[G. Edward Griffin] Fearful Master A Second Look (BookZZ.org)
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[G. Edward Griffin] Fearful Master A Second Look (BookZZ.org)


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on neighboring Kivu and 
Katanga provinces. The troop movements were by no means minor by 
Congolese standards, but the United Nations did nothing. . . . Mobutu was
certainly a sad and harried man when I saw him. If the United Nations under 
Dayal had not actively obstructed every move be made, he said, he could have 
dealt in fairly short order with the Stanleyville dissidents.4 
 
While all this was going on, Moise Tshombe was making efforts of his own to reunite the Congo 
along the federal lines previously discussed. On February 28 he met with a representative of the 
central government and one from Kasai province. There was immediate agreement on basic 
principles and the conference ended with all three signing a mutual defense pact to prevent the 
establishment of what they referred to as a United Nations "regime of tyranny."5 On March 8 
Tshombe convened a second conference, this time expanded to include virtually every Congolese 
leader of importance except the Communist Gizenga. Complete agreement was reached in record 
time. At the conclusion of the third day, the conferees issued a communiqué revealing that they all 
endorsed Tshombe's basic plan calling for a "community of Congolese states." There was to be a 
central government at Leopoldville in a neutral zone similar to the District of Columbia. Kasavubu was 
to remain president, serving on a council of states made up of the presidents of the member states. 
Foreign policy, a general internal policy, currency and military affairs would come under jurisdiction of 
this council of states. There were to be no customs or immigration barriers between the states. It was 
obviously fashioned very closely after the American pattern of government. In a final telegram to Dag 
Hammarskjold, the Congolese leaders warned that the dispatch of more UN troops to the Congo 
would "aggravate tension" between the United Nations and the Congolese population. Tshombe said 
at the conclusion of the conference, "We have resolved our problems ourselves and now we want 
both West and East to leave us alone." The Soviet news agency Tass responded by denouncing the 
meeting as "a conference of puppets and traitors."6 
Here was a giant step toward unity and the restoration of order in the Congo. The United Nations, 
however, was not pleased. For one thing, it was upset over the form of the new union, maintaining 
that it was much too decentralized. For another, its man Gizenga was not at the conference. 
Consequently, the UN ignored the whole thing, as though pretending the conference never took 
place. 
United Nations troops and armaments continued to roll into the Congo--most of them to Katanga--just 
as rapidly as U.S. Air Force Globemasters could bring them. Congolese leaders began to see the 
handwriting on the wall. Few of them had the strength of conviction that Tshombe possessed, and 
the weaker ones began to wonder if perhaps it might not be safer to go along with whatever the 
United Nations wanted. Finally, on April 17, 1961, the United Nations, in spite of its promise not to 
intervene in the internal affairs of the Congo, pressured Kasavubu into signing an agreement which 
directly repudiated the principles agreed upon by the Congolese leaders. But Tshombe did not find 
this out until six days later when he arrived at a third conference of Congolese leaders. The 
atmosphere had changed completely. Kasavubu and some of the others no longer spoke of a 
confederation of states. Their demands were now identical with those of the United Nations. Feeling 
completely betrayed, Tshombe walked out of the conference and prepared to return to Katanga. As 
he arrived at the airport, however, he was arrested without any pretense of legality and thrown into 
prison. A few days later, Tshombe was formally charged on four counts of high 'treason, two of which 
were punishable by death.7 
Tshombe was kept in prison for two months. At no time was he allowed to see his attorney. He 
apparently was not subjected to physical torture, but be was, nevertheless, kept in solitary 
confinement. He was given no exercise, nothing to read, and no one with whom to talk. A few months 
previously the United Nations had provided extravagant military protection for Patrice Lumumba and 
had loudly protested when he was arrested by Colonel Mobutu's men. Now that Tshombe was in jail, 
however, things were different. There were no protests or offers of protection. In fact, the world's self-
proclaimed champions of justice and human rights remained strangely silent. 
The enemies of Katanga expected Tshombe's arrest to set off a power struggle among his supporters 
back home. They reasoned hopefully that a new shuffle would possibly bring to the top someone 
more pliable and more willing to go along with United Nations policies. They were wrong on two 
counts. First of all, the strong man in the number two spot and the most likely to take Tshombe's 
place was Godefroi Munongo who was, if anything, more like Tshombe than Tshombe himself. Also, 
Tshombe had earned such complete respect and loyalty from his followers that the expected power 
struggle never happened. His cabinet and parliament closed ranks in his absence and proclaimed 
their solidarity. Posters began appearing on the streets of Elisabethville with huge pictures of 
Tshombe and the words "He suffers for us. Let us be worthy of him." 
It was fortunate for Tshombe that Lumumba was no longer top wheel in the central government. 
Otherwise, he would never have been seen again. But Kasavubu, even though he was now dancing 
to the UN tune, was not a vicious person. He was merely a weak politician who wanted to be on the 
winning side. 
Tshombe, however, still maintained the loyalty of his followers, and with the personal intervention of 
Colonel Mobutu he was finally released on June 22. Joyous mayhem broke out in Katanga when the 
news was received. A few days later, he was back at work with more determination than ever. There 
was an ominous note of anticipated tragedy in Tshombe's voice as he addressed the national 
assembly: "We shall see to it that the Katangese Nation shall endure. Let the enemies of Katanga 
know that they have to deal with a people."8 
 
Turning our attention back to the United Nations "moderates" in the central government, a new figure 
appears. He is Cyrille Adoula, former associate and supporter of Patrice Lumumba. He claims that he 
is not a Communist, but on December 28, 1957, he wrote: 
Being a socialist I am for the transformation of the present society. And for this I conceive the 
collectivisation of the means of production. In order to attain this goal, I see only one means: the 
struggle of the classes, the permanent class struggle.9 
Since the Communists advocate exactly the same thing, and since they also frequently refer to 
themselves as socialists instead of Communists, the distinction is not particularly reassuring. But 
what a man does is far more important than whether or not be may have been formally issued a 
membership card. If he does the work of the Communists, even unknowingly, he is just as dangerous 
as the most devoted and disciplined party member. 
On August 2, 1961, the Congolese parliament approved Cyrille Adoula as the new premier. One of 
his first official acts was to invite all the Russian and Czech diplomats to return their Communist 
embassies to Leopoldville--which they did. Next, it was announced that Antoine Gizenga, leader of 
the Communist faction in Stanleyville, had been appointed to the number two spot of vice-premier. It 
is not clear just how much Adoula had to do with this appointment since Mr. Sture Linner (United 
Nations representative in Leopoldville) has publicly claimed personal credit for persuading Gizenga to 
accept the position.10 Nevertheless, on August 16 Adoula visited Gizenga in Stanleyville to work out 
plans for their