Creativity and Intelligence

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CHAPTER 6 
Creativity and Intelligence 
Patricia A. Haensly and Cecil R. Reynolds 
The Relationship between Creativity 
and Intelligence 
Consideration of the relationship between creativity 
and intelligence during this past half-century has 
occupied the attention of psychologists with varied 
perspectives (e.g., Cattell, 1963a; Coler, 1963; 
Guilford, 1950, 1959, 1968, 1981; MacKinnon, 
1962; Roe, 1951, 1963; Terman, 1954, 1955; Tor-
rance, 1960, 1967). Scientists working in a variety 
of other disciplines from genetics to engineering 
(see Simonton, 1984, 1985; Taylor & Barron, 
1963) also have been intrigued by the contribution 
of intelligence to creative discovery and invention. 
And philosophers from Aristotle and Plato to Im-
manuel Kant, Brand Blanshard, and Jacques Mari-
tain (citing here only those of Western civilization) 
(Rothenberg & Hausman, 1976) have pondered the 
origin of creativity and its relationship to rational 
thought. Professionals and lay people alike are fas-
cinated by the topic, and, even more so, by the 
consequences of applying creative effort and/or in-
telligent action, and by the implications for their 
nurturance and educability. This chapter will pro-
vide a brief overview of past perspectives regarding 
the nature and extent of a relationship between 
creativity and intelligence and will propose and 
Patricia A. Haensly and Cecil R. Reynolds • Department 
of Educational Psychology, Texas A&M University, College 
Station, TX 77843. 
support a view of the two phenomena as integrated 
in optimal mental performance. 
A frequently recurring theme in the consideration 
of the dual phenomena of creativity and intelligence 
has been that creativity is not independent of the 
general factor of intelligence (Yamamoto, 1965). 
Intelligence appears to be a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for creativity (Rossiman & Hom, 
1971); that is, although intelligence appears to al-
low the development of creativity, it does not en-
sure that creative expression always will be forth-
coming (Schubert, 1973). However, many, if not 
most, students of the phenomena hold the view that 
intelligent thinking must also include some degree 
of creative thinking. The most prevalent view, 
then, has been that creativity is a distinct category 
of mental functioning that has limited overlap with 
intelligence, both in the processes used and in the 
characteristics of individuals who exhibit them. 
Because the terms creativity and intelligence 
carry strong valences in the images they convey, it 
is important that our examination not be hampered 
by conceptual biases stemming from images that 
may not be accurate. As deBono (1971) suggests, 
we must break "out of the old, self-perpetuating 
patterns [and generate] new ways of looking at 
things" (deBono, 1971, p. 11). 
Transitions in Contemporary Perspective 
The description of the relationship between 
creativity and intelligence has, throughout the his-
111 
J. A. Glover et al. (eds.), Handbook of Creativity
© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1989
112 
tory of psychology, most often been approached 
from a position of defensiveness; that is, intel-
ligence appears to be a "given," a characteristic 
organisms exhibit in varying degrees permitting 
them to adapt to their environment. Creativity, on 
the other hand, often is viewed as an appendage, an 
ancillary characteristic permitting humans to pur-
sue roads not usually traveled. Creative endeavor 
has even been viewed as an alternate pathway itself, 
one not necessarily basic to survival or adaptation. 
Under these circumstances, creativity has been ex-
plained as something external to models of intel-
ligence, something out of the realm of rational 
thought. We propose that such an approach has 
been incorrect and counterproductive in that it lim-
its our understanding of how individuals function 
mentally. In fact, most of the research of the past 30 
years or so on creativity has been inspired by the 
interests Torrance developed from his military 
work in survival training, in which creativity was 
seen as integral to survival. 
Contemporary perspective or a "new think" 
(deBono, 1971) regarding the relationship has be-
gun with consideration of the process of develop-
ment of creative effort. However, in this develop-
ment, the path by which an individual becomes 
creative cannot be described without first describ-
ing the nature of its context, that is, the environment 
or medium upon which the creative response acts 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1986). The nature 
of the response required to obtain the medium for its 
expression, or the experiences required to develop 
the skills necessary to express the creative re-
sponses, also must be described (e.g., Bloom, 
1985; Feldman & Benjamin, 1986). Consider, for 
example, the elements of intelligence that had to be 
present for the mentally retarded artist Alonzo 
Clemons (a 26-year-old man reported to have the 
mental capacities of a 6-year-old) to become an 
accomplished sculptor (Harper, 1983). Once, when 
counselors at a state institution where Clemons 
grew up took away his modeling clay, Clemons 
sneaked onto the roof and scraped up tar with his 
fingernails from which he sculpted tiny black 
horses. Such a response required an analysis of 
what could be done with soft tar and the goal-ori-
ented behavior to acquire it without being caught. 
Without "intelligence" within a very limiting con-
text, could his creative expression have taken 
place? 
Analyses from a neurological perspective also 
add insight to the relationship between intelligence 
and creativity. Gardner (1982), in describing the 
PART I • THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
studies of the processes followed by "creative" 
artists and scientists conducted by himself and 
Howard Gruber, stated that such individuals focus 
their abilities in particularly adept ways. Gardner 
asserted that these individuals integrate the spe-
cialized activities of the left and right hemispheres 
of the brain in particularly effective ways (Gardner, 
1982, pp. 352-353). In addition, Gardner and 
Gruber's findings verify Feldman and Benjamin's 
(1986) ideas regarding the effect of genetic, famil-
ial, motivational, and cultural factors in the out-
standing contributions of the creative genius, and, 
more importantly, on their coincidence. The bio-
graphical observations suggested that only when 
these variables come together in an appropriate time 
and place does creative genius seem to occur. 
The effect of these additional variables on cre-
ative productivity is seen in other biographical anal-
yses as well. Simonton (1979) found that anteced-
ents to creative production among Cox's 301 
eminent geniuses included not only intelligence but 
also family background, role models, and formal 
education. Judging by the paucity of creative ge-
nius, the correct combination of these factors ap-
pears to be very difficult to assemble. Simonton 
even suggested that education at the graduate level 
may lessen one's chances of achieving eminence. 
Simonton described achieved eminence as, in part, 
a curvilinear or inverted U function of the amount of 
formal education a person has. Based on his data, 
he suggested that "excessive amounts [of intel-
ligence] may inhibit creative development by en-
forcing an overcommitment to traditional perspec-
tives" (Simonton, 1979, p. 81). 
Even when intelligence is given primary focus, a 
similar view is perceived. Estes (1985), who de-
scribed intelligence as adaptive behavior, stated 
that creativity or creative responses are often not 
adaptive for a particular setting or in a limited time 
frame. This may be seen, for example, in some 
academic settings, limited levels of scientific en-
deavor, traditional societal groups, in conventional 
business, and other such settings. Estes suggested 
that the more intelligent individuals are, the more 
likely they will block their creative output in order 
to produce an adaptive responseto the particular 
setting. A problem exists in that, in the long run, 
this kind of blocking of creativity is likely to be 
maladaptive for the individual and for society. 
The matter of choice in how and when an intel-
ligent individual will allow his or her own creative 
expression may be seen in Krippner's systems ap-
proach to creativity (Krippner, 1983). Krippner 
CHAPTER 6 • CREATIVITY AND INTELLIGENCE 
suggested that different avenues for creative effort 
occur through expressed preferences for certain 
types of creative activity; that is, individuals exhibit 
preferences for the kinds of information they seek 
about their world, the mode through which they 
seek information, the way they process that infor-
mation, and the way they make decisions regarding 
their processed information. Creative effort may 
arise in each of these preferences and will be exhib-
ited accordingly. Thus, Krippner classified indi-
viduals who perceive information from their 
senses, who are practical and oriented to what is 
feasible now, as analytic scientists; he suggested 
that E. Paul Torrance is an example of this type and 
that one of Torrance's greatest creative contribu-
tions has been the set of principles by which the 
environment that would stimulate creativity in the 
learning process could be created. On the other 
hand, the individual who absorbs information 
through his or her imagination and reaches deci-
sions based on values unique to that individual-
the conceptual humanist-is exemplified in Rollo 
May who wrote The Courage to Create (1975). 
Intelligence, or adaptation to the perceived de-
mands of one's environment, as well as preference 
for specific models of functioning may, in this way, 
elicit creative responses. 
