22021615-Small-Sat-Report-Q4-2021_fin

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This issue of the Satellite Applications 
Catapult’s quarterly Small Satellite 
Market Intelligence report provides 
an update of the small satellites 
launched in Q4 2021 (1st October to 
31st December 2021). This edition 
also includes a commentary article by 
NORSS on Russia’s anti-satellite test 
pointing out its relevance to the small 
satellite community.
Q
4 
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SMALL 
SATELLITE 
MARKET 
INTELLIGENCE
REPORT
02SMALL SATELLITE 
MARKET 
INTELLIGENCE
Q4 2021
OVERVIEW 
There were 264 small satellites launched successfully into orbit in the fourth quarter of 2021. The second half of the 
year saw a dramatic slowdown in the number of small satellites being launched with the last two quarters combined 
contributing less than each of Q1 and Q2 individually. Nonetheless, the second half of 2021 has seen more satellites 
reach orbit than any full year prior to 2020. Q4 accounted for 15.4% of all satellites launched in 2021.
OneWeb and Starlink continued to top the list of contributors, launching 72 and 153 satellites respectively. Only thirty-
nine small satellites (14.8%) were not attributed to either company. For UK based OneWeb, this marked a significant 
milestone. With two launches of thirty-six satellites each, the company surpassed the halfway mark in its constellation 
growth, counting 394 out of the planned 648 satellites launched. 
The US, UK, France, China, Japan and Vietnam all took part in Q4 2021 launches. Vietnam launched a 3U CubeSat 
under their “Made in Vietnam” roadmap, named NanoDragon, which was researched, developed, and manufactured 
in-country under the direction of the Vietnam National Satellite Center (VNSC). VNSC had previously worked on 
PicoDragon, a 1U CubeSat, which was deployed in 2013. 
Overall, 2021 saw a 45.3% increase in the number of small satellites launched with a total of 1,715 small satellites. This 
does not quite match the dramatic three-fold upshoot seen between 2019 and 2020, but it is a significant increase, 
nonetheless. Of the 1,715, a total of 1,273 belong to OneWeb (284) and Starlink (989). The total number of 
satellites launched from other companies grew 214.4% from 2020 to 2021, reaching 313 satellites. This beat the 2017 
record of 197 satellites launched for activities that do not contribute to mega-constellations.
Figure 1: Number of Small Satellites Launched
Number of Small Satellites Launched
03APPLICATIONS
Applications are defined by the primary objective of the mission as categorised below: 
•	 Communications: the objective of the mission is to transmit or receive signals to/from a user terminal or gateway. 
•	 Technology/Scientific:	 the objective of the mission is to gather knowledge to better understand physical 
phenomena or to test the functionality of the payload or equipment. 
•	 Earth observation/Remote sensing: the objective of the mission is to provide imagery or data relating to the 
Earth or its atmosphere.
As previously mentioned, OneWeb and Starlink contributed 225 satellites (OneWeb launched 72 whilst Starlink 
launched 153) to the total this quarter. The remaining thirty-nine were divided between three categories: 
• Communications: 4 satellites 
• Technology: 19 satellites
• Earth observation: 16 satellites 
 
Figure 2: Small Satellites Launched by Application 
Figure 3: Percentage Share of Small Satellites by Application 
04
Communications
All four communications satellites came from the same Chang Zheng-2D ride-share launch. Two satellites formed 
part of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization Student Small Satellite project, whilst the other two added 
to the growing HEAD’s Skywalker constellation. Skywalker currently counts six satellites but has a planned final size 
of forty-eight, which HEAD intends to complete by 2023. The constellation aims to provide Machine-to-Machine 
connectivity for IoT (Internet of Things) services.
Technology
Excluding mega constellations, technology accounted for the highest number of satellites. The split between 
organisation types conducting technology missions was almost equal with five commercial, seven academic and 
seven governmental entities. All the academic and commercially lead satellites were flown by Japan or China with 
the majority of spacecraft carrying out technology demonstration missions from satellite thrusters or antennas to 
new approaches for Earth Observation (EO). Government initiatives were mainly originating from China and the USA, 
again focusing on technology demonstrators as well as scientific observations. Vietnam and Japan also contributed 
one governmental technology satellite each.
Earth Observation
More than one third of the EO satellites (six) belong to the BlackSky constellation which has now reached its final size 
of twelve satellites. Nonetheless, BlackSky plans on launching further spacecraft to ultimately produce 50-centimeter 
resolution imagery by 2023 as part of their “satellite imaging as a service” initiative. Five satellites launched were 
commercial Chinese missions. The remaining five were Chinese (two) and French (three) intelligence satellites.
