MaxWeber cap I (1)

Prévia do material em texto

CHAPTER I
BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL
TERMS
Prefatory Note
An introduetory discussion of eoncepts can hardly be dispensed with,
in spíte of the fact that it is unavoidably abstract and hence gives the
ímpressíon of remoteness from realiry, The method employed makes no
claim to any kind of novelty. On the contrary it atternpts only to formu-
late what all ernpirical sociology really means when ir deaIs with the
sarne problerns, in what it is hoped is a more convenient and somewhat
more exaet terminology, even though on that aeeount it may seern
pedantic. This is true even where terms are used which are apparent!y
new or unfamiliar. As compared to the author's essay in Logos/ the
terminology has been simplified as Far as possible and hence considerably
changed in order to render it more easily understandabIe. The most
precise formulation cannot always be reconcíled with a forro which can
readily be popularized. ln such cases the Iatter aim has had to be
sacríficed.
On the concept of "understandíng'" compare the AUgemeine Psycho-
pathologie Df Karl Jaspers, also a few observations by Heinrich Rickert
in the second edition of the Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Be-
griffsbildung and particularly some of Simmel's discussions in ehe
Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie. For certain methodological con-
siderations the reader may here be referred, as often before in the
author's writings, to the procedure of Friedrich Cottl in hís work Die
-Herrschaft des WOTtes; this book, to be sure, is written in a somewhat
dífficuIt style and its argument does not appear everywhere to have been
thoroughly thought through. As regards contenr, reference may be made
4 BASIC SOCIOLOCICAL TERMS [eh. I
especially to the fine work of Ferdinand Tõnnies, Gemeinschaft UM
Cesellschaft, and also to me gravely misleading book of Rudolf Stamm-
ler, Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffas-
sung. which may be compared with my criticism in the Archiv für
Sozialwissenschaft (vol. 14. 1907. [GAzW. 2.91-359]). This criticai
essay contains many of the fundamental ídeas of the following exposí-
tion. The present work departs from Simmel's methcd (in his Soziologie
and bis Philosophie des Geldes) in drawing a sharp distinction between
subjecnvely intended and objectívely valid "meanlngs": twc dHferent
things which Simmel not onIy fails to distinguish but often deliberateIy
treats as belonging rogether.
I. The Definitionof Sociology and of Social Action
Sociology (In the sense in whích this-highly ambiguous word is used
here) is a science conceming ítself with the interpretive understanding
of social action and thereby with a causal explanatíon of its course and
consequences. \Ve shaII speak of "acdon" insofar as the acting individual
attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior-be it overt or covert,
omission ar acquíescence. Action is "social'fnsofar as its subjective mean-
ing takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby onented in its
course."
A. METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDA110NS4
I. "Meaning" may be of two kinds. The tenn may refer 6rst to the
actual existing meaning in the given concrete case of a particular actor,
or to the average ar approxímate meaning attributable to a gíven plurallty
of actors; ar secondly to the theoretically conceived pure typé of subjec-
tive meaning attríbuted to the hyporhetícel actor or actors in a given
type of action. ln no case does it refer to an objectively "correct" mcan-
ing ar one whích is "troe" in some metaphysícal sense. It is rhís which
distinguishes the empirical sciences of acüon, such as sociology and
hístory, fram the dogmatic disciplines in that area, such as jurisprudence,
logic, ethícs, and esthetics, which seek to ascertain the "true" and "valid"
meanings associared with the objecta of their investigatíon.
2. The line between meaningful action and merely reactive behavíor
to which no subjective meanlng is attached, cannot be sharply drawn
empiricaIly. A very considerable part of all sociologically relevara be-
havíor, espedally purely tradítíonal behavior, is marginal between the
I J Detinitions of Sociology and of Social Action 5
two. ln th.e case of some psychophysícal processes, meaningful, i.e., sub-
jectively understandable, action is not to be found at all; in others it is
discernible onlv by the psychologist. Many mystical experíences whích
cannot be adequately communicated in words are, for a person who is
noe susccptíble to such experlences, not fully understendable. At lhe
sarne rime the ability to perfonn a similaraction is not a necessary pre-
requisite to undersranding, "one need not have been Caesar in arder to
. understand Caesar." "Recapturlng an experienee" is important for ac-
curare understendíng, hut not ao ahsolute precondition for its interpreta-
tion. Understaudable and non-understandable components of a process
are cften intenningled and hound up togerher.
3. AlI Inrerpretation of meaning, like alI scienti6c ohservations,
stríves for clariry and verífiable accuracy of ínsíght and comprehensíon
(E17idenz:).~ The basís for certainty in understanding can be eíther
rational, which can be further subdívíded into logical and mathematical,
or it can be of an emotionally empathic or artistieally appreciative qual-
iry. Action is rationaIly evident ehie8y when we attain a completely clear
'fntellectual grasp of the action-elements in their intended context of
meaning. Empathíc or appreciatíve aecuracy is artaíned when, through
sympathetic parricipatíon, we can adequately grasp the emotional conrext
in which the acuon took place. The highest degree of rational under-
standing is anained in cases involving the meanings of logically or
mathernatically related propositions; their meaning may be immedíateIy
and unamhiguously intellígíble. We have a perfectIy elear understanding
of what ít means when somebody employs the proposition 2 X 2 = 4 or
the Pythagorean theorem in reasoning or argument, or when someone
correctly carnes out a logical train of reasoning aceording to our accepted
modes of thinkíng. ln the same way we also undersrand what a person
is doing when he tries to achieve certain ends by choosing appropriate
means on the basis of the faets of the situation, as expenence has accus-
tomed us to ínterpret them. The ínterpreratíon of such rarionally pur-
poseiul action possesses, for the understanding of the choice of means,
the highest degree of veri6able certaínty. With a Iower degree of
certainry, whích is, however, adequare for rnost purposes of explanation,
we are eble to understand errors, ineluding eonfusion of problems of the
sort that we ourselves are Iiable to, or the origin of which we can detect
by sympatheuc self-analysis.
On the orher hand, many ultímate ends ar values roward which
experience shows that human aetion may be oriented, often cannot be
understood completely, though sometimes we are able to grasp them
Intellectually. The more radícally they differ from our own ulrímate
values, however, thc more difficuIt it is for us to understand them em-
6 BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL TERMS [eh. I
pathlcally. Depending upon the círcumstances of the particular case we
must be content either wíth a purely intellectuel understandíng of such
values or when even thet faíls, sometimes we must simply accept them
as given data. Then we can try to understand the action motívated by
thern on the basis of whatever oppornmíties for approxímate emotíonal
and intellectual Interpretarlon seem to be available at different points in
its course. These diffi.cultiesconfront, for Instance, people not susceptible
10 unusual acts of religious and charitable zeal, OI persons who abhor
extreme rationalist fanarícísm (such as the fanatic advocaey of rhe
"ríghts of man"). -
The more we ourselves are susceptíble to such emotional reactíons as
anxiety, anger, ambition, envy, jealousy, lave, enthusiasrn, pride, venge-fulness, Ioyalry, devoríon, ando apperítes of ell sorts, andoto the "irrational''
conduct whieh grows out of them, the more readíly can we empatlríze
with them. Even when such emotions are found in a degree of inrensity
of which the observer hímself is complerely íncapable, he can stíll heve
a slgnificant degree of emotional understanding of their meaning and
can interprer íntellecrually rheir influence on rhe course of action and the
selection of means.
For rhe purposes of a typological scíentific analysís it is convenient to
treat aIl írradonal, affeceoally determíned elements of behavíor as faetors
of devíatíon from a conceptually pure type of rational aetion. For ex-
ample a panic 00 the stock exehange ean be most conveníently analysed
by attempting to determine 6rst what the course of aetion would have
been if it had not been inRuenced by irrarional affects, it is rhen possible
to íntrcduce the irrational eomponents as aceounting for the observed
deviatíons Irem this hypothetical course. Símilarly, in analysing a polit-
icai ar milírary campalgn ír is convenient to determine ín the first place
what wouJd have been a rational eourse, given the ends of the partící-
pants and adequare knowledge of all the círcurnstances. Only in thís
way is it possfble to assess the causal sígnificance of irrational faetors as
accounting for the devíations from rhis type. The construcdon of a
purely rational course of action in such cases serves the sociologist as
a type (ideal type) which has the merit of clear understandabíliry and
Jack of ambíguiry. By comperison with this it is possíble to understand
the ways in which actual action is influenced by irrationa] factors of alI
sorts, such as eflects and errors, in that they account for the deviátion
fram the line of conduet which would be expected 00 the hyporhesís
that the actíon were pureI y rationa].
