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<p>.L...</p><p>(' !.\ ,~.</p><p>F~reign Policy ..'~</p><p>.• c;,. Theories; Actors, Cases</p><p>SECOI\iD EDiTIO!\J</p><p>Edited by</p><p>Steve Smith</p><p>Amelia Hadfield</p><p>Tim Dunne</p><p>OXFORD</p><p>\1:,,(VERSlTY l'JlI!S~</p><p>~</p><p>!</p><p>I</p><p>l</p><p>)</p><p>)</p><p>i.</p><p>!</p><p>L</p><p>\</p><p>OXFORD</p><p>UNJVF;RsrTY f'RESS</p><p>Great Oarendan 5tre-et, Orlord Ol('2 6DP,</p><p>United Kingdom</p><p>Orio'd Universrty Press is a dcpartment af the University af Orlord.</p><p>I: furthe~s the Urtiversity's objective af exçellence in researcn, schoJarship.</p><p>and educatian by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade rmrk af</p><p>Oxfard University Press in the UK and in certain othercountr;es</p><p>G Oxford University Press 2012</p><p>The moral rights of the atJthors have been asserted</p><p>First Edition published 2008</p><p>lmpression: 1</p><p>Ali rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, ;tored in</p><p>a (etrieval system, ar transmit'ted. in any form ar by any meaos. wit10ut the</p><p>prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as e)(pressly permitted</p><p>by law, by licence or under terms agre-ed with the appropriate reprcgraphics</p><p>rights organ;zation. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the</p><p>above shou!d be sent to the Rights Oepartment. Oxford University Press, ar the</p><p>address above</p><p>Vau must not circulate this work in any other form</p><p>and Vou must impose this saroe conditian on any acquirer</p><p>British library Cataloguing in Publicatian Data</p><p>Data available</p><p>library af Congress Cataloging in Publication Data</p><p>Data available</p><p>ISBN 978-0-19.959623.2</p><p>Printed in Great Britaio by</p><p>Ashford Colour Press ltd, Gosport. Hampshire</p><p>Unks to third party weosites are provided by Oxford in good faithand</p><p>for informalion onty. Oxford disclaims any responsibillty for the materiais</p><p>conlained in any third party website referenced in this work.</p><p>~f:.~,</p><p>\-</p><p>b</p><p>Actors, structures, and</p><p>foreign policy analysis</p><p>W!'.LTER CARLSN!'.ES</p><p>Chapter contents</p><p>lntwduetion</p><p>Hístorical background</p><p>The role of actors and structures in 'processo approaches to FP</p><p>The role oi actors and structures ir. 'policy' approaches to FP</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>o Reader's guide</p><p>íB</p><p>115</p><p>n8</p><p>124</p><p>The startíng paim af this chapter 5 tha! the foreign policy af a given state is the</p><p>product of a number af actors and structures, both domesti.: ar,d international. and</p><p>that it is the combinatíon af (hese that makes thr$ an uncommonly complicated field</p><p>af study. The chapter then discusses. how, in view af this complexíty, these actors and</p><p>structures have been [reated in the "iterature on foreign policy analysis_ The firststep</p><p>in this overview is to determine what i$ to be exolained. i.e. the object of analysis (ar</p><p>explanandum). The second question ís how foreígn polícy i, explaíned, referring to</p><p>the type o; explanatory facto,s (cr explanans) invoked in itsanalysis. The nature ano</p><p>role af actors and structures are the" discussed in relatian to these explanatol)'dimen-</p><p>sions and the approaches they havE generated within the field_ Finaliy, two further is-</p><p>sues are briefly raised-the agenc'I-structure pro:)lem. and the question of whether an</p><p>integrated rramework is feasible-before concluding with a recommendation of how</p><p>to resolve the former in terms of a constructive answer to thE latter.</p><p>Introduction</p><p>Foreign poiicy is neltner fish nor fowl in the study or politics, but an empírical subject matter</p><p>straddling the boundary between the internai and the external spheres of a state. Such policy</p><p>is conducted in complex internal and international environments: it resu!ts from coalítions of</p><p>aetive aetors and groups situated both inside and outside state boundaries; its substance</p><p>emanates frem issLJesof both domestic and internê.tional polities; and it involves processes of</p><p>bargaining and cOn1promise involving trade-off affecting the interests cf both domestic and</p><p>international groupings (Neaek 2003: 8-11), This double-sided nature of foreign policy-of</p><p>being 'at ~he hll)gE cf domestic politics and international relations,' as one eminent scho!ar</p><p>writes (Hi1l2003: 23)-has cOlõlplicat~d the analysls offoreign peliey irnn-.ensely sinee the very</p><p>beginning of th1s field or study .lt has also added significantly to the difficu!ties of conceptual-</p><p>izing. explaining. and assessing the role of actors and structures in foreign policy analysis.</p><p>114 WAi.TER CARlSNAE5</p><p>In t'ie~..•...of this complexity, 15it worthwh!le analysing this role? Yes,for the sim pie reason that</p><p>actors and strudures are always present in, and indeed crucial to, the making offoreign policy.</p><p>Chrís:opher Hill has expressed the intimate relationship b~ween these two fadors very well:</p><p>'Foreign policy ~ ti a complex process af interaction between many actors. differentially</p><p>embedded in a wide range af different structures. Their interaction i5 a dynamic proC€Ss,leading</p><p>to the constant evolution of both aeto's and struetures' (Hill,2003: 28). In other words, in the real</p><p>world we find a number af aetors, both domestic and international, who are closely involved in</p><p>foreign policy decision making in one manner or another; and equally there are.a number af</p><p>strudures on both 5ides af the domestic-international civide which decisively affeet these</p><p>actors in many different ways_A few elementary examples will suffice to illustrate the complex</p><p>nature af this abundance af both aetors and structures in the conduã of foreign policy.</p><p>First of alI, who are the most important actors making foreign palicy decjsions? The ObVl-</p><p>aus candidates are heads af state, heads af government, foreign ministers or secretaries of</p><p>state, politburos, parliaments, parliamentary committees, polítical parties, and soforth. These</p><p>are the politically responsible -oect5ion makers-democratically elected or rlOt-acting inter-</p><p>naticnally on behall of the polities they represento They should be distinguished from the</p><p>wider array of civil servants and experts also invalved in this process, in the first place within</p><p>ministries offoreign affair;, but also within rival entities such as military establishments, eco-</p><p>nomic ministries, and intelligence services. as well as lobbying firms, various think tanks., re-</p><p>search institutes, and the media. In additian, while these actors are usual!y domestically</p><p>base,j, they are often in contaet-even acting in consor:-with their counterparts in other</p><p>countries, as well as with various governmental and non-governmental organizations, both</p><p>domestic and international. Although by no means complete, this Iist suffkes to ilIustrate the</p><p>emp ficaI complexity facing us here.</p><p>The same applies to structural factors affecting the making of foreign policy. In the realist</p><p>tradition of lnternational Relations (IR), such structural entities have usually been seen as</p><p>belolging primarily to the international system, butthis isclearly an exceedingly narrow con-</p><p>ception ofthis phenomenon.lndeed, structures-po!itical, cultural, psychological, economic,</p><p>national, regional, global, technological, ideational, cognitive, and normative, to name some</p><p>ofthe most important~are omnipresent in societies everywhere, existing in various degrees</p><p>on a!1leveis from the most isolated tribal groupings to the global sl'stem as a whole. Not ali</p><p>are equally importantto foreign poliey making, ~ut manyare vit.al and central to understand-</p><p>ing and explaining its manifestations.