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Satellite	classification	 	Satellite	subclassification	 Associated wet mass range 
Small Satellite < 500 kg Mini-satellite 100 kg - 500 kg 
Micro-satellite 10 kg – 100 kg 
Nano-satellite 1 kg – 10 kg 
Pico-satellite 0.1 kg – 1 kg 
SIZE AND MASS
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Pico
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Nano
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Mini
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Micro
Micro Q4
Mini
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Nano
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In Q4 there were 252 mini-satellites, 5 micro-satellites and 7 nano-satellites launched. 
Mini-Satelites
OneWeb and Starlink together contributed 225 satellites to the ever dominant mini-satellite category. Even for non-
megaconstellations, mini-satellites continued to be the most common choice with twenty-seven satellites flown. 
These included Jilin-1b (one), Yaogan (two) and BlackSky (six). Of these twenty-seven, sixteen had Earth Observation 
applications and eleven had Technology applications. 
Micro-Satellites 
Of the five micro-satellites, three originated from Chinese corporations: two as an addition to the Skywalker 
constellation and one undertaking an atmospheric study. Japan’s Mitsubishi sent a technology demonstrator 
to measure heat sources. The only non-commercial micro-satellite was sent by the United States; the Air Force 
Research Laboratory (AFRL) CubeSat was deployed to demonstrate a 12U CubeSat utilisation in GEO. 
Figure 1: Small Satellites Launched by Mass Category in 
2021 Q4 Figure 2: Small Satellites Launched by Mass Category
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Nano-Satellites 
All nano-satellites were flown by Asian organisations (China, Japan and Vietnam). Except for two satellites, all were 
academic CubeSats.
Number of Owning Organisations and Satellites Launched by Country
States Commercial Academic Government Overall
Orgs Satellites Orgs Satellites Orgs Satellites Orgs Satellites
China 6 10 5 5 2 5 13 19
France - - - - 1 3 1 3
Japan 2 2 4 4 1 1 7 7
United Kingdom 1 72 - - - - 1 72
United States 2 159 - - 3 3 5 162
Vietnam - - - - 1 1 1 1
Overall 11 243 9 9 8 13
 Table 1: Number of Organisations and Small Satellites Launched 1
Figure 6: Small Satellite Launched by Organisation
264 satellites were launched by 27 distinct 
organisations, almost evenly distributed between 
Commercial, Academic, and Government organisations. 
The most populous category was Commercial, 
launching eleven. 
The eleven corporations together launched 243 
satellites. Eight government entities from China, France, 
Japan, the US, and Vietnam commissioned thirteen 
satellites.
Academic institutions, of which there were nine, each 
launched one satellite. 
The numbers are once again heavily skewed by 
the mega constellations as they account for 225 of the 
243 commercial satellites. 
1 The discrepancy in the overall numberof satellites is a result of missions being jointly run by commercial and academic 
organisations. 
07LAUNCH
Number of Small Satellite Launches and Number of Small Satellites 
Launched by Launch Vehicle
Vega
Soyuz
Long March
Kuaizhou
active Energy
Falcon
Epsilon
Electron
Atlas
4 2 0 50 100 50
Successful Launches Launched Satellites
0
Figure 3: Number of Small Satellite Launches and Number of Small Satellites Launched by Launch 
Vehicle 
There were a total of nineteen successful launches in Q4 which delivered 264 small satellites into orbit. 
 
The launch vehicle with the most launches and satellites was the Falcon which had five successful launches 
delivering a total of 157 satellites, 153 of which were Starlink. Two launches were purely occupied by Starlink 
satellites, with a third Starlink replenishment mission also placing two BlackSky satellites into orbit. The remaining 
two launches were commissioned by NASA, each for a single mission: the IXPE space observation of cosmic X-rays 
polarization and the DART asteroid deflection test. 
The second highest contributor to the number of satellites reaching orbit was Soyuz. Both Soyuz flights were used 
solely to grow the OneWeb mega constellation. OneWeb announced its intention to access space from India using 
the PSLV and GSLV Mark 3 rockets. This could have a significant impact on Arianespace which operated most 
of OneWeb launches this year. This reflects the changing nature of OneWeb, with an Indian conglomerate as its 
largest shareholder (30% equity). Nonetheless, there are indications that OneWeb might build its second generation 
satellites in the UK. 
