Francis J Coleman - A Critical Examination of Wittgensteins Aesthetics

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<p>North American Philosophical Publications and University of Illinois Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,</p><p>preserve and extend access to American Philosophical Quarterly.</p><p>http://www.jstor.org</p><p>North American Philosophical Publications</p><p>A Critical Examination of Wittgenstein's Aesthetics</p><p>Author(s): Francis J. Coleman</p><p>Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Oct., 1968), pp. 257-266</p><p>Published by: on behalf of the University of Illinois Press North American Philosophical</p><p>Publications</p><p>Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009280</p><p>Accessed: 26-11-2015 07:15 UTC</p><p>Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/</p><p>info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content</p><p>in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.</p><p>For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.</p><p>This content downloaded from 139.184.14.159 on Thu, 26 Nov 2015 07:15:14 UTC</p><p>All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=illinois</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=napp</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=napp</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009280</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>American Philosophical Quarterly</p><p>Volume 5, Number 4, October 1968</p><p>IV. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF</p><p>WITTGENSTEIN'S AESTHETICS</p><p>FRANCIS J. COLEMAN</p><p>NO</p><p>one acquainted with Ludwig Wittgenstein's</p><p>later philosophy should be greatly surprised</p><p>either by (i) the ways in which he describes the</p><p>subject called "aesthetics" or (2) by the ways in</p><p>which he treats its central issues.1 (1) He describes</p><p>aesthetics as one "subject matter of philosophy"2</p><p>which is (1.1) "very big and entirely misunder?</p><p>stood,"3 (1.2) concerned with a particular but</p><p>loosely connected group of words, activities, and</p><p>interests, and (1.3) intended to cure us of a "new</p><p>group of confusions" in which "language plays us</p><p>entirely new tricks."4 That aesthetics does fit the</p><p>description indicated by (1.1) is shown by two</p><p>obvious points: (1.12) The issues with which Witt?</p><p>genstein is concerned in the section on aesthetics in</p><p>Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and</p><p>Religious Belief often touch upon other branches of</p><p>philosophy and also upon what might be called</p><p>"applied aesthetics" or "practical criticism." (1.13)</p><p>Wittgenstein's solution to the traditional problems</p><p>of aesthetics are often at variance with those given</p><p>by other writers on the subject. In this paper I</p><p>should like to accomplish three chief ends : first, to</p><p>make as clear as possible the issues with which</p><p>Wittgenstein is dealing in the section on aesthetics</p><p>of the book already mentioned ; second, to explain</p><p>and criticize his ways of solving or approaching</p><p>these issues; and third, to complement his argu?</p><p>ments with various considerations of my own which</p><p>I hope are both interesting and Wittgensteinian in</p><p>character. It is obvious, therefore, that the reader</p><p>can evaluate this paper in the light of three</p><p>corresponding criteria : first, as a critical exegesis of</p><p>the text ; second, as an aid to removing</p><p>a number of</p><p>important difficulties in traditional aesthetics; and</p><p>third, as an example of how one might fruitfully</p><p>continue in the spirit of Wittgenstein's later</p><p>philosophy. Moreover, the reasons for trying to</p><p>accomplish these three ends are also, I believe,</p><p>obvious. First, the "Lectures ..." were</p><p>compiled</p><p>from students' notes; they were not written by</p><p>Wittgenstein himself. Many passages are Delphi</p><p>cally obscure, others are at first glance eccentric,</p><p>and still others seem to be irrelevant to what has</p><p>been historically considered aesthetics. The im?</p><p>portance of trying to accomplish the second end</p><p>depends upon the importance that one attaches to</p><p>aesthetics itself; I shall, however, forego trying to</p><p>give an apologia for the subject. It might be that</p><p>the best apologia is that Wittgenstein was greatly</p><p>interested in the subject. And the reason for attempt?</p><p>ing the third goal rests upon what it means to be a</p><p>successful way of "doing philosophy" : if it is a way,</p><p>then other persons ought to be able to follow it;</p><p>and if it is a good way, then they should arrive?at</p><p>least from time to time?at interesting results. In</p><p>this paper I shall not attempt to show that (1.13) is</p><p>true because to do so would involve lengthy histor?</p><p>ical commentary; however, anyone acquainted</p><p>with the history of aesthetics will see in the course</p><p>of this paper that (1.13) is true.</p><p>In regard to (1.2) I shall show that it involves a</p><p>persuasive definition of "aesthetics"; but to show</p><p>this is no great feat, for Wittgenstein, with his</p><p>habitual and exquisite candor, says: "How much</p><p>we are doing is changing the style of thinking . . .</p><p>and how much I'm doing is persuading people to</p><p>change their style of thinking."5 Consequently, I</p><p>shall attempt to show the helpfulness of (1.2) and</p><p>why we ought to be persuaded by it. In regard to</p><p>(1.3) I shall show what the "entirely new tricks"</p><p>are, how they arise, and how we can out-trick them.</p><p>I shall begin with (2). The ways in which Witt?</p><p>genstein approaches the issues of aesthetics seem</p><p>1 At the risk of pedantry but, I hope, with the gain of economy and precision, I have used the following indexical system</p><p>throughout this paper: first, chief points indicated by 'i', '2', '3', etc.; second, if a given point, for example 2, is broken</p><p>up for a more elaborate discussion, it is indicated by "2.1," "2.2," "2.3," etc.; third, if a part of a main point is to be broken</p><p>up, for example 2.3, in order to show either grounds for or criticisms of 2.3, it is indicated by "2.31"; fourth, should it be</p><p>necessary to qualify or to divide 2.31 further, or to give criticisms, it is indicated by "2.311," "2.312," "2.313," etc.</p><p>2 L. Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief, ed. by Cyril Barrett (Oxford, 1966),</p><p>p. 1.</p><p>8 Ibid. * Ibid. 5</p><p>Ibid., p. 23.</p><p>257</p><p>This content downloaded from 139.184.14.159 on Thu, 26 Nov 2015 07:15:14 UTC</p><p>All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>258 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY</p><p>to involve the following quasi-heuristic rules: (2.1)</p><p>If one is discussing</p><p>a word or</p><p>expression, one</p><p>ought</p><p>to ask how one is taught it. (2.2) If one is trying to</p><p>clarify the meaning of an expression, it is pointless</p><p>to concentrate on the form of the words ; one must</p><p>begin with certain occasions on which or activities</p><p>in which one uses the expression. (2.3) If one is try?