Variedades de intervencionismo estatal em política financeira após a crise global de 2008

Original articles Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , Unicamp . IE. http://dx.doi.org /10.1590/1982-35 33.20 20 v2 9n2art 03 Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n . 2 (6 9), p. 407 - 43 4 , maio-agos to 2020. Varieties of s tate intervention ism in financ ial policy in the afterm ath of the 2008 g lobal crisis \uf02a Maria Antonieta Del Tedesco Lins ** \uf02a Abstract Thanks to lessons learned and reforms implemented after th e financial crises of the late 1990s, most emerging market economies proved relatively resilient to the 2008 global crisis. Yet to cope with the turbulence th at ensued, several interventions by m onetary authorities in foreign exchange and capital markets were ca rried out. The literature on Latin American financial systems and central bank reform tends to emphasize international actors and pressures as key determinants of policy change. In contrast, th is paper raises the hypothesis that domestic concerns were the main drivers of financial po licym aking after the 2008 crisis even in coun tries with d iff erent institutional arrangements and macroeconomic trajectories such as Brazil, M exico an d Argentina. Th rough a comparative ca se study analysis, it is concluded that indeed the th ree countries \u2019 approaches to exchange markets and capital con trols contradicted international perceptions and ev en the IMF \u2019 s stance on foreign e xchange policies an d the ma nagement of ca pital flows. By pursuin g more autonomy and respond ing to domestic priorit ies, each of the three coun tries adopted different policy mea sures. Keywords : Financial policy; Financial integration; Emerging economies; Latin American economies. Resumo Variedades de intervencionismo estatal em política financeira após a crise global de 2008 Graças às lições aprendidas e às reformas implementadas após as crises financeiras do final dos an os 1990, muitas economias emergentes se mostraram relativamente resilientes na crise global de 2008. P ara enfrentar a turbulência originada , foram revistas políticas para os me rcados cambiais e controles de capitais. A literatura sobre os sistemas financeiros d a Am érica La tina e sob re as reformas dos bancos centrais enfati za o papel d e ato res e pressões internacionais sobre o po licymaking . O trabalho argum enta q ue questões doméstica s foram d eterminantes d a política financeira após a crise de 2008, m esmo em países como Argentina, Brasil e México, com distintos arranjos institucionais e trajetórias macroeconômicas. Por meio de uma análise de estudo de caso compara tivo, conclui-se que as políticas cambial e de controle de capitais dos três p aíses não se alinham com uma visão intern acional dominante e tampouco convergem com a po sição do FMI sobre câ mbio e a gestão dos fluxos de capital. Na busca por maior autonomia e atendendo às prioridades políticas do mé sticas, cada um do s três países adotou medidas dis ti ntas. Palavras-chave : Política financeira; Integração financeira; Economias eme rgentes; Econo m ias latino-americanas. JEL F330, G180 , G010. Introduction Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, notwiths tanding some shared comm on economic experiences \u2013 s uch as high inflation, foreign debt crises, adoption of hete rodox macroeconomic \uf02a Artigo re cebido em 7 de janeiro de 2019 e aprovado e m 30 de janeiro de 20 20 . ** Associate professor at the Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Univer sidade de São Paulo (IRI / USP), São Paulo, SP, Brasil. E-mail: madtlins@us p.br . ORCI D: https://orcid.org/000 0-0002-5332-0687 . Maria Antonieta Del Tedesco Lins 408 Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n. 2 (69), p. 407- 43 4, maio-a gosto 2020. adjustment plans under the supervision of the Internation al Monetary Fund, si mil ar macroeconom ic structures, pegged exchange rate regimes and financial liberaliza tion \u2013 ended up taking di stinct pat hs following the financial crises that hit developing markets dur ing the 1990s. In all three cases, substantial economic policy restructurings were implem ented af ter the crises. Indeed, the relative resilience of the emerging economies i n the face of the glob al financial crisis of 2008 can be exp lain ed , to a large extent, by t he economic reforms undertaken in response to each co untry \u2019 s own series of economic crises. Said reforms included institutiona l transformation s that permitted fiscal improvem ents and new efforts to regulate and supe rvise the financial sy stems. While A rgentina, Braz il and Mexico did implem ent diverse reforms to their resp ective financial sector policie s after the 1990s crises, the se changes do not appear to have been implem ented at the behest of external pressure s, either as a reaction to cyclical changes in t he world econom y or as a concession to m ultilateral or other g lobal play ers. Rather th ese polic ies appear to have been a response to domestic priorities. In fact, the use of capital and currency controls appears to be coherent with the existing domestic