</p><p>In summary, it is not only the inclusion af both domestic and international politics that</p><p>camplicates matters for the fareígn policy analyst. but al50 the omnipresence af both actors</p><p>and struetures, and the intimate and reciprocal link between these twa sets of factors. As a</p><p>consequence, it is impossible to incorporate them fruitfully into explanatians offoreign pol-</p><p>icy without analytically imposing some form of second-o~der intellectual 'structure' onto this</p><p>exceedingly messy first-order domain of foreign poliey making as an empirical object of</p><p>study_ In view of this, it ISessential for the scholar to have some iorm of analytical framework</p><p>ar approach as a starting point. This is also, in various ways, what scholars offoreign palicy</p><p>hav€ tried to establish over the years, atthe same</p><p>time as there remain fundamental disagree-</p><p>ments a.boutthe mostfruitful and feasibleways of achieving this goal. This chapterwill present</p><p>and briefly discuss some of the most prominent af these .:ontending approaches to this fjeld</p><p>of stJ~y before concluding on a somewhat more positivE and constructive note_</p><p>N~l'!S\S. c..: 1\.</p><p>~'\'''';'••aLI"'"•..•" .•..\l ..~,. ,</p><p>1~)~,0~-.</p><p><~f.uc:n.'iR~S,AtJ~ .' ljor. needs</p><p>...->: (. p_Ci:O~S, -' .." . criC3t c\antlca tlJdy</p><p>C'"'t,P, _R . í terrnlf\o\o~ " ne {,elO 0\ \</p><p>. 'a bne ('FPK \o(l . tne. witD t'n\s o'Je\'i'::~\h. <, ed lllsteacl o bre\J\at\on \s</p><p>, "'~rê oroceedlcg rn 'FP' wi\\ be L,S h ugh the latter ab "uateS tne</p><p>uowever, \)c</p><p>1v</p><p>, ter tne acrol1Y se) E'Jen to. -c'onym stl</p><p>" "5 chap, . 'l per ca, 'h • tnls d ' t do.</p><p>toben"lade.1nt,\l. Dolicy.A.na\YS1S up .. a['u' reason \st alo .rpA bycontras I •.•</p><p>~ iF ~e\on, T' e pnffi , 1 laT'ons í ' . e-</p><p>usuaíiV cai,\e~J. ~~ p ~urrent \iterature. r'l</p><p>f</p><p>. Id of internat'lona re h" ;tiOns and technJqu ~.</p><p>, e 'n ~.1~_ - b oad \p arc qu~,norma' on . '. "thin the r - ".<-\-, "t< own rese</p><p>d' of foreign pollcy \'1/1 l te sub-field Wll" \ -</p><p>stu { . t to c. separa</p><p>notes 2.. co~m\trnen</p><p>Historical backgro</p><p>und</p><p>. krow something abaut its</p><p>. , field of study ISto " \', s an aca-</p><p>. t for understandlng any .' d that forelgn po le) a</p><p>A fruitful startl~g .pom t on the one hand, to bear In mm . f the paile)' sciences, fo-</p><p>history. Thus ,t IS Impo~tanh~d strong roots in the broa der domaln oTh' s w-s particularlv the</p><p>demic subject matter as f the domestic public palicy arena I ° h rtly alter the</p><p>h hal"" Sp€ctrum o . b""'cmatters o.cllsinO' on t e il'JII ~ • bl" hed as an academlc su Ji:: l h" h</p><p>case i~\the US,-\,where FP was first es:a \5 ~~\ a s€cDnd majortraditíon emerge~, w. 1C</p><p>Second Wodd \/\/ar. However, alme5t concurre l VI' f the field. This is the inductlOn Into</p><p>. _. h bsequent eva utlon o . ~ '</p><p>has \eft a stronger Impnnt on t e su. . . I through the immense Intluence ar_. , r a doctnne wh!Ch, maln Y .</p><p>American thl1ktng ar rea 15m, J d', both the s-udy and practice offorelgn, ' igre came to ommal€ . _.</p><p>Hans Morgentnau, a European em, . _' h t f mos'" realists at the time. was to</p><p>. ,..- I ' 'vV a His main amb!tlan, as t a a , I</p><p>paliey dunng the ,-o a ar er . I r diplomatic practice ínto more general</p><p>r nslate 'the maxims af nineteenth century 5 ;:L1ropean . . f</p><p>ta. _ . I ' ce' (Guzzini 1998: 1). More specificaJly, by Irnklng the concept olaws af an AmenCdn SODa SCI€n .d . 1</p><p>pawer to tha.t of the national interest. Morgentha~ believed that he could provI e un.ver52.</p><p>explanations for the externai behaviour of ali soverelgn states. ..</p><p>During this period a more general scholarly developrnent, known as behavl~urallsm, aba</p><p>gained dominance in the USA, proclaiming that the social sciences shauld asplf:.to be more</p><p>'scientific' by emulatingthe methodologyofthe natural sciences. This new soentlflc approaeh</p><p>had a deeisive effect on both the pubJie poli:y and realist-oriented perspeetives on the study</p><p>of foreign policy. It5 impact on the former was perhaps the more deep~going in the sense</p><p>that it changed its character altogether frem being an essentially idiographic and normative</p><p>enterprise- ..e. analysing specific forms of pQlicy or pre5crrbrng better means for its formula-</p><p>tion and implernentation-to ane that aspired to generate and test hypo6eses in arder to</p><p>develop a ctJmulative body of empírica! generalizations. This inaugurated a period, which</p><p>turned out to be relatively brief but intensive, durrng which the wmparative study of foreign</p><p>policy (CFP) came to dominate thefield. The impact ar, realism was Jessfundamental, in 50 far</p><p>as the behavjollralists never really ehallenged the underlyjng assumptions of realism, only its</p><p>methodology. Realism nevertheless bifurca:ed ,nto essentrally tv/o strands, with neoreafism</p><p>givingthe st..-ucturesofthe international syslem an exclusive explanatary role, whíle neoclas-</p><p>sical realism (a mere recent and eclectic approach) retained the centrality af the concept af</p><p>power while rejecting the exclu5ion af dorr€stic factars in the explanation cf foreign policy.</p><p>1\10st neorea!ists have a/50 c1aimed that, given their exclusive [oeus on how internationa!</p><p>structures decisively determine the behavíour af states in a systemic fashion, they are oot</p><p>interested-nor i,l.deed cOlllpetent-in expiaiílingthe specrficforeign policies of any given state.</p><p>A third and lnore conceptual issue has deep historical roots as well, a.nd ;s also central to</p><p>lhe subject "'arte r 01 this chapter. This Is the crucial question of Jnderstanding what exactly</p><p>Constjtutes h</p><p>du t e objectto b</p><p>m (thatwhich' eanalyseda dWh' IS to b n expl' ,</p><p>, .dethis definitional" e explained ar; to use narned J~.foreign pOJicy, kno</p><p>,dIstlngu'shes farei n ISSue may seem trivial at feoposltlVlst pu/ance, the d;n as the explana o</p><p>dlSCipllnary'o _ g POJICyfrem both d . lístslghr, itgoes to th pendem vanable)</p><p>. 11 CJoFporr I . amestre d' - econcept} ~ .</p><p>Jsa/socru . I ' Ica SClence Th' dn IntemaUonaf pOr( ua coreorwhat</p><p>. . Cla to the appro ria ~ '. e snpulation and unders . I 1(5, the two major sub-</p><p>explarnlng, ar the inde p te dl~JCe af explanata fa tandrng af a g;ven exp!anand</p><p>feasib/e and emPiriCa/l;;':~;~,t ;:rrable) to be used ~ a ;~;~ ~~~;;:ia:ans (that which does~:</p><p>51SIn such research ' ese must be analytical/y co 'b g tlOn. To be theoreticafly, m~.~wTh~ '</p><p>The roles of both / 1 e obJ€ct of analy-</p><p>, exp anandum (OOje '</p><p>~~~~S~~~:;ig~POltcy are discussed bel:~vo~;:~~;:~ a~~tteXPhnans (explanatory factors) in</p><p>_. un amentally different ex In' erssomewhat,thiswiJj bedane i</p><p>f,rst IScharacterized bya foeus 00 decis;~n~,~:~~ currently l~ usein foreign po/lcy analysis_ Th:</p><p>makes a c/ear distinction between such g processes In a broad sense, while the secand</p><p>I ' , processes and por d fo actlOnmthepursuítofagoa/ oras t f I Icy, elnedmorenarrowlyasachoice, eogoasoftenh .</p><p>and the seieetion of explanatory app h ' c aractem:ed as an undert,akrng. These</p><p>. roac es-explanans-' . '</p><p>ana/ysed In turn, with a specific focus o th I f In eacn case, wdl be dlscussed and</p><p>n e ro e o actors and str Jctures in each</p><p>716</p><p>lhe role of actors and structures in 'process'</p><p>approaches to FP</p><p>Val~rje Hud~on ~as became the prime spokesperson for the first approaeh in a serres of jnflu-</p><p>ent~al contn~~tlons ~o the field over the past deeade ar 50. 'The explanandum af foreign</p><p>~OIICY~naIY5Is,she stlpulates in the keynote article ofthe journal Foreign PoJicy Anafysis when</p><p>It~"as flrst launched in 2005, 'Includes the process and resultants of human decision making</p><p>wlth reference to ar having known consequeoces for fareign entities' Hudsan 2005: 2). She</p><p>then elaborates further 00 this canceptualization:</p><p>One may be examining not a single decision. but a eonstellatian af decisions taken with refer-</p><p>enceto a particularsrtuation. Furthermare, decisions may be madified overtime, requiringan</p><p>examination af sequences af decisions. AIsa,the stages of decislon.making may be the foeus</p><p>of inquiry, from problem reeognition, framing,-and -perceptlon to more advanced stages af</p><p>goal prioritizatian, cantingency planning. and aption assessment (Hudson 2007: 4).