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<p>Foreign Policy</p><p>Theories, Actors, Cases</p><p>THIRD EDITION</p><p>Edited by</p><p>Steve Smith</p><p>Amelia Hadfield</p><p>Tim Dunne</p><p>OXFORD</p><p>UNIVERSITY PRESS</p><p>OXFORD</p><p>UNIVERSITY PRESS</p><p>Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,</p><p>United Kingdom</p><p>Oxford Universrty Press is a department of the University of Oxford</p><p>It furthers the University's objective of excelle11LI:! Ill research, schol.>.r!:hip,</p><p>and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of</p><p>Oxford University Press in the UK and in c.ertarn other countries</p><p>© Oxford University Press 2016</p><p>The moral rights of the authors have been asserted</p><p>First edition 2008</p><p>Second edition 2012</p><p>Impression: 2</p><p>All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in</p><p>a retrieval system. or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the</p><p>prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permrtted</p><p>by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprcgraphics</p><p>rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside ttle scope of the</p><p>above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford Universrty Press, at the</p><p>address above</p><p>You must not circulate this work in any other form</p><p>and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer</p><p>Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press</p><p>198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America</p><p>British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data</p><p>Data available</p><p>Library of Congress Control Number: 2016934372</p><p>ISBN 978-0-19-870890-2</p><p>Printed and bound in Great Britain by Bell and Bain Ltd, Glasgow</p><p>Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and</p><p>for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials</p><p>contained in any third party website referenced in thls work.</p><p>Contents in brief</p><p>Foreword</p><p>James N. Rosenau</p><p>How to use this book</p><p>Guided tour of the Online Resource Centre</p><p>Acknowledgements</p><p>Notes on contributors</p><p>Introduction</p><p>Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne</p><p>SECTION 1 Foreign policy analysis: Theoretical and historical perspectives</p><p>• • •• · · • ···· · · · · · • · ••• � · · · • • ! ! · · · • · .</p><p>1 The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis</p><p>Valerie M. Hudson</p><p>2 Realism and foreign policy</p><p>William C. Wohlforth</p><p>3 Liberalism and foreign policy</p><p>Michael W. Doyle</p><p>4 Constructivism and foreign policy</p><p>Trine Flockhart</p><p>..</p><p>5 Discourse analysis, post-structuralism, and foreign policy</p><p>Lene Hansen</p><p>s ECTI o N 2 Analysing foreign policy: Actors, context, and goals</p><p>xiii</p><p>xx</p><p>xxii</p><p>XXIV</p><p>xxvi</p><p>l</p><p>13</p><p>35</p><p>54</p><p>79</p><p>95</p><p>. . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' " . " . . . . ,. . . .. . . . . .</p><p>6 Actors, structures, and foreign policy analysis</p><p>Walter Carlsnaes</p><p>7 Foreign policy decision making: Rational, psychological,</p><p>and neurological models</p><p>Janice Gross Stein</p><p>8 Implementation and behaviour</p><p>Elisabetta Brighi and Christopher Hill</p><p>9 Public diplomacy</p><p>Caitlin Byrne</p><p>10 The role of media and public opinion</p><p>Piers Robinson</p><p>113</p><p>130</p><p>147</p><p>168</p><p>186</p><p>vi CONTENTS IN BRIEF</p><p>11 The primacy of national security 206</p><p>Brian C. Schmidt</p><p>12 Economic statecraft 222</p><p>Michael Mastanduno</p><p>13 Duties beyond borders 242</p><p>Michael Barnett</p><p>SECTION 3 Foreign policy case studies</p><p>• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •••••• •••••• • It • • • • •••••• • • ••• • •• •• • • • • • •</p><p>14 The Cuban Missile Crisis</p><p>Graham Allison</p><p>15 Canada and antipersonnel landmines: The case for human security</p><p>as a foreign policy priority</p><p>Lloyd Axworthy</p><p>16 Neoconservatism and the domestic sources of American</p><p>foreign policy: The role of ideas in Operation Iraqi Freedom</p><p>Yuen Foong Khong</p><p>17 China and the Tian'anmen Crisis of June 1989</p><p>Rosemary Foot</p><p>18 India and the World Trade Organization</p><p>Amrita Narlikar</p><p>19 Rising Brazil am.I Suulh America</p><p>Arlene B. Tickner</p><p>20 Australia and global climate change</p><p>Matt McDonald</p><p>21 Israeli-Egyptian (in)security: The Yom Kippur War</p><p>Gareth Stansfield</p><p>22 What kind of power? European Union enlargement and beyond</p><p>Lisbeth Aggestam</p><p>23 Energy and foreign policy: EU-Russia energy dynamics</p><p>Amelia Hadfield</p><p>24 The failure of diplomacy and protection in Syria</p><p>Karin Aggestam and Tim Dunne</p><p>Glossary</p><p>Endnotes</p><p>Bibliography</p><p>Subject Index</p><p>263</p><p>291</p><p>315</p><p>334</p><p>356</p><p>37G</p><p>394</p><p>411</p><p>431</p><p>451</p><p>476</p><p>495</p><p>505</p><p>512</p><p>551</p><p>Detailed contents</p><p>Foreword</p><p>James N. Rosenau</p><p>How to use this book</p><p>Guided tour of the Online Resource Centre</p><p>Acknowledgements</p><p>Notes on contributors</p><p>Introduction</p><p>Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne</p><p>The contemporary relevance of foreign policy</p><p>Foreign policy theory: disciplinary groundings</p><p>Organization of the third edition</p><p>SECTION 1 Foreign policy analysis: Theoretical and historical perspectives</p><p>. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . •· . ....... ... . . ...... .</p><p>1 The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis</p><p>Valerie M. Hudson</p><p>Introduction: three paradigmatic works</p><p>Classic FPA scholarship (1954-1993)</p><p>The psychological and societal milieux of foreign policy decision making</p><p>FPA self-reflection in the late 1970s and 1980s</p><p>Conclusion: contemporary FPA's research agenda</p><p>2 Realism and foreign policy</p><p>William C. Wohlfarth</p><p>Introduction</p><p>What is realism?</p><p>The development of realist theories</p><p>Realist analysis of foreign policy</p><p>Using realism in analysing foreign policy</p><p>Conclusion: hedgehogs, foxes, and analysing foreign policy</p><p>3 Liberalism and foreign policy</p><p>Michael W. Doyle</p><p>Introduction</p><p>Liberalism</p><p>Liberal foreign relations</p><p>Mitigating trade-offs</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>. . . . ....</p><p>xiii</p><p>xx</p><p>XXII</p><p>XXIV</p><p>XXVI</p><p>1</p><p>2</p><p>4</p><p>7</p><p>13</p><p>13</p><p>17</p><p>23</p><p>27</p><p>30</p><p>35</p><p>35</p><p>36</p><p>37</p><p>42</p><p>47</p><p>50</p><p>54</p><p>54</p><p>55</p><p>56</p><p>69</p><p>76</p><p>viii DETAILED CONTENTS</p><p>4 Constructivism and foreign policy</p><p>Trine Flockhart</p><p>Introduction</p><p>What is constructivism?</p><p>Applied constructivism</p><p>The essence of constructivism</p><p>Constructivism meets foreign policy</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>5 Discourse analysis, post-structuralism, and foreign policy</p><p>Lene Hansen</p><p>Introduction</p><p>Post-structural ism</p><p>Studying foreign policy discourses</p><p>Conclusion-the scope, strengths, and weaknesses of discourse analysis</p><p>SECTION 2 Analysing foreign policy: Actors, context, and goals</p><p>79</p><p>79</p><p>81</p><p>82</p><p>83</p><p>90</p><p>93</p><p>95</p><p>95</p><p>97</p><p>102</p><p>107</p><p>........••........•...•...•...•.....•............•...•...•...•...•....•...•..•...••••.•.•.</p><p>6 Actors, structures, and foreign policy analysis 113</p><p>Walter Carlsnaes</p><p>Introduction 113</p><p>Historical background 115</p><p>The role of actors and structures in 'process' approaches to FP 116</p><p>The role of actors and structures in 'policy' approaches to FP 118</p><p>Conclusion 124</p><p>7 Foreign policy decision making: Rational, psychological,</p><p>and neurological models 130</p><p>Janice Gross Stein</p><p>Introduction 130</p><p>Commonsensical understandings of rationality 131</p><p>Psychological models: the 'cognitive revolution' 132</p><p>Neuroscience, emotion, and computation 139</p><p>Conclusion 143</p><p>8 Implementation and behaviour 147</p><p>Elisabetta Brighi and Christopher Hill</p><p>Introduction 147</p><p>When actors meet their environment-theoretical issues 148</p><p>The practical importance of context 157</p><p>The instruments of foreign policy 161</p><p>Conclusion 166</p><p>DETAILED CONTENTS ix</p><p>9 Public diplomacy 168</p><p>Caitlin Byrne</p><p>Introduction 168</p><p>The origins and evolution of public diplomacy 170</p><p>Defining the new public diplomacy 172</p><p>Theorizing public diplomacy 176</p><p>Public diplomacy in action 179</p><p>Public diplomacy 2.0 182</p><p>Conclusion 183</p><p>10 The role of media and public opinion 186</p><p>Piers Robinson</p><p>Introduction 186</p><p>Public opinion and foreign policy 188</p><p>Media and foreign policy 190</p><p>Procedural versus substantive criticism and influence 196</p><p>Media, public opinion,</p><p>of the notion of foreign pol icy to</p><p>actors other than the state. We are now more incl ined to understand 'foreign policy' as a com­</p><p>bination of inputs and outputs that apply to the behaviour of a wide variety of actors, from</p><p>global institutions to influential social movements and regional actors such as the European</p><p>Un ion. Again, the d iscourse on negotiations, fol lowing the UK's 'Brexit' decision is a good</p><p>example of the enormous range of actors and motivations that constitute those in puts and</p><p>outputs. All such actors make use of foreign policies, and consequently have a high impact on</p><p>other states, societies, and organizations.</p><p>A second area where foreign policy is of growing relevance is in terms of its i nnovative con­</p><p>tribution to our understanding of the behaviour of international actors. Whereas the analysis</p><p>of foreign policy has trad itional ly focused on the state as the central foreign pol icy actor, it has</p><p>not meant accepting the core assumptions of real ism. Just as the international system can be</p><p>studied accord ing to various theoretical frameworks, the same can be said of foreign policy.</p><p>I ndeed, one of the drivers for the book is to connect both the classical and contemporary</p><p>theoretical work on foreign pol icy with wider currents in IR theory and, to a lesser extent,</p><p>the discipline of politics. Examples of the re- integration of key aspects of I R theory with for­</p><p>eign policy issues are evident in Section 1 of the book in wh ich leading theorists outl ine the</p><p>relevance to foreign policy of the main I R theories: real ism, l iberal ism, and constructivism,</p><p>alongside the tool of d iscourse analysis. In Section 2 authors make practical use of the key</p><p>3</p><p>4 STEVE S M I T H , AM EL IA H A D F I E LD, T I M D U N N E</p><p>insights of the I R canon by applying some of its more rad ical accounts; for example, drawing</p><p>on insights from post-structuralism and the connection between structures and agents in</p><p>both national and international realms. What this tells us is that there is not just one single</p><p>approach to foreign policy, but many. Final ly, foreign pol icy is an almost perfect subject for</p><p>examin ing in detai l the fundamental debates within the social sciences, most sign ificantly</p><p>the debate on the relative importance of structures and agency, the debate on whether we</p><p>should seek to explain or to understand foreign policy behaviour, the blurring of domestic</p><p>and international terrains, and the general interconnectedness of political, economic, and</p><p>socio-cu ltural dynamics.</p><p>Foreign policy theory: d iscipl inary groundings</p><p>U nderpinning Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases is the bel ief that the study of foreign pol i­</p><p>cy ought not to be regarded as an independent intellectual domain. This is an important issue,</p><p>since for most of the post Second World War period there has been a flourishing approach</p><p>known as foreign policy analysis {FPA). Hudson's chapter provides a comprehensive overview</p><p>of the history of FPA, and thus we do not need to d iscuss it at length here. However, we do</p><p>need to say why the coverage of this book is not restricted to FPA alone.</p><p>FPA developed in the 1 950s, and for the next thi rty years it was a vibrant research commu­</p><p>n ity in I R . As H udson notes, there were three main themes, each focused around a parad ig­</p><p>matic book. F irst there was the focus on foreign policy making, inspired by the work of Snyder,</p><p>Bruck, and Sap i n in the 1 950s, and then by the literature on bu reaucratic and organizational</p><p>pol itics in the 1 960s and 1 970s (notably the work of All ison and Halperin). Second, there was</p><p>a focus on the psychological d imension of foreign policy making, inspired by the work of</p><p>Kenneth Boulding and H arold and Margaret Spout i n the 1 950s, by Alexander George and</p><p>Michael Brecher in the 1 960s, and by lrvingJanis i n the 1 970s. Third, there was the attempt to</p><p>develop a theory of comparative foreign pol icy (CFP), inspired by J im Rosenau's work on the</p><p>relationship between genotypes of states and the sources of thei r foreign pol icy in the 1 960s.</p><p>FPA sought to develop m iddle-range theories; that is to say, theories that were not general</p><p>accounts of a l l foreign policy behaviour, but instead were accou nts of either the foreign pol i ­</p><p>cies of some types of states or foreign policy in specific situations (such as crises).</p><p>By the l ate 1 980s, FPA began to fall out of fashion. H udson d iscusses the reasons for this,</p><p>but clearly one of the main ones was the fai lure of the CFP project to develop a robust</p><p>theoretical framework. But if CFP was unsuccessfu l , the other two main strands of FPA-the</p><p>work on psychological processes and on policy making-had bui lt up robust and powerfu l</p><p>accounts of foreign policy. Therefore, to treat FPA as the only approach to the study of for­</p><p>eign policy would l imit our d iscussions, and of course would l ink our volume to a specific</p><p>approach to the study of foreign pol icy that was at its most influential and prod uctive in</p><p>the 1 960s and 1 970s. In short, reducing the study of foreign policy to be on ly FPA-related is</p><p>inaccurate, since many more theories are involved than those covered by FPA, and would</p><p>also focus on a specific approach that has decl ined in the last twenty years. The vast l iterature</p><p>on the USA's role in the world after 9/1 1 has connected with sign ificant FPA themes, such</p><p>as bureaucratic politics and groupthink , while not at the same time remain ing i nside the</p><p>subfield of FPA.</p><p>INTRODUCTION</p><p>We believe that the dynamics of foreign policy are found in a wide range of I R works.</p><p>I ndeed, the objects of foreign policy inquiry necessitate an engagement with a host of social</p><p>science fields, and a number of subfields ( including comparative pol itics, public policy analy­</p><p>sis, and international pol itical economy as well as I R). In terms of its l inks to the wider social</p><p>sciences in general, the study of foreign policy requires an engagement both with the l itera­</p><p>ture on policy making i n social psychology and with rational-actor models of policy making</p><p>that originated in economic i nterpretations of state behaviour. With regard to the political</p><p>science l iterature, much depends on how it is defined. As an aspect of state behaviour, for­</p><p>eign policy represents the pol icy making and unit behaviour involved i n i nter-state relations.</p><p>Therefore it can be d istinguished as a form of publ ic pol icy from domestic affairs. Conceptu­</p><p>ally, however, foreign policy l inks into much of the l iterature of public poli cy, with the notable</p><p>difference that its targets are (usual ly) actors outside the domestic process.