Evolução dos níveis de trabalho infantil nos estados brasileiros limites e contradições das políticas

Original articles Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , Unicamp . IE. http://dx.doi.org /10.1590/1982-35 33.2020v29n1art10 Ec onomia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n . 1 (68), p. 273 - 29 5, janeiro-abri l 2020. Evolution of child l abor rate in Brazi lian states : policy lim its and contradict ions \uf02a Temidayo James Aransiola ** \uf02a Marcelo Justus *** \uf02a Abstract This study descriptively ex plores the evolution of child labor rates in Brazilian states from 2000 to 2014 a nd indicates specific limits and co n tradictions o f g overnmental m easures adopted for its re d uction. On one hand, we examine the coverage o f th e Bolsa Família conditional cash transfer (P BF), w h ich is a transversa l program to reduce p overty. On the other hand, we examine the design of L abor Inspections with a focus on child labor. For this, we used data from the National Household Sam p le Survey, the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of L abo r and Employment. Our analysis showed that the expressive reduction of the child labor rate in Brazil was driven, in particular, by the rural areas of the North an d Northeast regions. However, th e agricultural sector is still the major employer of child labor. We also found that the distribution of governmental cou ntermeasures are co ntradictory as to the rate of child labor in the states. In spection activities are sho rthanded in fighting child labor in domestic work and family agricultu re as a result of the constitutional apparatus of th e inviolability of h omes. The P BF conditional cash transfer is also limited in tackling child labor given that poverty level determines eligibility . Keywords : Bolsa Família; Labor Inspection; Limit; Contradiction. Resumo Evolução dos níveis de trabalho inf antil nos estados brasileiros: limites e contradições das políticas Este estudo explora de forma descritiva a evolução dos níveis de trabalho infantil nos estados brasileiros, do ano de 2000 até 2014, e indica limites e contrad ições específicos das medidas governamentais adotada s p ara tentar reduzí- los. Por um lado, exam inamos a abrangência do Programa Bolsa Família (P BF), que é um pro gram a transversa l para reduzir a pobreza. P or outro, exam in amos o padrão de Inspeção do Trabalho, com foco no trabalho in fantil. P ara isto, u tilizam os dados da Pesquisa Nacional po r Amostra de Domicílios, d o Ministério d o Desenvolvimento Social e do Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego. Nossa análise mostrou que uma redução expressiva dos n íveis de trab alho infantil no Brasil f oi conduzida, especialmente, pelas áreas rurais n as regiões Norte de Nordeste. Porém, o setor agrícola ainda é o que tem maiores níveis de trabalh o in fantil. Também observamos qu e ambas contramedidas governamentais possuem distribuição contraditória em relação aos níveis de trabalho infantil nos estados. As atividades de inspeção não são suficientes para combater o trabalho infantil em atividades domesticas e de agricultura familiar, sendo este um resultado do preceito constitucional de inviolabilidade do domicílio. A transfe rência monetária condicional denominada P rograma Bo lsa Família (PBF ) também é limitada no combate ao trab alho infantil, devido aos níveis de pobreza ex igidos para que as pessoas possam ter acesso a ele. Palavras-chave : Bolsa Família; Inspeções do Trabalho; Limite; Contradição. JEL J08, J46, J48. * Article received on June 29, 2017 and approved on October 11, 2019. We would like t o thank Fapesp (The São Paulo Research F oundation) for financial support to develop the master \u2019 s thesis t hat con tains this rese arch (Pro cess num b er 2015/2141 0 - 8 ). ** Ph.D studen t at the Institute of Economics, University o f Cam p inas, Campinas, SP, Brazil. E-mail: 162937@unicamp .br . *** Profeso r at the Institute of Economics, Un iversity o f Campinas, Campinas, SP, Br azil. E-mail: mjust us@unicamp.br . Temidayo James Aransiola, Mar celo Justus 274 Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n. 1 (68), p. 273 - 29 5, janeir o-abri l 2020. 