</p><p>The notion here is essentially that the object 01analysis-foreign policy-is a question of what</p><p>foreign poliey decision makers are thinking and doing, i.e. their purposive behaviour. What</p><p>they are up to is taking part in the dynamic and complex proC€SSof making foreign policy</p><p>decisions on behalf af the state: henee this process as a whole iswhat needs to be examined</p><p>a"d explained, Or, as she notes: 'The explarians 01 FPA[sic]are lhose lactors that inlluence</p><p>loreign policy decision-making and loreign policy decision-ma,ers' (Hudson 2007: 5), Thus</p><p>the focus is-explicitly on 'human decisianal behaviour', as Douglas Stuart has recently noted,</p><p>adding that this 'makes this the most ambitiaus and multifaceted subfield of international re-</p><p>lations' (Stuart 2008: 576), Because they aim to explore the process 01loreign policy decision</p><p>making</p><p>as a whole rather than paliey per se, schalars of this ilk sometimes use the acronym</p><p>FPDM to describe the focus 01treir field 01study (Mintz and Derouen 2010), As summanzed</p><p>by Hudson, foreign policy is 'centered on foreign poHcy decisionmaking (FPOM) as 11is.per-</p><p>formed by human beings' (Hudson 2007:1 ÓS).</p><p>This process specif1cation af the object of analysis hás some obvious consEquences fcrthe rale</p><p>assigned to 2etorS and struetures. A central question here is what runction the state plays in</p><p>approaches that faces on decision-making processes (ratherthan specific policies). Viev.:ed in the</p><p>context of the two major historical strands brief!y discussed above, the choíce here is between</p><p>viewing t~e state in -ealist terms as the sole and independent actor in foreign policy, ar viewing</p><p>foreign policy 2Ct00: in terms o: the domesticfundioning of a state, in which decislons are made</p><p>by a number of elite decis\on rnakers acti~g on behalf of the 5tate_The amwer here is relatively</p><p>dear-cut: states are not concejved as unitary aetors but rather asan institutional structure within</p><p>which, and on behalf of which, individual decision rnakers aet. As Hudson Emphasizes: 'Statesare</p><p>not agents beeause states are abstractions and thus nave no ageney' (HuCson 2007: ó). As such,</p><p>this type of approach is explicitly 'aetor-specifie', meaning that ~heaetors ae not generic entities</p><p>but always specific individuaIs.</p><p>What roles do aetors and structures play in the explanation Df foreign policy decisíon mak-</p><p>ing? A clear trend is discernib\e here: thiS type of approach tends to favour a leveIs of analysis</p><p>framework, defined in jts simplest forrn in terms of an individual levei, a state leveI, and an</p><p>international leveI of explanation (Neack 2003), with additioilal varimts inciud-íng a group</p><p>deeision-making levei as \Neli as one incorpora~ing culture and national identity (Hudson</p><p>2007), Furthermore, the causal effects on the decísion-making process of actors and structures</p><p>are examined one leveI at a time, with actors dominating on the lower leveIs of analysis (indi-</p><p>vidual and group decision leveis), 1.•••/hile structures take over the stage as the leveIs become</p><p>more general and abstract (state, cultural, and ínternation2.llevels)- As readi\y acknow\edged</p><p>by Hudson, this poses a problem for this type of FP,since altnough it is fairly straightforward to</p><p>examine each separate leveI af analysis', theoreti:::al integration across leveIs 'must be possible,</p><p>but ... remains a promise unfulfilled forthe time being' (Hudson 2007 165,184). (5ee Box 61)</p><p>BOX 6.1'1. Y.</p><p>A\tnough in the 19505 Kenn2th Waltz had already enquired inta how war and ?eace cao be explained</p><p>by distinguishing between tiuee 'images', it is David Singer, in a landmark piece published in 1961, who</p><p>can lay dai~n ta having introduced the 'Ievel-of-analysis' problem to IR (Waltz 1959; Singer 1961). But</p><p>whereas Wa\tz's question had been concemed with what 5ociopoliticallevel in which to lo!=ate the causes</p><p>of \,-varar.d peace-whether in man, the state, ar the state system-Singer's discussion is in terms of only</p><p>two leveis: thestate system and the internatlonal system. Although there has been confusion an this iS5ue</p><p>(In both Singel's analysis and the subsequent Iiterature), his question is essenlial!y \'vhetherthe behaviour</p><p>of states (the Exp\anandum) !S to De explained in terms of causal factors (explanans) ar. the leve1 af the</p><p>inter~ati~nal system, or on the leveI of the state itself. His answer is clear: it a'l depends an the type of</p><p>~uestlOn\s) aSKed. Here he differs from Waltz, who ended up opting for the e>::planator'llevel of the</p><p>lnt,ernatlon2J;ystem, calljng explanations af state behaviour in terms of the state and/or ~he indívidu<=.1</p><p>~s red~~tlon,';t' (~~a[tr 19(9). However, bath agree that explanations of forei1n poJicy-a5 distinet from</p><p>~ntern,.tlonal POII~ICSm~re broadly deflned~cannot be couched in terms ofthe systemic leveI. Sino-ers</p><p>T-:)rmulatlon of the'problem also has another Implication, which ha5 remained iaro-ely unchall</p><p>o</p><p>d</p><p>11 'bJ ~.'. <_'_ _ :). engeas</p><p>we , as p,o em:tK, tnal leveis ar rhls tlnd cannot be Integrated ar combinEd_</p><p>117</p><p>Wli..l'£R CARlSNAE5</p><p>The role of aetors and structures in 'policy'</p><p>approaches to FP</p><p>Studies focusing on explaining the choice af specific policies rather than decision-making</p><p>processes do 50 because they view policies as resulting frem such processes rather being part</p><p>af them. Charles Hermanr., discussing many years ago 'that which is to be explained' (the</p><p>explanandum), wrote of foreign policy that 'it is the discrete purposeful action that results</p><p>from t.le politicallevel decisian af an individual ar group of individuais', and as such it i5 'not</p><p>the decision, but a produá of the decision' (C.F.Hermann 1978: 34; my emphasis). Among,t</p><p>schala~s writing in this tradition there 15considerable consensus today around a view Df the</p><p>explanandum which emphasizes the purpos'-ve nature offoreign policy actions, the centrality</p><p>of policy, and thecrucial role of ,tate boundaries (Carlsnae, 2002). Graham Allison and Philip</p><p>Zeliko\i have explained the rationale for canceptua!izing foreign policy in this sense as</p><p>follows ..</p><p>When we are puzzled by a happening in foreign affairs, the source of our puzzlement 15typi-</p><p>callya particular government action ar set of aetians ... These occurrences raise abvious</p><p>question: Whydid the Soviet Union place missiles in Cuba?Why were 500,000 soJdiers in the</p><p>Per5ianGulf? Whydid Germany give up the Deutsche-Mark? Why did the United Nat!ons do</p><p>50 little to defend Srebrenica in July 1995? In pursuing the answers to these questions, the</p><p>serious analyst seeksto discover why ane specific state afthe 'Norld carne about~rather than</p><p>some other (Allisonand Zelikow 1999: 2-3).</p><p>The important paint to notrce here is that by 50 c1early distinguishing a fareign paliey action</p><p>frem the decision-making píOces~preceding it, the authars are not fareclosing any particular</p><p>approac.l to answering the 'why' questian.lndeed, the whole paint af AlIison's original study-</p><p>and the reason why it had such an impact on the field in general-was his success in showing</p><p>that the same questians could be answered in different ways, depending on what kind af ex-</p><p>planatarv model, or conceptual 'Iens', was being used. (See Box6.2.)</p><p>What are the implieations for the role of actors and structures of such a specificatian of the</p><p>objeet ofanalysis (or explanandum)7 Contrary to proeess-orie.lted approaehes, this per5pec-</p><p>tive doesnot a priari view either actors ar structures in any particularway, since the focus here</p><p>is on 'palicy undertakings', not the behaviaur of any particular entity within a specific struc-</p><p>tural environment (such as 'decision making'). This is also why this perspective-à la Allison's</p><p>'lenses'-is able to harbour a number of different and not necessarily compatible analytical</p><p>approaches. . .</p><p>Oneway ofclassifyingthe various optionsta befound in the literature, whlch IS bath conven-</p><p>ient and appropriate in the present context, is to ask once again what role structures an~ adors</p><p>la in thE explanation of foreign policy adiam. The fact is thatthese two conce~ts POI~t to a</p><p>~e:p-rooted and long-standing tension which exists .within t~i~ field ~f study, as mdeed In th~</p><p>social sciences in general, between approaches tendlng to pnvllege elther structur:~ ar ?