SCHWELLER, Randall Bandwagoning for profit bringing the revisionist state ack in

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Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In
Author(s): Randall L. Schweller
Source: International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer, 1994), pp. 72-107
Published by: The MIT Press
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Bandwagoning Randall L. Schweller 
for Profit 
Bringing the Revisionist State Back In 
Do states ally more 
often with the weaker or with the stronger side in a conflict? In the parlance 
of international relations theory: do states tend to balance against or band- 
wagon with a rising state or coalition? The answer to this question is critical 
to the formulation of grand strategy and the definition of vital interests. If 
states resist the gains of their neighbors by drawing together to redress the 
balance, then conquest does not pay' and interventions to defend far-flung 
commitments are not only unnecessary, but often counterproductive in caus- 
ing local states to unite against the meddling great power and its protege. 
Conversely, if states gravitate to expanding power, then bandwagons will 
roll, dominoes will fall, and great powers will find it wise, even at the cost 
of blood and treasure, to defend remote areas of little or no intrinsic value 
to their national interests.2 
While international relations scholars have traditionally accepted the view 
that states balance against threatening increases of power, paradoxically, 
practitioners through the ages have held a bandwagoning image of interna- 
tional politics. As Jack Snyder remarks, "most imperial strategists defending 
far-flung commitments have feared falling dominoes, and most rising chal- 
Randall L. Schweller is a John M. Olin Post-Doctoral Fellow in National Security at the Center for 
International Affairs, Harvard University. In August 1994 he will join the faculty of the Department of 
Political Science at The Ohio State University. 
The author is grateful to Richard Betts, Marc Busch, Thomas Christensen, Dale Copeland, 
Michael Desch, Richard Herrmann, Robert Jervis, Ethan Kapstein, James McAllister, Gideon 
Rose, David Schweller, Jack Snyder, Kimberly Marten Zisk, and the members of the Olin 
National Security Group at Harvard's CFIA for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay. 
1. A leading proponent of the "balancing predominates" view, Kenneth N. Waltz, remarks: "In 
international politics, success leads to failure. The excessive accumulation of power by one state 
or coalition of states elicits the opposition of others." Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist 
Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major 
Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 49. 
2. The bandwagoning image of international politics pictures the global order as a complex 
machine of wheels within wheels. In this highly interconnected world, small local disruptions 
quickly grow into large disturbances as their effects cascade and reverberate throughout the 
system. In contrast, the balancing image sees a world composed of many discrete, self-regulating 
balance-of-power systems. Because balancing is the prevailing tendency among states, prudent 
powers should limit their commitments to places where their core interests are at stake. 
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107 
?D 1994 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
72 
Bandwagoning for Profit | 73 
lengers have anticipated bandwagon effects."3 Dean Acheson, for example, 
expressed the bandwagoning image that underlay American containment 
strategy, warning the U.S. cabinet in 1947 that, "if Greece fell within the 
Russian orbit, not only Turkey would be affected but also Italy, France, and 
the whole of Western Europe."4 Similarly, in 1635, the count-duke of Olivares 
predicted that, in the coming war with France, small losses for Spain would 
lead to more far-ranging ones: "The first and most fundamental dangers 
threaten Milan, Flanders and Germany. Any blow against these would be 
fatal to this monarchy; and if any one of them were to go, the rest of the 
monarchy would follow, for Germany would be followed by Italy and Flan- 
ders, Flanders by the Indies, and Milan by Naples and Sicily."5 
The bandwagoning belief that "nothing succeeds like success" in war has 
been at the heart of every bid for world mastery. Napoleon asserted: "My 
power depends on my glory and my glories on the victories I have won. My 
power will fail if I do not feed it on new glories and new victories. Conquest 
has made me what I am, and only conquest can enable me to hold my 
position."6 Likewise, Hitler declared: "We shall yet have to engage in many 
fights, but these will undoubtedly lead to magnificent victories. Thereafter 
the way to world domination is practically certain."7 
3. Jack Snyder, "Introduction," to Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: 
Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), p. 3. 
4. Quoted in Deborah Welch Larson, "Bandwagoning Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth 
or Reality?" in ibid., p. 95. 
5. Quoted in J.H. Elliott, "Managing Decline: Olivares and the Grand Strategy of Imperial 
Spain," in Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 1991), p. 97. 
6. Quoted in Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 133. Napoleon often spoke in 
terms of bandwagoning dynamics. In 1794, he said: "It is necessary to overwhelm Germany; 
that done, Spain and Italy fall of themselves"; in 1797: "Let us concentrate all our activity on 
the side of the navy, and destroy England; this done, Europe is at our feet"; and in 1811, "In 
five years, I shall be the master of the world; there only remains Russia, but I shall crush it." 
Quoted in R.B. Mowat, The Diplomacy of Napoleon (New York: Russell & Russell, [1924] 1971), 
pp. 22, 53, 243. Not all French strategists of the period viewed the world in these terms, 
however. After his remarkable victory over the First Coalition in 1794, Carnot feared that France 
might become drunk with victory: "The rapidity of our military successes . . . do not permit us 
to doubt that we could . . . reunite to France all the ancient territory of the Gauls. But however 
seductive this system may be, it will be found perhaps that it is wise to renounce it, and that 
France would only enfeeble herself and prepare an interminable warby aggrandizement of this 
kind." Quoted in ibid., p. 11. 
7. Adolf Hitler in a speech to Gauleiters on May 8, 1943. Quoted in J. Noakes and G. Pridham, 
eds., Nazism, 1919-1945: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, Vol. II: Foreign Policy, 
War and Racial Extermination (New York: Schocken Books, 1988), p. 857. 
International Security 19:1 | 74 
Recently, the issue of how states choose sides in a conflict has sparked a 
rich and somewhat heated theoretical debate. The view that "balancing pre- 
dominates" has been most forcefully articulated by Stephen Walt.8 Offering 
balance-of-threat theory to explain the causes of alignment, Walt claims that 
under most conditions balancing is far more common than bandwagoning. 
Some of his critics, however, point to numerous historical examples of band- 
wagoning and claim that balancing is the exception, not the rule.9 Others 
argue that Walt's theory downplays the importance of domestic factors in 
alliance decisions. They suggest that illegitimate elites and states that are 
weak vis-a-vis their societies bandwagon more often than balance-of-threat 
theory predicts.10 
In this article, I argue that all sides in the debate have mistakenly assumed 
that bandwagoning and balancing are opposite behaviors motivated by the 
same goal: to achieve greater security. As a result, the concept of band- 
wagoning has been defined too narrowly-as giving in to threats-as if it 
were simply the opposite of balancing. In practice, however, states have very 
different reasons to choose balancing or bandwagoning. The aim of balancing 
is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, while the 
goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted. 
Simply put, balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning 
by the opportunity for gain.11 The presence of a significant external threat, 
while required for effective balancing, is unnecessary for states to band- 
wagon. 
8. For his most comprehensive statement on the subject, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of 
Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
9. See Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Eu- 
rope," Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 417-447; and Paul W. Schroeder, "Neo- 
Realist Theory and International History: An Historian's View," paper presented at the War and 
Peace Institute, Columbia University, June 11, 1993. 
10. The domestic-sources school of alliance formation includes Deborah Welch Larson, Stephen 
R. David, and Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett. See Larson, "Bandwagoning Images in 
American Foreign Policy," pp. 85-111; Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," 
World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 233-256; David, "Why the Third World Still 
Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 127-159; David, Choosing 
Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1991); and Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett, "Alliance Formation, Domestic Political 
Economy, and Third World Security," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14, No. 
4 (December 1992), pp. 19-40; Levy and Barnett, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: 
The Case of Egypt, 1962-1973," International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 369- 
395. 
11. As will be discussed, when its purpose is profit and not security, bandwagoning is the 
opposite of defensive buck-passing, not of balancing. We might call this type of bandwagoning 
"predatory buck-passing": riding free on the offensive efforts of others to gain unearned spoils. 
