8. Hettne e Soderbaum. The New Regionalism Approach

Prévia do material em texto

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2399180 
 
1 
Pre-publication manuscript, Politeia, Vol 17, No 3 (1998). 
 
The New Regionalism Approach 
 
Björn Hettne & Fredrik Söderbaum Department of Peace and Development Research 
 Göteborg University 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This introduction outlines the dramatically changed context and content of 
the renewed trend towards regionalism in the international system. We start 
by identifying some of the most relevant aspects of the latest wave, the ‘new 
regionalism’. The central concepts in the study of regionalism are both 
ambiguous and contested, and attempts are made at clarifying them. The 
concept of ‘regionness’ is central to the New Regionalism Approach (NRA), 
which is suggested as a broad, open-ended framework for analysing 
regionalisation in a multilevel and comparative perspective. Several 
specific theories and theoretical perspectives are needed for understanding 
the complexities of present day regionalism, and a distinction is here made 
between regional and world approaches. Another distinction is that between 
monodisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches. Finally, the future of 
the new regionalism, the possibility of a regionalised world order, is 
touched upon. 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING REGIONALISM 
 
In order to understand regionalism today it is essential to realize that we are dealing 
with a qualitatively new phenomenon. The ‘new regionalism’ refers to a phenomenon, 
still in the making, that began to emerge in the mid-1980s, in contrast to the ‘old 
regionalism’ that began in the 1950s and faded away in the 1970s.1 Although studying 
the renewed trend towards regionalism sometimes involves a feeling of déjà vu, both 
the context and the content of regionalism have changed dramatically. 
It is important to point out that the old regionalism must be understood within a 
particular historical context, dominated by the bipolar Cold War structure, while the 
 
1 Needless to say, regionalism existed before the 1950s. Some authors see the protectionist trends in the 
1930s as the first wave. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2399180 
 
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current wave of regionalism needs to be related to the current transformation of the 
world. That is, the new regionalism is associated with or caused by a multitude of often 
interrelated structural transformations of the global system, the most important being: 
 
• the change of the bipolar Cold War structure and alliance systems towards a 
multipolar (or perhaps tripolar) structure, with a New International Division of Power 
(NIDP) ; 
• the relative decline of American hegemony in combination with a more positive 
attitude on the part of the USA towards regionalism, at least in the form of ‘open 
regionalism’; 
• the restructuring of the global political economy into three major blocs: the European 
Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the Asia-Pacific, 
which are all based on different forms of capitalism; 
• the erosion of the Westphalian nation-state system and the growth of economic, social 
and political interdependence and transnationalism, which has triggered new patterns of 
interaction both among governments and non-state actors; 
• the associated ‘globalisation’ of finance, trade, production and technology, which has 
lead to a New International Division of Labour (NIDL); 
• the recurrent fears over the stability of the multilateral trading order hand in hand with 
the growing importance of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade; and 
• the end of ‘Third Worldism’ and changed attitudes towards (neoliberal) economic 
development and political system in the developing countries (cf. Fawcett & Hurrell 
1995; Gamble & Payne 1996; Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel 1998; de Melo & Panagariya 
1993; Stallings 1995). 
 
The content of the renewed trend towards regionalism touring the world today has also 
changed radically. The new regionalism is a truly world-wide phenomenon, that is 
taking place in more areas of the world than ever before. The old regionalism was 
generally specific with regard to objectives and content, and often had a simple and 
narrow focus on free trade arrangements and security alliances, whereas the number, 
scope, and diversity of the new regionalism has grown significantly during the last 
decade. The new regionalism is a comprehensive, multifaceted and multidimensional 
process, implying a change of a particular region from relative heterogeneity to 
increased homogeneity with regard to a number of dimensions, the most important 
being culture, security, economic policies and political regimes. The convergence along 
these dimensions may be a natural process or politically steered or, most likely, a 
mixture of the two. 
 
