Aula 6 - Globalização, crime organizado e terrorismo que relação

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NegóciosEstrangeiros
número 14Abril 2009
publicação semestral do
Instituto Diplomático
do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros
Anton Bebler
Carlos Alberto Damas
Carlos Neves Ferreira
Christian-Peter Hanelt
Elsa Maria Dias Dinis
Fauzia Nasreen
Fernando A. de Figueiredo
Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses 
Francisco Knopfli
Francisco Proença Garcia
Gonçalo Santa Clara Gomes
João Sabido Costa
Jorge Azevedo Correia
José Carlos de Vasconcelos
José Segismundo de Saldanha
Leonardo Mathias
Manuel Duarte de Jesus 
Marcello Vaultier Mathias
Marina Eleftheriadou 
Meliha Benli Altunisik
Nuno Caseiro Miguel
Nuno Wahnon Martins
Paulo Vizeu Pinheiro
Pedro Catarino
Rui Reininho
Vasco Graça Moura
Vicente Jorge Silva
J otujuvup ejqmpnˆujdp
NegóciosEstrangeirosRevista 
N.º 14
Revista
Publicação do Instituto Diplomático do Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros
Director
Embaixador Carlos Neves Ferreira
(Presidente do Instituto Diplomático)
Directora Executiva
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Rua das Necessidades, n.º 19 – 1350-218 Lisboa
Tel. 351 21 393 20 40 – Fax 351 21 393 20 49 – e-mail: idi@mne.pt
Número
14 . Abril 2009
NegóciosEstrangeiros
 5 Nota do Director
 9 After Gaza: a common dialogue platform for the Middle East
 Christian-Peter Hanelt
 18 The Shia protocols: the Iranian project of Shiite proselytism
 Marina Eleftheriadou
 22 A situação actual no Cáucaso 
 Paulo Vizeu Pinheiro
 29 Turkey’s new activism in the Middle East
 Meliha Benli Altunisik
 40 What to do about the Western Balkans?
 Anton Bebler
 53 O diferendo sobre o nome ofi cial da Antiga República Jugoslava da Macedónia:
 a perspectiva da Grécia
 Marcello Vaultier Mathias
 76 A nova polemologia
 Francisco Proença Garcia
 112 Globalização, crime organizado e terrorismo: que relação?
 Nuno Gonçalo Caseiro Miguel
 123 A presença portuguesa em Timor-Leste (1945-1975): aspectos e implicações 
 do relacionamento com a Austrália
 Fernando Augusto de Figueiredo
 177 Os pedidos de empréstimos do Estado às casas bancárias 
 Sir Francis Baring & C.º e Henry Hope & C.ª (1797-1802)
 Carlos Alberto Damas
 211 A política diplomática portuguesa anterior à transferência da Corte para o Brasil 
 João Sabido Costa
 232 Portugal/Brasil, cinco séculos e alguns anos de convívio
 Francisco Knopfli
 242 O regresso da Comunidade e a ascensão da religião: três contributos para 
a fundamentação do liberalismo
 Jorge Azevedo Correia
Índice
 264 Intervenção da Directora da Academia dos Negócios Estrangeiros do Paquistão, 
Embaixadora Fauzia Nasreen, por ocasião da assinatura do Protocolo de Cooperação 
entre o Instituto Diplomático e a Academia
 Fauzia Nasreen
 NOTAS DE LEITURA
 275 Uma autobiografi a disfarçada, de João Hall Themido
 Uma vida dedicada à Diplomacia por Leonardo Mathias
 277 De Pequim a Washington. Memórias de um diplomata português, de Luís Esteves Fernandes
 Um livro sincero e corajoso por Pedro Catarino
 282 Letra e música, de Paulo Castilho
 Compositora e Intérprete por Rui Reininho
 285 Encontro em Capri ou o diário italiano de Gorki, de Marcello Duarte Mathias
 Algures no Mediterrâneo por Vasco Graça Moura
 291 Tanto Mar? Portugal, o Brasil e a Europa, de Francisco Seixas da Costa
 Portugal/Brasil: compreender e agir por José Carlos de Vasconcelos
 294 Todo-o terreno. 4 anos de reflexões, de Ana Gomes
 por Vicente Jorge Silva
 296 António Feijó – diplomata, de Fernando de Castro Brandão
 por Manuel Duarte de Jesus
 298 Guerra civil de Espanha: intervenção e não intervenção europeia, de Luís Soares de Oliveira
 por Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses
 302 Teatro de sombras – Contos, de António Pinto da França
 Entre Ironia e Cumplicidade por Gonçalo Santa Clara Gomes
 304 China – cooperação e conflito na questão de Taiwan, de Luís Cunha
 por Elsa Maria Dias Dinis
 308 Inside the Jihad. My life with Al-Qaeda, a spy’s story, de Omar Nasiri
 por Nuno Wahnon Martins
 CADERNOS DE ARQUIVO
 315 Relação da Embaixada e Entrada Pública que deu nesta Corte o Conde de Valdstein, 
Embaixador Extraordinário da Alemanha, ao Senhor Rei D. Pedro II, escrita pelo Conde 
de Assumar D. João de Almeida vedor da Casa Real que por ordem de El-Rei lhe fez a 
hospedagem
 José Segismundo de Saldanha
Linhas de Orientação
Os artigos reflectem apenas a opinião dos seus autores.
5
COMO SE SABE, mas convém sempre recordar, em revistas editadas por organismos oficiais 
os artigos de opinião publicados comprometem apenas os seus autores e não 
representam o ponto de vista oficial, oficioso ou mesmo diplomaticamente discreto, 
do Governo que tutela a entidade editora. Isso será tão mais verdade quanto mais 
polémicos possam ser os pontos de vista expressos. Pretender dar alguma vida e 
animação a uma publicação semestral é pois uma ambição frágil que só se for assente 
num módico de controvérsia pode adquirir alguma sustentabilidade. Há que fugir 
do politicamente correcto e das suas variantes oficiosas. É preciso evitar cair num sea 
of platitudes, para roubar uma expressão de Henry Kissinger, ouvida numa reunião da 
NATO nos anos 70, em que a procura obstinada do consenso transformava os textos 
a aprovar numa prosa inócua e esquiva.
Não tem a NE um conselho de leitura, por cujo crivo passem os textos publicados.
Quer isto dizer que a responsabilidade da sua escolha é integralmente do director 
da publicação, que se limitou a pedir a um ou outro especialista nas áreas cobertas 
pelos artigos uma simples opinião de sim ou não quanto ao mérito e à oportunidade 
da sua publicação. Não há pois qualquer diluição da responsabilidade pela via da sua 
transferência para um comité que assuma as escolhas que, sendo porventura polé-
micas, repousam depois na inocência e no anonimato das decisões colectivas.
Dito isto, umas palavras sobre o conteúdo do presente número.
Saíram em 2008 alguns livros cujos autores são membros da carreira diplomática. 
Cobrem vários géneros; memórias (embaixador João Hall Themido, Uma Autobiografia 
Disfarçada, e embaixador Luís Esteves Fernandes, De Pequim a Washington: Memórias de um 
Diplomata Português); ficção (embaixador Paulo Castilho, Letra e Música, embaixador 
Marcello Mathias, Encontro em Capri ou O Diário Italiano de Gorki e embaixador António 
Pinto da França, Teatro de sombras – Contos); compilações de intervenções públicas 
(embaixador Francisco Seixas da Costa, Tanto Mar? Portugal, o Brasil e a Europa e embaixadora 
Ana Gomes, Todo -o -Terereno – 4 anos de reflexões); ensaio biográfico, (embaixador Fernando 
de Castro Brandão, António Feijó, diplomata); estudos sobre a diplomacia portuguesa 
(embaixador Soares de Oliveira, Guerra Civil de Espanha: Intervenção e Não Intervenção Europeia). 
Nota do Director
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 5-7
6 São publicadas, também, notas de leitura relativas a outros livros recentemente 
editados.