Although Jackson and Messick, as early as 1965 
(Kagan, 1967), stated that efforts to distinguish em-
pirically between the two phenomena lack signifi-
cant informative power, contemporary efforts in 
this direction have continued. These efforts have 
focused on demonstrating, for example, that tests 
designed to elicit production of unusual responses 
bring into play distinctly different mental processes 
than tests designed to assess intelligence. In fact, 
the results of such efforts are somewhat arbitrary, 
since performance on the tests is, at best, a limited 
indicator of either phenomenon in practical situa-
tions (Sternberg & Wagner, 1986). 
A Focus on Integration 
Little attention has been given to the idea that 
creativity and intelligence may be viewed more in-
formatively as two different facets of a singular 
function originating from mental ability. In such a 
view, each facet has a different type of endpoint and 
each manifests a different way of attending to infor-
mation, retrieving and reorganizing it, and applying 
the resulting reorganization. Yet, together, both 
contribute to an integrated, fully adaptive response 
to a specific task or immediate environment. AI-
113 
though the difference between a dichotomous and 
the proposed unitary or integrated view may be sub-
tle, the implications of the latter for application, 
nurturance, and educability are extensive. 
To initiate this analysis of past thinking about the 
relationship between creativity and intelligence and 
to develop a foundation for the integrated view, 
some basic questions should be addressed. What 
specifically does creativity have to do with intel-
ligence? Can an individual ever be creative without 
having intelligence? Can an individual demonstrate 
a high degree of intelligence that has no creativity 
associated with it? Creativity and intelligence-can 
they be isolated from each other in verbal context, 
or in any other context? Despite careful factor anal-
ysis, is it possible to verify that the clusters of traits 
that emerge are completely independent of each 
other? Would, for example, one cluster actually 
occur if other clusters had not preceded or accom-
panied its emergence? 
More particularly, can creativity or intelligence 
be assessed as if one exists without the other? Is this 
any more possible than the culture-free assessment 
of intelligence? Indeed, have the psychometric in-
struments, so carefully designed to measure the de-
gree to which individuals possess creativity or intel-
ligence, been confounded by the presence of the 
other? This dilemma seems similar to that of verify-
ing a wholly unique role for either heredity or the 
environment in human behavior. A resolution of 
this latter' 'problem" was proposed 30 years ago by 
Anastasi (1958), when she suggested that the intri-
cate interweaving of the two components of heredi-
ty and environment had rendered the problem point-
less, that the more vital consideration had become 
the determination of how each contributes to the 
final product, and what contexts would be most 
suitable for promoting maximal expression of each. 
Similarly, we might more profitably view mental 
functioning as a complex interweaving of intel-
ligent and creative types of response, according to 
specific task demands and parameters, and depen-
dent upon individual predilection or capacity for a 
particular response type. 
Further, any consideration of mental functioning 
must include awareness of the effect of context. 
This environmental component, upon which genet-
ically controlled ability may develop and act, not 
only permits the expression of ability, shapes and 
defines it, but also can limit it (Haensly, Reynolds, 
& Nash, 1986). Yet, as canalization theory (Fish-
bein, 1976) suggests, when adverse environments 
occur, the human's genetic plan tries to restore po-
114 
tential maximization. So too might mental ability, 
modified by context, attempt to manifest itself ac-
cording to the individual's potential for different 
types of expression. The type and degree of re-
sponse also may be shaped by the individual's 
understanding of task demands and his or her men-
tal efficiency, which is defined by Sternberg (1984) 
as the internal world of the individual. Additional 
response shaping occurs through experiences that 
have developed or trained readiness for the task (the 
external world of the individual), and the recep-
tiveness of the available audience (context), as de-
scribed in Sternberg's componential theory of intel-
ligence (Sternberg, 1984). 
Attempting to isolate creativity from intelligence 
seems no more informative from an information-
processing perspective of intelligence than from a 
developmental perspective, nor, for that matter, 
through analyzing the differential contributions of 
brain hemispheres and cortical specializations. 
When the individual confronts new information, is 
it perceived and encoded intelligently or creatively? 
Are the neurological patterns that arise intelligently 
planned and stored, or do they associate flexibly? 
And, depending upon the prior storage of patterns, 
do they organize predictably, or do they become 
established in novel arrangements? When retrieved 
from short- or long-term memory, what determines 
whether resulting information qualifies as an intel-
ligent response or a creative response? Does this 
change when one considers the particular indi-
vidual, or does it depend upon the aggregate of 
individuals who are privy to the response? Or, must 
it await the criterion of acceptance over time? How 
long must the novel or highly original response be 
available before others view it as an intelligent re-
sponse to the task (Haensly & Roberts, 1983; 
Haensly et ai., 1986)? 
Critical examinations of traditional views of in-
telligence and reconceptualizations of the processes 
involved (e.g., Case, 1978; Gardner, 1983; Pas-
cuale-Leone, 1970; Piaget, 1972; Sternberg, 1985; 
Sternberg & Wagner, 1986) demand a reconsidera-
tion of the phenomenon of creativity as well. Unfor-
tunately, there is no eluding the problem of termi-
nology. To attempt to replace terms in current use 
will only decrease our ability to talk about mental 
functioning. We can, however,develop paradigms 
for description, explanation, and prediction in-
clusive of both creativity and intelligence. Such 
paradigms would demonstrate that optimal mental 
functioning occurs when there is appropriate align-
ment and balance between the various modes of 
PART I • THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
mental processing, according to the demands of the 
task addressed. 
This chapter focuses on how and why creativity 
and intelligence should be viewed as a unitary phe-
nomenon in which optimal mental functioning oc-
curs in an integrated, complementary fashion. The 
remainder of the chapter will be devoted to (a) a 
brief examination of several early approaches to the 
assessment of creativity in order to describe the 
theoretical and empirical inclusion of intelligence 
in each, and (b) an examination of several ap-
proaches to assessment of intelligence in order to 
describe the theoretical and empirical inclusion of 
creativity in each. The intent in both of these exam-
inations is to introduce and elaborate on the comple-
mentary nature of creativity and intelligence, rather 
than to review comprehensively all available theo-
ries. We then address a particular problem regard-
ing the perceived relationship between creativity 
and intelligence that stems from the restricted range 
encountered in the assessment data of many studies. 
This is followed by a discussion of the synergistic 
effect between creativity and intelligence. The 
chapter concludes with a brief presentation of a 
perspective of mental processing that views intel-
ligence as an intrinsic component of creative behav-
ior in which creative expression is the ultimate ex-
tension of intelligence. It also notes some implica-
tions of the integrated viewpoint. 
Intelligence as a Component in Theories 
and Assessment of Creativity 
The Association Hierarchy 
Among studies of creativity initiated with a focus 
on the creative process itself is that of Mednick 
(1962). Mednick defined creativity as "the forming 
of associative elements into new combinations 
which either meet specified requirements or are in 
some way useful" (p. 220). Based on this defini-
tion, Mednick established two immediate criteria 
for assessing creativeness: the degree of mutual re-
moteness of the elements of a new combination, 
and the combination's usefulness. For example, a 
propulsion device, chair, and parachute were once 
quite remotely associated elements, but their com-
bination into an ejection seat has permitted indi-
viduals to safely depart precrash, in-flight vehicles. 
Mednick also postulated that the probability and 
speed of creative solutions would be affected by the 
condition of the organism. One of the most salient 
CHAPTER 6 • CREATIVITY AND INTELLIGENCE 
of those conditions is the repertoire of elements 
available to an individual. In other words, indi-
viduals who have larger repertoires resulting from 
quality of preparation and experience in a content 
area, experience in related content areas, or even in 
parallel systems will have a greater availability of 
elements. This state of the repertoire of available 
elements might well be equated with an individual's 
level of intelligence, if quantity of information and 
diversity of experiences with that information can 
be said to reflect intelligence. If this holds, then the 
more intelligent the individual, the higher the prob-
ability that a creative and useful association will 
arise quickly. 
Other conditions that may affect the association 
of elements into new combinations include cog-
nitive style, the way in which an individual origi-
nally organized the associative elements, and pre-
vious or current disposition to the problem at hand 
or to methods of approaching problems. Organiza-
tion of information refers to encoding for efficient 
retrieval, which may include both visual and verbal 
representations. Again, the more intelligent an indi-
vidual is, the more likely that the encoding will 
make available to the individual a wider and more 
complex hierarchy of associations in a variety of 
representations from which a creative solution 
could be selected. 