-d~r</p><p>based forms af explanation. This is in marked contrast to the deClsion-makin~ tradrtlon. ~h~ch</p><p>. bl date both ador~ and strudure~based explanations essentlally by ê.SSlgntng</p><p>l5a etoaccommo . h I</p><p>. Iyt' 11 d fnet levei, of analysis What complicates malters furtherls t at we a 50</p><p>them to ana Ica y IS I . . '11h f h to be</p><p>find q(fferEnt approaches within each of these two perspectlves, whlCh wr tere ore ave</p><p>diseussed separately.</p><p>ane of lhe most influentia\ lwentieth-eenWry sludies of foreigo poliey is Gcaham A'.1ison'sEsse"ce Df</p><p>Oeeisioo: Exploilllng lhe Cubao Missife Ceisis, fi,st pub!ished in 197.1, wilh a seeaod ,od substanlially</p><p>uoda,ed edirion appearing</p><p>in 1999 (with Phi\ip Zelikow as co-author). 1his study foeuses 00 thirteen</p><p>de.ys in October 1952, duriog wr.;ch a erisis erupted whenJohn f. Keonedy learned lhat lhe Soviet Uoion</p><p>was in ,he proeess cf iostalling intecmediate-raoge ballistie missiles io fi dei CastroS Cuba This aclioo</p><p>was viewed as ao unaceeplable provoeation by lhe President and his key advisors, wno eonsequenlly felt</p><p>impelled to insist thal lhe Soviets wilhdraw ,hese m'ssiles.The US govemm</p><p>enl</p><p>eansidered lhree oplions</p><p>in lh,s coo,"xt: to i,wade Cuba, lO eooduer air strikes againsl lhe missile sites, or lo impose a r.aval</p><p>bloekade of Cuba The Presiden' fioally ehose lhe lhird oplior., a tacac lhal turr.ed out lo be successfu!.</p><p>Allison's purpose i5la explaio why ar.d how lhis choice was made, ar.d he does lOis ir. lhe form oHirsl</p><p>conslrucring \hr.e differer.t cor.ceplual models ar ler.ses (rational aetor, orgonizational beha,lour, anó</p><p>g",'e'omental politlcs), and theo using each in three separale eropir;cal chap,ers to explaio and asseSS the</p><p>aclions taker. by Ker.oedy ar.d his advisors durir.g lhese lh!rteer. days He does nol claim lha' Ihese lhre</p><p>e</p><p>moders Me lhe coly feasible oplior.s Ir. explaio',ng lhe puules ger.eraled by thir erisis. bul he does show</p><p>how our view of events such as these are 5tror.gly ir.fluer.ced by lhe 'baslc assu-nptioos lhal we make,</p><p>(alego</p><p>ries</p><p>we ure, our ar.gle of vision', and lhat by 'companng aod eontrastinglhe three framew</p><p>orks</p><p>,</p><p>we see vI,'hat eacn rnagnifies. highlight5. c.nd feveais as wel\ as what each blurs ar neg!ects' (Alliso</p><p>n</p><p>and Ze!íkow 1999: x). What has made tn:s study 50 iílfluentia\ is that although -I!purports to explain</p><p>the same events. it comes to the conclusion that different explanations are reached deper.ding on the</p><p>eO;Keplual medel employed As agalos' most sehools of \hought a' lhe "me, it thus ca!led Inlo queslion</p><p>~,e ~ssu,mptron lhal sodal seieoee ean achieve. and therefore should aim for e1ear-cu' and 'objec'ive'</p><p>,>.p,ana.,ons of socral acl,ons. Today this n01ion thal ali explanations predic'ions and evalualions are</p><p>wescapanly tl',e -j d ; , .,a vpn h c' o.ry a en ,5 more or less laken for .raoted aod, at least with;n IR, Allison's sludy must be</p><p>'" _ muc .f€dlt for thls. The lmportance of cone'" tu! dei' .explains whv ~his is one af ,he .,.d I -~ a mo 5 apphes eq~aHy to pohcy makers, which</p><p>. mos VI•• 1 e y read an::llnflue ( I f' I'policy decisicc makers as well. ,n ta orergn po "y sludies arr,ongs' foreign</p><p>Approaches based on a structural perspective</p><p>Reallsm</p><p>Al'h.I ough. a~IN€ have noted above tht" r</p><p>wlth Ihe ascendancy of neorealisrn' b;t~e:p"psm esPhoused by 1\.1orgenthau suffered a decline</p><p>reJnalí) strong t d 'b" "roac es to forei 1-5tlll th'" ~ ,:- o. ay, ai elt 10different forms. Hence h'l !( gn po ICYanalysis never:heless</p><p>I ••.••1CS, emlnent ,w I e enneth W 1+ ( ..</p><p>reor-ealísfn"o th I p~oponent Df neorealism) continuos t - _' a II the onglnator and</p><p>\ e ana YSIS of L" '- O [n~jst OP th' .</p><p>Orle findo.; \'''''iants f' lorelgn pOliey (Vvaltz 1996' for ~ ,e Inappllcability 01</p><p>_ 'c,, o It which f _ ,a contra~v .</p><p>sieal sch()12~rç foi 'o" ceus on prec'sely such polir' I I, VI€W, see Elman 1996)'</p><p>-' ,wmg In Mo h' ~Ies. n -ontr- t 1- '</p><p>to focus soua'el .' . rgent ,au s footsteps have ,aS, atter'day neoclas-</p><p>, ,_ y on explalnlng f' _ no such oua!ms ~ d h</p><p>Wltn re</p><p>G</p><p>3rC to th f orelgn pai ey and nothl'n I ' ,Gil ence contimlE</p><p>. o e ormer ... . g e so .</p><p>s:ve lorni' o; . ,a dlsw]Ct,on should b '.' . neoreallsm (R 1Qr'>" e made betwo.-been pre-enlnent! ase ..jb). DUf,ng the past tw d _.en aggressive and defen-</p><p>C 'Id ' Y represented' ., o ecadES .o \'Vei, )ased on b' I' oy Jo"n Mearsheimer ! h "aggressrve real15m has</p><p>Europe i-or~5 ~'ears it dlpa ~nty, .milltary balance, and n~;1 ,1~ 2S argued that whereas th~</p><p>fio ' ' s emrse wrll c " ea, v'ea-,o .</p><p>e ,(.5 ,[] lhe long run Th' . '. oOdarytO conventional v . d ,ns pcoduced peace in</p><p>. JS peSSlr.lf5tlc scenario folIa f VIS arn, necessarily have news rom a Slrict ap l"' ' gati'Jé</p><p>p Icatron af neorealfst</p><p>119</p><p>.120</p><p>tenets, especially the view that In 50 far as the structure of the international system invariably</p><p>fosters conflict and aggression, rational states continue to be compelled to pursue oflensive</p><p>strategies In their search for security (Mearsheimer 1995: 79-129)</p><p>Defensive neorealists, on the other hand, do not share Ihis ?essimistic and essentially Hob-</p><p>besian VI€W of the interna tio na! system, arguing instead that although systemic faetors do have</p><p>causal efleets on state behaviour, they tannot aCCOuntfor ali stale aetions. Furthermore, instead</p><p>of emph'-Sizing the role played by the distribution of power In the international system, scholars</p><p>belonging to this school have pointed to the importance of the source, levei, and direetion of</p><p>threats, defined primarily in terms of technological factors, geographic proximity, and oflensive</p><p>capabilities but also perceived intentions (Rose 1998: 146).</p><p>Finally, neoclassical realists share with neorealists the view lhat a country's foreign policy</p><p>is primarrll formed by its place in the international system and in particular by its relative</p><p>material power capabilities. However, these theorists also argue that the impact of systemic</p><p>fadors on a given country's foreign policy wiJl be indireet and more complex than neorealists</p><p>have assumed, since such features (an effect policy on/ythrough "actors on the domestic leveI</p><p>(Rose, 1998. 146), ar, as noted by Walt, the causallogic of this approach 'places domestic poli~</p><p>tics as an intervening variable between the distribution of power and foreign polrcy benavlor</p><p>(Walt 2002: 211), As a consequence of the stress on the role of both systemic and domest~c</p><p>" II d et d' the form of theorell-variables, research witf;in neoclassical reallsm ISgenera y COn u e In 'for e</p><p>ca/ly informed narratives that trace how diflerent factors from both leveis co~~~n:f~~ld s;e</p><p>the particular foreign policies of states(Rose 1998: 153);for a recent overvrew o I ,</p><p>Taliaferro et oi, (2009), , , . 11,a tructural orientalion for the sim-I, "t touS strands 15essentla 'f 5 _ .</p><p>In summary, rea 15m In f 5 var . hich is defined Eltr.er In. r th notlon of state power, w .</p><p>ale reason that at lts central core IES e . reali5m ar as a combinatlon of</p><p>' , ( nal system as In neo, 'hterms of the structure of the Interna la , ' The state is the core actor In bot</p><p>d . t matlonal structures, h'ft Indomestic povler resources an I.n e . d b material factors, and especially by 5 J 5</p><p>instances, ano its capacity to act 15 determrne y</p><p>these, be they externai o' internai to the state,</p><p>Neoliberal institutionalism t . f foreign policy, it is obvious</p><p>h to the ana YSISo ~ . I' (ar</p><p>Although not generally touted :~:~:::~~~~r the name of oeoliberalr~:~~~~:~~ao::eal_</p><p>that the type of focusthat usu anlto the study of foreign policy as ar~ou ht is posited as an</p><p>simply neolibErahsm) 15 as rel~v I deed in 50 far as th:s school af t ~ policy analysis</p><p>' fgurat,ons. n. . ch to forelgnism in their vanOU$ con I nts an alternatlve approa</p><p>. it a[50 represe</p><p>alternative to -ealtsm, , d o' view for some of the</p><p>' , d top- ow h(</p><p>Baldwin 1993), , struclUral systemlc, ar. es that states are t e. . f nalism 1$ a ' .....h It as~um . .