Baixe o app para aproveitar ainda mais
Prévia do material em texto
Consumption Correlation and Low Interest Puzzles, Aggregation, Gains from Risk Sharing Kenneth Rogoff Fall 2015 Low interest puzzle is most crisply defined in a complete markets model (1) Basic complete markets model (introducing notation) (2) International consumption correlations puzzle (3) Shiller Securities (4) Equity Premium and Low Interest Rate Puzzle (5) Cost of Capital market exclusion (first pass) 2 1 A Simple Two period, Two State Complete Markets Model (to introduce notation) two states, two periods, time separable utility 1 = (1) + (1)[2(1)] + (2)[2(2)] 1.1 Budget Constraints (with Arrow-Debreu securities) 3 Table 5.4 Measures of V m, the Securitized Value of a Claim to a Country’s Entire Future GDP, 1992 (billions of U.S. dollars) Country V m Std.rm/ Country V m Std.rm/ Argentina 2,460 9.86 Nigeria 2,019 10.06 Australia 4,340 3.88 Pakistan 2,894 2.45 Brazil 10,032 8.88 Philippines 1,602 3.68 Canada 7,663 4.22 South Africa 1,722 8.98 France 12,901 5.38 Spain 6,721 6.30 Germany (West) 16,796 4.47 Sweden 1,972 5.70 India 20,378 4.32 Switzerland 1,911 5.30 Italy 11,540 4.68 Thailand 4,007 3.99 Japan 31,762 8.41 Turkey 3,868 3.38 Kenya 418 4.34 United Kingdom 13,495 1.46 Mexico 9,583 5.33 United States 82,075 2.03 Netherlands 3,607 4.68 Venezuela 2,501 6.87 Source: Methodology is based on Shiller (1993, ch. 4). Underlying annual real GDP data are from Penn World Table, version 5.6. Standard deviations are on annual return (income plus appreciation) of a perpetual claim to GDP. a 1990 value based on 1950–90 data. Foundations ofInternationalM acroeconom ics (246) C hapter 5 O bstfeld & R ogoff © 1996 M assachusetts Institute of Technology First period constraint, where (1) is the cost of a bond that pays one unit in period 2, state 1, and is the risk free interest rate. (1) 1 + 2(1) + (2) 1 + 2(2) = 1 − 1 Period 2 budget constraints 2() = 2() +2() = 1 2 Present value budget constraint 1 + (1)2(1) + (2)2(2) 1 + = 1 + (1)2(1) + (2)2(2) 1 + 4 1.2 Optimal Behavior Unconstrained max. problem (substitute out budget constraints) 1 = " 1 − (1) 1 + 2(1)− (2) 1 + 2(2) # + 2X =1 ()[2() +2()] First order "Euler" conditions () 1 + 0(1) = ()0[2()] = 1 2 Rearrange to show that MRS between 1 and 2 equals price ()0[2()] 0(1) = () (1 + ) = 1 2 5 Or, adding these two conditions, yields 0(1) = (1 + )E1{0(2)} E1{0(2)} 0(1) = 1 1 + 6 2 Two-Country, Two Period Model, Many States Global equilibrium requires supply = demand in period 1 w1 = 1 + ∗ 1 = 1 + ∗ 1 = w 1 and in all possible period 2 states 2() + ∗ 2() = 2() + ∗ 2 () = 1 2 As before the Euler condition for an individual country is 0(1) = (1 + )()0[2()]() 7 or, with CRRA utility 1−(1− ), 2() = " ()(1 + ) () #1 1 Adding across the home and foreign Euler conditions and imposing global goods market equilibrium in both periods yields w2 () = " ()(1 + ) () #1 w1 = 1 2 which implies a date 1 price for security of () 1 + = () " w2 () w1 #− = 1 2 8 or combining the above equation for any two states yields () (0) = " w2 () w2 ( 0) #− × () (0) Making use of the above equations and, the equilibrium condition X =1 () = 1 one can straightforwardly solve for the real interest rates as 9 1 + = ³ w1 ´− P§ =1 () h w2 () i− Note again that the riskless bond is redundant with complete A-D securities 2.1 Equilibrium Consumption Levels Under certain conditions, the complete markets model implies that equilibrium consumption growth is perfectly correlated across countries. With many states, the Euler conditions reduce to 10 ()0 [2()] 0(1) = () (1 + ) = ()0 h ∗2() i 0(∗1) and ()0 [2()] (0)0 [2(0)] = () (0) = ()0 h ∗2() i (0)0 h ∗2( 0) i With identical constant relative risk aversion utility in both countries1−(1− ), we can solve to get 11 2() 2(0) = ∗2() ∗2( 0) = w2 () w2 ( 0) and 2() 1 = ∗2() ∗1 = w2 () w1 which implies that home consumption is a constant fraction of world output 2() w2 () = 2(0) w2 ( 0) ∗2() w2 () = ∗2( 0) w2 ( 0) 12 2() w2 () = = 1 w1 ∗2() w2 () = 1− = ∗ 1 w1 For countries with different relative risk aversion, and different subjective dis- count factors, we can still get the generalization log " 2() 1 # = à ! log " 2 () 1 # + 1 log à ! which, unfortunately, fails miserably 13 Table 5.1 Consumption and Output: Correlations