Mednick's theory led to a simple assessment de-
vice, the Remote Associates Test (RAT), which 
was designed to elicit creative combinations and 
thus measure an individual's creative potential. 
Mednick focused on the semantic component of 
associations, and the RAT depends on a semantic 
mode of response. The contribution of intelligence 
to the establishment of a rich repertoire from which 
creative combinations can be generated can be seen 
clearly. 
Guilford's Divergent Production Model 
Guilford, too, approached the phenomenon of 
creativity from a process orientation, using the op-
erations component of his structure-of-the-intellect 
(SOl) model to examine creativity (Guilford, 
1968). The relevant operation from within his SOl 
model that is known as "divergent production" or 
"divergent thinking" (Guilford, 1959) frequently 
has been thought of as analogous to creativity. Yet 
Guilford asserted that "creativity and creative pro-
ductivity extend well beyond the domain of intel-
ligence" (Guilford, 1950, p. 445). He further sug-
gested that having the requisite abilities does not 
115 
necessarily mean results of a creative nature will be 
produced; the latter would depend upon the pres-
ence of specific motivational and temperamental 
traits. Thus, Guilford addressed the genetic aspect 
in intellect (ability) and personality (temperament) 
yet did not exclude the contribution of environment 
(motivational factors) to the development of such 
traits. 
Early in his studies of creative process, Guilford 
(1963) attempted to demonstrate how factors of in-
telligence fit into the operations used in creative 
thinking. He maintained that typical problem-solv-
ing models (e.g., Dewey, 1933) essentially de-
scribe the same phenomenon as typical creative 
production paradigms do (e.g., Wallas, 1926, 
1945), with comparable, parallel steps or stages. 
Dewey's first stage of recognition of the problem 
was described by Guilford as the unique intellectual 
ability of sensitivity to problems. Further, he point-
ed out that Dewey's stage of solution-suggesting is 
comparable to Wallas's illumination or generation 
of ideas; the difference is that, in the latter case, the 
step occurs in a highly compressed timeframe, per-
haps with unusual efficiency in mental processing. 
Guilford described the generation of ideas, whether 
in Wallas's illumination stage or in Dewey's solu-
tion-suggesting stage as retrieving information to 
be used in new forms or with new connections. This 
process invokes the phenomenon of transfer, which 
goes beyond just recalling associations to selec-
tively reassociating pieces of information within the 
memory storage and with newly encountered 
problems. 
In Guilford's description of intellectual opera-
tions, the degree of continuity in producing associa-
tions (in which speed might be an assumed charac-
teristic) is termed fluency (see Guilford, 1968, p. 
125). Fluency is applied to multiple types of con-
tent-figural, semantic, symbolic-and to the 
complexity of associations-units, relations, sys-
tems. Within Guilford's divergent production oper-
ation, generation of ideas may exhibit greater or 
lesser degrees of diversity in their basic categoriza-
tion, which Guilford termed flexibility. Flexibility 
in idea production describes the ability to redefine 
problem parameters, a condition necessary for re-
ducing functional fixedness, and, in so doing, 
providing a richer array of possibilities for problem 
solution. Thus, fluency and flexibility represent 
measures of the quantity and quality of divergent 
production taking place. It can be assumed that flu-
ency depends, at least in part, on the quantity of 
ideas available in memory, and flexibility, on the 
116 
variety of ideas. Both fluency and flexibility also 
depend not only upon the efficiency of the mental 
search butalso on the manner of encoding-the 
variety of stimulus types (verbal, visual, tactile) 
and the organizational efficiency of the encoding 
(the categorization system). 
Through incorporating the divergent production 
process as only one of the five basic operations in 
intellectual activity, Guilford's theory inextricably 
binds intelligence and creativity. Despite this the-
oretical amalgam, Guilford's search for correla-
tional data to demonstrate a relationship between 
creativity and intelligence using traditional IQ tests 
resulted in data that do not necessarily support a 
direct relationship (Guilford, 1968). Using a bat-
tery of divergent production tests and a group intel-
ligence test, the California Test of Mental Maturity 
(CTMM), Guilford and Hoepfner found that figural 
divergent production factors correlated lowest with 
CTMM IQ and with verbal comprehension. Sec-
ond, they found that symbolic and semantic diver-
gent production factors correlated higher with both 
of these latter criteria. For example, the mean of 
correlations between the figural divergent produc-
tion tests and the verbal comprehension test was 
.10, and with the CTMM IQ, .22; the mean of 
correlations between the symbolic and semantic 
tests and verbal comprehension was .26 and .29, 
respectively, and with CTMM IQ, .40 and .37, 
respectively (Guilford, 1968, pp. 131-133). As 
Guilford pointed out, because the intelligence test 
reflects great complexity and thus has more sources 
of variance, using a limited type of divergent pro-
duction test can greatly affect the resulting correla-
tion. Further, Guilford stated that scatterplots de-
veloped from their data (see Guilford, 1968, pp. 
132-134) vividly demonstrate that low-IQ indi-
viduals do not show high divergent production 
scores, whereas high-IQ individuals exhibit a wide 
range of divergent production scores. (This issue 
will be discussed further in the section "Problems 
of Restricted Range in Studies of Creativity and 
Intelligence.") From the theoretical foundations of 
Guilford's SOl model, it could be expected that the 
low-IQ individual (assessed on whatever intel-
ligence measure) would lack the available quantity 
and quality of stored ideas to be either fluent or 
flexible. If efficiency of mental processing reflects 
intelligence, as previously assumed, retrieval of 
ideas and complex transference also would be lack-
ing in low-IQ individuals. Likewise, it could be 
expected that, with increased intelligence, diver-
gent production would access an increasingly wider 
PART I • THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
repertoire of ideas from which to retrieve, compare, 
combine, and transfer. In either case, in assess-
ment, the more specific the divergent production 
test (i.e., semantic, figural, and symbolic content, 
and the units, relations, and systems products), the 
less likely will be a tight relationship with a broader 
based, general intelligence test. 
It may be that theories generated to explain the 
creative and intelligence processes have not been 
matched with an appropriate system of verification , 
considering that reliance for verification has been 
on the interpretation of analyses from statistical 
procedures that confound rather than unravel the 
theories. Nevertheless, in Guilford's theory, intel-
ligence appears not only to contribute to creative 
ability, but creativity is actually one form of the 
process of intelligence. 
Torrance's Scientific View of Creative Process 
"I defined creativity as the process of becoming 
sensitive to problems, deficiencies, gaps in knowl-
edge, missing elements, disharmonies, and so on; 
identifying the difficult; searching for solutions, 
making guesses, or formulating hypotheses and 
possibly modifying them and retesting them; and 
finally communicating the results" (Torrance, 
1967, pp. 73-74). Thus, Guilford's (1963) elab-
oration of the unique intellectual ability of sen-
sitivity to problems as Dewey's first stage of prob-
lem recognition has also become the cornerstone of 
Torrance's definition. In generating this definition 
for creativity, Torrance set the stage for an objec-
tive observation of an elusive process. It also pro-
vided a foundation from which to study the personal 
and environmental factors that facilitate or inhibit 
creative process. In reflecting on his definition, 
Torrance commented that some find it too loosely 
constrained, while others find it too narrowly ori-
ented to scientific process to the exclusion of artistic 
endeavors. However, the definition was an attempt 
to find an area of focus in creativity that would be 
productive in helping scientists and lay people alike 
better understand the phenomenon. 
Toward that end, Torrance's definition suggests, 
though does not specify, a relationship between 
creativity and intelligence. It fits closely Spear-
man's ideas (1930) about mental creativity as the 
power to transfer relations and generate new corre-
lates and Newell, Shaw, and Simon's(l962) defini-
tion of creative problem solving. In each case, the 
focus is on process, that is, the use of particular 
CHAPTER 6 • CREATIVITY AND INTELLIGENCE 
mental abilities applied to some specific content in 
order to accomplish an end not previously in place. 