political movements of the time. External pressures are considered here as a set of events originating outside the country, such as econom ic shocks, crises, dissemination of op inions and po litical guide lines at the international level and conditionalit ies and policies proposed by international org anizations whose developm ents and im pacts could inf luence the count ries \u2019 financial policy making . This paper is an exercise of comparative political economy as it aims to ca rry out a comparative analysis of the financial policies of t he three countries from the beginning of the 2000s until 2014, with the objective of identifying the set of political fa ctors that acted on the choices of exchange rate policy and capital controls in order to define the pattern of financial integration of each country. The hypot hesis to be appra ised is that, despite the fact that policy motivation cannot be attributed solely to dom estic factors or external events, t he comparative analysis of the three countries \u2019 financia l policies \u2013 even considering the substantiv e distinctions between the three cases \u2013 indicates t hat domestic policy was imperativ e in determ ining the financial measures adopted by each country and their global financial insertion. The time frame of the study looks to (i) incorporate financial reforms and policy switches that were implem ented afte r the cycle of financial crises i n t he 19 90s an d the beg inning of th e 2000s; (ii) separate from t he anal ysis the profound political changes t hat Brazil and Argentina have undergone si nce 2014, with the shift in B razil \u2019 s economic pol icy beg inning i n the second mandate of Dilma Rousseff and her eventual impeachm ent, and t he transition in governm ents in Argentina to Mauricio M acri. 1 Albeit one large and two middle-sized economies, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico ar e traditionally policy takers in the internationa l monetary system regardless of the potential impacts of their economic policy shifts within the region. However, si nce the ir reinsertion in ( 1 ) Despite the rise to power of an o pposition party after seve n decades of Partido Revolucionario Instit ucional \u2013 PRI rule, Mexico has not experie nced a sharp pol itical turnaro und since 2 000. Varieties of state i nterventionism in financial policy i n the aftermath of the 2008 global crisis Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n . 2 (69), p. 407- 43 4, maio-a gosto 2020. 409 the world financial markets in t he 1990s and their respective macro economic stabilization processes, these countries could seek to achieve g reater relev ance i n the inte rnational financial sphere, either through more intense market participation or greater importance in the global financial gov ernance debate. Much has been said about the long period of macroeconom ic instability coupled with financial crises and erratic economic policymaking in Latin America (e.g. Stanley 2018, Wiesner 2008) . However, a fo cused study of f inanci al policies implem ented by Argentina, Brazil and Mexico carried out through the lenses of th eir very distinct political de velopm ents seems to be missing: an analy sis of the interdependence between politics a nd ec onom ic policym aking processes i n the three largest Latin American economies. By comparing t he respective financial policies against their political background, t he paper proposes to retrac e their evolution and outcomes to ultimately define the features of each country \u2019 s global financial integration. In a review essay on the re cent developm ents of interna tional m onetary politics within the international political economy (IPE) sc holarshi p, Cohen ( 2017) sheds lig ht on the prevalence of s tate-based analyses a nd scarce co ntributions devoted to stru ctural i ssues and the whole internationa l monetary system. T his study commits, in part, the same si n. Initially, i t departs from national policy investigations, howev er, on the other hand, the comparative case study presented here intends t o understand the f inanc ial insertion of three emerging nat ions that operate t he global system to differe nt d egrees, belong to a set o f new players and therefor e seek strategies t o position themselves in this system. How could they conciliate national priorities in an in terdepend ent financial sy stem and wh ich policy solutions do they chose? The m onetary power theori es will be bo rrowed to serv e as g uidelines for ass essing the relative i m portance of each country in an increasing ly integrated and complex international monetary and financial system, given it s condition of emerging m arket economy. The role played by domestic politics on each country \u2019 s financial policies will be evaluated based on theoretic cat egories re lating money and power; money being considered in a broad sense, covering monetary and foreig n exchange policies toget her with capital and financial accounts regulation, as Susan S trange (1990: 25 9) conceived i t: By the f ield of fin ance, I refer particularly to th e system by which credit is created, bought and sold and b y which