Bandwagoning for Profit | 75 
I adopt a different definition of bandwagoning-one that accords with 
common usage of the term-and argue that it is far more widespread than 
Walt suggests. To see this, however, we must focus on two factors that have 
been overlooked: the opportunistic aspect of bandwagoning, and the alliance 
choices of states that pose threats as well as those of states that respond to 
threats. In short, the theoretical literature on alliances must bring the revi- 
sionist state back in. 
The article begins by outlining the various positions in the "balancing 
versus bandwagoning" debate. In the next section, I offer a different critique 
of balance-of-threat theory that centers on Walt's definition of bandwagoning 
and the limitations of his theory as an explanation of alliances. This is 
followed by a discussion of rewards and bandwagoning, which underscores 
the opportunistic aspect of bandwagoning that has gone overlooked. Next, 
I examine the various reasons why states bandwagon other than as a form 
of appeasement. Finally, I propose an alternative theory of alliances based 
on the political goals of states. 
Balance-of-Threat Theory and Its Critics 
In The Origins of Alliances and several other works,12 Stephen Walt offers a 
refinement of balance-of-power theory, called balance-of-threat theory. Like 
structural balance-of-power theorists, Walt concludes that states usually bal- 
ance and rarely bandwagon; unlike them, however, he argues that states do 
not align solely or even primarily in response to the distribution of capabil- 
ities. States' alliance choices are driven instead, Walt argues, by imbalances 
of threat, when one state or coalition is especially dangerous.13 The level of 
threat that a state poses to others is the product of its aggregate power, 
geographic proximity, offensive capability, and the perceived aggressiveness 
of its intentions. 
12. See Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International 
Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 3-43; Walt, "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: 
The Case of Southwest Asia," International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 275- 
316; Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," International 
Security, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), pp. 5-49; Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: 
Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition," in Jervis and Snyder, Dominoes and 
Bandwagons, pp. 51-84; Walt, "Alliances, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman 
and Labs," Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 448-482. 
13. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 265; Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia," p. 54. 
International Security 19:1 | 76 
Walt claims that his theory "improves on traditional balance of power 
theory by providing greater explanatory power with equal parsimony."'14 
Because aggregate power is only one of several components defining a threat, 
Walt's theory explains, inter alia, the formation of overlarge winning coalitions 
in World Wars I and II, and "alliance choices when a state's potential allies 
are roughly equal in power. In such circumstances, a state will ally with the 
side it believes is least dangerous."'15 
Walt's theory is an impressive and convincing amendment of traditional 
balance-of-power theory. Walt builds on existing theory in a critical and 
constructive way, and he presents a clear and compelling set of ideas backed 
by a comprehensive survey of alliance formation in several regional universes 
of cases. While the evidence appears to support Walt's central claims, how- 
ever, his theory has not been without its critics. 
THE CHALLENGERS: THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF ALLIANCES 
Robert Kaufman argues that democracies do not behave as balance-of-threat 
theory predicts because various domestic constraints imposed by the demo- 
cratic process delay balancing behavior and dilute its effectiveness.16 As 
evidence, Kaufman points to the appeasement policies and the slow pace of 
balancing by the Western democracies in response to Hitler, who, he asserts, 
"gave ample warning thathe would lead a powerful, extremely dissatisfied 
Germany ... down a path ... that made conflict with other states inevitable." 
Given the clear danger presented by Nazi Germany, Europe during the 1930s 
is an "easy case" for Walt's theory; yet, Kaufman claims, it fails the test.17 
Deborah Larson's central charge against Walt's theory is that it cannot 
explain why similarly situated states behave in opposite ways and contrary 
to the theory's predictions, i.e., why strong states sometimes bandwagon 
14. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 263. 
15. Ibid., p. 264. This is a somewhat curious claim, however, since balance-of-power theory 
already has a commonly known phrase for this situation, called "holding the balance." When a 
state occupies this enviable position, it can play the role of balancer or that of kingmaker. As 
balancer, it seeks to preserve a stalemate between the two rivals. As kingmaker, it sells its 
services to the highest bidder. The motto of the kingmaker is: "Cui adhaereo prae est," translated 
as "the one that I join is the one which will turn the scales" or "the party to which I adhere 
getteth the upper hand." See Herbert Butterfield, "The Balance of Power," p. 138; and Martin 
Wight, "The Balance of Power," p. 159; both in Butterfield and Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investi- 
gations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1966). 
16. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon?" pp. 423, 436, 438. 
17. Ibid., pp. 419-420. 
Bandwagoning for Profit | 77 
and weak states sometimes balance.18 To explain these empirical anomalies, 
Larson offers an institutionalist approach that measures state strength by the 
nature of its state-society relations.19 Positing that elites' primary concern is 
to preserve their rule, Larson concludes that bandwagoning can help a weak 
regime retain authority by ending external subversion, undermining domes- 
tic rivals, and providing economic assistance and "an aura of invincibility by 
association with the great power's victories."20 
Steven David argues that realism's state-centric perspective ignores the 
"often fatal nature of the international and domestic political environment that 
characterizes the Third World. "21 To explain Third World alliances, David 
introduces the concept of omnibalancing, so-called because it "incorporates 
the need of leaders to appease secondary adversaries, as well as to balance 
against both internal and external threats in order to survive in power. "22 
Like Larson, David suggests that fragile Third World elites often bandwagon 
with hostile powers to balance more dangerous domestic or foreign threats.23 
Similarly, Jack Levy and Michael Barnett maintain that realism is "relatively 
silent concerning Third World alliances in general or how state-society rela- 
tions in particular might give rise to distinctive patterns of alignment behav- 
ior. "24 Stressing the resource-providing function of alliances and the impact 
of the domestic political economy on Third World alignments,25 they conclude 
that Third World leaders form alliances "to secure urgently needed economic 
and military resources to promote domestic goals, respond to external and 
internal security threats, and consolidate their domestic political positions."26 
Despite these attempts to discredit balance-of-threat theory's explanation 
of alliance formation, Walt has been able to respond effectively for several 
18. Larson, "Bandwagoning Images." 
19. Specifically, Larson measures the strength of a state not only by its size and capabilities but 
also by its level of institutional identity and elite legitimacy. 
20. Ibid., p. 103. For a similar argument, see J.W. Burton, International Relations: A General Theory 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 173-185. 
21. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," p. 235. See also David, "Why the Third World 
Still Matters;" David, Choosing Sides. 
22. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," p. 236. 
23. David asserts, "Third World leaders will bandwagon to a superpower threatening them in 
order to balance against the principal threats" being backed by that superpower. David, Choosing 
Sides, p. 25. But he claims that Egypt's realignment with the United States and Ethiopia's 
realignment with the Soviet Union during the 1970s are examples of omnibalancing rather than 
bandwagoning, because neither state appeased its primary threat. Ibid., pp. 184, 186. 
24. Levy and Barnett, "Alliance Formation," p. 22. See also Levy and Barnett, "Domestic Sources 
of Alliances and Alignments." 
25. Levy and Barnett, "Alliance Formation," p. 23. 
26. Ibid., p. 35. 
International Security 19:1 | 78 
reasons. First, his theory predicts most of the cases of bandwagoning that 
his critics attribute to domestic sources. According to the measures of power 
described by both Walt and Kenneth Waltz,27 states with illegitimate leaders, 
weak governmental institutions, and/or little ability to mobilize economic 
resources are weak states that are likely to bandwagon anyway.28 As for 
Kaufman's claim that democracies tend to bandwagon and cannot balance 
as effectively as balance-of-threat theory predicts, Walt convincingly refutes 
this argument by pointing out the ambiguity of Hitler's intentions prior to 
Munich and the vigorous democratic response after March 1939.29 
Second, the claim that fragile elites often bandwagon with secondary ad- 
versaries to counter their principal domestic threats is consistent with Walt's 
general argument that states balance against the most dangerous threat to 
their survival.30 Third, Walt has an advantage in the debate because no one 
else has undertaken as extensive a survey of alliance formation in the Middle 
East and Southwest Asia, both Third World regions. This undercuts the claim 
by Walt's critics that realist theory cannot explain and is "relatively silent 
concerning" Third World alliances. As for the "resource-providing" function 
of alliances raised by Levy and Barnett, Walt indeed tests the hypothesis that 
"states select alliance partners in order to obtain side payments of material 
assistance, such as economic or military aid,"'31 and finds little support for 
it.32 Finally, Walt's critics have not proposed a comprehensive alternative 
theory to challenge balance-of-threat theory. Thus it holds up fairly well as 
an explanation of alliance choices. 