Only in this respect and for these reasons of methcdologícal conven-
ience is the method of socioJogy "rarionaltstic.' It is naturally not legid-
mate to ínterpret this procedure aS invoJving a rationalistic bias of
1 J Definitians Of Sociology mui of Social Action 7
sccíology, but only as a methodological device. It certainly does not in-
volve a belief in the actual predominance of rational elements in human
life, for OD the question of how far this predominance does ar does not
exist, nothing whatever has been saído That there is, however, a danger
of rationalistic interpretations where they are out of place cannot be
denied. All experíence unfortunately confirma the exístence of this
danger.
4. ln aIl the sciences of human action, account must be taken of
processes and phenomena which are devoid of subjective meaning, in the
role of stímulí, results, favoring ar hindering circumstances. To be
devoid of meaning is not identical with being Iífeless ar non-human;
every artífact, such as for exemple a machine, can be understood only
in terms of the meaning which its production end use have had or were
íntended to have; a rneaning which may derive fram a relation to exceed-
ingly various purposes. Without reference to this meaning such an
object remains wholly unintelligible. That which is íntelllgíble or under-
standable about it is thus its relationto human action in the role either
'of means or of end; a relation of whích the actor or actors can be said to
have been aware and to whích their action has been oriented. OnIy in
terms of such categories isit possíble to "understend" objects of this kind.
On rhe other hand processes or conditions, whether they are animate or
inanimate, human or non-human, are in the present sense devoid of
meaning in so far as they carmot be related to an intended purpose. That
is to say they are devoid of meaning if they cannot be related to action
in the role of means ar ends but constitute only the stirnulus, the favor-
íng or hindering círcumsrances. lt may be rhat the Hooding of the
DoIlart [at the mouth of the Erns river near the Dutch-Gennan border]
in 1277 had historical sígnificance as a stimulus to the beginning of
certam migrations of considerable importance. Human mortality, indeed
the organic life cycle frorn the helplessness of infaney to that of old age,
is naturally of the very greatest sociological Importance through the
varíous ways in which human action has been oriented to these facts.
To still ancther category of facts devoid of meaning. belong certain
psychic or psychophysicaI phenomena such as fatigue, habítuation,
memory, etc.; also certain typical states of euphoría under some condi-
tions of ascetic mortification; 6nally, typical variations in the reactions of
individuaIs according to reacrion-time, precísíon, and orher rnodes. But
in the [ast analysís the sarne principIe appIies to these as to other
phenomena whích are devoid of meaning. Both the actor and the soei-
ologist must accept them as data to be taken ínto account.
It is possible that future research may be able to discover non-
interpretable uniformities under1ying what has appeared to be specif-
8 BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL TERMS reh. 1
ícally meaningful action, though little has been accompllshed in this
dírectíon thus faro Thus, for example, diflerences in hereditary hiological
constitution, as of "races," would have to be treared by sociology as gíven
data in the sarne way as the physiologicaI facts of the need of nutrition
or lhe effect of senescence 00 action. This would be the case if, and in-
safar as, we had statistically condusive proof of their íníluence 00 sccio-
logicaIly relevant behavíor. The reeognition of the causal sígníficance
of such factors would not in the leest alter the specífic task of scciological
analysis or of that of the orher sciences of ectíon, whích is the interpreta-
tion of action in tenns of its subjective meaning. The effect would be
OI"~y to lntroduce certain non-interpretable data of the sarne ceder as
otherswhich are already present, into the complex of subjecévely under-
standable motivation at certain poínts. (Thus it may come to be known
that there are typical relatíons between the frequeney of certain types of
teleologícal orientation of action ar of the degree of certain kinds of
ratíonalíty end the cephalic index ar skin colar ar any other bfologícally
ínherited cheracteríseic.)
5. Understandíng may be of two kinds: the first is the direct observa-
tionaI understanding' of the subjective meaning of a given act as such,
induding verbal utterances. We thus undersrand hy direct observetíon,
in this case, the meaning of the proposition 2 X 2 = 4 when we hear
ar read it. This is a case oE the direct rarional understanding of ideas.
We also understand an outbreak of anger as manlfested hy Facial expres-
sion, exclamatíons or irrational movernents. This is dírect observatíonal
understanding of irrationa] emoéonal. reacríons. We can understand in
a similar observational way the action of a woodcutter or of somebody,
who reaches for the knob to shut a door or who aims a gun at an animal.
This is rational observatíonal undersrendíng of acríons.
Understanding may, however, be oE another sort, namely explanarory
understandíng. Thus we understand in terms of motive the meaning an
actor atraches to the proposítíon twice rwo equals four, when he states
ir ar writes it down, in that we understand what makes hím do this at
precísely this moment and in these circumstances. Understanding in this
sense is attaíned if we know that he is engaged in balancing a ledger ar
ín making a scienrífic demonstration, or is engaged in some other task
oí which this particular act would be an appropriete parto This is ra-
tíonal understanding of modvation, which 'consists in placing the ad in
an inteIIigible and more inclusive context of meaning.3 Thus we under-
stand 'the chopping oE wood or aiming of a gun in terros of motive in
addition \~ direct ohservation if we know that tne woodchopper is work·
ingfor a wa:ge l)I is chopping a suppIy of 6rewood for his own use or
possibly is doing it for recreation. But he rnight also be working off a
Depnitions of Sociology and of Social Action 9
6t of rage, an irrational case. 8imiJarly we understand the motive of a
person aiming a gun if we know that he has been commanded to shoot
as a member of a 6ring squad, that he is fighting agaínst an enemy, or
that he is doing it for revenge. The last is affeetually detennined and
thus in a certain sense irrational. FinaUy we have a motivationaI under-
standíng of the outburst of anger if we know that it has been provoked
by jealousy, injured príde, or an insulto The Iasr examples are all eflec-
tually determined and hence derived from irracional motives. ln alI the
sbove cases the particular act has been placed ln an understandable
sequence of modvation, the understanding of which can be treared as an
explanatíon of the actual course of behavíor. Thus for a science which
is concemed with the subjective meaning of ection, explanation requires
a grasp of the complex of meaning in whích an actual course of under-
stendable action thus interpreted belongs. ln all such cases, even where
the processes are largely affectual, the subjective meaning of the action,
induding that also of the relevant meaning complexes, will be called the
-intended meaning." (This involves a departure fram ordinary usage,
which speaks of intention in rhis sense onIy in rhe case of rationally pur-
posive sction.)
6. ln alI these cases understanding ínvolves the interpretive grasp of
the meaning present in one of rhe following contexts: (a) as in rhe hís-
rorical epproach, the actually intended meaning for concrete individual
actíon, or (b) as in cases of sccíological mass phenomena, the average of
or an approximation to, the actually intended meaning; or (c) the mean-
ing appropríare to a scienufically formulated pure type (an ideal type)
of a common phenomenon. The concepts and "Iaws" of pure economic
theory are examples of this kind of ideal type. They state what course a
given type of human actíon would take if it were stríctIy rarional, un-
affected by errors or emotional factors and if, furthermore, ir were com-
pletely and unequivocally dírected to a single end, the maximization of
economíc advantage. ln reality, action takes exactly this course onIy in
unusual cases, às sometimes on the stock exchange: and even rhen there
is uSl!211y only an approximation to rhe ideal type. (On the purpose of
such construcnons, see my essayin AfS, I9 [cf. n. 5] and point 1 I below.)
Every inrerpretetíon attempts to atrain darity and certainty, but no
matter how clear an interpreration as -such appears to be from the point
of view of meaning, it cannot on this account claim to be the causally
velid interpretation. On this leveI it must remain only a peculiarly
plausible hypothesis. ln the 6rst place the "conscioLs motives" may weIJ,
even to the actor hirnseIf, conceaI the various "motives" and "repressions"
which constitute the real driving force of his action. Thus in such cases
even subjectively honest self-analysis has onIy a relative value. Then it
I O BASIC SOClOLOGICAL TERMS [eh. I
is the task of the sociologíst to be aware of this motivational situation
and to deserihe and analyse ír, even though it has not actuaIly been con-
cretely part of the conscious intention of the actor; possíbly not at ali,
at leasr not fully. Thís is a borderline case of the ínterpretatíon of mean-
lng. Secondly, processes of actíon which seem to an observer to be the
sarne ar similar may .6t intc exceedingly various complexes of motive in
the case of the actual actor. "Ihen even though the situatíons appear
superficíally to be very similar we must acrually understand them ar
interpret them as very diflerent, perhaps, in terms of meaning, direccly
opposed. (Símmel, in his Probleme der Geschichtsphilosopltie, gives a
number of examples.) Third, the ectors in any given situation are often
subject to opposíng and conflíctíng impulses, all of whích we are able to
understand. ln a large number of cases we know from experíence it is
not_possíble to arrive ar even an approximate estimate of the relative
strength of conHicting motives and very often we cannot be certain of
our ínterpretatíon. Only the actual outeorne of the confiíct gives a solid
basis of judgment.