Torrance's methods of assessment of creative po-
tential, especially the figural and verbal forms of 
Torrance's Tests of Creative Thinking (1966), em-
phasized (as in Guilford's theory described earlier) 
the ability to generate many new ideas (fluency) 
that are unusual (originality) and represent a variety 
of categories (flexibility), as well as the ability to 
embellish the ideas (elaboration). This approach 
would seem to reflect Mednick's association hier-
archy, and Guilford's divergent production strand 
of intelligence, more than a "sensitivity to prob-
lems and gaps in knowledge." However, Tor-
rance's philosophical perspective suggests that 
ability represented in the listed behaviors will be 
applied with increasing frequency or transferred to 
any of the phases of problem solving. Torrance's 
approach to creativity and its implications for the 
transference of behaviors to multiple situations thus 
reflects an intrinsic inclusion of intelligence in 
creativity. 
Creative Capacity, Constellation of Traits, and 
Their Application 
The crux of the problem of defining creativity 
may lie in our seeming inability to separate the 
individual from the process, and the process from 
its application; that is, do we define creativity as the 
"things" one does, or as the ability to do them 
given the right conditions and circumstances, an 
ability that cannot be determined until the behavior 
is exhibited? Ausubel (1978), in fact, attributed 
confusion in our conceptualization of creativity to 
the failure to separate creativity as a trait (or cluster 
of traits) from the individual who possesses these 
traits to a singularly high degree. This may be com-
pared to the difficulty in separating intelligence as a 
broad set of characteristic behaviors from the per-
son who possesses these behaviors. But let us delay 
a discussion of this difficulty to address more im-
mediately the process/ application entanglement. 
Ausubel (1978) maintained that semantic, if not 
theoretical, confusion results from a failure to dis-
tinguish "between creativity as a highly particu-
larized and substantive capacity . . . a manifesta-
tion of talent in a particular field of endeavor [and] 
as a general constellation of supportive intellectual 
abilities, personality variables, and problem-solv-
ing traits" (p. 180). Ausubel's argument ex-
emplifies the lack of separation of individual from 
process and process from application. He used 
117 
"manifestation of talent in a field of endeavor" to 
describe the process applied as well as the resulting 
product; "constellation of supportive intellectual 
abilities" describes the individual's internal "en-
vironment" from which the process emanated. In 
the former, we infercreativity based upon judgment 
of observed products (i.e., manifestation of talent). 
In the latter, supposedly, we must infer creativity 
based on observation of multiple behaviors (i.e., 
abilities, personality variables, problem-solving 
traits), across multiple situations. Thus, when Aus-
ubel describes creativity as a "particularized sub-
stantive capacity" versus creative abilities that are 
"supportive intellectual-personality functions," 
we are faced with a recurrent dilemma of obser-
vability and measurement. How can capacity be 
separated from function, the capability to act from 
the act by which we may infer the capability? How-
ever, Ausubel suggested that a truly creative prod-
uct only arises when the general constellation of 
supportive abilities is of such breadth and depth as 
to be manifested in a particularly rare and outstand-
ing way. Is creativity's manifestation a question 
then of degree of breadth and depth of abilities to 
exhibit function (i.e., process)? Ausubel provided 
an answer to this (one already attributed to Anastasi 
& Schaefer, 1971, and to Eisner, 1965), when he 
said" Assessments of creative potentiality can only 
be based on expert judgments of actual work prod-
ucts, suitably tempered by considerations of age 
and experience" [italics added] (Ausubel, 1978, p. 
181). We have thus returned to a focus on 
application of the process by which a judgment of 
the ability or capacity of the individual to deliver the 
process can be made. Apparently, not only must we 
return to process, but we must also consider the 
application of the process relative to what it might 
be, "tempered by ... age and experience." 
Ausubel (1978) saw confounding in yet another 
situation, resulting from discrepancies between 
cognitive trait data and assessment of ability data. 
He pointed out that cognitive traits associated with 
creativity (i.e., supportive of creativity) have been 
shown to correlate just as highly with intelligence as 
they do among each other, citing studies such as 
Anastasi and Schaefer (1971), Crockenberg 
(1972), and Getzels and Jackson (1962). Yet diver-
gent thinking scores tend to correlate only moder-
ately with measures of intelligence. The identified 
cognitive traits might then contribute but not be the 
sole support for creative expression, and/or they 
might contribute but not be sole support for intel-
ligent behavior. Although Ausubel (1978) postu-
118 
lated that a minimal degree of intelligence is neces-
sary for individual creative actualization, he balked 
at the idea that a relationship with creativity exists 
throughout the continuum of intelligence. 
Using traits and personality variables to define 
and examine creativity has been a part of the ap-
proach of others as well. In their 1965 study, Wal-
lach and Kogan identified a number of personality 
variables that appeared to characterize the indi-
viduals in their study (151 middle-class fifth gra-
ders) when they were grouped according to their 
intelligence and creativity. The continuum of intel-
ligence in this sample represented a limited range 
and especially did not represent the lower end of the 
continuum. The type of characteristics derived in-
cluded such things as high-creative-high-intel-
ligent individuals exhibiting a minimal anxiety 
level, "as if they were bursting through the typical 
behavioral molds that the society has constructed" 
(Wallach & Kogan, 1972, p. 213). High-intel-
ligent-Iow-creative individuals exhibited un-
willingness to take chances, fear of errors, and re-
liance on conventional responses and were not 
disruptive but were aloof from peers. Both of these 
groups shared strong capacities for concentration 
on academic work and long attention span. Low-
intelligent-high-creative individuals were least 
able to concentrate and maintain attention, were 
socially isolated, behaved disruptively, and 
possessed the lowest self-esteem. And finally, low-
intelligent-low-creative individuals, who func-
tioned better in the classroom than their highly 
creative counterparts in intelligence, showed the 
weakest aesthetic sensitivity. The personality traits 
associated with creativity thus appear to reflect a 
significant interaction with intelligence level, or at 
least with the way in which individuals of different 
intelligence levels are able to function. 
More recently, Sternberg (1986) also addressed 
interactive effects on performance between the 
traits of creativity and those of intelligence. In his 
frequently described student typology, he specified 
that Student Alice does not have synthetic abilities 
and described Student Barbara as having been rec-
ommended as a tremendously creative woman with 
the ability to generate and follow through on cre-
ati ve ideas producing important research. Thus, we 
have a temporary definition for creativity, that is, 
synthetic ability, and a measure of it, that is, com-
pleted work based on new ideas or approaches. 
Elaborating his triarchic componential theory , 
Sternberg described the three basic processes of in-
telligent behavior-metaprocesses, performance, 
PART I • THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
and knowledge-acquisition processes. "Meta-
processes are used to plan, monitor, and evaluate 
one's problem solving ... knowledge-acquisition 
processes are used to figure out how to solve the 
problems in the first place" (Sternberg, 1986, p. 
145). Thus, if creativity is equated with qualitative 
problem solving, then both the metaprocesses and 
knowledge-acquisition processes represent creative 
behavior at some level of response. Sternberg sug-
gested that conventional intelligence tests measure 
the metaprocesses directly (planning, monitoring, 
and evaluating one's strategies in solving posed 
problems) and knowledge-acquisition processes in-
directly through measuring past effectiveness of ac-
quisition of knowledge. It should be noted that there 
are inadequacies in the tests (the problems may not 
be as complex nor as practical as those faced in real 
life). Further, the tests cannot measure the effec-
tiveness of the knowledge-acquisition processes of 
a child who has not had the opportunity to apply 
them in his or her environment on the type of mate-
rial typical of intelligence tests. Synthetic abilities 
(as defined by Sternberg, 1986), then, are not as-
sessed in conventional tests, and available 
creativity tests do not measure creativity at the level 
needed for significant intellectual contributions. 
However, Sternberg suggested that they probably 
do as good a job of predicting creativity in the ar-
tificial setting as intelligence tests do in the artificial 
setting of academia. We must therefore look for 
prediction of future creative behaviors to past man-
ifestations of such behavior, that is, to products or 
observable accomplishments. With this conclu-
sion, are we really making a leap in understanding 
or only digging a deeper hole? 