</p><p>ing</p><p>to become clear about why</p><p>one wants to say of</p><p>a given set of things that they are so and so, even if</p><p>there be something common to them all, it does not</p><p>follow that this is all one means by calling a</p><p>particular thing</p><p>so and so. One can use the same</p><p>word for a great range of objects, though one's</p><p>reasons for so using it are</p><p>loosely?and perhaps</p><p>complexly?related.</p><p>It would carry me far afield to give Wittgen?</p><p>stein's justifications for (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3). In</p><p>this paper I am interested only in showing how he</p><p>brings these "rules" to bear on aesthetics.</p><p>(2.11) One learns "beautiful," "good," "fine"?</p><p>and their opposites?just as one learns interjections.</p><p>They are taught with a certain tone of voice, or</p><p>with a certain gesture, which the child takes as</p><p>indications of approval or disapproval. The word</p><p>is later used as a substitute for a gesture of approval,</p><p>and becomes a</p><p>piece in various "games." Some of</p><p>these "games" involve</p><p>listening to a piece of music</p><p>or reading a fable or looking at a painting. Since</p><p>such words are taught like "Helas !," and since they</p><p>continue to be used as</p><p>expressions of approval?</p><p>even though "the occasions on which they are</p><p>used?on the enormously complicated situation in</p><p>which the expression has a place</p><p>. .</p><p>.," ". . . almost</p><p>a</p><p>negligible place</p><p>. .</p><p>.,"6 vary and become more</p><p>complicated, it must be that "beautiful" is not the</p><p>name of anything, and therefore not the name of a</p><p>property which certain objects possess.</p><p>(2.11 ) can be shown in another way. (2.12) We</p><p>speak of properties of objects in two senses:</p><p>(2.121) those items, like yellow, that we directly</p><p>apprehend by one of the senses, and (2.122) those</p><p>that we infer to be present on the basis of some</p><p>empirically established rule like the size of objects</p><p>seen from a distance. But aesthetic value could not</p><p>be (2.121 ) because we would not infer that a man's</p><p>hearing, for example, was defective if we could not</p><p>teach him to appreciate the beauty of a certain</p><p>musical composition. But if we tried to teach him</p><p>to appreciate the difference between a seventh and</p><p>a diminished seventh and failed, we would draw</p><p>the inference that his hearing is defective. And</p><p>aesthetic value could not be (2.122) because such</p><p>properties continue to appear so and so even if we</p><p>know or believe that they are not really so and so. A</p><p>street still seems to come to a point in the distance,</p><p>though we know that it does not. But for one and</p><p>the same man to say that a</p><p>given object, and for the</p><p>same period of time, seems to him beautiful,</p><p>though he does not really believe that it is so, is</p><p>contradictory, unless one</p><p>interprets the statement</p><p>as (2.1221 ) "I believe that x is beautiful, though it</p><p>doesn't seem so to other persons,"</p><p>or</p><p>(2.1222) "I</p><p>believe it is beautiful, but it is so badly played (a</p><p>sonata) or so badly lighted (a painting) that it does</p><p>not seem so to me now," or (2.1223) "I believe it is</p><p>beautiful?I've liked it in the past, but it just</p><p>doesn't seem so now because . .</p><p>.," and I might</p><p>mention "I'm tired of hearing it," or "I'm just not</p><p>in the mood."</p><p>It might be assumed from (2.11) that Wittgen?</p><p>stein holds "beautiful," "good," "lovely," and</p><p>other "aesthetic adjectives" to be the paradigms of</p><p>aesthetic discourse and judgment. However, (2.21)</p><p>he holds that such words are of minor importance in</p><p>understanding what aesthetics is about; and (2.22)</p><p>it is important to see why he is right in this regard.</p><p>About (2.21) he says (2.211): "It is remarkable</p><p>that in real life, when aesthetic judgments are</p><p>made, aesthetic adjectives such as 'beautiful,'</p><p>'fine,' etc., play hardly any role at all."7 Words like</p><p>"lovely" are seldom used?except by people "who</p><p>can't express themselves properly"8?as inter?</p><p>jections. "I might choose between calling a melody</p><p>'lovely' and calling it 'youthful.'"9 Most words</p><p>used in aesthetic discourse express neither approval</p><p>nor disapproval, but serve to give the object "a</p><p>face"?like "stately," "pompous," "youthful,"</p><p>"melancholy." Moreover, (2.212) in criticism of</p><p>the fine arts "the words you use are more akin to</p><p>'right' and 'correct' (as these words are used in</p><p>ordinary speech) than to 'beautiful' and 'lovely.'</p><p>"10</p><p>He maintains, then, that fittingness and unfitting</p><p>ness, correctness and incorrectness are the main</p><p>considerations in appreciation and criticism. Some</p><p>of his arguments for (2.212) are strong, others not:</p><p>(2.2121) We do not, he maintains, speak of</p><p>appreciating or criticizing the great or tremendous</p><p>things in art. In a particular style of architecture?</p><p>let us say Greek Revival?one might say of a</p><p>particular building in that style, "The windows are</p><p>not right." Or in judging a Louis XVI chair, one</p><p>might complain that the proportions of the seat</p><p>?</p><p>Ibid., p. 2. 7</p><p>Ibid., p. 3.</p><p>8 A?/. 9 Ibid. 10 ??.</p><p>This content downloaded from 139.184.14.159 on Thu, 26 Nov 2015 07:15:14 UTC</p><p>All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S AESTHETICS 259</p><p>and back are incorrect. "In certain styles in</p><p>Architecture a door is correct, and the thing is you</p><p>appreciate it. But in the case of a Gothic Cathedral</p><p>what we do is not at all to find it correct?it plays</p><p>an entirely different role with us."111 find (2.2121)</p><p>badly confused. It is true that if we want to judge</p><p>whether a given object is a correct instance of a</p><p>given style, we try to see whether it adheres to the</p><p>rules ofthat style, for example, whether the windows</p><p>and balustrades of a fa?ade in the Louis XVI style</p><p>adhere to the precise rules laid down, for example,</p><p>by de Cordemoy.12 But there are also rules for say?</p><p>ing whether a given Gothic cathedral is a correct</p><p>instance of one of the Gothic styles, for there are</p><p>many Gothic styles, not just one, as Wittgenstein</p><p>seems to assume. And so we could ask whether a</p><p>particular building were a correct instance of say,</p><p>Flamboyant Gothic. It is also true that, "When we</p><p>talk of a symphony of Beethoven we don't talk of</p><p>correctness."13 But one might say that a</p><p>particular</p><p>passage in one of his symphonies is out of place,</p><p>unfitting, or repetitive : we could criticize a passage</p><p>in relation to others. But notice that we would not</p><p>call Louis XVI architecture "correct" or im?