27. Waltz lists economic capability and political stability and competence as measures of state 
capabilities. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 
1979), p. 131. Walt defines power as the product of several different components, including 
economic capability and political cohesion. In his discussion of Soviet penetration of South 
Yemen in the mid-1970s, Walt also cites the lack of established government institutions as a 
source of state weakness. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 250, 265. 
28. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 29-31, 263. Similarly, Waltz writes: "The power of the 
strong may deter the weak from asserting their claims, not because the weak recognize a kind 
of rightfulness of rule on the part of the strong, but simply because it is not sensible to tangle 
with them." Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 113. 
29. See Walt, "Alliance, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy," pp. 449-469. 
30. For instance, David suggests that omnibalancing theory "explains why what is thought to 
be bandwagoning is really consistent with balancing behavior (albeit against internal threats)." 
David, Choosing Sides, p. 191. 
31. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 218. For Walt's test of this hypothesis, see ibid., pp. 219- 
242. 
32. Walt's analysis of superpower foreign aid to the Middle East throughout the Cold War 
"suggests that, by itself, economic and military assistance has relativelylittle impact on alliance 
choices." Ibid., p. 241. 
Bandwagoning for Profit | 79 
Walt has so far won the debate because his critics, with the exception of 
Levy and Barnett, have accepted his premise that alliance choices are best 
examined as a response to threat, though some have broadened the focus to 
include internal as well as external threats. Consequently, the "domestic 
sources" challengers have not questioned Walt's definition of bandwagoning 
as giving in to the most menacing threat. 
I argue instead that the central premise of balance-of-threat theory stacks 
the deck in favor of disproportionately finding balancing over bandwagoning 
behavior. Defining bandwagoning as a form of capitulation, and thus ex- 
amining only those alliances formed as a response to significant external 
threats, Walt not surprisingly finds that balancing is more common than 
bandwagoning. This is especially true among strong states, when credible 
allies are available, and in wartime prior to its becoming a "mopping-up" 
operation.33 
Alliance choices, however, are often motivated by opportunities for gain 
as well as danger, by appetite as well as fear. Balance-of-threat theory is 
designed to consider only cases in which the goal of alignment is security, 
and so it systematically excludes alliances driven by profit. Yet, as Walt 
himself claims, one of the primary motivations for bandwagoning is to share 
in the spoils of victory. When profit rather than security drives alliance 
choices, there is no reason to expect that states will be threatened or cajoled 
to climb aboard the bandwagon; they do so willingly. The bandwagon gains 
momentum through the promise of rewards, not the threat of punishment. 
Thus, we will not observe cases of bandwagoning for profit by examining 
alliances as a response to threats. We must look instead at alliance choices 
made in the expectation of gain, unfettered by a desire for greater security. 
Bandwagoning in Balance-of-Threat Theory 
There are several problems with Walt's definition of bandwagoning: it departs 
from conventional usage; it excludes common forms of bandwagoning for 
profit rather than security; and it reflects a status-quo bias. His conclusion 
that balancing is more common than bandwagoning is therefore somewhat 
misleading. 
33. The absence of any one of these three conditions "may increase somewhat the likelihood of 
bandwagoning." Walt, "Alliance, Threats, and U.S. Grand Strategy," pp. 450-451; Walt, The 
Origins of Alliances, pp. 29-31. 
International Security 19:1 | 80 
CONVENTIONAL USAGE 
The term "bandwagoning" as a description of international alliance behavior 
first appeared in Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics.3 In his struc- 
tural model of balance-of-power theory, Waltz uses "bandwagoning" to serve 
as the opposite of balancing: bandwagoning refers to joining the stronger 
coalition, balancing means allying with the weaker side.35 
Walt re-defines these terms to suit balance-of-threat theory: "When con- 
fronted by a significant external threat, states may either balance or band- 
wagon. Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing 
threat; bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger."36 By 
these definitions, Walt, like Waltz before him, intends to place the concepts 
of balancing and bandwagoning in polar opposition: bandwagoning is meant 
to serve as the opposite of balancing. Without exception, the literature on 
alliance behavior in international relations theory has accepted Walt's defi- 
nition of bandwagoning as aligning with the most menacing threat to a state's 
independence.3 
In a later work, Walt fleshes out his definition of bandwagoning: 
Bandwagoning involves unequal exchange; the vulnerable state makes asym- 
metrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate 
role. . . . Bandwagoning is an accommodation to pressure (either latent or 
manifest). . . . Most important of all, bandwagoning suggests a willingness 
to support or tolerate illegitimate actions by the dominant ally.38 
34. Waltz credits the term to Stephen Van Evera. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 126. 
Arnold Wolfers earlier mentioned the term "bandwagoning" to mean the opposite of balancing, 
but only in a passing reference. Arnold Wolfers, "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," 
in Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 124. 
35. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 126. 
36. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 17. See also Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of 
World Power," p. 4. 
37. Walt's definition of bandwagoning is used by all of the authors in Jervis and Snyder, 
Dominoes and Bandwagons. Likewise, Eric J. Labs, Robert G. Kaufman, and Stephen M. Walt 
define bandwagoning as aligning with the source of danger in their essays for "Balancing vs. 
Bandwagoning: A Debate," Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992). Stephen Van Evera also 
defines balancing as aligning against the the greatest threat to a state's independence, while 
bandwagoning means "to give in to threats." See Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe 
After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), p. 20. 
38. Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia", p. 55. In a later passage (on p. 75), however, 
Walt seems to contradict himself when he states that dominoes may fall because, among other 
reasons, "one side's victories convince other states to shift their alignment to the winning side 
voluntarily. Strictly speaking, only the last variant should be viewed as bandwagoning" (emphasis 
added). 
Bandwagoning for Profit | 81 
One of several criteria for selecting a taxonomy is the "avoidance of un- 
necessary departures from common usage."39 In borrowing the terms "bal- 
ancing" and "bandwagoning" from balance-of-power theory, Walt wants to 
retain the original idea that "bandwagoning" should serve as the opposite 
of "balancing." But in so doing, he violates the rule of common usage with 
respect to the concept of bandwagoning.40 
Conventional usage defines a bandwagon as a candidate, side, or move- 
ment that attracts adherents or amasses power by its momentum. The phrase 
"to climb aboard the bandwagon" implies following a current or fashionable 
trend or joining the side that appears likely to win. Bandwagoning may be 
freely chosen, or it can be the result of resignation to an inexorable force. By 
this standard, balance-of-power theory's definition of bandwagoning as 
"joining the stronger coalition" is faithful to common usage. Balance-of-threat 
theory's definition as "aligning with the source of danger" or "giving in to 
threats" only encompasses the coercive or compulsory aspect of the concept 
captured by the phrase: "If you can't beat 'em, join 'em." 
In fact, the behavior Walt defines as bandwagoning comes very close to 
the concept of capitulation, defined as "the act of surrendering or of yielding 
(as to a dominant influence)."'41 In keeping with ordinary language, band- 
wagoning should not assume involuntary support gained through coercion, 
which is instead capitulation. This distinction is not simply a matter of 
semantic taste. To see why, we must examine the motives Walt ascribes to 
bandwagoning: 
What is the logic behind the bandwagoning hypothesis? Two distinct motives 
can be identified. First, bandwagoning may be adopted as a form of appease- 
ment. By aligning with the threatening state or coalition, the bandwagoner 
may hope to avoid an attack on himself by diverting it elsewhere. Second, a 
state may align with the dominant side in war in order to share the spoils of 
victory. Mussolini's declaration of war on France and Russia's entry into the 
war against Japan in 1945illustrate this type of bandwagoning, as do Italian 
and Rumanian alliance choices in World War I. By joining what they believed 
39. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 
p. 12. 
