e c t 
t h e m . l n t e r c e p t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s b e t w e e n a i - Q a e d a l e a d e r s s u g g e s t t h a t n e g a t i v e 
92 
IRREGULAR WARFARE: TERRORISM ANO INSURGENCV 
BOX 9 .5 Popular Support and Negative Measures in thejitiad in lraq 
The following correspondence between Ayman ai-Zawahiri and Abu Musab ai-Zarqawi which was 
intercepted and translated in October 2005, suggests senior ai-Qaeda leadership are keenly aware of 
the importance of popular support: 
And it's very 1mportant that you al low me to elaborate a little here on th is issue of popular support ... I f 
we arem agreement that the victory of lslam and the establishment of a cal1phate 1n the manner of the 
Prophet will not be achieved except through Jlhad against the apostate rulers and their rem oval, then 
th1s goal wil l not be accomplished by the mujahed movement whlie 1t 1s cut off from publ1c support, 
even i f thejihadist movement pursues the method o f sudden overthrow . .. In the absence of this popu-
lar support, the lslamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows, far from the masses who 
are distracted or fearful ... Therefore, the mujahed movement must avoid any action that the masses 
do not understand or approve ... meanmg we must not throw the masses-scant in knowledge-into the 
sea before we teach them to swim. 
ai-Zawahiri, A (2005) 'Letter from ai-Zawahiri to Zarqawi,' 
translated by the Fore1gn Broadcast lnformation Service 
measures remain a concern for contemporary insurgents and terrorists in that short-term 
gains may upset long-term goals (see Box 9.5). 
The most powerful method of legitimizing a struggle isto link military operations with a 
justifiable political end. Causes vary, but self-determination has been the most pervasive and 
successful rallying cry. Given the fundamental rights outlined in the Atlantic Charter {1941) 
and the United Nations Charter {1945), it was difficult for nations such as Great Britain, 
France, the Netherlands, and Portugal to maintain possession of overseas colonies in the face 
of native insurgencies claiming the right of self-governance. Likewise the legitimacy of the 
East Timorese claim o f independence led to internai and externai pressure on the lndonesian 
government to end a 25-year insurgency. Other successful causes blend social , cultural , and 
economic issues into a powerful political message that the government or an international 
audience finds difficult to counter or resist. 
Key points 
Terrorism and insurgencies can be examined in terms of time, space, legitimacy, o r support, 
reflecting specific local contexts rather than predetermined goals attributed to a general theory. 
Time is an important element in the success of insurgencies, involving a non-linear progression that 
includes: the space to manoeuvre and to gain legitimacy and/or support, ali of which are necessary 
for eventual victory. 
Terrain is important to offset weaknesses and gain tactical advantages, including gaining 
'force-to-space' superiority at the time and place of your choosing. 
• Support is dependent on legitimacy; it is derived internally from the quality of the interaction with 
the local populace and externally via resources from allies and sympathizers. 
Moral justification provides the cornerstone to sustain the struggle, usually blending cultural and 
social causes with political ends. 
183 
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K I R A S 
P r o t e c t i n g t h e S y s t e m : C o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y a n d 
C o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m i n T h e o r y a n d P r a c t i c e 
T h e d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g g o v e r n m e n t s b e s i e g e d b y i n s u r g e n t s o r t e r r o r i s t s m a y s e e m 
i n s u r m o u n t a b l e a t f i r s t g l a n c e , b u t n u m e r o u s w o r k s h a v e b e e n w r i t t e n t o e x p l a i n h o w t o 
q u e l l t h e m . T h i s l i t e r a t u r e r a n g e s f r o m g e n e r a l t h e o r i e s a n d p r a c t i c a l s u g g e s t i o n s , b a s e d o n 
h a r d - w o n e x p e r i e n c e , t o c o m p l i c a t e d e m p i r i c a l m o d e l s p u r p o r t i n g t o p r e d i c t o u t c o m e s o r 
t e s t p r a c t i c a l a d v i c e . C o m m e n t a t o r s h a v e r e d u c e d c o m p l i c a t e d p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y s t r u g g l e s 
a g a i n s t f o r c e f u l u s u r p e r s t o a n u m b e r o f p r i n c i p i e s o r f o r m u l a s f o r s u c c e s s ( s e e B o x 9 . 6 ) . 