Há que saudar com entusiasmo estas manifestações de veia literária: 
algumas que acompanharam a vida profissional dos seus autores, nasceram 
e maturaram ao longo dela (Marcello Mathias, Paulo Castilho, Pinto da 
França), outros, que esperaram a guilhotina legal que atira os diplomatas aos 
sessenta e cinco para a estranhamente denominada disponibilidade em 
serviço ou para a equívoca alacridade do estado de jubilação; outros, ainda, 
que traduzem uma vontade constante
de intervenção na vida política 
nacional (Ana Gomes, Seixas da Costa); outros, finalmente, que se espera 
contribuam para um costume abandonado, o do memorialismo e do 
testemunho pessoal das causas e dos factos que preencheram vidas 
profissionais e que se conhecem de forma esparsa por mera tradição oral 
(Hall Themido, Esteves Fernandes). Por último, é de dar um merecido relevo 
aos estudos sobre aspectos concretos da vida diplomática nacional e 
internacional, como os do embaixador Soares de Oliveira e embaixador 
Castro Brandão, sobre a diplomacia portuguesa no quadro mais vasto da 
guerra de Espanha e a acção de um escritor -diplomata de prestígio como 
António Feijó. Os estudos, monografias e ensaios perderam motivação e 
impulso (irremediavelmente?) quando no sistema de progressão na carreira 
se optou pela facilidade em nome da equanimidade, e se abandonou a 
dissertação, prévia à promoção a conselheiro, até aí, obrigatória. Perdeu -se o 
hábito da análise aprofundada do caso concreto e da sua peer review. Perdeu-
-se, também, uma fonte sistemática para o registo da visão do país sobre 
questões determinadas, nacionais ou não, sobre as actuações seguidas, as 
escolhas feitas e as alternativas rejeitadas.
Não foi fácil a selecção dos textos agora publicados. Procurou -se um 
equilíbrio entre as questões da actualidade com importância e algum relevo 
para Portugal, entre autores nacionais – diplomatas, civis, militares, 
académicos –, e estrangeiros que, gentilmente, nos cederam artigos inéditos 
ou deram a autorização para se reproduzirem textos já editados, porém em 
publicações de divulgação mais restrita.
Um conjunto de notas de leitura acompanha a notícia dos livros 
editados em Portugal, da autoria de diplomatas de carreira. Muitos dos que 
acederam a elaborá -las não são do MNE ou com o Ministério terão tido uma 
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 5-7
7relação remota. Procuraram -se afinidades electivas temperadas com visão 
crítica, espera -se que isso tenha vindo ao de cima.
Numa nova secção, a que se chamou “Cadernos de Arquivo”, passamos 
a transcrever documentos que são fontes para a História da Diplomacia, e 
que podem ser encontrados no Arquivo Histórico Diplomático, bem como 
noutros arquivos nacionais ou estrangeiros. Com esta nova secção espera -se 
suscitar interesses, despertar curiosidades e, até, estimular vocações científicas 
para a História da Diplomacia. Nestes Cadernos poderão publicar -se as 
transcrições de documentos que os leitores ou os investigadores desta área 
se disponham a enviar ao Arquivo Histórico Diplomático para esse efeito.
Quando foi possível e pareceu justificar -se, os artigos publicados foram 
precedidos de um abstract em inglês.
Por último, cumpre registar que este número foi possível porque se 
manteve a colaboração com a empresa ARED e com o seu director, Didier 
D’Arcy Dachez.
O Presidente do Instituto Diplomático
Carlos Neves Ferreira
Embaixador
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 5-7
8
9After Gaza: a common dialogue platform for the 
Middle East
Christian-Peter Hanelt*
■ Abstract:
If one wants to have peace in the Middle East, one will have to persuade all of the actors 
to sit around a table and to talk about all of the conflicts. Secret negotiations are just as 
ineffectual as the exclusion of certain actors. Only a common platform for dialogue will 
enable the European Union and above all the U.S. to fulfil their peacemaking mission.
■ Key words:
Middle East, Conflict-resolution, Europes role in the Middle East, Iran, Syria, USA. 
I – The Hamas -Israeli War THE WAR AGAINST Hamas has strengthened Israel directly in military 
terms, but has completely ruined its reputation in the Arab and Muslim world. The 
danger of Hamas rocket attacks may have been terminated for the time being, but in 
regional terms Israel’s security situation has not got any better.
Can anyone still provide security in the Gaza Strip? The Palestinians are divided 
and without a legitimate leadership, and the situation seems hopeless and desolate in 
Gaza. The Annapolis negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians have not yet led to 
a two -state solution. The strategy which involves strengthening Fatah on the West Bank 
and isolating Hamas in the Gaza Strip has not worked. The political elites continue to 
fight shy of an open and honest dialogue with their citizens. Although they are fully 
aware of the basic facts of a solution to the conflict between Israel and Palestine, they 
continue to steer clear of spelling out the compromises that will have to be made.
Trust in others has reached its nadir. Each side has its own media and perceptions. 
The Arabs watch Al Jazeera, the Israelis watch Channel 2, the Americans watch Fox 
News, and the Europeans watch the BBC. The conflict has generated a great deal of 
emotional turmoil, as the worldwide pro -Israeli and pro -Palestinian demonstrations 
have shown. Apart from demonstrations in European capitals, hundreds of people took 
* Senior Expert, Program Europe’s Future, Bertelsmann Foundation. Bertelsmann Stiftung, christian.hanelt@
bertelsmann.de
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 p. 9-17
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10 to the streets in German provincial towns, too. This poisons the whole atmosphere, 
and more and more people are prompted to espouse radical views. The moderate 
forces and governments are being weakened and the prospects of an Israeli-
-Palestinian two -state solution is becoming increasingly improbable.
In the Hamas -Israeli conflict in particular the European Union is once again 
being called upon to bear the burden of conflict management. This was already the 
case in the summer of 2006 in southern Lebanon, when the war between Israel and 
Hizbollah ended only after the deployment of the UNIFIL II mission. Yet this conflict 
demonstrates that the end of a war does not signify peace by any stretch of the 
imagination. The international missions monitoring the ceasefire will only turn out 
to be a success once peace treaties between Israel, the Palestinians and their Arab 
neighbours have been concluded.
II – Everything is Interconnected The convoluted state of affairs continues to worsen because 
all of the actors in the Middle East taken as a whole have their fingers in the pie 
somewhere, either with regard to the use of force or to attempts at peace -making, as 
some examples connected with the most recent Hamas -Israeli war demonstrate:
 Syria is allowing exiled Hamas leader Mashaal to act more freely in order to 
show Israel and the U.S. that Syria wishes to have a say in matters relating to 
war and peace.
 The hardliners in Iran are relieved yet again that international attention has 
now shifted to Israel and Gaza and away from their nuclear programme.
 Israel is attacking Hamas alos in order to deter Hizbollah on its northern 
border.
 Egypt has sealed off Hamas within the Gaza Strip in order to prevent it from 
cooperating with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
 Iran and Syria are using their influence on Hamas in order to strike the 
U.S. via Israel, in other words, to demonstrate that they can harm American 
interests in the region, but that they can also promote them.
“Regional Powers are playing the game indirectly.”
In these manoeuvres the regional powers are playing the game indirectly. Whilst 
demonstrating to each other how potentially disruptive they can be, they are not 
giving anyone a reason to attack them.
This method is also used in order to delay or even to torpedo bilateral attempts
to resolve conflicts.
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 9-17
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11 Turkish attempts to bring about a rap prochement between Israel and Syria has 
mobilised Lebanese and Palestinians, since they fear that such an agreement 
will be at their expense.
 Mere rumours that Washington is trying to reach a bilateral agreement with 
Tehran has Saudis, Emiratis, Israelis and Iraqis up in arms. They are afraid that 
an American -Iranian treaty might fail to take into account their own security 
interests.
 Israel is in favour of peace with Syria primarily in order to isolate Iran, and 
construes the stand -offs with Hamas and Hizbollah as proxy wars with Iran.
 Pictures of the unabated construction of settlements in East -Jerusalem or on the 
West Bank make it increasingly difficult even for moderate Arab leaders in the 
Gulf to ask their countries to support the Arab peace initiative with Israel.
 The attempts to ignore, neutralize or isolate spoilsports and obstructionists 
have come to grief as a result of regional entanglements.
 The Israeli government’s plan to negotiate a two -state solution with Fatah has 
ground to a halt also because it has been impossible to isolate Hamas, who 
are in control of Gaza.
 The Lebanese Hizbollah emerged strengthen-
ed from the asymmetrical war against the 
Israeli Army in the summer of 2006. It was 
able to exercise its veto in the context of 
intra -Lebanese wrangling and, by pointing 
to the ongoing conflict with Israel, to 
stop attempts to disarm it. In this regard 
Iran and Syria have displayed the extent of 
their influence. A Syrian -Saudi quarrel 
paralyzed an intra -Lebanese agreement for 
months.