1 Introduction Brazil has recently been internationally cited as one of the successful countries in the combat of child l abor. This is due to the expressive r eduction observed since t he beginning of the 21st century. Howev er, Conaeti ( 2011), and Ro sado and Luciana ( 2014) pointed to a fa ll in the rate of decline of child labor in specific activities such as family agriculture and urban informal serv i ces. Accordi ng to the se studies, su ch a trend i s due to the l i mits of governmental policies to reach these activit ies. There is widespread literature on Brazil regard i ng the determ inant s of child labo r. The most cited are family incom e, family structure, paren t \u2019 s education, l evel of urb anization and social culture and ideology (Basu, 1999; Kassouf, 2001; Emerson; Souza, 2003; Lopez- Calva, 2003; Guarce llo et al., 2007 ; Kassouf; Justus, 2010, to mention a few). Some studi es have al so found evidence concern ing the consequences of early work on health and future earnings of individuals and, consequently, on the economy as a whole (Baland ; Robinson, 2000; Feitosa et al., 2001; Em erson; Souza, 2011 ; Justus e t al., 2015; Aransiola and J ustus, 2018). Some focus on the long-run cycle of child labor among generations of the same family ( Emerson; Souza, 2003; Aquino et al., 2 010). Although no c lear consensu s has been reached, recent studies have also investigated t he impact of governm ent al countermeasu r es on child labor in Braz il (Cardoso; Souza, 2004 ; Ferro et al., 2010; Cacci amali et al., 2010; Ar aujo et al., 2010 ; Nascimento; Kassouf, 2016). T he observed lack of consensus is t he primary motivation for this study. Conditional cash transfers are the major counterm easures adopted in Brazil against child labor. A mong these are the P rogram for Er adication of Child L abor (PETI) 1 and the Bolsa Família Program (PBF), both managed by the Minist r y of Social Development (MDS). The difference between both program s i s that the f ormer only attend s to fam ilies above the pov erty line and i s, thus, exclusiv ely focused on families with child laborers. However, the latter attends to all poor and extremely poor families, making it a cross-cutting and wider prog ram. As for inspection, the only governmental measure adopted to reduce child la bor is the \u201c Labor Inspection with a focus on child labor \u201d (henceforth , Labor Inspection) conducted by the Ministry of Labor and Employm ent (MTE). In this study , we opt to focu s on the PBF and Labor Inspection since both are nation -w ide g overnm ental measures but differ in t he sens e that the former is cross- cutting and v ol untary, while the latter is focal and involuntary. In short , the major contribution of this study is to provide a relevant descriptiv e analysis of t he evolution of t he prevelance of child labor in Brazilian states and to shed li ght on som e limits and cont radictions faced by t he PBF and La bor Inspec tion activities. In addition to t his brief introduction, section 2 describes and contextualizes the governm ental counterm easures which we emphasize. In section 3 we present data sources, analyses and dis cussions. Conclu sions are prov ided in section 4. ( 1 ) Hencefo rth, we will use common Brazilian acrony ms and abbrev iations. Evolution of child labor r ate in Brazilian states : policy limits and contradictio ns Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n . 1 (68), p. 273 - 29 5, janeir o-abril 2020. 275 2 Countermeasure s against child labor 2.1 Labor Inspecti on Labor I nspections f ocusing on child labor were implem ented in Brazil as a result of expressively high rates of child l abor in the 1980s. Thenceforth, inspections hav e been m anaged by the Secretariat of Labor Inspection (SIT), which is part of the Braz ilian Ministry of Labor and Employm ent (MTE). In practice, inspections are preceded by an annual plan elaborated by the Regi onal Superintendenci es of Labor and Employ ment (SRTEs) based on SIT guidelines. In this plan , inspections are g eographically allocated based on the reported incidences of child la bor, prioritizing the worst forms. Subsequently, inspectors engage in prev entive act ions that involve awareness-creatio n by publicizing the negative impacts of child labor throug h lectures, seminars, d ebates, a nd cam paigns to children, employers, and famil ies. I n the followi ng months, inspectors are designated to visit specific businesses or workplaces in urban and rural areas throughout th e c ountry ( ILO/SIT, 