B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l S a m u e l B . G r i f f i t h s u g g e s t e d i n 1 9 6 1 t h a t a n t i - g u e r r i l l a o p e r a t i o n s c o u l d b e 
s u m m e d u p i n t h r e e w o r d s : l o c a t i o n , i s o l a t i o n , a n d e r a d i c a t i o n ( M a o T s e - T u n g 1 9 6 1 : 3 2 ) . 
G r i f f i t h ' s s u m m a r y i s a u s e f u l r e f e r e n c e p o i n t f o r e x p l o r i n g h o w t o a p p l y t h e s t r e n g t h s o f a 
s t a t e ( o r g r o u p o f s t a t e s ) a g a i n s t a n i r r e g u l a r t h r e a t . 
L o c a t i o n 
T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t p h a s e o f a n y c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y o r c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m c a m p a i g n i s 
r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t t h e t h r e a t e x i s t s . C o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y e x p e r t R o b e r t T h o m p s o n b e l i e v e d i t 
n e c e s s a r y t o t a c k l e a n i n s u r g e n c y d u r i n g i t s s u b v e r s i o n a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n p h a s e o r a t t h e f i r s t 
s i g n s o f a s u s t a i n e d c a m p a i g n o f v i o l e n c e ( T h o m p s o n 1 9 6 6 : 5 0 ) . I n o t h e r w o r d s , h e b e l i e v e d i t 
n e c e s s a r y t o d e f e a t i n s u r g e n t s i n b o t h p h y s i c a l s p a c e a n d t i m e . T h e p r o b l e m f o r 
c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t s a n d c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s t s i s d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n l a w f u l o r u n l a w f u l f o r m s o f 
d i s c o n t e n t . R e s t r i c t i n g g u a r a n t e e d r i g h t s a n d f r e e d o m s e v e r y t i m e a b o m b i s d e t o n a t e d w i l l 
u n d e r m i n e t h e c r e d i b i l i t y a n d i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t . W a i t i n g t o o l o n g t o u p h o l d t h e 
r u l e o f l a w , h o w e v e r , w i l l g i v e t h e i n s u r g e n t s o r t e r r o r i s t s t h e n e c e s s a r y t i m e t o b u i l d a r o b u s t 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e t h a t o n l y t h e m o s t d e d i c a t e d e f f o r t sm i g h t h o p e t o d e f e a t . 
T e r r o r i s m a n d i n s u r g e n c y c a n b e s t a v e d o f f w i t h e n o u g h e a r l y w a r n i n g , b u t t h i s i m p l i e s 
t h a t a n e f f e c t i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e - g a t h e r i n g a n d a s s e s s m e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n i s o p e r a t i n g . F e w s t a t e s 
p o s s e s s s u c h r e s o u r c e s o r f o r e s i g h t . T h o s e w i l l i n g a n d a b l e t o d e s t r o y t h e s y s t e m n e e d t o b e 
i d e n t i f i e d a n d t r a c k e d : t h i s r e q u i r e s t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f a s u p p o r t i v e p o p u l a c e . T h e q u e s t i o n i n 
p l u r a l i s t s y s t e m s i s w h e t h e r o r n o t p o t e n t i a l l y s e d i t i o u s i n d i v i d u a i s c a n b e m o n i t o r e d o r 
a r r e s t e d w i t h o u t v i o l a t i n g c i v i l l i b e r t i e s a n d u n d e r m i n i n g t h e r u l e o f l a w , a s r e c e n t d e b a t e s i n 
S w e d e n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d G r e a t B r i t a i n s u g g e s t . 