</p><p>Within this context of interdiscipl inarity, we nevertheless believe that there is a special rela­</p><p>tionship between foreign pol icy and I R. Rather l ike a distant cousin, FPA is often still referred</p><p>to as an I R subfield, because of its location with in public pol icy, comparative pol icy, real­</p><p>ism, and psychology, as well as incorporati ng a range of other interdiscipl inary contributions.</p><p>While IR yields a host of approaches exploring (if not always engaging with) the tenets of</p><p>state behaviour, it is rarely deployed to discuss key aspects of FPA. This is odd, because both</p><p>sides are effectively talking about the same thing; both are interested in understanding the</p><p>input and output of state behaviour, and from a conceptual stand point both attempt to judge</p><p>which particular methodology is best to understand, explain, or even predict state behaviour</p><p>and its underlying motives. Where they sometimes differ is in relation to both the level of</p><p>analysis and the units of analysis.</p><p>To an extent, this connection has always been both organizationally and intellectually</p><p>strong. Organizationally, FPA, in the US, has been a standing group of the International Stud­</p><p>ies Association (ISA) for over forty years; in recent years,</p><p>this connection has been further</p><p>enhanced by the creation of a dedicated ISA journal on foreign policy. I ntel lectual ly, the entire</p><p>history of IR has witnessed a constant debate with in the main theories in terms of whether they</p><p>were theories of the international system or theories of foreign policy. This was most famously</p><p>discussed in David Singer's seminal article on 'The Level of Analysis Problem in International</p><p>Relations' (Singer 1 961 ), in which he noted that the two main levels at which we could analyse</p><p>IR were the state and the systems levels; each had thei r strengths and weaknesses, but crucially</p><p>each introduced biases into their explanations (for example, by respectively overestimating</p><p>and underestimating the d ifferences between states as actors). A s imi lar discussion has been</p><p>a constant theme in the work of Kenneth Waltz, who in Man, the State, and War (Waltz 1 959)</p><p>saw accounts of war being developed on three levels: human nature, the type of state, and the</p><p>structure of the international system. The latter two of these became the alternative choices for</p><p>explanation in his ground-breaking Theory of International Politics (Waltz 1 979). More recently,</p><p>there has been the development of a new and dynamic i nterplay between IR and what would</p><p>previously have been termed FPA. A good example here is Christopher H i l l's outstanding text­</p><p>book The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Hi l l 201 6), which draws heavily on ideas and con­</p><p>cepts found in writers associated with the theory of international society such as Hedley Bull</p><p>and RJ. Vincent. Beyond this, Europeanist approaches to the analysis of foreign policy have</p><p>produced accounts heavily influenced by its core case study of the EU, drawing largely upon</p><p>constructivism, historical approaches, and a range of nee-institutionalist theories.</p><p>5</p><p>6 S T E V E S M I T H , A M ELIA H A D F I E L D , T IM D U N N E</p><p>The final issue concerning discipl inary grounding relates to foreign policy theory and the</p><p>recent more rad ical accounts of IR . By and large, most critical theorists have avoided the study</p><p>of foreign policy because it impl ies a normative commitment to the values and i nterests of</p><p>particular states or of sovereign actors per se, exceptions being David Campbell (1 998, 1 992)</p><p>and Henrik Larsen (1 997). However, we bel ieve that taking states seriously is not lhe same</p><p>as privileging state actors as the 'normal' or 'proper' unit of international pol itical analysis. I n</p><p>short, we do not believe that such a focus entails committing the error of state-centrism. Stud­</p><p>ying state behaviour, an unavoidable dimension of foreign policy, does not make one a statist.</p><p>Colin Hay's work on critical pol itical analysis (Hay 2002) has been neatly adapted to apply</p><p>to foreign policy by Paul Wil l iams (2005: 5-7). Following this approach, we consider five</p><p>relevant features of critical pol itical analysis i n the bui lding of a non-statist foreign policy.</p><p>• Critical foreign policy should be empi rical without being empiricist; this is to say that</p><p>analysis should look at actual case studies and evidence, but within an explicit theoretical</p><p>and normative comm itment. Empiricism impl ies that the analysis is in some way 'neutral'</p><p>and that the evidence is not tainted by the theoretical and normative lenses through</p><p>which these 'facts' rather than others are seen as the ones to use.</p><p>Both structure and agency need to be brought into consideration. This is one of the</p><p>most contentious debates within the human ities and social sciences, but at its base is the</p><p>concern that, as Hol l is and Smith (1 991 ) put it, in the social world there are always at least</p><p>two stories to tell. Thus, we can either explain state behaviour as the resu lt of the structure</p><p>of the i nternational system, or see it as the outcome of policy making within the state.</p><p>Hay (and Will iams) stress that both agency and structure are involved in foreign policy,</p><p>with decisions being made (agency) but always within a set of constraints (structure).</p><p>A critical approach to foreign policy accepts a broad view of politics and avo ids the</p><p>danger of seeing politics as only i nvolved at the governmental level. Instead, states fi nd</p><p>themselves i n a context in which thei r actions are being shaped by non-governmental</p><p>organizations (NGOs) on the inside and transnati onal norms/social movements on the</p><p>outside. Therefore, critical accounts of foreign pol icy move beyond the i nterrelationships</p><p>between governmental bodies and factions to look at a wider definition of the pol itical</p><p>realm, specifically looking at the role of individuals and groups in terms of who wins and</p><p>who loses from foreign policy decisions.</p><p>Studying foreign pol icy critically also means confronting important theoretical issues</p><p>to do with knowledge and real ity. On the one hand, knowledge is constitutive in that</p><p>ideas/beliefs/d iscourses shape and constitute the world in which policy makers find</p><p>themselves; on the other hand, care must be taken to avo id accepting the leaders'</p><p>rationale as the cause of a particular action. All critically- incli ned scholars search for</p><p>gaps between words and deeds-moreover, such d iscrepancies allow academics to hold</p><p>leaders accountable to the claims and benchmarks contained in policy statements and</p><p>commitments.</p><p>• The study of critical foreign pol icy recognizes the contingency of the pol itical process.</p><p>Decision makers find themselves operating withi n parameters that constrain their</p><p>freedom, but equally they do make decisions. Thus, a critical approach accepts that things</p><p>could always have been different-foreign policy is never simply the realm of necessity.</p><p>I N TROD UCTION</p><p>To Hay's five points, we would add a sixth.</p><p>Being critical does not entail assuming bad faith about leaders and their reasons.</p><p>Responses to events often mean that there are no good or right choices, and responsible</p><p>scholarsh ip needs to recognize the costs of non-decisions as well as the price of decisive</p><p>actions. For example, during the Cuban Missi le Crisis in October 1 962, President</p><p>Kennedy made the controversial decision to set up a quarantine zone around Cuba.</p><p>This risked escalation of the crisis, but, as he noted at the time, doing nothing was not</p><p>an option. Simi larly, in the case of the diplomacy over I raq in 2002-2003, it is very</p><p>easy to believe that every move in the d iplomatic game was part of a grand strategic</p><p>plan. Saddam Hussein could have done far more to persuade the world that he was</p><p>serious about d isarmament; l ikewise, Britai n cou ld have delayed-or possibly derailed</p><p>enti rely-the US desire for a punitive war. Decisions by leaders matter; and qu ite often</p><p>alternative policy responses were avai lable to them, but they chose not to advance them.</p><p>In realizing that foreign policy is a realm of decisions and actions, albeit under conditions</p><p>of constraint and uncertainty, we should remember not to treat historical outcomes</p><p>as though they were a given. In the words of former US Secretary of State Madeleine</p><p>Albright: 'H istory happens forwards, but is written backwards.'</p><p>Taken together, we bel ieve that a critical approach to foreign policy offers significant potential</p><p>for looking at state behaviour with in a wider ecosystem of pol itics than has trad itional ly been</p><p>the case. As a framework for th inking about foreign pol icy, we bel ieve that a critical approach</p><p>as outli ned in the preceding six poi nts offers significant advantages over more l im ited state­</p><p>centric approaches often found i n the FPA literature.</p><p>Organization of the third edition</p><p>As Valerie Hudson makes clear in her opening chapter, si nee the 1 950s FPA has sought answers</p><p>to inter-state relations by looking at the three levels involved in foreign policy: individuals</p><p>(psychological/socio logical studies), groups (group-based analyses), and states themselves</p><p>(comparative foreign pol icy). This</p><p>three-level analysis is very much the organizing theme of</p><p>this book.</p><p>What this text adds, refi ned further in this th i rd edition , is an appreciation of the role of I R</p><p>theory in shedding l ight on the dynamics of both state-to-state and state-non-state activ­</p><p>ity. FPA has, of course, ventured out onto the high seas of middle-range theory, with James</p><p>Rosenau as the first captain of theories that 'mediated between grand pr1nciples and the com­</p><p>plexity of reality'. Vast amounts of cross-d iscipl i nary data have been produced from the latter</p><p>side of this equation. As Hudson points out, wh i le this data has been of significant benefit in</p><p>generating new views on what constitutes a proper analysis of foreign policy in the American,</p><p>British, and European schools, disagreement as to the right methods and tools has of late</p><p>created something of a 'methodological impasse' which, if not resolved, could further widen</p><p>al ready d ivergent approaches. Analyses of 'grand principles' have also missed the benefit of the</p><p>explicit axioms on statehood and statecraft avai lable pri ncipally from JR . Carlsnaes remi nds</p><p>us that realism itself is capable of l inki ng axioms to variables, thanks to Morgenthau's work</p><p>on translating 'the maxims of nineteenth-century European d iplomatic practice into more</p><p>7</p><p>8 STEVE S M I T H , A M E L I A HADFI ELD , T I M D U N N E</p><p>general laws of an American social science' (Guzzini 1 998: 1 ) . Accordingly, realist, l iberal,</p><p>constructivist, and post-structural tenets can all provide equally robust explanations for the</p><p>external behaviour of sovereign states.</p><p>While the third edition does not attempt to produce a new type of middle-range theory, it</p><p>continues to engage with IR theory as the conceptual underpi nning of the key actors, struc­</p><p>tures, motives for action, and modes of implementation of foreign policy. The text is therefore</p><p>just as focused as the first two editions on the goal of identifying the grand principles at work</p><p>in foreign policy, both as a form of state behaviour and as an intellectual field, and its main</p><p>source for both these activities remains I R theory. As such, the following chapters retain a</p><p>keen appreciation for the ind ividual and group-based analyses of FPA, but they are equally</p><p>determined to shed light on the inter-state dynamics of which foreign pol icy is ultimately</p><p>comprised. Therefore, the uniqueness of the text lies in the advice first given by the late James</p><p>Rosenau, namely to provide a robust integrated analysis 'at several levels of analysis-from</p><p>individual leaders to the international system-in understanding foreign pol icy'.</p><p>The role of the I R perspectives presented in the text therefore is to generate conceptu­</p><p>al pay-offs for students, analysts, and practitioners. Our contributors do this by i l lustrating</p><p>the complementarity between individual, state, and structural dynamics of IR , and those</p><p>same levels of analysis found in FPA. As a result, the textbook is something of an exercise in</p><p>bridge-build ing. Narrowing the gap between FPA and IR should ultimately endow IR scholar­</p><p>ship with a greater appreciation of the mu lti level and multi-causal dynamics (so comprehen­</p><p>sively studied in FPA by Snyder and others), while s imultaneously granting FPA a clearer idea</p><p>of 'grand principles'; in other words, finding appropriate connective tissue for both sides as</p><p>well as keeping both the conceptual and practical sides of foreign pol icy as clearly balanced</p><p>as possible.</p><p>We have therefore asked the contributors to this third edition not to assume th;:it i:;t1 1-</p><p>dents have necessarily taken an 'introduction to international relations' course. Thus part of</p><p>the rationale for open ing with accounts of four dominant I R perspectives is to ensure that</p><p>students have a grasp of realist, l iberal, constructivist, and post-structural understandings of</p><p>actors, i nterests, commitments, and outputs. The third edition has retained the popular addi­</p><p>tions of the previous ed ition, with updated contributions on real ism, l iberalism, constructiv­</p><p>ism, and discourse analysis, designed as a whole to shed light on the wider dynamics of state</p><p>behaviour and the specific tenets of FPA. Here, real ism is reviewed again by Wohlfarth not</p><p>merely as the progen itor of the state, but as the conceptual foundation of statecraft , revealing</p><p>more clearly the l inks between anarchy, survival, the national interest, and national security,</p><p>as further i l l ustrated by Schmidt. As evidenced by many of our case studies, the realist canon</p><p>is alive and well and employed in many ministries of foreign affairs.</p><p>Liberalism continues to produce a more sophisticated overview of individuals, states, and</p><p>structures, providing bridges between key concepts of cooperation, institutions, and the</p><p>world of international pol itical economy. As Doyle poi nts out, l iberal ism needs to be under­</p><p>stood both as a foreign pol icy attitude and as a conceptual tool with which to deconstruct</p><p>foreign pol icy actions, shedding l ight on how individuals, ideas, and ideals (human rights, l ib­</p><p>erty, and democracy) connect to social forces (capital ism, markets) and pol itical institutions</p><p>{democracy, representation), which in turn di rectly affects foreign relations.</p><p>Constructivism takes further steps to open the black box of the state, permitting an in­</p><p>depth overview of the myriad forces of power, influence, identity construction, and the logics</p><p>of behaviour. Flockhart demonstrates once agai n that constructivism possesses the capacity</p><p>I NTRODUCTI O N</p><p>to understand how al l iances, such as NATO, adapt i n response to new contexts. Meanwhi le,</p><p>the u pdated chapter on d iscourse analysis by Hansen rounds out Section 1 by not only bring­</p><p>ing the spectrum of I R theories up to date, but also persuasively argu ing in favour of the need</p><p>to systematically deconstruct the textual artefacts of foreign policy (e.g. speeches, statements,</p><p>primary documents) to grasp more clearly the nature of what is said, and what is left unsaid.