</p><p>pressionistic</p><p>water colors "correct" or Art Nouveau</p><p>glass "correct." "One wouldn't talk of appreciating</p><p>the tremendous things in Art"14 is either a mistake or</p><p>a truism: A mistake, because one could say of</p><p>Jones: "He can appreciate the decorative and</p><p>ornamental things in art, but not the tremendous</p><p>things." Second and third person judgments in?</p><p>volving "appreciate"</p><p>are often made, and some?</p><p>times about what we would call "great" works of</p><p>art. Or a truism, because if I believe that a certain</p><p>work is tremendous, then of course I would not want</p><p>to say that I appreciate it ; rather, I am overwhelmed</p><p>by it, made speechless by it. (2.2121) is confused</p><p>because Wittgenstein seems to hold that it makes</p><p>sense to speak of some styles</p><p>as correct, but not</p><p>others; and that it makes sense to call some objects</p><p>of art correct, but not others. But if it is meaning?</p><p>less to speak of the Gothic style as correct?and it is</p><p>meaningless, for what could one reply if one were</p><p>asked, "Is the Gothic style correct?"?then it is</p><p>also meaningless to speak of the Louis XVI style, of</p><p>Greek Revival, of Italian Baroque</p><p>as "correct." One</p><p>can like or dislike a style ; but that is another matter.</p><p>And if it is meaningless to call a symphony of Beet?</p><p>hoven's correct?and it is meaningless, for the same</p><p>reason mentioned above?it would also be meaning?</p><p>less to ask whether one of Keats's minor sonnets</p><p>were "correct" or one of Chopin's mazurkas were</p><p>"correct"?unless, of course, one meant that it was</p><p>a correct instance of the Petrarchan form, or of the</p><p>mazurka form ; but then one could ask the same</p><p>thing about the form of a Beethoven symphony. It</p><p>is true that one can judge "a human being and on</p><p>the one hand to say 'He behaves well' and on the</p><p>other hand 'He made a great impression</p><p>on me.' "15</p><p>But whether an object of art is tremendous has</p><p>nothing to do with the reason for not calling it</p><p>"correct." Styles</p><p>are neither correct nor in?</p><p>correct, though instances of a style might be so;</p><p>styles do not admit of degrees, but particular</p><p>objects might adhere more or less closely to a style.</p><p>"Correct" and "incorrect," then, are intelligibly</p><p>used only if we are speaking about the relation of</p><p>an element of a work to the work as a whole, or</p><p>about a particular work and its relation to a certain</p><p>style,</p><p>or form.</p><p>(2.2122) has considerable force and serves to</p><p>correct an impression that (2.11 ) might have made,</p><p>that is, that aesthetic judgments are simply inter?</p><p>jections like, "Oh, how marvelous!" (2.2122): If</p><p>aesthetic judgments</p><p>were simply interjections</p><p>(which Wittgentstein once held in the Tractatus</p><p>Logico-Philosophicus, 6.421), then we could not</p><p>distinguish a person who knows what he is talking</p><p>about in the fine arts from one who does not. But</p><p>we obviously do distinguish them. "We use the</p><p>phrase</p><p>'A man is musical' not so as to call a man</p><p>musical if he says cAh!' when a piece of music is</p><p>played, any more than we call a dog musical if it</p><p>wags its tail when music is played."16 Nor would</p><p>we say this "if he is just happy when he hears</p><p>music."17 Now one point that did emerge from</p><p>(2.2121) is that to use "correct" and "incorrect"</p><p>involves using rules. And "in learning the rules you</p><p>get a more and more refined judgment."18 By</p><p>"rules" in this context Wittgenstein means not</p><p>only rules like those of counterpoint, harmony, or</p><p>prosody, but also the hundreds of considerations</p><p>that would be made in a given historical period by a</p><p>certain class of society: what such persons would</p><p>have in mind when they would say that one of</p><p>their peers has a cultured taste. "To describe a set</p><p>of aesthetic rules fully means really to describe the</p><p>culture of a period."19 Moreover, since the bulk</p><p>11</p><p>Ibid., p. 8. 12 Nouveau trait? de toute Varchitecture (Paris, 1706).</p><p>13</p><p>Wittgenstein, op. cit., p. 9.</p><p>14</p><p>Ibid., p. 8. 15 Ibid. 16</p><p>Ibid., p. 6.</p><p>17</p><p>Ibid., p. 6, n. 18</p><p>Ibid., p. 5.</p><p>19</p><p>Ibid., p. 8, n.</p><p>This content downloaded from 139.184.14.159 on Thu, 26 Nov 2015 07:15:14 UTC</p><p>All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>260 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY</p><p>of aesthetic judgments could not be made unless</p><p>one knew the rules, mere words of approval play</p><p>a</p><p>small r?le in aesthetic discussions. "Learning the</p><p>rules actually changes your judgments. (Although,</p><p>if you haven't learnt Harmony and have20 a good</p><p>ear, you may neverthless detect any disharmony in</p><p>a sequence of chords.)"21 His final argument for</p><p>(2.212) is (2.2123): How do we go about deciding</p><p>whether someone does have an</p><p>"appreciation</p><p>of . . ."? Even though it "is difficult to describe</p><p>what appreciation consists in, but impossible</p><p>. . .,"</p><p>and one "would have to describe the whole</p><p>environment;"22 even though some kinds of</p><p>appreciation</p><p>are intense but narrow, others</p><p>"neither deep</p><p>nor wide . .</p><p>.,"23 and others very</p><p>knowledgeable; nevertheless, what reveals that</p><p>someone has an</p><p>"appreciation of ..." is an</p><p>elaborate pattern of behavior, only a small part of</p><p>which is verbal, and of the verbal behavior, only a</p><p>fraction of it is expressions of approval. One of</p><p>Wittgenstein's examples of "having</p><p>an</p><p>apprecia?</p><p>tion of ..." is drawn from choosing</p><p>a suit of</p><p>clothing: "If a man goes through an endless</p><p>number of patterns in a tailor's and says : 'No, this</p><p>is slightly too dark. This is slightly too loud,' etc.,</p><p>he is what we call an appreciator of material. That</p><p>he is ... is not shown by the interjections he uses,</p><p>but by the way he chooses, selects, etc."24</p><p>The reason for (2.22) is (2.221): Many con?</p><p>temporary writers on aesthetics attempt to explain</p><p>what aesthetic disputes and discussions consist in,</p><p>and how they can theoretically be resolved. But</p><p>the difficulty with many such "explanations" is</p><p>that the phenomena which they are supposed to</p><p>explain have been twisted and simplified to the</p><p>point of absurdity. The following is often taken as</p><p>the paradigm case of aesthetic discussion: Jones</p><p>says of a certain painting, "This is beautiful."