the dir ection and use of capital is deter mined. Altho ugh it is hard to separate this entirely fro m what might be called the field of money \u2013 that is, the exchange rates between c urrencies \u2013 on account of the ke y role in both fields played b y the rate of interest. Notwithstanding the vast scholarsh ip devoted to a so -called monetary power theory, th e study elect s to concentrate on specific contribu tions broug ht by Cohen \u2019 s work (2005, 2 006, 2008, 2015, 2017). The t ext has four sections besides this introducti on. It starts by presenting the general economic situation of each of the three economies at t he time of the 2008 global crisis. The Maria Antonieta Del Tedesco Lins 410 Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n. 2 (69), p. 407- 43 4, maio-a gosto 2020. following sections analyze financial policies specifically, st arting with the f ore ign exchange designs within the framework of the macroeconom ic pol icy and then the policies of capital control. T he f ourth section presents a com parison made by adapting the selected monetary power criteria to each case, followed by a synthet ic analy sis and finally the conclu sion. 1 Th e p e ri o d i m me di a te ly p ri o r t o t he Gr e at R e ce ss i o n In the period immediately prior to the global crisis, Argentina was experiencing twin surpluses (fiscal and curren t accoun t), built up from the re surrection of its e conomy in the po st 2002 era. The real economy was being driven by the commodity boo m, and by a new type of macroeconom ic populism established in 2007 (Labaqui, 2014; Damill; Frenkel, 2013, 2014; Fanelli, 2013). The Brazilian econom y also passed th rough a prosperous phas e in 2008. After se veral years of fiscal disciplin e that restored a ce rtain l evel of international credibility and some stability, an expansionist econom ic policy was being implemented, characterized by stimulus to domestic consum ption and investm ent. As such, the countercyclica l policies applied during the global crisis were above all an e xtension of th e policies alrea dy in place. The effects of t he 200 8 shock, on the contrary, impacted Mex ico m ore har shly. I n fact, Mexico saw the reversal of a trajectory of g rowth that had begun in 2 002 and that was the resu lt of higher global oil prices, increased exports to the United States, and growing remittances from abr oad. This s ituation l ed to an in crease in g overnm ent spending up until 2008. Howev er, the close relationship with the Am erican economy conde m ned Me xico to endure more profound econom ic effec ts from the crisis, s pecifically v ia lower ex ports an d a heav ily depreciated curre ncy. Nevertheless, Mexico had a relatively fast recovery from t he initial shock. According to the IMF r eport on the Mexican financial system, 2 the adherence to an inflation t arg eting system since 1996 and a free- floating cu rrency, combined w ith strict fisc al discipli ne, w ere the essential factors t hat explained the recuperation of the Mexican econom y beginning in 2010 (IMF, 2012a). The restruc turing of the financial system after 1995, its low external exposure and a moderate reaction from the central b ank were characteristics of Mexican econom ic policy in reaction to the global cri sis (Esquivel, 2015). Despite their different econom ic situations upon the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008, and t he diversity of the overall macroecono mic policy established in these three countries, all three showed themselv es capable of maintaining important amounts of foreign reserves, ev en considering the fairly less fav orable situat ion of Argentina, w hose reserv es began to dec line significantly in early 2007 (and on ly returned to growth in 2015) as shown in Graph 1. ( 2 ) Mexico: F inancial System Stability A ssessment, March 201 2. Varieties of state i nterventionism in financial policy i n the aftermath of the 2008 global crisis Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n . 2 (69), p. 407- 43 4, maio-a gosto 2020. 411 Graph 1 International reserves as a % of GDP Source : World Bank data base. Graph 2 Sovereign debt risk: EMBI \u2013 Emerging Markets Bond Index Source : J. P. Morgan Note: The Em erging Markets B ond Index is a benchmark index for measuring the total return perf ormance of international government bonds issued by emerging market countries th at are con sidered sovereig n (issued in som ething other than local cu rrency ) and that m eet specific liquidity and str uctural req uirements. Maria Antonieta Del Tedesco Lins 412 Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n. 2 (69), p. 407- 43 4, maio-a gosto 2020. Capital flight began in Argentina in 2007 when i t became public knowledge that t he official st atistics i nstitute was con sistently underreporti ng the rate of inflation. Fro m that point the credibility of the countr y \u2019 s economic policy beg an to decl ine system atically, which can b e confirmed by the prices of Argentine gov ernment bonds i n international markets, and the rising spreads measuring the perceived risk of def ault (Damill ; Frenkel, 2013). Graph 2 presents the