Thus the so -called non -state actors such 
as Hamas and Hizbollah are in fact tools of 
the competing regional powers in the Middle 
East. And to make everything even more 
complicated, moderate politicians and radical 
leaders are jostling for power even within 
movements such as Hamas and Hizbollah.
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 9-17
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12 The former CIA case officer and Middle East specialist Robert Baer sums up the 
situation thus. “Hizbollah, Hamas and the Shiite parties in Iraq look to Tehran for 
financial aid and support. As long as the U.S. does not solve the Israeli -Palestinian 
conflict, Iran’s influence will grow.”
Thus it is possible to argue that the attempt to isolate the regional powers Syria 
and Iran has been a failure. Furthermore, bids to conclude bilateral agreements have 
come to grief on account of the veto powers of neighbouring states. Conflict 
management as in the case of Israel -Gaza and Israel -South Lebanon may be of 
importance in order to bring armed conflicts to an end, yet conflict management per 
se simply increases the potential for further wars. The next step in the dispute 
relating to the Iranian nuclear programme is already discernible on the horizon.
And last but no least, conflict management is becoming more expensive. The 
international community is having to come up with more and more diplomatic, 
financial and human resources to support a UN mandate, whilst at the same time 
endangering the lives of its aid workers and blue helmets. And the missions come to 
an end only when it is possible to make peace. For example, the UNIFIL II mission 
in southern Lebanon, which since the summer of 2006 has been run primarily by 
European blue helmets, will turn out to be a success only after Israel has signed 
peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon.
Each actor in the Middle East is afraid that his interests and anxieties will be 
passed over or ignored. Each actor wishes to be esteemed, accepted and taken 
seriously by his neighbours and the USA. Each actor would like to show how 
important he is in the region and that it is worth supporting him in political and 
economic terms. Each actor is striving for security and prosperity.
Politics is no doubt a sober business of balancing interests. Yet in the Middle East 
emotions, symbols, vivid ideas and neurotic images also play an important role. 
Future conflict management and conflict resolution need to pay more attention to 
such perceptions.
III – A Common Platform for Dialogue Future diplomatic efforts should be directed 
primarily at providing a common platform for all of the actors and thus for all of 
their interests, fears and cleavages.
However, this common platform will not simply be part of a never -ending series 
of Middle East intergovernmental conferences and not another summit held for its 
own sake. No actor will be excluded, all interests will have a voice, every conflict will 
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 9-17
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13be taken seriously and everyone will have the same opportunity to explain his 
anxieties and fears about the future. It will all be about honesty, openness, modesty 
and a new language of reconciliation.
It is not about pageantry, showmanship, big promises or bitter accusations. This 
is not a naive or cosy strategy, and is also all about sending out a symbolic signal: 
There will be no more secret negotiations of the kind which give rise to nothing but 
suspicion and opposition. Secretiveness spawns rumours and conspiracy theories, 
and in the Middle East this always means that everything has already come to grief 
before it has even got off the ground. The search for peace in the Middle East needs 
to escape from this vicious circle.
“Avoid as much diplomatic wrangling as possible.”
The methodology of this new approach is based on the idea of inviting all parties to 
share a common platform on which they can search for ways for a common and 
sustainable resolution of their various interlinked conflicts. The goal of this quest is 
not as in the past conflict management as such. Many actors in the region reject the 
kind of conflict management strategy pursued in recent years, which they believe is 
nothing more than muddling through and procrastination, and has been unable to 
reduce the potential for new outbursts of violence.
In contrast to this the goal of this quest is nothing less than conflict resolution, 
though in all modesty on two levels of attainment: The first level, which takes its 
bearings from the notion of conflict transformation, is a stage in which the dialogue 
platform becomes the forum within which potential conflicts can be nudged into 
peaceful channels. The second level presupposes that a serious effort will be made 
by all of the participants to terminate as many conflicts as possible with the help of 
peace treaties. Thus the platform could move on from being a dialogue forum to 
become a negotiating forum.
Once all of the actors are sitting round a table, they will have become an integral 
part of the process. No one will be able to claim that he was not invited or that he 
was not listened to, and that he thus has every right to opt out of the process and to 
make trouble for everyone else. Anyone who turns down an invitation is telling the 
rest of the world that he is trying to hold things up. He can no longer hide behind 
the claim that an external force, as was the case with the Bush administration, has 
done all it can to isolate him (as in the case of Iran) or is actually dead set against 
having him there
at all (as in the case of Syria).
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 9-17
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14 All the actors will be invited on the basis of equality. The envoy system will be 
used in order to avoid as much diplomatic wrangling as possible about status 
questions before the platform convenes. Every head of state and government will 
choose an envoy. The Palestinians (in point of fact without a legitimate leadership 
since 9 January) will decide themselves, without pressure from outside, who is to 
represent them at the talks. If it is one person from Gaza and one person from the 
West Bank, then that may initially be possible, though in the course of time they will 
also have to reach agreement on a special envoy. The platform will be exerting 
pressure on them to attain a consensus. As a multilateral external actor the European 
Union should agree on one voice, which might well be that of the High Representative 
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana.
The meetings will take place on a regular, 
or, and this would be even better, on a 
permanent basis, so that invitations to the next 
gathering will not involve a great deal of 
diplomatic effort. The envoy solution will 
make it easier to agree on dates and on an 
agenda. All the various conflicts will be on the 
agenda. The discussions will then consider all 
of the more or less interwoven lines of conflict: 
Israel -Palestine, Israel -Syria, Israel -Lebanon, 
Arab World -Israel, Lebanon -Syria, Iraq -Iran-
-Turkey -Syria, Gulf States -Iran, Iran -Israel, and 
Iraq and its neighbours. The most important 
thing is to attempt to create as much consensus 
as possible and to balance the various interests in an equitable manner. And if progress 
is made in the discussions and negotiations on the Israeli -Syrian agenda item, for 
example, it will have a positive influence on the other conflicts.
All the fundamental issues on which these conflicts are based, such Israel’s right 
to exist as a Jewish state, the Palestinians’ and the Kurds’ right to self -determination, 
the territorial integrity of Iraq, the independence of Lebanon and Syria, Iran’s 
security interests, or the stability and security of the Arab Gulf states will be taken 
into account.
The comprehensive approach of a common platform for dialogue will give the 
Arab world the assurance that all the contentious points relating to Israel will be dealt 
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 9-17
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15with, as will Israel’s concerns about its regional security and full incorporation into 
the region. Iran will be able to make out a case for its wish to be an integral part of 
the region. The U.S. will perceive that the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq is safe in 
the regional context. And the smaller countries of the region will also have their say.
The symbolism of the venue is of some importance. For this reason the common 
forum for dialogue will not be meeting in places which remind people of previous 
Middle East initiatives such as Oslo, Madrid, Annapolis, Camp David or Shepherdstown. 
Nor will the participants be meeting in places which are associated with important 
historical agreements such as San Francisco, Rome or Seville (however pleasant it 
might be, though not all of the actors may be of this opinion). The common forum 
for dialogue is supposed to stand for a new beginning of a modest, inclusive and 
goal -oriented kind, and for this reason as many associations as possible should be 
avoided. It must be a practical working location for the envoys. The best thing would 
be somewhere in the Middle East, partly in order to emphasize the connection with 
the region, and the commitment of the actors who actually live there.
The greatest responsibility devolves on the host as discussion leader. What is 
needed is a powerful and very tactful personality. Even if many actors believe that the 
U.S. has lost its reputation as an honest broker, it continues to be the most powerful 
external actor. It has a sizeable number of armed forces in the region, a plethora of 
interests, and the greatest ability to issue certain guarantees. For almost everyone in 
the region the new American president stands for hope and a new beginning. His 
envoy should also embody this positive kind of authority. The reason for this is that 
the American envoy will bear the principal responsibility for the atmosphere of the 
talks. He must avoid that the multilateral talks will fall apart into bilateral and (semi -) 
secret negotiations. And last but not least he will also have to incorporate the other 
external actors (EU, UN, Russia, China, and Japan) on an equal footing.
IV – No time to lose The inauguration of the new U.S. president would seem to be a good 
moment to start with the initiative. Barack Obama himself has announced that he 
will quickly become involved in the Middle East conflict. Thus it seems that on this 
occasion presidential participation, in contrast to Obama’s predecessors Clinton and 
Bush, can already be expected at the beginning of a term of office and not at the 
end. That would strengthen the authority and the commitment of U.S. involvement. 
At the same time Obama will encounter a great willingness on the part of the 
Europeans and many regional actors to work together closely.