U p h o l d i n g t h e r u l e o f l a w i s c r u c i a l i f s t a t e s a r e t o p r e s e r v e t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e i r c a u s e 
a n d m a i n t a i n t h e m o r a l h i g h g r o u n d o v e r i n s u r g e n t s o r t e r r o r i s t s . M e t h o d s t o c o u n t e r t e r -
r o r i s m , f o r e x a m p l e , m u s t b e e f f e c t i v e y e t s t a y w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a r y o f t h e r u i e o f l a w . T h i s 
a p p l i e s t o b o t h d o m e s t i c a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l m e a s u r e s . C i t i z e n s o f d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e s a r e 
l o a t h t o g i v e u p r i g h t s a n d f r e e d o m s t o c o m b a t t h r e a t s e s p e c i a l l y i f t h e y i n t r u d e u p o n p e r -
s o n a l p r i v a c y . M a n a g i n g h o w a n d w h e n ( a n d i n w h a t m e a s u r e ) t o b e g i n c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y 
a n d a n t i t e r r o r i s m e f f o r t s , s u c h a s i m p o s i n g c u r f e w s a n d c o n t r o l l i n g m e d i a a c c e s s w h i l e 
u p h o l d i n g t h e r u l e o f l a w , i s t h e p r i m a r y c h a l l e n g e t o a n y g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r s i e g e . I n m o st 
d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t i e s , h o w e v e r , s t e p s t o c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s t s a r e r a r e l y p r e v e n t i v e a n d a r e 
a l m o s t a l w a y s t a k e n a f t e r h o r r i f i c a c t s o f v i o l e n c e h a v e b e e n c o m m i t t e d , a s t h e l n d i a n r e a c -
t i o n t o t h e M u m b a i a t t a c k s o f N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 8 s u g g e s t . D e m o c r a c i e s r u n i n t o g r e a t e r 
• 
• 
• 
IRREGULAR WARFARE: TERRORISM ANO INSURGENCV 
sox 9.6 Principies, Prerequisites, and laws of Counterinsurgency 
and Counterterrorism 
Material quoted from specific texts in chronological order. 
Charles W Gwynn: Principies from Imperial Policing {1934) 
Policy remains vested in civil government 
• Minimum use of force 
• Firm and timely action 
• Cooperation between civil and military authorities 
David Gaiuia: Laws of counterinsurgency from Counterinsurgency Warfare {1964) 
• Support of the population necessary 
• Support gained through an active minority 
• Support from population is conditional 
• intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential 
Robert Thompson: Principies of counterinsurgency from Defeating Communist lnsurgency (1966) 
• Clear political aim 
• The government must function in accordance with the law 
• The government must have an overall plan 
• The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas 
• The government must secure its base areas first (in the guerrilla phase) 
Frank Kitson: Framework for an effective counterinsurgency campaign from Bunch of Five (1977) 
• Good coordinating machinery (between civil and military agencies) 
• Establishing the sort of poli ti cal atmosphere within which the government measures can be 
introduced with the maximum likelihood of success 
• lntelligence (right information = sensible policy) 
• Law (upholding the rui e of) 
US Government: The iong-term approach, buiiding democracy and representative institutions, as well as the four 
priorities of action, from the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006) 
• Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism; 
• Prevent attacks by terrorist networks; 
• Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them; 
• Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; 
• Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and 
• Lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward 
against terror and help ensure ou r ultimate success. 
US Army/Marine Corps: Principies of counterinsurgency from FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2007) 
185 
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K I R A S 
B O X 9 . 6 ( c o n t i n u e d ) 
• L e g i t i m a c y i s t h e m a i n o b j e c t i v e 
• U n i t y o f e f f o r t i s e s s e n t i a l 
• P o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s a r e p r i m a r y 
• C o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t s m u s t u n d e r s t a n d t h e e n v i r o n m e n t 
• l n t e l l i g e n c e d r i v e s o p e r a t i o n s 
• l n s u r g e n t s m u s t b e i s o l a t e d f r o m t h e i r c a u s e a n d s u p p o r t 
• S e c u r i t y u n d e r t h e r u l e o f l a w i s e s s e n t i a l 
• C o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t s s h o u l d p r e p a r e f o r a l o n g - t e r m c o m m i t m e n t 
B r i t i s h A r m y : P r i n c i p i e s o f c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y f r o m B r i t i s h A r m y F i e l d M a n u a l 
V o l u m e 1 , P a r t 1 O: C o u n t e r i n g l n s u r g e n c y 
• P r i m a c y o f p o l i t i c a l p u r p o s e 
• U n i t y o f e f f o r t 
• U n d e r s t a n d t h e h u m a n t e r r a i n 
• S e c u r e t h e p o p u l a t i o n 
• N e u t r a l i z e t h e i n s u r g e n t 
• G a i n a n d m a i n t a i n p o p u l a r s u p p o r t 
• O p e r a t e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e l a w 
• l n t e g r a t e i n t e l l i g e n c e 
• P r e p a r e f o r t h e l o n g t e r m 
• L e a r n a n d a d a p t 
t r o u b l e w h e n t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n s a p p e a r t o c o n t r a v e n e t h e i r d o m e s t i c l a w s a n d 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l n o r m s . T h e v e x i n g i s s u e s o f a i - Q a e d a d e t a i n e e s a n d s o - c a l l e d ' a g g r e s s i v e 
i n t e r r o g a t i o n m e t h o d s ' w i l l n o t b e r e s o l v e d w i t h a s t r o k e o f a p r e s i d e n t i a l p e n b u t w i l l c o n -
t i n u e t o i n f l u e n c e U S c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m m e a s u r e s a d v e r s e l y u n t i l i t s c r e d i b i l i t y i s r e s t o r e d 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . 