</p><p>Smith says of the same painting, "No, it is not</p><p>beautiful." And then the usual step is to ask whether</p><p>Jones and Smith are "really" contradicting each</p><p>other. The conclusion is that they are not. They</p><p>are only expressing feelings of approval and</p><p>disapproval; or Jones is expressing "pro-feelings"</p><p>with an implicit imperative "You ought to find it</p><p>beautiful also!," and Smith is expressing "con</p><p>feelings" wTith an implicit imperative, "You ought</p><p>not to find it beautiful either!" Though Jones and</p><p>Smith can</p><p>give "reasons," the story continues, these</p><p>must be either factual or non-factual. If the former,</p><p>then they have no logical connection to the con?</p><p>clusion, "It is beautiful," because the conclusion is</p><p>a</p><p>"value-judgment" and "facts do not entail</p><p>values"; if the latter, then the "reasons" are also</p><p>expressive, or "emotive" or</p><p>"persuasive" and</p><p>therefore they give no logical ground for the con?</p><p>clusion, because they are also "value judgments."</p><p>The story concludes: since all aesthetic discussions</p><p>are really nothing more than "It is beautiful! No, it</p><p>is not beautiful!," the "logic" of aesthetic discussion</p><p>and judgment is now clear.</p><p>Wittgenstein does not name proponents of this</p><p>sort of thing, and politeness dictates that one ought</p><p>not to do so. But "this is just the stupid kind of</p><p>example which is given in philosophy, as if things</p><p>like 'This is hideous,' and 'This is lovely' were the</p><p>only kinds of things we said. But it is only one thing</p><p>amongst a vast realm of other things?one speciaj</p><p>case."25 Wittgenstein is the first philosopher</p><p>sensitive to what could be called the "phenom?</p><p>enology of aesthetic discourse." This will be even</p><p>more apparent in (3.23).</p><p>From (2.221) it follows that it is both false and</p><p>misleading to compare, as Arnold Isenberg does,26</p><p>aesthetic discussions to (2.2211) disputes in cases of</p><p>law, involving grounds and verdicts; (2.2212) con?</p><p>tests involving definite sets of criteria, like judging</p><p>tennis players or dogs in a show, as Helen Knight</p><p>does;27 (2.2213) syllogisms involving major prem?</p><p>isses about aesthetic value and minor factual</p><p>premisses, and particular conclusions of value, as I</p><p>once did.28</p><p>From (2.3) Wittgenstein indicates ways of</p><p>solving?and I hope to show, of correctly solving?</p><p>two questions that have often troubled aestheticians.</p><p>How can we distinguish aesthetic liking from</p><p>aesthetic approval (2.31)? What does it mean for</p><p>Jones to say that he likes Chopin's "Sonata in B</p><p>minor," but does not believe it is good (2.32) ? How</p><p>can we use words like "exquisite" to describe both</p><p>a string quartet and the odor of Mocha Java?</p><p>Must there not be something in common? Or</p><p>20 The text reads "and haven't a good ear," but it must be emended. Obviously, the negative is either a student's mistake</p><p>or a printer's.</p><p>21</p><p>Wittgenstein, op. cit., p. 5.</p><p>22</p><p>Ibid., p. 7.</p><p>23</p><p>Ibid., p. 9.</p><p>24</p><p>Ibid., p. 7.</p><p>25</p><p>Ibid., p. 11.</p><p>26 "Critical Communication," The Philosophical Review, vol. 58 (1949), pp. 330-344.</p><p>27 "The Use of'Good' in Aesthetic Judgments," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 36 (1936), pp. 207-222.</p><p>28 "^ Phenomenology of Aesthetic Reasoning," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 25 (1966), pp. 197-203.</p><p>This content downloaded from 139.184.14.159 on Thu, 26 Nov 2015 07:15:14 UTC</p><p>All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S AESTHETICS 26l</p><p>should we say that our reactions to mere sensuous</p><p>properties are not really aesthetic ?</p><p>(2.31) Notice first that one does not say, "I like</p><p>the 'Sonata' and I don't think it's good." The "and"</p><p>would make the sentence a contradiction, as I</p><p>showed in (2.122). We say "but" in such contexts,</p><p>and "but" has the force of "except that," or</p><p>"nevertheless," or "and still." Notice, also, that</p><p>Jones could have said, "I like the 'Sonata' and I</p><p>don't like it." This might sound paradoxical, but it</p><p>is not. We should not try to find two different</p><p>meanings of "like." What we must do to understand</p><p>such expressions is hear Jones out. We must bear in</p><p>mind (2.2). He might say, "I like the second</p><p>movement, but I admit it is rather sentimental."</p><p>Or, "I greatly enjoy the first movement?such</p><p>verve, such wealth of musical ideas?but as a</p><p>whole it is badly organized." In other words,</p><p>"liking x aesthetically, but not approving of x</p><p>aesthetically"</p><p>is philosopher's jargon for "liking</p><p>with reservations."29 The "but" introduces the</p><p>reservations, things about the work that we are</p><p>willing to concede. It would make no sense if</p><p>Jones liked the "sonata" without reservations for</p><p>me to ask him, "But do you also approve of it</p><p>aesthetically?" Or if he disliked it without reserva?</p><p>tions, for me to ask, "But do you also disapprove of</p><p>it aesthetically?"</p><p>(2.32) Suppose Jones calls Mozart's "Quartet D</p><p>minor" "exquisite," and he uses the same word to</p><p>describe the odor of Mocha Java. He is delighted by</p><p>both. "But did you learn two meanings of 'de?</p><p>light' ?"30 No, for "You use the same word on both</p><p>occasions," and this not by chance, as we</p><p>speak of a</p><p>river bank and a money bank. Now if the question is,</p><p>"How can we distinguish the two delights?," what</p><p>we cannot do is talk about a different psychological</p><p>reaction, or some common property. I shall show</p><p>that one cannot mention psychological reactions</p><p>at all in such cases in (3.23). Moreover, the idea of</p><p>there being something aesthetically in common to</p><p>both a Mozart quartet and the odor of coffee is</p><p>too silly even to consider. Again, to distinguish the</p><p>two delights, we have to hear Jones out. Suppose</p><p>we ask him what he has in mind when he calls the</p><p>"Quartet" "exquisite": there are dozens of things</p><p>to which he can call our attention. But there is</p><p>very little to which he can call our attention in</p><p>regard to the odor. In the former the expression of</p><p>delight plays a minor role; however, one could</p><p>write an entire chapter on the "Quartet" (as Sir</p><p>Francis Tovey does) to help someone else appre?</p><p>ciate it. In the latter the expression of delight is all.</p><p>To distinguish the two uses of "exquisite" we turn</p><p>to two games in which they</p><p>are</p><p>pieces, to two</p><p>patterns of behavior.</p><p>These, then, are the results of (2.1), (2.2), and</p><p>(2.3). There are two further points that Wittgen?