More generally, verificarion of subjective interpretaríon by compari-
son with the concrete course of events is, as in rhe case of aIl hypotheses,
índíspensable. Unfortunately rhís type of verificatíon is Feasíble with
relative accuracy only ín the few very specíal cases susceptible of
psychologicalexperimentation. ln very different degrees of approximation,
such verification is also feasible in the limited number of cases of mass
phenomena which can be statisrically described and unambiguously
inrerpreted. For the rest there remains only the possíbility of comparing .
the largest posslble number of hisrorical or contemporary processes
which, whíle otherwise similar,-differ in rhe one decisive point of their
relation to the particular motive ar factor rhe role of which is being
ínvestigared. Thís is a fundamental task of comparative sociology.
Often, unfonunately, there is avaíleble onIy the uncertain procedure
of rhe "ímagínary experirnent" which consista in thinking away certain
elements of a chain of motivation and working ouc the course of actíon
which would then probebly ensue, thus arriving at a causal judgmenr."
For example, rhe generalization called Gresham's Law is a rarionally
clear interpretation of human actíon under certain condídons and under
the assumptíon that ir wíll follow a purely rarional course. How far any
actual course of action corresponde to this can be verified only by the
available statistica] evidence for the actual dísappearance of under-valued
monetary units from circulatíon. ln this case our information serves to
demonstrare a high degree of accuracy. The facts of experience were
known before the generalizaríon, which was formulated aíterwerds;
but withour this successful interpretation our need for causal undersrand-
Depnitions of Socíology and Df Sociol Action I I
ing would evídenrly be Ieft unsarísfied. On the other !tand. without the
demonstratian rhet what can here be assumed to be a theoretically ade-
quate interpretatian alsc is in some degree relevem to an actual course
of action, a "law," no matter how fully demonsrrated theorericelly, would
be worthless for the understanding of ecdon in the real world. ln thís
case the correspondence between the theoretical lnterpreration of motiva-
tion and its empírica] veríficaüon is entirely sansfecrory and the cases are
numerous enough 50 that verífication can be consídered established. But
to take enother example, Eduerd Meyer has advanced en ingenious
theory of the causal signíficence of the battles oE Marathon, Salamis, and
Platea for the developmenr of the cultural peculiaríties of Greek, and
hence, more generally, Western, civilizaüon." This is derived from a
meaningfuI interpretation of certein symptomatic facts having to do
with the attitudes of the Greek orecles and prophets towards the Per-
sians. It can only be directly verífied by reference to the examples of the
conduct of the Persians in cases where they were víctoríous, as in
Jerusalem, Egypt, and Asia Minor, and even this verification must neces-
.serily remain unsatisfactory incertain respeets. The striking retíonal
plausíbility of the hypothesis must here necessarily be relied on as a sup-
porto ln very many cases of historical interpretation which seem highly
plausíble, however, there is not even a possibllíty of the order of verifica-
rion which was feesíble in rhis case. Where thís is true the interpretaríon
must necessarily remain a hypothesis.
7. A motive is a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the
actor hímselfor to the observer an adequare ground for the conducr in
questiono The interpreration of a coherent course of, conduct is "sub-
jectívely adequate" (or "adequare on the levei of meaning"), insofar as,
according to óur habitual medes of thought and feeling, its component
parts taken in their mutual relation are recognized to constitute a
"typícel" complex of meaníng." 11 is more comrnon to say "ccsrect." The
Inrerpretation of a sequence of events will on the other hand be called
causally adequare insofar as, according to esrablíshed generaIizations
. from experience, there is a prohahility that it will always actuelly occur
in the sarne way. An example of adequacy on the level of meaning
in this sense is what is, according to our current nonns of calculation or
thinking. the ccrrecr solution of an arithmeticaI problem. On the other
hand, a ceusally adequate ínterpretation of the sarne phenomenon would
concem the statistica] prohability that, according to veri6ed generaliza-
tíons fram experíence, there would be a correct or ao erronecus solution
of the sarne problem. Thís alsc refers to currently accepted nonns hut
includes taking account of typícal errors ar of typical confusions. Thus
causal explanation depends OD being able to determine that there is a
12 BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL TBRMS [eh. I
probabílity, which in the rare ideal case can be numerically stated, but is
always in some sense celculeble, that a given observable event (overt ar
subjective) wilI be foHowed. or accompanied hy enother evento
A correct causal interpretation of a concrete course of aetion is arrived
at when the overr aetion and the motives have both been correctly appre-
hended and at the sarne time their relation has become meaningfully
comprehensihle. A ccrrect causal intcrpretation of typical action means
that the process which is claimed to he rypícel is shown to be both ade-
quately grasped cn the Ievel of meaning and atthe sarne time the inter-
pretation is to some degree causaIly adequete. If adequacy in respect to
meaning is Ieckíng, then no matter how high the degree of unifonnity
and how precísely its prohahility can he numericaIly determined, it is
still an incomprehensihle statistical probabílíty, whether we deal with
overt ar subjective processes. On the other hand, even the most perfect
adequacy on the level of meaning has causal sfgnificance from a socío-
Iogícal point of view only insofar as there is some kind of proof for the
existence of a probabtlíry" that action in fact normaIly takes the course
which has been held to be meaningful. For this there must be some
degree of determinable frequency of approxímation to an average or a
pure rype.
Statistical uníformities constitute understandable types of action, and
thus constitute sociologícal generalizations, only when they can be
regarded as manífestatíons of the understandabIe subjective meaning of
a COUISe of social. actíon. Conversely, formulations of a rational course
of subjectively understandable action constitute sociological types of
empirical process only when they can be ernpiricaIly observed with a.
sígnificant degree of approxímaticn. By no means is the actual Iíkelíhood
of the occurrence of a given COUISe of overt action always directly pro-
portional to the clarity of subjective interpretatioo. Only actual experi-
ence can prove whether this is 50 in a given case. There are statistics of
processes devoíd of subjective meaning, such as death rates, phenomena
of fatigue, the production rate of mechínes, the amount of rainfall, in
exactly the sarne sense as there are statistics of meaningful phenomena.
But onIy when the phenomena are meaningful do we speak of socío-
logical statistics. Examples are such cases as crime rates, occupatíonal
distributions, príce statísncs, and stetístícs of crop acreage. Naturally
there are many cases where both components are involved, as in crop
statistics.
8. Processes and uníformítíes which it has here seemed convenient
not to designate as socíological phenomena ar uniformíríes because they
are not "understendeble," are naturally nor 00 that account any the less
ímportant. Thls is troe even for sociology in our sense which is restricted
I ] Definirions of Sociology and of Social Action I 3
to subjectively understandable phenomene-c-a usage which there is no
intention of attempting te impose OD anyone eIse. Such phenomena,
however important, are simply treated by a di1ferent method from the
others; they becorne condíticns, stimuli, furthering or híndering circum-
stances of action.
9. Action in the sense of subjectively understandable orientation of
behavior exísrs cnly as the behavíor of one ar more individual human
beíngs. For other cognitive purposes it may he useful or necessary to
consider the individual, for instance, as a collectíon of cells, as a ccmplex
of bio-chemical reactions, ar to conceíve hís psyehic !ife as made up of
a variety of differentelements, however these may be de6ned. Llndoubt-
edly such procedures yield valuable knowledge of causal relatíonshíps.
But the behavior of these elements, as expressed in such unfformíties,
is not subjectively understandable. This is true even of psychic elements
because the more precisely they are fonnulated from a point of view of
natural scíence, the Iess they are eccessíble to subjective understanding.
,This is never the road to interpretation in terms of subjective rneaning.