The Long March followed the Falcon with the most lift-offs and contributed the most non-mega constellation 
satellites. Fifteen of the remaining thirty-eight satellites were delivered by Long March’s four flights. All these 
satellites were of Chinese origin. All Chinese Launch Vehicles were exclusively launching Chinese satellites with 
Galactic Energy and Kuaizhou each delivering two satellites to orbit. 
08
Together with seven Japanese satellites, the Vietnamese first small satellite reached orbit on the solid fuel Epsilon 
rideshare launch. The Electron rocket was used twice, each time carrying two BlackSky satellites. Apart from 
BlackSky’s first launch all launches were using either an Electron or Falcon rocket. Vega delivered three French 
defence signal interception satellites to orbit whilst Atlas delivered the Air Force Research Laboratory’s ASCENT 
CubeSat which will demonstrate CubeSat operations in GEO.
Polar orbits were the top choice in the final quarter of 2021, which is a contrast to the normally dominant sun-
synchronous orbit (SS0). All contributions to the polar orbit were from the seventy-two launched OneWeb satellites.
In the SSO region more variety in organisation is observed, although all launched satellites are either Chinese 
(seventeen) or Japanese (seven), with one Vietnamese CubeSat. 
In the LEO ‘Other’ category, which dominates the breakdown, there are 163 satellites, of which ten are not Starlink. 
Nonetheless, apart from NASA’s IXPE space observatory the remaining nine are part of the CERES (three satellites) 
and BlackSky (six satellites).
Finally, GEO saw the rare addition of two small satellites to its region. This brings the total amount of small satellites 
to reach GEO in 2021 to three. Out of the two, one small satellite was the Chinese SJ-21. Though promoted as a 
debris mitigation mission, it is understood to be an In-Orbit Servicing and Manufacturing (IOSM) test which could 
have dual-use (defence and technology). The second small satellite to reach GEO in Q4 was the Air Force Research 
Laboratory’s Ascent 12U CubeSat. This satellite aims at evaluating how Commercial Orbital Transportation Services 
elements and the CubeSat standard can be used in GEO. One may wonder whether in the future more small satellites 
will be destined to GEO. Astranis, a US start-up, plans to launch its first GEO communications small satellite in early 
2022, with an agreement announced in December 2021 to supply broadband to Peru in 2023. 
Finally, Q4 saw the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) inform of their intention to offer a ‘small’ satellite bus. However, 
the overall mass would still be above 500kg (600-700kg) – outside of the scope of this report which considers small 
satellites to be below 500kg.
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Year and Quarter
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In the early hours of Monday 15th November 2021, a Russian direct ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) weapons test 
occurred, reportedly testing the PL-19 Nudol surface-to-space missile from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk 
Oblast, Russia. To date, there have been at least ten suspected Nudol flight tests. Testing of the Nudol reportedly began 
in August 20141, initially experimenting with the launch vehicle alone; the first test system supposedly failed shortly after 
launch. The later test stages progressed to test-launching from a road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) which 
provides the strategic benefit of the missile system to be portable, launches incorporating the kill vehicle and finally the 
live demonstration on the 15th of November, 2021. DA-ASAT tests have also been conducted by influential space-faring 
nations such as China (2007), the United States (2008), and India (2019).
Russian 
DA-ASAT Testing, 
November 2021 
Figure 5: Gabbard plot of the COSMOS 1408 DA-ASAT 15/11/2021 
The DA-ASAT event resulted in the destruction of a Russian Tselina-D SIGINT satellite, Cosmos-1408 (NORAD ID: 13552, 
INT DES: 1982-092A). Tselina-D was a military signals intelligence satellite and one of the two-satellite Tselina electronic 
signals intelligence (ELINT) satellite systems. Cosmos-1408 launched in 1982 and weighed approx. 2180kg. 
The event occurred at an altitude of approximately 480km with the high impact destruction of the satellite resulting in a 
substantial spread of debris fragments. A gabbard plot is conventionally used to visualise the expected altitude distribution 
of fragments as a function of time following the point of impact – the initial gabbard plot produced by NORSS HIVE Orbital 
Analysts is shown in Figure 12. The distribution of fragments resulting from the weapons test poses a significant and 
ongoing risk to objects in an already congested orbit, with many high-value assets and human spaceflight activities. 
By Elizabeth Shearer, Connie 
McCreath, and Prof. Chris 
Newman
10
Both the International Space Station (ISS) and the Tiangong space station have been affected by the debris; reports 
indicate that crew on the ISS were instructed to prepare for impact shortly after the event. Other notable assets 
affected by the debris include Elon Musk’s Starlink constellation, which operates at approximately 550km, and 
the UK owned OneWeb constellation. OneWeb currently launches into an insertion orbit of approximately 440km 
altitude, prior to starting their orbit raising operations which take them to their final operational altitude. 