A Synthesis: Intelligence as an Element of 
Creative Process 
Varied views on the nature of creativity have 
been presented and the contribution to each of intel-
ligence as a differentJacet of mental functioning, 
rather than a different phenomenon, has been dis-
cussed. Although a relationship between creativity 
and intelligence is evident, and commonalities ap-
parent, differences in perspective hinder agreement 
on the relationship as one of "universal mutual 
origin," or even mutual purpose. For example, in 
Mednick's view, assessment involves creative re-
sponses that are essentially semantic in nature, an 
almost sure link with intelligence as we have known 
it. However, through focusing on the semantic 
component of associations and depending on the 
CHAPTER 6 • CREATIVITY AND INTELLIGENCE 
semantic mode of response, other forms of stored 
information that might be more typically associated 
with creative endeavor, such as the figural, images, 
or even kinesthetic patterns, may be ignored. From 
the standpoint of creative talent and development,another problem surfaces. The test ignores the indi-
vidual's disposition to the specific problems, that 
is, his or her particular experiences with and interest 
in the problems presented for response. Individual 
differences in prior conditions available to the prob-
lem solver and familiarity or experience with the 
particular domain of terms included in the test also 
are not taken into account. Assessment depends on 
the individual's ability to generate uncommon asso-
ciations based on a current store of knowledge and 
experience, even though this measure of fluency in 
divergent production may not be generalizable to 
situations in the individual's occupation or practical 
living conditions. 
A statistical relationship, or lack of it, between 
measures of creativity and measures of intel-
ligence, or between these measures and other char-
acteristics of the individuals studied, frequently has 
been viewed as definitive evidence. Wallach and 
Kogan posed the thesis that such proof shows dif-
ferences in cognitive capacity between creative in-
dividuals and intelligent individuals. The evidence 
takes a strange tum when the results focus on social 
and motivational differences (as discussed in the 
previous section) rather than on the actual cognitive 
processes, the social and motivational differences 
that have long been associated with failure to suc-
ceed in relation to peers. Capacity to perform might 
be inferred but the ability of these findings to dis-
tinguish a difference in capacity for creativity ver-
sus capacity for intelligence does not seem logically 
sound. 
Comparisons also have been based on (a) the 
presence of specific, intact characteristics or clus-
ters of traits and personality variables, used to infer 
capacity in individuals, (b) the expression of both 
creative and intelligent process by individuals, and 
(c) products, as in academic achievement, resulting 
from the application of the processes. U nfortunate-
ly, comparisons of intelligence with creativity often 
have been made that confound person, process, and 
product. For example, a process variable for 
creativity, such as divergent thinking, may be cor-
related with a product variable for intelligence, 
such as academic achievement. Several investiga-
tors (Getzels & Jackson, 1959, 1962; Torrance, 
1960; Yamamoto, 1964a,b,c) have found correla-
tions between Guilford-type and Torrance-type 
119 
creativity tests with academic achievement, com-
parable to those found with intelligence test scores. 
However, Ausubel (1978, p. 184) asserted that it is 
"quite unlikely that creativity should be related to 
academic achievement, inasmuch as mastery of a 
given subject-matter discipline does not in any way 
presuppose conspicuous capacity for making origi-
nal or creative contributions to that discipline." 
Additional confounding occurs when the ex-
pression of a specific process appears to be product-
oriented yet lacks the essential integrity of a prod-
uct; for example, assessment of creative potential 
based on the total number (fluency of responses) 
and uniqueness (originality of responses) of rele-
vant associations (simulated product) in an 
artificially defined situation (Wallach & Kogan, 
1965). 
Contemporary theories of intelligence suggest 
similar problems of definition and measurement, as 
well as difficulties in extracting the process from its 
application or endproduct and the individual from 
the process. An even more informative parallel with 
these contemporary theories (already alluded to in 
the discussion of Mednick's association hierarchy) 
is the idea that context, age, and experience always 
must be taken into account when attempting to as-
sess the presence of intelligence through applica-
tion of the process; or when predicting the capacity 
of the individual to function in an intelligent way 
based on fragmented expressions of intelligence. 
In fact, according to Sternberg and Davidson's 
theory of insight and problem solving (Sternberg & 
Davidson, 1983), or to deBono's theory of lateral 
thinking (deBono, 1971), creative problem solution 
entails selective combination of seemingly isolated 
pieces of information for creative associations, or 
seemingly illogical combinations, associations 
that, once examined, create breakthroughs in think-
ing about a problem. Further, these theories suggest 
that selective comparison of new problem situations 
to old bits of information or associations can be-
come the extraordinary insights of creative problem 
solving. Whether Sternberg and Davidson consid-
ered these processes characteristic of creative be-
havior or of intelligent behavior is not clear, but, in 
either case, their studies indicated that a rela-
tionship between intelligence (assessed through 
group intelligence tests) and the various insight 
abilities is a positive one. Thus, the greater the 
intelligence, the greater the likelihood that indi-
viduals will employ spontaneously the selective 
comparison and combination (insights) necessary 
to solve insight problems. 
120 
There seems no doubt that intelligence is an ele-
ment of the creative process. But is creativity as 
important an element of intelligence as it has been 
defined by various theoreticians? We continue with 
our examination of these phenomena, or the inte-
grated phenomenon, as the case may be. 
Creativity as a Component in Theories 
and Assessment of Intelligence 
Intelligence as a hypothetical construct has been 
aptly described by Conger (1957) as a "scientific 
fiction" invented to help explain and predict behav-
ior. Psychologists from Cattell to Wechsler to the 
present day have focused in various ways on three 
themes or components of this scientific fiction: ca-
pacity to act purposefully, that is, to learn or change 
one's behavior based on experiences; ability to 
think rationally and abstractly; and the ability to 
respond effectively to new situations in one's en-
vironment. Much earlier, however, Thorndike 
(1921) viewed this hypothetical construct in a more 
concrete way as facility in manipulating objects, in 
the use of symbols, and in interacting with other 
human beings. Remnants of these three themes may 
be found in each of the current views of intel-
ligence. Through these themes the groundwork was 
laid for a translation of theoretical construct into 
observable and measurable behaviors. Notwith-
standing this simplified thematic context and sim-
plicity of measurement possibilities, four distin~tly 
different theoretical approaches to understandmg 
and measurement of intelligence have arisen (Mal-
oney & Ward, 1976). Each places differential em-
phasis on the three possible themes and each has 
generated different methods for measurement. The 
four general approaches can be classified as learn-
ing, neurological-biological, psychometric, and 
developmental. We briefly describe, in tum, each 
general approach to intelligence, focusing on how 
the creative process is addressed in each. The pur-
pose of this examination of a sample of available 
theories is to demonstrate that perspectives on intel-
ligence typically have included creative process, 
whether or not it was labelled as such. (Some of 
these approaches, such as the developmental and 
psychometric, are addressed at length in other chap-
ters of this handbook. They are included here in 
order to develop a point regarding the relationship 
of creativity with intelligence.) 
PART I • THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
Learning Theory 
Classical learning theory focuses exclusively on 
process, and intelligence becomes "learning pr~­
cess functioning at its optimal level under appropn-
ate situational conditions and satisfying some exter-
nal value-type criteria not inherent in the behavior 
itself" (Maloney & Ward, 1976, p. 176). Learning 
theory claims to have the least use for i~div~d~al 
characteristics, ignoring hereditary capaCIty m Its 
consideration of what behaviors the individual 
emits and the circumstances under whichthose be-
haviors occur. 
From this perspective, Thorndike (1926) focused 
on associations or connections as the "accumula-
tion" of intelligence, in which greater intelligence 
occurs when a larger number of connections have 
been made. If creative production may be consid-
ered the result of accessing the more remote asso-
ciations in one's mental storage (Mednick, 1962), 
then we can begin to see a tenuous notion of 
creativity and intelligence as having a common ori-
gin. One can further see the role a wide variety of 
prior learning experiences might play in establi~h­
ing the vast and diverse hierarchy from WhICh 
unique associations could be generated. 
The influence of classical learning theory in the 
consideration of creativity may also be seen in the 
role of behavior modification in expanding origi-
nality in responses and creative production in prob-
lem solving. Studies by Brigham, Graubard, and 
Stans (1972), Goetz and Baer (1973), Glover and 
Gary (1976), Glover and Sautter (1977), Haensly 
(1979), Locurto (1974), Maltzman (1960), Nash 
(1975), Wallach and Kogan (1965), and othe~s 
have focused on various ways to successfully modI-
fy stimuli for eliciting creative respon~es an? in-
creasing frequency of responses and theIr quahty or 
originality. 
Neurological-Biological Theory 
The neurological-biological approach to intel-
ligence seeks to understand behavior and the pa-
rameters that influence or determine behavior 
through looking for relationships within the under-
lying neurological system, its anatomy and phys-
iology (Maloney & Ward, 1976). Attempts to ver-
ify earlier versions of this theory focused on trying 
to locate specific areas of the brain devoted to mem-
ory, reasoning, and judgment. In this approach, 
behavioral correlates of neuroanatomical and neu-
rophysiological functioning are assessed. 