O n c e a n i r r e g u l a r t h r e a t h a s b e e n i d e n t i f i e d , v a r i o u s c i v i l a n d m i l i t a r y a g e n c i e s m u s t l o c a l -
i z e t h e t h r e a t w h i l e c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e i r r e s p o n s e . T h e y m u s t i d e n t i f y s a f e h o u s e s , g r o u p m e m-
b e r s , a n d s o u r c e s o f s u p p l y . G a t h e r i n g s u c h i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e t e r r o r i s t s c a n b e d a u n t i n g , 
g i v e n t h e d e s i r e o f m o s t s u b v e r s i v e s t o k e e p t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s m a l l , s t e a l t h y , a n d s e c r e t . F o r 
a s t a t e p r o v i d i n g d i r e c t c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y o r c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m s u p p o r t i n t o a g e o g r a p h i c a l l y 
a n d c u l t u r a l l y u n f a m i l i a r c o u n t r y , a s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d i d i n S o u t h V i e t n a m , o b t a i n i n g e v e n 
b a s i c i n f o r m a t i o n o n s u b v e r s i v e s t a k e s t i m e . T h i s p r o b l e m i s c o m p o u n d e d w h e n a s t a t e 
e i t h e r d o e s n o t h a v e a n e f f e c t i v e a n d e f f i c i e n t s e c u r i t y a p p a r a t u s { A f g h a n i s t a n ) o r t h e e x i s t -
i n g o n e e v a p o r a t e s a n d m u s t b e p a i n s t a k i n g l y r e c o n s t r u c t e d { l r a q ) . T h e t i m e g a i n e d i s u s e d 
b y i n s u r g e n t s t o r e t a i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e a n d d e v e l o p t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l b a s e f u r t h e r . 
IRREGULAR WARFARE: TERRORISM ANO INSURGENCY 
lsolation 
lsolating insurgents and terrorists from their bases of support is probably the most 
important element of successful campaigns against them. lsolation can take the form of 
physical separation or political alienation. Physical separation can be achieved by moving 
villagers into more easily defended compounds, known in Malaya and Vietnam as 
'strategic hamlets'. Preventive measures such as curfews, prohibited ('no-go') areas, food 
rationing, aggressive patrolling, and overt presence can also physically isolate insurgents. 
As with any form of deterrence, the threat posed by patrolling and presence must be a 
credible one and not consist simply of half-hearted 'cordon and search' operations. 
lsolation also means limiting the mobility and range of the insurgents or terrorists, in 
effect taking away their space and their time. lnsurgents and terrorists can also be cut off 
from their externai sources of support by a combination of diplomatic pressure and 
military measures. The French managed to block externai support from reaching the 
Armée Liberation Nationale during the Algerian insurgency {1954-1962): the border 
between AI geria and its neighbours Morocco and Tunisia was shut down by a combination 
of wire barriers, guardhouses, and patrols. Experts suggest that the insurgencies in lraq 
and Afghanistan cannot be dealt with effectively until supply routes from neighbouring 
countries are cut off. 