On the contrary, both for sociology in the present sense, and for history,
the ohject of cognition is the subjective rneaning-complex of acciono The
behavior of physiologicaI entities such as cells, ar of any sort of psyehic
elements, may ar [east in princíple be observed end an attempt mede to
derive uniforrnities frorn such observations. It is further possihle to
attempt, with thelr help, to ohtain a causal explenatíon of individual phe-
nomena, that is, to subsume them under uniformíties. But the subjective
understanding of action tales the sarne account of this type of fact and
uniformity as of any others not capable of subjective Inrerpretadon.
(This is true, for example, of physícal, estronomícal, geologícal, mereor-
ologícal, geographícal, botanicel, zoological, and anatómica] Facts, of those
aspects of psycho-pathology which are devoid of subjective meaníng, or
of the natural condítions of technologícal processes.)
For still other cognitive purposes--for instance, juristic ones-c-or for
, practícal ends, it may on the other hand be convenient or even indispensa-
ble to treat social collectivíríes, such as stetes, assccietíons, buslness corpora-
tions, foundaríons, as if they were individual persons. Thus they may he
treated as the subjects of rights and duties or as the performers of legally
significant actions. But for rbe subjective Interpretancn of action in socío-
logical work these collectivities must be treared as solely the resultants
and modes of organizatíon of the particular ects of individual persons,
since these alone cen be treeted as agents in a course of subjectively
understandahle action. Nevertheless, the sociologist cannot for his pur-
poses afford to ignore these collective concepts derived. from other
disciplines. For the subjective interpretation of action has at least three
14 BASIC SOC!OLOGICAL TERMS [eh. I
r
important relatíons to these concepts. ln the 61'$t place it is often neces-
sary to employ very similar collective concepts, indeed often using the
same terms, in order to obtaín an intelligible tenninology. Thus both in
legal terminology end in everyday speech the term "srate" is used both
for the legal concept of the state and for the phenomena of social action
to whích its legal roles are relevant. For sccíological purposes. however,
tl.e phenomenon ....the state" does not consist necessarily ar even primarily
of the elements whicb are re1evant to legal analysis; and for sociological
purposes .there isno such thíng as a collective personality which "ects."
When reference is made in a sociological context to a state, a natíon, a
corporation, a famíly, ar an army corps, Dr to similar collectivities,
what is meant is, on the contrary, emIr a certain kínd of development of
actual ar possible social ectíons of individual persons. Both beceuse of its
precision and because Jt is established in general usage .me juristic con-
cept is taken over, but is used in an entireIy different meaníng.
Secondly, the subjective interpretation of action must take account
of a fundamentally important facto These concepts of collective entities
which are found both in common sense and in juristic and other tech-
nical forms of thought, have a meaning in the minds of individual per-
sons, partly as of something actuaIly existing, partIy as something with
normative euthority. Thís is true not onIy of judges end officials, but of
ordinary privare individuaIs as well. Actors thus in part orient their
action to them, and in this role such ídeas have a powerful, often a
decisive, causal inBuence on the course of action of real individuaIs. This
is above all true where the ideas involve normative prescríption or pro-
hibitíon. Thus, for instance, one of the important ~t.i. of the exíst- '
ence of a modem state, precisely as a complex oÍ'9t'Jéial interaction of
individual persons, consists in the fact that the action of various indi-
viduaIs is oriented to the belíef that ít exists or shouId exist, thus that
its acts and lews are valid in the legal sense. Thís will be further dis-
cussed below. Though extremely pedantic and cumbersome, it would be
possíble, if purposes of sccíological terminology alone were involved, to
.elíminate such terms entírely, and substitute newly-eoined words. Thís
.would be possible even though the word "srate" is used ordinarily not
onIy to designate the legal concept but aIso the real process of action.
But ín the above important connexíon, et Ieast, this would naturally be
ímpossíble.
ThirdIy, it is the method of the so-ealled "organíc" school of sociology
-classical examp]e: Schãfile's brilliantwork, Bau und Leben des
sozialen K6ryers-to attempt to understand social interaction by using as
a point of departure me "whole" within which the individual acts. His
action and behavior are then interpreted somewhat in the way that a
•
I ] Definitkms of Sociology and of Social Action I 5
physiologíst would treat the role of an organ of the body in the "economy"
of the organism, that is from rhe point of view of the survival of the
latter. (Compare the famous díctum of a weH-known physiologist: "Sec.
roo The spleen. Of the spleen, gentlemen, we know nothing. So much
for the spleen.' Actually, of course, he knew a good deal about rhe
spleen-its pcsiríon, size, shape, etc.: but he eould say nothing about its
funcríon, and it was his ínabílíry to do this ehar he cslled "lgnorance.")
How far in other disciplines thís type of funetional analysis of the rela-
tion of "parts" to a "whole" can be regarded as defini tive, cannot be dis-
cussed here, but it is well known that the bío-chemícal and bio-physícal
modes of analysis of the organism are on principie opposed to stopping
rhere. For purposes of scciologícal analysis two things can be saído First
this functíonal frame of reference is convenienr for purposes of practícal
íllustration and for provisional orientation. ln rhese respects. it is not
only useful but indíspensable. But at the sarne time If its cognitive vaIue
is overestímeted and its concepts illegitimately "relfied,"!' it can be highly
.dangerous. Secondly, in certain circurnstances this is the only evaíleble
way of determining just what processes of social action it is important to
understand in arder to explaín a given phenomenon. But this is onIy ehe
beginning of sociological analysis as here understood. In the- case of
social collectívíríes, precisely as distinguished from organisms, we are in
a positíon to go beyond merely demonstrating functional relationships
and uniforrníties. We can accomplísh something which is never attain-
able in the natural sciences, namely the subjective understanding of the
aetion of the component indivíduels. The natural sciences on the other
hand cannot do rhis, being Iimited to the formulatíon of causal uni-
fonnities in objects and events and rhe explanation of individual facts
by applying them. We do not "understand" the behavior of cells, but can
only observe the relevant Iunctíonel relatíonships and generalize on the
hasis of these observanons. This addítional achíevernent of explanaríon
. by interpretive understanding, as distinguished Eram -exremal observa-
tion, is of course ettained only at a price-the more hypothencel and
fragmentary character of its results. Neverrheless, subjective understand-
ing is the specífic characrerisríc of socíological knowledge. •
Ir wouId lead too far a6eld even to atterrrpt to discuss how far rhe
behavior of animais is subjectívely understandable to us and viee versa;
in both cases the meaning of the term understanding and its extent of
appIication would be highly problematieaI. But in so far as such under~
standing existed ir would be theoretically possible to fornmlate a sOOoI-
ogy of the relations of men to animaIs, both domestic and wild. Thus
many animals "understand" commands, anger, love, hostility, and reaet to
rhem in ways which are evidentIy often by no means purely instinctive
BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL TBRMS [eh. I
and mechanicaI and in some sense both consciously meaningful and
affected by experience. ln a way, our abiliry to share the feelings of
prinútive men is not very much greater. We either do not have any
relíable means of determining the subjective state of mind of an animal
ar what we have is at hest very unsatisfactory. Ir is well known that the
problems of animal psychology, however ínterestíng, are very thomy
0JleS. There are in particular various forms of social organization among
anímals: monogamous and polygamous "famílies," herds, Hocks, and
6nally "stetes,' with a functional division of labour. (The extent oE func-
tíonal differentiation found in these animal socíetíes is by no rneans,
however, entirely a matter of the degree of organic or morphological
dííferenneríon of me individual members of rhe specíes. Thus, the func-
tionaI differentiation found among the termites, and in consequence that
of theproducts of their social actívítíes, is much more advanced than in
the case of the bees and ents.) ln this field it goes without saying that a
purely functional point of view is often the besr that can, at least for the
present, be attained, and the investigator must be content with it. Thus
it is possible to study the ways in which the species provides for its
survival; that is, for nutrition, defence, reproduction, and reconstrucuon
of the social units. As the principal bearers of these functions, differentí-
ated types of individuaIs can he identi6ed: "kíngs," "queens," "workers,'
"soldíers,' "drenes,' "propagators,' "queen's substitutes," and 500n. Any-
thing more than thatwas for a long time merely a matter of-speeulation
or of an attempt to determine the extentto which' heredity on the one
hand and envircnment on the other would he involved in the develop-,
ment of these "social" proclivities. This was particularly true of the con-
'- trovetsíes between Gõtte and Weismann. U The [atter's concepríon in Die
AUmach~' der Naturzikhtung was largely based on wholly non-empirical
deduetions. But alI serious authorities are naturally fully egreed that the
Jimitatíon of analysis to the functíonal leveI is only a necessity Imposed
by cur present Ignorance, which it is hoped wíll onIy be temporary. (For
an account of the state oE knowledge of the termites, for example, see
the study by Karl Escherich, Die Termuen oder weissen Ameisen,
19"9·)
• '-c. - The researchers wouldlike to understand not onIy the reIatively
obvious surviwl funetions of these various diílerentíated types, but also
the bearing of different veríants of the theory of heredity or its reverse
en the problem of explaining how these difFerentiations have come
about. Moreover, they would Iíke to know first what Factors account for
the original differentiation of specíalized types From the stíll neutral
undifferentíared species-type. Secondly, it would be important to know
what Ieads the díflerentiated individual in the typical case_to behave
I J Definitions ai Sociology and of Social Actlon I 7
in a way-which acrually serves the survival valueof the organiud group.