</p><p>Neoliberal InStltUla , coostitutes such ao approa, '. e oistic value maXlmlzers,</p><p>same reasons that neoreallS~ional system, that they behave Irk~_r~erarchical in distlnctlon</p><p>Primary actors in the mterna m is essentially anarchlc, l.€. nO</p><p>, (onal syste , I'cy</p><p>and that the tnterna I in 1993: B-14), ,,' roach to foretgn POI</p><p>f domestic polltl€S {Bald</p><p>w</p><p>h eoliberal instltutlonallst app I'berals view forelgnrom , bout t e n I' t and neo I d</p><p>What then is distinc~vef:lfowing: whereas both neorea :rtof states acting rationally anI sis? Very bnefly, te, ed choice on the pana y . cess af -eonstralnpolicy m"akingas a pro</p><p>N" L'[S'iS</p><p>.,_, "0\..\(.-'; p., r'< "</p><p>~<~~. '. :J~:-:.,;f,~-<.t</p><p>~_<'""U(.-rU'!jZt':';' atlO{\a\</p><p>., ~Lq~ 5•• ' r the Intern</p><p>c.y, il,.P 1 ~;., i 1'- - pnrna1</p><p>,\V In te(1T1S ~ll.-.\C syste.rn \Nn\c\.l~</p><p>nt 1")0l {anal (\ \ ftecteu</p><p>rstancl th\S conSl:a~""s but Ir\.ten"15 ü ali c,s be pOSltlve\y a (-</p><p>I me \atter unde IP5 faclr,g Sl.aL~, can nevert'ne\e- ~ fostenng lOte</p><p>suateg\ca\\'i' ,'power capab\1.t ~ erunNconcerns, O~Iru\es, óe,eby nglnterna-</p><p>• tlOns () d hence,:> -' d "'011111\ ' d fVIPW1</p><p>~~;,~~g,~~:stersuncertal:~;;r;v\dlng tnfOrm~~~:::e ~ 993) Ihus, tnste:~,~,se'-lMearshelmer</p><p>by the :::reat\on d regi at least some degree \ ,..constltutl:lg a fa\se P , rnatter-that they</p><p>natIonal cooperatl</p><p>on</p><p>to phenomena\ ano hencc tha"- such mstltútlons ao \ DOlttlCS' (5te1l1</p><p>tlons as epl ?nas\ze l r v'rnatlOl1a, d</p><p>nona! tnst\tu \ mstn:ut\onailslS em d n the nature Oí m ~ ses 15tempere</p><p>1994-95), neoilbera lhe behavlOUr d states an'd \fend anO pursue tre" purpo [whICh]have</p><p>'make a dlfference In K I HO'Stl,how states e rules and etlquette 6 7)</p><p>2008 212) Or as noted by 'h' encampass Ideas norms ' (KJ Holstl 2004 30 -</p><p>bv mtel natlonõ.\mst\tutlons t aL I' _ ana actlons of thelr soverelgns oreahsm neollberals</p><p>1 n the p an:l I t tlon<to ne '</p><p>a moderatmg .nfluence o~ n tre role of lnlernatlona Im ltU. '- tnout undermtnmg lts</p><p>Furthermore, by addmga oc~s ~he pxplanator'l power of neoreallsn Wl</p><p>cla m that they have added 'o -</p><p>main structuralist assumptlonS.</p><p>Social constructivism _ . . li, a meta-theoretical</p><p>-' .. r im Iv constructlvism) 15essent\a 'i ..</p><p>Aithough social constructlvlsm \0 s p, d h e '. foundationa\ to oO!ltlCa!analysis</p><p>f . I hpnomena an enc 15 '"</p><p>standpoint in the study a sacia p - '_ I oac'1 VJithin IR here-followmg a</p><p>T I (cal ar theoretlCa appr I . r ,</p><p>rather than being a SP~CIICa.naY I _". d t d "-jgnate a more ar less coherent body</p><p>comman practice withln the ltterature--It IS~.sens:re;~at yealityls socially construded in the</p><p>~;::O~fsh;~:::~il:~I~~~n~::;I:Su~~:~~~:u,~':~~~ngs, and th':t this affects o~r knowledge of it</p><p>how we s€e the world as well as ourselves, and how we detme our mteres,s and proper ways</p><p>af behaviour (see Adler 2002; revised in Carlsnaes et ai. 2012). . .</p><p>Although construct;vism consists of an increasingly broad spectrum of vle:-vs.we.wlll fo~us</p><p>here only on the so-called 'modernist' ar 'thin' type. which prEdomlfl~tes .In fo.relgr. pollcy</p><p>ana!ysis. This approach can be said to consist, first of ali, of a normatlve-,deatlOna/ stra~d,</p><p>whicn conceives of norms qua ideas as aspects of social structure emerging fmm the purposlve</p><p>behaviour Jf actars in specific communities and that these, in tum, shape such behaviour by</p><p>constituting the identities and actians of such actors (Hoffmanr 2010: 2). Challenging main-</p><p>stream assumptions ofthe internationa! system as essentially consisting of power ealculations</p><p>and material forces, early normative constructivists thus 'worked to demonstrate that shared</p><p>:deas about appropriate state behaviour had a profound impact on the nature and funct;on-</p><p>Ing Df world poJitics' (Hoffmann 2010: 2). VVithparticular referEí1Ceto foreígn policy behav-</p><p>iour, the goal VIlasto show how such behaviour is enabled or constrained by normative and</p><p>ideational :a(tor5, i.e.howthese inffuence states' understanding ofthe externaI material world .</p><p>.A.second research focus, ohen intertwined with the f!rst, centres on the notion of identity to</p><p>highlight the social!y constructed nature af the state and its interests. As noted by Bruce</p><p>:::ronin, 'identities provide a frame af reference ham whích poJiticaJ leaders can initiate. main-</p><p>tain, and ~,;ructure their relationships with other states' ((ranin 1999: -18), and as such it 'is a</p><p>.:onstructi\'ist concept if there ever was one' (Berenskoetter 2010: 2). lndeed, as Paul Kowert</p><p>nas recently claimed, most af 'coi1structivist 5cholarship in foreign policy . _dictate[s] a Con.</p><p>cem with 5tate identity' (Kowert 2010: 2). Although human interaction is essential for estab-. . ,</p><p>:shmg anG upholding these norms. tdeas, and identrties, constructi'Jisrr; is nevertheless a</p><p>structuraJ. approaeh .</p><p>In terms of the effee; Slnee the explanatio</p><p>INlthreferenee to any ~~~ocjal struetures (b~~:;~e ~Olicy choicES made b ..</p><p>. Tosum up, altho</p><p>ug</p><p>h th ate characteristics of y hdjlned) on the individ: 7ecIslon makers is</p><p>In their anar ese threediff, SUe actors. a actOr ratherthan</p><p>h yses, what pri. erent structural</p><p>t an actors are. marr/y unites the - approachesto FP d</p><p>tieular lNay;,1 th;::~~~as t~e dynamie fae:~s':~~;i~n ;:eh instanee stru~t:~atl~:~~~: :~~rs</p><p>tables are turned in fa et Or rts foreign policy In the a</p><p>g</p><p>partICUlar state to behave in a pa</p><p>er</p><p>f VOurof th pproaehes t b . r-</p><p>orm ar another. e exp!anatory power af actors o. e d,scussed below, the</p><p>. and thelf characteristics in one</p><p>Approaches from an actor-b. . ased perspective</p><p>Cogmtlve and psychological approaches</p><p>Although researeh on the cognitive and ps cholo i . .</p><p>makers has been viewed with cons'd bl Y . ~ cal charactenstrcs af individual decision</p><p>. I era e sceptlClsm b h I</p><p>natlons offoreign poliey this has in fact b y se o ars pursuing structural expla-, een one ofthegr th ..</p><p>quarter of a century (Hudson 2007) A' . ow are's wlth,n FPoverthe past</p><p>b</p><p>.s~lnstthe~lonalch"</p><p>oth realism and neoliberal institutO '" .. . OIce assumptlOI1-COmmon tolona Ism-that tndlVldu I . ..</p><p>and adaptable to the dictates Dfstructural constraints "t' b</p><p>a</p><p>s :e In principie open-minded</p><p>that they are to a considerable degree impervious to ;~c~se:;:ts ~:::s:oo~~~:\~~:~i~:'~'~~</p><p>thelr un~erlymg beflefs and the way they process information. as well as a number cf other</p><p>personalrty and cognitive traits.</p><p>From h~ving focu~ed on the study of attitudes and attitudinal chê.nge in its earliest years.</p><p>~sychologl;al a~al:sls underwen: a 'cog~itive revolution' in the 19705. Instead of the concep-</p><p>tl~n of th~ passl/e actor underlYlng prevlous work, a new viewed emerged. stressing the 1nw,.~</p><p>vldual as problem-solver' rather than malleable agent (Rosati 1995: 52-54). This was also'a</p><p>period when studies af haw the characteristics af leadership-beliefs, motivations, decisional</p><p>and interpersonal styles-affeeted the pursu;t offoreign policies first received seriaus attention,</p><p>a foeus which has continued to this day (M.G. Hermann and Preston 1998). Under this rubric</p><p>one can also inc1ude small-group approaches, including a focus on tr,e effeets of 'groupthink'</p><p>(Garrison 2010), as well as prospect theory, which reputedly 'has evoked the most interest</p><p>among students of foreign policymaking' (Kahler 1998: 927). James Taliaferro has provided us</p><p>with the most recent and up-to-date review ofthis approach and its currentapplícations in FP</p><p>(Taliaferro 2010). Role theory, first introduced into FPby KalHolsti (K.J.Holsti 1970) and most</p><p>recently discussed by Cameron Thies (Thies 201 O), should also be mentioned in this contexto</p><p>Although there is much overlap between studies of this kind and those discussed above</p><p>underthe rubricof foreign policy decision making, they should nevertheless be clearly distin-</p><p>guished from each otherfor at least two reasons. The first is thefundamental difference in the</p><p>explanandum focused on, which in the case of the FPOM approach ;s the decisíanal process</p><p>itself, whereas here it is intentional policy behaviour-the questian why a particular polícy</p><p>undertaking was chosen. The second is that while the scholars d;scussed here are exc!usively</p><p>engaged inJinding psyeho!ogical and cognitive causes (ar 'theories') for explaining given pol-</p><p>icy choices, the FPDM framework goes well beyond the individual aetor levei to account for</p><p>the particular nature af a given decisional processo</p><p>~\..,to tne</p><p>\) app,oaL". 