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 9-17
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16 In recent months Obama’s advisers have let it be known that they will be 
suggesting to the new U.S. administration that there should be multilateral 
involvement, close cooperation and burden -sharing with the EU, and a dialogue 
between Washington, Damascus and Tehran. Furthermore, Israel is electing a new 
parliament in February and thus a new government, and Iran is electing a new 
president in June. And the Palestinians are being pressured to determine a new 
legitimate leadership. These are the points which suggest that 2009 may well be a 
year of opportunity in which it would make sense to embark on a new approach to 
conflict resolution in the Middle East.
The difficult and unpredictable challenges posed by the global economic and 
financial crisis still constitute a risk. Thus the Obama administration might well have 
to deal with growing intra -American problems, and this may leave little time for 
foreign policy initiatives. Similarly, new incidents in the Middle East may lead to 
crises or wars at a moment’s notice, and this would terminate an ongoing dialogue 
or defer it indefinitely.
V – What is the EU doing? The European Union possesses a wealth of experience and skills 
with which it can help to implement a new Middle East ap proach on the basis of a 
common platform for dialogue.
 The EU can impress upon the new U.S. administration that the inclusive 
approach is better than to act bilaterally and to isolate important players; that 
Obama must move on the Middle East at the beginning of his presidency 
and not towards the end; that the strategy should be conflict resolution and 
not procrastinatory conflict management; that a new negotiating approach 
must be adopted and that all this taken together can dramatically improve the 
image of the U.S. in the region, and in the final analysis can even create better 
regional conditions for a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq.
“The isolation of Syria and Iran has failed.”
 The EU has resilient relations with all of the actors in the region, and for this 
reason it can underline the importance of American envoy invitations to states 
such as Iran and Syria that have hitherto been isolated from the USA.
 The EU is the largest financial donor to the Palestinian administration. It is 
involved in police training (EUPOL COPPS) and in customs clearance at Rafah 
crossing between Gaza and Egypt (EU BAM).
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 9-17
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17 Europe needs peace projects in its southern neighbourhood so that the 
Mediterranean Union can get off the ground and that at long last the great 
social and economic challenges in North Africa and the Middle East can move 
to the centre of the policymaking stage.
Despite this important potential, the European Union should not adopt a 
competitive stance towards the USA. In fact the EU should realize that a solution of 
the conflict will only be possible if there is a new and stronger role for the U.S., 
which in its turn is placing its hopes in a resilient Transatlantic partnership.NE
FOR FURTHER READING:
Christian Hanelt / Almut Möller (Editors): Bound to Cooperate – Europe and the 
Middle East II, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008
Bertelsmann Foundation: Trans -Atlantic Briefing Book – Managing Expectations, 
Expanding the Partnership, Shaping the Agenda for 2009, November 2008
Aaron David Miller: The Much Too Promised Land - America's Elusive Search for 
Arab -Israeli Peace, März 2008
Robert Baer: The Devil we know – Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower, 
September 2008
Richard N. Haass / Martin Indyk: Beyond Iraq. A New U.S. Strategy for the Middle 
East, Foreign Affairs, January 2009
Henry Siegman: A Last Chance at Middle East Peace?, The Nation, January 2009
Hussein Agha/Robert Malley: How Not to Make Peace in the Middle East, The New 
York Review of Books, Volume 56, No. 1, January 2009
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 9-17
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18 The Shia protocols: the Iranian project of Shiite 
proselytism
Marina Eleftheriadou*
■ Abstract:
Lately there has been a heated debate about Iranian efforts to spread Shiism to Sunni 
countries. Many Sunni religious and political figures have contributed to this latest 
addition of anti -Iranian rhetoric, exaggerating the actual extent of the phenomenon of 
Shia conversions. It seems that once again Iran’s rising regional status challenges Sunni 
predominance in the region. However, although politically more prolific, religiously, the 
Iranian example, at least for now, flourishes only under very specific circumstances.
IN SEPTEMBER 2008 one of the most prominent Islamist scholars – perhaps the most creative of 
the Muslim Brotherhood trend – Yusuf al -Qaradawi, condemned the Shiite “attempts 
to invade the Sunni community… [through] missionary work”. From inside the Sunni front 
some more or less discreetly nodded their heads, while others in turn dismissed 
Qaradawi’s remarks in abhorrence usually attributed to someone still evaluating the 
situation. Qaradawi’s warning was the latest ring in a chain of similar statements 
starting from Jordan’s king Abdullah who first spoke of the ‘Shia crescent’, followed 
by Hosni Mubarak, who in 2006 asserted that the Arab Shia were more loyal to Iran 
than to their own countries. Saudi king Abdullah said in this context that the Shia 
were trying to convert Sunnis, while assuring at the same time that “the dimensions 
of spreading Shiism” were under the close scrutiny of the Saudi regime. Furthermore, 
Qaradawi himself accused the Shia of trying to exploit Hezbollah’s victory against 
Israel in order to penetrate Sunni societies.
In the meantime newspapers and figures of lesser influence and with no real 
interest in the official political -correctness preserved the issue by adding drama to the 
debate. The editor -in -chief of Al -Ahram linked Iran’s project of “spreading Shiism” to the 
desire to “revive the dreams of Safavid” (a Persian dynasty that in 16th century established 
Shiism as the official religion of the Persian Empire). Accordingly, the Jordanian 
* Senior Researcher and PhD candidate at the Center for Mediterranean, Middle East and Islamic Studies of the 
Peloponnese University, Greece. This article was published in the Middle East Bulletin, Issue 13, November 
2008, http://pedis.uop.gr
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 18-21
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19newspaper, Ad -Dustour, identified that the project’s plans were to expand Shiism from 
India to Egypt. However, nothing was more indicative of the Sunni community’s low 
spirit than the moan of wounded pride in the article published in Al -Siyassa (Kuwait), 
written by its editor -in -chief Ahmad al -Jarallah. In his article, Jarallah pleaded the 
“leaders of all Arab countries [to] hold a summit to prevent Iran from stealing Arab issues”.
The Middle East witnesses Iran’s second 1979 and the Sunni regimes are alarmed 
by it, more so since the Sunni community perceives an ongoing transformation of this 
threat from a political into an existential one. 
Iran’s current rise might lack the revolutionary charm of 1979; however, quite 
contrary to the heydays of the Iranian Revolution it is now characterized by firmer 
foundations. The inexperienced leadership of 1979 entered Islamist and generally 
Middle Eastern affairs like a bull into a china shop, stirring up the whole region but 
in the end ‘grabbing’ more than it could hold. Nowadays, the Sunnis argue that Teheran 
takes one step at a time, sneaking into the former’s open wounds and letting its 
defiance of regional and global norms of conduct attract followers. A message, which 
was proven inadequate in the post -1979 “shia expansion”, has been ‘surrounded’ now 
by an entire – conspiracy – strategy in order to support its validity and consistency. In 
the past Iran merely managed briefly to mobilize the Gulf Shia: civil unrest in the oil-
-rich Shia -populated eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia erupted in December 1979 but 
soon died out although one has to say that its products remained active even after the 
revolution (e.g. the Saudi Arabian Hezbollah and its attack on the Khobar towers in 
1996). The Iranian Revolution also inspired the creation of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
and created its star product the Lebanese Hezbollah. Finally, it gave a note of militancy 
to the Sunni Islamists which however in their majority preferred to use the Iranian 
example without adopting its dogma. Soon the Sunni militants would either turn 
indifferent in the face of the new Islamic ideal in Afghanistan or applaud Saddam as he 
was bleeding out Iran. Briefly, Iran’s final balance -sheet was far from positive.
Nonetheless, in 2008 as the Sunni regimes failed to cope with the mounting 
crises, they saw their cherished containment of Iran evaporate. On Iran’s east, the 
Taliban -Pakistan -Saudi Arabia axis might remain strong and potent, however, it has 
been transformed while additionally the Pakistani and Saudi Arabian link have been 
highly volatile and therefore less manageable. On Iran’s west the Iraqi bulwark 
disappeared into thin air, opening thus the gates of the Middle East. As the great force 
multiplier (nuclear power) is coming into being,
Iran is scoring victories in Iraq, 
Lebanon (via the other Shia player, Hezbollah) and Palestine (through its direct or 
Syria -intermediate relations with Hamas and smaller rejectionist Palestinian groups, 
e.g. Islamic Jihad and PF -General Command).