</p><p>stein examines in the Lectures with great care. (3)</p><p>What are aesthetic reactions? "Perhaps the most</p><p>important thing in connection with aesthetics is</p><p>what may be called aesthetic reactions, e.g., dis?</p><p>content, disgust, discomfort."31 (4) Is aesthetics a</p><p>branch of psychology ? Can aesthetics be "reduced"</p><p>to psychology? "People often say that . . ." it can</p><p>be. "The idea is that once we are more advanced,</p><p>everything?all the mysteries of Art?will be</p><p>understood by psychological experiments. Exceed?</p><p>ingly stupid as the idea is, this is roughly it."32</p><p>Since his discussion of (3) and (4) are intimately</p><p>related, I shall deal with both at the same time.</p><p>Becoming clear about the answer to (3) implies</p><p>becoming clear about (4) and conversely; and so I</p><p>shall use the notation (3) to indicate both.</p><p>(3) Assuming that the paradigm of science is</p><p>mechanics, one might say that if aesthetics is to be</p><p>scientific, it must employ mechanistic explanations.</p><p>One might be tempted to say that aesthetics</p><p>awaits its Newton?someone to explain the laws</p><p>for the various effects of art on various persons</p><p>under certain conditions. Now the temptation to</p><p>ask for a mechanistic explanation, Wittgenstein</p><p>argues, is both natural and mistaken. It is natural</p><p>(3.1) because we say such things as "the effect of a</p><p>work of art," "the force of a certain musical</p><p>transition," and "the feelings caused by reading</p><p>a</p><p>certain poem." Such expressions might lead us to</p><p>compare them to, "The effect of cortisone," or "the</p><p>force of an</p><p>engine," and "the changes caused by</p><p>adding sodium nitrate." We might be duped by</p><p>verbal similarities into believing that aesthetic</p><p>expression involves two things: the work of art</p><p>which has certain "powers," and the effects of</p><p>these "powers"</p><p>on human beings. Just</p><p>as we could</p><p>give a chemical description of cortisone on the one</p><p>hand, and its prime effects on the other?such as,</p><p>for example, the disappearance of certain in?</p><p>flammations, or its possible side-effects, such as</p><p>increased nervousness and sudden gaining of</p><p>weight</p><p>or arthritis?so, too, one</p><p>might attempt to</p><p>describe the Minuet from "Don Giovanni" on the</p><p>one hand, and its effects and side-effects on the</p><p>29</p><p>Wittgenstein, op. cit., p. 12.</p><p>31</p><p>Ibid., p. 13.</p><p>30</p><p>Ibid., p. 12.</p><p>32</p><p>Ibid., p. 17.</p><p>This content downloaded from 139.184.14.159 on Thu, 26 Nov 2015 07:15:14 UTC</p><p>All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>202 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY</p><p>other. But Wittgenstein wants to hold that</p><p>"aesthetic puzzlements" cannot be solved by</p><p>psychology (3.2).</p><p>(3.21 ) is his first argument for (3.2) ; it involves a</p><p>persuasive definition of "aesthetic puzzlement." He</p><p>admits that it is possible to "predict that a certain</p><p>line of poetry will, on a certain person, act in such</p><p>and such a way."33 One might imagine a psy?</p><p>chiatrist testing the effects of a piece of music on</p><p>certain persons and taking note of their behavior.</p><p>The same piece might send one type into a fit of</p><p>melancholy, another into a state of anxiety,</p><p>an?</p><p>other into an attempt to commit suicide. There</p><p>would be two events involved; it is possible that</p><p>certain statistical laws could be formulated. But</p><p>"what we</p><p>really want, to solve aesthetic puzzle?</p><p>ments, is certain comparisons?grouping together</p><p>of certain cases."34 What he means by "aesthetic</p><p>puzzlement" is both difficult and important to</p><p>make clear; I shall defer it until (3.23). (3.21) in?</p><p>volves a persuasive definition because (3.211):</p><p>Much of the work of such writers as Theodor Lipps</p><p>and Wilhelm Worringer is of the type that Witt?</p><p>genstein would describe as "predicting the reac?</p><p>tions of human beings, say to works of art,"35 but</p><p>also of the type commonly called "aesthetics."</p><p>Furthermore, (3.212) Wittgenstein speaks of what</p><p>we "really"</p><p>want to solve aesthetic puzzlements, and</p><p>as he himself says, "Those sentences have the form</p><p>of persuasion in particular which say 'This is</p><p>really that.'"36 But one can persuade for good</p><p>reasons as well as for bad ; and some of Wittgen?</p><p>stein's reasons for (3.2) are good; (3.21), then,</p><p>rests upon (3.22) and (3.23).</p><p>(3.22) Wittgenstein argues that '"the sense of a</p><p>proposition' is very similar to the business of 'an</p><p>appreciation of art.'"37 Just</p><p>as there is no</p><p>imagery</p><p>that must accompany a written or</p><p>spoken sentence,</p><p>so too, there is no</p><p>expression which must accom?</p><p>pany our listening to a melody. If one cannot</p><p>distinguish thinking from using certain words in</p><p>certain activities, there are not two things : there is</p><p>no universal mental imagery that might be ex?</p><p>pressed now in French, now in English. Now,</p><p>(3.221) one might grant what he says about think?</p><p>ing and language without having to grant what he</p><p>says about expression and music. Either the cases</p><p>are identical or not; if not, what he says about</p><p>language, however true, is strictly irrelevant. It is</p><p>obvious that the two cases are not identical: there</p><p>is nothing corresponding</p><p>to a semantics in music,</p><p>and the rules of composition only figuratively</p><p>correspond to a</p><p>syntactics. However, it might be</p><p>pedantic even to call (3.22) an argument, since it</p><p>has the tone of a</p><p>comparison made en passant;</p><p>moreover, there is a</p><p>point to the comparison,</p><p>as</p><p>one will see in (3.23).</p><p>(3.23) If an "aesthetic puzzlement" were the</p><p>same as a psychological problem about the effects</p><p>of works of art on persons, then to describe the</p><p>face of S. Sebastian in El Greco's "Martyrdom of</p><p>S. Sebastian" as "anguished" would imply that</p><p>the face causes the feelings of anguish in persons</p><p>who looked at it attentively, which is absurd.</p><p>There are not two things: the face painted by El</p><p>Greco occupying a certain area, and the feeling of</p><p>anguish produced in the spectator. To call a paint?</p><p>ing or a face or a melody "anguished" is to see it</p><p>in a certain way.</p><p>Recall the exchange between Hamlet and</p><p>Polonius. Hamlet asks him whether he does not see</p><p>"yonder cloud that's almost</p><p>in shape of a camel?"</p><p>Polonius says, "By th'mass, and 'tis like a camel</p><p>indeed." Hamlet: "Methinks it is like a weasel."</p><p>Polonius : "It is backed like a weasel." Hamlet : "Or</p><p>like a whale. Very like a whale." The conclusion</p><p>that I want to draw is not the one that Hamlet</p><p>draws: "They fool me to the top of my bent." My</p><p>point is that a complex object can be seen as a</p><p>number of things. Consequently, question, "But</p><p>what does it really look like?" is meaningless.