40. For a discussion of "ordinary language" and conceptual definitions, see Felix E. Oppenheim, 
"The Language of Political Inquiry: Problems of Clarification," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson 
W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 1: Political Science: Scope and Theory (Reading, 
Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 283-335, especially, pp. 307-309. See also Baldwin, Economic 
Statecraft, chap. 3. 
41. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, 1986), p. 204. 
International Security 19:1 f 82 
was the stronger side, each hoped to make territorial gains at the end of the 
fighting.42 
Walt correctly points out that states bandwagon both out of fear of being 
despoiled and out of the desire to despoil others. But both motives for 
bandwagoning may be present even when there is no imbalance of threat, 
that is, when neither side is perceived as significantly more dangerous than 
the other. 
Consider Walt's first motive for bandwagoning: to avoid attack.43 For him, 
this means appeasing the most dangerous side. This need not be the case, 
however. Suppose war is coming, and a state caught in the crossfire must 
choose sides, but there is no imbalance of threat. Seeking shelter from the 
storm, the state may align with the stronger coalition because there is safety 
in numbers and its survival depends on its being on the winning side. Here, 
the source of greatest danger to the state does not come from one side or 
the other but from the consequences of being on the losing side, whichever 
that may be.44 Thus power, not threat, drives the state's choice. 
Walt's second motive for bandwagoning-to share the spoils of victory- 
is certainly correct, but it is not consistent with his claim that "balancing and 
bandwagoning are more accurately viewed as a response to threats" rather 
than power imbalances.45 Security from Germany was not the primary mo- 
tivation for Italy's declaration of war against France in 1940, or Japan's 
decision to bandwagon with the Axis later in the year. Similarly, Stalin's 
eagerness to fight Japan in 1945 was driven more by the prospect of gaining 
unearned spoils than a desire for greater security from the United States or 
Japan. The opportunistic aspect of bandwagoning is especially important for 
42. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," pp. 7-8. 
43. When the goal is to divert attack, bandwagoning is virtually indistinguishable from buck- 
passing behavior. Consider, for instance, the Nazi-Soviet pact. Were the Soviets bandwagoning 
to divert attack or passing the balancing buck to France and Britain? Are not these goals one 
and the same? 
44. The Italians employed this strategy to survive the initial stage of the War of the Spanish 
Succession. Emperor Leopold of Austria opened the hostilities against the Franco-Spanish forces 
by attacking Italy, which he believed had been loyal to the Spanish regime of Louis XIV's 
grandson King Philip V, the seventeen-year-old Duke of Anjou. In truth, the "people of Italy 
had no particular love for either Bourbon or Hapsburg; they only wanted to be on the winning 
side." Thus, when the Imperial army led by Prince Eugene of Savoy smashed Louis's forces 
under the command of General Villeroi at Chiari, Italy jumped on the Austrian bandwagon. 
Bitter over the pro-Imperial behavior of the Italians, Louis wrote: "You should be cautious and 
risk nothing with people who know how to profit by everything and who entrench themselves 
before you." John B. Wolf, Louis XIV (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), pp. 516 and 518. 
45. Walt, "Alliance Formation," p. 9. 
Bandwagoning for Profit | 83 
assessing the alliance choices of revisionist states. Walt identifies this motive 
but then overlooks it because the logic of his theory forces him to conflate 
the various forms of bandwagoning into one category: giving in to threats. 
CASE SELECTION 
To determine whether balancing or bandwagoning is the dominant tendency, 
Walt considers only cases involving a significant external threat.46 Walt's 
causal scheme for alliance behavior may be diagrammed as in Table 1. 
Holding constant the initial condition of a clear external threat in selecting 
his cases,47 Walt finds strong evidence that balancing is the preferred re- 
sponse. But the theory thus only tests for balancing and appeasement-type 
bandwagoning among threatened states, while it ignores the behavior of 
unthreatened states that align for reasons other than security and that present 
the threats that drive Walt's theory. In short, Walt does not offer a theory of 
alliances so much as a theory of how states respond to external threats. 
The hard case for confirming the balancing hypothesis is a situation in 
which a state is not directly menaced by a predatory state but decides to 
balance against it anyway to protect its long-term security interests. In Walt's 
words, "when examining the historical record, we should focus not only on 
what states did, but even more important, on what they preferred to do. "48 
But his cases are not designed to do this. 
When confronted by a dire and unmistakable threat to national survival, 
statesmen "can be said to act under external compulsion rather than 
Table 1. Walt's Causal Scheme for Alliance Behavior. 
Causal Variable Dependent Variable 
Significant External Threat (initial Balancing or Bandwagoning 
condition held constant) > (hypothesized behavior) 
46. Each of the states in the two regions he examines, the Middle East and Southwest Asia 
since World War II, have at all times confronted external threats. 
47. The level of threat does vary in the cases Walt considers. But when the state in question 
does not perceive a significant external threat, it cannot engage in either balancing or bandwag- 
oning, since, by Walt's own definitions, both behaviors are responses to the most dangerous 
threat to the state's survival. For this reason, cases that do not involve significant external threats 
cannot be used to test for balancing versus bandwagoning behavior, as Walt defines these terms. 
48. Ibid., p. 55. 
International Security 19:1 f 84 
in accordance with their preferences."49 This is the logic behind Arnold 
Wolfers's well-known metaphor of a house on fire: With rare exceptions, we 
expect individuals inside a burning house to feel an irresistible compulsion 
to run toward the exits.50 Similarly, when statesmen are confronted by a 
dangerous imbalance of threat, we would expect them to "rush to enhance 
or maximize national power,"51 especially under the conditions that Walt 
identifies as most favorable for balancing: when the threatened state is strong 
enough to affect the balance of power, allies are available, and the outcome 
of the war remains in doubt. 
The problem is that the security literature has tended to overgeneralize 
Walt's findings by not specifying the conditions required for his theory to 
operate.52 Thus, it is commonly asserted, without supporting evidence, that 
"balancing behavior is the prevalent tendency of states. 53 Walt himself de- 
clares, "as I have argued at length elsewhere, balancing behavior predomi- 
nates in international politics.... These results expose the poverty of much 
of the justification for U.S. foreign policy since World War II."54 Similarly, 
Stephen Van Evera claims that bandwagoning is a "rare event" and "history 
indicates that such cases are the exception, not the rule."55 Yet Van Evera's 
own argument in support of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf deployment rests 
almost entirely on bandwagoning logic: 
Had Iraq gone unchecked, its seizure ofKuwait might have foreshadowed 
its seizure of the rest of the Arab Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman).... Syria, Jordan, Yemen, and Leba- 
non would then be vastly outmatched by Iraqi power, and might succumb 
to it.56 
49. Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," in Discord and Collaboration, p. 13. 
50. Ibid., pp. 13-16. 
51. Ibid., p. 14. 
52. For instance, Eric Labs defines bandwagoning as giving into threats and admits without 
explanation that he does not consider cases of "bandwagoning to share in the spoils of conquest." 
Labs, "Do Weak States Bandwagon?" Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992), p. 409. 
Consequently, Labs's claim that bandwagoning places last among small states' choices is mis- 
leading. He arrives at this conclusion by substituting "capitulation" for "bandwagoning" and 
by focusing on the alliance choices of only small states seeking to maintain what they have, 
excluding unthreatened, small states with irredenta that choose to align for profit. 
53. Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," p. 36. 
54. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment," p. 35. 
55. Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," pp. 36-37. Also see Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive 
and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), 
p. 62. 
56. Stephen Van Evera, "American Intervention in the Third World: Less Would Be Better," 
Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Autumn 1991), pp. 12 and 14. 