CHAPTER 6 • CREATIVITY AND INTELLIGENCE 
Perhaps the most successful of these efforts was 
that of Broca who established the presence of a 
speech center in the posterior portion of the left 
frontal lobe of the brain. However, principles of 
mass action and equipotentiality formulated by 
Lashley (Maloney & Ward, 1976, p. 180), contra-
dicted the efforts of those trying to localize specific 
functions in specific areas ofthe brain. This contro-
versy continues to be addressed in research on 
hemispheric lateralization of the brain for abilities 
ranging from spatial to language expression and 
reading comprehension and from musical reception 
to mathematical abstraction (Gardner, 1983). This 
category of theory has been distinguished by 
Hebb's (1972) ideas on intelligence A and B and by 
Cattell's (1963b) theory of fluid and crystallized 
intelligence, referring, respectively, to innate bio-
logical capacity and to experience with the environ-
ment. The biological contribution in these latter 
theories refers to the intactness and efficiency of the 
nervous system. 
Recent theories in this category have focused on 
the integrative functions within the brain and of the 
brain and nervous system, on the biochemical as-
pects within the brain and at the nerve endings, as 
well as on the measurable excitations of specific 
areas of the brain in response to specific types of 
tasks. Though perhaps difficult, it is not impossible 
to conceive of creativity and intelligence as differ-
entiated either in chemical constituency or in area of 
cerebral localization. 
A nebulous reference to creative production 
might be suggested for Hebb's intelligence A, with 
the assumption that biological capacity is related to 
problem-solving abilities, and for Cattell's fluid in-
telligence, with the assumption that untutored abil-
ity would represent the raw material of creative as 
well as intelligent responses. In this latter case, 
experiences with the environment could enhance 
creative responses only if the experiences did not 
overwhelmingly reinforce mundane responses. 
Psychometric Theories 
Psychometric theories view intelligence as a pat-
tern of particularly adaptive abilities. Individuals 
differ in the specificity and extent of their abilities. 
With few exceptions these theories have arisen 
from data gathered on individual differences in abil-
ities. Spearman's two-factor theory (1927), Thur-
stone's multiple-factor theory (1931), and hier-
archical models with a general factor at the apex of 
121 
the pyramid and specific factors breaking out from 
the general are models that depict a common origin 
for general mental functioning. These theories were 
devised to explain observed patterns of differences 
among individuals, particularly groups of indi-
viduals. They have been the product of two specific 
mathematical and statistical organizations of data, 
correlations, and their derivative procedure, factor 
analysis. Factor analysis by itself cannot provide 
answers about theoretical conceptions of intel-
ligence. Interpretations must be developed for the 
observed relationships among specific abilities de-
termined through correlations of performance on 
different types of tasks. These interpretations be-
come quite critical as the statistical procedure be-
comes more detailed and complex in factor analy-
sis. Frequently, several interpretations appear 
equally viable in explaining the data. Further, the 
origin of the data (i.e., the subject population from 
which the data are gathered) and its homogeneity or 
heterogeneity (sample selectivity) may greatly alter 
the results, as does the choice of variables for inclu-
sion in the analysis. 
Although two of the most frequently applied psy-
chometric assessments of intelligence-the Binet 
and Wechsler scales-were constructed to sample a 
variety of intellectual abilities and are thus some-
what conceptually related to the multiple factor hy-
pothesis (Maloney & Ward, 1976), their reliance on 
a single index would imply an assessment of the 
"g" or general factor. Nevertheless, the single 
quantitative index does not fit well with the factor 
approach, and the tests are a theoretically complex 
mix of such factors. Psychometric theory, which is 
basically qualitative in explanation (based on ob-
served patterns of performance), does not seem to 
be represented well by these basically quantitative 
tests that result in an intelligence quotient. Current 
psychometric conceptualization continues to lean 
toward multiple factors, the number lying some-
where between the unacceptable extremes of too 
few (Spearman) and too cumbersome (Guilford). 
Interestingly enough, Gardner (1983), who pro-
fesses extreme opposition to the psychometric 
"IQ," has promoted a neurobiological theory that 
distinctly focuses on factors similar to those sug-
gested by Thurstone. 
Now, given these hedges, does creativity have a 
place in psychometric theories of intelligence? 
Since creativity and creative production are not ex-
clusive to any content or domain and conceivably 
can encompass all manner of performance, it would 
122 
seem inappropriate to assign it one specific ability 
slot in one of the factor theories. Vernon's model 
(1950) postulated two major group factors (verbal-
numerical-educational and practical-mechanical-
spatial-physical), one of which may be more 
function-oriented and the other content-oriented; 
creative production might find its niche in such a 
function-oriented factor. Within IQ tests them-
selves, little if any allowance has been made for 
divergent types of response; in fact, correctness in 
response is the mode. Yet the abilities assessed 
form the foundation from which creative endeavor 
must arise. 
Although Guilford's theory falls into the psycho-
metric category because it purported to measure 
individual differences in ability through perfor-
mance, it is a reversal of typical approaches in that a 
theory of intelligence preceded the gathering of data 
for its verification. Most relevant to this discussion, 
it assigned creative function as one of the five types 
of mental operations,specifically, divergent think-
ing or divergent production (as described in a pre-
vious section of this chapter). This operation can 
take place with any of the four types of content, at 
any of the six increasingly complex levels of prod-
ucts. However, a problem arises in an exclusive 
assignment of creativity to the divergent production 
operation. Unless cognition is present, no content is 
available for memory. Unless memory is available, 
divergent production would be limited to responses 
in cases immediately at hand, and, without evalua-
tion, divergent production cannot be usefully di-
rected to form a creative contribution. Thus, we see 
that an intricate integration of operations must take 
place for divergent production to be realized as 
creativity. Such integration seems to reflect 
Sternberg's "synthetic ability" (Sternberg, 1986) 
-application of metaprocesses to knowledge-ac-
quisition and performance processes. As in other 
assessments stemming from Guilford's theory, we 
must conclude that it is the pattern of integration 
that provides diversity among responses and among 
individuals. Even though various levels of the dif-
ferent types of operations might contribute to effec-
tive functioning, some minimal levels of each 
would be imperative. Creative genius would occur 
as each of the operations found its optimal balance 
for a particular content, operating on one of the six 
possible levels of products, in response to a particu-
lar environment with its specific demands, and cri-
teria or qualifications. 
PART I • THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
Developmental Theory 
Intelligence in the developmental perspective is 
conceptualized as action-dynamic, epigenetic, 
and ontogenetic-represented by mental organiza-
tional structures that change with maturation and 
experience. The third of the three all-purpose 
themes for the intelligence construct, the ability to 
respond effectively to new situations in one's en-
vironment, seems to dominate this perspective. Ad-
aptation of the individual to the environment is the 
goal of intellectual activity, as it is the goal of all 
biological organisms. 
Epistemological orientation, or emphasis on the 
genesis and growth of knowledge in the individual, 
is reflected in, for example, Piaget's concept of 
schema and his principles of assimilation, accom-
modation, and equilibration. Piaget emphasized 
that these internal organizational processes are 
available to all, and the focus is on universality 
rather than individuality. Intelligence is not only 
quantitatively different, at different ages, but also 
qualitatively different, and the age-related stages 
are sequential and hierarchical; that is, organiza-
tional processes or mental structures available to the 
individual are different at infancy than at adoles-
cence. They are different in type of stimulus that 
activates response and different in type or mode of 
response generated, with each new stage interfac-
ing with the structures or knowledge of the previous 
stage and, in this way, adding to the complexity of 
understanding. 
Maloney and Ward (1976) suggested that these 
psychological structures have a neurological ana-
logue. This possibility lends credence to Piaget's 
position that stage development is limited by neu-
rological development; thus, maturation would ex-
ert an effect on capacity and performance. Accord-
ing to Piagetian perspective, individuals may differ 
in the rate at which they accomplish the concep-
tualization characteristic of a particular stage and, 
likewise, not all individuals will necessarily attain 
the highest stages. A critical element in the rate 
difference is the environment, with the individual 
dependent upon the appropriateness and richness of 
environmental experiences for optimization of 
knowledge growth and stage attainment. However, 
even with the richest environmental experiences, 
individuals would be limited in stage attainment by 
age-related neurological development. In practice, 
a few individuals with extraordinary mental capaci-
CHAPTER 6 • CREATIVITY AND INTELLIGENCE 
ty transcend these ordinary maturational limita-
tions. Neo-Piagetian perspective (e.g., Case, 1978; 
Pasquale-Leone, 1970) proposed that some of such 
limitations have to do with the mental capacity 
available for processing increasing quantities of in-
formation. This perspective opens up the possibility 
that strategy awareness, training, or task simplifica-
tion might permit responses not thought possible 
under strict Piagetian perspective. 