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While the old regionalism was often imposed, directly or indirectly, from above 
and outside, very much in accordance with the bipolar Cold War power structure, so 
called ‘hegemonic regionalism’, and/or as a simple copy of the European Communities 
(EC), the new regionalism involves more spontaneous processes, that often emerge 
from below and from within the region itself, and more in accordance with its 
peculiarities and problems. 
It is crucial to understand that the new regionalism is a complex process of change 
taking place simultaneously at the various levels of analysis: the global system level; 
the level of interregional relations; the internal structure of the region (including the 
nation-states, subnational ethnic groups and transnational microregions). It is not 
possible to state which of the levels that dominate, because processes at the various 
levels interact and their relative importance differs from one region and period to 
another. 
Much of the contemporary debate centres around the intriguing relationship 
between globalism and regionalism. There is a variety of perceptions and opinions on 
both of these two processes and how they relate to each other. There are no clear-cut 
answers on to what extent they are mutually supporting and reinforcing each other, or if 
they are incompatible and contradictory? Several studies point to the fact that the 
relationship tends to be symbiotic rather than contradictory (Fawcett & Hurrell 1995; de 
Melo & Panagariya), while others emphasise a dialectical rather than a linear 
relationship (Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel 1998). The only clear conclusion that can be 
drawn is that regionalisation and globalisation are mutually constitutive processes 
existing within the broader context of global system change; and that it seems that we 
are dealing with different layers of globalisms and regionalisms simultaneously. 
The increased importance of interregional relations is also characteristic of the 
current wave of regionalism. Since we are dealing with a world order phenomenon the 
behaviour of one region has an impact on the behaviour of others. The most obvious 
example is European regionalism, which has both provoked and promoted regionalism 
in other parts of the world. All the core regions, EU, NAFTA and Asia-Pacific, support 
interregionalism, between themselves (North-North) as well as with other regions 
(North-South). South-South regionalism is also likely to increasing in importance in the 
future. Consider for instance: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); Asian 
Regional Forum (ARF); Indian Ocean Rim (IOR); and the Initiative for the Americas; 
the involvement of EU in Eastern Europe, Latin America, North Africa, and parts of 
sub-Saharan Africa etc. Furthermore, in several respects trade, financial and investment 
flows have increased interregionally as well as intraregionally, especially in the Core. In 
fact, there is no evidence that these processes of integration are competitive, which may 
suggest thatthe new regionalism may to an extent bolster rather than impede (global 
and regional) multilateralism. 
 
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In sharp contrast to the old regionalism, which was often inward-oriented and 
explicitly exclusive in terms of member states, today’s regionalism is extroverted rather 
than introverted, which reflects the deeper interdependence of today’s global political 
economy. From this perspective, ‘open regionalism’ is one way of coping with global 
transformation, since an increasing number of states realise that they lack the capability 
and the means to manage such a task at the national level. In a more narrow sense, 
‘open regionalism’ often refers to ‘non-discrimination’ and that it should contribute 
more to the process of global liberalisation and multilateralism than it detracts from it. 
Openness may also refer to non-exclusiveness in terms of membership of trading 
blocks. In practice the two latter aspects are interrelated, because exclusion matters 
more if membership has substantial discriminatory effects (see review by Odén; Cable 
and Henderson 1994). 
The new regionalism is simultaneously linked with nationalism and domestic 
factors (Axline 1994; Palmer 1992:2). Regionalism cannot be understood as a distinct 
alternative to the national interest and nationalism, but is often better explained as an 
instrument to supplement, enhance or protect the role of the state and the power of the 
government in an interdependent world. The nation-states today experience a lacking 
capacity to handle global challenges to national interests, and increasingly respond by 
‘pooling sovereignty’. At the same time they give up sovereignty and may ultimately 
end up as semi-independent parts of a larger political community. 
The process of regionalisation is triggered by events on the intrastate, subnational 
level as well. One example is the ‘black hole’ syndrome or the disintegration of nation-
states due to ethnonational mobilisation. Another less violent form of disintegration is 
the strengthening of microregions, a the geopolitical environment creates a more direct 
approach to the macroeconomy for dynamic subnational regions. As exemplified by the 
European experience both of these movements may be linked with the larger 
macroregional regionalisation process. The so called growth triangles in Southeast Asia 
can also be understood from this perspective (cf. Ohmae 1995). 
 
 
CONCEPTUALISING REGIONALISM 
 
It has proved to be notoriously difficult to agree on common and compatible 
conceptualisations and definitions in the study of regionalism, old as well as new, 
within as well as between academic disciplines. Although these problems certainly 
cannot be solved here, we will explain how the central concepts are used in the New 
Regionalism Approach (NRA), which guides the analyses included in this special issue . 
 