</p><p>In Section 2, the structure draws emphatical ly upon IR-oriented perspectives twinned with</p><p>FPA concepts to explore the specific appl ication of real ist, l iberal, and constructivist perspec­</p><p>tives in terms of national security (Schmidt), economic statecraft (Mastanduno), and cosmo­</p><p>politan responses (Barnett). Section 2 also i l lustrates in some detail the range of structures,</p><p>actors, and identifiable goals making up the international system. Carlsnaes ( l ike Flockhart)</p><p>i l lustrates the potential of an I R-FP interface in his exam ination of ind ividual policy making,</p><p>the role of bureaucracies and organizations (as first explored by All ison), and the activities of</p><p>international society, while Brighi and Hi l l examine one of the least well understood dynamics</p><p>of the foreign policy decision-making cycle: that of implementation. Stein revisits the impera­</p><p>tives at work in decision making at the individual level, but which have profound implications</p><p>for the psychological, rational, and neurological explanations for decisions taken by un its,</p><p>groups, and states themselves. Examinations of transnational communication come from</p><p>Robinson's chapter on the d iscursive effect of the media's influence on foreign policy, in which</p><p>he provides new coverage of social media and its impact on foreign policy decision making,</p><p>while the new chapter by Byrne on the i ncreasing sal ience of publ ic dip lomacy within foreign</p><p>policy provides a necessary new complement to these mu ltiple perspectives.</p><p>Section 3 offers an insightfu l series of contemporary case studies, with clear examples of th is</p><p>same I R-FP interface at work. After the seminal chapter by Al l ison on one of history's most</p><p>nail-biting episodes of foreign policy, Section 3 featu res chapters by Khong on the ro le of</p><p>national security from the perspective of US neoconservatism; Narl ikar, who renews her focus</p><p>on economic foreign</p><p>pol icy that contextual izes the relationship between India and the World</p><p>Health Organisation (WHO); and Hadfield, who reviews the fast-moving world of European</p><p>energy security in the context of fractious EU-Russia-Ukraine relations. Axworthy, Foot, and</p><p>Lisbeth Aggestam deal with the role of norms changing the foreign policy perspectives of</p><p>Canada, China, and the European Un ion, respectively, with Aggestam commenting instruv­</p><p>tively on the policy ramifications of the UK's June 201 6 'Brexit' decision. Reflecting a world of</p><p>emerging powers and regions, Stansfield re-examines the role of cu lture affecting the Arab­</p><p>Israel i peace process i n the context of the Yorn Kippur War, whi le chapters by McDonald and</p><p>Tickner examine cl imate change in relation to Austral ian foreign and security policy, and the</p><p>role of Brazi l and Latin America in international pol itical analysis, respectively. Karin Agges­</p><p>tam and Tim Dunne conclude the case study section with a new chapter on the Syria crisis, in</p><p>which they examine the motives of other actors, particularly the major powers, i n their deci­</p><p>sions to finally escalate their mi l itary engagement in 201 5. All contributions to Section 3 feature</p><p>additional engagement with practitioner d imensions, with a variety of new learning boxes</p><p>focusing on foreign pol icy decisions d i rectly and indirectly related to the case at hand, giving</p><p>readers a flavour of the practical challenges confronting decision makers at any given time.</p><p>Lastly, the invaluable in put detailed by Steve Lamy on the teaching of foreign pol icy case stud­</p><p>ies is now to found on l ine as part of the lecturer resources within the Onl ine Resource Centre,</p><p>allowing for more material aimed d i rectly at the students to be included in the textbook.</p><p>In summary, we think that there are six main features of this th i rd edition. F irst, as we hope</p><p>we have made clear in this I ntroduction, our aim is to bridge the l iterature on FPA with wider</p><p>9</p><p>1 0 STEVE S M IT H , AM E LIA HAD F I E LD, T IM D U N N E</p><p>theoretical insights from I R . Second, the contributions to the book demonstrate that there</p><p>is no single approach to explaining and understanding foreign pol icy; it is a varied field that</p><p>reaches out to many disciplines and draws on diverse theoretical groundings. Third, the book</p><p>seeks to bui ld knowledge about foreign policy on the basis of empirically informed theory</p><p>and theoretically informed cases. Fourth, we have attempted to include studies on all th ree</p><p>core focal points of FPA as identified by Hudson (group policy making, psychology, and state­</p><p>level explanations). Fifth, this collection does not confine our thinking about foreign policy to</p><p>the state; instead, most of our contributors concur that many other types of organizations and</p><p>actors (e.g. the EU) are capable of constructing and pursuing foreign pol icies, and therefore</p><p>we assume that the kinds of account discussed in this book will be appl icable to these other</p><p>types of actors. Sixth, we have brought critical accounts of foreign policy into the conversa­</p><p>tion; accounts which draw on a wider notion of pol itics where actions are oriented towards</p><p>normative outcomes and where policy makers are seen making choices, albeit in ci rcum­</p><p>stances where thei r room for manoeuvre is often heavily constrained.</p><p>We hope that readers wi l l find this a helpful and clear gu ide to th inking about foreign</p><p>policy. The study of foreign pol icy is entering an exciting period of renewal, and we trust that</p><p>the theories, concepts, and case stud ies dealt with in this book wil l serve as a valuable road­</p><p>map that can help make sense of the choices and d i lemmas facing actors trying to reach their</p><p>foreign policy goals.</p><p>Sect ion 1</p><p>. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .</p><p>Foreign pol icy</p><p>analysis</p><p>Theoretical and h istorical</p><p>perspectives</p><p>. . ,. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .</p><p>1 The history and evolution of foreign policy analysis</p><p>2 Realism and foreign policy</p><p>3 Liberalism and foreign policy</p><p>4 Constructivism and foreign policy</p><p>5 Di�course analysis, post-structuralism, and foreign policy '</p><p>1 3</p><p>35</p><p>54</p><p>79</p><p>95</p><p>- -</p><p>The h i story and evolution</p><p>of foreign pol icy analysis</p><p>VAL E R I E M . H U DSON</p><p>Chapter contents</p><p>Introduction: three paradigmatic works 13</p><p>Classic FPA scholarship (1954-1993) 17</p><p>The psychological and societal milieux of foreign policy decision making 23</p><p>FPA self-reflection in the late 1970s and 1 980s 27</p><p>Conclusion: contemporary FPA's research agenda 30</p><p>Reader's guide</p><p>This chapter traces the evolution of foreign policy analysis (FPA) as a subfield of</p><p>international relations (JR) from its beginnings in the 1950s through its classical pe­</p><p>riod until 1 993; jt then sketches the research agenda of contemporary FPA, which</p><p>is represented by the other chapters in this volume. Three paradigmatic works, by</p><p>Richard Snyder and colleagues, James Rosenau, and Harold and Margaret Sprout,</p><p>laid the foundation of this subfield. In turn, these works created three main threads</p><p>of research in FPA: focusing on the decision making of small/large groups, compara­</p><p>tive foreign pol icy, and psychological/sociological explanations of foreign policy.</p><p>These three primary areas of research have waxed and waned in importance to the</p><p>subfield over the years. Current FPA scholarship explores l inkages between these</p><p>literatures, seeking both greater cross-level integration of explanation and new</p><p>methodologies more appropriate to cross-level analysis.1</p><p>I ntroduction: three paradigmatic works</p><p>What are the origins of foreign policy analysis (FPA)? I n one sense, FPA-style work-that</p><p>is, scholarship whose theoretical ground is human decision makers, acting singly or within</p><p>groups-has been around as long as there have been historians and others who have sought</p><p>to understand why national governments have made the choices they did regarding i nter­</p><p>state relations (see Box 1 .1 ). But FPA-style work within the field of International Relations ( IR)</p><p>per se is best dated back to the late 1 950s and early 1 960s.</p><p>Three paradigmatic works arguably built the foundation of FPA.</p><p>• Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics by Richard C. Snyder,</p><p>H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin ( 1 954: see also Snyder et al. 1 963; reprinted in 2002).</p><p>1 4 VA L E R I E M . H U D S O N</p><p>eox 1 . 1 Key i:lefin itions</p><p>FOREIGN POU� The strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its</p><p>relations wi th e,ctemaf er, rlies. Thrs includes decisions to do nothing.</p><p>FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR The observable artefacts of foreign policy-specific actions and words used to</p><p>i 1 1 fluence others 1n the realm of for'eig,, po l icy; mily include the categorization of such behaviour, such</p><p>as along confl ict-cooperat ion continua, which categorizations could be used to consrruct data includ ing</p><p>event data. Foreign policy behaviour may include behaviour that was accidental o r un intended by the</p><p>government, and in add ition decisions to do nothing may not leave any behavioural artefact. Thus there</p><p>is sl ippage between the concept of foreign policy and the concept of foreign pol icy behaviour.</p><p>FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS The subfield of international relations that seeks to explain foreign policy,</p><p>or, alternatively, foreign policy behaviour. with reference to the theoretical ground of human decision</p><p>makers, acting singly and in groups. The subfield has several hal lmarks:</p><p>• a commitment to look below the nation-state level of analysis to actor-specific information;</p><p>• a commitment to bui ld actor-specific theory as the interface between actor-general theory and the</p><p>complexity of the</p><p>real world ;</p><p>• a commitment to pursue multicausal explanations spann ing multiple levels of analysis;</p><p>• a commitment to uti l ize theory and findi ngs from across the spectrum of social science;</p><p>• a commitment to viewing the process of foreign policy decision making as being as important as</p><p>the output thereof.</p><p>ACTOR•GENERAL THEORY Theory that explains the behaviour of actors i n general, such as game theory.</p><p>ACTOR-SPECIFIC THEORY Theory that explains the behaviour of !ipeclfrc i\ctO�, surh ;if; FPA theory. Thfs typ of</p><p>theory may be genenaHz.able, bu under speo fie scope condltions for appl icabi lity. Actor-specific heory is a</p><p>forrn of middle-range theory, in Iha rt is more generalfzablc thari ins ights derived frt>rn tase studTes but. on</p><p>the ot,,er'haod, has more severe scope condit ions con�ining Its general izability than actor-general theory.</p><p>However, given Its nature, actor-specific theory allovvs for richer explana�ion 9-nd even prediction of the</p><p>fore gn pol icy b'ehaviour of particular entities than does actor-generaJ theo�.</p><p>• 'Pre- theories and Theories of Foreign Pol i cy' by James N . Rosenau (a book chapter</p><p>written In 1 964 and publ ished in Farre l l 1 966).</p><p>• Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics by Haro ld</p><p>and Margaret Sprout (1 956: expanded and revised in article form in 1 957 and the i r 1 965</p><p>book The Ecolo9ical Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International</p><p>Politics; see Box 1 .2).</p><p>The work of Richard Snyder (Photo 1 . 1 ) and his col leagues insp i red researchers to look below</p><p>the nation-state level of analys is to the p layers i nvolved:</p><p>We adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental leve l of analysis , yet we have d iscarded</p><p>the state as a metaphysical abstraction. By emphasizi ng decis ion making as a centra l focus</p><p>we have provided a way of organizing the determ inants of action around those officia l s who</p><p>act for the pol itical society. Decision makers are viewed as operati ng i n dual -aspect setti ng</p><p>so that apparently unrelated i nternal and external factors become re lated in the actions</p><p>of the decision makers. H itherto, precise ways of relating domestic factors have not been</p><p>adequately developed. (Snyder et al. 1 954: 53)</p><p>C H A P T E R 1 T H E H I S TO RY A N D EVO L U T I O N O F F O R E I G N P O L I C Y A N A LY S I S</p><p>eox 1 . 2 Three paradigmatic works of foreign policy analysis</p><p>Richard Snyder</p><p>Decision Making as an Approach</p><p>to the Study of International</p><p>Politics by Richard C. Snyder,</p><p>H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin</p><p>(1 954: see also Snyder et al.</p><p>1 963; reprinted in 2002).</p><p>Contributed a focus on the</p><p>decision-making process itself as</p><p>part of the explanation, rather</p><p>than just foreign policy outputs</p><p>James Rosenau</p><p>'Pre- theories and Theories of</p><p>Foreign Pol icy' by James N.</p><p>Rosenau (a book chapter written</p><p>in 1 964 and published in Farrel l</p><p>1 966).</p><p>Development of actor-specific</p><p>theory that would lead to the</p><p>development of generalizable</p><p>proposi tions at the level of</p><p>middle-range theory</p><p>Photo 1 .1 Richard Snyder lead ing a foreign policy seminar.</p><p>Harold and Margaret Sprout</p><p>Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses</p><p>in the Context of lntemarional Politics</p><p>by Harold and Margaret Sprout</p><p>(1 956: expanded and revised in</p><p>article form in 1 957 and their 1 965</p><p>book The Ecological Perspective on</p><p>Human Affairs with Special Reference</p><p>to International Politics).</p><p>Foreign pol icy can only be</p><p>explained with reference to the</p><p>psycho-mi lieu ( he psychological,</p><p>situational, pol itical, and social</p><p>contexts) of the individuals</p><p>involved i n decision making</p><p>Source: © Princeton University Library. Princeton Un iversity Archives, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections,</p><p>Princeton University Library.</p><p>1 5</p><p>1 6 VALER IE M . H U D SON</p><p>I n taking this approach , Snyder and his colleagues bequeathed to FPA its characteristic</p><p>emphasis on foreign policy decision making (FPDM) as versus foreign policy outcomes. Deci­</p><p>sion making was best viewed as 'organizational behaviour', by which the basic determinants</p><p>would be spheres of competence of the actors involved, communication and information</p><p>flow, and motivations of the various players. Desirable explanations would thus be both mul­</p><p>ticausal and i nterdisci pl i nary.