Segregating insurgents and terrorists from the population involves more than just physi-
cally separating them. To impose meaningful isolation, the state must defuse the irregular's 
most powerful asset: its political message. Widely held grievances that foster a potent 
source of recruitment and support must be mitigated by the government. Obviously, some 
messages are more influential than others: self-determination is difficult to counter by an 
externai or occupying power, whereas demands for land reform or increased political rep-
resentation can be more easily satisfied. The words of the government must be accompa-
nied by effective deeds to show that the state can and will respond to what amounts to 
political extortion. The terrorist's or insurgent's 'propaganda of the deed' must be diffused 
by government displays of a firm, yet lawful response. The displays can range from enforcing 
a 'no negotiations with terrorists' policy to simple measures like providing basic necessities 
and local security. The o nus is on the representatives of the state to prove that they are mor-
al/y superior to the guerrillas and terrorists and will provide for the needs of their citizens, 
including responding to the sources of disgruntlement that led to armed insurrection in the 
first place. Likewise, the terrorist or insurgent cause must be discredited. Leniency should 
also be extended to those insurgents and terrorists who give up the armed struggle. Above 
ali, citizens must be convinced that the state's fight is their fight. One of the keys to success 
in lraq has been the so-called 'awakening' of the Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar province 
where a degree of local autonomy has been traded for turning against the local ai-Qaeda-
affiliated group. Popular support for the terrorists or insurgents must be denied through 
credible and efficient actions to win what Si r Gerald Templar called 'the hearts and minds' of 
the population. With little internai or externai sustenance flowing to the rebels anda popu-
lation willing to support the government, it is only a matter of time before the state's forces 
destroy the irregular threat. 
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E r a d i c a t i o n 
E r a d i c a t i o n i n v o l v e s t h e p h y s i c a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e i n s u r g e n t s o r t e r r o r i s t s , a l t h o u g h f e w 
w o u l d g o s o f a r a s t o f o l l o w R o b e r t T a b e r ' s r h e t o r i c a l a d v i c e : ' T h e r e i s o n l y o n e m e a n s o f 
d e f e a t i n g a n i n s u r g e n t p e o p l e w h o w i l l n o t s u r r e n d e r , a n d t h a t i s e x t e r m i n a t i o n . T h e r e i s o n l y 
o n e w a y t o c o n t r a i a t e r r i t o r y t h a t h a r b o u r ' s r e s i s t a n c e , a n d t h a t i s t o t u r n i t i n t o a d e s e r t ' 
{ T a b e r 1 9 7 2 : 1 1 ) . T h e s t a t e h a s n u m e r o u s a d v a n t a g e s o v e r i t s o p p o n e n t s g i v e n i t s c o n t r o l 
o v e r s o c i a l , f i s c a l , a n d m i l i t a r y r e s o u r c e s . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n i n d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e s 
i s w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e l e a d e r s o f t h e s t a t e c a n a p p l y t h e i r r e s o u r c e s e f f e c t i v e l y t o e x t i n g u i s h 
t h e i n s u r g e n t f l a m e w i t h o u t a l i e n a t i n g p o p u l a r s u p p o r t f o r t h e i r o w n a u t h o r i t y . C u l t u r a l 
c o n t e x t m a t t e r s w h e n d e t e r m i n i n g a r e s p o n s e . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e l e a d e r s o f s o m e E u r o p e a n 
c o u n t r i e s w e r e h e s i t a n t t o c a s t a c t i o n s a g a i n s t a i - Q a e d a a f t e r S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 1 a s a ' w a r ' f o r 
c u l t u r a l a n d p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n s b a s e d o n t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e . l n d e e d m a n y c o n t i n u e d t o 
s e e t h e p h e n o m e n o n o f v i o l e n t e x t r e m i s t t e r r o r i s m e x c l u s i v e l y a s a d o m e s t i c l a w e n f o r c e m e n t 
i s s u e w i t h i n t h e i r s o v e r e i g n b o r d e r s , r e q u i r i n g c i v i l i a n p o l i c e o r p a r a m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , a n d n o t 
a s a g l o b a l p r o b l e m t h a t m i g h t r e q u i r e t h e u s e o f m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . 
