Gerace M P - Between Mackinder and Spykman_ geopolitics, containment, and after

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Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, containment, and after
Michael P. Gerace
To cite this Article Gerace, Michael P.(1991) 'Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, containment, and after',
Comparative Strategy, 10: 4, 347 — 364
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Between Mackinder and Spykman:
Geopolitics, Containment, and After
MICHAEL P. GERACE
Framingham, MA 01701
Abstract This essay is about geopolitical frameworks for analysis in U.S. foreign
policy. The geopolitical frameworks of Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman
have undergone a resurgence over the last decade and have evoked an equal measure
of criticism as well. Both critics and supporters, however, share certain assumptions
about Spykman that have become part of the conventional wisdom defining his rela-
tionship to Mackinder and U.S. containment policy. The first assumption sees Spy-
kman as only modifying Mackinder's basic framework, while remaining compatible
with its basic logic. The second, which builds on the first, is that Spykman's geopo-
litics (as understood) layed the foundations for U. S. containment policy through the
writings of Kennan, containment documents, and later policymakers.
Arguing from these assumptions, critics see the rimland concept as responsible
for problems of containment. Supporters, upholding the same assumptions, see the
rimland as a passive contact zone around the littorals of Eurasia within which seapo-
wers and heartland struggle for control. This view is said to have informed contain-
ment by pointing to the seapower's ability to construct a system of alliances around
the rimland and thus bar the heartland from access to the sea.
Both views of Spykman are false because they are based on false assumptions.
Mackinder and Spykman are actually quite different. In Mackinder there is one
pattern of conflict in history—that between seapower and heartland. In Spykman,
however, there are two—that between seapower and heartland, and that between an
independent center of power in the rimland with both seapower and heartland allied
against it. These patterns alternate around the shifting distribution of power within
important regions of the rimland. It is this dualism in Spykman that is ignored.
Conventional views of Spykman see only the first pattern in his framework, which
supports his link to Mackinder. Yet it was the second pattern that he saw as coinciding
with major wars in modern times. The first is real, but is no longer the overriding
theme that it is in Mackinder.
With these differences established, the implications of each can be contrasted and
their substantive differences clarified. And the wide differences between the tradi-
tional interpretations of Spykman and the actual implications of his framework can
also be seen. Most notable is the issue of European unity. While containment policy
supported European federation, Spykman warned against it whether it was by federa-
tion or conquest. While Mackinder said nothing on unity, his framework is not neces-
sarily inconsistent with it.
The ideas behind containment were not geopolitical in the true sense of the term.
They were only outwardly so. To the extent that they were, however, they reflected
Mackinder and not Spykman. Reasoning from Mackinder's framework is consistent
with key aspects of containment, while reasoning from Spykman's leads to very differ-
ent conclusions. If these frameworks would lead to different implications for U.S.-
Soviet conflict, they would also lead to different interpretations on the end of this
conflict and what it means for U.S. foreign policy.
From Mackinder's perspective, the current process of European unity can be
seen as the fruition of U.S. containment policy and multilateral cooperation.
U.S.-Soviet conflict, as seapower-heartland conflict, reflected the only historical
347
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348 M. P. Gerace
pattern. The dissipation of this conflict suggests no replacement. But from Spykman's
view, the decline in one pattern will simply be replaced by another in accordance
with new centers of power in the world. Thus European unity is not the fruition of
containment's success, but a development that will transform the basic pattern within
which the first pattern existed. While this first is real to Spykman, it is far less volatile
than the second. An irony here is that while the flaring up of U.S.-Soviet conflict in
the 1980s reassured Mackinder's relevance, the decline of this conflict may make
Spykman more timely than ever.
This article focuses on the geopolitical framework of Nicholas Spykman and his relation-
ship to U.S. foreign policy. The frameworks of Halford Mackinder and Spykman have
undergone a resurgence over the last decade and have evoked an equal measure of
criticism as well. Both critics and supporters, however, share certain assumptions about
Spykman that have become part of the conventional wisdom defining his relationship to
Mackinder and U.S. containment policy. This can be summarized as two related link-
ages. The first is that Mackinder's geopolitics is consistent with that of Spykman's.
Spykman is seen as only modifying Mackinder's framework while remaining compatible
with its basic logic. The second, which builds on the first, is that Spykman's geopolitics
(as understood) informed U.S. containment policy via the writings of Kennan and early
containment documents, as well as the thinking of later U.S. policymakers. Critics take
this second link to be evidence that containment's problems are rooted in Spykman's
geopolitics.
This article does not refute containment's problems, only that they are not rooted in
Spykman's geopolitics. The ideas behind containment have totally ignored Spykman.
The central purpose, however, is to show the dramatic differences between Spykman and
Mackinder. Geopolitical interpretations of U.S. foreign policy are conditioned by the
framework one reasons from. If these frameworks have any validity (as I believe they
do), then it will be fruitful to separate the two to show that the implications of Spyk-
man's framework for U.S. foreign policy contrast sharply with traditional geopolitical
prescriptions. Spykman cannotbe spoken of directly, however, without first disentan-
gling him from the conceptual morass that obscures the dynamism of his framework.
Thus the above linkages will be outlined before distinguishing Spykman from Mackinder
and containment.
The view that containment's problems can be explained by their link to "classical"
geopolitics has been articulated most explicitly by G. R. Sloan. Sloan states that while
no direct link can be made between a theorist (e.g., Spykman) and a policymaker (e.g.,
Kennan), geopolitical concepts have influenced policymakers more generally as a
creed.1 Thus problems of containment, which he terms "indiscriminate globalism," are
said to stem from geopolitical doctrines.2
The contours of this linkage focus on the advent of a truly global containment. Its
universalization and failure to distinguish between vital and non-vital interests, which
led to unlimited foreign policy goals, are specifically related to geopolitics. Like others,
Sloan sees the Truman Doctrine as beginning the enormous expansion of U.S. foreign
policy and NSC-68 as the final stage in its globalist development.3
Sloan links this directly to Spykman's rimland concept by seeing Kennan's writings
and NSC-68 as reflecting it. He states that the " X " article is evidence of this because
"Spykman's emphasis on the importance of the United States maintaining a margin of
political and military superiority on the rimland was similar to Kennan's political objec-
tive of deterring Soviet expansionism."4 And NSC-68 sought to implement this by join-
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Between Mackinder and Spykman 349
ing countries together as points to form a line to deny Soviet control of the rimland.5
Finally, the view that the Soviets had an expansionary advantage due to interior lines of
communication "represents a striking congruity with the theories of Lea, Mahan, and
especially Spykman. . . ."6 Sloan's criticisms of NSC-68 are quite similar to those of
others and these linkages are not exclusive to him either, but pervade the writings of
critics and supporters of containment and geopolitics alike.7
As noted, this linkage is built on the first between Mackinder and Spykman. Equat-
ing the two is prevalent on a far wider basis than the above link. The reason for this
seems to be due to the uneven treatment each has received. Mackinder has received a
tremendous amount of analysis and criticism since his writing, but Spykman has re-
ceived very little. Most analysis of Spykman is superficial and part of a larger work on
Mackinder or geopolitics in general.8 Thus he has never been comprehensively analyzed
and compared to Mackinder. Instead there is an utter similarity in most treatments of
him.