Bandwagoning for Profit | 85 
In another reference to bandwagoning, Van Evera says "militaries exag- 
gerate the tendency of other states to give in to threats-to 'bandwagon' 
with the threat instead of 'balancing' against it. Such myths bolster the 
military's arguments for larger forces by reinforcing claims that a bigger force 
can be used to make diplomatic gains. "57 Focusing exclusively on the threat- 
ened target of the military buildup, Van Evera does not consider how this 
signal affects other unthreatened states that may see themselves as benefi- 
ciaries of the larger military force. Historically, military buildups have some- 
times served to encourage untargeted states to bandwagon with the "bigger 
force" for profit or for protection from other more threatening states. Dissat- 
isfied states or those states that lack internal strength and stability tend to 
gravitate away from declining powers and towards a rising power.58 
THE STATUS-QUO BIAS 
At bottom, balance-of-threat theory suffers from a problem that plagues all 
contemporary realist theory: it views the world solely through the lens of a 
satisfied, status-quo state.59 Unlike traditional realists such as E.H. Carr and 
Hans Morgenthau, modern realists typically assume that states are willing 
to pay high costs and take great risks to protect the values they possess, but 
will only pay a small price and take low risks to improve their position in 
the system. Waltz writes: 
In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states 
safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power. Because power 
is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two 
57. Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," p. 20. 
58. Martin Wight, Power Politics, edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1978), p. 163. As Napoleonic France grew in power, it gained alliances with 
Spain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia; likewise, the expansion of Nazi Germany's military power 
secured for Hitler pacts with Poland, Rumania, Italy, Hungary, Japan, and Russia, among others. 
59. In contrast, postwar realists invariably distinguished two types of states: Morgenthau called 
them imperialistic and status-quo powers; Schuman employed the terms satiated and unsatiated 
powers; Kissinger referred to revolutionary and status-quo states; Carr distinguished satisfied 
from dissatisfied Powers; Johannes Mattern, among other geopoliticians, divided the world into 
"have" and "have-nots," and Wolfers referred to status-quo and revisionist states. See Hans J. 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1948), esp. chaps. 2, 3, 9, 10, and p. 156; Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics: The Destiny 
of the Western State System, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), pp. 377-380; Edward Hallett 
Carr, The Tzventy Years' Crisis: 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1946); Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich, 
and the Problem of Peace, 1812-22 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957); Johannes Mattern, Geopolitics: 
Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1942); Wolfers, "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," pp. 125-126. 
International Security 19:1 f 86 
coalitions. . . . If states wished to maximize power, they would join the 
stronger side . . . this does not happen because balancing, not bandwagon- 
ing, is the behavior induced by the system. The first concern of states is not 
to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.60 
Waltz is right to say that states seeking to maximize their power will 
bandwagon, not balance. But it is simply not true that the first concern of all 
states is security.61 Here, he takes a distinctly status-quo perspective.62 Only 
in reference to satisfied countries can it be said that the primary goal is "to 
maintain their positions in the system."63 In contrast, classical realists de- 
scribed the "true interests" of states as "a continuous striving for greater 
power and expansion." For them, the goal of diplomacy was "to evaluate 
60. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 126. 
61. In this regard, Joseph M. Grieco has coined the term "defensive positionality," which 
essentially posits that the primary goal of states is to prevent relative losses. He argues that "it 
is a defensively positional concern that partners might do better-not an offensively oriented 
interest in doing better oneself-that drives the relative-gains problem for cooperation." Grieco, 
"The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), p. 742 (emphasis in original). See also Grieco, Cooperation 
Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1990); and Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the 
Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), p. 498. 
Similarly, Robert Gilpin says international competition "stimulates, and may compel, a state to 
increase its power; at the least, it necessitates that the prudent state prevent relative increase in 
the powers of competitor states." Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), pp. 87-88. 
62. For a more recent example of neorealism's status-quo bias, see Thomas J. Christensen and 
Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," 
International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168. By combining two "top- 
shelf" realist theories, Christensen and Snyder purport to explain alliance patterns in Europe 
prior to World Wars I and II. Absent from their discussion, however, are the alliance choices of 
the members of the revisionist coalitions: Austria-Hungary and Turkey prior to World War I, 
and Italy and Japan prior to World War II. Moreover, they examine Hitler's strategy of piecemeal 
aggression but do not mention Germany's alliance choices. 
63. Waltz admits that states may seek profit and power, but he says that they must pursue 
them "safely" and only "if survival is assured." This view of state preferences is aptly describedby Arthur Stein: "States that place preeminent weight on security and do not gamble with it 
regardless of temptation to do so may, for example, act to maximize assured security rather 
than expected payoffs. Such states would undertake attractive gambles only when assured of 
survival." Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 90. In rational-choice terminology, this is known 
as lexicographic preferences: actors have a hierarchy of objectives and maximize in sequence 
rather than making trade-offs. See Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., "Balance of Power and the Mainte- 
nance of 'Balance': A Rational-Choice Model With Lexical Preferences," in Dina A. Zinnes and 
John V. Gillespie, eds., Mathematical Models in International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1976), 
pp. 318-332. 
Bandwagoning for Profit | 87 
correctly the interplay of opposing forces and interests and to create a con- 
stellation favorable to conquest and expansion."64 
This aside, preventing relative losses in power and prestige is sound advice 
for satisfied states that seek, above all, to keep what they have. But staying 
in place is not the primary goal of revisionist states. They want to increase, 
not just preserve, their core values and to improve their position in the 
system. These goals cannot be achieved simply by ensuring that everyone 
else does not gain relative to them. They must gain relative to others. Arnold 
Wolfers recognized this when he wrote: "[Revisionist states] can accept bal- 
anced power only with utter resignation since they know that only in quite 
exceptional cases can the established order be seriously modified without 
the threat of force so preponderant that it will overcome the resistance of 
the opposing side."65 
Calling for a "new order," dissatisfied states are attracted to expanding 
revisionist powers. Waltz overlooks such states when he asserts: "Secondary 
states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger 
side that threatens them. On the weaker side they are both more appreciated 
and safer."66 That states are safer on the weaker side is a curious claim. Are 
they also more appreciated by the weaker side? Consider, for instance, the 
case of Italy in 1936. Mussolini believed that he would be more appreciated 
and politically autonomous as Hitler's satellite than as a member of the 
weaker Anglo-French coalition. Unlike Britain and France, Nazi Germany 
supported Mussolini's goal of turning the Mediterranean into an "Italian 
Lake."67 Moreover, Mussolini's decision to hitch Italy's wagon to the rising 
64. Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 95-96. Of contemporary realists, Fareed Zakaria, Samuel 
P. Huntington, and John J. Mearsheimer come closest in their views of state interest to that of 
eighteenth-century power politics. See Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review 
Essay," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 177-198; Huntington, "Why 
International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83; 
and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International 
Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 12. 
65. Wolfers, "The Balance of Power," p. 126. 
66. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 127. I am grateful to Michael Desch for drawing my 
attention to this point. For more on balancing behavior and the goal of autonomy, see Barry R. 
Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 17; Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military 
Power," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 82; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging 
Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 74. 
67. "Any future modifications of the Mediterranean balance of power," Hitler told Ciano in 
International Security 19:1 | 88 
Nazi star was motivated by his raw Social-Darwinist predilections. As Alan 
Cassels asserts, "Fascists worshipped strength, and what Mussolini called a 
fascist foreign policy meant in effect siding with the strongest power."68 
In the end, Italy paid a high price for siding with Germany. This did not 
prove to be the safer choice, but it was not because Italy joined the stronger 
coalition, as Waltz's logic would have us believe. To the contrary, Italy was 
crushed because, after the United States actively entered the war, it was on 
the weaker side. 