</p><p>As explored in the Foreword, James Rosenau's pre-theorizing encouraged scholars to</p><p>systematically and scientifically tease out cross-nationally appl icable general izations about</p><p>nation-state behaviour. As Rosenau (Photo 1 .2) put it:</p><p>To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To understand processes that affect external</p><p>behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not</p><p>under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as wel l as external factors is</p><p>not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one pre­</p><p>dominates over the other . . . Foreign policy analysis lacks comprehensive systems of testable</p><p>generalizations . . . Foreign policy analysis is devoid of general theory. (Rosenau 1 966: 98-99)</p><p>General testable theory was needed, and the intent of Rosenau's article was to point in the</p><p>d irection it lay. However, the general theory Rosenau advocates is not the grand theory</p><p>of Cold War IR ; the metaphor Rosenau used in this work is instructive in this regard-FPA</p><p>researchers should emulate Gregor Mendel, the father of modern genetics, who was able to</p><p>discern genotype from phenotype in plants through careful observation and comparison. Are</p><p>there genotypes of nation states, knowledge of which would confer explanatory and predic­</p><p>tive power on our models of foreign policy i nteraction? What Rosenau was encouraging was</p><p>the development of middle-range theory-theory that mediated between grand principles</p><p>and the complexity of reality. At the time Rosenau wrote this article, he felt that the best way</p><p>to uncover such mid-range generalizations was through aggregate statistical exploration and</p><p>confirmation. Rosenau also underscored the need to integrate i nformation at several levels</p><p>of analysis-from individual leaders to the i nternational system-in understanding foreign</p><p>policy. As with Snyder, the best explanations would be m ulti level and multicausal, i ntegrating</p><p>information from a variety of social science knowledge systems.</p><p>Photo 1 .2 James Rosenau, pioneer of foreign policy analysis.</p><p>CHAPTER 1 THE H I STORY AND EVOLUT ION OF FORE IGN POLICY AN ALYS I S</p><p>Harold and Margaret Sprout (Photo 1 .3) contributed to the formation of the field by sug­</p><p>gesting that understanding foreign policy outputs, which they associated with the analysis of</p><p>power capabil ities within an interstate system, without reference to foreign policy undertakings,</p><p>which they associated with strategies, decisions, and intentions, was m isguided: 'Explanations</p><p>of achievement and estimations of capabil ities far achievement invariably and necessarily pre­</p><p>suppose antecedent undertakings or assumptions regarding undertakings. Unless there is an</p><p>undertaking, there can be no achievement-and nothing to explain or estimate' ( 1 965: 225).</p><p>To explain undertakings, one needs to look at the psycho-milieu of the individuals and groups</p><p>making the foreign pol icy decision. The psycho-mil ieu is the i nternational and operational envi­</p><p>ronment or context as it is perceived and interpreted by these decision makers. I ncongruities</p><p>between the perceived and the real operational environments can occur, leading to less than</p><p>satisfactory choices in foreign pol icy. The sources of these incongruities are diverse, requiring</p><p>once again multicausal explanations drawn from a variety of fields. Even in these early years,</p><p>the Sprouts saw a clear difference between FPA and what we have called actor-general theory:</p><p>Instead of drawing conclusions regarding an individual's probable motivations and</p><p>pu rposes,</p><p>h is environmental knowledge, and h is intellectual processes l inking purposes and knowl­</p><p>edge, on the basis of assumptions as to the way people are likely on the average to behave</p><p>in a given social context, the cognitive behavioralist-be he narrative h istorian or systematic</p><p>social scientist-undertakes to find out as precisely as possible how specific persons actually</p><p>did perceive and respond in particular contingencies. (Sprout and Sprout 1 965: 1 1 8)</p><p>The message of these three works was powerful i n its appeal to certain scholars: the par­</p><p>ticularities of the human beings making national foreign pol icy were vital ly important to</p><p>understanding foreign pol icy choice. Such particularities should not remain as undigested</p><p>idiosyncrasies (as I n traditional single-country studies), but rather be i ncorporated as instan­</p><p>ces of larger categories of variatlon in the process of cross-national m idd le-range theory</p><p>bui lding. Multiple levels of analysis, ranging from the most micro to the most macro, should</p><p>ideally be integrated in the service of such theory. The stores of knowledge of all the social</p><p>sciences must be drawn upon in this endeavour. The process of foreign pol icy making was at</p><p>least as important as, if not more important than, foreign pol icy as an output. The substance</p><p>of this message was, and continues to be, the 'hard core' of FPA (see Box 1 .3).</p><p>The second wave of theorizing built upon the foundational paradigmatic works. Between</p><p>1 974 and 1 993 FPA developed a number of paral lel research pathways (see Box 1 .4).</p><p>Other parts of the message were more temporal ly bounded. As we shall see, certain meth­</p><p>odological stances that perhaps seemed self-evident in the early 1 960s would not stand the</p><p>test of time. These would engender troubl ing paradoxes, which would plague the field and</p><p>lead to a temporary decl ine in some areas in the mid- to late 1 980s until they were satisfac­</p><p>torily resolved. Despite these paradoxes, the first bloom of FPA, lasting from the late 1 960s to</p><p>the aforementioned decli ne, was a time of great intel lectual effort and excitement.</p><p>Classic FPA scholarship (1 954-1 993)</p><p>The energy and enthusiasm of the first generation of work in FPA ( 1 954-1 973) was tremen­</p><p>dous. Great strides in conceptual ization, along with paral lel efforts in data collection and</p><p>methodological experimentation, were the contributions of this time period. The second</p><p>1 7</p><p>1 8 VA L E R I E M . H U DSON</p><p>Photo 1 .3 Harold and Margaret Sprout, who emphasized the psychological milieu of individual and group</p><p>decision making.</p><p>Source: © Princeton University Library. Princeton University Archives, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections,</p><p>Prir,ceton Unive�[ty Library.</p><p>�---</p><p>BOX 1 .3 Primary levels of analysis in FPA</p><p>Cognitive processes Cognition, learning, heuristic fallacies, emotion, etc.</p><p>Leader personality and orientation Operational codes, motivations, psychobiography, etc.</p><p>Small-group dynamics Groupthink, newgroup, coalitions, etc.</p><p>Interface of leader personality with small-group composition</p><p>Organization process Incremental learning, standard operating procedures, implementation issues, etc.</p><p>Bureaucratic politics Turf, morale, budget, influence, inter-agency group politics, etc.</p><p>Culture and foreign policy Identity and nationalism, heroic histories, role theory, etc.</p><p>Domestic political contestation Regime type, media, political interest groups, organized party</p><p>contestation and electoral politics, etc.</p><p>National attributes and foreign policy Geography, resources, economic factors, etc.</p><p>System effects on foreign policy Anarchy, distribution of power, regional balances of power, etc.</p><p>generation of work from about 1 97 4 to 1 993 expressly bui lt upon those foundations. Tho1..1gh</p><p>it is always difficult to set the boundaries of a field of thought, the overview which follows</p><p>includes a representative sampl ing of classic works in the first and second generation, wh ich</p><p>both examined how the 'specifics' of nations lead to differences in foreign policy choice/</p><p>behaviour and put forward propositions in this regard that at least have the potential to be</p><p>general izable and applicable cross-national ly.</p><p>C H A PT E R 1 T H E H I S T O RY A N D E V O LU T I O N O F FO R E I G N P O L I C Y A N A LYS I S</p><p>BOX 1 .4 Classical foreign pol icy analysis-tlie seconcl generation</p><p>Smal l -group dec is ion maki ng</p><p>Refers to the process and structure of groups maki ng foreign pol icy decisions. The groups that were</p><p>studied ranged i n size from very smaf l groups to large organizations and bureaucracies. I nsights from</p><p>social psychology were incorporated i nto FPA. It was discovered that the motivation to maintai n group</p><p>consensus and personal acceptance by the group cou ld result in a deterioration of decision-making</p><p>qual ity.</p><p>Organ izational process and bureaucratic po l iti cs</p><p>Researchers began to study the influence of organization process and bure.aU1cratic pol itics on foreign</p><p>policy decision making. Organ izations and bul'eaiicra.cie.s put their own survival at the top of their l ist of</p><p>prlorines; o�en they wil l seek to inc;rease their relative strength. It was found that the u lu.:u or objectives of</p><p>foreign pol icy decis ion 'players' i nfluenced thei r decision maki ng.</p><p>Comparative foreign pol icy</p><p>The subfield of comparative foreign pol icy (CFP) developed as a response to James Rosenau's challenge</p><p>to bu i ld a cross-national and mu lti level theory of foreign pol icy. Foreign pol icy behaviour events, as</p><p>d i sparate as warfare, treaty making, or d ip lomacy, cou ld be compared and aggregated. Data was col lected</p><p>on a variety of possible explanatory factors to determ ine patterns by which these i ndependent variables</p><p>were correlated. Researchers hoped to emerge with a grand un ified theory of foreign policy behaviour</p><p>appl icable to a l l nations and time periods. The empir ical results were less than the p rotagonists had</p><p>hoped.</p><p>Psychological i nfl uences on foreign pol icy dec is ion mak i ng</p><p>I ncreasing attention was directed to the mind of the f0reigo pol icy de ision maker. Under certain stressful</p><p>cond itions, ind ividual characteristics would become crucial in understanding how deci ions are made</p><p>Also, the problem of misperception was identifi ed, with potential d isastrous consequences in relat ion to</p><p>quest ions of war and peace.</p><p>Societal m i l ieux</p><p>The societal context also came to the fore. Researchers examined how far national attributes, such as</p><p>culture history, geQgraphy, economics, pol itical i nstitutions, mi l itary power, ideology, and demographics,</p><p>determined pol icy making. The nature of regime type also rose in prom nence, particularly wi h 1he</p><p>real ization that democracies tended not to fight with one another.</p><p>Group decision making</p><p>Snyder and co l leagues had emphas ized the process and structu re of groups making fore ign</p><p>po l icy dec is ions (Snyder extended h is work with case stud ies i n col laboration with G lenn</p><p>Paige; see Snyder and Paige 1 958; Paige 1 959 ; Paige 1 968). N u merous scho lars echoed th is</p><p>theme in their work , wh ich ranged from the study of foreign pol i cy maki ng in very smal l</p><p>groups to the study o f foreign pol icy making in very large organ izations and bu reaucracies.</p><p>1 9</p><p>20 VA LER I E M. H U D SON</p><p>Small-group dynamics</p><p>Some of the most theoretical ly long-l ived work produced duri ng this period centred on</p><p>the consequences of making foreign pol icy decisions in small groups. Social psychologists</p><p>had explored the un ique dynamics of such a decision setting before, but never in relation</p><p>to FPDM, where the stakes might be much higher. The most important work is that of Irving</p><p>Jan is, whose seminal Victims of Groupthink almost single-handedly began this research trad i­</p><p>tion. In that volume, and using studies drawn specifically from the realm of foreign</p><p>policy,</p><p>Janis shows convincingly that the motivation to maintain group consensus and personal</p><p>acceptance by the group can cause deterioration of decis ion-making q ual ity. The empiri­</p><p>cal research of Leana (1 975), Semmel (1 982), Semmel and M inix (1 979), Tetlock {1 979), and</p><p>others extended this research using aggregate analysis of experimental data as well as case</p><p>studies. Groupth ink becomes one of several possible outcomes in the work of C.F. Hermann</p><p>(1 978). Hermann categorizes groups along several dimensions (size, role of leader, rules for</p><p>decision, autonomy of group participants), and is able to make general predictions about the</p><p>l ikely outcome of del iberations in each type of group.</p><p>The work of the second wave moved 'beyond groupth ink' to both refine and extend our</p><p>understand ing of small-group processes. Representative work includes Herek et al. (1 987,</p><p>1 989), McCauley ( 1 989), Ripley (1 989), Stewart et al. ( 1 989), Hart (1 990), Gaenslen (1 992),</p><p>and Hart et al. (1 997).</p><p>The second wave also brought with it a new research issue. How does a group come to under­</p><p>stand, represent, and frame a given foreign policy situation? Works include those by George</p><p>Breslauer, Charles F. Hermann , Donald Sylvan, Phi l ip Tetlock, and James Voss (Vertzberger 1 990;</p><p>Breslauer and Tetlock 1 991 ; Voss et al. 1 991 ; Bi l l ings and Herman n 1 994). Turning to efforts by</p><p>ind ividual scholars, we wi l l highl ight the work of Khong (1 992) and Boynton (1 991 ).</p><p>Boynton wishes to understand how human agents in groups come to agreement on the</p><p>nature of a foreign policy s ituation. In his 1 991 paper (cited above), he uses the official record</p><p>of Congressional Committee hearings to investigate how committee members make sense</p><p>of current events and policies. By viewing the questions and responses in the hearing as an</p><p>u nfolding narrative, Boynton is able to chart how 'meaning' crystall izes for each committee</p><p>member, and how they attempt to share that meaning with other members and with those</p><p>who are testifying. Boynton posits the concept of 'interpretive triple' as a way to understand</p><p>how connections between facts are made through plausible interpretation-in effect, ascer­</p><p>tai n ing which interpretations are plausible with in the social context created by the hearings.</p><p>Khong's 1 992 book, Analogies at War, has a sim ilar aim, but with a different focus: the use of</p><p>analogies to gu ide problem framing by foreign policy makers. In this particular work, Khong</p><p>demonstrates how the use of conflicting analogies to frame the problem of Vietnam led to</p><p>conceptual d ifficulties in group reasoning about policy options. The 'Korea' analogy gained</p><p>ascendance in fram ing the Vietnam problem, without sufficient attention being paid to the</p><p>incongruities between the two sets of circumstances.</p><p>Organizational process and bureaucratic politics</p><p>Th is first period also saw the emergence of a strong research agenda that examined the i nflu­</p><p>ence of organizational process and bu reaucratic politics on FPDM. The foundations of th is</p><p>C H A P T E R 1 T H E H I S T O RY A N D EVO LUTI O N O F F O R E I G N P O L I CY A N A LYSIS</p><p>approach can be traced back to Weber's The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations</p><p>(201 2; originally from the 1 920s). F i rst-period research showed how 'rational' foreign pol icy</p><p>making can be upended by the attem pt to work with and through large organized govern­</p><p>mental grou ps. Organizations and bureaucracies put their own survival at the top of their l ist</p><p>of priorities, and this su rvival is measu red by relative influence vis-a-vis other organizations</p><p>('turf') , by the organization's budget, and by the morale of its personnel. The organization</p><p>wi l l jealously guard and seek to increase its turf and strength, as well as to preserve undi luted</p><p>what it feels to be its 'essence' or 'm iss ion'. Large organizations also develop standard operat­</p><p>ing procedures (SOPs) which, whi le al lowing them to react reflexively despite their i nherent</p><p>unwieldiness, permit l ittle flexibi l ity or creativity. These SOPs may be the undoing of more</p><p>innovative solutions of decision makers operating at levels higher than the organization,</p><p>but there is little alternative to the implementation of pol icy by bureaucracy. The interface</p><p>between objectives and implementation is d i rectly met at this point, and there may be sub­</p><p>stantial s l ippage between the two because of the incompatibi l ity of the players' perspectives.