This understanding of Spykman asserts a compatibility between his framework and
Mackinder's. The rimland, as the littoral of the Eurasian land mass, is seen as being the
area that the heartland seeks to control, which puts it into conflict with the seapowers.
Spykman is seen as pointing to the danger of the heartland coming into control of this
area because it would result in the strategic encirclement of the United States.9
This link is made at a more theoretical level as well. Here Spykman's significance
amounts to an extension of the optimism about the fate of the seapowers against the
heartland that Mackinder found in his last essay (1943). Mackinder was initially pessi-
mistic because the advent of railways would enable the heartland to gain wide access to
the sea and outcompete the seapowers. His midland ocean concept (explained below)
offered a way to prevent this. Here the rimland is simply a more systematic elaboration
on this optimism. By allying with the littoral states of Eurasia and fostering their inde-
pendence and industrial development, the seapowers could deny this area to the heart-
land and, ideally, bottle it up in a landlocked fortress.10
This interpretation of Spykman is patently false. It fits neatly, however, into argu-
ments that link it to problems of containment. First, it maintains the core importance of
the seapower-heartland conflict as the overriding theme (as in Mackinder). The rimland
was just a tidier concept to describe the same process at work in Mackinder. Second, this
view sees the rimland as giving uniform political significance to the entire Eurasian
littoral, which supports its link to "indiscriminate globalism." These are both false
views. They ignore the core importance that Spykman gives to the rimland, which
radically alters the significance of seapower-heartland conflict. They also ignore the
selectiveness with which Spykman accords importance to certain regions of the rimland
rather than the entire area.
Throughout the 1980s, however, there was a plethora of geopolitical works that
refined, revised, and employed Mackinder's framework. These works either sought to
clarify Mackinder or to apply his framework to U.S. national security policy. But like
critics, these works also accepted the equation between Mackinder and Spykman. Colin
Gray, for example, speaks of both in the singular when stating that his book employs
"Mackinder's and Spykman's framework of Heartland-Rimland."11 James Lowe states
that except for a minor misunderstanding, "there was actually no difference at all be-
tween the theories of Spykman and Mackinder" because Spykman's ideas are "pure
Mackinder. Straight from the Heartland."12 Despite Lowe's assertions this could not be
further from the truth.
With this link reaffirmed, however, familiar statements about the role of the rimland
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350 M. P. Gerace
as providing a bulwark against Soviet expansion were made.13 This was generally ac-
companied by detailed regional analysis, such as with Soviet tactics in Western Europe.
The Soviet attempt to decouple the United States from the continent while pressuring
individual West European countries into a neutralist stance to undermine unity was often
the focus.14 Such analysis was prominent before Soviet control over Eastern Europe
collapsed. While not denying the excellence of this analysis or that there was a need for
a bulwark against Soviet expansion, the use of the rimland from Mackinder's framework
has obscured its true dynamism.
Zbigniew Brzezinski is quite similar to Gray in his geopolitical outlook. Brzezinski
sees U.S.-Soviet conflict revolving around the Soviet attempt to control Eurasia and is
played out in three central-strategic fronts—Western Europe, the Far East, and South
West Asia, with a fourth established in Central America.15 He is similar to Gray in his
analysis of Soviet tactics in these regions. Brzezinski argues, however, that the United
States needs to focus on new geopolitical imperatives beyond Europe and Japan because
its policy has been successful in these regions.16
It is impossible to do justice to the complexity of these works here. The point is that
they all argue from the standpoint of Mackinder and either confuse him with Spykman or
simply do not bother to distinguish the two. The terms seapower, heartland, rimland,
and others are not empty labels of mere convenience. They are geopolitical categories
that have a specific significance within the framework of the theorist. The seapower-
heartland conflict in Mackinder is certainly different to that in Spykman, and the rimland
concept is unintelligible within Mackinder's framework. Confusing the two has led to a
misunderstanding of Spykman by both critics and supporters. In terms of the more
recent geopolitical works above, this means that their understandings of U.S.-Soviet
conflict and support of certain aspects of containment, while consistent with Mackinder,
contrast sharply with Spykman. West European unity is the most prominent example.
How it is understood within Mackinder's frameworkdiffers dramatically from how it is
seen within Spykman's framework. And the implications for U.S. policy are thus differ-
ent in each. Because the two theorists are assumed to be essentially the same, these
differences are ignored.
Though not fully outlined here, the basics of Mackinder's framework are introduced
before going to its specific aspects that bear on Spykman.
The principal conflict around which Mackinder's geopolitical framework is con-
structed is that between seapower and heartland. These two categories of power are
defined in part by their geographic orientation toward sea or land power. Part of Mack-
inder's focus is on the shifting balance of power between them, which is explained by
new transportation technologies that present new opportunities for the power potential of
those geographically disposed to exploit them. His understanding of this shifting balance
forms the basis of his geopolitics and becomes his theory of history.17 He focuses on
three main epochs in history, with the third emerging during his writing due to the
advent of railways (as well as modern artillery and the internal combustion engine). New
opportunities were opened to land power against sea power.18
Of key importance during this epoch is the heartland concept, first described as the
pivot area of history. The heartland is a core, landlocked area that includes the USSR,
Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and Tibet.19 In the Middle Ages it was open to the horse
riding nomads who descended upon outlying areas. This put Europe under the long-term
dominance of land power to the east, while it was boxed-in by pirates on the sea to the
north and south.20 The advent of sailing ships liberated Europe from this as it prevailed
over the sea. In modern times the heartland's importance rose again on the crest of new
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Between Mackinder and Spykman 351
land transportation, coupled with the fact that a single state could now organize this area.