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‘Regionalism’ refers to the general phenomenon as well as the ideology of 
regionalism, i.e. the urge for a regionalist order, either in a particular geographical area 
or as a type of world order. There may thus be many regionalisms. ‘Regionalisation’ 
generally denotes the (empirical) process, and furthermore, implies an activist element, 
a strategy of regionalisation. It is therefore crucial to recognise that there can be 
regionalism (in the narrow sense as ideology) without a corresponding process of 
regionalisation, and vice versa. From this follows also that there is nothing inherently 
‘good’ about regionalism and regionalisation from a normative point of view, although 
this often may be the case in the current world order. 
The process of regionalisation can be described in terms of increasing levels of 
‘regionness’, i.e. the process whereby a geographical region is transformed from a 
passive object to a subject with capacity to articulate the interests of the emerging 
region. The concept of regionness, which is a central component of NRA, is useful for 
understanding some of the logic of contemporary processes of regionalisation in the 
world today. It provides also a basic framework for comparing emerging regions. 
Regionness can be understood in analogy with ‘stateness’ and ‘nationness’ (Hettne 
1993). Before elaborating further on this concept, the definition of ‘regions’ needs to be 
clarified. 
‘Regions’ are obviously important to the study of regionalism. Given that regions 
necessarily involve a geographical dimension, the main task of identifying regions 
implies making judgements about the degree to which a particular area in various 
respects constitutes a distinct entity, which can be distinguished as a territorial 
subsystem (in contrast with non-territorial subsystems) from the rest of the international 
system, i.e. its degree of what we call regionness. 
It is important to conceive regional organisation as a second order phenomenon, 
compared to processes that underlie regionalisation in a particular geographical area, 
which should be seen as ‘region in the making’. Becoming rather than being is thus 
what is focused upon in this context. 
It should be noted that there are no ‘natural’ or ‘given’ regions, and what is 
referred to as a region with regard to economic relations may not always be a relevant 
delimitation seen from, for instance, a political perspective. It is therefore fruitful to 
maintain eclectic and open-minded definitions of regions, particularly in the lower 
stages of regionness and as far as their outer boundaries are concerned, which often tend 
to be the most blurred. There are thus many varieties of regions, with different degrees 
of regionness. This eclectic understanding of regions is made possible by the fact that 
the problematique of the NRA is not the delineation of regions per se, but rather to 
determine the role of regions in the current global transformation and analyse the 
origins, dynamics, and consequences of regionalism in various fields of activity; i.e. 
increasing and decreasing levels of regionness. 
 
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When different processes of regionalisation in various fields converge within the 
same area, the distinctiveness of the region in question — i.e. the level of regionness — 
increases. Regionness means that a region can be a region ‘more or less’ and the level of 
regionness can both increase and decrease. There are three generalised levels or stages 
of regionness, which can be said to define a particular region in terms of regional 
coherence. Since a ‘region’ is a social construct, constantly created and recreated in the 
process of global transformation, it can only be identified post factum. It is therefore 
only potential in the first stage. The actual regionalisation process takes place in stage 
two, whereas stage three shows the outcome in terms of actually existing regional 
formations, such as the EU (so far the only one on this higher level of regionness). 
Mostly when we speak of regions we actually mean regions in the making, and we 
cannot be sure about the outcome. 
 
• In the ‘pre-regional’ stage, the potential region constitutes a geographical and social 
unit, delimited by more or less natural physical barriers and marked by ecological 
characteristics: ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural’; ‘Africa south of the Sahara’; 
Central Asia; or ‘the Indian subcontinent’. This level can be referred to as a ‘proto-
region’, or a ‘pre-regional zone’. The region as social system implies ever widening 
translocal relations between human groups, which in an early phase may be based on 
symbolic kinship bonds rather than trust and contract relations. The social relations may 
thus very well be hostile and completely lacking in cooperation, i.e. the region being a 
conflict formation or a ‘security complex’. The potential region, just like the larger 
international system of which it gradually forms part, can therefore on a low level of 
‘regionness’be described as anarchic, where a balance-of-power, or some kind of 
‘concert’, tends to be the sole security guarantee. We can therefore talk of a ‘primitive’ 
region, exemplified by the Balkans today. 
 
• The second level — which is the stage where the crucial regionalisation process takes 
place — could start with either ‘formal’, intergovernmental regional cooperation/state-
promoted regional integration or ‘informal’, spontaneous, market- and society-induced 
processes of regionalisation, in any of the cultural, economic, political or military fields, 
or in several of them at the same time. It is in fact this multidimensionality that defines 
the new regionalism. The more organised region could be called the ‘formal region’. In 
order to assess the relevance and future potential of a particular regional organisation, it 
should be possible to relate the ‘formal region’ (e.g. defined by regional 
cooperation/integration and/or organisational membership) to the more spontaneously 
formed ‘real region’, which has to be defined in terms of potentialities and through less 
 
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precise criteria such as market- and society-induced regionalisation, regional 
convergencies and regional identity. (These concepts will be further elaborated upon 
below.) 
 