The capacity to destroy on-orbit capabilities using direct ascent missile technology poses a huge risk to many 
military operations worldwide which rely on intelligence, navigation and communication information provided by 
satellite technology to conduct operations in the field. As a result, there is an expectation that military forces may 
look to invest in small satellite technology, such as CubeSats and NanoSats, to expand and support military assets. 
A distributed network of space-based resources would be capable of providing functionality should a single satellite 
be destroyed, and as such there would be no apparent single point of failure to be exploited. Such an investment 
into small satellite equipment from military operators would likely lead to overall technological advancements in the 
community.Large space debris creating events present a long-lived and dangerous threat to space operations; gathering an 
early understanding of the potential impact from such an event, and the associated risks, allows for informed and 
timely decision making for operators in the area, including the small satellite community. NORSS analysts evaluated 
the situation and found from an initial assessment that over 1500 pieces of trackable space debris (i.e >10cm) were 
likely to have been created by the event, with a worst-case projected estimate of 1561 additional fragments in Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO) as shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 6: Initial modelling of the debris field generated by the Russian DA-ASAT 15/11/2021 
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Preliminary modelling conducted by the NORSS HIVE Orbital Analyst team has remained consistent with estimates 
produced by the US 18SpCS and aligns with observable data; it is important to note that the true extent of the debris 
created by the event is likely to significantly exceed 1500 fragments as many pieces of debris will be too small to 
observe and catalogue. As a number of the smallest fragments cannot be detected using standard ground-based Space 
Surveillance and Tracking (SST) networks, it is extremely difficult to mitigate against potential collisions, which for many 
small satellite operators may be lethal to operations. 
As of 10th January 2021, 18 SpCS have released element sets for 1000+ pieces of COSMOS-1408 debris to Space-
Track.org, the NORSS HIVE analyst team have produced a visualisation of the debris as of 17/01/2022 as shown in Figure 
14. 
The lasting effects of this debris generating event are likely to impact the small satellite community for years to come as 
hundreds of satellites are now at an increased risk of damage from very small debris fragments orbiting in LEO at speeds 
great enough to cause significant harm. 
There is little substantive legal protection for small satellites from damage caused by space debris. The International 
space treaties deal with general principles rather than granular detail. Whilst they emphasise that space should be used 
for peaceful purposes, there is no international prohibition on ASAT weapons testing, indeed, there is no specific mention 
of dealing with space debris in the Treaties. There are also no special protective mechanisms for smaller satellites. 
International space law does not differentiate between different sizes of satellite, classifying them all as space objects. 
Where a state launches a space object which, through their fault, causes damage to another state’s space object, the 
launching state will be internationally liable. But gaining any redress for damage caused is unlikely, with state-to-state 
litigation being both expensive and slow. 
Figure 7: Visualisation of the current catalogued space debris generated by COSMOS 1408 
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[1] Weeden, B. and Samson, V., 2021. Global Counterspace Capabilities. [online] Swfound.org. Available at: 
 <https://swfound.org/media/207162/swf_global_counterspace_capabilities_2021.pdf#page=81> 
[2] Unknown, 2021. Anti-ballistic missiles. [online] Available at: <https://bmpd.livejournal.com/1137442.html> 
[3] Unknown, 2021. Electronic Surveillance Spacecraft. [online] Available at:
 <https://www.yuzhnoye.com/en/company/history/electronic-surveillance-spacecraft.html>
Additionally, establishing fault in space operations is also not clear cut. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 imposes 
responsibility on individual countries for the authorization and continuing supervision of their national space activities. 
National regulators can impose conditions on operators to ensure the mitigation of future debris from smaller 
satellites, but this does nothing to remove the risks created by ASAT weapons testing. Given the current geopolitical 
climate, a ban on ASAT weapons testing, or broader treaties protecting the space environment seem unlikely to be 
realised any time soon. 
To reduce the risk of damage caused by space debris, small satellites with on-board propulsion capabilities may be 
required to manoeuvre to a temporarily safer, lower risk orbit if a possible collision with a debris object is identified. 
This can have an impact on the satellite’s mission, as collision avoidance manoeuvres can cause temporary 
constraints depending on the nature of the mission in question. 