Thus Mackinder saw Russia, with its pressure on neighboring Finland, Scandinavia,
Poland, Turkey, Persia, India, and China as the modern equivalent to the horse riding
nomads of history.21
The heartland is the strategic core of a larger unit, the Eurasian land mass, which is
demographically superior to and has a larger resource base than any other geographic
unit. With railroad tracks covering Eurasia, the heartland power could expand outward
and control its littoral. It would then have access to the sea on a wide basis with a
superior resource base. In his first version of this idea, Mackinder states that "the
oversetting of the balance of power in favor of the pivot state, resulting in expansion
over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit vast continental resources used for
fleet building and the empire of the world would be in sight."22 This possibility put the
seapowers, who depend on control of the seas for their survival, into conflict with
Eurasian contenders. Thus "West Europe, both insular and peninsula, must necessarily
be opposed to whatever power attempts to organize the resources of East Europe and the
heartland."23
This is the central conflict animating Mackinder's framework. The seapowers must
prevent a power from organizing the heartland and Eurasia, and ultimately from gaining
unlimited access to the sea. Geopolitical views of U.S. foreign policy have largely been
from this framework. Seeing postwar U.S.-Soviet conflict as seapower-heartland con-
flict on a grand scale is generally faithful to Mackinder. The problem is in the oversim-
plification of this relationship, which amounts to ignoring the differences of the smaller
categories that Mackinder designates between seapowers and heartland—the inner cres-
cent and coastlands. These subdivisions were not prominent in his last essay, but were
essentially consistent with it as will be shown. Spykman's entanglement with Mackinder
is largely due to ignoring the meaning of these smaller categories.
The inner crescent—coastland division serves to establish the fault line that separates
the heartland from coastal Eurasia. The significance of states within these categories is
different to Mackinder. France and Germany, for example, are in two different catego-
ries. Mackinder saw Germany as a heartland power and France as a coastland power. It
is often stated that he saw Germany as a rimland power in his 1943 essay.24 Aside from
the fact that Mackinder does not use the term rimland, the interpretive significance of
the rimland as a concept is alien to his framework.
The usual assertion is that Mackinder sees Russia as the heartland power. This is an
oversimplification. He considers Russia to naturally occupy the heartland, but he also
consistently sees three traditional centers of power in the heartland, all potentially domi-
nant. Brandenburg-Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia were "a vast triple base of
manpower, which was lacking to the horse raiders of history."25 While World War I
eliminated Austria as a contender and Russia already occupied the heartland, Germany
remained as its most serious challenger.
Mackinder states that Russia's significance emerged at the end of the Middle Ages
when the "Cossacks first policed the steppes" and it towered in the 19th century, but
Germany and Austria became determined to control the heartland by the end of the
century.26 It was not a foregone conclusion that Russia would be the sole inheritor of the
heartland. While he is wary of Russia's potential, he is constantly concerned about
Germany.
Within his framework Germany lies outside the pivot area proper, but is in the inner
crescent along with others such as Austria, Turkey, and China. The outer crescent in-
cludes Britain, South Africa, Australia, the United States, Canada, and Japan. And
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352 M. P. Gerace
France, Italy, Egypt, India, and Korea are "so many bridgeheads where the outside
navies would support armies to compel the pivot allies to deploy land forces and prevent
them from concentrating their whole strength on fleets."27 The bridgeheads are the
contact zones between seapowers and heartland. They are amphibious (like Spykman's
rimland), but are naturally allied to the seapowers (unlike the rimland).
Mackinder's understanding of Germany, whose key to world power was strictly on
land, is tied into the differences in these categories, which reflects his larger theory of
history. He sees the Germans as a people lying straddled across the division between
heartland and coastland, with the western Germans being historically and culturally
integrated into Western Europe and the eastern Germans being distinct and politically
similar to autocratic Russia.28 His cultural division of Western Europe from Eastern
Europe is at the same demarcation of the coastland from the heartland, with the Germans
being split between them.
This picture is extended back into history. The Germans are seen to be in a struggle
against the east while pursuing division in the west. Since the late Middle Ages, notes
Mackinder, the Germans have taken three paths of invasion into Eastern Europe—along
the Baltic shore, up the Oder River, and down the Danube, creating "a great triple
organization of German domination over a mainly Slavonic population. . . ."29 Thus the
primary significance of Bismarck was that he moved the center of power in the east
away from Russia to Prussia while keeping the west divided.30
It should be clear that Germany is categorically similar to Russia as a contender for
the heartland while being incomparable to France in Mackinder's framework. It is im-
portant to make these distinctions to clarify Mackinder's relationship to Spykman and the
interpretive differences of their frameworks. Mackinder's categories are not arbitrary.
They reflect hisunderstanding of the shifting balance between seapower and land power
as it has been played out in history. His framework reflects an arrangement of categories
with specific interpretive significance for the countries within them. His midland ocean
concept is no substantial departure from this. It is a consistent extension of his earlier
works with Germany, not the USSR, being its main concern.
The midland-ocean concept was designed to eliminate Germany as a threat, which
Mackinder thought could be done "if it were controlled by strong embankments on
either hand—land power to the east, in the Heartland, and sea power to the west, in the
North Atlantic Basin."31 To implement this, he calls for cooperation among the United
States, Britain, and France, "die first for depth of defense, the second as the moated
forward stronghold . . . and the third as the defensible bridgehead."32 Then he calls for
these three to cooperate with Russia against Germany, which is often overlooked.33
Mackinder's vision of the postwar world was one in which the allies were intact and
the perennial German problem solved. The midland-ocean concept was designed to
accomplish this. Mackinder describes a "girdle" that is "hung around the north polar
regions" and includes the heartland and the midland ocean (the North Atlantic). The
Baltic, Arctic, Mediterranean, and Caribbean Seas are its subsidiaries, and the Pacific,
Indian, and South Atlantic are the "Great Ocean" that lies outside it.34 Instead of a
single seapower, North America, Britain, and France are bound together. And they are
called on to cooperate with one part of the heartland (the USSR) against another (Ger-
many).
The midland ocean powers and Moscow constitute the "fulcrum" of the new world,
while the outer world would be led by the United States, Britain, and China.35 This
fulcrum is a construct revolving around Germany with the rest of the world being
defined by its relationship to this as the outer world. In a sense, it is a global version of
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Between Mackinder and Spykman 353
the cordon sanitaire. How can Mackinder's interpreters say that the midland ocean is
aimed at the heartland (implying Russia), on the one hand, and that it sees Germany as a
rimland power, on the other, while the substance of the entire essay is focused on tying
down the Germans?
With Germany being the central problem, then, the midland-ocean concept is not
exactly a precursor to NATO, which included West Germany and was designed to con-
tain the USSR.36 If one ignores the details and transfers the roles of seapower and
heartland to the United States and the USSR after World War II exclusively, the strategic
parallel is sound. But this is not the same thing as saying that Mackinder meant this and
making conclusions based on that assumption. Yet ignoring these details is at the basis of
the misinterpretation of Spykman.
Spykman accepts the seapower-heartland conflict in Mackinder, but alters its signifi-
cance. The inner crescent and coastlands are united into a single new category, the
rimland. The outer crescent is replaced by the offshore continents, but Britain and Japan
are excluded from this and seen as offshore islands. The Eurasian littoral is better
described as a rimland to Spykman because it is linked together in terms of seapower by
the string of marginal and mediterranean seas that separates it from the oceans.37
In addition to the polarity between seapower and heartland Spykman adds that be-
tween the New World and the Old, with its offshore continents. The significance of this
is that the New World—the Western Hemisphere—was geographically surrounded by the
Old from the Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic Oceans.38 Spykman is interested in the power
potential of these two units and the factors that affect the balance of power between
them. His general assertions about this have been seen as pointing to the heartland's
ability to control the rimland, which would result in the strategic encirclement of the
United States.