• The outcome of the regionalisation process, i.e. the third level of regionness, is the 
region as acting subject with a distinct identity, institutionalised actor capability, 
legitimacy, and structure of decision-making, in relation with a more or less responsive 
regional civil society, transcending the old state borders. In security terms the reference 
is to ‘security community’, which means that the level of regionness makes it 
inconceivable to solve conflicts by violent means, between as well as within former 
states. With regard to development and welfare, the regional sphere is not merely 
reduced to a ‘market’, but there exist also regional mechanisms that can ensure social 
security and regional balance, with similar functions as in the old states. The region as 
civil society may emerge spontaneously, but is ultimately dependent on that an enduring 
organisational framework facilitates and promotes security, social communication and 
convergence of values and actions throughout the region. A shared cultural tradition — 
an inherent regional civil society — in a particular region is often of importance here, 
particularly for more informal forms of regionalisation. However, it must be 
remembered that culture is not given, but continuously created and recreated. The 
defining element is rather the multidimensional and voluntary quality of regional 
interaction, and the societal characteristics indicating an emerging regional society. The 
processes shaping the ‘formal’ and ‘informal region’ are similar to state-formation and 
nation-building, and the ultimate outcome could be a ‘region-state’, which in terms of 
scope and cultural heterogeneity can be compared to the classical empires, but in terms 
of political order constitutes a voluntary evolution of a group of formerly sovereign 
national, political units into a supranational security and development community, 
where sovereignty is pooled for the best of all. Moreover, authority, power and 
decision-making are not centralised but layered and decentralised to the local, micro-
regional, national and supranational levels. This is basically the idea of the EU as 
outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
These three levels (or ‘stages’) may express a certain evolutionary logic. Various stages 
are in fact a plausible explanation of the development of regionalism historically. 
However, the idea is not to suggest a stage theory, because there is nothing 
deterministic or inherently evolutionary about regionalism. On the contrary, since 
regionalisms are political and social projects, devised by human actors in order to 
transform or alter existing structures, they may, just like nation-state projects, fail. 
 
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Furthermore, increased interdependence may very well be the source of conflict. As the 
European experience shows, integration and disintegration go hand in hand. The result 
may very well be reduced levels of regionness, and a situation dominated by conflict 
rather than cooperation and where other dynamics dominate, such as globalisation, 
nation-building and fragmentation. 
Regionalism (in the broad sense) covers too many phenomena to be useful as an 
analytical tool, and should therefore be broken down into specific categories. Drawing 
on recent literature2, we will distinguish analytically between: (i) intergovernmental 
regional cooperation and state-promoted regional integration; (ii) market- and society-
induced regionalisation; (iii) regional convergence and coherence; and (iv) regional 
identity. 
‘Intergovernmental regional cooperation’ refers to an open-ended process, 
whereby individual states act together for mutual benefit in certain fields, such as 
infrastructure, water, energy etc., and in order to solve common tasks. It must thus be 
understood from the perspective of the interests of the individual member states. 
Intergovernmental regional cooperation may be formal and involve a high degree of 
institutionalisation, but may also be based on a much looser and ‘informal’ structure. It 
constitues one component of all regionalisation processes analysed in this issue. ‘State-
promoted regional integration’ is a deeper form of joint action, which refers to a process 
whereby the individual states voluntarily merge and mingle, wholly or partly, into a 
single regional economy and political system (cf. Nye 1987). State-promoted regional 
economic integration refers mainly to the policies designed to abolish barriers to the 
mutual exchange of goods, services, capital and people. Regional integration in the 
political sphere involves a minimum degree of transfer of sovereignty or functions to 
supranational organs.3 Although regional cooperation and integration should be 
analytically distinguished, the borderline is in practice both ambiguous and rather 
artificial, which is the main reason why they are brought together under the same. 
 
2 There exists no commonly agreed conceptualisation of the various aspects of regionalism (although the 
narrower agenda of the old regionalism tended to be somewhat more consistent). Many scholars try to 
capture similar phenomena, but they rarely use the same terminology and not seldom incompatible 
definitions. In order to avoid this trap we will build on what is one of the best conceptualisation to date, 
namely by Andrew Hurrell (1995). Also confer Cable and Henderson (1994), Gamble and Payne (1996), 
Hettne and Inotai (1994), Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel (1998). 
3 Supranationality contains several aspects, e.g. the by-passing or transferring of member states’ decision-
making authority, implementation of rules and functions traditionally exercised by the government, or the 
judicial authority etc. 
 