</p><p>Although the articulation of this research agenda can be found in works such as H unting­</p><p>ton (1 960), Sch i l l ing et al. (1 962), Hi lsman (1 967), and Neustadt (1 970), probably the most</p><p>cited works are Al l ison (1 971 ) and Halperin (1 974) (additional works co-authored by Halperin</p><p>include All ison and Halperin (1 972) and Halperin and Kanter ( 1 973)). In his famous Essence</p><p>of Decision, Graham All ison offers three cuts at explaining one episode in foreign policy-the</p><p>Cuban Missile Crisis of 1 962. Investigating both the US and the Soviet sides of this case, Al l i ­</p><p>son shows that the unitary rational -actor model of foreign pol icy making does not suffice</p><p>to explain the curiosities of the cris is. Offering two additional models as successive 'cuts' at</p><p>explanation, the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (one of</p><p>i ntra-organ izational factors, and one of inter-organizational factors), al lows All ison to explain</p><p>more fu l ly what transpired. His use of three levels of analysis also points to the desire to inte­</p><p>grate rather than segregate explanations at d ifferent levels.</p><p>Halperin's book Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (1 974) is an extremely detailed</p><p>amalgam of generalizations about bureaucratic behaviour, accompanied by unforgettable</p><p>examples from American defence pol icy making of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson</p><p>years. It should be noted that bureaucratic pol itics research gained impetus from the Vietnam</p><p>War ongoing during this period, because the war was seen by the publ ic as defence pol icy run</p><p>amok due, in part, to bureaucratic i mperatives (e.g. Krasner 1 971 ).</p><p>Comparative foreign policy</p><p>Those who took up James Rosenau's challenge to bui ld a cross-national and mu ltilevel theory</p><p>of foreign pol icy and subject that theory to rigorous aggregate empirical testing created the</p><p>subfield known as comparative foreign policy (CFP). It is in CFP that we see most d i rectly the</p><p>legacy of scientism/behaviouralism in FPA's genealogy. Foreign policy could not be studied</p><p>in aggregate-foreign pol icy behaviour could. Searching for an analogue to the 'vote' as the</p><p>fundamental explanandum in behaviouralist American pol itical studies, CFPers proposed</p><p>the foreign policy event-the tangible artefact of the influence attempt that is foreign policy,</p><p>alternatively viewed as 'who does what to whom, how' in international affairs. Events could</p><p>be compared along behavioural d imensions, such as whether positive or negative effect was</p><p>21</p><p>22 VA L E R I E M . H U D S O N</p><p>being d isplayed, o r what instruments of statecraft (diplomatic, m i l itary, econom ics, etc.) were</p><p>used in the i nfluence attem pt, or what level of commitment of resources was evident. Behav­</p><p>iour as disparate as a war, a treaty, or a state visit could now be compared and aggregated in</p><p>a theoretically mean ingful fash ion.</p><p>This conceptual ization of the dependent variable was essential to the theory-bui lding</p><p>enterprise in CFP. To uncover law-l i ke general izations, one would have to conduct empirical</p><p>testing across nations and across time; case studies were not an efficient methodology from</p><p>this standpoint. However, with the conceptual breakthrough of the 'event', it was now pos­</p><p>sible to collect data on a variety of possible explanatory factors and determine (by analysing</p><p>the variance in the event's behavioural</p><p>d imensions) the patterns by which these independent</p><p>variables were correlated with foreign policy behaviour (see McGowan and Shapiro 1 973).</p><p>Indeed, some scholars i nvolved in CFP research gave the impression that their goal was noth­</p><p>ing less than a GUT (grand un ified theory) of all foreign policy behaviour for all nations for</p><p>al l time. Some set of master equations would l ink all the relevant variables, independent</p><p>and dependent, together, and when applied to massive databases provid ing values for these</p><p>variables would yield R-squares approaching 1 .0. Although the goal was perhaps naive in its</p><p>ambition, the sheer size of the task called forth immense efforts i n theory bui ld ing, data col­</p><p>lection, and methodological innovation that have few paral lels in IR .</p><p>Events data</p><p>The col lection of events data was funded to a sign ificant degree by the US government.</p><p>Andriole and H opple (1 981 ) estimate that the government (primarily the Defense Advanced</p><p>Research Projects Agency and the National Science Foundation) provided over $5 mi l l ion</p><p>for the development of events datasets du ring the time period 1 967-1 981 . Generally speak­</p><p>ing, the collection effort went l ike this: students were employed to comb through newspa­</p><p>pers, chronologies, and other sources for foreign pol icy events, which they would then code</p><p>accord ing to rules l isted in their coding manuals, have thei r cod ing periodically checked for</p><p>interceder rel iabil ity, and finally punch their coding up on computer cards. For example, if</p><p>we wanted to code an event such as 'The USA i nvaded Afghanistan', we would code a date</p><p>(DDMMYYYY), the actor (USA), the subject (Afghanistan), and some code or series of codes</p><p>that would indicate 'i nvasion'. A series of codes might work l i ke this: the code for invasion</p><p>might be '31 7', the '3' indicating that this was a hostile act, the '1 ' ind icating it was a mi l itary</p><p>act, and the '7' indicating in more specific fashion invasion. Many other variables could also</p><p>be coded; for example, we might code that the United Nations faci l itated the act by sponsor­</p><p>ing a Security Council Resolution, we m ight l ink in previous events such as Mul lah Omar's</p><p>refusal to turn in Osama bin Laden, and so forth. Events data sets, then, contain thousands or</p><p>even mi l l ions of l ines of code, each of which is a foreign policy 'event'.</p><p>The acronyms of some of these events data projects l ive on; some because the data are</p><p>sti l l being collected (e.g. Gerner et al. 1 994} (some collection is funded by the DDIR (Data</p><p>Development for International Research) Project of the NSF), and others because the data</p><p>are sti l l usefu l as a testing ground for hypotheses-WEIS {the World Event/Interaction Survey),</p><p>COP DAB (the Conflict and Peace Data Bank), CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of</p><p>Nations), and so forth. The Kansas Event Data System (KEDS) is more of a second-wave effort,</p><p>in that the Kansas team has developed mach ine coding of events, leading to much more</p><p>C H A P T E R 1 TH E H I STORY A N D EVOLUTI O N OF F O R E I G N P O L I C Y ANALYS I S</p><p>reliable and capacious data col lection and coding than was possible i n the first wave of events</p><p>data collection (Schrodt 1 995).</p><p>Integrated explanations</p><p>I n contrast to the other two types of FPA scholarsh ip being discussed, CFP research aimed</p><p>explicitly at integrated multilevel explanations. The four most ambitious of these projects</p><p>were those of Brecher (1 972) and his associates i n the IBA Project (Wilkenfeld et al. 1 980),</p><p>DON (Rummel 1 972, 1 977), CREON (East et al. 1 978; Callahan et al. 1 982), and Harold Guetz­</p><p>kow's INS (Guetzkow 1 963). Independent variables at several levels of analysis were l inked by</p><p>theoretical propositions (sometimes instantiated in statistical or mathematical equations) to</p><p>properties or types of foreign policy behaviour. At least three of the four attempted to confirm</p><p>or d isconfirm the propositions by aggregate empirical testing. Unfortunate ly, the fact that the</p><p>empirical results were not all that had been hoped for ushered in a period of d isenchantment</p><p>with all things CFP, as we shall see in a later section.</p><p>The psychological and societal mi l ieux of foreign</p><p>policy decision making</p><p>The mind of a foreign policy maker is not a tabula rasa; it contains complex and intricately</p><p>related information and patterns, such as bel iefs, attitudes, values, experiences, emotions,</p><p>traits, style, memory, and national and self-conceptions. Each decision maker's mind is a</p><p>microcosm of the variety possible in a given society. Culture, h istory, geography, economics,</p><p>political institutions, ideology, demographics, and innumerable other factors shape the soci­</p><p>etal context in which the decision maker operates. The Sprouts (1 956, 1 957, 1 965) referred</p><p>to these as the mil ieu of decision making, and scholarly efforts to explore that mi l ieu were</p><p>both innovative and impressive during this first period. M ichael Brecher's work cited above</p><p>(Brecher 1 972) belongs in this genotype as well . Brecher's The Foreign Policy System of Israel</p><p>explores that nation's psycho-cultural environment and its effects on Israel's foreign policy.</p><p>Un l ike Brecher's i ntegrative approach to the psycho-social mi lieu, most works i n this geno­</p><p>type examined either the psychological aspects of FPDM, or its broader societal aspects.</p><p>Individual characteristics</p><p>Would there be a distinct field of FPA without this most micro of all explanatory levels? Argu­</p><p>ably not. It is in the cognition and i nformation processing of an actual human agent that all</p><p>the explanatory levels of FPA are i ntegrated in real ity. What sets FPA apart from more main­</p><p>stream IR i s this i ns istence that, as Hermann and Kegley put it, '[a] compell ing explanation (of</p><p>foreign policy) cannot treat the decider exogenously' (1 994: 4).</p><p>Political psychology can assist us i n understanding the decider. Under certain conditions­</p><p>high stress, h igh uncertainty, dominant position of the head of state in FPDM-the personal</p><p>characteristics of the individ ual will become crucial in understand ing foreign policy choice.</p><p>The work of Harold Lasswel l on political leadersh ip was a significant influence on many early</p><p>pioneers of political psychology with reference to foreign pol icy (see Lasswel l 1 930, 1 948).</p><p>23</p><p>24 VALER IE M . H U DSON</p><p>Joseph de Rivera's The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (1 968) i s an excellent survey</p><p>and integration of early attempts to apply psychological and social psychological theory to</p><p>foreign pol icy cases. Another early effort at a systematic study of leader personal ity effects</p><p>is the concept of operational code, an idea originating with Leites (1 95 1 ) and refined and</p><p>extended by one of the most impor Lant figures in this area of research-Alexander George</p><p>(1 969). Defin i ng an operational code involves identifying the core political beliefs of the</p><p>leader about the inevitabil ity of conflict in the world, the leader's estimation of his or her</p><p>own power to change events, and so forth, as well as an exploration of the preferred means</p><p>and style of pursuing goals (see also 0. Holsti 1 977;Johnson 1 977; Walker 1 977). It should be</p><p>noted that George's i nfluence on the field is by no means confined to his work on operational</p><p>codes; he has offered useful suggestions on methodological issues (see George 1 979 on pro­</p><p>cess tracing) , on the demerits of abstract theorizing versus actor-specific theory (George and</p><p>Smoke 1 974; George 1 993), and on the need to bridge the gap between theory and practice</p><p>in foreign pol icy (George 1 993, 1 994).</p><p>The work of Margaret G. Hermann is l ikewise an attempt to typologize leaders with specific</p><p>reference to foreign policy dispositions. A psychologist by train ing, she was also involved in</p><p>a CFP project (CREON). However, the core of her research</p><p>is leaders' personal characteristics</p><p>(Hermann 1 970, 1 978). Using a modified operational code framework i n conjunction with</p><p>content analysis, she is able to compare and contrast leaders' beliefs, motivations, decisional</p><p>styles, and interpersonal styles. Furthermore, Hermann integrates this information into a</p><p>more hol istic picture of the leader, who may belong to one of six distinct 'foreign policy ori­</p><p>entations'. Orientation allows her to make more specific projections about a leader's behav­</p><p>iour in a variety of circumstances. I n the second wave of research, scholars began to explicitly</p><p>compare and contrast the findings of d ifferent personal ity assessment schemes (Winter et al.</p><p>1 991 ; S inger and Hudson 1 992; Snare 1 992; see also Winter 1 973; Post 1 990).</p><p>The role of perceptions and images in foreign policy was a very important research agenda</p><p>in this first generation of FPA. The work of both Robert Jervis and Richard Cottam deserves</p><p>special mention here. Jervis's Perception and Misperception in International Politics ( 1 976) and</p><p>Cottam's Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study (1 977) both explicate</p><p>the potentially grave consequences of misperception in foreign pol icy situations by exploring</p><p>its roots. Deterrence strategies can fai l catastroph ically if misperception of the other's inten­</p><p>tions or motivations occur (see also the stimulus-response models of Holsti et al. (1 968)). Like</p><p>Janis, Halperin , and others, the work of Jervis and Cottam is consciously prescriptive; both</p><p>include advice and suggestions for policy makers. Work i n the late 1 980s continuing this tra­</p><p>d ition included scholarship by Jan ice Gross Stein , Richard Ned Lebow, Ole Holsti, Alexander</p><p>George, Deborah Welch Larson, Betty Glad, and Stephen Walt (as well as Jervis et a/. 1 985; Lar­</p><p>son 1 985, 1 993; M. Cottam 1 986; Glad 1 989; George and Smoke 1 989; 0. Holsti 1 989; Lebow</p><p>and Stein 1 990; Walt 1 992). An excellent example of work in this period is that of Richard</p><p>Herrmann (1 985, 1 986, 1 993), who developed a typology of stereotypical images with refer­</p><p>ence to Soviet perceptions (the other as 'ch i ld', as 'degenerate', etc.) and began to extend his</p><p>analysis to the images held by other nations, i ncluding American and Islamic images.</p><p>The work on cognitive constraints was informed by the work of scholars in other fields,</p><p>including that of Herbert Simon (1 985) on bounded rationality, Heuer (1 999, but written</p><p>between 1 978 and 1 986) on cognitive bias, and Kahneman et al. (1 982) on heuristic error.</p><p>Many other important cognitive and psychological studies which appeared during the 1 970s</p><p>C H A PTER l T H E H I STORY A N D EVOLUTI O N O F F O R E I G N P O L I C Y ANALY S I S</p><p>and early 1 980s dealt with a diversity of factors: motivations of leaders {Barber 1 972; Winter</p><p>1 973; Etheredge 1 978), cognitive maps, scripts, and schemas {Shapiro and Bonham 1 973;</p><p>Axelrod 1976; Carbonell 1 978), cognitive style (Suedfeld and Tetlock 1 977), l ife experience</p><p>of leaders {Stewart 1 977), and others. Good edited collections of the time include Hermann</p><p>{1 977) and Falkowski {l 979).</p><p>National and societal characteristics</p><p>Kai Holsti's {1 970) elucidation of national role conception spans both the psychological and</p><p>the social mi l ieu. With this concept, Holsti seeks to capture how a nation views itself and its</p><p>role in the international arena. Operational ly, Holsti turns to elite perceptions of national role,</p><p>arguing that these perceptions are arguably more salient to foreign policy choice. Perception</p><p>of national role is also influenced by societal character, a product of the nation's socialization</p><p>process. Differences here can lead to d ifferences in national behaviour as well (e.g. Broderson</p><p>1 961 ; Hess 1 963; Merelman 1 969; Renshon 1 977; Bobrow et al. 1 979). The methodology of</p><p>national role conception was continued in the 1 980s by Walker (1 987) and others (Wish 1 980;</p><p>Cottam and Shih 1 992; Sh ih 1 993).