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 18-21
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20 In other words, Teheran is stealing the Arab issues while the Arab elites want to 
secure the Sunni soul. In 1979 Saudi Arabia battled Shia expansionism by highlighting 
Iran’s Shia particularity as directly linked to Persian nationalism. Today, it is not 
anymore only about more assertive Shia communities inside Sunni -dominated states 
but also about losing followers to the Shia. What can seem more threating compared 
to the image of scores of Shia converts in “Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and other 
non -Arab countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Senegal…even the Gulf States and Syria, but 
of course, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon have Shia communities and therefore, unlike countries where there was 
no Shia, conversion to the Shia sect does not stand out” (Yusuf al -Qaradawi).
Actual figures which would allow estimations are lacking and Sunni alarmism 
blurs the picture even more. However, conversions, although far less common than 
asserted, seem to occur mostly in predominately Sunni regions, which share some 
kind of acquaintance with Shia culture. On the contrary, in regions of mixed 
populations and Shia minority status (Arab Gulf) or in regions of increased Shia 
assertiveness and tensed Sunni -Shia relations (Iraq and Lebanon) the Sunni identity 
seems more solid and resistant. An exception to this pattern is Syria which due to 
the political leverage exerted by Iran and the peculiar sectarian nature of its regime 
forms the most interesting case. One could also add Jordan. However, Amman’s 
increasing preoccupation with Shia converts is most probably connected with the 
social upheaval created by the arrival of thousands of well -off Iraqi Shia refugees.
In this context, conversions occur in North African countries, including Egypt, 
which acquired their religious folk familiarity with Shia practices from the time of 
the Fatimid rule. When Qaradawi highlighted the case of Egypt: “I left Egypt 47 years 
ago, it had not a single Shiite and now there are many... who took them to Shiism? Egypt is the cradle of 
Sunnism and the country of Al -Azhar”. However, he overlooked that Al -Azhar was founded 
during the Fatimid era or as Qaddafi said: “Cairo cannot escape its Fatimid destiny”. 
Although Shia in Egypt are said to represent less than 1% of the population (and any 
sporadic conversions can hardly change that), the authorities, in order to rally the 
people around the flag vis -à -vis Iran, look worried. So are the Algerians, the Sudanese 
and the Moroccans. Two years ago the Algerian Ministry of education suspended 
eleven teachers as they were accused of conducting Shia missionary work. While in 
Algeria primarily Shia expatriates from Iraq, Syria and Lebanon were held responsible, 
in Morocco the .messengers. were Moroccans working in Europe where they were 
approached by Iranian charitable organizations. In Sudan the accusations have been 
directed towards the Iranians themselves who allegedly took advantage of Khartoum.s 
friendly disposition towards the Iranian revolution. According to the Sudanese.
Supreme Council for Coordination among the Islamic Associations, through the 
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 18-21
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21proselytism of the Iranian Cultural Center in Khartoum, “whole villages have been converted 
to Shiism, and Shi’a mosques have proliferated in Khartoum”.
While these predominately Sunni countries are more susceptible to Shia 
proselytism, the Gulf countries on the other hand, which are home to large Shia 
communities (20% in Saudi Arabia, 30% in Kuwait, 70% however politically 
subordinated in Bahrain), are more vulnerable to the prospect of militant Shiism 
rather than proselytism as the Sunni community, threatened as it feels, is heavily 
entrenched behind its sectarian identity. This is even more explicit in Lebanon and 
Iraq. Not only, as Nasrallah, said would it be cheaper simply to produce more 
children (as the Shia in Lebanon have been doing for the last decades), but also the 
possible candidates for conversion are more probable to turn to militant Sunnism to 
safeguard their political position rather than change camp.
Syria’s Sunnis present a different situation. Not only have they been indoctrinated 
for years in a Ba’athist -Alawi regime and subjected to significant Iranian political 
and economic penetration, but they have also been deprived from a rallying point 
since the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is disputed whether conversions 
predominately affect the Alawi or the Sunni community (official statistics point to 
the former, while the Sunnis claim it is the latter under the regime’s blessing). 
However, in any case, both of them are subjected to the same set of powers. Iran’s 
and Hezbollah’s achievements are multiplied via Iran’s political, economic and 
cultural inroads into the country. Dozens of Shia shrines have been built or restored, 
hundreds of hawzas (Shia seminary) and cultural centers have been established and 
several hundreds of thousands religious Shia tourists (mostly Iranian) flood the 
country every year. At the same time, Iran’s huge investments engulf the Syrian 
economy. If the state sector is earmarked for the close circle of Assad’s Alawi loyalists, 
the private sector is not less cliental, but in this case it is the Iranians who occupy 
the HR positions. It is exactly the combination of Iranian political and economic 
involvement and the doctrinal -sectarian proximity of the two regimes that allowed 
Teheran to establish an enormous mechanism of cultural influence. This explains 
why for example in Palestine (Gaza), despite the defamatory “Shiites” increasingly 
attributed to Hamas by Fatah, there is no such phenomenon. 
In the final analysis, as a Shiite cleric in Saudi Arabia said: “People in the region always 
complain about a Shiite crescent...That’s just a crescent. What about the full Sunni moon?” The exact 
extent of the “Shia invasion” little matters. It is more interesting and important to 
see if the Sunni world and especially Saudi Arabia is capable to recuperate from 9/11 
setbacks and put again in motion its extensive counter -Iranian mechanism that 
worked so effectively in the 1980s.NE
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 18-21
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22 A situação actual no Cáucaso
Paulo Vizeu Pinheiro*
AGRADEÇO AO PROFESSOR LUÍS Filipe Tomás, da UCP, e ao Embaixador Carlos Neves Ferreira, 
Presidente do Instituto Diplomático que me desafiaram para participar nesta mesa 
redonda sobre a região do Cáucaso. Aceitei de imediato, pois sabia que seria sempre 
um enorme prazer regressar, ainda que por breves instantes, à casa onde me licenciei 
e onde frequentei, em simultâneo, uma pós -graduação e um mestrado.
Começaria por uma pergunta provocatória.
Qual o interesse de e para Portugal? É que não importamos nem petróleo nem gás. Para 
Portugal, em termos concretos, quer energéticos, quer económicos ou comerciais, é 
uma espécie de non issue. Também
não é uma zona de passagem dos nossos bens. Não 
é sequer um entreposto de serviços para o nosso país. 
 E em termos humanos, de imigração (segurança humana e segurança 
nacional) a importância do Cáucaso é também reduzida.
 O Cáucaso não reflecte nenhum interesse vital ou fundamental, verdadeiramente 
insubstituível ou incontornável. Também não constitui uma ameaça à nossa 
segurança.
 Ainda para mais é provavelmente a região com maior concentração de 
conflitos irresolúveis por km2 – os hoje chamados conflitos gelados, mas que, 
desde há séculos, existem sobre outras denominações. Conflitos anteriores a 
Pedro o Grande ou Catarina.
 Reparem que os períodos de alguma estabilidade e identidade nacional, na 
Arménia ou Geórgia, são sempre muito curtos. Aproveitando as transições nos 
ciclos imperiais. O período mais recente, o do fim da URSS, também 
testemunhou conflitos secessionistas e integracionistas. Ou seja, mesmo no 
* Diplomata, Director-geral de Política da Defesa Nacional. Intervenção num Seminário organizado pela 
Universidade Católica.
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 22-28
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23período ideal para afirmação nacional, de desagregação súbita do império 
soviético, os conflitos, do início dos anos 90, extremamente sangrentos, não 
tiveram um desfecho minimamente claro ou estável, como sucedeu, em 
grande medida, nos Balcãs, em que a antiga Jugoslávia se desdobrou e 
multiplicou em países viáveis, hoje membros da UE ou NATO, ou a estes 
candidatos.
 Mais, por razões de simplificação analítica gostamos de nos referir ao Cáucaso 
como uma região bem definida. Mas estamos a falar do Cáucaso do Sul, com 
três países independentes que muito pouco têm a ver entre si em termos 
políticos, culturais e militares. A Arménia, a Geórgia e o Azerbeijão. O Cáucaso 
do Norte é todo ele russo, mas também muito diverso em termos de moldura 
humana, cultural e até confessional. Se me perguntarem o que é que têm de 
comum a Ingushia, a Chechénia ou o Daguestão, diria que o jugo estatal 
russo, o rublo, a língua russa e a administração. Mas o Daguestão poderia ser 
considerado uma extensão natural do Azerbeijão. E a Ingushetia, uma extensão 
europeizada da Chechénia. E a Chechénia, um país como o Iémen… Mas se 
espetarem uma vara, em Grozni, ela vem manchada de preto, com petróleo a 
1 metro. Muitas casas na Chechénia têm mini -refinarias improvisadas. Em 
2000, as Forças russas desmantelavam por mês entre 1500 a 2000 refinarias 
rebeldes. Agora imaginem aquelas que colaboravam com os exércitos russos.