In the event of an ASAT test, debris fragments yet to be catalogued will be observed and identified as an unknown 
object by space surveillance sensors, known as an uncorrelated track (UCT). Successfully identifying a manoeuvre 
event through the processing of sensor observation data becomes increasingly more difficult to achieve when multiple 
UCTs are captured by the sensors in the vicinity of the expected position of the satellite in question; this is due to 
ambiguity in the data caused by an increase in observation noise. The added challenge of differentiating between 
small satellite observations and observed debris of similar sizes must also be considered. Therefore, there is a 
possibility of temporarily losing small satellites with space surveillance sensors when manoeuvring following a DA-
ASAT test. However, the small satellite would likely be identified again soon after, unless in an orbit similar to that of 
the debris cloud where cross-tagging (misidentifying objects in close proximity) could occur.
 
Should a small satellite be lost, the satellite itself will then be observed and identified as a UCT itself, or cross tagged 
as described above as a debris object, leading to difficulties in re-identifying and cataloguing the satellite in question. 
In this instance, there are a few routine procedures that can be done by operators to avoid their small satellite from 
being misidentified and lost forever. 
To aid in the lost satellite’s recovery process, small satellites can be manufactured to include tracking software 
on-board, such as GPS. If the lost satellite is not fitted with on-board self-tracking technology, other means of 
transmitting signals, such as telemetry, may be utilised to communicate the active status of the object with ground 
stations, so as not to be catalogued as defunct inactive debris. Additionally, satellite operators can share ephemeris 
files with 18th SpCS to help correlate UCT orbit determination (OD) data to the small satellite’s orbit. Finally, 
information can be shared with radar operators regarding a lost satellite’s shape and size. This will help sensors 
cross-reference observed UCT RCS data against the small satellite’s geometric information provided. 
Unfortunately, DA-ASAT tests burden our global SST sensor network and greatly increase workloads at 18th SpCS 
to catalogue, track, and re-map the new space environment. Therefore, recovering lost satellites will not necessarily 
be of high priority in the SST community during said events. However, with time, fragment clouds will disperse, and 
localised debris congestion will dissipate providing opportunities for original orbits to be resumed and lost satellites to 
be found, in a safer, less threatening space environment. 
References
13
About the Authors of the Feature Section 
Northern Space and Security Limited (NORSS) is the only UK based commercial company dedicated to Space 
Situational Awareness (SSA), Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST), Space Domain Awareness (SDA) and Orbital 
Analytics. Its mission is to empower success through opportunities in outer space supporting industry and academic 
use of space and helping governments to regulate space through unprecedented access to data of space; NORSS 
strive for the democratisation of data of space. The company’s expertise results from several key personnel bringing 
> 100 years of combined experience in SST/SSA, across military and civilian sectors. NORSS operate their Orbital 
Analyst Hive, an SSA/SDA centre of excellence, to ensure the long-term development of operational experience to 
meet sustainable orbitalchallenges. NORSS is dedicated to ensuring the long-term sustainability of the benefits from 
space through the development of unmatched experience in SSA operations.
Connie McCreath is an Orbital Analyst at NORSS. Master of Aero-Mechanical Engineering with Distinction, Connie 
began her early career in the space industry in 2020 contributing to, and leading on, a variety of technical projects 
focussing on the design and optimisation of both ground- and space-based SST systems. Through her broad range 
of optical analytic and engineering experience, Connie specialises in SST, SSA and SDA. 
Elizabeth Shearer is an Orbital Analyst and Project Manager at NORSS Elizabeth graduated with a First-Class 
Masters of Physics with honors in Astrophysics in 2019. Since joining NORSS, Elizabeth has been involved in 
a breadth of projects spanning from ground-based SST to on-orbit services. She has operated in both project 
management and technical roles and specialises in SSA, SDA and SST.
Prof. Chris Newman is active in the teaching and research of space law at Northumbria University. He has 
published extensively on the legal, ethical, and environmental aspects of space governance and has also published 
numerous articles exploring the interface between international and national space law. Christopher is a Visiting 
Professor in Space Law at the Open University and an academic and policy consultant to Northern Space and 
Security.
Call for External Contributions 
We are inviting others to propose contributions to the second part of the report – the feature section. The section 
focuses on the past quarter crucial events or broader topic of particular interest during that timeframe. If you 
interested in providing a topic or opinion in the field of small satellites, please send an email to MarketIntelligence@
sa.catapult.org.uk. 
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Disclaimer: whilst every effort has been made 
to provide accurate and up to date information, 
we recognise that this might not always be the 
case. If any reader would like to contribute edits 
or suggestions to our reports, kindly email the 
team and we will make the amendments. 
Q
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Contact
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