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Conventionally the study of regionalism has focused on intergovernmental (and 
supranational) structures and economic sectors while many non-governmental and 
transnational processes beyond and below the ‘state’, particularly civil societies, have 
been largely ignored. ‘Market- and society-induced regionalisation’ refers to the growth 
of the often undirected processes of societal and economic interaction and 
interdependence (Hurrell 1995:39). For obvious reasons, this type of regionalisation 
may be affected by intergovernmental regional cooperation and state-promoted regional 
integration, but it is crucial to analytically separate the processes from one another. 
Often this distinction is not made. The actors and driving forces of the latter is obvious 
while in the former they come from markets, private trade and investment flows, 
networkof private firms, transnational corporations (TNCs), transnational business 
networks, people, NGOs and other types of social networks contributing to the 
formation of a transnational regional economy and civil society. 
‘Regional convergence and coherence’ is also needed in order to understand the 
process of increasing regionness. As Hurrell (1995:44) points out, this phenomenon can 
be understood in two main ways: (i) when the region plays a defining role in the 
relations to the rest of the world; and (ii) when the region serves as the organising basis 
across a wide range of issues within the region. There are of course different paths to 
regional convergence and coherence. Besides explanations at the regional level of 
analysis, it may occur either as a consequence of structural transformation at the 
systemic level or by way of separate processes of convergence, homogenisation and 
elimination of extremes in terms of structure and behaviour at the domestic level. For 
instance, it is clear that the economic and political systems on the African continent has 
converged and become more compatible during the era of structural adjustment, 
irrespectively of whether this is the result of domestic policy convergence or externally 
imposed conditionalities, or by way of regional cooperation and integration. This 
convergence and homogenisation of economic policies may pave the way for further 
regionalisation in both a formal and a spontaneous way, thus reflecting the interlinkages 
between the various processes. 
‘Regional identity’ is a contested concept. However it cannot be ignored and plays a 
much more significant role in the new regionalism compared to the old. It is thus 
evident that many parts of the world have seen a marked increase in regional awareness 
and regional identity. This shared perception of belonging to a particular community 
can be explained by internal (domestic and regional) as well as external factors, in 
response to the Other. To a certain extent, all regions are ‘imagined’, subjectively 
defined and cognitive constructions. There is also an inherent ‘sameness’ in many 
regions chaped by pre-Westphalian empires and civilizations. In order to be successful, 
regionalisation necessitates a certain degree of homogeneity or compatibility of culture, 
identity and fundamental values. We do not know how strong these enlarged ‘imagined 
 
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communities’ are, and how much internal crises and resurgent nationalism they can 
withstand. The European example exemplifies this tension between levels of identity. 
 
 
THEORISING REGIONALISM 
 
The previous two sections illustrate the pluralism and multidimensionality of 
contemporary regionalism. From this follows that theorising similarly has to be a rather 
pluralistic exercise. The NRA suggests that the theoretical approaches which start from 
the region must be complemented (but not replaced) by world approaches, from the 
‘outside-in’, and the monodisciplinary by interdisciplinary approaches. 
The NRA seeks to integrate three previously more or less isolated theoretical 
perspectives: (i) Theory of International Relations/International Political Economy; (ii) 
Development Theory; and (iii) Regional Integration Theory. 
It has been frequently stated above that the new regionalism is in different ways 
linked to global structural change and globalisation, and can therefore not be understood 
merely from the point of view of the single region in question. As Hurrell (1995:71) has 
pointed out, there is now a recognition that the theories of regional integration that 
dominated the old regionalism in general and the analysis of the European Communities 
(EC) in particular provide only an incomplete and partial guide to understanding the 
new regionalism. The resurgence of regionalism is now deeply connected with the 
broader theoretical debate within IR/IPE. 
The study of international politics makes little sense in isolation from global 
economic issues. We know that we are living in a global market, but what is less clear is 
what constitutes world order; i.e. the political framework for the world economy similar 
to what the state provided for what previously were ‘national economies’. The study of 
world order (a study increasingly focusing on world order changes) can be said to 
constitute the distinct contribution of IR/IPE to social science, and consequently to 
Development Theory. 
Similarly, the study of world order makes little sense if not related to 
‘development’. However, Development Theory as a state-centric concern today lacks 
relevance and needs to be merged with IR/IPE, which, on the other hand, in turn would 
be enriched by the more dynamic and normative concerns central to classical 
Development Theory, and in particular Alternative Development Theory. Such a merger 
may ultimately strengthen an emerging ‘critical political economy’, dealing with 
historical power structures at various levels of analysis, emphasizing contradictions in 
them, as well as change and transformation expressed in normative terms (Cox 1996). 
This much needed focus on history is an escape from unchanging transhistorical theory, 
 