R e g a r d l e s s o f t h e f o r c e s u s e d , t h e o r y a n d d o c t r i n e i s r i f e w i t h p l a n s t h a t d i s c u s s t h e 
d e s t r u c t i o n o f g u e r r i l l a s . T h e s e p l a n s r a n g e f r o m F r e n c h M a r s h a l L y a u t e y ' s i n n o c u o u s -
s o u n d i n g ' o i I p a t c h ' m e t h o d a p p l i e d i n M o r o c c o i n t h e f i r s t q u a r t e r o f t h e t w e n t i e t h c en t u r y 
t o t h e m o r e s i n i s t e r - s o u n d i n g N a z i G e r m a n ' s p i d e r ' s w e b ' a n d ' p a r t r i d g e d r i v e ' t a c t i c s . A l i 
t h e o r i s t s a g r e e t h a t e l i m i n a t i n g t h e i n s u r g e n t s ' s a f e h a v e n s m u s t b e a p r i o r i t y . N u m b e r s a l s o 
m a k e a d i f f e r e n c e . U S c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y d o c t r i n e s u g g e s t s t h a t 2 0 - 2 5 p e r s o n n e l a r e 
r e q u i r e d f o r e v e r y 1 , 0 0 0 i n h a b i t a n t s { D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e A r m y F M 3 - 2 4 : 2 3 ) . M o s t t h e o r i s t s 
a l s o a s s e r t t h a t ' s p e c i a l f o r c e s ' a r e a l s o n e e d e d t o d e f e a t t h e i r r e g u l a r s a t t h e i r o w n g a m e . 
S o m e a d v o c a t e t h e u s e o f t e c h n o l o g i e s n o t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e i n s u r g e n t s , s u c h a s h e l i c o p t e r s 
a n d r e m a t e s e n s o r s , t o e n h a n c e t h e f o r c e - t o - s p a c e b a l a n c e b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t a n d i r r e g -
u l a r f o r c e s a n d t o a c h i e v e s u p e r i o r m o b i l i t y . O t h e r s s u g g e s t t h a t a ' k i l l / c a p t u r e ' s t r a t e g y , u s i n g 
a m i x t u r e o f s p e c i a l f o r c e s a n d a i r p o w e r i n a r e l e n t l e s s c a m p a i g n t o r e m o v e k e y l e a d e r s , 
m a n a g e r s , a n d f a c i l i t a t o r s , w i l l e v e n t u a l l y e r o d e t e r r o r i s t g r o u p s i n t o i r r e l e v a n c e . 
T h e r e a l s o a r e p a s s i v e w a y s i n w h i c h t h a t s t a t e c a n s u b v e r t a n i n s u r g e n c y a n d t h e r e b y d i m i n -
i s h t h e n u m b e r o f g u e r r i l l a s o r t e r r o r i s t s . O n e s u c h m e t h o d c o m b i n e s p s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r f a r e 
t e c h n i q u e s , p r o m i s e s o f a m n e s t y ( e . g . t h e C h i e u H o i , o r ' O p e n A r m s ' p r o g r a m m e u s e d i n S o u t h 
V i e t n a m ) , c a s h i n c e n t i v e s , o r l a n d t o c o n v i n c e i n s u r g e n t s a n d t e r r o r i s t s t h a t t h e i r s t r u g g l e i s i n 
v a i n . O t h e r m e t h o d s , s u c h a s t h o s e t r i e d w i t h m i x e d s u c c e s s i n Y e m e n { t h e s o - c a l l e d ' K o r a n i c 
C o u r t s ' ) , a t t e m p t t o r e h a b i l i t a t e t e r r o r i s t s a n d r e i n t e g r a t e t h e m i n t o s o c i e t y . P o l i t i c a l a n d e c o -
n o m i c p r e s s u r e c a n b e p l a c e d o n s t a t e s o r g r o u p s p r o v i d i n g s a f e h a v e n s f o r t e r r o r i s t s a n d i n s u r -
g e n t s . O t h e r p a s s i v e m e a s u r e s i n c l u d e e n g a g i n g i n p o l i t i c a l d i a l o g u e w i t h , a n d o f f e r i n g s u p p o r t 
f o r , m o d e r a t e s w i t h i n a n i r r e g u l a r o r g a n i z a t i o n , c o n v i n c i n g t h e m o f t h e n e e d t o s t a r t t a l k i n g 
a n d s t o p f i g h t i n g a n d c a u s i n g g r o u p s t o f r a c t u r e , s p l i n t e r , a n d p e r h a p s t u r n o n t h e m s e l v e s . 
