Enciclopédia da Energia Natural   CPMA.COMUNIDADES.NET
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Enciclopédia da Energia Natural CPMA.COMUNIDADES.NET

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The Role of the CDM Post Kyoto
Many of the problems with the CDM stem from the fact that
the transfers of emission reductions occur between parties with
uneven standing, that is, parties with quantified emission re-
duction commitments and parties without any quantitative
obligation of emission reduction. In an exchange of Allocated
Amounts Units between parties with quantified objectives de-
fined in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, both parties are liable
should the emission ceiling be exceeded, whereas in the CDM
the host country has no binding emission limit. Several ob-
servers thus consider the CDM as a transition phase, following
which upper-middle-income economies would proceed to take
on quantified emission reduction commitments. Concerns
about the CDM are also based on arguments of the inefficiency
of a project-based mechanism versus an emissions market and
the high administrative costs that are obstacles to the diffusion
of CDM projects outside of some major host countries. In
equity terms, the mechanism has been challenged for the low
share of projects and CERs from low-income countries. Al-
though not an explicit objective of the CDM, technology trans-
fer is included in the UNFCCC and the CDM has been
evaluated on its role of furthering technology transfer between
Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries. Here too, tech-
nology transfers seem to occur only to a limited extent, notably
in large projects and projects based on existing bilateral ties
such as existing trade or FDI relations.
Reform proposals for the CDM include further streamlin-
ing and simplification of the registration and validation pro-
cess not just to minimize transaction costs \u2013 in particular for
small-scale projects \u2013 but also because it is now clear that the
mechanism needs to be reconsidered in a more fundamental
manner. The changes that are the most discussed for a future
CDM are policy and sectoral CDM, to substitute for the
CDM\u2019s current project basis. The idea is that countries pool
20 Climate Change and Policy | Clean Development Mechanism
several projects and measures in one sector into one CDM
sectoral program and obtain CERs for emission reductions
obtained from a predefined baseline for the sector. The ad-
vantage of sectoral CDM is that the GHG mitigation potential
can be tapped in entire sectors such as residential energy
efficiency, or transportation, where the CDM has not made
inroads so far (see the distribution of CERs according to the
type of project in the section \u2018The Distribution of CDM Pro-
jects According to Region and Type\u2019). Programmatic CDM
already exists in the CDM rulebook and could be a basis for
further development of policy-based CDM for entire sectors.
A potential problem with this approach is that it does noth-
ing to solve the incentives to manipulate host country base-
lines. Rather, it may amplify them by delaying projects or
national policies that otherwise would otherwise have been
implemented. Others favor a sectoral regional approach, in
particular, to avoid potential carbon leakage. Here, CERs
would stem from projects regrouped on an industry sector
basis. The advantage of this approach is that it would strive
toward the goal of each industry facing the same price per
GHG emission regardless of its location.
Despite the uncertainty about the future of the CDM, it
has enabled a nonnegligible total sum of emission reduc-
tions. Some of these emission reductions may have come at
a higher cost than necessary (recall the debate surrounding
the initially high part of HFC and PFC reduction), but to a
large extent the CDM has brought forward low-cost mitiga-
tion options that help in achieving the emission reduction
commitments of Annex I countries. Most debaters agree that
the CDM has been less successful when it comes to its other
main goal, achieving sustainable development in non-Annex
I countries. Part of this failure may result from weak defini-
tions and verification of sustainability, by DNAs that do not
necessarily have the correct incentives to genuinely imple-
ment such change from a political economy perspective. The
EB has attempted to solve this by excluding or restricting
certain types of projects from the CDM, but the distribution
of projects could still be improved, both in terms of the kind
of projects and their geographical location. The main success
of the CDM thus has to be its pivotal role in keeping certain
key developing countries interested in staying in the Kyoto
Protocol framework. A critical review of the narrow geograph-
ical distribution of CDM projects concentrated in four major
newly industrialized countries has to note that they are the
countries with the highest economic growth rates and, thus,
the countries that should be key participants in a future
climate treaty.
See also: Climate Change and Policy: Carbon Offsets; Economics
of Forest Carbon Sequestration as a Climate Change Mitigation
Strategy; Markets/Technology Innovation/Adoption/Diffusion:
Technological Change and Climate Change Policy; Media:
Biological: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Further Reading
Dechezlepre\u2c6tre A, Glachant M, and Me´nie`re Y (2008) The clean development
mechanism and the international diffusion of technologies: An empirical study.
Energy Policy 36: 1273\u20131283.
Figueres C and Streck C (2009) A post-2012 vision for the clean development
mechanism. (Chapter 26) In: Freestone D and Streck C (eds.) Legal Aspects of
Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond, pp. 562\u2013582. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Hagem C (2009) The clean development mechanism versus international permit trading:
The effect on technological change. Resource and Energy Economics 31(1): 1\u201312.
Kallbekken S (2007) Why the CDM will reduce carbon leakage. Climate Policy 7(3):
Lecocq F and Ambrosi P (2007) The clean development mechanism: History, status and
prospects. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 1(1): 134\u2013151.
Narain U and van\u2019t Veld K (2008) The clean development mechanism\u2019s low-hanging fruit
problem: When it might arise and how it might be solved? Environmental and
Resource Economics 40(3): 445\u2013465.
Olsen KH (2007) The clean development\u2019s mechanism\u2019s contribution to sustainable
development: A review of the literature. Climate Change 84: 59\u201373.
Rose A, Bulte E, and Folmer H (1999) Long-run implications for developing countries of
joint implementation of greenhouse gas mitigation. Environmental and Resource
Economics 14(1): 19\u201331.
Seres S, Haites E, and Murphy K (2010) The contribution of the clean development
mechanism under the kyoto protocol to technology transfer. UNFCCC Report.
Vo¨hringer F, Kuosmanen T, and Dellink R (2006) How to attribute market leakage to
CDM projects. Climate Policy 5: 503\u2013516.
Wara M (2007) Is the global carbon market working? Nature 445: 595\u2013596.
World Bank (2011) State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2011. Washington, DC:
World Bank.
Relevant Websites
http://cdmpipeline.org \u2013 The UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database.
http://cdm.unfccc.int/index.html \u2013 The UNFCCC CDM website.
Climate Change and Policy | Clean Development Mechanism 21
Climate Change and Food Situation*
E Blanc and JM Reilly, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
ã 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Glossary Terms
Bio-physical model A model simulating the growth of
individual plants given various environmental factors.
Climate change mitigation Actions taken to reduce GHG
emissions in order to limit changes in climate.
CO2 fertilization Enhancement of plant growth due to
an increase in atmospheric CO2 concentration.
Computable general equilibrium model A global