The general point is that most states, even of the Great-Power variety, 
must ultimately serve someone; only top dogs can expect otherwise. And 
because members of military alliances always sacrifice some foreign-policy 
autonomy, the most important determinant of alignment decisions is the 
compatibility of political goals, not imbalances of power or threat.69 Satisfied 
powers will join the status-quo coalition, even when it is the stronger side; 
dissatisfied powers, motivated by profit more than security, will bandwagon 
with an ascending revisionist state. 
Bandwagoning for Rewards 
As mentioned, Walt associates bandwagoning with giving in to threats, 
unequal exchange favoring the dominant power, acceptance of illegitimate 
actions by the stronger ally, and involuntary compliance. This view of the 
concept illustrates the tendency among political scientists to ignore the role 
of positive inducements in the exercise of power. Yet, positive sanctions are 
the most effective means to induce bandwagoning behavior. States, like 
delegates at party conventions, are lured to the winning side by the promise 
1936, "must be in Italy's favour." Count Galeazzo Ciano, Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, edited by 
Malcolm Muggeridge (London: Odhams Press, 1948), p. 57. 
68. Alan Cassels, "Switching Partners: Italy in A.J.P. Taylor's Origins of the Second World War," 
in Gordon Martel, ed., "The Origins of the Seconid World War" Reconsidered: The A.J.P. Taylor Debate 
After Twenty-Five Years (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 82. 
69. For example, in 1940, the British ambassador, Sir Stafford Cripps, was sent to Moscow to 
persuade Stalin that German expansion in Western Europe endangered Russia as well as Britain. 
"'Therefore both countries,' he argued, 'ought to agree on a common policy of self-protection 
against Germany and on the re-establishment of the European balance of power.' Stalin replied 
that he did not see any danger of Europe being engulfed by Germany. 'The so-called European 
balance of power,' he said, 'had hitherto oppressed not only Germany but also the Soviet Union. 
Therefore the Soviet Union would take all measures to prevent the re-establishment of the old 
balance of power in Europe."' Wight, "The Balance of Power," p. 155. 
Bandwagoning for Profit | 89 
of future rewards.70 By contrast, relying on force to coerce states to band- 
wagon involuntarily often backfires for the dominant partner. Seeking re- 
venge, the unwilling bandwagoner becomes a treacherous ally that will bolt 
from the alliance the first chance it gets. 
During the Italian Wars of 1494 to 1517, for instance, Venice "recklessly 
chang[ed] over to the side of the French, lured by the prospect of gaining 
more territory on the Italian mainland,"'71 namely, half of Lombardy. Later, 
by the secret Treaty of Granada of November 11, 1500, Spain's Ferdinand of 
Aragon bandwagoned with Louis XII of France to rob the king of Naples of 
his kingdom.72 Then, in 1508, the allies of the League of Cambrai-France, 
Spain, and Austria-bandwagoned to cut up the Venetian territories.73 Fi- 
nally, in 1513, Henry VIII of England bandwagoned with the Holy Leagueagainst the weaker Franco-Venetian side to gain provinces in Northern 
France.74 
During the period 1667-79, Louis XIV's France achieved hegemonic status 
in Europe largely by promising rewards to attract bandwagoners. For ex- 
ample, in the War of Devolution (1667-68), Emperor Leopold I of the Austrian 
Hapsburgs bandwagoned with France to partition Spain. By the secret 
Franco-Austrian treaty of 1668, the French Bourbons were to inherit Spanish 
Navarre, the Southern Netherlands, Franche-Comte, Naples and Sicily, and 
70. "Delegates wish to be on bandwagons because support of the nominee at the convention 
will be a basic criterion for the later distribution of Presidential favors and patronage." Gerald 
Pomper, Nominating the President: The Politics of Conzventionz Choice (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern 
University Press, 1963), p. 144. 
71. R.B. Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy, 1451-1789 (New York: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1928), p. 28. 
72. Ibid., p. 31; Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomnacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955), 
pp. 165-166. After capturing Naples, Spain and France quarreled over the spoils, unleashing 
the Franco-Spanish wars for Italy that lasted with only occasional breaks for nearly sixty years. 
73. "All princes who had any claims upon Venice, or rather upon its lands and possessions, 
were to be invited to join in the operations. The frontiers of Milan and Naples were to be 
readjusted in favour of Louis and Ferdinand, those of the Empire and Austria in favour of 
Maximilian, and those of the States of the Church in favour of the Pope." Mowat, History of 
Eturopean Diploinacy, pp. 33-34. For the precise territorial arrangements contained in the secret 
Treaty of Blois, see Francesco Guicciardini, The Histony of Italy, trans. and ed. by Sidney Alexander 
(New York: Macmillan, [1561] 1969), book 8, pp. 191-207, esp. p. 196. 
74. Mowat, European Diplomacy, p. 39; Guicciardini, The History of Italy, Books 10 and 11, espe- 
cially pp. 243 and 276. In the partitions of the Milanese between France and Venice, Naples 
between France and Spain, and Venice among the allies of the League of Cambrai, the governing 
principle was "the biggest dog gets the meatiest bone, and others help themselves in the order 
of size." Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomnacy, p. 163. Dismembering the victim's territory according 
to the relative size of the conquerers supports classical realism's stress on power as the deter- 
mining factor in international relations, but it contradicts the "defensive positionalist" tenet of 
avoiding gains gaps for security reasons. 
International Security 19:1 | 90 
the Philippines, in exchange for which Louis ceded his rights to the Spanish 
Crown.75 
In preparation for the Dutch War (1672-79), Louis offered rewards to gain 
the support of virtually all the powers that had previously opposed him. 
Charles II of England signed the June 1670 Treaty of Dover, with plans for a 
joint Anglo-French attack against the Dutch in 1672, in exchange for Louis's 
agreement to provide England subsidies of ?225,000 a year and territorial 
gains around the Scheldt estuary. In April 1672, Sweden, too, abandoned 
what was left of the Triple Alliance and jumped on the French bandwagon 
against the Dutch. Between 1670 and 1672, Louis offered the payment of 
French subsidies to gain alliances with many of the former members of the 
defunct League of the Rhine, including the Rhenish archbishop-electors, 
Saxony, the Palatinate, Bavaria, the Archbishop-Elector of Cologne, and the 
Bishop of Munster. And while he did not ally with France, Leopold I signed 
a neutrality agreement in November 1671.76 
The peace of Nijmegen that ended the Dutch War in 1679 proved that 
Louis could take on all his enemies and still dictate the peace. A contempo- 
rary statesman declared: "France has already become the arbiter of Europe 
henceforth no prince will find security or profit except with the 
friendship and alliance of the King of France."77 
Like his predecessor, Napoleon Bonaparte used territorial rewards and 
spectacular military victories to attract bandwagoners. For example, in cre- 
ating the Confederation of the Rhine (1806) as a counterweight to Prussia 
and Austria, Napoleon strengthened Bavaria, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, and 
Wurttemberg at the expense of the tiny German states. Lured by the promise 
of aggrandizement, these middle-sized German states voluntarily climbed 
aboard Napoleon's bandwagon.78 
75. David Kaiser, Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 149 and 172. Derek McKay and H.M. Scott, The Rise of the 
Great Powers, 1648-1815 (London: Longman, 1983), pp. 14-23. 
76. McKay and Scott, The Rise of the Great Powers, pp. 23-35. 
77. Quoted in ibid., p. 36. For a detailed account of Louis's preparations for the Dutch War, 
see Paul G. Sonnino, Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988). 