</p><p>The study of culture as an independent variable affecting foreign policy was just beginning</p><p>to be redeveloped near the end of the 1 980s after petering out in the 1 960s {Almond and</p><p>Verba 1 963; Pye and Verba 1 965). Culture m ight have an effect on cogn ition (Motokawa 1 989);</p><p>it m ight have ramifications for structuration of institutions such as bureaucracies (Sampson</p><p>1 987). Conflict resolution techniq ues might be d ifferent for different cultures as well (Cush­</p><p>man and King 1 985; Pye 1 986; Gaenslen 1 989). Indeed, the very processes of policy making</p><p>might be stamped by one's cu ltural heritage and social ization (Hol land 1 984; Etheredge 1 985;</p><p>Lampton 1 986; Merel man 1 986; Leung 1 987; Banerjee 1 991 ; Voss and Dorsey 1 992).</p><p>The study of the role of societal groups in foreign policy making can be seen as an out­</p><p>growth of the more advanced study of societal groups in American domestic politics. Some­</p><p>times an individual scholar used theory developed for the American case to explore the more</p><p>diverse universe of the i nternational system. For example, Robert Dahl's vo lume Regimes and</p><p>Oppositions (1 973) provided the key theoretical concepts necessary to analyse the relation­</p><p>ship between domestic pol itical pressure by societal groups and foreign pol icy choice by the</p><p>government. Other more country- and region-specific case studies were also developed; see</p><p>Deutsch et al. (1 967), Hel lman {1 969), Dall in (1 969), Ch ittick (1 970), H ughes ( 1 978), and Ogata</p><p>(1 977) among others. In the late 1 980s, a new wave of thinking began to explore the l imits of</p><p>state autonomy i n relation to other societal grou ps i n the course of policy making. The work</p><p>of Putnam (1 988) on the two-level game of foreign and domestic policy was paradigmatic</p><p>for establishing the major questions of this research subfield. Other excel lent work includes</p><p>Evans et al. (1 985), Hagan (1 987), levy (1 988), Lamborn and M umme {1 989), Levy and Vakil i</p><p>(1 989), and Mastanduno et al. (1 989). A second wave of research in this area can be seen</p><p>in the work of Kaarbo {1 993), Skidmore and H udson (1 993), and Van Belle {1 993) (see also</p><p>Bueno de Mesqu ita and Lalman ( 1 992) for an interesting combination of game theory and</p><p>FPA to understand domestic pol itical i mperatives and their effect on foreign pol icy).</p><p>The second-wave work of Joe Hagan deserves special note. He compi led an extensive</p><p>database on the fragmentation and vulnerability of political regimes, with special reference</p><p>to executive/legislative structures (Hagan 1 993). The set included ninety-four regimes for</p><p>25</p><p>26 VA L E R I E M . H U D S O N</p><p>thirty-eight nations over a ten-year period. H is purpose was to explore the effects of pol itical</p><p>opposition on foreign policy choice. Using aggregate statistical analysis, Hagan was able to</p><p>show, for example, that the i nternal fragmentation of a regime has substantially less effect on</p><p>foreign pol icy behaviour than mi l itary or party opposition to the regime.</p><p>Domestic political i mperatives could also be ascertained by probing el ite and mass opin­</p><p>ion {again, piggy-backing onto the sophisticated voter-attitude studies of American pol itics).</p><p>Though usually confined to studies of democratic nations {especially America, where survey</p><p>research results were abundant), these analyses were used to investigate the l imits of the</p><p>so-called Almond-Lippman consensus-that is, that publ ic opinion is incoherent and lacking</p><p>un ity on foreign policy issues, and thus that public opinion does not have a large impact on</p><p>the nation's conduct of foreign policy {see Bailey 1 948; Almond 1 950; Lippman 1 955; Camp­</p><p>bell et al. 1 964; Converse 1 964; Upset 1 966). Opinion data collected during the Vietnam War</p><p>period appears to have served as a catalyst to re-examine this question. Caspary {1 970) and</p><p>Achen {1 975) found more stabil ity in American</p><p>publ ic opinion concern ing foreign policy and</p><p>i nternational i nvolvement than their predecessors. Mueller {1 973) used the Vietnam War to</p><p>show that although the publ ic may change their opinions on international issues, they do so</p><p>for rational reasons. Holsti and Rosenau {1 979) and Mandelbaum and Schneider {1 979) used</p><p>survey data to identify recognizable ideological positions to which the publ ic subscribes on</p><p>foreign pol icy issues. A large amount of research was undertaken to show that public and elite</p><p>opinion does affect governmental FPDM {see Cantril 1 967; Verba et al. 1 967; Graber 1 968;</p><p>Verba and Brody 1 970; Hughes 1 978; Yankelovich 1 979; Beal and H i nckley 1 984).</p><p>The study of the effect of national attributes {size, wealth, pol itical accountabil ity, economic</p><p>system , etc.) on foreign pol icy was certain ly, in a theoretical sense, in the Sprout genotype, but</p><p>was carried out by scholars and with methods more to be placed in the Rosenau genotype</p><p>{if you exclude pre-Rosenau writers such as Lenin). The propensity to be involved in war was</p><p>usually the foreign policy dependent variable of choice in this work (see Rummel 1 972, 1 977,</p><p>1 979; Kean and McGowan 1 973; East and Hermann 1 974; East 1 978; Sal more and Sal more</p><p>1 978; for a more hol istic treatment, see Korany 1 986}.</p><p>The questions raised by these theorists are fascinating. Are large nations more l ikely to</p><p>go to war than small nations? Are rich nations more l ikely to go to war than poor ones? Are</p><p>authoritarian regimes more bel l icose than democracies? Statistical manipulation of aggre­</p><p>gate data, at best a blunt i nstrument, was unable to uncover any law- l ike generalizations on</p><p>this score (though for an interesting and hard-to-classify treatment of the multi level causes</p><p>and effects of war, see Beer (1 981 )). Political economy research on the effects of econom ic</p><p>structures and conditions on foreign policy choice are fairly rare; the 'culture' of international</p><p>political economy (I PE) and the 'culture' of FPA did not mix well, for reasons explored below.</p><p>However, the works of Nei l Richardson and Charles Kegley (e.g. Richardson and Kegley 1 980)</p><p>and Peter Katzenstein (e.g. Katzenstein 1 985) are notable as exceptions to this generalization.</p><p>However, in the second-wave years, one striking exception to all the analysis of the previ­</p><p>ous years burst forth upon the scene-democratic peace theory. Democracies, it was noted,</p><p>tend not to fight one another, though they fight non-democratic countries as often as other</p><p>non-democracies do. This appeared to be an example of how a difference in pol ity type pro­</p><p>duced a d ifference i n foreign policy behaviour {Russett 1 993a, 1 993b). This has been a par­</p><p>ticularly interesting bridging question for FPA and I R (and is examined further i n Chapter 3}.</p><p>Why do democracies not fight one another? Here we find more abstract theorists of war</p><p>C H A P T E R 1 T H E H I STORY A N D EVOLUTION O F F O R E I G N POLICY A N A LYS I S</p><p>(Merritt and Zinnes 1 991 ; Morgan 1 992; Bremer 1 993; Dixon 1 993; Ray 1 993; Maoz and Rus­</p><p>sett 1 993) wrestl ing with a question that leads them i nto FPA waters and into conversation</p><p>with FPA scholars (Hagan 1 994; Hermann and Kegley 1 995).</p><p>Final ly, if it is possible to see the international system as part of the psycho-social mi l ieu in</p><p>which FPDM takes place, then the work of m uch of mainstream I R at th is time can be seen as</p><p>contributing to the FPA research agenda. The effects of system type, as elucidated by Kaplan</p><p>(1 957, 1 972), may depend on the number of poles in the system, the d istribution of power</p><p>among poles, and the rules of the system game that permit its maintenance. This structure</p><p>may then determine to a large extent the range of permissible foreign policy behaviour of</p><p>nations. The work of Waltz was extremely influential i n its description of the effects of an</p><p>anarchical world system on the behaviour of its member states (see also Hoffmann 1 961 ;</p><p>Rosecrance 1 963; Singer et al. 1 972). FPA seemed not to emphasize this type of explanation ,</p><p>primarily because the variation in behaviour during the time when a certain system is main­</p><p>tained cannot be explained by reference to system structure because the structure has not</p><p>changed. Explanation of that variation must be found at lower levels of analysis, where varia­</p><p>tion in the explanations can be identified. Here, then, is one of several sources for the notable</p><p>Jack of integration between actor-general systems theory in I R and FPA.</p><p>FPA self-reflection in the late 1 970s and 1 980s</p><p>A period of critical self-reflection in FPA began in the late 1 970s and continued until the</p><p>mid- l 980s. The effects were felt uneven ly across FPA, with CFP being affected the most; it is</p><p>here that we see the most prun ing, both theoretical and methodological, which wi l l be dis­</p><p>cussed later. In decision-making stud ies there was a period of rather slow growth because of</p><p>methodological considerations. The information requirements for conducting a high-qual ity</p><p>group or bureaucratic analysis of a foreign policy choice are tremendous. If one were not</p><p>part of the group or bureaucracy in question, detailed accounts of what transpired, prefer­</p><p>ably from a variety of primary source viewpoints, would be necessary. Because of security</p><p>considerations in foreign policy, such information is not usually available for many years</p><p>{e.g. unti l declassified). The question facing decision-making scholars became: Is it possible</p><p>to be theoretically and policy relevant if one is relegated to doing case studies of events</p><p>twenty years or more old? If so, how? If not, how is it possib le to manoeuvre around the h igh</p><p>data requirements to say someth ing meaningfu l about more recent events? (See Anderson</p><p>1 987.) Scholars wrestl ing with this issue came up with two basic responses: (a) patterns in</p><p>group/bureaucratic processes can be isolated through historical case studies, on the basis</p><p>of which both general predictions of and general recommendations for present-day FPDM</p><p>can be made; (b) innovative at-a-d istance indicators of closed group/bureaucracy process</p><p>can be developed, which al low for more specific explanation/pred iction of resultant foreign</p><p>policy choice.</p><p>FPA work at the psychological level actual ly expanded during this time period, but work at</p><p>the societal level arguably contracted on some research fronts. The reason for this bifurca­</p><p>tion in the genotype was methodological: psychology provided ready-made and effective</p><p>tools for the study of pol itical psychology, but pol itical science did not offer the foreign policy</p><p>analyst the same advantage. To understand how the broader socio-cultu ral-political context</p><p>27</p><p>28 VALE R I E M . H U D SON</p><p>within a nation state contributes to its governmental pol icy making (whether domestic or</p><p>foreign) is , perforce, the domain of comparative pol itics. It is hopeful ly not controversial to</p><p>aver that the theories and methods of comparative pol itics in this period were not quite as</p><p>highly developed as those of psychology. The attem pt to graft 'scientific' statistical analyses</p><p>of variance onto the uncJerdeveloped theory of com parative politics ot the 1 970s and 1 980s</p><p>was a fai lure. More successful were efforts to spin existing comparative pol itics work on a</p><p>particular nation to the cause of explaining factors that contribute to that nation's foreign</p><p>pol icy-for example, borrowing techniques from American pol itics (such as public opin ion</p><p>surveys) to study domestic political i mperatives in the USA on foreign pol icy issues. Sti l l miss­</p><p>ing were the conceptual and methodological tools necessary to push past the artificial barrier</p><p>between comparative politics and I R that stymied theory development. One of the greatest</p><p>leaps forward in the present period of FPA is the innovative work begun o n conceptualizing</p><p>the 'two-level</p><p>and theoretical frames 198</p><p>New developments: organized persuasive communication</p><p>and the 'war on terror' 202</p><p>Conclusion 204</p><p>11 The primacy of national security 206</p><p>Brian C. Schmidt</p><p>Introduction 206</p><p>Realism and national security 209</p><p>Security studies and national security 212</p><p>National security and American grand strategy 215</p><p>Conclusion 219</p><p>12 Economic statecraft 222</p><p>Michael Mastanduno</p><p>Introduction 222</p><p>Economic statecraft: instruments and objectives 224</p><p>Economic sanctions: not always successful. but still useful 227</p><p>Economic incentives: an under-appreciated instrument of statecraft? 235</p><p>Economic interdependence: source of political harmony or conflict? 238</p><p>Conclusion 239</p><p>13 Duties beyond borders 242</p><p>Michael Barnett</p><p>Introduction 242</p><p>Duties beyond borders 243</p><p>Theories of foreign policy and duties beyond borders 245</p><p>X DETAILED CONTENTS</p><p>Are foreign policies becoming kinder and gentler?</p><p>The tragedy of Rwanda</p><p>Libya: case of interests or responsibilities?</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>SECTION 3 Foreign policy case studies</p><p>248</p><p>250</p><p>255</p><p>257</p><p>. ... ..... ... ......... ..... . . . .. ... .. ... . ..... . .</p><p>14 The Cuban Missile Crisis 263</p><p>Graham Allison</p><p>Introduction 263</p><p>Operation Anadyr 264</p><p>Why missiles in: four hypotheses 267</p><p>Why American blockade 271</p><p>Why Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba 275</p><p>Epilogue: three conceptual frameworks for analysing foreign policy 280</p><p>15 Canada and antipersonnel landmines: The case for human</p><p>security as a foreign policy priority 291</p><p>Lloyd Axworthy</p><p>Introduction 291</p><p>The context 295</p><p>The process 301</p><p>Establishing a legacy, planning for thP. f11ture 107</p><p>16 Neoconservatism and the domestic sources of American</p><p>foreign policy: The role of ideas in Operation Iraqi Freedom 315</p><p>Yuen Foong Khong</p><p>Introduction 315</p><p>Neoconservatism as a domestic source of American foreign policy 317</p><p>The four tenets of neoconservative foreign policy thought 320</p><p>Neoconservatives and the slaying of the Iraqi monster 323</p><p>Neoconservatism in the context of other factors 327</p><p>Conclusion 329</p><p>17 China and the Tian'anmen Crisis of June 1989 334</p><p>Rosemary Foot</p><p>The external consequences of China's open-door policy 335</p><p>The human rights issue before Tian'anmen 337</p><p>The Tian'anmen crackdown 338</p><p>Immediate foreign policy consequences 345</p><p>China's foreign policy response to sanctions 347</p><p>The deepening of China's involvement with human rights 349</p><p>China's emergence as a significant global actor 350</p><p>Conclusion 351</p><p>DETA I L E D CONTENTS xi</p><p>18 India and the World Trade Organization 356</p><p>Amrita Narlikar</p><p>I ntroduction 356</p><p>From the margins of the GATT to the core of the WTO 358</p><p>The political economy of rising influence 362</p><p>Institution-specific explanations: learn ing to negotiate successfu l ly 364</p><p>Negotiating culture: an explanatory variable 370</p><p>The burden of rising power 372</p><p>Conclusion 373</p><p>19 Rising Brazil and South America 376</p><p>Arlene B. Tickner</p><p>I n troduction 376</p><p>Brazi l ian diplomacy: methods and mechanisms 378</p><p>Three keys to Brazil's rise 381</p><p>Why South America? 