Wherever research has madeany progress in lhe solution of these prob-
lems it has been through the experimental demonstratíon of the prob-
ability ar possíbílity of the role of chemical stimuli cr physiological
processes, such as nutritional states, lhe effects of parasitic castration,
etc., in the case of the individual organismo How far mete is even a
hope that the existence of "subjective" ar "meaningful" crient ation could
be made experimentally probable, even the specialíst today would hardly
be in a position to say. A verifiable conception of the srate of mind of
these social animaIs eccessible to meaningfuI understanding, would seem
to be attainable even as an ideal goal only within narrow [Imits, How-
ever that may be, a contribution to the understanclíng of human social
aetion is hardly to be expected from this quarteto On the contrary, in the
6eld of animal psychology, hurnan analogies are and must be continually
employed. The most that can be hoped for is, then, that these biologícal
anaIogies may some day be useful in suggesting signi6cant problems.
For instance they may throw light on the question of the relative role in
.the early stages of human social differentiation of mechanical end in-
stinctive Iactors, as compared with that of lhe factors which are accessíble
to subjective interpretation generally, and more particuIar1y to the role
of consciously rationa] actíon. It is necessary for the socíologist to be
thoroughly aware of lhe Iact that in the early stages even of htiman
developrnent, the 6rst set of fectors is completely predominant. Even in
the later stages he must take account of their continual interaction with
the others in a role which is often of decisive importance. This is par-
ticular1y true of alI "tradicional" action and of many aspects of charisme,
which contain the seeds of certam types of psychic "contagion" end thus
give rise to new social developments. These types of actíon are 'very
closely related to phenomena which are understandabIe either only
in bíological terms or can be interpreted in terms of subjective motives
onIy ín fragments. But alI these Iacts do not díscharge sociology from the
oblígation, in fuIl awareness of the narrow limits to which it is conflned,
to accomplish what it aIone can do.
The various works of Othmar Spann [I878-I950J are often full of
suggestive ideas though at the sarne time he is guilty of occasional mís-
understandings and ebove alI of arguing on the basis of pure value
judgments which have no place ín an empírícal ínvestígetíon. But he is
undoubtedly correct in doing something to whích, however, no one seri-
ously objects, namely, emphasizing the sccíological sígníficance of the
functional point of view for preliminary orientation to problems. This is
what he calls the "universalístic method." It is true that we must know
what kind of action is functionally neçessary for "survíval," but even
BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL TERMS [eh. I
more so for the maintenance of a cultural type and the continuity of the
correspondinj, rnodes of social action, before it is possíble even to inquire
how thís acuo.i has come about and what motives determine it. It is
neeessary to know what a "king," an "officíal," an "entrepreneur," a
"prccurer,' or a "magicían" does, that is, what kind of rypical action, whieh
justifies classifying an individual in one of thesé'categories, is important
and relevam for an analysis, before ir is possible to undertake rhe analysís
itself. (This is what Rickert means hy Werthezogenheit.) But it is only
thís analysis írself whích ean aehieve the sociologícal understandíng of
rhe aetions of typieally díflerentiated human (and only human) índi-
viduals, and whieh hence constitutes the specific funetion of sociology.
It is a trernendous misunJerstanding to think thar an "índívidualístíc"
method should involve what is in any conceivable sense an individualistic
system of values. It is as importam to avoíd this error as rhe relared one
which confuses rhe unavoidable tendency of sociological eoneepts to as-
sume a ratíonalistíc character with a belief in the predominance of
racional motives, or even a positive valuation of rationalism. Even a
socialistic economy would have to be understood sociologically in exactly
the sarne kind of "indivídualísric" terras; that is, in terms of the action
of índíviduals, the types of officials found in it, as would be rhe case
with a system of Free exchange analysed in terms of the theory of mar-
ginal utility or a "bener," but in this respect similar theory). The real
empirical sociological investigation begins with the quesrion: What
motives determine and lead the individual members and partícípants in
thís sccialistic communi-y to behave in such a way that the community
carne imo being ín the first place and that it continues to exisr? Any'
form of functionaI analysis which proceeds from the whole to the parts
can accomplish only a prelímínary prepararíon for this investigation-
a preparation, the utilíry and indíspensability of whích, íf properly car-
ried out, is narurally beyond questiono
IO. Ir is customary to designare various sociological generalizarions,
as for example "Gresham's Law," as "laws." These are in Fact typieal
probabílíoes confirmed by observetion to the efiect that under certain
given conditions an expected course of social action will occur, which is
understandable in tenns of the rypical motiyes and typícal subjective
intentions of the actcrs. These generalízations are borh understandable
and definire in the highest degree insofar as the typieaIly observed course
of acrion can be understood in terms of the purely rational pursuit of
an end, or where for reasons of methodological conveníence such a
theoretical type can be heunstícally emplcyed. ln surh cases the relatíons
of rneans and end will be clearly understandable on grounds of experi-
ence, particularly where rhe choice of means was "inevírable." ln such
Definitions of Sociology and of Social Action r 9
cases it is legitimare to essert that insolar as rbe aetion was rigorously
rationa] it could not have taken any other course because for rechnícal
reesons, given their clearly defined ends, no other means were available
to the actors. This very case demonstrares how crroneous it is to regard
any kind of psyehology as the ultimare foundation of the scciological
interpretation of actíoo. The tenn psychology, to be sure, is today
understood in a wide variety of senses. For certain quite specífic method-
ologícal purposes the type of treatment whieh atteIPpts to follow the
procedures of the natural sciences employs a distlncüon between
"phystcal" and "psychic" phenomena which is entírely foreign to the
disciplines coneerned with human action, at least in the present sense.
The results of a type of psychologicaI invesngatíon wluch employs the
methods of the natural sciences in any one of various possible ways may
naturally, like the results of any other science, have outstanding signíf-
icance for scciological problems: indeed thís has often happened. But
this use of the results of psychology is something quite different From
.the investigarion of human behavíor in terms of its subjective meaning.