78. David G. Chandler, The Cainpaigns of Napoleon (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 449-450; 
Mowat, The Diplomacy of Napoleoni, chap. 16. In Article 1 of the Franco-Bavarian treaty of alliance 
(August 24, 1805), Napoleon pledged "to seize all occasions which present themselves to 
augment the power and splendour of the House of Bavaria," in return for support by 20,000 
Bavarian troops. See ibid., p. 152. Likewise, greed not security, Mowat claims, animated Baden's 
decision to bandwagon with France: "The Elector of Baden, in the preamble of the treaty, gives 
Bandwagoning for Profit | 91 
Similarly, Alexander I bandwagoned with the French Empire in 1807, when 
Napoleon not only used his decisive victory over the tsar's army at Friedland 
to force an alliance, but coupled it with the reward of the Vistula as the new 
expanded frontier of Russia. Napoleon also offered Russia control over Eu- 
ropean Turkey and Finland, and he encouraged further Russian conquests 
in Asia. In exchange, the tsar was asked to join the Continental System 
against England, use his influence to compel Denmark and Sweden to follow 
suit, and send the Russian Navy to aid France in the capture of Gibraltar.79 
As the historian R.B. Mowat put it: "Thus a prospect was held out to the 
defeated autocrat not merely of keeping what he possessed, but actually of 
gaining more territory: a strange sequel to the debacle of Russia at Friedland!"80 
Saying, "I will be your second against England," Alexander quickly ac- 
cepted the proffered alliance with France, which "put the Continent of Eu- 
rope at the disposal of the two Powers of France and Russia, with, however, 
the balance distinctly in favour of France. "81 During the Franco-Austrian war 
of 1809, Alexander proved his loyalty to Napoleon by "fail[ing] to avail 
himself of the opportunity to 'hold the balance' between the antagonists, 
with the result that France once more defeated Austria, added more territory 
to her already bulging empire, and threw the European system still further 
out of balance."82 The defeated Austrian state was shorn of most of its 
possessions in Italy, Illyria, and Germany. 
Napoleon's amiability toward Russia at Tilsit did not carry over to Prussia. 
After crushing the Prussian army at Jena, Napoleon was determined to exact 
his pound of flesh from King William Frederick for inciting war against him. 
By the Prussian Treaty of Tilsit, William suffered the humiliating loss of one- 
third of his territory,83 nearly half of his subjects and, most stinging of all, 
the curious reason for making it, that 'the renewal of hostilities threatened the independence 
of the States of the German Empire'; therefore he joined with that Empire's enemy. The real 
reason is . . . that the Elector of Baden, through the support of France in 1802-03, had gained 
greatly in territory." Ibid., p. 154. 
79.Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, p. 588; Mowat, The Diplomacy of Napoleon, chap. 18; 
Georges Lefebvre, Napoleon: From 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, 1799-1807, trans. Henry F. Stockhold 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 272-275. 
80. Mowat, The Diplomnacy of Napoleon, p. 176. 
81. Ibid., pp. 177, 182. 
82. Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theony and 
Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (New York: W.W. Norton, 1955), p. 106. 
83. Virtually all of Prussia's possessions west of the Elbe were torn away and incorporated into 
the new Kingdom of Westphalia or merged into a Grand Duchy of Warsaw ruled by the King 
of Saxony. 
International Security 19:1 | 92 
the occupation of French garrisons on Prussian soil pending full payment of 
a war indemnity.A4 
Ironically, it was the Prussian foreign minister, Karl von Hardenberg, who, 
at Tilsit, had advised Alexander "to offer Napoleon a three-cornered alliance 
whose purpose would be to fight England and to redraw the map of Europe." 
Agreeing in principle to Hardenberg's plan, the tsar did his best to defend 
his Prussian ally in his private meetings with the French emperor, but to no 
avail. Napoleon held all of Prussia by right of conquest and would not 
consider admitting Frederick William as a third party.85 
Prussia and Austria got their revenge in June of 1813, when they joined 
England and Russia to form the Fourth Coalition that defeated France. But 
the victory of the Allies over the would-be hegemon was not as inevitable 
as the "balancing predominates" view would have us believe. The Allied 
coalition, whose forces doubled those of France by February of 1814, would 
never have come together in the first place, much less held together, had 
Napoleon not attacked his own allies and neutrals. By repeatedly thwarting 
the bandwagoning strategies of Russia, Prussia, Spain, and Austria, Napo- 
leon finally succeeded where the British had failed in creating a coalition 
with the strength and resolve to defeat Imperial France.86 
Why States Bandwagon 
Bandwagoning dynamics move the system in the direction of change. Like 
a ball rolling down an incline, initial success generates further success, not 
greater resistance. In the language of systems theory, bandwagoning is a 
form of positive feedback. By contrast, the purpose of balancing behavior is 
84. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pp. 589ff; Lefebvre, Napoleon, pp. 273-274; Mowat, The 
Diplomacy of Napoleon, pp. 175-187. In practice, the indemnity, which was of an undefined 
amount, meant that Napoleon could defer the evacuation forever by imposing payments beyond 
Prussia's capacity. Mowat writes: "Simple, dishonest, cynical, Napoleon's method of veiled 
annexation was put in practice, and French troops remained in Prussia until driven out by force 
in 1813." Ibid., p. 186. 
85. Lefebvre, Napoleon, p. 272. 
86. For more on this point, see Paul W. Schroeder, "Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal 
Enterprise," Journal of Military History, Vol. 54, No. 2 (April 1990), pp. 147-162; and Schroeder, 
"The Collapse of the Second Coalition," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 59 (1987), pp. 244-290. 
Holland, Italy, and the maritime states of Scandinavia, Denmark, and Portugal were similarly 
coerced into bandwagoning with the French Empire. 
Bandwagoning for Profit | 93 
to prevent systemic disequilibrium or, when deterrence fails, to restore the 
balance. Balancing is a form of negative feedback.87 
This is not to suggest that bandwagoning effects are always undesirable; 
this depends on the nature of the existing order. If it is characterized by 
conflict, bandwagoning behavior may enhance the prospects for a more 
durable peace. In this regard, the bandwagon's raison d'e^tre also matters. 
"Jackal" bandwagoning, with a rising expansionist state or a coalition that 
seeks to overthrow the status quo, decreases system stability. Conversely, 
"piling on" bandwagoning with the stronger status-quo coalition enhances 
system stability. Other forms of bandwagoning may have varying effects on 
system stability. What all these forms of bandwagoning have in common, 
however, is that they are motivated by the prospect of making gains. Herein 
lies the fundamental difference between bandwagoning and balancing. Bal- 
ancing is an extremely costly activity that most states would rather not engage 
in, but sometimes must to survive and protect their values. Bandwagoning 
rarely involves costs and is typically done in the expectation of gain. This is 
why bandwagoning is more common, I believe, than Walt and Waltz suggest. 
JACKAL BANDWAGONING 
Just as the lion attracts jackals, a powerful revisionist state or coalition attracts 
opportunistic revisionist powers.88 The goal of "jackal bandwagoning" is 
profit. Specifically, revisionist states bandwagon to share in the spoils of 
victory.89 Because unlimited-aims revisionist powers cannot bandwagon (they 
are the bandwagon), offensive bandwagoning is done exclusively by lesser 
aggressors, which I call limited-aims revisionist states. Typically, the lesser 
aggressor reaches an agreement with the unlimited-aims revisionist leader 
87. See Robert Jervis, "Systems Theory and Diplomatic History," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., 
Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 220- 
222; Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behavior," in Jervis and Snyder, Dominoes and Band- 
wagons, pp. 22-23; Lisa L. Martin, "Coalition Dynamics: Bandwagoning in International Politics," 
paper presented at Columbia University, Seminar on International Political Economy, October, 
29, 1993. 
88. "In a style less grave than that of history, I should perhaps compare the emperor Alexius 
to the jackal, who is said to follow the steps, and to devour the leavings, of the lion. Whatever 
had been his fears and toils in the passage of the first crusade, they were amply recompensed 
by the subsequent benefits which he derived from the exploits of the Franks." Edward Gibbon, 
The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. 6 (New York: Macmillan, 1914), p. 335. 
89. For this motivation for bandwagoning, see Larson, "Bandwagon Images," pp. 85-87; Jervis, 
"Systems Theory," p. 220; and Walt, "Alliance Formation," p. 8. None of these authors specif- 
ically refer to jackal behavior. 
International Security 19:1 | 94 
on spheres of influence, in exchange for which the junior partner supports 
the revisionist leader in its expansionist aims. 