This is incorrect, however. The problem of encirclement comes from rimland
powers, not the heartland. Spykman is concerned with the rise of independent centers of
power on the rimland. He uses balance of power concepts to inform its immediate
significance, where balanced power is divided power and unbalanced power is integrated
power.39 When unbalanced power exists within regions of the rimland (as with Germany
and Japan during World War II), then the problem of U.S. encirclement exists.
That Spykman did not attribute uniform political significance to the entire rimland is
evidenced by his view of the world as being characterized by the regional decentraliza-
tion of power in the twentieth century. He states that when Europe was the center of the
world, balance of power in Europe affected all other regions. But then the United States
emerged as an independent center of power in the nineteenth century and Japan in the
twentieth. The result was that the relative importance of regions in the world shifted as
the others began to influence the European balance.40
Not only does this make the world politically interdependent, but the rise of these
regions indicates the location of important centers of maritime power. Spykman
thought they included the Atlantic coast of North America, the European littoral, and
the Far Eastern coastland of Eurasia, with a minor one in India that he thought might
increase in power in the future.41 Spykman views the interdependence of these regions
in terms of the relative integration or division of power within them, which determines
the balance of power among them. With the European and Far Eastern regions of the
rimland being the most important, it is the integration or division of power within them
(equal to the existence or absence of a dominant power) that bears on U.S. security
interests.
Spykman summarizes the importance of the rimland when he states:
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The power struggles of the Eastern Hemisphere have always been fought in
reference to the relations between heartland and rimland; the power constel-
lation within the rimland itself; the influence of maritime presence on the
littoral; and finally, the participation in that presence exerted by the Western
Hemisphere.42
These variations of interaction place the rimland in a central position. Spykman's
interpreters have seen the rimland as a passive area that seapower and heartland struggle
over, while Spykman sees it as the area from which geopolitical struggle emanates. He
states:
Looking at both directions, [the rimland] . . . must function amphibiously
and defend itself on land and sea. In the past, it has had to fight against the
land power of the heartland and against the seapower of the offshore islands
of Great Britain and Japan. Its amphibious nature lies at the basis of its
security problems.43
Thus the rimland is composed of actors who are often in opposition to both seapo-
wers and heartland. Spykman states that during the Napoleonic Wars and the two World
Wars, Britain and Russia were "lined up together against an intervening rimland power
as led by Napoleon, Wilhelm II, and Hitler."44 Mackinder notes the same three wars, but
interprets them differently. The first was simply a dual between West and East Europe,
while the two World Wars were attempts by Germany to control the heartland.45 All three
are geopolitically equivalent in Spykman.
Spykman does not negate the existence of seapower-heartland conflict, but it is no
longer the overriding theme. He states that "there has never really been a simple land
power-sea power opposition. The historical alignment has always been in terms of some
members of the rimland with Great Britain against some members of the rimland withRussia, or Great Britain and Russia together against a dominating rimland power."46
It is a common observation to note that Britain and the United States have never
really been in direct conflict with Russia in modern times, but have been allied in major
wars. The false conclusion often drawn, is that this indicates where their "true" geopo-
litical interests lay. This leads to the view that U.S.-Soviet conflict after World War II did
not reflect genuine strategic dispositions, but was due to meddling in each others affairs,
misunderstandings, etc.47 We do not get this understanding from Spykman. Rather,
sometimes the rimland is split between seapowers and heartland and sometimes both are
allied against the rimland. This is no small point. Much of the Spykman's thinking about
the rimland is centered on this basic dualism.
All geopolitical frameworks seek to indicate recurring patterns of conflict in history.
In Mackinder, there is only one—that between seapower and heartland. In Spykman,
however, there are really two—that between seapower and heartland with the rimland
divided between them, and that between a rimland power against both seapower and
heartland. The pattern that prevails depends on the distribution of power within the
rimland.
These patterns are not always as clear-cut as the above three wars, but Spykman's
framework captures shifts in geopolitical conflict in a way that Mackinder's cannot.
From Mackinder's framework, Germany in the two World Wars is analogous to the
USSR in the postwar period. All three reflect attempts by a heartland power to dominate
Eurasia, which put it into conflict with the seapowers. But in Spykman, the first two
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examples reflect a different pattern than the third. If Napoleonic France and Germany in
the two World Wars are equivalent examples of the pattern that emerges around a domi-
nant rimland power where seapower and heartland ally, the periods beginning with the
removal of these powers reflect a different pattern—that which emerges around a divided
rimland where seapower and heartland conflict.
Thus the breakup of the Quadruple Alliance after 1815 between conservative Aus-
tria, Russia, and Prussia against liberal Britain, and U.S., British, and French antago-
nism against revolutionary Russia in the interwar period are analogous to U.S.-Soviet
conflict after World War II. By the postwar period, the conflict would be global in scope
due to the sheer enormity of the antagonists, modern technology, and the fanatical messi-
anism of Soviet ideology. In all three examples, however, the wartime alliance dissipated
with the removal of the rimland power as a new geopolitical alignment emerged that
brought the allies into conflict.
To Spykman, then, the distribution of power within the rimland determines the pat-
tern that prevails. This, in turn, indicates the strategic interests of actors. With the
United States, his concern was its encirclement. He notes that U.S. history has largely
been accompanied by balanced power in Europe and Asia, with the possibility of its
encirclement arising only four times.48 The last was the German-Japanese alliance of
World War II, which presented "two gigantic empires controlling huge war potential"
that could reverse "the balance of power across the oceans."49 While powerful in and of
itself, the United States "would still find herself irresistibly encircled by a superior force
if she should ever be confronted with a united Eurasian rimland."50 It should be clear
that the rimland, not the heartland, presented the problem of encirclement for the United
States and only under certain conditions.
The position of Japan is somewhat ambiguous in Spykman's framework. On the one
hand, Japan is geographically similar to Britain as an offshore island and seapower, but
it is geopolitically different on the other. This is illustrated by the significance of both to
the United States where U.S. "participation in a war to preserve the balance of power in
Europe against Germany means war in cooperation with the dominant naval power.
Participation in a war to preserve the balance of power in Asia in this period in history
means war against Japan, against the dominant naval power, a strategic problem of an
entirely different nature."51
The geopolitical difference between the two stems from the fact that a plurality of
states separates Britain from Russia, while Japan is pressed against the two mainland
powers. The British policy was aimed at avoiding the Japanese situation by maintaining
a balance in Europe, while there was a balance in the Far East maintained by Russia and
China on the mainland before Japan became a power.52 The rise of Japanese power and
the building of its empire meant the disruption of the balance.