2010). During these visits, inspectors identify irregularities concerning child labor and report the characteristics of work exercised by chil dren and adolescents. When judged necessary, children and adolescents are withdrawn f rom work and infraction reports are issued to exploiters, which m ay lead to fining. To avoid the re t urn to work, ch ildren and adolescents are included in social welfare program s. C hildren (below the age of 14) are enrolled in cash transfer programs condi tioned to school attendance and participation in social, educational and healthcare p rojects. Adol escents (below the ag e of 15) are enrolled in apprenticeship prog rams which offer educative and technical training. It is important to note that aside from being a countermeasure focused on chi ld labor, inspections can rea ch the entire population, provided that child labor is detected, since the withdrawal of children and adolesce nts from wor k i s involuntary and do es not requir e eligibility com pared to conditional cash transfers. 2.2 Conditional Cash T ransfer (CCT) The Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima 2 were the first CCT programs adopted in Brazil in the m id -1990s. These program s granted financial subsidies to poor parents under the condition of enrolling t heir children in school. In 1996, the Program for Elimination of Child Labor (PE T I) was created to addre ss t he h i gh proportion and pre c arious situa tion of children in the labor market. According to Soares and Sátyro (2010), the PE TI also had the objective of withdrawing children and adolescen ts between the ages of 7 and 15 f rom hazardous work and enrolling them in school. The PETI program also required children to participate in extracurricula r sport, cultural, artis tic and leisure activities in order to prev ent time allocation to work. ( 2 ) Schooling Grant an d Minimum I ncome, respectively . Temidayo James Aransiola, Mar celo Justus 276 Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n. 1 (68), p. 273 - 29 5, janeir o-abri l 2020. In 2003, all c ash and in -kind tr ansfer programs designed to reduce poverty were combined to form a single nationwide CC T program \u2013 the Bolsa Família Program (PBF), which is manag ed by the Mi nistry of Social Development (MDS). Participation of f amilies in the PBF is conditioned on t he level of family per capita income, whereas to continue i n the program, beneficiary families have to meet additional conditions concerning health care and enrollment and attendance o f children in school. Therefore, one can interpret that the p r ogram seeks to increase the human capital of poor families throug h education and health, which in turn can yield better incom e di stribution in the long run and also interrup t the pover ty cycle. In 2005, the PET I program was incorporated into th e P BF to enhance m anagem ent and encourage synergy between both program s. Despite critics regarding the amalgam ation of these welfare program s, experts affirmed in the repor t published by Repórter Brasil (2013) that such an action was imm inent to optimize publi c resources, increase coverage and enha nce the accessibility of grants by eligible families. In practice , child labor is addre ss ed by one of the conditionalities for participation in the PBF which obligates beneficiary families to withdraw children from work and enroll them in school. Presently, the PBF at tends families with per capita income belo w the poverty line 3 , prioritizing families with pregnant women or children or adolescents under the age of 17. Regarding financial values, a fixed amount of R$77 (Brazilian currency) is transferred to extremely poor families irrespective of family structure. In addition, a variable amount between R$35 and R$175 is transferred to poor and extremely poor families depending on the family structure. As observed through the values, t he PBF particularly aims to raise vulnerable families above the poverty line. Note that unlike the Labor Inspection policy, participation in the PBF is voluntary and limited to the poor population. T o cover suc h a gap, the PETI program was reconfigured to reach child laborers fr om families above the poverty line. However, the value tr ansferred is expressively lower than that of the PBF program \u2013 R$ 25 per child to fam ilies who reside in rural or urban areas with less than 250 thousand inhabitants and R$ 40 per child to families who reside in urban areas with more t han 250 t housand inha bitants. Contrastingly, according to data from the 2014 Nation al Household Sample Survey (PNAD), t he average income of child l aborers in urban and r ural areas was about R$ 363 and R$ 262, respectively. 