'approach . . , overnmenta ke the</p><p>BureaueratiC P01:tl~ the ;o-ca\\ed bureauc~a~~ Pi~\~:c;,~,'a;r. why d:CiSi~~:::~:~~: no~ in</p><p>The rnain íatlon.a e o I" ,nonu\aril€C bV A 15 ' of oro.....P lntendeo, .an. bút 'accordl'lg</p><p>- f IEn 1'0 ICY,e e Yperson b . '\1tnKtng)</p><p>ana\ysis aí ore 's disünctfronl wnat an tas in ratiana! cno1ce '._ . uestion' (AIllsO\l</p><p>torm Df're~u\tants ,aerences and strategic f\',Qves d opponents or the a(tl~n In qct'lonis IJrimari\y</p><p>{ g\\len</p><p>çrel 'onents an . ch Jntera</p><p>ten-ns o nd performar'IC€ Oi prop h ower invo\ved In 5U b aining games</p><p>to the power a , 6) At the same time, t e P taking part in these arg • find</p><p>anO Ze\iko~ I S99. 25 . ersonal. ir, 50 far aS th.e.actor~ (~In other words, wh:l v:e .</p><p>bureaucratlc rc.ther than P _ I tl-.er than indIViduaI mtere-,LS- f b reaucratic lnflghtlng.</p><p>\ r factlona ra 1\ . d' '"erms <) U . \</p><p>represent se~t.on~ o f .an DCnevean best be explal~e m.</p><p>l</p><p>d. '.d' Isin their organizatlonal</p><p>hereistheVlf?oNtnat creia, .' -f noftheinteractlonofln \\;1ua ir reàis-</p><p>and thatthis neeessitates ao ex.amlo: 1.~ive-psYChOlogjcalapproaches, in term~ ~fthe P ive\y</p><p>environments rather than, as In (o':;,nl \' \ 'med aS anc eriticized for, belng excess</p><p>Alth ugh ear ler c ai , h . (se"positions as decision makers. o..... I \ findir.g itsway te, Europe ar-d elsew €I e _ ~</p><p>,. . .' I pl,cabllity, It lS S OWY ,US-centrea Ir. It5 emplrlca ap .</p><p>Janes 201 O).</p><p>New liberalism</p><p>h ,..1 h'. f\! d FP Andrew Mcra.vcsik</p><p>Aithough liberalism itself has roots going back to t e ea.•lI' I dSIQ, T j .' IR..J FP</p><p>nlust bp aiven primarl eredit for having put new liberallsm Otl rhe conlemporary anu,</p><p>- b . d \' \1' h 11noe t~neo-agendas (Jv',oravcsik1997). In his view, three core assum~tlons un er le t 15~ .a e. C> • U .</p><p>reãlism 2nd neoliberalisrn. The first is the primacy af sOCletalactor5 over polltlCal rnstltutlons,</p><p>ihe impiication of whieh is that being based on a 'bottom-up' view of the political system,</p><p>individual and social groups are treated as prior to polities, because they define thei r interesls</p><p>independently af pol:tics and then pursue these interests throush political exchange and cal ..</p><p>leaive actiJn. Secone, state preferences represent the interests af a particular subset of soeiety,</p><p>in the sense that state officials d€fine state preferenees and act purposively in world politics in</p><p>term:; af these interests. Third. state behaviour in the internationalsystem isdetermined by the</p><p>configuration within it af interdependent state preferences. l.e. by the constraints imposed Oil</p><p>a given state by the preferences af other states (Maravesik 1997. 520).</p><p>This framework differs from the actor-based approaehes d;scussed aoove prirnariiy oe-</p><p>cause af Its emphasis on the role of societal actors rather. than politieally appointed individu-</p><p>aIs ar small-group aetors in the formation cf the foreign pai eies of states. In this sense it</p><p>broadens the scope:;lf explanation beyond the purely politieal or governmental, and as sueh</p><p>plaees thE analysis of foreign palie}' in a broader sociopo!Jtica! context than any of the other</p><p>approaches diseussEd here.</p><p>lnterpretative actor perspective</p><p>Th~ final approach to be disclJssed here shares with social constructivisl1 an interorQtatr ,to</p><p>ep1ste,ilO;ogy, i.e. understanding aetors as reflexive entities ir' an inter-subjective ~'\I~rl..\_~</p><p>nleaning. Hov~ever, 'Nhereas thE iogic ofthe rormer is to interpret individual actions in te~i~'~</p><p>o.f soc~a.!.rules ~nd c~llect!lje meaniogs, this perspective apprüaches the explanatiol1 af for-</p><p>elgn P'~/11C'{b~ rocusmg on the thinking and aetions ar individuc"t1 decl'sl'on m k 'H .a ers. ere ~he</p><p>~---&</p><p>Concem is to unde</p><p>structin th . rstand decisd .g elr reaso I iOns from th</p><p>epenas On ho . os, Hol1is and S' e standDOint o' IhWlnd" mlthth" ede"a surn o~co b" IVlduals with us write. 'The.ç ... . ClSlon-makers bm rnatio f"' powerperc' rQ'€'gn poli b - Y reCOn-</p><p>An iflustrative n o Individuai aetion' elve and ana/y,e situatio cy ehav'our oi 51ates</p><p>Ze/ikow and C example 01 this type I s (Hol/" and Smith 1990' 74)ns,COl/ective action is</p><p>ondole' o essenr /I ' .</p><p>1995), It aflers an' ezza R,ce's detailed slud la y atheoretical iOlm oi ana '.</p><p>luniled 5tates, the 5::i:re~~i~~W::I the innerm~s~I"~~:::,:; ~~~~ilication (Ze/ik~:sa~:~:~~</p><p>lon, following a serl'e I . est Germanll East Ge o e top pO/ltreal elites af th</p><p>5 o top-Ie I . l' rmany. Brit - e</p><p>the reasoning behind Ih' ~e negotlations, af a reuníled G' am, and France in the crea-</p><p>elr choJ~e d ermany The- ..</p><p>Occurred dJringthe yearfoll .\...S an proffers an explanatian af th . _ Ir analysls examines</p><p>its effects. The assu f ow'ngthe colJapse ofthe BerJin VV lI' e fmmense changes that</p><p>'f mp 10n under/ying thi a In terms ofthis.easoni</p><p>I the main actors in th;s historl'ca' 5 type of ana!ysis is the (ounterfactuai a ng and</p><p>d'd h . I process had t rgument that</p><p>J ,t e hJstoJryof this period would have b nd~areasoned and made choices in the way they</p><p>een 11 terent.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>The purpose of lhe above discussion has been I ' ,</p><p>tried to deal with the many actors d o grve a,n overVlew of how FP scholars have</p><p>fmeign policy is made, and which t~ner:f~~;t~res WhlCh exist in the real :-V0rld</p><p>in which</p><p>formation ar.d pursuít of such policies. As we 'h~v:::e~a;o:eaSncohtohlear,ar.e mvolved.,n the</p><p>t th I f . ,rs glve pre-em,nence</p><p>o ~.ro e ~ .actors In such explanations, whíle others, while slrT'ilarly intent on explainin</p><p>speClflc poliCies, placetheir bels on lhe prime importance of struclural factors in exPlain~</p><p>,n~_s~ch actlo.ns. A thlrd group, focusmg on decision-making processes rather than on</p><p>po,lcles, casts lts net much wider, incorporating both actors and structures in the form of a</p><p>leveis of.anal'{sis framework. Thus, whereas scholars aiming to explain policies can be said</p><p>to practlse ~ logic of indusíon and exclusion, of privileging either actors ar structures,</p><p>those focusmg on decision-making processes take the opposite tack of including aI! pos~</p><p>sible factors Vlhich may play a role in the general activity of foreign policy decision making.</p><p>The first two groups also differ in terms of applying either a top-down or bottom-up ana-</p><p>Iytical procedure, in the sense that structural explanations gen::rally take the first farm,</p><p>while actor-based explanations take the secando This ís not the case with scholars explain-</p><p>ing decision-making processes, for which this problem does notseem to exist in 50 far as</p><p>each levei of analysis 15 treated separately and on its own merits in a 'fairly straightforward'</p><p>manner (Hudson 2007: 165)</p><p>These differences within FP point to at least two important issues. The first is common1y</p><p>referred to as the agency-structure problem, the implications of which are neatly illustrated</p><p>in the discussion above: scholars focusing on e)(plaining policies either view actors as the</p><p>prime cause cf policy actions, or give structures this role, and when both are present (as in</p><p>decision-making analyses), they are essentially treated as separate factors not interaeting</p><p>with each other. The prablem is that it is generally recognized that in real life actors and</p><p>struetur~s do not exist in such a zero-sum relationship but, rather, that human agents and</p><p>social str'uctUíeS are in a fundamental sense dynamícally interrelated entities, and that hence</p><p>V'J€ cannot account fully for the one wíthout invoking the other. Nane of the approaches</p><p>€lther actorS Of</p><p>. ~O pnv\\€ge tYS1Se each tenas I " -t leveIs of "na</p><p>eso\\Ied tnlS ploblern'hSI:C separate\y oll. d,ffe,€l'</p><p>d abol1€ n2S 1 ar -.:reats tI ,€ ~ c::yntheticd.scusse \anat\ons, . tegrated o' -</p><p>>-helfexp ~Oí ali In. . over</p><p>stru(\ur2S 11"',l bl1lty 3lld/or neeo , d namlC lnteractlOn</p><p>(se;h~~~a~s~; a second prr~~:~:b~~; ::~~\U;es an~ :~:~r: ~:~;~;he\rue prom:c~::sF~;~~~:\</p><p>{lamewQ(k In 'FP,,ncorp~udSo~ 15qUIte frank ab;~n the \ntegratlon 01 t'neo~ak\ng' (Hudscn</p><p>time betvveH\. thE tWOust be theoretlca\ lnteg:,a J on foreign po\\cy decl~IO[l aios 'a prorrllsE</p><p>Po\icy AnalySIS . - . m omplete perspectlv€ k ow\edges that thls rem</p><p>\ a more c n\y Q-.C nleveIs to deve ap "bTt issue she ope b •</p><p>2007 165). As to the feasl ':' yHuds~n 2007: 184). . , ion olley ls ,ndeed feasible, u,</p><p>fulfi\\ed for tne time belOb</p><p>(. , mewarkfor ana\yslng ',ore b P h than in process terml.un '._ nthetlC,ra . h 'ourratl;er .'