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artificially imposed on an ever changing reality, and characterizing what still is 
mainstream international IR/IPE Theory. 
The basic argument is that certain strands within IR/IPE in combination with 
certain strands in Development Theory provide a base from which to start global 
theorizing. The proposed marriage would address the problem of the ‘lack of 
emancipatory content in international theory’ (Smith, Booth & Zalewski 1996). It can 
furthermore be described as filling a theoretical vacuum constituted by at least two 
problematic gaps in Development Theory. The first is between the growing irrelevance 
of a ‘nation-state approach’ and the prematurity of a ‘world approach’. The second is 
between, immanence, i.e. a theorizing about development as ‘inherent’ in history and, 
intention, i.e. a political will to ‘develop’, which may breed unrealistic voluntarism, 
particularly as development has become globalized and out of reach for the main actor, 
meaning the state (Hettne 1997). The missing link here is the region; as a level of 
analysis and as a political actor, becoming increasingly important in the emerging world 
order. 
This brings us to Regional Integration Theory. With regard to the political science 
perspectives on regional integration, the functionalist and neofunctionalist have been 
very influential in the (old) European integration debate, and to a large extent also 
elsewhere. The basis of cooperation for both functionalists and neofunctionalists is that 
cooperation should be initiated in the technical and basic functional areas. This process 
will then gradually spill-over within and across sectors. According to the 
neofunctionalists, with Haas (1958, 1964) as the leading proponent, the process would 
spill-over and lead to increased political integration, ultimately supranationality, and a 
redefinition of group identity around the regional unit. 
Regional organisations have received much attention and other forms of 
institutionalist perspectives have also play an important role in the debate. Neoliberal 
institutionalism departs from the assumption that increasing levels of interdependence 
generate increased demand for international cooperation and formal as well as informal 
institutions, organisations or so called international regimes, including security regimes 
(Keohane 1984; Rittberger 1993). 
Particularly the latter theoretical perspective may prove to be a good starting point 
for analysing regions, particuarly if the region has moved beyond the first ‘pre-regional’ 
stage of regionness. With regard to the political economy nexus the approach may be 
combined or amalgamated with the open-ended versions of regionaleconomic 
integration. 
However, apart from the fact that the institutionalist theories are culturally biased 
towards the West, they are heavily state-centric and tend to exaggerate the role and 
instrumentality of international institutions (formal and informal). Therefore theoretical 
perspectives that also manages to account for non-state actors and the people are 
 
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necessary. Therefore a constructivist perspective is also needed, particlarly if the 
purpose of the analysis is to get a more comprehensive understanding of contemporary 
processes of regionalisation and regionnness. 
Constructivist theorists downplay the important of materialist incentives and 
instrumental strategies associated with many of the theoretical perspectives outlined 
above and instead point at the importance of subjective aspects of identity, interests, 
learning, communication, shared knowledge, ideational forces as well as how 
cooperation and communities emerge. 
One particular and very influential strand of constructivism is associated with the 
work of Karl Deutsch (1957), who’s main proposition was that cultural interaction and 
communication can become so intense that a region can become a security community, 
which is defined as a the shared sense of belonging to a community, a sense of we-ness, 
including the development of diplomatic-political-military practices and behaviour, that 
ensure for a long time the expectation of only peaceful relations among the populations. 
Concerning economic integration theory, the discipline has been dominated by 
what can be labelled the orthodox theory of regional economic integration, which 
involves the creation in linear succession of increasingly more ‘advanced’ stages of 
economic integration, namely: free trade area, customs union, common market, 
economic union, complete economic union (Balassa 1961). Mainstream economists 
have emphasised the removal of obstacles to free movement of goods and factors of 
production (often within a static comparative framework) rather than focusing on 
positive integration which can make the region function better and the political 
objectives and dimensions of regionalism. 
However, the thinking on economic regionalism has matured as a discipline and 
also opened up to influences from related disciplines, such as geography, international 
business, political science, international political economy and international relations. 
This means that many observers have realised that there are many more objectives than 
the stimulation of trade, and a wide range of non-orthodox and dynamic economic gains 
are highlighted, such as e.g. increased investments in production and infrastructure and 
the links to trade, stability and credibility, economies of scale as well as avoiding the 
‘costs of non-integration’ and the present trend of marginalization (cf. Hettne & Inotai 
1994; Robson, 1993).4 The non-economic gains, primarily political objectives, are taken 
into account. Furthermore, economists also analyse the regions in a world-wide 
 
4 New economic thinking realizes that the unrealistic assumptions of orthodox integration theory do not 
apply in the industrialized world and certainly do not apply in the developing world, thus acknowledging 
the presence of imperfect factor and goods markets and production structures, high transportation costs, 
imperfect and asymmetric information and competition, externalities, and the role of institutions etc. 
 
