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23 Debatendo o casamento do mesmo sexovideo play button

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Remember the sound? WGBH Boston Associated. A Harvard University. Well, we'll quiz. Assert off us here. Justice Michael sent about 10 Because a man will do me is more sex. We ended last time talking about the narrative conception of the self. We were testing the narrative conception of the self and the idea of obligations of solidarity or membership that did not flow from consent that claimed us for reasons unrelated to a contract or an agreement or a choice we may have made. And we were debating among ourselves whether there are any obligations of this kind or whether all apparent obligations of solidarity and membership can be translated into consent or reciprocity or universal duty that we owe persons great persons. And then there were those who defended the idea of loyalty and patriotism. So the idea of loyalty and of solidarity and a membership gathered a certain kind of intuitive moral force in our discussion. And then, as we concluded, we considered what seems to be a pretty powerful counter example to that idea, namely the film of those Southern segregationists in the 19 fifties. And they talked all about their traditions, their history, the way in which their identities were bound up with their life history. And you remember that and what flowed from that history from that narrative sense of identity for those Southern segregationists, they said, We have to defend our way of life. Is this a fatal or a decisive objection to the idea of the narrative conception of the self? That's the question we were left with, but I would like to do today is to advance an argument and see what you make of it. And let me tell you what that argument is. I would like to defend the narrative conception of the person as against the volunteers conception. I would like to defend the idea that there are obligations of solidarity or membership. Then I want to suggest that they're being such obligations lends. Forced to the idea when we turn to justice that arguments about justice can't be detached, cannot be detached after all, from questions of the good. But I wanted to distinguish two different ways in which justice might be tied to the good and argue for one of them. Now, the volunteers conception of the person of Contin roles we saw was powerful and liberating a further appeal is it's universal aspiration, the idea of treating persons as persons without prejudice without discrimination. And I think that's what lead some among us toe Argue that. Okay, maybe there are obligations of membership, but they are always subordinate. They must always be subordinate to the duties that we have to human beings as such the universal duties. But is that right? If our encompassing loyalty should always take precedence over more particular ones, then the distinction between friends and strangers should ideally be overcome. Our special concern for the welfare of friends would be a kind of prejudice, a measure of our distance from universal human concern. But if you look closely at that idea, what kind of a moral universe that kind of moral imagination would that lead you? To? The Enlightenment philosopher Montesquieu gives perhaps the most powerful, and I think ultimately the most honest account of where this relentless universalize ing tendency leads the moral imagination. Here's how Monta skew put it, he said. A truly virtuous man would come to the aid of the most distant stranger as quickly as to his own friend. And then he adds, Listen to this If men were perfectly virtuous, they wouldn't have friends. But it's difficult to imagine a world in which persons were so virtuous that they had no friends on Lee. A universal disposition to friendliness. The problem isn't simply that such a world would be difficult to bring about that it's unrealistic. The deeper problem is that such a world would be difficult to recognize. That's a human world. The love of humanity is a noble sentiment, but most of the time we live our lives by smaller Solidarity's. This may reflect certain limits to the bounds of moral sympathy, but more important, it reflects the fact that we learned to love humanity not in general, but through its particular expressions. So these are some considerations. They're not not don't arguments, but moral philosophy can't offer knock down arguments. But considerations of the kinds that we've been discussing and arguing about along well, suppose that's right. One way of assessing whether this picture of the person and of obligation is right is to see what are its consequences for justice. And here's where it confronts a serious problem, and here we go back to our southern segregationists. They felt the weight of history. Do we admire their character, these segregationists who wanted to preserve their way of life? Are we committed to saying If we accept the idea of solid Aaron membership? Are we committed to saying that justice is tied to the good in the sense that justice means whatever a particular community or a tradition says it means, including those Southern segregationists here, it's important to distinguish two different ways in which justice can be tied to the good. One is a relativist way. That's the way that says to think about rights, to think about justice, look to the values that happen to prevail in any given community at any given time. Don't judge them by some outside standard, but instead conceived justice is a matter of being faithful to the shared understandings of a particular tradition. But there's a problem with this way of tying justice to the good. The problem is that it makes justice holy conventional, a product of circumstance, and this deprives justice of its critical character. But there is a second way in which justice can be tied with or bound up with the good. On this second, non relativist way of linking justice with conceptions of the good principles of justice depend for their justification, not on the values that happen to prevail it in a given moment in a certain place, but instead on the moral worth or the intrinsic good of the ends, writes serve on this non relativist view. The case for recognizing a right depends on showing that it honors or advances some important human good. The second way of time. Justice to the good is not, strictly speaking, communitarian. If by communitarian you mean just giving over to a particular community the definition of justice. Now what? I would like to suggest that of these two different ways of linking justice to the good, the first is insufficient because the first leaves justice the creature of convention. It doesn't give us enough moral resources to respond to those Southern segregationists who invoke their way of life, their traditions, their way of doing things. But if justice is bound up with the good in a non relativist way, there's a big challenge, a big question to answer. How can we reason about the good? What about the fact that people hold different conceptions of the good, different ideas about the purposes of key social institutions. Different ideas about what social goods and human goods are worthy of honor and recognition. We live in a pluralist society. People disagree about the good. That's one of the incentive to try to find principles of justice and rights that don't depend on any particular ends or purposes or goods. So is there a way to reason about the good? Before addressing that question, I want to address a slightly easier question. Is it necessary? Is it unavoidable when arguing about justice, to argue about the good? And my answer to that question is, yes, it's unavoidable, it's necessary. So for the remainder of today, I want to take up. I want to try to advance that claim. That reasoning about the good about purposes and ends is an unavoidable feature of arguing about justice. It's necessary. Let me see if I can establish that. And for that I'd like for us to begin a discussion of same sex marriage. Now, same sex marriage draws on, implicates deeply contested and controversial ideas morally and religiously, and so there's a powerful incentive to embrace a conception