</p><p>Myown Vlev.15 tnata SYsdefined as purposive pollcy be aVI.. \ fact that ali forelgn pollCY</p><p>only ifthe explanandum \ . _ and acceptance of the emp\nc~ _ "t"ve-psychological</p><p>The second step</p><p>is a reCogn.ltl0nd ther in the form of intentlOnl, cago! r . . onmDí'ts</p><p>' I -~eIlnke toge -' ndthelrenvlf ~ I •actioos, 5mall ar arge, c1 characterizing SOCletleS a ., t</p><p>factors, and the various structuraJ phen_om~na r actions must be able to give accoums toa</p><p>, I' ions of actüa\ to! ergn po lCy</p><p>and hence tnat exp anal: ... _ , of these tvpes of explanans.</p><p>no not by deflnition exc\ude ar pm"k.ge anf. _ I ynthetic a.na!ytical framework (on-</p><p>..J • h d ; conceptua\lztng sue 1a 5 I di)</p><p>/Viv own favounte met o OI . . : r y aetions (the explanan um</p><p>• . .' - r h TO explalnlng forelgn po lC . ~</p><p>sists of a slmple rnpartlte app,oac . l ,_., r nd a struetural dimenslOn ar ~xp\a-</p><p>. . l' \ cf an intentronaf, a arsposltIOI1Q" aconslstmg, (€spec lve y, _ ) (5 F'. ~ 6 - \</p><p>nation (the explanam), as follows (Cadsnaes I~92. ee 19urc .. 1</p><p>The agency-sÚ-ucture problem rocuses on the empirical c1aim that .huma.íl agents 3:d social structures</p><p>are fundam€-ntally interrelated. and hence that explanatiom of sOCIalaetlom must Incorporate both. Or,</p><p>as noted by [olin Wíght: 'In the social world both agents anc! structures are necessaryfor any social ad</p><p>to be possíbie' (Wight 2007: 111). The 'problem' is [hat although such views of reciprocal implication are</p><p>generalJy taken for granted, we neveriheless ;)ack a seJf-evidentway to conc,:,ptualise these entlties and</p><p>their relationshJps', as Alexander Wendt has noted. A\though he did this in 1987, in the first discussíon of</p><p>this issue in IR, it is fairto say that the problem is yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of'most IR theorlsts.</p><p>One persist~nt stumbling: block is the cominued influence cf t..vo types of e:~p.lanations in IR,which deny</p><p>either the need orthe possibility cf such a resolution: methodolcgical individualism, c1aiming that social</p><p>outcomes (an be explained solely in terms af the characteristics of individuais (a 'bottom-up' notion), and</p><p>methodological structura'lism, which acmrds such powers to strudures (a 'Iop-down' ootlon). A second</p><p>íssue that has caused considerabJe controversy is the c1aim that agents and structures 'constitute' eaC:l</p><p>other, and that thís is essentiallythe nature of the link between them. This means that although agenrs</p><p>and structures mutuaHy affecteach other, this relationsh1p is not of a causal nature. Here, Wendt has</p><p>argued in terms ofthis Jink providing expianations of what an entity is, as fcr e~:amDle in the master-slavE'</p><p>relationship-the one actor constitutes the other (see \'Vendt 1998). As agahst this: Wight has argued thar</p><p>the 'relationships that constitute them as certain types af sodal actors are v.hat causes them to behave in</p><p>certain ways' (Wight 2007: 117). A third body of controversy (and confusion) concerns the re!ationship</p><p>between agency-structure. micro-macro, and level-of-anaJysis issues. ali o: which are c!osely reJated,</p><p>sometimes confl2.ted w.th one another, bUi, v_hieh it is argued by some schoJars. should nevertheles5 be</p><p>~ep, analy-;:i~aJ!yapart. The most re::ent discussion of these issues-as of the agency-structure prGbJemariqu'2</p><p>lt1 generai-Js pruvJded by Wight in his penetrating and exhaustive book ar this topic (Wight 2007: 102-20;,</p><p>us</p><p>126 ---.,~</p><p>Structural ~</p><p>D 11/ o" '.</p><p>Í~ension I~PO~jtional</p><p>F</p><p>" DJmension IntentionaI</p><p>'gure 6.1 DThree dime . imension</p><p>nsrons for I'exp aming fore"</p><p>Alth3ugh Jgn pOlicy detions.</p><p>vi conCeptualized</p><p>ewed as c1ose/y linked' h as analytically autono</p><p>ner to pr d In t e sense th h maus, these thre d"O UCeincreasin I . at t ey can be eDn" . e Imensions should</p><p>The starting point in s~c~ :~haustlve (ar 'deeper') eXPla~:;~~e:;n a I09</p><p>1c</p><p>al step-by-step ma~~</p><p>between a given for' _ explanatlOn woufd be to f offorelgn policy actions</p><p>F" elgn polrcy act" ocu~ on the f st r k -</p><p>rgure 6.]). This is a teleolo i I ,?n and the intention ar ~oal th Ir In, i.e. the relatian</p><p>certain poJicy undert k' 9</p><p>T</p><p>ca refatlOnship, giving us the spe 'f" at It expresses (arrow 1 in</p><p>a Ing hi' I ClIcreason( ) f</p><p>nature ofthe explanand ' 5 ISa 50 a necessary first step, g'ven th ' s ar, ar goal(s) of, a</p><p>excellent example of su~:~~h:pS~~::c~~~:~an uni:icati~n by zelik;~na~e~~~~~ ('~~~~;i~:~</p><p>tJon.s.and statecrah at its best. However ;ch jg us a thlck descnption of top~[evel negotia-</p><p>addltlon.to intentionai explanations will'wa ~ ars who are alsc interested in giving causal in</p><p>be descnbed in term5 of an 'in arderto'a d n'bto go furtherthan this. ThJS distinction can al50</p><p>th f n a ecauseof'd" .-</p><p>e armer refers to actions pursued . t' . rmenSlon In explanations, in which</p><p>whlle the latter aims to indicate th In. entlonally (Le. 'in arder to' achieve a certain aim)</p><p>ose prior ar underlving m h . '</p><p>actor to have this but no! that intenf Th . ec anlsms which 'caused' a given</p><p>d</p><p>. lon, us scholars no! satísf d "th</p><p>escnptivelY the reasoning behind t . . re w[ merely tracing</p><p>other intentlon in the form of a poli:;:~~~rt:~t.t~nwill :~ntto ask wh.y one ~ather than an-</p><p>I h. I gwas €!ngpursuedtntr,eflrst-place</p><p>n ~uc .a~ anal~sls th~ next ~tep v:ou1d be to trace the link cetween the intention~1 and</p><p>the d,spa.s~tanal dlmen~lons, Wlt~ a vlew to findíng the particular and underlyíng psychalogí-</p><p>caJ.-cagn.ltlve factors ~hl~h have d/sposed a particular actorto havethis and not that preference</p><p>ar mtentlOn (arro~ 2m FIgure 6.1}.ln the analysis of such dispositl')ns the prímaryfocus would</p><p>be on the underlYlng va~ues(or.'belief systems') which motivate actors to pursue certain goals,</p><p>as~~II as on the percepttons WhlCh make actors see the world in particular ways ('world views').</p><p>Th,s lSwhere cognitive and psychological approaches to the explanatian offoreign palieI enter</p><p>mto the analytical picture.ln the case af German unification, for example, in-depth leaàership</p><p>analyses af t71evarious individual statesmen, not pursued by Zelikow and Rice, would be rele-</p><p>vant ;n determining the aetar dispasitions of the main protagonists.</p><p>This leaves us with the question of how struct~ral factors are to be incorporated into this</p><p>framework, since they are present in neither Df the first two dimensions- In my view, they do</p><p>50 in terms cf a third, 'deeper' and very powerful structural dimension, always underlying and</p><p>thus affecting lhe cognitive and psychological dispositions 01 individuais (arraw 3 in Figure</p><p>6.1). These structural fadors-domestic and international, social, cultural, econamic, material.