</p><p>Similarly,</p><p>to recognize the expressiveness of S.</p><p>Sebastian's face (I have in mind the painting in the</p><p>Prado) is to see it as. One can see the face as</p><p>anguished because it represents a man</p><p>suffering</p><p>hideously;</p><p>one can see the face as</p><p>resigned and</p><p>heroic, because he is looking toward Heaven and</p><p>there is a kind of expectant serenity about his lips.</p><p>Many works of art are</p><p>continuously ambiguous</p><p>objects. Although one</p><p>interpretation?or "seeing-as"</p><p>?of the painting may be better than others, and</p><p>although there might even be a number of "seeings</p><p>as" which are equally good, still, the criterion for</p><p>"being better" or "being as good as" is not</p><p>determined as one would require if an "aesthetic</p><p>puzzlement"</p><p>were the same as a</p><p>psycholgical</p><p>problem. In psychology one would say that # is a</p><p>better way thanjy of curing someone's stammer if*</p><p>has better effects thanjy: the criterion is success.</p><p>Moreover, if aesthetic puzzlements were the same</p><p>as psychological problems, one would not even</p><p>speak of one "seeing-as" as better than another:</p><p>33</p><p>Ibid., p. 29.</p><p>34 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 36</p><p>Ibid., p. 27.</p><p>,7</p><p>am/., p. 29.</p><p>This content downloaded from 139.184.14.159 on Thu, 26 Nov 2015 07:15:14 UTC</p><p>All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S AESTHETICS</p><p>263</p><p>one would only be interested in statistical averages,</p><p>and in trying to determine, for example, what</p><p>kind of mental illness the patient is suffering from.</p><p>To say that "seeing the painting as #" is better than</p><p>"seeing it as y" means that the "story" given for</p><p>seeing it as x is better than the one given for y. By</p><p>"story" I mean the directions that one gives to</p><p>help someone appreciate the object as fully as</p><p>possible. For example, a critical "story" concerning</p><p>"Hamlet" which has to omit many of the lines,</p><p>gloss over them, assign motives to the characters</p><p>for which there is no textual support, would be</p><p>ceteris paribus inferior to another critical "story"</p><p>that does not do so.</p><p>Let us return to "S. Sebastian." To help</p><p>some?</p><p>one who upon first glance sees no expression in his</p><p>face, one might point out the soaring effect of the</p><p>lines, the pallor, the lips that are neither parted nor</p><p>altogether closed. It is possible that the person</p><p>knows nothing about S. Sebastian, nothing at all</p><p>about early Christian martyrs. After a while, he</p><p>might say: "I begin to see what you mean."</p><p>What we would not do is try to make him feel</p><p>anguish?which is what one would expect if "being</p><p>aware of aesthetic expressive qualities"</p><p>were the</p><p>same as "having a certain kind of feeling caused by</p><p>the perception of certain lines and colors." There</p><p>is not the face and the expression : the expression is</p><p>a way of seeing the face.</p><p>To explain an "aesthetic puzzlement" is to give</p><p>reasons for saying why one wants to say, for ex?</p><p>ample, that a certain musical theme is pompous,</p><p>brooding, listless, or tragic. One might call atten?</p><p>tion to the tempo, the phrasing, the key, the</p><p>harmonic progressions, the context. Sometimes one</p><p>can</p><p>only make a face or a gesture with one's hand</p><p>or mention something similar?like a poem. But</p><p>one would not talk about one's feelings, as one</p><p>would if a doctor asked about the effect of a drug</p><p>he had given you. Nor would one try to find some?</p><p>thing</p><p>common to people who are sad and musical</p><p>themes that are sad.</p><p>By "aesthetic puzzlement" Wittgenstein means</p><p>four different but related cases, all of which have in</p><p>common: (3.231) one is attempting to give "causes</p><p>for" in the sense of "reasons for," not the "causes</p><p>of" in the sense of "statistical grounds for asserting</p><p>that" or "mechanisms of"; (3.232) one is attempt?</p><p>ing to explain "What is in my mind when I say so</p><p>and so?"38 One is expected to know the reasons, or</p><p>at least to recognize them if I say "I will tell you</p><p>what is in the back of your mind."39 One is not ex?</p><p>pected to know the laws by which the mind or body</p><p>is governed. The reason is not that the one is much</p><p>simpler than the other, or that we know our</p><p>reasons because we have had so much experience of</p><p>ourselves. The reason is grammatical: if a: is your</p><p>reason for saying/?, then it is yours.</p><p>What is peculiar to each of the four kinds of</p><p>puzzlements is: Those cases (3.2311) in which one</p><p>says, or some way indicates, that something about</p><p>a certain work of art is not right, not correct, not</p><p>balanced. The work is lacking, dissatisfying, and</p><p>at the same time one is attempting "to put his</p><p>finger" on what it is about the object that makes it</p><p>so. When one sees what it is, or at least believes one</p><p>sees it?perhaps by bringing in rules as mentioned</p><p>in (2.2122)?the "aesthetic puzzlement"</p><p>van?</p><p>ishes.40 Those cases (3.2312) in which one feels one</p><p>wants to say that a certain object of art is, for</p><p>example, wistful or delicately melacholy, but one is</p><p>not sure that the description is fitting: the aesthetic</p><p>phenomena</p><p>are too vague, too ambiguous. When</p><p>one settles upon a critical "story" or way of "seeing</p><p>as," the description falls into place, and the puzzle?</p><p>ment vanishes.41 Those cases (3.2313) in which</p><p>one is struck by the correctness or rightness of a</p><p>certain element in a work, although one is not sure</p><p>why one finds it so. One is not clear about what</p><p>reasons or rules or</p><p>"story"</p><p>one should give. Why</p><p>is this word just right in this line of poetry? This</p><p>kind of puzzlement might vanish if one can give</p><p>the rules involved or the conventions. Again, the</p><p>puzzlement might vanish if one can see that if</p><p>certain changes were made, they might give the</p><p>work a different "face" altogether. Sometimes one</p><p>tries to find a "story" to show why the artist did</p><p>what he did ; why, for example, Chopin concluded</p><p>the "B flat minor Sonata" with such an eccentric</p><p>movement?a moto-perpetuo in unison octaves. You</p><p>might say: "Well, that's just what he wanted?</p><p>that's all." The reply would be correct, but notice</p><p>that it is not the same as: "Well, that's just what he</p><p>did." It is obvious what he did write; our puzzle?</p><p>ment consists in trying to fit the movement into</p><p>some</p><p>"story," some way of "understanding-as."