[G. Edward Griffin] Fearful Master A Second Look (BookZZ.org)
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[G. Edward Griffin] Fearful Master A Second Look (BookZZ.org)

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Army constitutes a potential military threat to South Korea, since there is a strong 
possibility that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces, and thus induce 
our own withdrawal. This probably will take place just as soon as they can be 
sure that the North Korean puppet government and its armed forces which they 
have created are strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied 
upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops.2 
This, of course, is exactly what happened, but General Wedemeyer's report was, at Secretary of 
State George Marshall's insistence, suppressed and denied to both Congress and the public. 
After we had withdrawn most of our troops in accordance with a United Nations resolution, our Army 
general headquarters in South Korea began sending repeated and urgent reports to Washington 
warning that there was an unmistakable military buildup just above the 38th Parallel. One such report 
even contained the date of the expected North Korean attack.3 In spite of these reports, however, 
and despite the fact that money had been appropriated by Congress for the purpose of building up 
South Korea's defenses, officialdom somehow managed to stall and delay for over three months so 
that no military equipment--not even ammunition--was delivered to reinforce South Korea.4 Yet, when 
the attack finally came Washington officials pretended to be surprised and taken off guard. 
One thing is certain: if we knew that the Communists were preparing for over a year to attack South 
Korea, the Communists knew it too! That may seem too obvious to mention, yet nine out of ten 
Americans have never considered the possibility that the Communists wanted the United Nations to 
commit the U.S. to fight in Korea. If the Communists had not wanted the Korean War, they would not 
have started it. And if they had not wanted the UN to go through the motions of trying to oppose 
them, they would have vetoed the action in the Security Council. As part of the show, however, the 
Soviet delegation had stage-managed an impressive walkout supposedly in protest over the defeat of 
a motion to seat Red China. Consequently, when the attack came, the Soviets supposedly 
outsmarted themselves by not being on hand to administer the veto. But, as we have just stated, the 
assumption that the Communists did not know well in advance that the whole thing was coming is 
absurd. They planned it! The fact that they were conveniently absent when the issue came before the 
UN only shows that they needed a surface excuse to refrain from the veto. 
The actual course of the war is well known by all. Our tiny occupational force had been deliberately 
kept unprepared for the sudden massive assault. It was overwhelmed, backed into the Pusan pocket, 
and hovered on the brink of being pushed into the sea. There is no doubt that the Communists fully 
expected to sweep us off the peninsula with hardly any opposition, which would have been quite a 
prestige-builder for them around the world. They would have done it, too, if it had not been for the 
independent Americanism of General MacArthur and the bravery of his troops. As MacArthur, 
himself, recalled: "The only predictions from Washington at that time warned of impending military 
disaster. Then, too, our ammunition was critically short. . . . General [Walton] Walker, at one stage, 
was down to five rounds per gun. His heroically successful efforts under unparalleled shortages of all 
sorts constituted an amazing military exploit."5 
Hopelessly outnumbered by the enemy, General MacArthur conceived one of the most brilliant 
maneuvers in military history: the Inchon landing. It was a daring surprise flank attack aimed at 
cutting off the North Korean supply lines. It worked beautifully and, as a result, the enemy forces 
disintegrated and were nearly destroyed. As General MacArthur stated: 
By the latter part of October, the capitol of Pyongyang was captured. These 
events completely transformed the situation from pessimism to optimism. This 
was the golden moment to translate military victory to a politically advantageous 
peace. Success in war involves military as well as political considerations. For 
the sacrifice leading to a military victory would be pointless if not translated 
properly to the political advantage of peace. But what happened was just the 
There was early evidence that the North Korean forces were being trained and equipped by the 
Soviets and, after the Inchon landing, that the Chinese Communists were providing actual combat 
troops by the thousands.7 Lt. General Samuel E. Anderson, commander of the Fifth Air Force, 
revealed that entire Soviet Air Force units fought in the Korean War for over two and a half years "to 
gain combat experience for the pilots." All in all, some 425 Migs were being flown by Russian pilots.8 
The Soviets never even tried to conceal their part in the war. When United States Ambassador Lodge 
complained to the General Assembly's political committee that "Soviet planning instigated the original 
aggression, which was subsequently maintained by Soviet training and equipment," Vyshinsky, the 
Soviet delegate, calmly admitted the substance of the charge and replied, "Mr. Lodge is pushing at 
an open door."9 
In spite of all this, the United States Government refused to allow General MacArthur to pursue the 
enemy across the Yalu River or even to bomb the bridges over which the Chinese Communists 
transported their troops and supplies. The official reason given was to prevent a war between the 
United States and Red China! The real reason, since we were already in a war with Red China, was 
simply that the United Nations did not want us to obtain a victory in Korea, and we had, by this time, 
agreed to go along with whatever the UN wanted. 
The typical view of so many of our UN allies was expressed in The Fabian Essays, published in 
London in 1952, with a preface by Prime Minister Clement Attlee. On page 31 the author, R. H. 
Crossman, says: "A victory for either side [in the cold war] would be defeat for socialism. We are 
members of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO); but this does not mean that we are enemies of every 
Communist revolution. We are opposed to Russian expansion, but also to an American victory."10 
In 1950, when Congress appropriated rather substantial sums of money to carry on the Korean War, 
and it looked as though we just might start thinking in terms of pressing for a victory, Prime Minister 
Attlee rushed to the United States to confer with President Truman. His mission was aptly described 
by the U.S. News and World Report which stated: 
The British Government continues to maintain direct diplomatic relations with the 
Chinese Communists . . . even though Chinese armies were killing British 
youths. . . . To Mr. Attlee, China's Mao Tse-tung still is an official friend. . . . He 
does big business with the British through Hong Kong. British businessmen are 
accepted in China. . . . The British want to get rid of Chiang and turn Formosa 
over to the Communists. They oppose any move inside China that might 
embarrass the Communist regime. . . . Mr. Attlee still hopes for a deal covering 
Asia, while keeping up the appearance of a fight in Korea.11 
Mr. Attlee was needlessly alarmed, for on November 16, 1950, President Truman announced: 
"Speaking for the U.S. Government and people, I can give assurances that we support and are acting 
within the limits of the UN policy in Korea and that we have never at any time entertained any 
intention to carry hostilities into China."12 
When the Chinese crossed the Yalu, General MacArthur instantly ordered the bridges--six of them--
destroyed by our Air Force. Within hours his orders were countermanded from Washington. These 
bridges still stand. In his bitterness, the