 Hitler não hesitou em procurar chegar até Baku para garantir o que hoje 
chamaríamos segurança energética… e sofreu a maior derrota, a de Estaline-
grado, que muito analistas militares consideram o ponto de viragem da 
segunda guerra mundial.
 Estes territórios, do norte e sul do Cáucaso, tresandam a petróleo, tresandam 
a gás, e estão no ponto de passagem que liga a Europa à Ásia, no ponto de 
passagem comercial por excelência entre blocos de interesses, entre potências 
comerciais, entre pólos de hegemonia militar.
 Mas a cultura local não mudou, desde o tempo do “Prisioneiro do Cáucaso”, 
de Pushkin, que relata as desventuras de um soldado russo na transição do 
século XVIII -XIX escravizado pelos islâmicos chechenos, isto no apogeu do 
controlo cossaco. Em 1998, no tempo do moderado auto proclamado Presidente 
checheno Aslan Maskhadov, aplicava -se a Sharia em Grozni, e todas as semanas 
havia decapitações e amputações, decretadas pelas Shuras. Em 1999, foram 
decapitados em segredo, pelos combatentes chechenos, 4 trabalhadores 
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 22-28
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24 britânicos de telecomunicações, acusados de espionagem a favor dos impe-
rialistas ocidentais mas também ao serviço do imperialismo russo. Em 2000, 
ainda decorrendo a campanha brutal e sangrenta militar russa, eram 
descobertos, em buracos, “escravos”, normalmente eslavos, mas também de 
culturas inferiores à chechena, como jordanos ou iemenitas… Estamos a falar 
de práticas do Século VIII mas no século XXI. A corrente islâmica mais em 
voga na Chechénia é a do Waabismo saudita, a de Bin Laden.
 Para Moscovo, nenhum Estado ou mais apropriadamente Província ou Região 
da Federação russa é separável. E muito menos os do estratégico e 
economicamente rentável Sul. Importa não esquecer que há outras províncias 
russas de matriz islâmica, como o Tatarstão ou a Bashkiria. O mesmo se diga 
de algumas regiões siberianas ou o extremo oriental russo, onde os problemas 
têm outro nome, como a fragilidade demográfica e a fortaleza económica, 
comercial e demográfica da confinante China.
 Daí que desde há muito, já dos tempos de Ieltsin, mas agora agravado pela era 
neo nacionalista expansiva ou musculada de Putin, que os Russos designam 
por “vizinhança próxima” o Cáucaso do Sul e até a Bielorrússia ou mesmo a 
Ucrânia, na frente ocidental.
 E em plena Europa da União Europeia e da NATO, os russos mantêm, com 
mão de ferro, o enclave de Kaliningrado. Para a identidade Russa, o país tem 
11 fusos horários, de Kaliningrado até Kamchatcka, onde a zona de 
contencioso territorial das Kurilas, tem como adversário o Japão.
 Ou seja, quando falamos do Cáucaso estamos em grande medida a falar da 
Rússia e da sua afirmação, crescente e musculada, como pólo de poder, face 
aos EUA, UE -NATO, incluindo aqui naturalmente a Turquia, mas também o 
Mundo árabe da região do Golfo, o Irão, a China e a Índia.
 Mas será que a Rússia tem direito a ter um backyard? É do interesse europeu? 
Dá -nos mais ou menos estabilidade? Qual o interesse ocidental em jogo? 
Se me perguntarem se o Cáucaso é importante para a segurança e estabilidade da Europa, 
da Eurásia e da Ásia, não hesito em responder afirmativamente. 
 Portugal pode não ter um interesse directo, vital ou não, na região. Mas tem 
um interesse mediato muito importante, como país da UE, como Aliado da 
NATO e como nação com uma política selectivamente global e de vocação 
universalista.
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 22-28
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25 Como país da União Europeia, Portugal não pode ser indiferente ao jogo, estron-
dosamente geo estratégico, eu diria neo clássico, que se está a desenrolar no 
Cáucaso. E que, pela via colectiva, o afecta, quer em termos económicos, comerciais 
europeus, quer em termos de segurança de vanguarda ou fronteira europeia.
 A segurança energética – e estamos a falar do euro -asiático Cáspio ao euro-
-europeu Mar Negro – não nos pode ser indiferente. É também um problema 
português, quanto mais não seja pela inerente pressão crescente do preço 
mundial das comodities, do crude ao gás, mas também pela pressão que não 
deixaremos de sentir nos nossos tradicionais mercados abastecedores resultante 
da diversificação energética dos nossos parceiros europeus. Não nos devemos 
fiar na elasticidade na área dos recursos energéticos. E muito menos na 
plasticidade do comércio mundial nesta área, sobretudo conhecendo a OPEP 
e as tentativas russas de uma OPEP do gás.
 E também importa ter em consideração que nem sempre a Europa esteve ou 
está à altura dos seus interesses e capacidades. O ex -chanceler alemão é um 
administrador da maior máquina de pressão político -económica russa 
existente, a Gazprom. E o mercado comum energético europeu continua 
ainda por alcançar não obstante as evidencias.
 E vamos ser claros, a actual crise financeira, económica e comercial mundial, 
que nos
pôs a todos em recessão, em pressão sócio -laboral de magnitude 
planetária e totalmente imprevisível em termos de estabilidade política 
governativa à escala nacional e regional, veio tornar ainda mais premente e 
dramático o jogo caucasiano. Este, desenrola -se às nossas portas, pode 
contaminar, através de uma geometria política e económica de mutação 
permanente, o nosso Mediterrâneo, tanto o oriental – que está a passar 
também por uma situação de contornos dramáticos no Médio Oriente – como 
o Ocidental, o que está aqui ao nosso lado, que exporta mão-de-obra 
magrebina e africana negra para o nosso pacato Sul.
 Infelizmente, já não existem conflitos puramente nacionais ou exclusivamente 
regionais. A era da globalização tornou -nos inter dependentes uns dos outros, 
em regiões cada vez mais distantes, para o melhor e para o pior.
 E se Portugal joga também os seus interesses no Cáucaso enquanto país da 
União Europeia, cuja segurança e estabilidade nos afecta directamente, o 
nosso país também é actor na região enquanto aliado fundador da NATO. E 
como todos sabem, a Geórgia é um candidato à Aliança, já com lugar 
prometido na Cimeira da NATO em Bucareste, no ano passado.
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 22-28
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26  No pior dos cenários, Portugal poderá vir a jogar a sua solidariedade ao 
abrigo do artigo V. Tudo, mas mesmo tudo, devemos fazer para que o Worst case 
scenario nunca venha a ter lugar.
 E aqui entra, ou deve entrar, a nossa diplomacia, política e económica, de 
vocação universal e de diálogo permanente. Que não é de empreitada ou 
proxi, que não é subsidiária de interesses ou lógicas de hegemonia ou 
domínio.
 Portugal é, por natureza, um Honest Broker singular, pois sendo do Ocidente, 
Euro -Atlântico, é também do Sul Afro -Sul -Americano e Oriental, com 
presença histórica em todo o Grande Médio Oriente, que vai da Mauritânia à 
Índia. Mas vamos também até ao Japão. E estivemos na Corte Russa, quer nos 
tempos de Pedro o Grande, quer nos tempos de Catarina. Perguntem a todos 
estes povos (até em Omã) o que pensam dos portugueses. Perguntem também 
às elites. Somos uma “ponte natural” inter continental e subcontinental. 
Lembro que o nome original da Geórgia é “Ibéria Oriental”. Existe no 
Cáucaso do Sul, particularmente na Geórgia e na Arménia, uma cultura 
(incluindo a gastronómica) do tipo mediterrânica. As nossas raízes e os 
nossos consequentes bons laços inter confessionais e inter culturais, a nossa 
vocação universalista e ecuménica, pode ser particularmente útil nesta região, 
como tem sido em muitas outras. Veja -se por exemplo a opinião unânime de 
responsáveis, oficiais ou “fácticos” libaneses, bem como dos israelitas, sobre 
o profissionalismo, a perspicácia, a tolerância, o diálogo, boa percepção e 
inserção do contingente português na UNIFIL.