</p><p>Perhaps this would help: "Look at it this way. The</p><p>movement before the last is the 'March Fun?bre,'</p><p>which contains an insipid and unconsoling trio in</p><p>B flat major. Then the March is repeated, as if his</p><p>'philosophy' were that there is no consolation about</p><p>death. The trio is supposed to be insipid, almost</p><p>88</p><p>Ibid., p. 18. S9 Ibid. 40</p><p>Cf., ibid., p. 15, para. 21. 41</p><p>Cf., ibid., p. 20.</p><p>This content downloaded from 139.184.14.159 on Thu, 26 Nov 2015 07:15:14 UTC</p><p>All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>264 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY</p><p>insincere. Chopin concludes the 'Sonata' with an</p><p>unrelievedly bleak and chaotic series of eighth</p><p>notes, which have no musical direction. The last</p><p>movement is a sort of despairing confusion and</p><p>resignation."</p><p>In neither (3.2312) nor (3.2313) would one try</p><p>to relieve the puzzlement by turning to the psy?</p><p>chology or biography of the artist. One could do</p><p>such things, but the puzzlement would remain.</p><p>Secondly, in (3.2311), (3.2312), and (3.2313) one</p><p>assumes that the work is not a fortuitous collision</p><p>of elements. It is something constructed, and above</p><p>all, something made to be a sort of gesture.42</p><p>Those cases (3.2314) which Wittgenstein refers</p><p>to by "grouping</p><p>together of certain cases"43 and by</p><p>"A picture, 'Creation of Adam' by Michelangelo,</p><p>comes to mind. I have a queer idea which could be</p><p>expressed by: 'There is a tremendous philosophy</p><p>behind this picture.'"44 The puzzlement would</p><p>consist in trying to explain, for example, why one</p><p>wants to call a certain passage in a play by</p><p>Marivaux "Mozartean." "All have learnt the use</p><p>of</p><p>' = '. And suddenly they use it in a particular</p><p>way . . . An equality which we could call the</p><p>'equality of expression.' We have learnt the use of</p><p>'the same.' Suddenly</p><p>we automatically</p><p>use 'the</p><p>same' when there is not similarity of length, weight,</p><p>or anything of the sort."45 A similar puzzlement</p><p>would be involved in attempting to spell out a</p><p>particular style, say Proust's. Or again, to explain</p><p>why one would want to call artists as dissimilar as</p><p>Altdorfer, Parmigianino, van Valckenborgh, Bron</p><p>zino, and D?rer "mannerists." In such cases the</p><p>puzzlement would vanish after a great deal of</p><p>research into their styles and the period.</p><p>From (3.2312), (3.2313), and (3.2314) it is</p><p>clear how one might fail to get someone else to see</p><p>the object as you see it, or to appreciate it for the</p><p>reasons you give. The reasons are put forth like the</p><p>construction that a lawyer places upon his client's</p><p>actions : the lawyer wants to make them coherent,</p><p>to give them a shape and tone, and to appeal to the</p><p>judge. One's failure might be of three sorts: The</p><p>person (3.23121) is neither persuaded nor not</p><p>persuaded by your story. That is, he cannot</p><p>psychologically see the object as you see it, just as</p><p>someone might not be capable of seeing, try as he</p><p>will, Napoleon's face in a few lines that you</p><p>sketch, though you and others can. (Notice, I am</p><p>not saying that the lines are a</p><p>symbol for Napoleon's</p><p>face, for then there would be no question of seeing a</p><p>similarity: the relation of a symbol is asymmetrical,</p><p>that of similarity symmetrical.) This would be a</p><p>case of aesthetic blindness, perhaps due to a feeble</p><p>imagination. I think of persons who have difficulty</p><p>in seeing certain of the drawings of Matisse as so and</p><p>so. The person (3.23122) is not persuaded by your</p><p>reasons, that is, he rejects your "story" although</p><p>he can see the thing as you do. He believes that his</p><p>own is a better "story." It is the more revelatory,</p><p>the more</p><p>interesting, perhaps the more complete;</p><p>perhaps it is simply the one that helps him appre?</p><p>ciate the object more fully. Think of the dozens of</p><p>stories that critics have given us to tell what</p><p>"Hamlet" is really about. They have been doing</p><p>this sort ofthing since 1819, when S. T. Coleridge</p><p>gave his interpretation. Hardly a year goes by</p><p>without a new</p><p>"story" about Hamlet, some of</p><p>which are helpful and interesting, others eccentric</p><p>and pedantic. But the critic fails in this enterprise</p><p>not because his "story" is false, or because another</p><p>critic at least believes it to be so ; one fails because</p><p>the evidence for the "story"</p><p>seems</p><p>inadequate</p><p>or</p><p>irrelevant. The person (3.23123) is neither per?</p><p>suaded nor not persuaded. That is, the man is</p><p>simply not interested in the object, or not interested</p><p>in the fine arts. This is both the most pleasant and</p><p>the most disheartening kind of failure. One's story is</p><p>neither rejected nor criticized; it is not given a</p><p>hearing.</p><p>(3.2), then, is true, and Wittgenstein shows it to</p><p>be so. It is not that aesthetics and psychology come</p><p>up with different and incompatible answers, but</p><p>that they are explaining different things.</p><p>I shall conclude with a brief consideration of two</p><p>points that emerge from my discussion of (3.2).</p><p>(4) What does it mean to call art "unique"? (5)</p><p>What is aesthetic experience?</p><p>(4) Although Wittgenstein does not use the</p><p>word "unique" in the text, it is fair to use it in</p><p>dealing with certain passages because he is dealing</p><p>with the problem of uniqueness.46 Critics and non</p><p>critics are given to saying such things as: (4.1) "^4</p><p>la Recherche du Temps Perdu is a unique novel." (4.2)</p><p>"Rubenstein gives</p><p>a</p><p>unique interpretation of</p><p>Mozart's 'Rondo in A minor.'" (4.3) "Jacob</p><p>42 The word "gesture" is not Wittgenstein's; but it would take a dozen pages to explain why I want to use it here.</p><p>43</p><p>Wittgenstein, op. cit., p. 29.</p><p>44</p><p>Ibid., p. 29, n. 45</p><p>Ibid., p. 32.</p><p>46</p><p>Cf., ibid., p. 34, entry 9; and p. 36, first para, entry 12.</p><p>This content downloaded from 139.184.14.159 on Thu, 26 Nov 2015 07:15:14 UTC</p><p>All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S AESTHETICS</p><p>265</p><p>Swanenburgh's</p><p>'</p><p>Charon's Barque' is hardly unique."</p><p>(4.4) "Art is unique." (4.5) "Dali is a unique</p><p>painter." In these five contexts a</p><p>variety of games is</p><p>played with the word. (4.4) is the most perspicuous :</p><p>"hardly unique" would indicate that many paint?</p><p>ings in the late 16th and early 17th centuries em?</p><p>ploy contorted human figures, human-animal</p><p>hybrids, gruesome acts like auto-sodomization, and</p><p>remnants of mediaeval symbolism like the treacher?