Hence socíology has no closerrelationship on a general analytícal level _
to thís type of psychology than to any other scíence. The SOUIce of error
Iies in the concept of the "psychíc." It is held rhat everything which is ,
not physical is ipso facto psyehic. However, rbe meaning of a train of
mathematical reasoning which a persan carnes out is not in rhe relevant
sense "psychic.' Similarly the rational dellberatíon of an actor as to
whether rhe rcsults of a given proposed course of action wíll or will not
promete certain specífic inrerests, and the correspondíng decision, do
not becomc one bit more understandable by taking "psychological" con-
síderauons into account. But it is preeisely on the basis of sueh ratíonal
assumptíons that most of the Iaws .of socíology, índuding those of eco-
nomics, are built "I': On the orher hand, in explainíng the írratíonalítíes
of actíon socíologically. rhat form of psychology which employs the
merhod of subjective undcrstandíug undoubtedly can make decisively
Importam contriburíons. But this does not alter the fundamental ,ietll-
odologicalsíruation. •
I I. We have taken for granted that sociology seeks to formulate type
concepts and generalized uniformítíes of empirical processo This dís-
tinguishes it from hístory, 'whích is oriented to the oeusel analysis and
explanaríon of individual ections, strucrures, and personalítíes possessíng
cultural sígníficance. The empírical material which underlies the con-
cepts of sociology consists to a very large extenr, though by no meaqs
exdusively, of the sarne eoncrete processe! of action which are deaIt witJ1
by historians. An important consideration in the fomlUlation of soei-
ologicaI concepts and generalizations is the con;rifSution that sociology
>0 BASIC SOCIOLOGlCAL TBRMS [eh. I
can make toward the causal explanation of some historically and cul-
turally important phenomenon. As in the case of every generaIizing
scíence the ahstraet character of tbe concepts of sociology is responsible
for the fact that, compered with actual historieaI realíey, they are rela-
rívely lacking in fullness of concrete contento To compensare for this
disadvantage, sociological analysis can offer a greater precision of con-
_,_ cepts. This precision is obtained by striving for the highest possible
degree of adequacy 00 the level of meaning. It has already been te-
peatedly seessed tIui, this aim can be reelized in a particularly high
degree in tbe case of concepts and generalizations which formulare
rationaI processes. SUl sociological investigation attempts to include in
i15 scope wrious irrational phencmene, such as prophetic, mystic, and
affectuaI modes of actíon, formulated in terms of theoretical concepts
which are adequare 00 the leveI of meaning. ln tdl cases, rarional ar
. irrational, socioIogical analysis both abstracts From reality end at the
sarne time helps us to understand it, in thet it shows wísh whae degree of
approximation a concreta historical phenomenon can besubsumed under
one or more of theseconcepts. Forexample, the sarne historícal phenome-
non may be in one aspeet feudal, in anot:her patrimonial, in encther
bureaucratic,and in still another charismatic. ln ceder to give a pre-
cise meaning to these terms, it is necessary for the sociologist 10 fonnulate
pure ideal types oE the conespondingforms oE action which in each case
involve tbe highest possible degree of logical integration by virtue oE
their complete adequacy on the leYeI of meaning. But precisely hecause
lhis is true, it is probably seldom if ever thar a real phenomenon can be
found which corresponds exactly 10 cee of these ídeelly constracted pure
types. The case is similar to a pLysical reaction whích has been cal-
culated on me assumption oE an absolute vacuum. Theoretical differ-
eneiatíon (Kes- istik) is possibIe ÍD sociology only in terms oE ideal or
pure types. It goes -ithout sayUIg that in addition it is convenient for
me sociologist [rom time tQ time to employ average types of an em-
-drícal stadsfical' character,concepts which do not require methodologícal
discussion. But when reference is made to "typícal" cases, the termshould
always be UDderstood, uniess. ochawise steted, as meaning ideol types,
which may in turiibe: rationaJ. ar imldona! as the case may be (drus
in economic theory &hey are alwa:ys rational), hut in any caseare always
constructed witb19iew to adequacy on the level oE meaning.
It is importanl lO realize that ín the sccíclogícal Beld as elsewhere,
averages,and hente average types, can be formulated with a relative
degree of precisio" onIy whese lbey are concemed with dilferences of
degree in respeet to ectíon wbicb remains qualitatively the sarne. Such
cases do cccur, but ~ the majorítyof cases oE action important to. hístory
Defmitions of Sociology and of Social Action
ar sociology the motives which determine it are quelitatívely heterogene-
ouso Then it is quite impossfble to speak of an "average" in the troe sense,
The ideal types of social action whích for instance are used in economic
theory are thus unrealístíc or abstract in that they always ask what course
of action would take place íf it were purely racional and oriented to
economícends alone. This constructíon can be used to aid in the under-
standing of 'action not purely economicaIly detennined but which in-
volves deviations arising from ttaditional restraints, affects, errors, end
the íntrusion of other than economic purposes or considerations. This
can take place ín rwoways. First, in ana1ysíng the extent to which in the
concrete case, or on the average for a cIass of cases, the action was in
part economícally detennined along wíth the other Factors. Secondly, hy
throwing the discrepancy berween the actual course of events and the
ideal type into relief, the analysís of the non-eeonomic motives actually
involved is facilitated. The procedure would be very similar in emplcy-
ing an ídeal type of mystical oríentatíon, wíth its appropriate attitude of
'indifference to worldly things, as a tool for analysing íts consequences
for the actor's relation to ordinary life-for Instance, to politícal or eco-
nomic affairs. The more sharply and precísely the ideal type bas been
constructed, thus the more ebstracr and unrealistic in this sense it is, the
better it is able to perfonn its functions in fonnuIating tenninology,
clessificatíons, and hypotheses. ln working out a concrete causai explana-
rion of individual events, the procedure of the historian is essentially the
sarne. Thus in attempting to expIain the campaign of 1866, it is in-
dispensahle both in the case of Moltke and of Benedek to atternpt to
construct imaginativeIy how each, given fully adequate knowledge both
of his own sítuatíon and of that of hís opponent, would have acted,
Then ít is possible to compare wíth this the actual course of action and
to arrive at a causal explanetíon oE the observed devíatíons, which will
be attrihuted to such fectors as misinfonnation, strategical errors, logical
, fallacíes, personaI temperament, or corisiderations outside the reaIm of
sttategy. Here, too, an ideel-typícal constructíon of rational action is
actually employed even rhough it is not made explicito
The theoretícal concepts ofsociology are ideal types not onIy from the
objective point of view, but also in their applícetícn to subjective proc-
esses. ln the great majority of cases actual action goes cn in a state of in-
articulate half.consciousness or actual unconsciousness of its subjective
meaning. Tbe actor is more likeIy to <lhe awere" oE it in a vague sense than
he is to "know" what he is doing ar be explicitly self-eonscious about ir.
ln most cases his action is governed hy impulse ar habito OnIy occasion-
ally and, ín the uniform action of Iarge numhers, often" onIy ín the case
of a few individuaIs, is the subjective meaning of the actíon, whether
BASIC SOCIOLOOICAL TBRMS [Ch~ I
racional or irrational,brought dearly into consciousness. The ideal type
of meaningful action where the meaning is fully conscíous and explicít
is a marginal case. Every socíologícel or historical investigation•.in apply-
ing its analysis to the empírica] facts, must take this fact into account.
But the difE.culty need not prevent the sociologist from systematizing his
concepts by the clessiíicanon of possíble types of subjective meaning.
That is, he may reason as if action actually proceeded on the basis of
clearly self-eonscious meaning. lhe resulting deviation fecm the concrete
Facrs must continually be kept in mind whenever it is a question of this
level of concreteness, and must becarefully studied with reference both
to degree and kind. It is often necessary to choose between terms whích
are either clear or unclear. Those which are clear wíll, to be sure, have
the abstracmess of ideal types, but they are nane the less preferable for
scienrífic purposes. (On alI these quesrions see "'Objectivity' in Social
Science and Social Polícy.")
B. SOCIAL ACTION
I. Social action, which includes both failure to act and passive
acquiescence, may,be oríented to the past, present, or expected future
behavior cf others. Thus it may be motivated by revenge for a past
anack, defence against presento or measures of defence agaínst future
aggression. The "others" may be individual persons, and may be known
to the actor as such, or may constitute an indefinite plurality and may
be entirely unknown as individuaIs. (Thus, money is a means of ex-
cheng . which the actor accepts in payment because he orients his actícn
to the expeetation that a large but unknown number of individuaIs he is
personelly unacquainted with will be ready to accept it in exchange on
some future occasion.)
2. Not ev, . kind of action, even of overt action, is "social" in the
sense of the present discussion. Overt action is non-social if it is oriented
sole1y to the behavior of inanimate objects. Subjective attitudes constitute
social action only 50 far as they are oriented to the hehavior of others. For
example, religious behavior is not social if it is simply a matter of con-
templation or of solítary praye:. The economic activity of an individual
is social only if it takes account of the behavior of someone else. Thus
very generalIy it becomes social insofar as the actor assumes that others
wíll respect his actual control over economic gocds. Concretdy it is social,
for ínstance, if in relation to the actor's own consumption the future
wants Df others are caken ínto account and thfs beeomes one considera-
tion affecting the actor's own savíng. Or, in another connexion, prcduc-
tion may be oriented to the future wants of other pecple.
Definitions of Sociology and of Social Action
3. Not every type of contact of human beings has a social character;
this is rather confined to cases where the actor's behavior is meaning-
fully oriented to that of others. For example, a mere collísion of two
cyclisrs may be compared to a natural evento On the other hand, theír
attempt to avoid hitting each other, ar whatever lnsults, blows, ar friendly
díscussion mighr follaw the collision, would constitute "social acríon."