 Dizia há dias o nosso Presidente da Comissão Europeia que numa crise 
mundial desta escala, onde o sistema internacional – quer em termos geo-
políticos, quer em termos de governação ou regulação global económica, 
financeira e comercial – está em processo reconfiguração, de mutação 
acelerada decorrente em parte da emergência célere, factual, do tão falado 
mundo multi polar, são precisos mais diplomatas. Mais visão global, integradora, 
com capacidade de diagnóstico frio ou pragmático mas também de previsão 
estratégica de novas alianças e parcerias. 
 E aqui entra Portugal, que tem um potencial único, enquanto país, enquanto 
exportador de quadros qualificados, mas sobretudo, enquanto construtor de 
pontes e diálogos. E também como bom e equilibrado parceiro comercial 
europeu e afro -europeu. 
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 22-28
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27 Falo -vos da minha experiência em Washington, Moscovo e Tbilisi (deixo de 
lado África, onde também estive e onde vou regularmente). Falo -vos da nossa 
participação na Troika (EUA, URSS -Rússia) sobre Angola e Moçambique 
(processos de paz). Falo -vos da nossa experiência, em Moscovo, da Presidência 
portuguesa do Conselho da UE em 2000, e particularmente da primeira missão 
de monitorização europeia na Chechénia, que a diplomacia portuguesa 
conseguiu desbloquear. Falo -vos da nossa experiência, também no ângulo de 
Moscovo, da Presidência portuguesa ministerial da OSCE, em que se conseguiu 
introduzir no Fórum Económico o difícil e conflituoso tema da gestão dos 
recursos hídricos, explorando modelos de estabilização e criação de confiança.
 Mas que pontes podemos nós, portugueses, construir no Cáucaso? Antes de 
mais ajudar a criar dinâmicas de confiança gradual entre países, directa ou 
indirectamente, relacionados pelos frozen conflicts, passando por Moscovo, isto é, 
não contra Moscovo. Tornando a Rússia confiante que pode ser parte ganha-
dora, política e economicamente, da solução e não parte do problema. 
 Num dos mais complexos cenários da geopolítica contemporânea, ainda 
repleto de separatismos, etno -nacionalismos, redefinição de áreas de influência, 
devemos acentuar o que traz estabilidade, certeza, como os princípios da 
integridade territorial, não só da Geórgia mas também da Rússia. Como 
defensores de minorias, incluindo as russas
 O 8/8/8 surgiu como a mais mediatizada das tensões “Rússia/“Ocidente”. 
Uma percepção errada na minha opinião. Não creio que o “Ocidente” tivesse 
sido ali ameaçado, pelo menos tanto quanto os russos se sentem com a 
entrada de conselheiros e instrutores militares de países da NATO e a adesão, 
acelerada, à Aliança Atlântica. Mas efectivamente, a diplomacia que funcionou 
com a cabeça fria foi a europeia de Sarkozi. Pergunto -me para que servem 
tantos conselheiros militares quando o problema não é primacialmente 
militar. Podemos ajudar os georgianos a garantirem a impermeabilidade da 
fronteira georgiana com a Rússia no vale checheno de Pankissi? 
 Nos 5 focos de tensão:
 1. Ossétia do Sul, Geógia X Rússia;
 2. Abkházia, Geógia X Rússia;
 3. Nagorno -Karabakh, Arménia X Azerbaijão, 1M refugiados e deslocados;
 4. Chechénia, Rússia;
 5. Reconhecimento da fronteira comum, Arménia X Turquia.
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 22-28
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28 Cabe perguntar do papel que Portugal pode jogar no quadro europeu, não só 
da UE, mas também da OSCE e Conselho de Europa, onde têm assento 
interesses russos. Poderemos algum dia ser “os noruegueses do Cáucaso”, mas 
de forma consistente?
 Recentemente, a Turquia, visando uma abrangente cooperação regional, 
propôs “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) initiative”, «visando o 
fortalecimento da paz, da estabilidade e da segurança, encorajar o diálogo político regional, 
fomentar a cooperação económica, desanuviar tensões e desenvolver políticas de boa 
vizinhança na região».
 Foi bem recebida pelo Azerbaijão, Arménia e Rússia.
 A Geórgia, não rejeitando a iniciativa, está ainda hesitante em sentar -se à 
mesma mesa com a Rússia, pelo menos enquanto decorrem sessões negociais 
em Genebra;
 A Turquia tem tentado convencer a Geórgia de que, agora, ainda é mais 
importante o estabelecimento de um diálogo directo entre as duas partes 
(dando assim relevo à importância da sua iniciativa). Mas não seria possível 
contar com uma parceria luso -turca neste domínio? É que, por exemplo, na 
Aliança Atlântica, temos uma relação muito próxima com Ankara e leituras 
regionais convergentes. E temos a vantagem de não sermos um país da região! 
E como reflexão inicial acho que termino por
aqui. Muito obrigado.NE
NegóciosEstrangeiros . N.º 14 Abril de 2009 pp. 22-28
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29Turkey’s new activism in the Middle East
Meliha Benli Altunisik*
■ Abstract:
Turkey has become increasingly active in its foreign policy towards the Middle 
East in recent years. This article explains Turkey’s new activism with structural 
transformations in the region as well as with the new vision of the current AKP 
government. Turkey’s engagement with the Middle is discussed through three cases: 
Improvement of relations with neighbors; third part roles in regional conflicts; and 
Turkey’s soft power. It is argued that changes in the regional landscape and Turkey’s 
domestic transformations as well as expected changes in the US policy under the 
Obama Administration have poised Turkey to play constructive roles in this region. 
Yet such a role is also contingent on several variables related to domestic and foreign 
policies of Turkey.
■ Keywords:
Turkish foreign policy; the Middle East; AKP foreign policy; Turkey’s new activism.
TURKEY HAS STARTED to play a more active role in the Middle East recently. Dangerously volatile 
and unstable environment in the Middle East, and thus increasing challenges to 
Turkish security, can partly explain this new activism. These challenges in the fluid 
post -Cold War context required Turkey to be more interested in the region and 
to be more innovative in its policy. Particularly the developments in neighboring 
Iraq since 1991 War have forced Turkey to be more engaged with the region. The 
general instability in Iraq as well its implications specifically for the Kurdish issue 
in Turkey meant that Turkey could not ignore what happens in the Middle East. Yet 
Turkey’s interest in the region also goes beyond strategic interest. Especially after the 
coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-
-henceforth AKP) in 2002 the government has developed a comprehensive Middle 
* Professor. Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara 06531 Turkey.
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30 East policy which underlined the importance of historical and cultural ties and 
responsibilities to this region in addition to strategic interest. 
Thus the AKP continued Turkey’s new engagement in the region and added some 
new dimensions to it.1 In practice this new interest translated into three interrelated 
policy outputs. First, the AKP developed a “zero -problem with neighbors” policy 
and thus made an effort to improve Turkey’s relations with its Middle Eastern 
neighbors. This perspective also meant moving away from security oriented and 
zero -sum mentality; instead the government emphasized constructive engagement 
and win -win. Second, the new activism meant engagement in regional conflicts as a 
third party. This constituted a departure from traditional Turkish policy which 
avoided entanglement in regional conflicts. Third, the government began to 
emphasize Turkey’s soft power in the region in addition to its hard power. This article 
will analyze these three policy outputs and then discuss the opportunities and 
limitations of this policy. 
Improving Relations with Neighbors One of the consequences of new forms of activism 
and engagement has been improved relations with the Middle East. Compared to 
the most of the 1990s, Turkey’s has been able to develop closer relations with the 
regional countries. The new strategic environment that emerged after Iraq War of 
2003 as well as AKP government’s efforts contributed to this development. The most 
important example has been the successful transformation of conflictual relations 
with Syria into a quite cooperative one.2 Turkish -Syrian relations hit the bottom 
when Turkey threatened Syria with the use of force in October 1998 if it did not 
cut its support to the PKK, illegal Kurdish organization fighting against the Turkish 
state. The crisis was resolved with Adana Agreement when Syria committed to end 
its support to the PKK. After the resolution of this particular conflict Turkey has been 
determined to take the bilateral relations beyond normalization. As a result, the two 
countries have been able to establish quite close and diversified relationship since 
then. 
1 For more on this new vision and it’s comparison with other visions see ALTUNISIK, Meliha Benli, “Worldviews 
and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East”, Special Issue on Turkish Foreign Policy, New Perspectives on 
Turkey, forthcoming.
2 ALTUNISIK, Meliha Benli and TUR, Özlem, “From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian -Turkish 
Relations,” Security Dialogue 37, 2 (2006): 229 -248. 