From a developmental perspective, then, multi-
ple creative possibilities exist in the schemata each 
individual constructs from his or her particularly 
unique interaction with the environment. Carrying 
this further, the concept of generative processing 
(Wittrock, 1974) proposes that, at any point in 
one's epistemological development, construction 
of knowledge is based on quantity and quality of 
one's prior, specifically individual experience. 
Therefore, no two individuals can have exactly the 
same construction and/or understanding of any 
concept, nor are they likely to have exactly the same 
view of events, persons, places, and things. 
Uniqueness becomes available to everyone. The 
quality of original ideas will greatly depend upon 
the appropriateness or "fit" with the understanding 
of others in the population. In turn, this may depend 
upon the extent to which an individual has devel-
oped related schemata, based on reliable experi-
ences. The application of unique perspectives will 
depend upon the individual's problem-solving 
strategies (which will also evolve via the process 
described above) and on the opportunities for ap-
plying them-being in the opportune place at the 
opportune time. 
The possibility of a contrib,ution of creativity to 
intelligence from the developmental perspective 
becomes much more evident upon examination of 
Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson's (1986) elabora-
tion of the time lines in development of talent. 
These authors superimposed Erikson's life-span 
transitions on Piaget's stages of cognitive develop-
ment along with a time line for progression in a 
particular domain and in a particular field of en-
deavor. The latter two time lines may depend upon 
maturational factors, but even more importantly on 
the presence of appropriate training experiences at 
the most opportune intersects with cognitive and 
personality development. Further, the evolvement 
of an acknowledged creative contribution will de-
pend upon its intersection with an appropriate and 
accepting audience at a time that will take max-
123 
imum advantage of the individual's readiness and 
inclination to produce the creative contribution. 
Thus, outstanding creative contributions, generated 
to resolve problems, will occur when specific abili-
ties have coalesced in a relevant context, and are 
emitted with sufficient quality, intensity, and dura-
tion (Haensly et at., 1986). 
A Synthesis: Integration of Creative Process 
with Intelligence 
As stated earlier, the purpose of an examination 
of basic approaches to intelligence was to demon-
strate that perspectives of intelligence do include or 
assume creative process as integral to intelligence, 
even when creative process is not so labeled. 
In summary, classical learning theory appears 
not to distinguish between an intelligent and a cre-
ative response, viewing responses in general as ob-
servable and measurable behaviors, elicited and re-
inforced by attendant stimuli. On the other hand, 
neurological-biological theory may be seen as the 
most elusive of the four described approaches, yet 
the most promising for future investigation. 
Through microanalyses of physiological and ana-
tomical correlates of behavior, the possibilities of 
differentiating the biochemical state in creative pro-
cess from that in intelligent process, especially with 
relationship to antecedent conditions for the re-
sponses, is well within the realm of consideration.However, as of now, localization of response to 
specific content or domains of knowledge appears 
to have been the most productive application of this 
approach. 
Despite bias regarding intelligence testing and its 
assumed exclusion of creative potential, psycho-
metric theory provides an avenue for explaining the 
complementary nature of creativity and intel-
ligence. However, it is developmental theory that 
appears most clearly suited to explanation of the 
mutual origin of creativity and intelligence in men-
tal function, the interrelatedness of creative and in-
telligent responses within that function, and the rea-
sonableness of universal goal-oriented adaptation. 
This adaptation is accomplished through appropri-
ate application, timing, and intermingling of intel-
ligent responses (planning, executing, and monitor-
ing) and creative responses (extending beyond 
previously derived solutions to novel and useful 
ones). 
Before proceeding to further elaboration of the 
124 
nature of an integrated relationship between crea-
tivity and intelligence as elements of a unitary phe-
nomenon, we discuss a recurring barrier to such a 
view, a barrier resulting from interpretation of re-
stricted-range studies. 
Problems of Restricted Range in Studies 
of Creativity and Intelligence 
Data accumulated from studies of the rela-
tionship between assessed creativity and intel-
ligence have lent support to the idea that creativity 
does represent a function distinctly different from 
intelligence. In these studies, correlations between 
creativity and intelligence have often differed sig-
nificantly between low or moderate levels of intel-
ligence and high levels of intelligence. Some of 
these studies examined a restricted range of intel-
lectual ability. Others focused on criteria of 
creativity that limited the options for creative re-
sponse for particular subjects with specific back-
grounds and thus may have wrongfully identified 
them as noncreative. Using a sample of relevant 
studies, problems arising from interpretation of this 
type of limited-range data are discussed in the fol-
lowing section. Interpretations of restricted-range 
data based on the idea of conceptual differences 
between creativity and intelligence will be de-
scribed. The discussion will center, however, on 
alternative interpretations of statistical differences 
at low- and high-IQ levels. 
Limited Range in Intellectual Ability 
In a study designed to partially replicate with 
elementary, high school, and graduate school stu-
dents the Getzels and Jackson 1958 study, Torrance 
(1962) found that a significant portion of students 
identified as most highly creative (upper 20%) on 
his battery of creative-thinking tasks (the Min-
nesota Tests of Creative Thinking) also were identi-
fied as most highly intelligent (upper 20%) on a 
variety of individual and group intelligence mea-
sures . Yet the overall correlations between 
creativity scores and intelligence were less than 
moderate, the highest, .32, in a sample where intel-
ligence was assessed with the Otis Quick-Scoring 
Test of Intelligence. Among five samples of ele-
mentary school children, this overlapping highly 
creative-highly intelligent group comprised from 
25% to 41 % of the total sample; in a high school 
PART I • THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
sample of 272, 52% were among the top 20% in 
both creativity and intelligence as measured with 
the Lorge Thorndike Verbal Battery, a phe-
nomenon Torrance attributed to the distribution of 
talent in this school or to the nature of the particular 
measure of intelligence used. 
For comparison, however, the highly creative 
group (who did not rank in the upper 20% in intel-
ligence) were contrasted on achievement measures 
with the highly intelligent group (who did not rank 
in the upper 20% on creative thinking). Using the 
Iowa Basic Skills Battery as criterion for achieve-
ment, the highly intelligent group consistently (but 
slightly) outscored the highly creative group, 
though the difference was not statistically signifi-
cant in most samples. Torrance considered this evi-
dence supportive of the Getzels and Jackson 1958 
data and suggested that it also validated the Tests of 
Creati ve Thinking as measures of factors other than 
intelligence. He alluded to the possibility that the 
mental abilities sampled in measures of IQ may be 
more useful in certain kinds of achievement, where-
as the creative-thinking abilities may be more 
useful in other kinds of achievement. Differences in 
the mean of intelligence between the highly creative 
and the highly intelligent group, a statistically sig-
nificant difference in each sample, were further 
suggested as supporting a distinction between cre-
ative ability and intelligence. However, a dif-
ference in mean of intelligence between these two 
groups had to exist by virtue of the way in which the 
groups were comprised, with the most highly intel-
ligent creatives eliminated from the comparison 
group just as the most highly creative intelligent 
individuals were eliminated from the intelligence 
comparison group. The results appear to support 
more appropriately the contention that a high de-
gree of intelligence is more likely to be associated 
with a high degree of creativity, whereas at the 
same time, creative responses may be associated 
with intelligent responses at any level of either 
mode. 
Using performance on the Remote Associates 
Test (RAT) (Mednick, 1962) as measure of 
creativity and the Scholastic Aptitude Tests of Ver-
bal Ability (SAT-V), Mednick and Andrews (1967) 
found intelligence moderately related to creative 
ability in college populations, r = .43. Among 
1,211 University of Michigan freshman, there was 
a slight tendency for the relationship to increase as 
the level of intelligence increased (from .09 to .19 
over the six increments of SAT -V scores from mini-
mal to maximal). Mednick and Andrews (1967) 
CHAPTER 6 • CREATIVITY AND INTELLIGENCE 
found no support for the suggestion that creativity 
and intelligence are more closely related at lower 
levels of intelligence, and that they are relatively 
independent processes among the brightest stu-
dents. In this same data sample, the relationship 
between the SAT-Math scores and the RAT re-
mained negligible across the same range, varying 
from .03 to .08, with an overall correlation of .20, 
as might be expected when using a verbal measure 
of creativity to correlate with an intelligence test 
focused on mathematics. 