</p><p>ar ideational-do 50 in many ways, but essentia.lly as a consequerrce of being perceiv_edJ re-</p><p>acted to, and taken ínto account by actors, and it is in tnis sense that structural factors can be</p><p>said to influence, condition, or otherwise affect-either by constraint ar by enabling-human</p><p>values, preferences. moods, and attituaes, i.e. actar dispositians as here conceptualized. It is</p><p>also by causally affecting the dispositional characteristics ofthe agents of policy in this manner</p><p>that on.e can say that structural faetors-via their effects 00 the dispositions of actors (and only</p><p>in this ~anner)-also àetermine the particular types of intentians motivating policies (thus</p><p>combk1ing ali t.hree arrowS). In the case Df German unificatian, such structural fadors would</p><p>be the end afthe (old VI/ar, the economic decline of lhe SOvlet Union, the gro:JP dynamics af</p><p>the persons involveó In the negotiations, the cantinued consoJ.i~ation of apeaceful European</p><p>Community, and the (entr;;.; importance af democracy-to name but a few</p><p>If this a?proach to foreign policy analysis provides an integrative framework. !inking both</p><p>individual decision makers anG social structures across state boundaries, does it resolve the</p><p>Qgency-structure problem? No, not as it stands, for although it combines anor and structural</p><p>features (which ISa step fon/Ilard),lt privileges structures aver actars In 50hí as the former are</p><p>viewed as having causal effects on the latter, but nOl: the latter ::mthe former. In short, it is a</p><p>logically static framework, which can be used to explain sing/e foreign policy 2ctions but not</p><p>a series ofsuch actions overtrme_ However, once we view policy</p><p>undertakings with rererence</p><p>ai50 to their actual outcornes-which may be intended Ot unintended, eKtEnsive ar marginal-</p><p>a dynamic component enters into the picture. In other v..•.ords, in 50 far as the5e outcomes</p><p>have subsequent effects over time on both the structures and actors dete,-mining the foreign</p><p>poliC'y undertakings of a particular state, we have a case or mutual interaction between the</p><p>two (see Carlsnaes 1992). To quote Hlll once again, this conceptualization of the reciprocal</p><p>relationship neat!y encapsulates the notion that 'Their interaction 15 a dynamic process, lead-</p><p>ing to the constant evalut;an af bath aetors and structures' (Hi112003:28),</p><p>In condusion, this is but Orle possible way, outlined in the barest detai!, in which to concep-</p><p>tualize an integrative framework ror the analysis of tr.e roles cf cctors and ~tructures i.I foreign</p><p>policy actions, aswell asa dynamic model of the age:1cy-strueture relatíonship. Neveítheless,</p><p>much remains to be dane to consolidate further a fieiá of study which, despite some Jean</p><p>years in the shadow of the vibrant theoretical developments and debates within t:!€ larger</p><p>discipline af IR, is now ready once again to make more space for itself.</p><p>o Keypoints</p><p>«l In the real world w"" find a number af actors. both domestic and internatioml, v.ho are cosely</p><p>involved in the ronnuiation af foreign policy. Equa 1':/,there are a number ofsuuetures on both</p><p>sides af the domestic-inteonationa! di ...•.ide that decisively affect these foreigrl palieI' acto"s ano</p><p>their behaviour in màny different ways</p><p>'i' The combinêtion or these factors complicates the conceptualizatian, explanation, and assessment</p><p>ofthe role ofactors anó structures in foreign polie)' analysis well beyond wnat ISthe case. for</p><p>exarnple, in the $wdy of ",ither domes:ic ar internationai poiitics, since it involves both of thes€ as</p><p>well as the mterplay bervveen i:hem</p><p>it .:"'sa conseqLence. it is not feasible to Incorporate actOrS and st"uctures fruif.utly into e,;plallatiolls</p><p>:)f foreign pclicy ,,,,'ithout analytically imposing some form of second-ordertheoretical ar</p><p>intellectual 'strueture. amo this exceedingly mess'i rirs!-order d:)main of foreign policy màing</p><p>as an empirical ObjECt cf study. In otherwords, li. is essential for the scholarto have some form at</p><p>:malytica! frCt11€v..'orl, or cpproQch as a startlng point.</p><p>~ This is also, in V;J.nO<J5 ways. whal scholars of Foreign Poli;:;' (FP) ha ..•..e tried to do over ;:he years, and</p><p>hence lt is adv in tf',ms 0;- ;:hese attemptS to structure this tield Cof study analytical1y that a '~a50nabiE</p><p>and fruitfu! e:.:ami:'2i:io!l 2nd dis.cussiO:l of the role af ac:tors and struetures within Ir cao proc:eed.</p><p>~ The fi,si "Such SE'ccnd.crcer conceptualizatlon is that 01 t~e explanandum-:he phenomencn</p><p>that is lb be eqlain'O'G. oh:en also referred to as 'ih€ deue!,dent '..•.ariable. Twú differer.t type-~ of</p><p>such e'Xplananda can be faund in the current literature: scholar:s focusing on fOI"eign policy as á.</p><p>127</p><p>128</p><p>decisiGn-making process, and schoJars (a much larger group) focusing on policy co(ceived;;ls a</p><p>produc: af such processes. In the first, aetors are viewed ai those indiv:duals partaking in decision</p><p>making, whereas structures are primarily those af the state. 00 behalf af which decisions are made.</p><p>In the secand, the role cf adors and structures is left undefined, since the fOCliS is on policies</p><p>defined as undertakings ar commitments, which ~~ aetor-like nor struetural in nature.</p><p>4jl The second and more importam analytical.category cf relevl.nce here is that oftheexplanans-</p><p>those factors scholars pointto in arder to explain a certain phenomenon. afien also referred to as</p><p>independeot variables. Scholars focusing on explaining foreign poliey qua processes tend to invokethe</p><p>explanatory role of actors and struetures in terms of the notion af analytically separate 'leveis of analysis'.</p><p>someof whicn are aetar-base<! and others structuraL On theatherhand, seholars who viewtheirobject</p><p>of analysis in policyterms tend to do 50 frem either oftwo perspeetives:those highlighting strudures as</p><p>e>:planatoryfaetors (a top~down view), ar those who privilege o.àors in this role (a battom-upview).</p><p>'" In view of this arro.y of eontending o.pproaches to the stuey ofthe role of aetors and structures in</p><p>FP, it is generally agreed that there is a strong need at present forseholars to facilitate integrative</p><p>frame-works of analysis, as wel1 as to break the habit ofvie,.ving aetors and struetures.as two</p><p>mutually exclusive ratherthan constitutive and interactive entities. One sueh suggestion in the</p><p>form of an analytlc2:.1framework is offered at the end of the ehapter.</p><p>fi Questions</p><p>1. Why is the study of the role of actors and structures in foreign policy important?</p><p>2. Why is it neeessary to employ approaches ar f,ameworks Gfanalysis when studying aetors o.nd strue-</p><p>tures in foreign policy?</p><p>3. Give a trief sketeh af the historiai development of foreign policy analysis.</p><p>4. What charaeterizes 'behaviouralisrn', and what effeets did it have on the subsequent development of</p><p>the Field offoreign poliey analysis?</p><p>5. Give a bnef charaet02rizatian of 'process' approaches to foreign polky analysis, and how they treat</p><p>actors and struetures.</p><p>6. What, in your view, is the essential differenee between 'process' and 'poliey' approaches to foreign</p><p>policy ana!ysis?</p><p>7. Give a brief outline and comparison of the various approaehes to foreign poliey anaJysis based on a</p><p>struetural perspeetive, and the role whieh actcrs and structJres play in these.</p><p>8. How do the eognitive and psyehologieal approaehes dis(ussed in the ehapter differ from process-</p><p>oriented approaehes?</p><p>9. Give a brief analysis of the ageney-structure problem and i[Srelevance to foreign polieyanalysis.</p><p>10. Evaluate the 'synthetic' framewark suggested i;"jthe condusion.</p><p>QFurther reading</p><p>AUison, G.T. and Zelikow, P. (1999), Essence af Deós;on: Explaining the Cuban Missife Cr;s;s (2nd</p><p>edn) (New York: Longman).</p><p>lhe second and rTluch revised and updated editíon of one oi the twentieth.century c1assics in foreign</p><p>poliey analysis. mueh read by students, seholars and decision makers alike.</p><p>Carlsnaes, W. and Guzzini, S. (eds) (2011), Foreign Po/;cy A!1alysis, Vols 1-5 (London: Sage).</p><p>A five-volume colleetion af some ofthe most seminal contributions to FP sinee the Second World</p><p>War. Although obviously a subjeetive cholee, this collection is intended to present a broad pieture of</p><p>ttle analyt,'cal d iversity of the field.</p><p>00000001</p><p>00000002</p><p>00000003</p><p>00000004</p><p>00000005</p><p>00000006</p><p>00000007</p><p>00000008</p><p>00000009</p><p>00000010</p><p>00000011</p><p>00000012</p><p>00000013</p><p>00000014</p><p>00000015</p><p>00000016</p><p>00000017</p><p>00000018</p>