 
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perspective, which means that the border-line towards IPE has become blurred. Thus, 
the new, eclectic economic theorising on regions are both more interdisciplinary and 
multilevel compared to old thinking, and is in many ways consistent with the NRA 
outlined here. 
However, it is still needed to make a distinction between mainstream economic 
and political integration theory and the NRA. This political understanding of the new 
wave of regionalism, which we have labelled the NRA, is radically different from the 
dominant discourse among economists, which can be represented by the World Bank 
and other International Financial Institutions, often seated in Washington, and it may be 
useful to pinpoint these differences rather than debating what is the right or wrong 
interpretation. So much depends on the basic assumptions about, for instance, the 
meanings and implications of globalisation: 
• Whereas Washington conceives the new regionalism as a trade promotion policy, 
building on regional arrangements rather than a multilateral framework, for NRA 
regionalism is a comprehensive multidimensional package, including economic, 
security, environmental and many other issues. 
• Whereas the normative point of view of Washington is that the new regionalism at 
best is a second best contribution to the task of increasing the amount of world trade and 
global welfare, and at worst a threat against the multilateral order, regionalism 
according to NRA can contribute to the solving of many problems, from security to 
environment, that cannot efficiently be tackled on the national level. 
• Whereas the new regionalism according to Washington is ‘new’ only in the sense that 
it is a revival of protectionism, NRA sees regionalism as qualitatively new, in the sense 
that it can only be understood in relation to the current transformation of the world, i.e. 
what is often called ‘globalisation’. 
• Whereas the new regionalism according to Washington basically is an economic 
phenomenon, NRA perceives it more as a political phenomenon. 
• Whereas for Washington the new regionalism is a phenomenon that can be analysed 
through standard economic theory in general and trade integration in particular, the 
NRA contains an interdisciplinary framework. 
 
In view of these contrasting perspectives, what will be the future of the new 
regionalism? Will the world become fragmentised into introverted and potentially 
hostile blocs, as in the neomercantlist scenario? Or will the second wave of regionalism 
be as brief as the first? Will the process of globalisation then get the upper hand and 
create a homogenous monolithic world where history has ended? This would be the 
extreme neoliberal or hyperliberal scenario. Or will the world be divided into rich and 
 
14 
poor regions as in the neomarxist scenario? We believe that globalisation is a strong and 
in certain of its dimensions irreversible force, but that it will be significantly modified 
by regional formations in defence of social order and attempts at political control over 
the market, attempts that never will succeed but nevertheless will make a difference. 
Thus there will be a gap between regions that succeed to a large extent, and those that 
fail completely to organise themselves. 
How to conceive the world then? In spite of the current wave of post-structuralist 
thinking in international relations theory, it still makes sense to analyse the world as a 
structural system, i.e. a system defined by certain regularities and rigidities in the 
relations among its constituent units. 
 
 
FORECASTING REGIONALISM 
 
What is new with the world system today is that various structural positions, as a 
consequence of transnationalisation processes and domestic changes, can increasingly 
be defined in terms of regions rather than nation-states. The emerging global power 
structure will thus increasingly be defined by the world regions. To clarify this pattern, 
we shall to some extent fall back upon ‘good old’ dependency theory and the familiar 
division of the world into Centre (or Core) and Periphery. However, this is a 
dependency analysis at a stage of higher integration and interdependence of the world, 
where the ‘delinking’ option is ruled out in any other way than involuntary 
marginalisation. 
This makes it important to understandthe nature of the emerging regional 
formations both in the North and in the South. A rough distinction can be made between 
three structurally different types of regions: regions in the Core zone, regions in the 
Peripheral zone and, between them, regions in the Intermediate zone. The latter are 
situated in an ambivalent position, which means that they can move in both directions; 
they can achieve Core status or become peripheralised. Regions are transformed in 
accordance with structural changes and, consequently, they can move from one zone to 
another. 
How do these types of regions then differ from each other in structural terms? 
There are two basic characteristics. The regions will be distinguished by their relative 
degree of internally generated economic dynamics and by their relative political 
stability. These characteristics also reflect an underlying higher level of regionness, and 
thus constitute criteria by which regionalisation, at least in a qualitative sense, can be 
measured. At the same time regionalism — in terms of development and security — 
 