evolution of th e m ost utilize d coun try risk indicator calc ulated by JPMorgan. The i ndex clearly shows a rising trend in Argentina \u2019 s sovereign risk in 2007, while during the same period t he same indi cator for Brazil and Mexico had a relatively stable evolution, w hich remained as such until the end of 2014 in the case of Brazil. Reflecting on these movem ents, the inflows of portfolio investments into Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico were relatively unstable f ollowing the 2008 crisis. Aside from fluctuations in international markets, lev els of f oreign capi tal inflows were relatively unequal for the three countries during this period. The erratic behavior of foreign capital was not only due to the significan t diversities established betwe en these three m arkets in the early 20 00s, but can also be attribut ed to a shift in the global econom y at the end of 2011. The large emerging economies decreased their growth rate which , combined wit h the new moneta ry policy in advanced economies and expectations for rising interest rates in these more secure mark ets, resulted i n smaller capital inflows for em erging markets. At the sam e time, capital controls were implemented by e merging economies, both in order to prot ect against reversals of capi tal inflow s, but also as a tool to reduce sharp fluctuations in foreign ex change m arkets. Braz il was a pioneer in t he use of taxes on capital to control capital flight. Mexico, on the other hand, was rewarded by the credit rating agencies for its conservative managem ent of economic policy. In su m, emerg ing economies began to execute new economic policies or refo rm some existing ones \u2013 using cap ital controls, m onetary policy, and more permissive fiscal agendas \u2013 and a s such they brought new elem ents to the mark et and new configurations to their own po licy repertoir es. The different positions of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico could be understood by looking at the trajectory o f their financial crises in the 1990s and 20 00s . In addition to economic restrictions, dom estic polit ical dynamics played a crucial role in t he sele ction of financ ial policy and in the in ternational po sition of the th ree countr ies. 2 Ec o no m i c po l ic y d if f us io n i n t h e ne w m il l e nn iu m Economic policy suffered a number of changes during the period i n focus. The i ssue of having an international currency wa s not relevan t for the three countries in the period. Above all, the ir m ain concern was to consolidate their positions as stable economies and relevant Varieties of state i nterventionism in financial policy i n the aftermath of the 2008 global crisis Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n . 2 (69), p. 407- 43 4, maio-a gosto 2020. 413 players in the international financial system, with political positions that should be heard. The concepts of autonomy and influence developed by Cohen (2006, 2008) can serve as par ameters for the analysis of the cases, considering the l imits of each one \u2019 s international perform ance. How can financial policy contribute to guaranteeing some degree of autonomy for t hese countries? To wha t extent, by establishing their position in the international system, would it be possible to exer t some kind of influence? Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico benefited enorm ously from the prolonged and intense increase in commodity prices, as noted above. 3 For Argentina in particular, this was a phenomenon of primary i mportance t hat prov ided the gov ernment a marg in in which to innovate its econom ic policy from 2003, given the country \u2019 s unique position in internationa l financial markets after its period of default. Brazil and Mexico continued attracting f inancial capital and main tained their abi lity to place bonds in internat ional mark ets. A RG E N T I N A The end of the Arg entine conv ertibility regim e in January 2002 autom atically gav e the governm ent back the ability to set monetary and exchange rate policies. Soon after the system ic change, the policy objective was to maintain a co m petitive currency in order to support economic growth. Different to o ther crisis episodes, the recovery proces s in Argentina occurre d amid sur pluses in the fiscal and current accounts. The fiscal surplus originated due to the increase in nation al economic grow th following the cris is and the surplus in the current account was the resu lt of global economic conditions \u2013 initially supported by the domestic recessio n. When Néstor Kirchner took the reins of the government (2003-2007), the economy was already growing at an int ense rate (Labaqu i 2012). After abandon ing conv ertibility, despite the initial intention to widen the discretionary room for economic policy, and consistent intervention from the central bank in the foreign exchange m arket in orde r to sustain a depreciate d currency, the real mov e t oward interventionism came in early 2007, as described belo w. Contrary t o what many analysts and even IMF economists had predicted, the Argentine economy recovered rapidly following