Both seapowers lay across U.S. lines of communication. But the British policy of
balance prevented the emergence of a rimland power in Europe while its navy buffered
the United States from the continent.53 And "the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere
would mean the final destruction of the balance of power in the Transpacific Zone."54
While Japan is geographically similar to Britain, therefore, it is East Asia's geopolitical
equivalent to Napoleonic France and Germany in the two World Wars. Like the three
European examples, it was a major amphibious power that threatened the mainland
powers on land and the United States on the sea.
While allied regions of the rimland would leave the United States encircled, they
would also encircle the Soviet Union. Spykman notes that German-Japanese success
would have pushed the USSR back behind the Urals and Lake Baikal:
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The result will be the final removal of all threats to land power in Europe
and the Far East that might come from the heartland of the continent. Ger-
many and Japan will then be free to devote themselves to their remaining
enemies, to break through the European and Asiatic mediterraneans into the
Indian Ocean and to begin a pincer movement against the Western Hemi-
sphere.55
Thus the conditions that threaten the United States with encirclement also threaten
the USSR with encirclement in a world where power is diffused and more than one
region of the rimland has great power potential. It is perhaps ironic that Mackinder's
framework was blind to this while it was also seen as being consistent with Spykman's.
While Spykman recognizes the validity of seapower-heartland conflict, it is not the
pattern that has historically coincided with major wars in his framework. And it is the
only pattern in Mackinder.
Spykman's two patterns of geopolitical struggle emerge and dissipate with dynamic
shifts in the distribution of power within the rimland. It is clear which of these two
patterns he sees as being the most dangerous for the United States by his advocacy of
balanced power in Europe, which was to prevent a reemergence of the pattern of conflict
just ending around a united rimland power.
Thus in calling for a balance of power in Europe, he states that the United States
should not support a federation of Europe because "balanced power, not integrated
power is in our interests."56 To Spykman it is geopolitically irrelevant whether Europe
was unified by conquest or by voluntary federation because "a federal Europe would
constitute an agglomeration of force that would completely alter our significance as an
Atlantic power and greatly weaken our position in the Western Hemisphere."57 Thus the
United States should seek balanced power on the continent. The need to maintain a
balance in Europe, of course, was completely superseded by the Cold War and super-
power rivalry, as the divided rimland was split with unprecedented clarity between
seapower andheartland.
As the above has shown, Spykman differs substantially from Mackinder. And the
implications of Spykman's framework are completely absent from containment policy.
Formulators of containment were only implicitly geopolitical, and to the extent that they
were, they reflected Mackinder not Spykman. The broad outlines of containment were
infused with traditional realist analysis and only implied a parallel with geopolitics
proper. Yet Spykman has been directly linked to containment because the broadly ac-
cepted interpretation of him seems to reflect this policy.
Kennan's realism has certain general similarities to the geopolitical theorists. His
understanding of the relationship between Britain's balance of power policy in Europe to
its general position in the nineteenth century and its navy's role in providing a belt of
security for the United States, for example, are shared among other realists and geopolit-
ical theorists alike.58 But his writings on containment are only outwardly similar to
Mackinder, and not at all on a theoretical level.
In the "X" article, the view of Soviet expansion has nothing to do with the core
relationship between transport technology and geography or the historical importance of
the heartland designated by Mackinder. Instead Soviet expansion is rooted in communist
ideology and the peculiarities of Russian history.59 The U.S.-Soviet struggle is seen as
being that between a free society and a communist one. To contain the Soviets, states
Kennan, the United States should apply counterforce to constantly shifting points in
conjunction with shifts in Soviet policy.60
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What this means is that Soviet expansion to Kennan did not reflect its strategic
outlook, but its system, ideology, and historical experience. Its world view was not a
reflection of its geopolitical significance modified by the nature of its regime, but was
the product of its regime. Thus a change in system will cause a change in Soviet behav-
ior, which should be followed by a change in U.S. policy. Kennan's limited intentions
for containment are made clear in his memoirs when he states that containment "lost
much of its rationale with the death of Stalin and the Soviet-Chinese conflict."61 The
Long Telegram portrays a similar picture where "the Kremlin's neurotic view of world
affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity."62 Thus conflict between
capitalist and socialist systems is not real, but is manufactured by the Soviets to justify
dictatorship.63 To Kennan, then, U.S.-Soviet conflict was ultimately a product of subjec-
tive Soviet experience.
Early containment documents do not stress subjective aspects of Soviet behavior, but
their pictures of Soviet expansion are similar to Kennan's in that they broadly reflect
Mackinder. NSC-7 seemingly reflects Spykman's rimland. It states:
between the United States and the USSR there are in Europe and Asia areas
of great potential power which if added to the existing strength of the Soviet
world would enable the latter to become so superior in manpower, resources
and territory that the prospects for the survival of the United States as a free
nation would be slight.64
But this reflects the misinterpretation of Spykman, which implies a consistency be-
tween his rimland and Mackinder's framework where the heartland maintains its status
as the principle adversary. If this statement is geopolitical, it reflects Mackinder's warn-
ing about the "empire of the world" and not the issue of U.S. encirclement that focused
on rimland powers alone.
Soviet domination of Eurasia and its implications are similarly repeated in NSC-20/
4, NSC-68 and A Resume of the World Situation. It is no surprise, then, that these same
documents support European unity as a bulwark against Soviet expansion. This, how-
ever, shows their utter dissimilarity to Spykman. Strangely, one document saw European
federation to be necessary to prevent both Soviet domination and (coupled with a re-
stored Germany) another attempt at German domination.65 European unity or division
was being viewed through the prism of U.S.-Soviet conflict and not in terms of how its
very existence might alter the strategic environment itself.
There is the casual use of the term "Eurasian land mass" in these documents, which
is a key phrase signifying geopolitics. But these early writings on containment are en-
tirely within the realist tradition. While they are not explicitly geopolitical, however,
they are not necessarily inconsistent with Mackinder. But the parallel is only superficial.
And they are even further away from Spykman. There are no hints of Spykman's dual-
ism, but a single enemy reflecting a single pattern of conflict. Containment may superfi-
cially reflect Spykman's scenario of conflict under conditions of a divided rimland where
seapower and heartland conflict. But this is seen as being the only pattern in Spykman,
embodied in the rimland concept. And Kennan's thinking is said to reflect this. The
rimland was largely focused on the other scenario of conflict under conditions of united
rimland powers, therefore there is no real connection. Thus the policy prescriptions in
these documents, while apparently consistent with Spykman's first pattern, ultimately
conflict with this second pattern, which was his central concern.
Further distorting Spykman here is the debate over points and lines where counter-
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point defense became the joining of several points to form a line, which resulted in the
geographic expansion of containment and its "indiscriminate globalism." This is seen to
reflect the rimland as a geographic expression. But Spykman only thought that two
regions of the rimland were important, with a possible third in the future and his treat-
ment of them was as centers of power in terms of the second pattern, not as passive
contact zones.