3 Data and analy sis 3.1 Sources of dat a Following I LO conventions, the Brazilian Federal Constitution defines child labor as the engag ement of childr en and adolesc ents between the ages of 5 and 15 in any labor activ ity, ( 3 ) In 2014, the poverty and extreme poverty line were set at R$154 ($1.90 per da y) and R$77 ($0.95 per d ay) monthly per capita income , respectivel y. Evolution of child labor r ate in Brazilian states : policy limits and contradictio ns Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n . 1 (68), p. 273 - 29 5, janeir o-abril 2020. 277 except in the condition of apprenticeship as from t he ag e of 14 4 . This is t he definition that we use throughout th is study. Data concerning the child labor rate from 2004 to 2014 was obtained by aggregating microdata of the Nationa l Household Sample Survey (PNAD) by state. All esti mates were computed using the weights or sam ple expansion f actors provided by the IBGE in t he data files. Data on the Bolsa Família Program and Labor I nspection was obtained from the Mi nistry of Social Dev elopment and Ministry of Labor and Employment, respect ively. As for t he PBF, we make a comparison of data from 2 004 to t hat from 2014, by state. However, for t he l abor inspection, we compare data from 2007 and 2014 si nce such a focal inspection was inexistent in 2004. 3.2 Analysis and di scussion 3.2.1 Evolution Brazil has been widely cite d as a model i n the quest to combat child l abor due to the expressive reduction observ ed duri ng the last decade (se e Figur e 1). Child labor increased by about 0.4 p.p. in 2 005 but p lumm et ed until 201 3. Ex perts de fend t hat such a reduction is m ai nly due t o the rise of a big ger welf are state marked by the launch of t he PBF prog ram together with other social programs. Roug hl y speaking, from 2004 to 2013, the Brazilian g o vernment successfully cut t he rate of child labor in half. Notwithstanding the favorable scenario witnessed during the last decade, the passage from 2013 to 2014 w as marked by an abrupt increase o f about 0.9 p. p. in the rate of child labor . Although st udies are yet to point to the potential causes of this increase, some bel ieve it was simply a temporal fluctuation whil e others believe it to be an aftermath of econom i c cri sis. The latter opinion seems more convincing since, according to Pochmann (2009), unemploy ment has been on the rise and inflation has caused most families to lose purchasing power, which m i ght have led to the use of child labor to bol ster fam ily incom e. Brazilian child l abor expert s point to a new challeng e, which is that of the dim i nishing reduction of the child l abor r ate. T his novel scenario can be observed in Fig ure 2, which decomposes the rate of child labor i n rural and urban areas. The first observation from this figure is the preeminen ce of the rate of child labor in rural areas compared to urban areas. Specifically, the rate of child labor in rural areas w as about four tim es the rate in urban areas in 2004 and about thr ee and half times in 2014. Such preeminence may be partly explained by the level of poverty , the dom inance of agricultural activities and d i fficulty of inspe ction in t he rural areas. ( 4 ) Apprentices were excluded by not considering adolescents aged 14 or 15 who work with a le gal permit. This was possible because t he PNA D survey pro vides a question w hich identifies l abor activ ities with a work permit. Temidayo James Aransiola, Mar celo Justus 278 Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n. 1 (68), p. 273 - 29 5, janeir o-abri l 2020. Figure 1 Percentage of child labor, 2004 \u2013 2009 and 2011 \u2013 2014, Brazil Source: Prepared using PNAD data. Note: The confidence intervals for these rates are in the Appendix. Figure 2 Percentage of child labor classified by rural and urban areas, 2 004 \u2013 2009 and 2011 \u2013 2014, Brazil Source: Prepared using PNAD data. Note: The confidence intervals for these rates are in the Appendix . Aside from the comparative proportions of both areas, a m ore curious observation is the evolution o f these propo r tions. Ignoring the rec ent shock, one observes that the rate of child labor i n the rural area fell more sharply compared to that of urban areas. This perception induces Evolution of child labor r ate in Brazilian states : policy limits and contradictio ns Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n . 