[G. Edward Griffin] Fearful Master A Second Look (BookZZ.org)
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[G. Edward Griffin] Fearful Master A Second Look (BookZZ.org)

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Red Crosses, seriously wounding the 
African driver and two white nurses.20 
Tshombe, speaking to his people over a hidden transmitter that identified itself as "Radio Free 
Katanga," called for total resistance--"a fight to the last round of ammunition." Five thousand Baluba 
warriors responded by joining the Katangese soldiers. Several hundred Bayeke warriors also came 
into the fight. White residents took up arms and fought side-by-side with their African neighbors. They 
were not mercenaries. Nobody paid them. They volunteered to fight for the simple reason that the 
United Nations was destroying their homes and killing their loved ones. 
Finally, the tide began to turn. The UN had prematurely announced to the world that the secession 
was over. It was now in serious danger of having its forces completely annihilated because of the 
unexpected determination of the Katangese people to maintain their independence. As supplies and 
morale began to run low, it became obvious that the UN had made the fatal mistake of believing its 
own propaganda. It had asserted that Tshombe was a mere puppet of the Belgians and that he was 
supported in power only by a few mercenaries against the true will of his people. It maintained that 
his government would collapse at the first blow. It was now paving the price of self-deception. Things 
were going so badly for the United Nations that by September 17 its whole company A was cut off, 
badly beaten, and forced to surrender. With Operation Morthor on the verge of total collapse, the UN 
finally agreed to a face-saving cease-fire. On September 20, just one week after the United Nations 
had launched its unprovoked attack, peace once again returned to Katanga; its green and white flag 
still fluttered proudly to proclaim that Katanga remained free. 
The only thing more incredible than the United Nations military action in Katanga is the way in which 
it tried to justify that action. If things had gone according to schedule there would have been little 
trouble. Press releases would have simply stated that Tshombe had been replaced by "moderate" 
Bochely-Davidson and that after a light exchange of gunfire "secessionist" Katanga had been brought 
back under the central government. The United States President would have sent his congratulations 
to Dag Hammarskjold and State Department officials would have expressed great satisfaction with 
this victory over Communism. But as it turned out, the situation had "escalated," and there were just 
too many newspaper reporters willing to make that hundred-mile trek to Northern Rhodesia to get the 
true story out to the world.21 
At one point, the UN explained that it had initiated military action at the request of the central 
government. An official spokesman elaborated: "The UN motive in complying with the request was to 
avoid the alternative--invasion of northern Katanga by central government troops and a prolonged 
civil war."22 In other words, the central Government was preparing to attack Katanga; but that would 
have been civil war. Therefore, the UN attacked Katanga to save the central Government the trouble! 
As the fighting spread, it became apparent that the United Nations needed another story. As a result, 
it was decided to announce that the UN had nothing to do with starting the action at all--that it was 
merely defending itself against Katangese aggression. And so, on September 16, three days after the 
United Nations had stated it had initiated the action "at the request of the central government," Dag 
Hammarskjold, at a press conference, told this fantastic story: 
In the early hours of September 13th . . . an alert was set since arson was 
discovered at the UN garage. As the UN troops were proceeding toward the 
garage premises, fire was opened on them from the building where a number of 
foreign officers are known to be staying. UN troops were subsequently also 
resisted and fired at as they, were deploying toward key points or while they 
were guarding installations in the City.23 
In the words of Conor O'Brien, the man who helped plan the attack: 
I have no idea what the source for the "arson" statement may be. No such fire 
was ever reported by me, or to me, or ever referred to in my presence. Nor is 
there any reference to such a phenomenon in the military "situation report." 
Some days before, an empty UN vehicle was upset and damaged by the 
"spontaneous demonstrators" outside a garage in the town (properly speaking, 
there was no "UN garage"). This incident, the nearest known to me to the "arson 
alarm," was no longer present to our minds on the morning of September 13th.24 
Just for the record, Operation Morthor comes from a Hindi word. Morthor does not mean "Sound the 
alarm; there is arson in the garage" or "Let us now assist the authorities to prevent civil war." It 
means smash! 
1. O'Brien, p. 61. 
2. Ibid., p. 221. 
3. 46 Angry Men, pp. 44-45. 
4. Article entered in the Congressional Record by Senator Thomas Dodd (September 8, 1961). 
5. 46 Angry Men, p. 47. 
6. Senator Thomas Dodd, Congressional Record (September 16, 1961). Also, Sturdza, p. 39. 
7. O'Brien, pp. 249-251. 
8. Ibid., p. 282. When this was called to their attention at a later date, UN officials in Katanga 
apologized and said that they had made a mistake and meant to say "white officers." 
9. UN document S/4417/ADD 6 (August 12, 1960), pp. 3-4. Also, UN document A/4711/ADD 2 
(March 20, 1961), pp. 62, 68, 73. Also, van den Haag, p. 22. 
10.Newspaper article entered in the Congressional Record by Senator Thomas Dodd (September 16, 
11. Visa Procedures of Department of State, report to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (August 
6, 1962), p. 28. 
12. Newspaper article entered in the Congressional Record by Senator Thomas Dodd (September 
16, 1961). 
13. 46 Angry Men, pp. 68-69. 
14. Newspaper article entered in the Congressional Record by Senator Thomas Dodd (September 
16, 1961). 
15. 46 Angry Men, pp. 48-51. 
16. Ibid., pp. 20-24. Also, Hempstone, p. 195. 
17. Hempstone, p. 224. 
18. The Tidings (Los Angeles, January 11, 1963), p. 1. 
19. "UN Action in Katanga Stirs Dismay in Europe," London newspaper article entered in the 
Congressional Record by Senator Thomas Dodd (September 16, 1961). 
20. "All Out War in Katanga," newspaper article entered in the Congressional Record by Senator 
Thomas Dodd (September 16, 1961). 
21. In addition to news reporters, of course, there were many prominent individuals who 
independently came to Katanga to conduct their own personal investigations. One such observer was 
Lord Bertrand Russell, a strong, supporter of the United Nations. Not only did he confirm the stories 
of UN atrocities, but the following excerpt from his report presents an interesting sidelight on the way 
in which UN officials were becoming overwhelmed by the dilemma of so many impartial observers: 
"Next day by appointment I saw General Yakub . . . I told the general that I had been collecting 
evidence regarding the alleged reports of murder of innocent civilians in Elisabethville by United 
Nations troops, and that I wanted to ask him some questions. He said that 'No offense has been 
committed; there are only rumors.' I told him that I had not come to argue whether such offenses had 
been committed, but merely to ask whether any inquiry had been set on foot to find out whether there 
was any foundation to such an allegation. . . . The general would say nothing; he just sat and stared 
at me." As quoted by Sturdza, p. 26. 
22. "UN Troops Seize Katanga in an Eight Hour Street Battle," New York Times (September 14, 
1961). Also, Senator Thomas Dodd, Congressional Record (September 16, 1961). Also, Visa 
Procedures of Department of State, report to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (August 6, 
1962), p. 16. 
23. UN document