The term "geopolitics" is often used to describe realism and its modifications, as
well as nearly any activity that occurs between states.66 This is certainly a misuse of the
term. Sloan, who I have criticized above, offers an appropriate distinction when he
states that geopolitics seeks to show "that political predominance is a question not just of
having power in the sense of resources, but also of the structure of the field within which
that power is exercised."67 The above geopolitical frameworks are often seen as being
outmoded by the more recent realist approaches, when what they actually do is modify
the currency of power by making it multidimensional. Geopolitics is not concerned with
issue outcomes, but with broad patterns of conflict that reflect certain force alignments
that indicate strategic interests. It is thus not necessarily incompatible with approaches
that are concerned with issue outcomes, and because the focus is different it is certainly
not outmolded by them.
As indicated, the implications of Spykman's framework for U.S. foreign policy
differ from traditional geopolitical prescriptions. The newer geopolitical works noted
above mirror the traditional views because they uniformly argue from Mackinder's per-
spective. Their support of European unity, which has been a constituent feature of U.S.
containment policy since World War n , is the most significant example.
Brzezinski, for example, calls for the United States to encourage the political and
military integration of Western Europe, strategically allied to the United States, and the
creation of a triangular alliance in the Far East among the United States, Japan, and
China.68 This is quite in line with the earliest containment documents. Brzezinski even
considers that "the Carter Doctrine was modeled on the Truman Doctrine, enunciatedin
response to the Soviet threat to Greece and Turkey" where the "collapse of Iran and the
growing vulnerability of Saudi Arabia dictated the need for such a wider strategic con-
cept."69 European unity is part of Brzezinski's view of the need for regional security
structures in terms of his larger framework.
Advocating European unity as part of U.S. security, however, is where the utility of
Mackinder is stretched into the gross misunderstanding of Spykman. First, there is no
attempt here to distinguish between the significance of a security structure and a center
of power. Second, such a policy is seen through the prism of seapower-heartland con-
flict, where European unity would be functional to a U.S. alliance against Soviet expan-
sion. From Spykman's standpoint, such a development would preclude the very need for
a bulwark against Soviet expansion because the outlook of both the United States and the
USSR would be totally transformed.
A united Western Europe would be far more than a mere security structure. From
Spykman's viewpoint, it would be an integrated center of power on the rimland that
would undercut the postwar pattern of conflict by dramatically altering the geopolitical
parameters within which that conflict existed. A security structure, as a system of alli-
ances, has no indigenous geopolitical imperative. Rather, its strategic outlook derives
from its connection to a center of power. The outlook of West European countries has
thus far stemmed from their alliance to the United States, through NATO, against the
USSR. And the opposite has been true of Warsaw Pact countries. Thus the character of
Western Europe's outlook must inevitably be altered by its integration as it acquires an
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Between Mackinder and Spykman 359
indigenous geopolitical imperative. But this picture has been complicated by the decline
in U.S.-Soviet conflict since Gorbachev and the collapse of Soviet control over Eastern
Europe, which opened the way to German unity and the Soviet and East European
interest in this process.
Today Western Europe and Japan are fast emerging from the postwar world. While
preceded by their economic rise, it was catalyzed by the dissipation of U.S.-Soviet
conflict. Sooner or later both will be forced out of their U.S. security shells. The
Atlantic Alliance is often treated as if it were a permanent geographic fixture, but its
cohesion was fueled by the Soviet threat, as was the U.S. security alliance with Japan.
The decline of this threat must be followed by a decline in the salience of these alliances.
Why, for example, would Japan seek an alliance with the United States and China
against the USSR? Its need for such an alliance in the wake of U.S.-Soviet conflict
seems lacking.
Japan's principal concerns today are economic. The economic unity of Western Eu-
rope, worsening economic relations with the United States, and increased competition
from the Asian NICs could see Japan focus increasingly on creating a system of relations
in East Asia.70 At the same time, Japan has territorial disputes with the Soviets over the
Kurile Islands and with China over the Senkaku Islands. This could draw the Soviets into
closer cooperation with China as Japan emerges from its postwar garb.
It is often stated that Western Europe and Japan are major political and economic
powers, but not military. But this observation is never accompanied by a probe into why
this is so. It is treated as a "new reality" in the world that demonstrates the decline in
the salience of military power.71 But there are clear reasons why they are not major
military powers. They never needed to become so because they have existed under the
U.S. security umbrella since World War II. The significant forces that they do have are
pointed eastward in line with their U.S. alliances. Thus they never needed to assume the
full burden of their security or protect their commerce. This should not be taken to mean
that these functions are obsolete.
The economic rise of Western Europe and Japan was within the framework of the
U.S.-centered world economy stemming from Bretton Woods. While this order began
unraveling in the mid-1960s, it is not really separable from the Western security frame-
work. Both were complementary. Paul Kennedy states that "the expansion of American
economic influence was going hand in hand with the erection of an array of military base
and security treaties across the globe,"72 which he parallels with Britain after 1815.
Thus the postwar economic order fell along lines of the strategic order, reflecting its
unity as well as divisions. Even today, the "world economy" refers only to North
America, Western Europe, and Japan, with a host of secondary actors. The Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe are not even part of it, though they are fast gaining entrance. The
point is that the postwar economic order is inseparable from its alliance structures. The
Marshall Plan, which was part of containment, provided the foundations for which
Western Europe and Japan could participate in this order. They were buffered from
Soviet power while rebuilding, and have remained so since.
With Western Europe and Japan on the brink of ejecting from this order, sooner or
later they will have to assume their own strategic burdens. Leaving aside the issue of
what a united Western Europe would look like, especially because of its complication
due to German unity, it is enough to state that such a development cannot really be seen
through the framework of U.S.-Soviet conflict or even its wake. The same can be said of
a fully independent Japan. Will not their security structures reflect their own interests as
centers of power?
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Prior to their emergence, Western Europe and Japan were not "centers of power"
per se. As allies, they were akin to spheres of influence in the U.S.-Soviet conflict.
Geopolitical analysis of Europe and Japan, for example, universally understood the
balance in these areas to be a function of the larger U.S.-Soviet balance. As centers of
power, spheres of influence will begin to coalesce around them in accordance with their
own geopolitical positions. Will this not predispose them to certain patterns of conflict
and cooperation in terms of their relationships to other centers of power? How any of
this is worked out depends on specifics.