1 (68), p. 273 - 29 5, janeir o-abril 2020. 279 to conclude that t he expressive reduction of the child labor rate in Brazil is mainly driven by the reduct i on obse r ved in th e rural area s. T his is upheld by t he acute increase obser ved in 2014 for rural areas a nd Brazil as a whole , but not for urb an areas. Figure 3 and 4 illustrate t he spatial d istribution of child labor in Brazil in 2004 and 2014, respectively . As presented earlier, the percentage of child labor fell si gnifica nt ly in Brazil as a whole during the refe rred period. However, t he concentratio n of higher rates i s obvious in the North and No rtheast compar ed to other r egions. This is partly j ustifiable by the socioeconom i c characteristics of these regions in terms of pov erty, urbanization rate a nd preeminence of family agriculture. Comparing the map of the year 2004 to that of 2014, one perceives the homog e nization of child labor rates in 2014. However, t he in -depth comparison indicates that such homog eni zation is due to a higher reduction of child labor in the Northern and Northeast, and l ower reduction i n the Southe rn and Southeas t regions. Figure 3 Percentage of child labor, by state, Brazil, 2004 Source: Prepared using PNAD data. Note: The confidence intervals for these rates are in the Appendix. Temidayo James Aransiola, Mar celo Justus 280 Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n. 1 (68), p. 273 - 29 5, janeir o-abri l 2020. The states with the highest rates of chi l d labor in 2004, in reducing ranking order, were: Piauí, Rondônia, Maranhão, and Acre. In the sam e year, the lowest rates were observed in the Federal District, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Amapá (in increasing ranking order). Analogously for the year 2014, the states of Piauí, Acre , Ma ranhão, and Sergipe had the highest rates, while the states of R io de Janeiro, São Pau lo, Amapá, and the Federal District had t he lowest rates. Im pressively, the states of Pernambuco, Alagoas, Rondônia, Santa Catarina, and Ceará were able to si gnifica nt ly reduce the r ate of child labor from 2004 to 2 014. Figure 4 Percentage of child labor by state, Brazil, 2014 Source: Prepared using PNAD dat a. Note: The confidence intervals for these rates are in the Appendix. There is consensus in the l iterature tha t the agricultural se ctor is the primary employ er of ch i ld l aborers. According to PNAD dat a, i n 2004, about 54% of ch i ld laborers were working in t he agricultural s ector, while in 2014 this proportion was 46 % . G i ven that t he m ajority of the Evolution of child labor r ate in Brazilian states : policy limits and contradictio ns Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n . 1 (68), p. 273 - 29 5, janeir o-abril 2020. 281 children and adolescents in this sector are concentrated in family agriculture, about 88% of them were not pa id and produced for own consumption in both y ears. The trade and repair s ector, which is second to agriculture, was responsib l e for the employm ent of 18% of child laborers in 2004 and 20% in 2014. Similarly, the service sector employed 18% and 21 % of child laborers in 2004 and 2014, respectively . Although no less important, the in dustrial and cons t ruction sec t ors employ ed t he least in bo th years. Figure 5 Sectoral distribution of child labor, 2004, Brazil Source: Prepared using PNAD data. 3.2.2 Labor Inspe ction Figure 6 and 7 5 present the geographical distribution of the number of Labor Inspections conducted wit h a focus on child labor and t he number of children that were effectively withdrawn from work in 2007 and 2014. There are t wo subfigures in each figure \u2013 one for Labor Inspection co verage and the other for its effectiv eness in reducing ch ild labor. In line with ILO/SI T (2010), we recognize t hat the effectiveness of the Labor I nspection should not be exclusively measured by t he number of children wit hdrawn from work, but also by the awareness-raising activities which precede inspection. However, the effect of such activities is counterfactual a lbeit acknowledged. Inasmuch as the Labor Inspection activities were conducted in al l states, regional concentration is observed. In the map (a) from Figure 6 we not e that the allocation of inspection activities does not correspond to the rate of child labor in states (correlation of \u22120. 