4. Social action is not identical either with the similar actions of
many persons or with every action inHuenced by other persons. Thus,
if at the beginning of a shower a number of people on the street put up
their umbrellas ar the same time, this would not ordinaríly be a case of
action mutually oriented to that of each other, but rather of ali reacting ,
in the sarne way to the Iíke need of protection from the rain. It is well
known that the actions of the individual are strongly influenced hy
the merc fact that he is a member of a crowd confined within a limíted
space. Thus, the subject matter of studies of "crowd psychology," such
as thase of Le Bon, will be called "action conditioned hy crowds." lt is
also possible for large numbers, though dispersed, to be inHuenced símul-
taneouslyor successívely hy a source of influence operating similarly on
alI the indívíduals, as by means of the press. Here also the behavior of
an individual is íníluenced by his membership in a "mass" and hy the
fect that he is aware of being a member. Some types of reaction are only
made possible by the mere fact that the individual acts as part of a
crowd. Others beeome more difficult under these conditions. Hence it is
possible that a particular event or mede of human behavior can give rise
to the most diverse kinds of feeling-gaiety, anger, enthusiasm, despaír,
and passions of alI sorts-in a crowd situation whích would not occur at
all ar not nearly 50 readíly if the individual were alone. But for thís to
happen there need not, at least in many cases, be any meaningful rela-
tion berween the behavior of the individual and the fact that he is a
member of a crowd. It is nct proposed in the present sense to cell ectíon
, "social" when it is merely a result of the effect on the individual of the
existence of a crowd as such and the action is not oriented to that Facr
on the level of meaning. Atthe sarne time the borderline is naturalIy
highly indefinite. ln such cases as that of the inAuence of the demagogue,
there may he a wide variation in the extent to which bis mass clientele is
affected by a meaningful reacríon to the fact of íts large nurnbers; and
whatever thís relation may be, ir is open to varying interpretations.
But furthermore, mere "imitation" of the acríon of others, such as that
on whích Tarde has rightly laid emphasis, will not be considered a case
of specífically social acticn if it is purely reactive 50 that there is no
meaningful orientation to the actor imítated. The borderlíne is, however,
50 inde6nite that it is often hardly possíble to discriminare. The mere
BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL TERMS [eh. I
fact that a person is found to employ some apparently useful procedure
whích he leamcd from someone else does not, however, constirure, in the
present sense, social actíon. Action such as thís is not oriented to the
ecrion of rhe other person, but the actor has, through observing the
orher, become acquainted wíth cerrain objective facts; and it is these to
which hís action is orienred. His action is then causally determined by
the action of others, but not meaningfully. On the other hand, if the
action of others is imitated because ir is Iashíonable or traditional or
excmplary, or lends social distinction, or on similar grounds, ít is mean-
ingfulIy oriented eírher to the behavíor of the source of imitation or of
third persons or of both. There are of course all manner of transitionaI
cases between the two types of imitation. Both the phenomena dlscussed
above, the behavior of crowds and imitatíon, stand on the inde6nite
borderline of social action. The sarne is true, as will often appear, of
traditionalism and charisma. The reeson for the indefiniteness of the
line in these and other cases líes in the fact rhat both the orientation to
the behavior of others and the meaning whích can be imputed by the
actor himself, are by no means always capable of c1ear determination and
are often altogether unconscious and seldom fulIy self-conscious. Mere
"influence" end meaningful orientation cannot therefore always be clearly
differentiated on the empírica] level. But conceprually it is essential to
distinguish them, even though merely reactive imitation may well have
a degree of socíological importance ar least equaI to that of the type
which can be called social action in the strict sense. Sociology, it goes ,
without saying, is by no means confined to the study of social ectíon;
this is only, at least for the kind of sociology being developed here, its
central suhject matter, that which may be said to be decisive for its status
as a scíence. But this does not imply any judgment on the comparative
Importence of this and other fectors.
2. Types ofSocial Action
Social actíon, like ell action, may be oríented in four ways. It may be:
c» instmmentally rational (rwec1trational), that is, derermíned by
expeetations as to the hehavior of objects in the environment and oE
other human beings: these expectations are used as "condítíons" OI
"means" for the attainment of the acror's own rationalIy pursued and
calculated ends;
(a) •.z....,..ti<mal (wertrati<mal), that is, determíned by a conscious
Typés Df Soda! Action
belief in the value for i15 own sake of some ethícal, aesthetic, relígious,
or other fonn of behavíor, independently of its prospects of success,
(3) affectual (especíally emoríonal), that is, determined by the actor's
specffic affects and feeling states;
(4) traditional, that is, determined byíngrained habituation.
J. Strictly traditional behavior, like the reactive- type of imítation
díscussed above, Iíes very dose to the borderline of what can juseifiebly
be celled meaningfully oriented action, and indeed often on the other
side. For ir is very often a matter oE almost automatic reaction to habit-
ual stimuli whi~ guide behavior in a course which has been repeat-
edly followed. Tbe great bulk of all everyday action to which people
have become habitually accustomed approaches this type. Hence, its
place in a systematic classi6cation is not merely that of a Iimiting case
because, as will be shown later, attachment to habitual fonns can be up-
held with varying degrees 9Í self-consciousness and in a variety of
senses. ln this case rhe type may shade over into value rationality
(Wertrationalitat).
, 2.. Purely affectual behavícr also stands OD the borderline of what
canbe consídered "meaningful1y" oriented, and often ir, too, goes over
the line. It may, fOI instance, consist in an uncontrolled reacríon to
some excepãonal stimulus. Ir is a case of sublimation when affectually
detennined action occurs in the fonn of conscious release of emotional
tensíon. When this happens it is usually well on the road to rationali-
zation in one OIthe other or both of the above senses.
3. The orientation of value-rationa1 action is distinguished from the
affectual type by its c1early se1E-<:onscious fonnu1ation, of the ultimate
values governing the action and the consistently planned orientation of
its detailed course to rhese values. At the same time the two types have a .
common element, namely that the meaning of the action does not lie in
the achievement of a result ulterior to it, but in carrying our the specí-
fic type of action for its own seke. Action is affectua1 if it satislies a
need for revenge, sensual gratification, devoeíce, contemplative bliss, or
for worlcing off emotional tensions (írrespectíve of the leveI of sublima-
tion).
Examples of pure value-rational orientation would be the actions of
persons who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put into
practice their ccnvíctices. of what seems to them to be required by duty,
honor; me punuit of beauty, a religious cell, personal loyalty, cr the
importance of some "cause" no rnatter in what it consiste. ln our termi-
nology, value-rational action always involves "ccmmends" or "demands"
whích, in the actor's opinion, are binding on him. It is only In cases
where human action is motivated by me fullillment of such uncondí-
tionaI demands that it will be called value-rationaI. Tbís is the case in
wide1y varying degrees, OOt for the most part on1y to a relatively slight
extent. Nevenheless, it will be shown that the occurrence of this mode
of action is important enough to justify its fonnulation as a distinet typeô
.6 ~ASIC SOCIOLOCICAL TERMS [eh. I
though it may be remarked that there is no intention hcre of auernpting
to Formulare in any sense an exhaustive classíficetíon of types oí action.
4. Action is instrumental1y rational (zweckrational) when the end,
the means, and the secondary results are alI rationally taken into account
and weighed. This involves rational consideration of altemaríve means
to the end, of the relarlons of the end to the secondary consequences,
and finelly of the relarlve importance of different possíble ends. Deter-
minaticn of action either in eêecrual ar in traditional terms is thus
incompaeíble with this type. Choice between alremaríve and conâíceíng
ends and results may well be detetmíned in a value-rational manner.
ln that case, action is instrumentaUy rational only in respect to rhe
choice of means. On the other hand, the actor may, instead of deciding
berween altemative and conHicting ends in terms of a rational orienta-
tion to a system of values, simply take them as gíven subjective wants
and arrange them in a scale of conscicusly assessed relative urgeney. He
may then orient hís action to this scale in such a way that they are
setísfied as far as possíble in arder of urgeney, as formulated in the
principle of "marginal utility." Value-rational action may thus have
various díêerent relations to the instrumentaIly rarional action. From
the latter point of view, however, velue-retíonalíey is alweys lrratlonal.
Indeed, rhe more the value to which action is oriented is elevated to the
stanrs of an absolute value, the more "irrational" in this sense the corre-
spondíríg action is. For, the more unconditionalIy the actor devotes him-
self to this value for its own seke, to pure sentiment or beauty, to abso-
lute goodnessor devotion to duty, the Iess is he inllocnced by ccnsíder-
ations of the consequences of his action. The orientation of action
whoIly to the rational achievemenr of ends without relation to funda-
mental velues is, to be sure, essentíally onIy a limiting case.
5. Ir would be very unusual to 6nd concrete cases of action, espe-
ciaUy of social action, which were oriented only in one or another of
these ways. Furthermore, this classi6cation of the medes of orientation
of action is in no sense meant to exhaust the possibilities of the fíeld,
but .0nIy to fonnulate in conceptuaIIy pure fonn certain socíologícally
important types to which actual action is more or less closely approxí-
mated ar, in much the more common case, which constitute lu de"
ments. The usefulness of the classificatíon for the purposes of this
investigation can only be judged in terras of its results.