the devaluation o f the peso; this growth was supported by the strong bounce in traded goods enhanced by the chang e in r elative prices (see g raph 3) (Damill, Frenkel & Rapett i 2005). The strong growth following the 2002 crisis allowed Argentina to return to levels of production seen in 1998 by as soon as 2005 (Labaqu i 2012). ( 3 ) T he share of primary goo ds in total exports is parti cularly high for A rgentina and Br azil. I t decreased for M exico after NAFTA . For Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, agricultural, fuel and mining exports in terms of GDP represented 6%, 3% and 6% respectively in 1990. On aver age, betwe en 2002 and 20 07, these figure s were respectively 14.5%, 6% and 5%. Maria Antonieta Del Tedesco Lins 414 Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n. 2 (69), p. 407- 43 4, maio-a gosto 2020. Graph 3 Gross Domestic Product, annual growth rates (%) Source : World Bank data base. Despite being criticized fo r its econom ic policy \u2013 during the period of fisca l i m balances as well as after 2007 \u2013 t he Argent ine governm ent constantly professed the comm itment to paying its debt. Upon taking power in 2003, Kirchner benefited from the default declared by the brief presidency of Adolfo Rodriguez Saá (2011) (Labaqui 2012). The negotiations continued during Eduardo Duhalde \u2019 s governm ent (2002-2003) and renegotia tions were achieved in 2005, as an outcom e of favorable internati onal conditions, includ ing interes t fr om the United States Preside nt George W. Bush (2001-2009) in t esting a pack age of grand proportions, concerning bail-outs and providing support to creditors (Helleiner 2005). At the same time, in March o f 200 5, after in tense neg otiations , the Arg entine gov ernment announced a restructuring of 76% of its defaulted debt. Old bonds were traded for new bonds, part of which were denominated in local currency and linked to GDP growth, reducing t he stock of public debt by approximately US$ 67 billion accord ing to publications by the Economic Ministry at tha t time (Dam ill; Frenkel; Rapetti 2005, p. 42). Inflationary pres sures had returned t o Argentina, pressures which wer e converted into excuses to restart direct gov ernment interventions in different sectors. In 2005, contr ols were applied to agricul ture exports \u2013 generating a political conflic t that reached an apex in 2007 with fires started by farmers in different regions and around Buenos Aires. S ince 2007, state intervention has risen in tensely, includi ng \u2013 at the expense of further loss of international credibility \u2013 interfe rence in t he National Institute of Statistics (IND EC), nati onaliz ation of Varieties of state i nterventionism in financial policy i n the aftermath of the 2008 global crisis Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n . 2 (69), p. 407- 43 4, maio-a gosto 2020. 415 corporations that had been privatized, a conflict betw een the administra tion and the central bank and the strong confrontation with the agricultura l sector previously mentioned (Labaqui 2012; Dam ill; Fre nkel 2013). These events worsened the risk per ception that i nternational mark ets hel d of the country ( see Graph 2) and contributed, together with t he global crisis, whose eff ects cou ld stil l be allev iated by comm odity export s, to the ou tflow o f fo reign capital. Despite the wide acceptance of debt restru cturing by creditors in 2005 and 2010, a group of hold-out creditors \u2013 that did not accept the restructur ing offer in 2005 \u2013 were able t o legally prevent Argentin a from placing more debt on in ternational m arkets (Labaqui, 201 4). Labaqui (2012) describes how Argentina attempted to regain the confidence of international markets, and as such, reduce t he spread on Argentine bonds, in t he process normalizing ext ernal debt payments \u2013 this despite n ot being able to br ing in the ho ld-out creditors. The president a t the time, Cristiana Fernández de Kirchner, tried to convince observers an d inves tors of the s tability of the mechan ism of inter public sector fina ncing us ing resources from national pension fund s to increase international r eserves. With the wors ening of the internation al situat ion, increasing risk aver sion and a fall in commodity prices, the Argentine gov ernment began implementing m ore drastic measures. Regarding financia l policy , the Kirchner gov ernments (2003-2015) tried to reduce the country \u2019 s dependence on i nternat ional finance, including its dependence on multilateral organisms. The attempt to widen the national policy autonomy led to an early payment to the IMF, 4 the issuing of debt to Venezuela i n 2005 (Labaqui, 2012), and via t he joint issuing of sovereign bonds with Venezuela in 2006, the Bonus der Sur (Phil lips, 2012). Since 200 8, access to i nternation al markets has been closed, i nclu ding Venezuela. President Fernández de Kirchner \u2019 s speech, justifyin g nat ionaliz ation based on the \u2018 failure of l iberal ism \u2019 as a result of the crisis of 2008, linked Argentina \u2019 s policies with the return of interventionis m around the world (Datz, 2012). Moving forward on the institut ions, the federal governm ent announced in December 2009 that it would use foreig n r eserves to pay down part of t he private external debt, creating a fund for this, the Fondo Bicentarnar io, 5 which in March 2010 was replaced by another fund that allows gov ernment access to reserves. D espite a great deal of backla sh, from legal process es t o the effective resig nation of the gov ernor of Argentina \u2019 s central bank (BCRA), who at that time refused to implement this policy, the gov ernment continued to exchange reserves for 10-year debt se curities (Labaqu i, 2014). Due to this se t of m easures, the Arg entine g overnment became its own larg est cr edit or. The t ransfer of resources from the BCRA for public sector operations, the nationalization of ( 4 ) At the end of 2005, when Brazil announced that it woul d pay the IMF before t he debt\u2019s maturity, Kirchner, the Argentine p residen t, followed the example, and proudly announced that it woul d pay its debt with money borrowed from the central bank. The payme n t was equal to 9% of Argentina\u2019s total exter nal debt. ( http://ww w.lanacio n.com.ar/7653 14-historico- el - pais-saldara- en - un -solo-pago- la -deuda-con- el -fmi ). ( 5 ) \u201c El Gobierno utilizar á reservas del Banco Central para pagar la deuda \u201d ( http://www.lanacion.com .ar/1211 935- el - gobierno-utilizara-re servas-de l-banco-central-par a-pagar- la -deuda ). Maria Antonieta Del Tedesco Lins 416 Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n. 2 (69), p. 407- 43 4, maio-a gosto 2020. pension funds (whose funds were critical for maintaining the country \u2019 s ability to service its debt), in addition to the favorab le prices of exported products, were the crucial elements that permitted Argentina to launch a policy of reversing financ ial integra tion with t he world that had taken place a decade pr ior. B RA Z IL In Brazil, the scenario was still favorable for the government in general term s during the 2008-2009 period. Presiden t Lula, who was in the m iddle of his second term, maintained his h igh level of popu lar ap proval despite the corru ption scandals involving important pol itical leaders closely conne cted to hi m. T he improv ements in welfare obtained by lower income groups provided the gov ernment with a broad base of support, wh ile also consolidating the idea of Brazil as an emerg ing country. The worsening of the economic situa tion follow ing t he international cri sis was t herefor e not an ac ceptabl e alternativ e, politically speak ing, to the president and his pa rty. Since Lula \u2019 s first mandate (2003-2006), a dissatisfied g roup within his own party criticized the direction of what it considered a \u2018 neolibe ral \u2019 economic policy. Havi ng achieved a ce rtain lev el o f macroe conom ic stabi lity, this grou p believ ed i t w ould be necessary to change the policy \u2019 s objectives and direction. Pro-g rowth actions could be combined with stability in normal times. When the crisis broke out i n 2009, p ol icies aim ed at stimulating economic growth were already being executed. As well as an expansionary monetary policy, the three main Brazilian federal banks 6 were rapidly increasing the concession of credit. At t hat time, a set of complem entary policies to support growth was bei ng created, as a package named the \u2018 new industrial policy \u2019 , which in fact consisted of a series of fiscal exemptions for specific sectors of the econom y as well as incentiv es for produ cers with the ab ility to expo rt 7 . The transition f rom President Lula t o President Dilma Rousseff marked an important change in the steering of econom ic policy. I n the face of poor economic perfo rmance in 2011, more i ntervent ionist policies, and policies that were esse ntial ly less geared to ward ensuring macroeconom ic stability, gained im portance within the g overnment. At the sam e time, the relations between the executiv e branch and t he central bank bec ame much closer, to t he detriment of th e autonomy and credibility of the m onetary autho rity. Dilma Rousseff \u2019 s first mandate paved the way for a com plete change \u2013 that was long awaited by a developmentalist group within the Workers \u2019 Party (PT) \u2013 regarding the relationship between the Ministry of Finance and the central bank. Since the beginning of the Workers \u2019 P arty rule, the central bank k ept its com mitm ent to m acroeconom ic sta bility. During Lula \u2019 s tenure, conflicts between the two ins titutions were general ly won by the central bank. Between 2003 and 2010 the central bank \u2019 s board of governors enjoyed a de facto operation al ( 6 ) These banks are: Banco do Brasil, the largest commercial Brazilian bank, the BNDES (National Bank for Economic and Social De velopment), a dev elopme nt bank, and Caixa Econômica F ederal, the fe deral savings bank. ( 7 ) Plano Brasil Mai or , launched in 2 011, see Motta Ve iga et al. (201 3).

Variedades de intervencionismo estatal em política financeira após a crise global de 2008

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