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[G. Edward Griffin] Fearful Master A Second Look (BookZZ.org)
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against Communists in government jobs. A Communist is head of the French atomic energy agency and was recently made advisor to the European center of nuclear research.2 It would be absurd not to expect the Communists to be well represented among France's quota of employees and delegates at the United Nations. Italy is in almost the same position. At each election for the past eight or nine years the Communists, posing as a legitimate political party, have gained a larger and larger vote at the polls to the point where today they hold the balance of political power in that country. Much of this power in Italy comes from the influential labor unions, the largest of which is completely Communist dominated. As the Wall Street Journal observed: The Italian government can't legally keep Communists out of the Government. Further, the laws there provide that questionable characters have the same right to government jobs as anybody else, even if the job is a "classified" position. Also, there are no statutes the Library of Congress can find to protect military secrets.3 Even Great Britain allows Communists to hold government jobs so long as they are not classified as sensitive positions. The British do not consider United Nations employment as sensitive.4 A Senate subcommittee investigating this situation reported that certain UN delegates from foreign countries have been invited to Communist party headquarters in New York to lecture local party leaders. One of these was from the French delegation who gave a speech on the problems of the French Communist party in relation to the situation in Indochina. The other was from the Indian delegation who lectured on the problems faced by the Communist party in India with the dissemination of propaganda.5 Mr. Joseph Z. Kornfeder, a former Communist who trained in Moscow and who specialized in methods of Communist political warfare in this country, spoke before the Congress of Freedom in 1955 and told his audience: How many Communists, fellow travelers and sympathizers there are among the UN employees, no one seems to know, but judging by their number among the American personnel, there can be no doubt that the Communists control the UN and its staff association, and use it for all its worth; which means that most of the special agencies at UN headquarters are, in fact, operated by them and coordinated through the Communist cell in the UN staff association.6 The situation was summarized by the U.S. News and World Report in 1952 when it stated: U.S. authorities have no power to dig into the backgrounds of UN employees from other nations, although they have information indicating heavy Communist infiltration among these employees. Some UN employees who come from Great Britain, France, Mexico, Canada and other non-Communist countries are known or suspected Communists. . . . An informed estimate suggests that as many as one-half of the 1,350 administrative executives in the UN are either Communists or people who are willing to do what they want.7 [Italics added.] Note that the date of this estimate was 1952. Communist influence within the governments of the world has greatly expanded during the intervening years. Since the United Nations was first launched in 1945 the secretary-general has traditionally been portrayed to the American people as the epitome of neutralism, the ideal non-Communist (as distinguished from an anti-Communist)--the truly impartial man. If the secretary-general had been portrayed as openly anti-American and pro-Communist, we Americans would have withdrawn our support long ago. Knowing this, the strategists decided from the very beginning to select men with obscure pasts; men who were not actual party members but who were ideologically so compatible that they could be relied upon to carry the ball for the party. A brief look at the record will illustrate the wisdom of this strategy. Trygve Lie: Politically, Trygve Lie, the first United Nations secretary-general, was a dedicated socialist, a labor lawyer, and a high ranking member of the Social Democratic Labor party in Norway- an offshoot of the early Communist International.8 According to Leon Trotsky, one of the founders of the worldwide Communist apparatus: "The Norwegian Workers' party had the reputation of being a radical party. . . . In the past, it belonged to the Third [Communist] International." Trotsky further revealed that Trygve Lie was no stranger to the Communists in those early days. Lie had visited Moscow in 1921 and, as Trotsky put it, had been identified with the Comintern at that time. When Trotsky--the archenemy and rival of Stalin--was exiled in Norway, Trygve Lie was the minister of justice of that country. Acting in accordance with the wishes of Stalin, Lie confronted Trotsky with an ultimatum of choosing between either ceasing all criticism of the Communist regime in Moscow or going to jail. Trotsky continued to write exposes of the ruthlessness of Stalin and his henchmen. Lie, consequently, had him thrown in prison and later deported him to Mexico.9 Commenting on the desirability of admitting Red China to the UN, Lie revealed an almost unbelievable naivety about the nature of Communism when he wrote: Once before, the world had seen a Communist state-- the USSR-- isolated by the West after a successful revolution. I had always believed that this was a great mistake and that the West, instead, should have sought every means to fuller intercourse with Russia in the 1920's. Such a policy might well have influenced the development of the Soviet state in a direction other than the one it took.10 One of the first items on the agenda of the newly created United Nations was the election of the president of the General Assembly. At first the United States delegation considered nominating Lie for the position but later shifted its support to Henri Spaak, a Belgian socialist. What happened next is described by Lie: On the morning of the 10th-- the day on which the president of the assembly was to be elected-- Feodore T. Gousev, the Soviet ambassador in London, sought me out. His delegation, he said, had been informed by the Americans of my withdrawal; nevertheless the USSR, together with its Eastern European associates, wanted to nominate me . . .. His delegation had conferred with the United States delegation upon hearing of my withdrawal and, as a result of the meeting, the Americans had agreed to revert to their original support of my candidacy. The Soviet Union would nominate me, he added, and the Americans would vote for me. . . . Mr. Gromyko strode to the rostrum and declared: "Weighing the candidatures which have recently been mentioned in connection with the election of the president the Soviet delegation has come to the conclusion that the most appropriate candidature would be that of the foreign minister of Norway, Mr. Trygve Lie." . . . Wincenty Rzymowski of Poland then rose in dutiful support of the nomination, and spoke of Norway and of me in generous terms. He was followed by Dimitri Manuilsky, the "old Bolshevik" from pre-Stalin days who was then foreign minister of the Ukrainian SSR. . . . Spaak won the election by just three votes, but, as Lie reminisced: "There is no doubt that the results of that election were felt long after, and clearly influenced the subsequent election of the secretary- general."11 The post of secretary-general is infinitely more important than that of president of the assembly. So when the time came to fill this post, Washington and Moscow once again moved in unison. Lie wrote: I recall something that Andrei Vyshinsky said in the course of a conversation in London just before my election as Secretary-General. It was a most friendly talk in which