3. The Concept of Social Relationship
The term "social rclatfonship" wilI be used to denote lhe behavior of
a plurality of actors insofar as, in its meaningfuI content, the acrion of
each takes account of that of lhe others and is oriented in these terroso
The social relarionship thus COT.isists entirely and exclusivcly in!he exist-
3 ] The Concept of Social Relationship 2 7
ence of a prõbability that there wíll be a meaningful course of social action
-irrespective, for rhe time being, of the basis for this probability.
I. Thus, as a defining criterion, it is essential that there should be
ar least a minimum oE mutual orientation of the action of each to that
oE the others. Its content may be of the most varied nature: conAict,
hosnliey, sexual attraction, friendship, Joyalty, ar economic exchange. lt
may involve the Fulfillment, the evasion, ar the violatian of- the tenns
of an agreement; ecoaomíc, erotic, ar some oeher fonn of "compedcon",
common membership ín status, national ar class groups (l?IOvided it
leads to social action ), Hence, the definitian does not specífy whether
the relation of the actors is co-opereríve ar the opposite.
2. The "meanmg" relevant in rhis context is always a case of me
meaning imputeJ to the parties in a given concrete case, on the average,
or in a rbeorerícally formulated pure type-it is never a normatively
"correct" or a metaphysically "troe" meaning. Even in case: of such
forms of social organization as a stare, church, assccíaríon, or marriage,
the social reletionshíp ccnsists exclusively in the Fact rhar there has ex-
isted, exists, ar will exist a probability of action in somedefinite way
appropriate to rhis rneaning. It is vital to be continually clear about rhís
, in order to avoid the "reijication" of those concepts. A "state," for ex-
ample, ccases to exist in a sociologically relevam sense whenever there
is no longer a probability that certain kinds of meaningfully oriented
social action will take place. This probability may be very high or it may
be negligihly low. Bui in any case it is onIy in the sense and degree in
which it does exist that the correspondíng social relatíonsblp exísts. lt is
ímpossible to find any other clear meaning for me statement that, for
instance, a glven "state" exlsts or has ceased to existo
3. The subjective meaning need not necesserily be the sarne for ali
the parties who are rnutuallyoriented in a gíven social relationship;
there need not in this sense be "recíprocíey.' "Friendshíp," "leve,"
"loyelty,' "fidelity to ccetreces," "patríotísrn," on one síde, may well be
faced wirh an entirely díêerene attitude on the otber. ln such cases the
perríes associate diêerent meanings with their aceíons, and the social
telerionshíp is insolar objectively "esymmerrícal" From the pojnts of view
of the two parties. It may nevertheless be a case of mutual orientation
insofar as, even though partly ar wholly erroneously, one party pre-
sumes a particular anitude toward him on the part of the other and
orients his actíon to this. expecteríon. This can, and usually wilI, have
consequences for the course of action and the form of me relatíonship.
A reIationship is objectively symmetrical only as, according to the typí-
cal expectations of the perríes, the rneaning for one party is the sarne as
that for the other. Thus me actual attitude of a chfld to its father may be
a lea.st approximately that which the father, in the individual case, on
the average or typically, has come to expecto A social relationship in
which the attitudes are cornpIetely and fully corresponding is in realiiy
a limiting case. But the absence of reciprocity wiIl, for tenninological
28 BASIC SOCIOLQGlCAL TERMS [eh. I
•
purposes. be held to exclude the existence of a social relarionship only
if it eceually resulrs in the absence of a mutual crientation of the action
of rhe perties. Here as elsewhere ali sorts of transitional cases are the
rule rather than the exception.
4. A social relationship can be of a very Aeeting character ar of
varying degrees of permanence. ln the latter case there is a probability
of the repeated recurrence of the behavior whieh corresponda to its sub-
jective meaning and hence is expeceed. ln arder to avoid falIadous im-
pressions, let it be repeated that it is only the existence of the probability
that, corresponding to a given subjective meaning, a certain type of
action will take place which constitutes the "existence" of the social
relationship. Thus that a "friendship" ar a "seete" exists ar has existed
means this and only this: that we, the observers, judge that there is ar has
been a probabíliry thar on the basís of certain kinds of known subjective
attitude of certain individuaIs there wiIl result in the average sense a
certain specífic type of action. For the purposes of legal reasoning it is
essential to be able to decide whether a rule of Iaw does or does not
carry legal authority, hence whether a legal relationship does or does
nor "exíst,' This type of question is not, however, relevam to sociologi-
cal problems.
5. The subjective meaning of a social relationship may chenge, thus
a politica] relationship once based on solidarity may develop into a
confliet of interests. ln that case it is only a matter of terminological
convenience and of the degree of continuity of rhe change whether we
say that a new relationship has come into existence or that rhe old one
continues but has acquired a new meaning. It is also possible for rhe
meaning to be parrly constant, partly chengíng.
6. The meaningful content whieh remains relatively constant in a
social relationship is cepable of formulation ín terms of maxims whieh
the parties concerned expect to be adhered to by their partners on the
average and approximately. The more rational in relation to vaIues ar
to ,given ends ehe action is, the more is this Iikely to be the case. There
is far less possibility of a rational formulation of subjective meaning in
the case of a relation of erotic attractíon or of personei loyalty ar any
other affectual type than, for example, in the case of a business contracto
7. The meaníng of a social releeionship may be agreed upon by
mutual consene. This ímplies that the pareies make promises covering
eheír future behavíor, wherher toward each other or toward thírd per-
sons. ln such cases each party then normaIly couras, so far as he acts
rationally, in some degree on the fact rhat lhe other will orient bis ac-
tion to the meaning of the egreement. as he (ehe fim actor) under-
stands it. ln part he orientshis actíon rationally (z:weckrational) to these
expectetícns as given fects with, to be sure, varying degrees of subjec-
tively "Ioyal" intention of doing his parto But in part a1so he is motivated
value-rationally 'by a sense of duty, whieh makes him adhere to the
agreement as he understands it. This much may be antieipated. (For
a further e1aboration, see seeS. 9 and 13 beIow.)
Types of Orientation: Usage, Cuswm, Self-Interest
4· Types of Action Orientation: U sage,Custam,
Self-Interest
Within the realm of social action certain empiricaI uniformities can
be observed, thar is, courses of action that are repeated by the actor or
(símultaneously) occur among numerous actors since the subjective
meaning is meant to be the sarne. Sccíological investigation is concemed
with these typical medes of acciono Thereby it differs from history, the
subject of which is rather the causal explanation of important individual
events, important, that is, in hav:ing an influence on human destiny.
If an orientation roward social action occurs regularly, it wiIl be caIled
"usage" (Braueh) Insolar as the probability of its existence wíthin a
groupis based on nothing but actual practice. A usage wiIl be caIled a
"custam" (Sitte) if the practíce is based upon long standing. On the
other hand, a uniformity of orientation may be said to be "determined
by self-interest," if and insofar as the acrors' conduct is instrumentally
C~eckrational)oriented towardídenrícalexpectaríons."
I. Usage elso includes "fashion" (Mode). As distinguished from
custem and in direct contrasr to It, usage will be called Fashion 50 far
as the mere fact of the novelty of the corresponding behavior is the
basis of the orientation of action. lts Iccus is in the neighborhood of
"convenríon,'?" since both ar them usuaI1y spríng from a desíre for social
prestíge. Fashion, however, will not be further dísccssed here.
2. As distinguished Irom both "convention" and "law," "custem"
refers to roles devoid of any external sanction. The actor conforms wirh
them of his own free wilI, whether his motivation líes in the face that
he merely faUs to think about it, that it is more cornfortable to confonn,
cr whatever else the reason may be. For the sarne reasons he can consider
it Iikely that other members of rhe group wiIl adhere to a custem.
Thus custem is not "valid" in anything Iike rhe legal sense; confonn-
ity with it is not "demanded" by anybody. NaturaIIy, rbe transition fram
tMs to validly enforced convention and to law is gradual. Everywhere
what has been traditionally handed down has been an important source
of whar has come to be enforced. Today it is customary every moming to
eat a breakfast which, withín limits, confonns to a certain partem. But
there is no ohligation to do 50, except possibly for hotel guests, and it
has not always been customary. On the other hand, the current mede
of dress, even though it has partly originated in custom, is today very
largely no longer customary