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31Turkish -Iranian relations also improved through enhanced security cooperation 
and deepening economic relations.3 First, the two countries cooperated against the 
separatist Kurdish organizations of PKK and its Iranian version PJAK. Such cooperation 
had intensified after Iraq War of 2003. To reflect the new level of cooperation Turkey-
-Iran High Security Committee, which was established in 1988 but largely remained 
ineffective in those years, was revived. The 12th meeting of the Committee convened 
in Ankara in April 2008 was said to be once again dominated by discussion on 
security cooperation against terrorism. In the meantime, Turkey and Iran started to 
deepen their energy cooperation. There is already a natural gas pipeline from Tabriz 
to Ankara that became operational in 2001. As a result Iran has become Turkey’s 
biggest supplier of natural gas after Russia and accounts more than 20 percent of its 
imports. In May 2007 Turkey and Iran agreed in principle over dam and power 
station construction and electricity trade. In July 2007 the two countries signed a 
deal to use Iran as a transit for Turkmen gas and also agreed to develop Iran’s South 
Pars gas field to facilitate the transport of gas via Turkey to Europe as part of the 
Nabucco project. 
In general, Turkey’s relations with -and the image in - the Arab and Islamic world 
have improved significantly. Turkey established the Turkish -Arab Cooperation Forum 
with the Arab League.4 Turkey also got the post of Secretary -General of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in March 2008. This was the first time 
that the Secretary General was determined through election in the organization. 
Ekmelleddin Ihsanoglu was re -elected in March 2008. 
Turkey has also been able to develop more cooperative relationships with all the 
communities in Iraq, including finally with the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG). Turkey was able to come to a point of cooperation on PKK issues with the US 
and Iraq in 2008. The central Iraqi government was already more inclined to 
eliminate the PKK as a negative factor in Turkish -Iraqi relations. Iraqi Prime Minister 
Nuri el -Maliki reiterated this position during his visit to Ankara in December 2008 
and said “PKK’s actions are designed to create problems in Turkish -Iraqi relations”.5 
3 OLSON, Robert, Turkey -Iran Relations 1979 -2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups, and Geopolitics, Costa 
Mesa, CA: Mazda Publications, 2004; ARAS, Bulent, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran: Ideology and 
Foreign Policy in Flux”, Journal of Third World Studies, Spring 2001.
4 “First Turkey -Arab League Forum to meet in ·Istanbul”, Turkish Daily News, 11 October 2008. 
5 Hürriyet,
19 December 2008.
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32 Nevertheless, there were limitations to what the central government could do as long 
as the KRG refused to cooperate. Thus it was quite significant that Turkey and the KRG 
were able to develop a working relationship on this issue. Faced with the reality of US 
withdrawal and increasing power of the central government under Maliki, the KRG 
realized that it would no longer gain by using the PKK against Turkey. On the contrary, 
it needed Turkey as an outlet to the world. Thus, the KRG ended its hostile rhetoric 
against Turkey and started to put pressure on the PKK in its region. Turkey responded 
by opening an official dialogue, for the first time since 2003.
Turkey as a Third Party In addition, Turkey has become more eager to play third party roles, 
promoted network of economic and political relations, engaged more in coalition 
building activities. In sum, Turkey increasingly began to favor engagement as a form 
of dealing with challenges it faced in the region. In the context of bipolar regional 
system in the Middle East, Turkey defined itself as a constructive power willing and 
able to talk to both blocs. 
Eagerness to play third party roles is a relatively new aspect of Turkey’s Middle 
East policy and in significant contrast to Turkey’s long -held policy of not getting 
involved in regional conflicts. Again changing geostrategic environment and 
increasing instability in the region began to have repercussions for Turkey and forced 
Ankara to be more involved in the management of conflicts. The protracted conflicts 
led to radicalization and a constant threat of war in the region. The continuation of 
Arab -Israeli conflict also allows some states to exploit the conflict to increase their 
power and influence in the region. For instance, the Palestinian conflict has allowed 
Iran to increase its power and influence beyond its immediate neighborhood and 
made it effectively a Mediterranean power. These developments upset the regional 
balance of power and thus are of concern to Turkey. In addition, the current AKP 
government has also been particularly eager to play third party roles in the region. 
The government believes that due to its historical ties with this region, Turkey cannot 
be indifferent to what happens there. 
The examples of Turkey’s third party roles are many. The involvements in the 
Israeli -Syrian track as well as the Palestinian issue will be discussed in more detail 
below. Yet Turkey has also been involved in Lebanon. Turkey is participating in 
UNIFIL II which was created after the Lebanon War in 2006. Together with Qatar, 
Turkey was also instrumental in brokering the Doha Agreement that ended the 
political stalemate in Lebanese politics. 
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33Similarly Turkey has been announcing its eagerness to play roles in Iranian 
nuclear issue. The possibility of a nuclear Iran imposes limitations on Turkish -Iranian 
relations. Turkey is disturbed by a nuclear Iran as it would completely alter the 
bilateral and regional balance of power. This would go against the main principles of 
Turkish foreign policy in the region and vis -à -vis Iran, which rejects regional 
domination by a country. This would also be against the Turkish position of having 
a WMD -free Middle East. Thus, possible nuclearization of Iran, which may provoke 
a general proliferation in the region, is not clearly welcomed by Turkey. However, 
Turkey is also concerned about the escalation of conflict between its Western allies 
and Iran. The failure of diplomatic channels and a possible military operation against 
Iran entails several minefields from Turkey’s perspective. All the possible scenarios 
such as chaos in Iran or Iranian retaliation would have enormous economic, political 
and strategic repercussions for Turkey. Ultimately Turkey is trying to maintain a 
delicate balance between its desire to see a stable Middle East and its Euro -Atlantic 
relations. In these conditions so far Turkish policy has been formulated under three 
pillars: Making it clear that Turkey would not let the use of its territory for an attack 
against a neighboring country; using Turkey’s relations with Iran, the US and the EU 
to facilitate diplomatic solution to the problem; harmonizing its policies with the 
international community, particularly with that of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). In the meantime, Turkey has been giving Iran the message that it 
should be transparent about its nuclear program and cooperate fully with the IAEA. 
During the Bush Administration Washington reacted negatively for any Turkish role 
to mediate with Iran as well as being highly critical of developing Turkish ties with 
that country. However, with Obama Administration’s declarations of its willingness 
to talk to Iran, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said that the government was 
considering raising the issue of mediation with him.6 The intensification of visits 
recently with Tehran points to a possibility of such a role for Turkey in the new 
period.
Turkey also tried to play constructive roles in Iraq. In 2003 Turkey initiated Iraq’s 
Neighbors Forum, which later expanded to include Iraq. The Forum continues to 
meet at the level of foreign and interior ministers and aims to tackle the Iraqi issues 
on a regional basis and to foster confidence building measures in this sub -region. 
6 “Iran sought Turkey’s help to mend links with US, says Erdogan,” Guardian, 24 February 2009.
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34 Similarly Turkey organized a meeting in Istanbul with the participation of Sunni 
leaders from Iraq to convince the Sunnis to participate the elections in 2005.
Mediation between Israel and Syria:
Following the gradual improvement of it’s relations with Syria after the October 
1998 crisis Turkey began to pass messages to both Syria and Israel that it would be 
ready to bring them together if they were ready to do so. After the collapse of Syrian-
-Israeli talks in 2000 and the deterioration of U.S. -Syrian relations under the Bush 
administration the US was not in the scene to restart the negotiations. Turkey was the 
only country in the region with good ties to both sides that could play such a role. 
Ankara believed that resolution of the Israeli -Syrian conflict would not only bring 
peace and stability to the region, but also engage Syria more constructively into the 
regional politics. Thus with these considerations in mind Prime Minister Erdogan is 
said to be involved personally and to have conveyed messages to both sides. 
Finally in May 2008, after several failed attempts, the two countries started 
indirect peace talks in Istanbul under Turkey’s aegis. The two parties had their own 
reasons to engage in the process. As a result, Israel and Syria held four rounds of 
indirect negations in Turkey after the peace talks were launched in May. The talks 
were suspended when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced he would step 
down as a result of charges of corruption brought against him in Israel. During 
Olmert’s visit to Ankara in December 2008 Erdogan and Olmert had a meeting that 
lasted more than five hours. Later it was revealed that through telephone diplomacy 
Turkey had facilitated another round of indirect talks and aimed to bring parties to 
agree