</p><p>ously winding path?in order to portray the</p><p>horrors of Hell. One finds such elements in</p><p>Brueghel's "Juno in Hell," Desiderio's "Hell,"</p><p>Callot's "Temptation of S. Anthony," and Jan</p><p>Mandyn's "S. Christopher." "Hardly unique"</p><p>would mean "not peculiar to." There is no</p><p>question of approval or disapproval. In (4.5)</p><p>"unique" would typically indicate that one ad?</p><p>mires Dali's work. If the statement were used to</p><p>state a fact, it would be false. One can show how</p><p>greatly Dali resembles earlier mannerist painters?</p><p>like those referred to in (4.4). In (4.1) "unique" is</p><p>used for "unusual" or "remarkable." By lingering</p><p>on certain phrases, by occasional use of smorzando</p><p>Rubenstein gives the piece a Chopinesque and</p><p>almost Slavic "face." In (4.4) we do state a fact,</p><p>but a fact about the way in which most persons</p><p>generally</p><p>use works of art. Wittgenstein asks us to</p><p>imagine a different civilization: "Here there is</p><p>something you might call music, since it had notes.</p><p>They treat music like this: certain music makes</p><p>them walk like this. They play a record to do this.</p><p>One says: T need this record now. Oh, no, take</p><p>the other it is just as good'.</p><p>"47 We do not use music</p><p>this way, nor do we use it simply to get associations.</p><p>If this were the case, then if another painting, for</p><p>example, gave us the same associations, we would</p><p>not care which we looked at. "The Resurrection"</p><p>by Caravaggio and "The Resurrection" by Pierro</p><p>della Francesca give</p><p>one the same associations : it is</p><p>a scene described in the New Testament (Christ is</p><p>rising out of His tomb, He is carrying the banner of</p><p>victory</p><p>over death, there are the startled Roman</p><p>soldiers, etc. ). But we</p><p>might want to see</p><p>Caravaggio's</p><p>and not care about seeing della Francesca's. Con?</p><p>trast "admiring something aesthetically" with</p><p>"wanting to feel relaxed." If there were many</p><p>equally good and equally feasible ways of achieving</p><p>the latter?a drink, a</p><p>drug,</p><p>a swim?we would not</p><p>care which we had. But if one admires a certain</p><p>minuet, we do not say, "Take another, it will do</p><p>the same." (4.4) is a factual statement, not a</p><p>definition of "art."</p><p>On the basis of what has preceded, (5) can be</p><p>readily answered. Many writers on aesthetics have</p><p>assumed that there must be a sui generis aesthetic</p><p>feeling which occurs in certain human beings.</p><p>Then one might attempt to give a description of</p><p>the feeling, lament the paucity of the vocabulary for</p><p>describing the feelings (as I. A. Richards does, for</p><p>example) and finally conclude (again, as Richards</p><p>does) that we lack the technique at present for</p><p>such subtle descriptions, though they form part of</p><p>the ideal science of aesthetics. In (3.23) we saw</p><p>why these mechanistic assumptions</p><p>are mistaken</p><p>and misleading. Furthermore, from (2.3), (2.31),</p><p>and (2.32) we can see why the assumption that</p><p>there must be a sui generis aesthetic</p><p>feeling or</p><p>attitude is also mistaken. In addition, Wittgenstein</p><p>mentions (5.1): What could such an ideal descrip?</p><p>tion be? "Don't imagine a description which you</p><p>have never heard, which describes an attitude in</p><p>unheard of detail. For you know nothing about</p><p>such an attitude. We have no idea of such an</p><p>attitude."48 It is true that the slightest change ("the</p><p>lips were parted only i/ioooth of an inch too</p><p>much".49) might change one's entire attitude</p><p>toward the object. But to describe a change in</p><p>one's attitude is to describe a</p><p>change in one's</p><p>behavior. The slight change in the painting might</p><p>make us smile, shift the weight of our body, and</p><p>say, "Well, now it's a sort of ironical sneer."</p><p>Before the change we might have stood rigidly</p><p>before the painting, frowned, and looked at it</p><p>seriously, and said, "What a tender smile." In</p><p>both cases our attitude would also involve a</p><p>"seeing-as," as described in (3.2313) and (3.2314).</p><p>"Aesthetic experience" is not the name of a</p><p>peculiar</p><p>feeling because it is not the name of a feeling at all.</p><p>To describe someone's aesthetic experience of a</p><p>sonata, for example, would involve: (5.21)</p><p>describing the sonata?the style, key, tempi,</p><p>phrasing?in other words, what the attitude is</p><p>toward, or the experience is of. Experience has a</p><p>focus.50</p><p>(5.22) describing the person's behavior, for</p><p>example, that he grew restless at a certain point,</p><p>began to yawn, started to be distracted.</p><p>(5.23) describing what he said: "It reminds me</p><p>too much of those tired melodies of Saint-Sa?ns,"</p><p>"I couldn't see any point in the repetition of the</p><p>47</p><p>Ibid., p. 34.</p><p>48</p><p>Ibid., p. 35.</p><p>49</p><p>Ibid., p. 31.</p><p>50</p><p>Ibid., p. 14, para. 18.</p><p>This content downloaded from 139.184.14.159 on Thu, 26 Nov 2015 07:15:14 UTC</p><p>All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>266 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY</p><p>minor theme after the coda," "The composer was</p><p>just striving after effect when he introduced the</p><p>appassionata section in the adagio." Granted, the</p><p>description might be long, but at least it would be</p><p>informative. We would know how the man re?</p><p>acted aesthetically. Granted, the description could</p><p>not be reduced to a single head?"What really</p><p>matters is the structure," or "What really matters</p><p>are the harmonies;"51 but it would be accurate.</p><p>As Wittgenstein says: "If your explanation is</p><p>complicated, it is disagreeable, especially if you</p><p>don't have strong feelings about the thing itself."52</p><p>And it should now be obvious that Wittgenstein</p><p>had very strong feelings about the fine arts.</p><p>University of Pittsburgh Received December 4, ig6y</p><p>"</p><p>a., ibid., p. 34.</p><p>*2</p><p>ibid., p. 36.</p><p>This content downloaded from 139.184.14.159 on Thu, 26 Nov 2015 07:15:14 UTC</p><p>All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp</p><p>Article Contents</p><p>p. 257</p><p>p. 258</p><p>p. 259</p><p>p. 260</p><p>p. 261</p><p>p. 262</p><p>p. 263</p><p>p. 264</p><p>p. 265</p><p>p. 266</p><p>Issue Table of Contents</p><p>American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Oct., 1968), pp. 219-276</p><p>Wittgenstein's Earlier Ethics [pp. 219-232]</p><p>"Forms of Life" in Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" [pp. 233-243]</p><p>The Puzzle of Ludwig Wittgenstein's "Phänomenologie" (1929-?) [pp. 244-256]</p><p>A Critical Examination of Wittgenstein's Aesthetics [pp. 257-266]</p><p>Wittgenstein and Intuitionism [pp. 267-274]</p><p>Corrigenda to Castaneda, Beck and Saunders [p. 275-275]</p>