384</p><p>Power without leadership 387</p><p>Conclusion 390</p><p>20 Australia and global climate change 394</p><p>Matt McDonald</p><p>I ntroduction 394</p><p>Global c l imate change and the UNFCCC 395</p><p>Austral ia and the d i lemmas of c l imate action 399</p><p>Australia and the global climate regime 401</p><p>Conclusion 408</p><p>21 Israeli-Egyptian {in)security: The Yorn Kippur War 411</p><p>Gareth Stansfield</p><p>Introduction 412</p><p>The legacies of the Six-Day War of 1 967 415</p><p>Foreign policy thematics 424</p><p>Conclusion 427</p><p>22 What kind of power? European Union enlargement and beyond 431</p><p>Lisbeth Aggestam</p><p>Introduction 432</p><p>EU fore ign policy 434</p><p>The Big Bang enlargement 436</p><p>Beyond en largement: EU foreign policy in the neighbourhood 443</p><p>Conclusion: transformative power or political dwarf? 447</p><p>23 Energy and foreign policy: EU-Russia energy dynamics 451</p><p>Amelia Hadfield</p><p>Introduction 451</p><p>The role of energy in foreign policy 455</p><p>xii D E TA I L E D CONTENTS</p><p>Energy in post-Cold War reform</p><p>Pre-crisis</p><p>Security of supply crisis</p><p>Foreign policy perspectives</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>24 The failure of diplomacy and protection in Syria</p><p>Karin Aggestam and Tim Dunne</p><p>Introduction</p><p>From popu lar uprisi ng to civil war</p><p>Meddling, mediating, muddling through</p><p>Great power cooperation and conflict</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>Glossary</p><p>Endnotes</p><p>Bibl iography</p><p>Subject I ndex</p><p>457</p><p>460</p><p>465</p><p>468</p><p>472</p><p>476</p><p>476</p><p>477</p><p>481</p><p>487</p><p>491</p><p>495</p><p>505</p><p>512</p><p>551</p><p>Foreword</p><p>JAM ES N . ROSENAU</p><p>My contribution to the analysis of foreign pol icy began on a blackboard. I was prompted to</p><p>clarify for students what variables were central to probing the dynamics of foreign policy. The</p><p>resu lt was an eight-column matrix that l isted the relative i mportance of five key variables in</p><p>eight types of countries (Rosenau 1 966). That matrix still informs my teaching and research. I t</p><p>also impl icitly underlies more than a few of the chapters i n this volume. Need less to say, I am</p><p>honoured that this volume takes note of my contribution to the field.</p><p>I called the eight-column matrix and the description of it a 'pre-theory of foreign policy'. It</p><p>provoked sufficient interest among colleagues around the country to convene a series of con­</p><p>ferences that explored various facets of the pre-theory, which in turn led to the publ ication of</p><p>a collection of essays prepared for the conferences (Rosenau 1 974). This collaboration among</p><p>some twenty scholars who had developed a keen interest in comparing foreign policies gave</p><p>rise to the founding of the I nter-Un iversity Comparative Foreign Policy (ICFP) project. The</p><p>members of ICFP remained in continual contact for some six years, thus demonstrating that</p><p>l i ke-minded colleagues can pool their resources and sustain collaboration across some ten</p><p>universities during a period of dimin ishing support for comparative and quantitative research.</p><p>The matrix was impelled by the mi l ieu of the field at that time. It was a period in which com­</p><p>parison was very much in vogue and it seemed to me that foreign policy phenomena were as</p><p>subject to comparative analysis as any other pol itical process. Indeed, I still find it remarkable</p><p>that no previous analyst had undertaken a comparative enquiry of when, how, and why differ­</p><p>ent countries undertook to l ink themselves to the international system i n the ways that they did.</p><p>In retrospect, it seems clear that the original pre-theory sparked wide i nterest not only</p><p>because it stressed the need for comparative analysis, but for several other reasons that also</p><p>underlay the enthusiasm for the ICFP. First, the pre-theory offered a means for analysing the</p><p>conduct of foreign pol icy in previous years as well as anticipating future developments in a</p><p>country's external behaviour. Second, as stressed below, it provided a means for bringing for­</p><p>eign and domestic policy together under the same analytical umbrella. Third, it h ighl ighted</p><p>the virtues of case studies as a basis for comparing, analysing, and interpreting foreign policy</p><p>phenomena. All of these central characteristics of the field are fu l ly represented in the chap­</p><p>ters that comprise this volume.</p><p>Much progress has occurred in the field since the founding of the ICFP. The very fact that it is</p><p>now comfortably regarded as a 'field' is in itself indicative of how securely it has been established.</p><p>This is not to say, however, that the field is easily mastered. On the contrary, several of its key as­</p><p>pects pose difficult analytical problems. If politics is conceived as processes of trying to control the</p><p>actions and attitudes of other actors in the more remote environment, a formulation I have always</p><p>considered sound and worthy of applying to empirical materials (Rosenau 1 963), it follows that</p><p>analysis must focus on a wide range of phenomena-from individuals and their orientations to the</p><p>groups and</p><p>game' (Putnam 1 988).</p><p>As mentioned, CFP dwindled in the 1 980s. Indeed , the very term 'comparative foreign</p><p>pol icy' began to sound q uaint and naive. Membership of the Comparative Foreign Policy</p><p>Section of the International Studies Association plummeted. Publ ic vivisections took place,</p><p>while Rosenau-genotype-style scholarship became scarce. Both sympathetic and unsympa­</p><p>thetic criticism abounded (e.g. Ashley 1 976, 1 987; Munton 1 976; East 1 978; Kegley 1 980;</p><p>Caporaso et al. 1 987; Hermann and Peacock 1 987; Smith 1 987). At one point, in exasperation,</p><p>Kegley (1 980: 1 2), himself a CFPer, ch ides, 'CFP risks being label led a cult of methodological</p><p>flagel lomaniacs'.</p><p>This searing criticism and self-criticism revealed a number of inconsistencies in the CFP</p><p>approach, which needed to be sorted out before any progress could be contemplated. The</p><p>stum bling blocks included the following:</p><p>1 . You can't have your parsimony and eat it, too. The tension between the desire of</p><p>some CFPers for a hard-science-l ike grand unified theory and the assumption that micro­</p><p>level detail is necessary if one really wants to explain and predict foreign policy behaviour</p><p>became unbearable. Rosenau's 'Pre-theories' article (Rosenau 1 966), when reviewed from</p><p>this vantage point, sets the genotype up for an inevitable d i lemma about parsimony. To</p><p>what should we aspire: richly detai led , comprehensively researched micro-analyses of a few</p><p>cases, or conceptually abstract, parsimonious statistico-mathematical renderings of thou­</p><p>sands of events? One can see the problem in desiring richly detailed, comprehensively re­</p><p>searched micro-analyses of thousands of events: a l ifetime would be over before a theorist</p><p>had col lected enough data to do the first big 'run'! But many CFPers rejected the case study</p><p>approach as unscientific and too much l ike the soft anecdotal research of the 'trad itional­</p><p>ists' (Kegley 1 980). CFPers wanted to be behaviouralists and to be scientific , and a hallmark</p><p>of this was aggregate empirical testing of cross-nationally applicable generalizations across</p><p>large values of N. At the same ti me, they were fiercely committed to unpacking the black</p><p>box of decision making, so the detail of their explanans grew, and with it their rejection of</p><p>knee-jerk ideal ization of parsimony. Push had to come to shove at some point: CFP meth­</p><p>ods demanded parsimony in theory; CFP theory demanded n uance and detail in method.</p><p>2. To quantify or not to quantify? A corollary of large-N-size testing is the need for</p><p>more precise measurement of data; indeed, quantification of variables is essential to l in­</p><p>ear regression and correlation techniques, as well as to mathematical manipulations such</p><p>CHAPTER 1 T H E H I ST O RY A N D EVOLU T I O N O F F O R E I G N P O L I C Y A N A LYS I S</p><p>as differential equations. However, the independent variables of CFP included such non­</p><p>quantifiables as perception, memory, emotion, cu lture, h istory, etc., all placed in a dynamic</p><p>and evolving stream of human action and reaction that might not be adequately captured</p><p>by arithmetic-based relationshi ps. To leave such non-quantifiable explanatory variables out</p><p>seems to defeat the very pu rpose of micro-analysis; to leave them in by forcing the data into</p><p>quasi - interval level p igeonholes seems to do violence to the substance that CFP sought to</p><p>capture. CFPers began to ask whether their methods were aiding them in achieving their</p><p>theoretical goals or preventing them from ever achieving those goals.</p><p>3. A final inconsistency centred in policy relevance. As mentioned earlier, CFP had</p><p>received a large amount of money from the government to create events data sets. CFP</p><p>researchers successfully argued that such an investment would yield information of use</p><p>to foreign pol icy makers. Specifically, events data would be used to set up early warning</p><p>systems that would alert policy makers to crises in the making around the world (as if they</p><p>do not also read the same sources from which events data come!}.</p><p>Computerized decision aids and analysis packages with tel l-tale acronyms began to appear­</p><p>EWAMS (Early Warn ing and Monitoring System); CASCON (Computer-Aided Systems for</p><p>Handl i ng Information on Local Conflicts); CAC IS (Computer-Aided Conflict Information Sys­</p><p>tem); XAIDS (Crisis Management Executive Decision Aids) (see Andriole and Hopple 1 981 ).</p><p>Unfortunately, these cou ld never l ive up to their promise; the co llected events could be had</p><p>from other sources and so were nothingwithout the theory to explain and predict their occur­</p><p>rence. The methodological paradoxes explicated above resulted in theory that was stuck, by</p><p>and large, at the level of globally applicable but specifically vacuous bivariate generalizations</p><p>such as that 'large nations participate more in international interactions than small nations'</p><p>(see McGowan and Shapiro 1 973). Again, CFP found itself pul led in two opposed directions.</p><p>Was the research goal to say someth ing predictive about a specific nation at a specific t ime</p><p>in a specific set of c ircumstances (which would be h ighly pol icy relevant, but which might</p><p>closely resemble the output of a traditional country expert)? Or was the goal a grand unified</p><p>theory (which would not be very policy relevant. but which would qualify you as a scientist</p><p>and a generalist)? Attempts to accomplish both with the same research led to products that</p><p>were unsatisfactory in a scholarly as well as a policy sense.</p><p>Hindsight is always 20/20; it does seem clear in retrospect that change was necessary. Left</p><p>behind were: (1 ) the aim of a grand unified theory, and (2) the methodological straitjacket</p><p>imposed by the requ i rement of aggregate empirical testing. In 1 980, Kegley spoke of the need</p><p>to come down from the rarefied air of grand theory to middle-range theory, and to capture</p><p>more of the particular:</p><p>To succeed partially is not to fai l completely . . . Goals (should be) downgraded to better fit</p><p>capacities. . . This prescribes reduction in the level of generality sought, so that more contex­</p><p>tually-qualified, circumstantially bounded, and temporal ly/spatial ly-specified propositions</p><p>are tested. More of the pecul iar, unique, and particular can be captured at a reduced level of</p><p>abstraction and generality. (Kegley 1 980: 1 2, 1 9)</p><p>To be fair, this was arguably Rosenau's original aim, and the CFP community had to reach a</p><p>consensus to return to its founding vision. The conference on New Di rections in the Study of</p><p>Foreign Pol icy, held at Ohio State Un iversity in May 1 985, probably represents a finalization</p><p>29</p><p>30 VA LER I E M. H U DS O N</p><p>of these changes for the CFP group (see the resulting volume, Hermann et al. 1 987; see also</p><p>Gerner 1 992).</p><p>Conclusion: contemporary FPA's research agenda</p><p>As FPA was being l iberated from its inconsistencies in the late 1 980s, the world was being</p><p>l iberated from the chess match of the Cold War. This was a felicitous coincidence for FPA,</p><p>and was an added source of vigour for its research agenda. The significance of this temporal</p><p>coincidence can be understood by remembering what types of I R theory were in ascendance</p><p>at the time: neorealist systems structure theory and rational choice model l i ng. Indeed, the</p><p>dominance was so overwhelming that on taking an I R theory course during this time, one</p><p>would think these two were the summum bonum of all thinking in international relations (at</p><p>least in the USA). This state of affairs was natural for American thinkers; America was one of</p><p>two poles of power in the Cold War i nternational system. A bipolar quasi -zero-sum rival ry</p><p>lends itself relatively well to abstract actor-general analysis focused primarily on the macro­</p><p>constraints imposed by the system. Furthermore, actor-general theory was more practical</p><p>for scholars during the Cold War because so l ittle was known of the black box of the closed</p><p>Soviet, Chinese, and Eastern Bloc FPDM bodies.</p><p>However,</p><p>when the b ipolar system collapsed with the fal l of the Soviet bloc regimes, an</p><p>important theoretical discovery was made: it is impossible to explain or predict system change</p><p>on the basis of system-level variables alone. Along the same li nes, in a period of great uncer­</p><p>tainty and flux, lack of empirically grounded inputs to rational choice equations is deadly in</p><p>terms of the usefulness of such analysis. Our intuitive understanding of the collapse involves</p><p>variables more to be found in FPA: the personal ities of Gorbachev, Havel, and Walesa; the</p><p>activities of transnational groups such as the Lutheran Church and the Green Movement;</p><p>the struggles between various domestic pol itical players such as the mil itary, the Commun ist</p><p>Party, the bureaucrats, etc.; the role of econom ics and societal needs in sparking the desire for</p><p>change, etc. With the fall of the Iron Curtai n, the need for an 'actor-specific' complement to</p><p>mainstream I R theory became stark in its clarity.</p><p>FPA i n the post-Cold War era retains the distinctive theoretical commitments that demar­</p><p>cated at its inception. Incl uded among these are:</p><p>• a com mitment to look below the nation-state level of analysis to actor-specific</p><p>information;</p><p>• a com mitment to bui ld midd le-range theory as the interface between actor-general</p><p>theory and the complexity of the real world;</p><p>a commitment to pursue multicausal explanations spanning multiple levels of analysis;</p><p>• a commitment to utilize theory and findings from across the spectrum of social science;</p><p>• a commitment to viewing the process of foreign pol icy decision making as being as</p><p>important as the output thereof.</p><p>Nevertheless, FPA has evolved in the soph istication of the questions asked, and in the means</p><p>of answering those questions. I ndeed, FPA's abil ity to ask new questions is perhaps more</p><p>promising in relation to its future theoretical potential than any other indicator. Einstein and</p><p>C H A PT E R 1 T H E H I STORY A N D EVOLUT I O N O F F O R E I G N POL ICY A NALYS IS</p><p>l nfeld (1 938) commented that '[t]he formulation of a problem is often more essential than</p><p>its solution, wh ich may be merely a matter of . . . ski l l . To raise new questions, new possibi l i ­</p><p>ties, to regard old problems from a new angle, requires creative imagination and marks real</p><p>advances in science'.