between Domestic and World Growth Rates, 1973–92 Country Corr (Oc, Ocw� Corr ( Oy, Oyw� Canada 0.56 0.70 France 0.45 0.60 Germany 0.63 0.70 Italy 0.27 0.51 Japan 0.38 0.46 United Kingdom 0.63 0.62 United States 0.52 0.68 OECD average 0.43 0.52 Developing country average −0.10 0.05 Note: The numbers Corr.Oc, Ocw/ and Corr. Oy, Oyw/ are the simple correlation coefficients between the annual change in the natural logarithm of a country’s real per capita consumption (or output) and the annual change in the natural logarithm of the rest of the world’s real per capita consumption (or output), with the “world” defined as the 35 benchmark countries in the PennWorld Table (version 5.6). Average correlations are population-weighted averages of individual country correlations. The OECD average excludes Mexico. Foundations ofInternationalM acroeconom ics (243) C hapter 5 O bstfeld & R ogoff © 1996 M assachusetts Institute of Technology 2.2 Rationale for the Representative-Agent Assumption First assume agents have identical generalized CRRA utility but different wealth levels () = (0 + 1)1− 1− Making use of our earlier bond Euler equations, we get ³ 0 + 1 1 ´− = ⎡ ⎣ (1 + )() h + 12() i () ⎤ ⎦ − = 1 2 14 or 0 + 1 1 = " (1 + )() () #−1 h 0 + 1 2() i = 1 2 Sum over all agents, divide by (number of agents) and raise result to the power 1 (0 + 11) − = (1 + )() [0 + 12()] () − Thus prices can behave as if there is a representative agent. 15 When agents do not have identical utility functions, we can still sometimes aggregates using geometric averages instead of arithmetic averages. Define ˜ ≡ Π=1() 1 Assume agents have distinct CRRA utility function with different values of . Then the individual Euler conditions for agent is given by 2() = " ()(1 + ) () # 1 1 raising both sides to the 1 (where is the number of individuals) and then multiplying the resulting individual equations, one can obtain. 16 ˜2() = Π =1 " ()(1 + ) () # 1 ˜1 or () 1 + = () " ˜2() ˜1 #−˜ where ˜ is the harmonic mean ˜ ≡ 11 P =1 1 17 3 Consumption-Based Capital Asset Pricing Model Extending the two period multi-state multi-country model, consider an asset with period 1 price that pays 2 () in state of nature . The value of the asset is the cost of purchasingArrow-Debreu bonds with the same payout vector; = §X =1 ( ()0[2()] 0(1) ) 2 () where consumption can refer to any individual Because of complete markets, it does not matter which individual we use to evaluate risky asset . This 18 equation can alternatively be written as = 1 ( 0[2()] 0(1) 2 ) or equivalently = 1 ( 0(2) 0(1) ) 1 2 + 1 ( 0(2) 0(1) ) 2 . Note that with constant relative risk aversion utility, we can replace individual consumption with world consumption. Note that by the bond Euler equation, 1 ( 0(2) 0(1) ) = 1 1 + 19 Then, defining the ex-post return on the above risky asset as = 2 − we can arrive at the standard equation for the consumption based capital asset pricing model 1( )− = −(1 + )1 ( 0(2) 0(1) ) − 20 Post-War Financial Repression? Real US Stock, Bond Returns: 1802-1992 PERIOD Stocks Short Bonds Long Bonds 1802-1992 6.7 2.9 5.4 1871-1992 6.6 1.7 2.6 1802-1970 7.0 5.1 4.8 1871-1925 6.6 3.2 3.7 1926-1992 6.6 0.5 1.7 1946-1992 6.6 0.4 0.4 Source: Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, Siegel, 1995 4 The Equity Premium Puzzle Mehra and Prescott (1987) first pointed out that the CCAPM fails very badly to explain the excess return on stocks over bonds measured over long periods, using 1889-1978 data.. Assume a constant relative risk aversion utility function in the preceding consumption CAPM equation E1{}− = −(1 + )Cov1 ⎧ ⎨ ⎩ à 2 1 !− − ⎫ ⎬ ⎭ To do a simple empirical calculation, we approximate the function à 2 1 ! ≡ à 2 1 !− ( − E1) 21 in the neighborhood of 21 = 1 and = E1. (Note: there are approaches to this approximation though all yield the same general approach à 2 1 ! ≈ ( − E1)− à 2 1 − 1 ! ( − E1) Taking conditional (period 1) expectations of both sides yields E1 à 2 1 ! = Cov1 ⎧ ⎨ ⎩ à 2 1 !