Guilford and Christensen (1973) used a divergent 
production (DP) battery of tests to demonstrate that 
a triangular scatter plot of the relationship between 
IQ and creative potential would be found more 
often than an elliptical scatter plot. These authors 
pointed out that the IQ as usually assessed probably 
represents most strongly semantic or verbal infor-
mation. They hypothesized that, consequently, se-
mantic divergent production tests would be more 
likely candidates for demonstrating the triangular 
type of relationship, with an elliptical relationship 
when visual-figural tests were used. As hypoth-
esized, their data supported triangular scatter plots 
for semantic-DP tests and the more usual elliptical 
form for visual-figural DP tests. The data were ob-
tained in a study of six groups of 40 to 95 children in 
each case, grades 4, 5, and 6, groups from which 
children with a Stanford-Binet IQ of 130 (Califor-
nia "gifted") or higher had been removed. The 
resulting triangular plots showed a continuous grad-
ual shift in divergent production from low to high 
IQ with no breaks at any IQ level. Guilford and 
Christensen (1973) interpreted these findings to 
demonstrate that "the higher the IQ, the more like-
ly we are to find at least some individuals with high 
creati ve potential" (p. 251). They further stated 
that their evidence does not support the threshold 
hypothesis regarding absence of relationship be-
tween IQ and creative potential abovea critical IQ 
level, such as 120. 
Guilford (1967) again emphasized the lack of 
correlation between creativity and intelligence at 
the upper end of the creativity range as he described 
the results of studies by Roe (1952), MacKinnon, 
Barron and associates (MacKinnon, 1960), and 
others. Scientists, writers, architects and mathe-
maticians with an observable record of creative ac-
complishment do not appear to exhibit a verifiable 
statistical corelationship between creativity and in-
telligence- "the relation of creative potential and 
creative production to the traditional IQ has been 
found close to zero where groups of superior IQ are 
125 
concerned" [italics added] (Guilford, 1967, p. 9). 
However, when considering a wide range ofIQ, for 
example, from 62 to 150, the relationship is sub-
stantial in the lower and middle area, but less strong 
at the upper end. Although Guilford suggested that 
IQ sets an upper limit on creative potential, other 
explanations should be considered. First, we may 
not have sophisticated or precise enough instru-
ments to differentiate levels of creativity at its upper 
range. Second, limiting description to a linear 
model also may limit our understanding of the rela-
tionship. It may be that as the information base 
(intelligence) expands and an ever widening variety 
of possible responses becomes available, the type 
of intelligence tests and creativity tests must be-
come more diversified as well. Guilford's emphasis 
on the importance of "transfer recall" (Guilford, 
1967), or transformation in the understanding of 
insight within creative thinking, points to multidi-
mensionality to explain the existing relationship. It 
very well may be necessary to use a three-dimen-
sional model to demonstrate the corelationship of 
creativity with intelligence, especially to accom-
modate the upper end of the continuum. 
Multiple Criteria for Assessing Creativity 
Owens (1972) introduced a different type of con-
cern into the creativity-intelligence question with 
regard to restricted range. In contrast to sampling 
only a portion of the distribution of intelligence, 
Owens referred to the limited range of types of cre-
ative response or application included in studies 
that focus on a specific field, such as psychology, 
architecture, mathematics. Thus, in Owens's study 
of research and development engineers, the type of 
creative response that may most frequently be ex-
pressed in relationship to the creativity criterion for 
engineers would be invention. Invention does not 
really represent the range of creative responses that 
might exist across other fields or occupations. As a 
matter of fact, in his study, Owens found that, in 
machine design, a specific, highly structured test 
with multiple definers for the product was a better 
predictor of creativity than a general ability test. 
Whether the measures used to assess individual 
creativity actually possess criterion-related (con-
struct) validity long has been a controversial issue 
and is addressed at length in another chapter of this 
volume. The following remarks specifically apply 
to the topic of restricted range. Dellas and Gaier 
(1970) addressed this issue citing MacKinnon's 
(1961) study of architects, in which the Guilford 
126 
tests did not correlate highly with expert-peer judg-
ment of the architects' creativity; Gough's (1961) 
data on the creativity of peer-rated research scien-
tists exhibited low and even negligible correlations 
with the Guilford tests of Unusual Uses, Conse-
quences, and Gestalt Transformations; Bittel's 
(1964) findings showed little relationship between 
measures of divergent thinking and performance in 
art; and Skager, Klein, and Schultz's (1967) study 
of artistic achievement at a school of design yielded 
inconsistent results. However, Barron (1963) found 
contradictory results using the Guilford tests with 
Air Force officers and Elliott (1964) with public 
relations personnel. As Dellas and Gaier (1970) 
pointed out, the criteria used for individual 
creativity nominations and judgments are a critical 
factor in whether or not the assessment measures 
can be expected to relate with the identifiers used in 
the practical applications of a particular field or 
occupation. The semantic nature of many of the 
divergent production tests may provide an optimal 
medium for the creativity of individuals who are 
engaged in advertising or public relations, but a 
much less appropriate medium for the expression of 
artistic, inventive, or discovery-based talent. 
Della and Gaier's (1970) position goes beyond 
this suggestion of inappropriately constructed mea-
sures using an irrelevant medium. They empha-
sized that production of creative ideas simply may 
be, to use a medical metaphor, the "symptom" that 
exhibits when inherent potential meets with an ap-
propriate intervening environment. The intervening 
environment, or intermediary factors, from which 
creativity symptoms might arise would be the mutu-
ally reinforcing clusters of personality charac-
teristics (such as intuitiveness, unconventionality, 
openness to feelings, independence, empathic ca-
pability) and motivation variables (such as attrac-
tion to unconventional types of achievement, self-
actualizing need, history of reinforcement for risk-
taking endeavors). Reapplying the medical meta-
phor, the individual may experience pain and de-
scribe it, even suggesting its presumed source, but 
unless the diagnosing physician also views this pain 
as a recognizable symptom of condition X, the indi-
vidual's pain remains a personal expression of an 
unrecognized condition. Although creative symp-
toms cannot evolve from a vacuum, but from an 
"effective use of intelligence" (Dellas & Gaier, 
1970) that prepares the information and/or skills 
from which the creative response emanates, neither 
will they evolve without the fostering factors. Thus, 
some intelligent individuals go beyond to produce 
PART I • THE NATURE OF THE BEAST 
creative responses while others with an equal ca-
pacity for intelligence limit their responses to the 
conventional and usual. What should be added to 
this fostering base is an environmental respon-
siveness to the particular direction of symptomatic 
behavior, without which the symptom cannot be 
recognized as creative even when the producer 
deems it is (Haensly & Roberts, 1983). Thus, ac-
cording to Dellas and Gaier (1970), "the roots of 
creativity do not seem to lie in convergent or diver-
gent thinking, but rather ... in the personality and 
motivational aspects of character" (p. 68). Yet the 
organic entity that can produce the creative re-
sponse remains the individual with at least a 
modicum of intelligence. Nevertheless, these au-
thors stopped short of suggesting that either the 
personality characteristics or motivational factors 
are the determining factors for identifying who will 
or will not be creative. 
In a retrospective view of creativity investiga-
tion, Taylor (1975) listed a number of definitions 
and criteria of creativity, including his own, which 
suggest the basic concept that new ideas are in-
volved and that what is viewed as creative at one 
time and in one culture may not be so viewed at 
another time and culture. Wade (1968), who specu-
lated on the role of environment in fostering the 
child's creativity, helps us focus on the possibility 
that variance in quantity and quality of creative re-
sponses may be a function of factors that permit the 
child to go beyond basic, intelligent responses. Fac-
tors, such as psychological safety and freedom, 
which provide a climate where external evaluation 
is not restrictive, may foster imagination, in-
ventiveness, and fantasy. Although this type of en-
vironment should have little effect on development 
of the processes of efficient acquisition, effective 
storage, and successful retrieval of information 
needed for intelligent responses, it is likely to have 
a profound effect on the production