15 
will become the obvious strategy to reduce the structural gap between Periphery and 
Core; i.e. to move from the Peripheral to the Intermediate zone. 
• Regions in the Core zone: North America, Europe and East Asia centred on Japan, are 
economically more advanced and normally growing economically. They also have 
stable — if not always democratic — regimes which manage to avoid interstate as well 
as intrastate conflicts. They organise for the sake of being better able to control and get 
access to the rest of the world with respect to resources and markets. Thus they will 
have an impact rather than being impacted upon. The predominant economic 
philosophy in the Core will remain ‘free-tradism’, which therefore also, with varying 
(and perhaps decreasing) degrees of conviction, will be preached throughout the world, 
as the only game in town. As always has been the case, the stronger economies will 
demand access to the less developed in the name of free trade, although they themselves 
often maintain protection towards the latter . 
• Regions in the Intermediate zone are in many cases closely linked to one or the other 
of the Core regions in the sense that they both have strong economic relations with a 
particular Core and try to imitate its policies. This is the case of South America, Central 
Europe and South East Asia, wheras South Asia and Africa are drifting. The former are 
under ‘core guidance’. They will thus, if they are lucky, gradually be incorporated into 
the Core, as soon as they fully conform to the criteria of ‘core-ness’; i.e. sustained 
economic development and political stability. This means that ‘politics of distribution’ 
probably will be thrown on the historical dustbin. The expression used both in South 
East Asia and Latin America is ‘open regionalism’, which means open economies, 
albeit with some preference for one’s own region, as well as a rather precautionary 
attitude as far as the Core regions’ assumed adherence to free trade is concerned. 
However, to this category we also count regions which are losing their comparative and 
competitive advantages in terms of robust economies and stable political regimes. Their 
level of regionness will decrease, which means that they are threatened to become 
peripheralised. 
• Regions in the Peripheral zone, in contrast, will continue to be politically turbulent and 
economically stagnant. War, domestic unrest, and underdevelopment constitute a 
vicious circle which will make them sink to the bottom of the system, creating a zone of 
war and starvation. Consequently they will have to organise in order to arrest a 
threatening process of marginalisation and peripheralisation. At the same time, their 
regional arrangements are necessarily as fragile and ineffective as their states, and — 
this weakness notwithstanding — they must first of all tackle acute poverty and 
domestic violence. Their overall situation thus makes ‘security regionalism’ and 
‘developmental regionalism’ more important than the rather irrelevant creation of 
preferential trade regimes, or even adhering to ‘open regionalism’, which becomes 
 
16 
relevant only as some strength vis-à-vis the rest of the world has been achieved. They 
are necessarily more interventionist. This is what lies behind the protectionist 
(‘stumbling bloc’) interpretation of the new regionalism. 
Finally a word on the transformation of this world order into a less unequal and 
explosive structure. Regional integration implies a security dimension, which is quite 
essential to the dynamics of the integration process. By security regionalism, we refer to 
attempts by the states and other relevant actors in a particular geographical area — a 
region in the making — to transform a security complex with conflict-generating 
interstate relations towards a security community with cooperative relations. Thus a 
higher level of regionness implies a lower degree of conflict, whereas decreased 
regionness leads to an increase in security problems. 
The new regionalism may also provide solutions to development problems. By 
development regionalism we refer to concerted efforts from actors (i.e. state, market and 
civil society) within a geographical area to increase the economic development of the 
region as a whole and to improve its position in the world economy. Development 
regionalism is a relatively new phenomenon. It contains the traditional arguments for 
regional cooperation of various relevance for different actors, such as territorial size, 
population size, and economies of scale, but, more significantly, also add some which 
are expressing new concerns and uncertainties in the current transformation of the world 
order and world economy, such as resource management, peace dividend, social 
security, investment and finance, stability and credibility etc. The traditional (orthodox) 
arguments for regional (economic) integration and cooperation hardly suffice since even 
a firm implementation would make little difference. 
There is a vicious circle, where conflict and underdevelopment feed on each other. 
But the circle, if reverted, can also become positive. Regional cooperation for 
development would reduce the level of conflict and the peace dividend facilitate further 
development cooperation. Regional peace thus becomes a comparative advantage in an 
integrating but turbulent world economy, a factor usually disregarded by economists. 
Security and development form one integrated complex, at the same time as they 
constitute two fundamental imperatives for regionalism and increasing regionness. 
Thus, political will and political action will play their part in breaking the vicious circle 
of uneven globalization, regional conflict, underdevelopment and human insecurity. 
 
 
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_______________________ 
 
Professor Björn Hettne & Fredrik Söderbaum 
Department of Peace and Development Research 
Göteborg University 
P.O.BOX 700 
SE-405 30 Göteborg 
Sweden 
E-mail: B.Hettne@padrigu.gu.se & F.Soderbaum@padrigu.gu.se