Aside from the desire to acquire additional territory, the motivation for 
jackal bandwagoning may also be security from the lion itself. As Roy Doug- 
las remarks, "Stalin merits Churchill's famous epithet, 'Hitler's jackal' as 
richly as does Mussolini, to whom it was applied. Pickings from the lion's 
kill were succulent and satisfying for lesser beasts; but they also afforded 
these creatures strength to resist the greater predator should he later turn 
his attentions to them."90 
Sometimes the revisionist leader is stronger than the opposing status-quo 
coalition. In such cases, the revisionist leader does not require the active 
assistance of the junior partner. Instead, it seeks to prevent or block the 
formation of a powerful status-quo coalition.91 When blocking is the goal, 
the revisionist leader often allows the limited-aims revisionist state to gain 
unearned spoils in exchange for a pledge not to join the adversarial coalition. 
Because the jackal is a scavenger and not a true predator, this type of 
bandwagoning is a form of predatory buck-passing: the jackal seeks to ride 
free on the offensive efforts of others. 
Exemplifying this strategy, Hitler encouraged Italy, the Soviet Union, Ja- 
pan, Hungary, and Bulgaria to feed on the pickings of the Nazi lion's kill,in 
order to block the formation of a dangerous rival coalition.92 In this way, the 
Reich became master of Europe by 1941. But just as Napoleon had gratui- 
tously destroyed the source of his own success by attacking his allies, Hitler 
brought Germany to ruin by declaring war against his Soviet ally and the 
United States, "two World powers who asked only to be left alone."93 In so 
90. Roy Douglas, New Alliances, 1940-41 (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 40. Walt makes this 
point in "Alliance Formation," p. 8. 
91. See George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 33. 
92. For example, Mussolini and Hitler successfully played on Hungary's and Bulgaria's revi- 
sionist aspirations to lure these states into the Axis camp. As part of the Munich agreement of 
September 30, 1938, a German-Italian court of arbitration pressured the Czech government to 
grant a broad strip of southern Slovakia and Ruthenia to Hungary. Then, when the Germans 
carved up the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Hitler, in a deliberate attempt to gain 
further favor with the Hungarian government, ceded the remainder of Ruthenia (Carpatho- 
Ukraine) to Hungary. In exchange for these territorial rewards, Hungary pledged its unshakable 
support for the Nazi cause, and its "foreign policy was brought into line with that of the Reich. 
On February 24, 1939, Hungary joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, on April 11 it left the League 
of Nations." Norman Rich, Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion 
(London: W.W. Norton, 1973), p. 184. 
93. A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (New York: Atheneum, 1961), p. 278. 
Bandwagoning for Profit | 95 
doing, the Fiihrer forced into creation the only coalition powerful enough to 
prevent a German victory in Europe. 
PILING ON 
"Piling-on bandwagoning" occurs when the outcome of a war has already 
been determined. States typically bandwagon with the victor to claim an 
unearned share of the spoils. When this is the motive, piling on is simply 
jackal bandwagoning that takes place at the end of wars. Contrariwise, states 
may pile on because they fear the victors will punish them if they do not 
actively side against the losers. Whatever the motivation, either opportunity 
or fear, piling on is a form of predatory buck-passing with regard to the 
winning coalition. 
Historically, most major wars have ended with piling-on behavior. In the 
War of the Spanish Succession, for instance, Louis XIV watched his waning 
hopes for victory vanish when two of his staunchest allies, Portugal and the 
Duke of Savoy, deserted the Franco-Spanish coalition and bandwagoned with 
the Grand Alliance to make gains at Spain's expense.94 The Napoleonic Wars 
ended when Sweden, Austria, Spain, and certain German and Italian states 
sided with Prussia, Britain, and Russia at the precise moment that Napoleon's 
defeat appeared certain.95 
During the First World War, Japan bandwagoned with the Entente powers 
because it coveted German possessions in Asia, while China bandwagoned 
to gain Anglo-French protection from Japan and Imperial Russia. For its part 
Italy, expecting to gain unearned spoils at Austria's expense, declared war 
against its former friends in May of 1915.96 In 1916, Russia's decisive victory 
over Austria persuaded Rumania to enter the war on the Allied side. 
In World War II, the Soviets wanted a fight to the finish with Japan to get 
in on the kill and thereby share in occupying Japan. In contrast, Turkey 
wanted to remain neutral but was coerced by the Allies into declaring war 
against Germany and Japan on February 23, 1945. Ankara did so because of 
the Allied decision to exclude from the organizing conference for the United 
94. Wolf, Louis XIV, pp. 526-529. For similar reasons, on August 16, 1703, Sweden also acceded 
to the Grand Alliance. Thus, by October of 1703, "France was left with no allies except Spain, 
and the Electorates of Cologne and Bavaria . . .; and when one by one the other satellites of 
Louis dropped off, in 1702 and 1703, Bavaria alone kept to her engagements." Mowat, A History 
of European Diplomacy, p. 166. 
95. Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power, p. 88. 
96. The Allies were not impressed, however, and awarded Italy a loser's share at Versailles. 
International Security 19:1 | 96 
Nations any country that had not entered the war against the Axis by March 
1, 1945. More recently, the overwhelmingly superior coalition arrayed against 
Iraq in the Gulf War exemplifies piling-on bandwagoning behavior. 
WAVE OF THE FUTURE 
States may bandwagon with the stronger side because they believe it repre- 
sents the "wave of the future." During the Cold War era, for example, many 
less-developed countries viewed communism in this way. Consequently, 
they did not have to be coerced or bribed to join the Sino-Soviet bloc; they 
did so voluntarily. Third World elites as well as the masses were attracted to 
communism for rational reasons: they thought they could profit by it, as had 
the Chinese and the Soviets. This type of bandwagoning most concerned 
George Kennan in 1947, as he understood that "a given proportion of the 
adherents to the [communist] movement are drawn to it . . . primarily by 
the belief that it is the coming thing, the movement of the future . . . and 
that those who hope to survive-let alone to thrive-in the coming days will 
be those who have the foresight to climb on the bandwagon when it was 
still the movement of the future. 97 And indeed, the Soviet success with 
Sputnik caused more dominoes to fall than Soviet military pressure ever 
could. 
Likewise, states across the globe have recently abandoned communism in 
favor of the newest wave of the future, liberal democracy. Van Evera points 
out that "the chain of anti-communist upheavals in Eastern Europe during 
1989" is "the only widespread domino effect on record."98 But the definition 
of bandwagoning as "giving in to threats," which he endorses, does not 
cover this voluntary global epidemic. The same can be said about the massive 
decolonization of the 1950s and 1960s. Both trends are instances of benign 
positive feedback; that is, they altered the course of international politics in 
a more stabilizing direction. 
Wave-of-the-future bandwagoning is typically induced by charismatic lead- 
ers and dynamic ideologies, especially when buoyed by massive propaganda 
97. Quoted in Jervis, "Domino Beliefs," p. 33. 
98. Stephen Van Evera, "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand 
Strategy After the Cold War," The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1990), p. 23. 
On this latest domino effect, see Harvey Starr, "Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches 
to the Spread of Democracy in the International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, 
No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 356-381; Timur Kuran, "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in 
the East European Revolution of 1989," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 1 (October 1991), pp. 7-48. 
Bandwagoning for Profit | 97 
campaigns and demonstrations of superiority on the battlefield. Here, the 
bandwagon becomes a "mass orgy feeling that sweeps with the fervor of a 
religious revival."99 For example, Germany's stunning military victories in 
May of 1940 convinced Japan to reverse its neutralist policy and bandwagon 
with the Axis. Hosoya writes: 
The rising prestige of Germany in the eyes of the Japanese resulted in 
resurrecting pro-Nazi sentiment from its demise following the conclusion of 
the Nonaggression Pact. This change in public opinion naturally affected the 
balance of power between the Anglo-American and Axis factions in Japan. 
Second, the existence of the French and Dutch colonies in Indochina and the 
East Indies now swam into