[G. Edward Griffin] Fearful Master A Second Look (BookZZ.org)
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[G. Edward Griffin] Fearful Master A Second Look (BookZZ.org)


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savage act. It was followed by an equally savage one. In Stanleyville 
nine anti-Lumumbists who had been held and mistreated for months were also murdered. The United 
Nations conducted no investigations. There were no outcries of indignation or protest from UN 
spokesmen. There were no spontaneous demonstrations around the world. There were no bleeding 
heart editorials in our daily newspapers. 
Here is a silent tribute to the powerful hold that Communist-inspired propaganda has over the minds 
and attitudes of those in the non-Communist world. It is astounding that so many millions of people 
could be sincerely shocked and saddened over the death of a man like Patrice Lumumba while at the 
same time feeling little concern over the brutal murders of hundreds of anti-Communist leaders in the 
Congo, Eastern Europe and Red China. Here was a man who was literally unknown to the world until 
he led his people into chaos. And then, in spite of his clear record as an ex-convict, a dope addict, a 
murderer and a Communist, he was catapulted into the hearts of millions who were skillfully 
conditioned to think of him as a great martyred leader. 
NOTES 
1. Hempstone, pp. 107-110. 
2. Philippa Schuyler, Who Killed the Congo? (New York, The Devin-Adair Company, 1962), p. 17. 
3. Ibid., P. 172. 
4. As quoted by Schuyler, p. 163. 
5. As quoted by Congressman Donald C. Bruce, Congressional Record (September 12, 1962). 
6. Hempstone, p. 111. Also, O'Brien, p. 88. 
7. Hempstone, p. 242. 
8. UN document S/4426. 
9. As quoted by Hempstone, p. 242. 
10. Senator Thomas Dodd, Congressional Record (August 3, 1962). 
11. Senator Thomas Dodd, Congressional Record (September 8 and 16, 1961). Also, Department of 
State Bulletin (December 12, 1960), p. 908. 
12. Hempstone, pp. 113-114. 
13. O'Brien, p. 58. 
14. Ibid., p. 189. 
15. Allen P. Merriam, Congo: Background of Conflict (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 
1961), p. 240. 
16. Schuyler, p. 234. 
17. Senator Thomas Dodd, Congressional Record (August 3, 1962). Also, Schuyler, pp. 233-234. 
18. Philippa Schuyler, Who Killed the Congo? (New York, The Devin-Adair Company, 1962), p. 260. 
19. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee as quoted in the Tidings (Los Angeles, August 16, 1963), 
p. 2. 
20. Bare Red Plot by Lumumba," Chicago Tribune (November, 2, 1960). 
21. O'Brien, p. 96. 
22. Philippa Schuyler, Who Killed the Congo? (New York, The Devin-Adair Company, 1962), pp. 233-
235. 
23. Ibid., p. 235. 
24. Hempstone, pp. 126, 130. 
 
We know only too well that UN forces would bring Lumumba's agents with them. 
Godefroi Munongo, August 4, 1960 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE MODERATES 
For many years the United States has been financing and supporting the expansion of international 
Communism around the world through measures which have been presented to the American people 
as ways of fighting Communism. Foreign aid is probably the most obvious example. President after 
president has told us that we have to send billions to various Communist and pro-Communist 
countries in order to win them away from Soviet domination. We have shipped them military 
equipment, trained their officers in our military schools, sent them machine tools, built whole factories 
and power dams for them, and sold them subsidized wheat. Our political leaders have shrewdly 
borrowed the required money from our children and grandchildren who will be saddled with these 
debts for many generations to come. The record is truly fantastic. But the most incredible part of all is 
that this whole operation, which has been so necessary for Communist success, has been sold to 
Americans as a way of opposing Communism. A glance at a few issues of the People's World or the 
Worker or other Communist periodicals will cause even the skeptical to realize that our foreign aid is 
very near and dear to the hearts of Communists everywhere. The only criticism one finds of our 
foreign aid program in the Communist press is that it isn't as large and doesn't grow as fast as the 
Communists want. One of the prime reasons they advocate foreign aid even to countries that are not 
yet totally Communist but are merely in the socialist (or transitional) phase, is that it helps to destroy 
private enterprise and strengthen socialism within these countries. The money must never be allowed 
to be used to develop private industry. It must be used only for government projects. For instance, 
back in 1955 when the Communist party of India formally announced its support of Nehru, the 
Communist Daily Worker carried a description of the event. Toward the end of the article it quoted 
Ajoy Ghosh, general secretary of the Communist party in India, as saving: "We want foreign aid 
coming at a governmental level and not with a specific purpose." He further said Indians should be 
"free to use the aid for anything we want."1 
That, however, is another story. It is mentioned here merely to point up a recognizable pattern that 
has developed over the past few years regarding certain United States State Department policies. 
This pattern is involved with convincing the voters that a particular policy of the State Department or 
the United Nations is in the best interests of the United States when, in reality, it is just the opposite. 
There is no better illustration of this than the circumstances surrounding United Nations and 
Washington support of the so-called "moderate" central Government that emerged after Lumumba's 
death. To tell that part of the story, however, it is necessary to take a closer look at Antoine Gizenga. 
Gizenga was a minor personality in Congolese politics until he was invited to Prague, 
Czechoslovakia, for Communist cadre training.2 When he returned, he became one of Lumumba's 
strongest supporters and worked closely with him to implement plans for the Communist take-over of 
the whole Congo. When Lumumba was arrested and then killed, Gizenga set himself up as 
Lumumba's successor. He established a Communist regime in the neighboring province of Orientale 
and gathered all of Lumumba's followers around him. The Soviet and Czechoslovakian diplomats and 
consular officials who were kicked out of Leopoldville by Colonel Mobutu popped up in the Gizenga 
stronghold of Stanleyville where they quickly received official accreditation. The Soviets lost no time 
in announcing to the world that they now recognized Gizenga's regime as the "only legitimate 
Government of the Congo."3 
With this background in mind it may still come as a shock to some to recall that at this point the 
United Nations swung its full support and influence behind Gizenga and did everything it could to 
hamper Colonel Mobutu and President Kasavubu. This is doubly hard to justify because Mobutu and 
Kasavubu represented the central government, which had called in the United Nations in the first 
place. Gizenga's little Communist satellite of Orientale province was just as much secessionist as 
Katanga province had been. But the United Nations made no effort to end Gizenga's secession. It 
passed no angry resolutions in the Security Council. It initiated no massive troop movements. In fact, 
as has been pointed out, it used what few troops it did have in Orientale province to protect Gizenga 
and his followers. Stewart Alsop, writing in the Saturday Evening Post, described it this way: 
 
The United Nations policy has been, in essence, to immobilize the forces 
controlled by the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime. . . . Dayal [United Nations 
representative in the Congo] has ruled that Mobutu's army should be permitted to 
make only minor troop movements. . . . With the Kasavubu-Mobutu forces thus 
effectively hamstrung, and with help from Egyptians and iron curtain money and 
technicians, Gizenga's rump pro-Communist regime quickly consolidated its 
position. . . . Gizenga's forces then began moving