The geopolitical framework one reasons from about postwar geopolitics and U.S.-
Soviet conflict itself suggests how to interpret the end of this conflict and the emerging
new balance. If one reasons from the standpoint of Mackinder, for example, the
seapower-heartland conflict is the overriding theme that defines all. Thus its dissipation
leaves only an absence of conflict without a foreseeable replacement. The inference from
this would suggest the onset of harmonious relations among major actors. From Spy-
kman's framework, the dissipation of one pattern of conflict is simply replaced by
another in accordance with new centers of power in the world. May we not amend
Spykman's assertion that a united Europe would alter U.S. significance as an Atlantic
power and weaken its position in the Western Hemisphere to include the Mediterranean,
the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean and East Asia in terms of Japan?
From Spykman's viewpoint, we can also state that the Soviet Union must face a
complete reorientation in its outlook. Both it and China are seeking to tie into the
Western economies, and see Japan as an economic opportunity, but Japanese demands
over the Kuriles have steadily increased since Gorbachev recognized the dispute.73 The
Soviets have become more conciliatory, but they clearly do not want to give up the
Kuriles.74 Japan also has a dispute over the Senkaku with China and economic concerns
withthe West. No clear pattern is yet evident in East Asia, but a more pluralistic power
arrangement is certainly developing. Maybe Japan will seek closer relations with
ASEAN and the NICs,75 or see China as the future of its economic prosperity. Perhaps
the superpowers will begin to cooperate in an effort to restrain Japan in the future.
Whatever the result, U.S.-Soviet conflict will scarcely define anything.
The fact that an independent center of power on the other side of Eastern Europe is
anathema to the Soviet strategic outlook is evident in its policy toward Western Europe
both before and after its hold over Eastern Europe collapsed. Gorbachev's own rhetoric
before these events was a mixture of the old and new. The "common European home"
idea still contained the decoupling tactic and the attempt to create neutralist West Euro-
pean states. The Soviets attacked the EC and NATO as subregional structures that were
both hostile to the peaceful socialist states and products of U.S. imperialism.76 The
United States, Western Europe, and Japan were still the three main centers of imperial-
ism in the world and the postwar division of Europe was still due to U.S. aggression.77
Soviet pan-Europeanism was presented as an ideological alternative to West European
integration and the Atlantic Alliance. The collapse of Eastern Europe and the rise of
German unification put an end to this rhetoric. The United States was no longer the
interloper in Europe, but part of the process. It became part of the European "family"
whose presence became a stabilizing force.78
The Soviet press has since been littered with debates on the meaning of these
developments. A principal concern became how to restructure European relations so
that "aggression from the territory of Germany would become impossible."79 The
common European home idea shifted from housing the old tactics to advancing the
creation of a multilateral institutional arrangement. Sheverdnadze thought it unfortu-
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nate that German unification was "outdistancing the formation of common European
structures that could become a guarantee of stability."80 There is also concern about
what an integrated Western Europe would be like. Would it be an economic power, a
military power? And "won't it become a wind tunnel which would draw in the East
European economies?"81
The Soviets are clearly wary of an independent center of power on the other side of
Eastern Europe whether it be a united Germany, an integrated Western Europe, or both.
The newer focus of the common European home is on multilateral arrangements to both
tie down the Germans and avoid facing a united Western Europe exclusive of the USSR.
This policy is broadly similar to the earlier approach in that both sought to prevent the
formation of a power center in Western Europe. While U.S.-Soviet conflict defined the
European balance before the most recent developments, Soviet opposition to this was
evident in its attacks on the EC. It was not starkly evident, however, because it was
linked to Soviet opposition to the United States. These are two separate strands of the
Soviet strategic outlook that were intertwined only because they existed in the postwar
pattern of conflict. Soviet concern about a center of power in Western Europe becomes
increasingly evident as the postwar pattern dissipates. Unlike the earlier approach, the
newer approach cannot be said to house attempts at domination. It seems to be aimed
more at avoiding a certain alignment.
The Soviets and Eastern Europe do want to benefit from Western economic opportu-
nities. But this will entail Western economic penetration into Eastern Europe to an
unprecedented degree. Eastern Europe has hitherto been a buffer for the Soviets against
the West. Will not Eastern Europe run into the arms of the more attractive West, which
will wrest this historical security blanket away from the Soviets? Disintegration in the
East and integration in the West points to an alignment on the Western end of Eurasia
where Eastern Europe will be a power vacuum between the heartland and a united
rimland power.
Eastern Europe has never really been a center of power, but has always been more or
less a sphere of influence. Various geopolitical pictures of Eastern Europe have thus seen
it as being functional to the interests of another power. From the West, it has been seen
as a means to surround Germany or block Russia, or separate the two. From the East it
is a buffer against the West.
Events in Europe seem to be taking on clearer lines than in East Asia. But two major
centers of power are emerging from their postwar alliances on the western and eastern
ends of Eurasia. Mackinder's framework cannot capture this because of its central focus
on seapower-heartland conflict. But Spykman offers a more dynamic framework.
This article has sought to clarify Spykman's framework. His scarce treatment in the
literature has left this problem curiously untouched. The status of geopolitics is not a
closed debate, as the more recent works have shown. But Spykman's status has been
problematic. By contrasting him with Mackinder and containment policy, Spykman is
shown to differ substantially from conventional views of him. The implications of his
framework for U.S. foreign policy are quite unlike traditional geopolitical prescriptions
with some surprising differences. U.S.-Soviet conflict, as seapower-heartland conflict,
is certainly not the only pattern of geopolitical struggle that impinges on U.S. national
security interests. Yet this pattern was so omnipresent after World War II that it was
impossible to see beyond it. Thus prescriptions for containment were uniformly from
Mackinder. From Spykman's viewpoint, aspects of containment, such as European fed-
eration, would eclipse the very purposes of containment itself by ushering in a new
pattern. It is truly ironic that while the flaring up of U.S.-Soviet conflict in the 1980s
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362 M. P. Gerace
reassured Mackrinder's relevance, the decline in this conflict seems to have made Spyk-
man more timely than ever.
Notes
1. G. R. Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890-1987 (New York: St.
Martin's, 1988), xii.
2. Sloan, Strategic Policy 141.
3. Sloan, Strategic Policy 133-134.
4. Sloan, Strategic Policy 135.
5. Sloan, Strategic Policy 140.
6. Sloan, Strategic Policy 132.
7. See Peter Taylor, Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality (Lon-
don: Longman, 1985), 42. He states "As a counter to the Mackinder thesis [Spykman] argued that
the key area was the 'inner crescent,' which he renamed the 'rimland' and control of the latter
could neutralize the power of the heartland." For a direct link to Kennan, see James E. Dougherty
and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive
Survey (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), 65. "The 'rimland' hypothesis is a central theoretical
foundation of George F. Kennan's famous postwar proposal for a 'policy of containment'. . . . "
8. There are a few works that give more than cursory treatment to Spykman. See J. R. V.
Prescott, The Geography of State Policies (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1968), 28-40.
Treats all of Spykman's writings, from his essays during the 1930s to his two books. Interesting
criticism, but makes familiar links.