P o l i t i c a l w i l l m u s t u n d e r l i e e f f o r t s t o c o u n t e r t e r r o r i s m a n d i n s u r g e n c y . T h e e r a d i c a t i o n o f 
a n i r r e g u l a r m o v e m e n t i s a g r a d u a l p r o c e s s o f a t t r i t i o n t h a t r e q u i r e s a s i g n i f i c a n t a n d c o n -
s i s t e n t i n v e s t m e n t i n t i m e a n d r e s o u r c e s . R a r e l y h a v e n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s b e e n a b l e t o s u s t a i n 
t h e p o l i t i c a l w i l l n e c e s s a r y t o d e f e a t i n s u r g e n t s o r t e r r o r i s t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y w h e n t h o s e l e a d e r s 
a r e i n t e r v e n i n g i n i r r e g u l a r c o n f l i c t s i n o t h e r s t a t e s . E q u a l l y d a u n t i n g i s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e 
u n d e r l y i n g c a u s e s o f d i s c o n t e n t o f t e n r e s u r f a c e a n d t h e e m b e r s o f i n s u r g e n c y a r e r e k i n d l e d 
IRREGULAR WARFARE: TERRORISM ANO INSURGENCV 
in a different form. For example, the government of the Philippines conducted a textbook 
campaign to 'defeat' a communist insurgency during the 1950s with inspired leadership and 
US assistance. Barely a decade later, another Marxist-inspired insurgency flared up. Today 
Philippine leaders continue to struggle against Marxist and Muslim separatist groups. Some 
commentators have suggested that terrorism and irregular warfare are analogous to the 
mythical hydra: cut off one head and several more appear in its place. 
The effects of terrorism can be limited through a combination of offensive and defensive 
measures, but ultimately bringing terrorists to justice, especially for crimes beyond state bor-
ders, can be accomplished by a combination o f the political will to susta in the struggle, main-
taining core societal valves and upholding norms, and making the best use of its capabilities. 
Bringing individuais to trial for actions below the threshold of 'an act of war' takes even greater 
reserves of time, patience, resolve, negotiation, and treasure. lt took the United States 12 
years and considerable third-party support, for example, to bring those allegedly responsible 
for the Lockerbie bombing to trial. In the end, the side that will prevail will be the one most 
willing to continue the struggle and make the least damaging choices throughout its course. 
Key points 
• Methods used by the state in response to local threats are aimed crucially at maintaining a lawful, 
hence political/moral, legitimacy. 
The strategy of state success is based on isolating the insurgents both physically and politically. 
The eradication of insurgents is often a slow process and w ill take different forms in different 
political and cultural contexts. 
Irregular Warfare Now and in the Future 
The supposition that terrorism and irregular warfare involve the use of force strictly for 
political ends has recently been challenged. As stated in the introduction, some suggest that 
the irregular conflict is no longer about politics. In other words, wars of national liberation, 
ideological terrorism, and revolution have joined colonial small wars in the museum of 
'conflict past.' lnstead, some suggest that contemporary and future irregular threats are 
driven by a mixture of culture, religious fanaticism, and technology. 
Culture 
Samuel Huntington famously argued in 1996 that future conflict on the macro levei will 
result from differences in culture between incompatible civilizations. Others believe that on 
a micro levei, substate warrior cultures will become the predominant irregular threat. 
Westerners fight wars according to established norms and modalities. States, which retain 
the monopoly on the use of force, go to war with one another to achieve political aims. 
Examples from Chechnya, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as in 
Afghanistan and lraq, suggest a new form of irregular warfare is emerging. In this 'fourth 
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g e n e r a t i o n w a r f a r e ( 4 G W ) , ' n e t w o r k s o f w a r r i o r s w i l l u t i l i z e t h e i r s o c i a l a n d c u l t u r e a d v a n t a g e s 
t o o f f s e t t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n t a g e s o f W e s t e r n s o l d i e r s ( H a m m e s 2 0 0 4 ) . A c c o r d i n g t o