− − ⎫ ⎬ ⎭ ≈ −Cov1 ( 2 1 − 1 ( − ) ) 22 With CRRA utility, the CCAPM equation can be thus approximated as E1 {}− = (1 + )Cov1 ( 2 1 − 1 − ) = (1 + )Std1 ( 2 1 − 1 ) Std1 { − } where ≡ Corr1(21 − ) is the conditional correlation coefficient between consumption growth and the excess return on equity, and Std1 is the standard deviation of consumption growth. Mankiw and Zeldes 1991) find that = 04 in the Mehra Prescott data set, and the standard deviation of consumption growth is 0036 per year, and the standard deviation of excess 23 returns on equity were 0167 per year. Assuming (1 + ) = 1, we find that the model only fits the observed excess equity return of E{}− = 00698− 00080 = 00618 if = 26, seemingly an implausible estimate 24 Habit persistence () = ( −)1− 1− where = (1− )−1 + −1 0 1 This approach helps explain equity premium since individuals are very averse to big changes in consumption but then the MRS of consumption would be very volatile and the risk free interest rate would be counterfactualy volatile. 25 Other explanations of equity premium puzzle: "Keeping up with Joneses" Transactions costs Non-diversifiable consumption Tail risk (Barro-Reitz) Uncertainty about Future Trend Growth 26 5 The Low Interest Rate Puzzle With CRRA utility, the stochastic Euler equation can be written 1 + = 1 n (+1 ) − o ≈ log(1 + ) = ( log( +1 ) ) − 2 2 ( log( +1 ) ) − log In Mehra Prescott sample, mean per capita consumption growth is 0.018 per year with variance 0.0013. With = 2, then even with = 1, model predicts that riskless rate is 3.34, but sample mean is only 0.8 27 THE DROP IN US REAL INTEREST RATES Ben Bernanke Blog, March 30 2015 Growth Rates and Rates of Return for OECD Countries, 1870-2006 (or shorter samples) Growth rates Real rates of return Country ∆c/c ∆y/y ∆C/C ∆Y/Y stocks bills bonds Australia 0.015 0.016 0.032 0.033 0.103 0.013 0.035 Canada 0.019 0.021 0.036 0.038 0.074 0.013 0.038 Denmark 0.016 0.019 0.024 0.027 0.071 0.032 0.039 France 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.023 0.060 -0.008 0.007 Germany 0.019 0.021 0.025 0.027 0.076 -0.015 -0.001* Italy 0.017 0.021 0.023 0.027 0.053 0.005 0.017 Japan 0.025 0.028 0.035 0.038 0.093 0.004 0.031 Norway 0.019 0.023 0.027 0.031 0.072 0.021 0.028 Sweden 0.021 0.023 0.027 0.029 0.092 0.025 0.032* U.K. 0.015 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.064 0.018 0.028 U.S. 0.019 0.022 0.033 0.036 0.083 0.020 0.027 Means 0.018 0.021 0.027 0.030 0.076 0.012 0.026 See Robert Barro QJE 2006 ROBERT BARRO QJE 2006 “rare disaster” model log(Yt+1) = log(Yt) + g + ut+1 + vt+1 g is the deterministic part of growth process, u is the i i d shock Probability 1-p, vt+1=0 u is the i.i.d shock Probability p, vt+1= log (1-b), 0<b<1 P , the probability of disaster is small, but b is large • Barro’s 2006 QJE paper calibrates b and p byBarro s 2006 QJE paper calibrates b and p by looking at disasters where b > .15 using cumulative loss in output over the potentiallycumulative loss in output over the potentially multi-year catastrophe. (For further work, see Barro and Ursala (2008) and Barro NakamuraBarro and Ursala (2008) and Barro, Nakamura, Steinson and Ursala (2012). ROBERT BARROS list of the Main Economic Crises ofROBERT BARROS list of the Main Economic Crises of 20th Century For real per capita consumer expenditure: • WWII: 23 cases, average 34% • WWI: 20 cases, average 24% G t D i 18 21%• Great Depression: 18 cases, average 21% • 1920s (influenza): 11 cases, average 18% • Post-WWII: 38 cases average 18% (only 9 in• Post WWII: 38 cases, average 18% (only 9 in tranquil OECD) • Pre-1914: 21 cases, average 16% Distribution of C Disasters 0 4 8 12 16 20 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 C-disaster size (N=95, mean=0.219) See Robert Barro QJE 2006 Distribution of GDP Disasters 0 10 20 30 40 50 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 GDP-disaster size (N=152, mean=0.207) See Robert Barro QJE 2006 Problems with basic formulation • Power utility function has some counter- factual predictions for rare disasters. • Biggest problem is that rare disasters bid UP stock prices as people seek to save when the disaster starts • Barro, Nakamura, Steinson and Ursala (2012) use Epstein Zinn (also Weil) formulation to separate risk aversion and intertemporal substition. Other refinements • Barro looks at peak to trough fall in output. But actually output declines initially by more than in long run (global average is 30% in short run but 14% in long run • Disaster risk is time varying • Disaster risk is correlated across countries
Compartilhar