9. Sloan, United States Strategic Policy, 17.
10. See Taylor, and Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff above.
11. Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Superpower (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,
1988), 42.
12. James T. Lowe, Geopolitics and War: Mackinder's Philosophy of Power (Washington
DC: University Press of America, 1981), 70. For similar views see also Prescott above, 40. Also
see RobertE. Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access
Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 278-287; and W. H. Parker, Mackinder: Geogra-
phy as an Aid to Statecraft (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), 148 (fn., 5), 154.
13. Gray, Superpower, 76; and Parker, Mackinder, 220.
14. Gray, Superpower, 76 and 111; see also Harry Gelman, Gorbachev's Policies Toward
Western Europe: A Balance Sheet (Santa Monica: Rand, 1987), a good short study of this type of
focus.
15. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S. Soviet Contest (Boston:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), 23. Also by the same author, In Quest for National Security
(Boulder: Westview, 1988), 26-27.
16. Brzezinski, In Quest, 39.
17. Lowe denies that Mackinder meant it to be a theory of history. Instead he meant it to be a
theory of power, as the title suggests.
18. Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: With Additional Papers (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1962), 111.
19. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, 110.
20. Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographic Pivot of History," Democratic Ideals cited
above, 247-249. All references to this article are from this volume.
21. Mackinder, "Geographic Pivot," 260-262.
22. Mackinder, "Geographic Pivot," 262.
23. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, 139.
24. Sloan, Strategic Policy, 60-61.
25. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, 110.
26. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, 110-111.
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Between Mackinder and Spykman 363
27. Mackinder, "Geographic Pivot," 262.
28. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, 123-126.
29. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, 127-130, and 131-132.
30. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, 124-125.
31. Halford J. Mackinder, "The Round World and The Winning of The Peace," Foreign
Affairs 21(4) (July 1943):601.
32. Mackinder, "Round World," 601.
33. Mackinder, "Round World," 602.
34. Mackinder, "Round World," 602.
35. Mackinder, "Round World," 603.
36. Sloan, Strategic Policy, 139. He states that the midland ocean concept does indeed reflect
NATO and the Atlantic Community.
37. Nicholas Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.,
1944), 37-38.
38. Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Bal-
ance of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1942), 447.
39. Spykman, America's Strategy, 21.
40. Spykman, America's Strategy, 166.
41. Spykman, Geography, 45.
42. Spykman, Geography, 51.
43. Spykman, Geography, 41.
44. Spykman, Geography, 43.
45. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, 122, 62, 66, and 150. See also "Round World," 601-602.
46. Spykman, Geography, 43.
47. John L. Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1987), 18.
48. Spykman, America's Strategy, 449.
49. Spykman, America's Strategy, 194-195.
50. Spykman, Geography, 45.
51. Spykman, America's Strategy, 159.
52. Spykman, America's Strategy, 135-136.
53. Spykman, America's Strategy, 123.
54. Spykman, America's Strategy, 155.
55. Spykman, America's Strategy, 183.
56. Spykman, America's Strategy, 466.
57. Spykman, America's Strategy, 466.
58. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1990-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1969), 5.
59. George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," American Diplomacy cited above,
118.
60. Kennan, "Sources," 120.
61. George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and co., 1967), 367.
6 2 . Kennan, Memoirs, 549.
63. Kennan, "Sources," 113.
64. Report by the National Security Council on "The Position of The United States With
Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism": NSC-7, March 30, 1948, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1948, vol. 1, (Part 2), (Washington DC: GPO, 1976), 546.
65. Report by the Policy Planning Staff, "Review of Current Trends U.S. Foreign Policy":
PPS/23, Feb. 24, 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, vol. 1 (Part 2), (Washington
DC: GPO, 1976), 515.
66. Harkavy, Access Diplomacy, 272.
67. Sloan, Strategic Policy, ix.
68. Brzezinski, In Quest, 30.
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364 M. P. Gerace
69. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor
1977-81 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 523.
70. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military
Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), 459-460. Kennedy sees Japan's
economic growth as having a "scissors effect"—a reaction against its export-led growth in the
West, and greater competition from the Asian NICs.
71. Wolf Mendel, Western Europe and Japan: Between the Superpowers (New York: St.
Martin's, 1984), 47-48. Mendel calls them "new model powers," who have "returned to the first
rank among states, but for historical reasons have abandoned the traditional badge of great power
status."
72. Kennedy, Great Powers, 361.
73. While touring in Europe, Prime Minister Kaifu said Japan was a "victim of Soviet
expansionism" in reference to the Kuriles. The Soviets saw this as "an excuse to defend continued
military confrontation in the Far East." For Kaifu's remarks, see V. Golovnin, "Japan's Kaifu
Cited on Claim of Expansionism," Tass, Jan. 12, 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
FBIS-SOV-90-010, Jan. 16, 1990, 31-32. For Soviet response, see "Japan Seen as Promoting
Military Confrontation," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-SOV-90-005, Jan. 8,
1990, 12-13.
74. Yeltsin proposed to make the Kuriles a free trade zone, but the Japanese were not satis-
fied. "Querried on N. Territories, Domestic Issues," interview with Yeltsin, Foreign Broadcast
Information service, FBIS-SOV-90-010, Jan. 16, 1990, 32-33. Soviet desire to keep the islands
was supported by a poll they issued in February 1990 where 85% of the population did not want to
return the islands. "85 Percent of Soviets Oppose Return of Islands," Foreign Broadcast Informa-
tion Service, FBIS-SOV-90-036, Feb. 22, 1990, 12.
75. For a good overview of Japan's economic and political outlook see Robert S. Ozaki and
Walter Arnold, eds., Japan's Foreign Relations: A Global Search for Economic Security (Boulder:
Westview, 1985).
76. John Van Oudenaren, Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe: Objectives, Instruments,
Results (Santa Monica: Rand, 1986), 5.
77. Mikhail Gorbachev, Speech to the 27th Party Congress, Toward A Better World (New
York: Richardson and Steirman, 1987), 93 and 98. This speech contains most of his views before
events in Europe changed.
78. An interesting interview with Gorbachev over recent events in Europe that has none of
the old ideological language is "Gorbachev Interviewed on German Unity, NATO," Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-SOV-90-047, March 9, 1990, 27-28.
79. "Shevardnadze Interviewed on German Unity Issues," Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, FBIS-SOV-90-046, March 8, 1990, 2.
80. "Shevardnadze on German Relations, Helsinki Meeting," Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, FBIS-SOV-90-038, Feb. 26, 1990, 2. An interesting survey of how the Soviets see
German unity is Mikhail Bezrukov and Mikhail Kozhokin, "The German Question: What Do The
Interested Parties Think," New Times (Moscow), (51) (Dec. 19-25, 1989): 12-14.
81. Daniil Proektor, "United Germany's Threat to Europe Assessed," Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, FBIS-SOV-90-064, April 3, 1990, 2.
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