07 and \u2212 0.08 in 2007 and 2014, respectively). In 2007, the st ates of Piauí and Ma ranhão had the hig hes t rates ( 5 ) In order to avoid polluing the fig ures, the maps are not la beled. F or identification of t he states ref er to Figure 3 or 4. Temidayo James Aransiola, Mar celo Justus 282 Economia e Sociedad e, Campinas , v. 29, n. 1 (68), p. 273 - 29 5, janeir o-abri l 2020. of child labor but were ranked i n the 20th and 18th positions concerning the number of conducted inspect ions. Moreover, the states of Ceará, Mato Grosso do Sul and Mi nas Gerais are first, second and third, respectively, as to the number of conducted inspections, but are 5t h 17th and 18th, respectiv el y, as to the highest r ates of child labor. I n fact, we observe that the highest rates of child labor are concentrated in t he Northeast region and the lowest are observed in the Midwest and Southeast r egions. However, the Northeast region is less prioritized than the Midwest and Southeast regions concerning inspection allocation. In this case, the distribution of Labor Inspections among st ates is paradoxical since the major objectiv e of the inspection activ ities is to re duce child labor. To understand this paradoxica l distributi on one h as to consider the design and features of the inspections and h ow they relate to o ther constitutional apparatus. Firstly , it is import ant to recall that the L abor I nspection depends on reported complaints in th e reg ion. How ever, this does not justify the paradoxical distribution since the complaints are only part of what guides the planning process. Still, regarding design, it is worth noti ng that inspectors visit businesses and workplaces, but overlo ok chi ld labor outside organiz ed establishm ents. Take for example children who work as street vendors , in family agriculture, in inform al urban activities or as domestic workers or housekeepers. These types of child labor are hardly reached due to their invisibility and difficulty to pinpoint. Another dilemm a is fac ed concerning t he desi gn of the Labor Inspec t ion \u2013 the focus on child labor in regions where the incidence i s higher but invisible or on child labor in r egions where the incidence is relativ el y low but visible. These alternativ es are not mutually exc lusive but they may concentrate Labor Inspection i n more urbani zed regions (as observed in Figure 6) since child l abor in som e act ivities is not visible to inspections. The incompatibility of i nspection activities and the Brazilian constitutional apparatus of inv i olability of homes without j udicial authorization (Art. 5 § XI of the 1988 Federal Constitution) inhibits effectiv e access of i nspecto rs to households. This impedes the wit hdrawa l of children an d adolescents from family ag riculture or domestic ac tivities. Specifically, 38% and 42% of child laborers were engaged in family agriculture i n 2004 and 2014, r espectively , and about 6% were domestic work ers. Therefore, about 42% and 46% of child laborers were invisible to insp ections in the years 2 004 and 2014. In terms of the effectiv eness of Labor Inspection on child labor, it is notable in Figure 6b that a greater number of children were withdrawn from work in the Northeast region compared to t he Midwest and Southeast regions. For instance, t he state of Maranhão, which had t he highest rate of child labor in 2007 and was ranked in the 18 th po sition on the inspection \u2019 s priority l ist, had the second-highest number of children withdrawn from work. Conversely, the states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Minas Gerais, which had lower child l abor rates but were highly prioritized for inspection were not at the t op of the list of states that withdrew children from w ork as a result of inspect i ons.

Evolução dos níveis de trabalho infantil nos estados brasileiros limites e contradições das políticas

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