</p><p>In order to see this advance, let us examine some of the new questions that have evolved</p><p>from the old. As a detailed overview of FPA scholarship from 1 993 to the present can be found</p><p>in Hudson (2005, 2007), let us now turn to the micro-levels of analysis and then move toward</p><p>macro-levels.</p><p>New questions</p><p>When studying the effects of individual leaders on FPDM, the key question is whether we can</p><p>extend our understanding of how a leader's personality affects foreign pol icy through deter­</p><p>mining its effect on choice of advisors, preference for issues, preference for certain group</p><p>processes, and so forth. Moreover, can we integrate d ifferent analytical schemes for analysing</p><p>leader personality and its effects? What are the ramifications of new breakthroughs in neu­</p><p>roscience for FPA? How do various leader personal ity types shape the structure and process</p><p>of groups serving them?</p><p>At the group level, we must then ask how are problems actually recognized by the group?</p><p>How are situations 'framed' and 'represented'? How are options developed? How does a</p><p>group come to share an interpretation of the situation? How does a group change an estab­</p><p>l ished interpretation? How does a group learn? How is the group's potential for creativity</p><p>enhanced or dampened? How does group memory affect group action? H ow do groups</p><p>become players in the 'two-level game'? How are group structure and process a function of</p><p>societal culture?</p><p>At the level of society and political competition, we explore whether we can uncover the</p><p>societal sources of change in shared perceptions. For example, how do attitudes of lead­</p><p>ers and publics change as context changes? Can national role conception be reconfigured</p><p>to serve as the theoretical interface between a society and the individual members of that</p><p>society who come to lead it and make its foreign pol icy decisions? Can we specify the effect</p><p>on foreign pol icy of domestic political competition? Can we complete the theoretical circle</p><p>and specify the effects on domestic pol itics of the imp lementation of a certain foreign pol icy</p><p>choice? How can we d iscern cu lture's influence on foreign policy? Does type of pol itical sys­</p><p>tem impact on foreign policy? What is the effect of systemic change on foreign pol icy?</p><p>Methodologically speaking, there are just as many key q uestions to be considered. These</p><p>include: Can events data be re-conceptual ized to be of use to contemporary FPA? Can FPA</p><p>util ize methods created to s imu late human decision making as a means of i ntegrating com­</p><p>plex n on-quantifiable data? Can we think of non-arithmetic ways to relate variables? Can</p><p>rational choice models be altered to accommodate actor-specific idiosyncrasies with regard</p><p>to uti l ity, choice mechanisms, and choice constraints? Can we create models that wil l allow us</p><p>to use as inputs the actor-specific knowledge generated by country/region experts? When is</p><p>the detail of actor-specifics necessary, and when is actor-general theory sufficient to explain</p><p>and project FPDM? How could one instantiate a model of the 'two-level game'? Can discur­</p><p>sive analysis or interpretivism be used to introduce the dynamics of evolving understanding</p><p>in FPDM?</p><p>31</p><p>32 VA L E R I E M . H U DS O N</p><p>An Atlantic divide?</p><p>While there are new efforts to both catalogue and promote the analytical study of foreign</p><p>pol icy in the Global South (Brummer 201 1 ; Brummer and Hudson 201 5; Giacalone 201 1 ;</p><p>Zhang 201 1 ) , at this point such study is predominantly of Atlantic origins. This raises the</p><p>question of whether there are important d ifferences in the way such studies are conducted</p><p>in the USA compared with European countries, to which an affi rmative answer can be given.</p><p>In an overview of such d ifferences (Hadfield and Hudson 201 1 ) , the authors point out several</p><p>d istinctions between FPA (American) and what they term AFP (the analysis of foreign policy,</p><p>Eu ropean). This issue is of interest to the readers of this volume, for about half of its authors</p><p>are American and about half are Eu ropean.</p><p>Hadfield and Hudson note a greater emphasis on cognitively oriented theories i n FPA than</p><p>in AFP, as well as the more frequent use of quantitative methods by Americans and h istori­</p><p>cal process-tracing by Europeans. They also note a clear preference for the use of American</p><p>cases by American scholars, which, while not unexpected and also understandable, also bears</p><p>predictable consequences for theory build ing. For example, Zhang (201 1 ) finds that, in the</p><p>Chinese case, being 'ideological' and being 'practical' are not oxymoronic terms, whereas in</p><p>American-inspired theory, such personality orientations are seen as precluding one another.</p><p>Hadfield and Hudson also note a greater sense of commun ity among American FPA scholars,</p><p>which they attribute to the small number of graduate programmes trai n ing FPA scholars in</p><p>that country; they are all l i kely to know one another with in one or two degrees of separation.</p><p>Turning to the European context, there are almost no graduate programmes that emphasize</p><p>FPA/ AFP, and so as yet scholars have not been able to create a critical social mass that is the</p><p>prerequisite for an epistemic community. Fi nal ly, Hadfield and Hudson suggest that AFP is</p><p>far more theoretically inclusive than FPA has been to dr1tP, Pm bracing not only actor-specific</p><p>theories, but also grand theory and constructivist approaches. For example, one is not l ikely</p><p>to see a reference to the work of Roy Bhaskar in American FPA l iterature, while such a refer­</p><p>ence might be very</p><p>l ikely in AFP work.</p><p>New attempts to bridge IR and FPA</p><p>Also fai rly recent i n origin are sustained organized attempts to bridge the divide between</p><p>FPA and IR . The two that we will mention in this section are neoclassical realism (exempl ified</p><p>by Lobell et al. 2009) and behavioural I R (exemplified by Walker et al. 201 1 ; see also Mintz</p><p>2007). Neoclassical realism attempts to cross the divide from the IR side to the FPA side, while</p><p>behavioural IR is moving in the opposite direction.</p><p>Neoclassical realism is premised on the understanding that 'un it-level variables constrain</p><p>or faci l itate the abi l ity of all types of states-great powers as well as lesser states-to respond</p><p>to systemic imperatives' (Lobell et al. 2009: 4). While the power d istribution within a system</p><p>may bound grand strategy, the implementation of this strategy through decisions by foreign</p><p>pol icy executives concern ing threat assessment, risk, and mobil ization of domestic resources,</p><p>includ i ng public support, s imply cannot be inferred from the 'grand' level. H istorical process­</p><p>tracing is the preferred methodology of this school.</p><p>Behavioural I R, on the other hand, takes as its touchstone the field of 'behavioural econom­</p><p>ics', associated with the work of such scholars as Richard Thaler. Walker and his co-authors</p><p>C H APTER 1 T H E H I STORY A N D EVOLUT ION OF F O R E I G N POL ICY AN ALY S I S</p><p>define the approach as 'a social-psychological analysis of world pol itics, which employs a</p><p>general systems theory [i.e. role theory] to unify the understanding of actors, actions, and rela­</p><p>tions that constitute foreign pol icy and i nternational relations' (Walker et al. 201 1 : 5). In other</p><p>words, behavioural IR seeks to integrate the external world of events with the internal world</p><p>of bel iefs by examining strategic moves with in dyads. The operational codes of the two actors</p><p>are deciphered by quantitative content analysis of leader texts, and then a theory of strategic</p><p>game moves (TOM) is employed to determine (at an abstract level) the next move that each</p><p>actor in the dyad wil l take and how their game wi l l resolve over sequential moves. The use</p><p>of a game-theoretic logic informed by un it-level characteristics is an interesting amalgam</p><p>of actor-general and actor-specific theorizing which, l ike neoclassical real ism, attempts to</p><p>bridge the divide between FPA and IR . Noteworthy, however, is the fact that neoclassical real­</p><p>ism and behavioural I R-research programmes with the very same bridging goal-are working</p><p>in such divergent methodological traditions that one wonders if they could possibly commu­</p><p>n icate with one another. But that i s a topic for the future.</p><p>These are all exciting new questions, issues, and approaches to be exploring. Doubtless</p><p>some of you will be involved i n this work. It is a wonderful time to become engaged in FPA-a</p><p>time of new horizons.</p><p>Key points</p><p>• Foreign policy analysis (FPA) takes as its theoretical ground the human decision makers, acting</p><p>singly and in groups, who make foreign policy.</p><p>• Three paradigmatic works laid the foundation of FPA-Richard Snyder and colleagues on decision</p><p>making, James Rosenau on comparative foreign policy {CFP), and Harold and Margaret Sprout on</p><p>the psycho-social milieu of foreign policy decision making {FPDM).</p><p>• Several emphases, corresponding to levels of analysis in FPA, began to emerge from this</p><p>foundation. induding work on small/large groups, events data, political psychology of leaders,</p><p>cultural effects on foreign policy, the effects of domestic politlcal contestation on FPDM. and the</p><p>influence of national attributes and systemic characteristics on foreign pol icy behaviour.</p><p>FPA retains its emphases on actor-specific theory, m ulticausal explanations, interdisciplinarity, and</p><p>the explanations of foreign policy processes, as well as foreign policy outcomes.</p><p>• Cu rrent FPA scholarship explores l inkages between the levels of FPA analysis, and combines that</p><p>with a search for new methodologies that are more appropriate for actor-specific theoretical</p><p>investigation.</p><p>Questions</p><p>1. What are the key hallmarks of FPA?</p><p>2. What is the difference between foreign policy and foreign policy behaviour?</p><p>3. What are the primary levels of analysis examined in FPA?</p><p>4. What did Richard Snyder and his colleagues contribute to FPA's foundations?</p><p>5. What did James Rosenau contribute to FPA's foundations?</p><p>6. What did Harold and Margaret Sprout contribute to FPA's foundations?</p><p>7. What is events data and how is it used in FPA?</p><p>33</p><p>34 VALERIE M. H U DS O N</p><p>8. What is comparative foreign policy (CFP)?</p><p>9. Why did FPA enter a period of self-reflection in the late 1 970s and early 1 980s, and what was the</p><p>result?</p><p>1 0. What kinds of questions are being asked in FPA research today? How effective and/or necessary</p><p>are 'bridging techniques' between IR and FPA?</p><p>Further reading</p><p>Caporaso,J.A., Hermann, C.F., and Kegley, C.W. (1 987), 'The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy:</p><p>Perspectives on the Future', International Studies Notes, 1 3: 32-46.</p><p>This is an interesting piece, from a historical point of view, as it attempts to engage international</p><p>political economy ( IPE) with FPA.</p><p>Garrison,j. (ed.) (2003), 'Foreign Policy Analysis in 20/20', International Studies Review. 5: 1 56-163.</p><p>Tl1is special issue of ISR features a variety of FPA scholars discussing the future prospects of FPA as a</p><p>field of study.</p><p>Gerner; D.J . (1 992), 'Foreign Policy Analysis: Exhilarating Eclecticism, Intriguing Enigmas',</p><p>International Studies Note5, 1 6(3) / 17(1 ): 4-1 9.</p><p>Gerner's piece is an excellent summary of FPA scholarship up until the end of the Cold War.</p><p>Hudson, V.M. (2007), Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory (New York:</p><p>Rowman and Littlefield).</p><p>This textbook covers not only the history of FPA. but also seven levels of analysis. as well as a</p><p>discussion of integrative efforts in the field.</p><p>Neack, L., Hey, J.A., and Haney, P.J. (1 995), Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its</p><p>St!cond Genen1tfo11 {Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall).</p><p>This edited volume served as a textbook in many FPA classes from 1 995 to 2005, and includes chapters</p><p>on nearly all levels of analysis. as well as subjects such as events data.</p><p>Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for more information:</p><p>www.oxfordtextbooks.eo.uk/orc/smith_foreign3e/</p><p>Introduction</p><p>Real ism and foreign po l icy</p><p>W I LL I A M C . W O H L F O RTH</p><p>Chapter contents</p><p>Introduction</p><p>What is realism?</p><p>The development of realist theories</p><p>Realist analysis of foreign policy</p><p>Using realism in analysing foreign policy</p><p>Conclusion: hedgehogs, foxes, and analysing foreign policy</p><p>Reader's guide</p><p>35</p><p>36</p><p>37</p><p>42</p><p>47</p><p>50</p><p>This chapter shows how familiarity with realist theory i m proves foreign policy anal­</p><p>ysis (FPA). The main challenge is to exploit two features of realism that are often in</p><p>tension with each other: its firm grounding in centuries of real foreign policy prac­</p><p>tice, and its aspi ration to create powerful general theories that help to s impl ify and</p><p>explain the i nternational setting in which foreign policy takes place. The chapter</p><p>identifies a branch of realist theory-neoclassical real ism-which bridges the gap</p><p>between these two aspects of the realist tradition and thus is most useful for the</p><p>analysis of foreign pol icy. The following key questions are addressed.</p><p>• What is realism?</p><p>How is it applied to the analysis and practice of foreign policy?</p><p>What are the main pitfalls i n applying realist theories to FPA?</p><p>What is a useful set of guideli nes for avoid ing those pitfalls and using realist</p><p>insights to sharpen the analysis of foreign policy?</p><p>Real ism is the foundational school of thought about international politics around which al l</p><p>others are oriented. It follows that any foreign policy analyst</p><p>who wishes to make use of inter­</p><p>national relations ( IR) theory must understand real ism. Fortunately, this is not difficult to do.</p><p>As this chapter demonstrates, the realist school can be understood as a body of theories and</p><p>related arguments that flow from a very small set of basic assumptions about how the world</p><p>works. Used with sensitivity in their appl ication to the complexity and uncertainty of the real</p><p>political world, realist theories can substantially sharpen the analysis of foreign policy.</p><p>To apply realism to FPA, one has to bridge the gap that divides highly general, 'top-down'</p><p>theory from the 'ins ide-out' analysis of specific cases. Realism itself embodies this tension,</p><p>36 WILL IAM C. WOHLFORTH</p><p>reflecting the desire to be both realistic (i.e. grounded i n actual foreign pol icy practice) and</p><p>theoretical (i.e. aspiring to general timeless knowledge). Realists seek to d istil the accumulated</p><p>wisdom of generations of foreign pol icy practitioners into general theories of IR . Real ism's</p><p>basic conceptual foundations are derived from the close observation of l ived pol itics. But in</p><p>seeking to construct and apply a reality-based Lheory, realists constantly face the chal lenge of</p><p>cycl ing between the nuanced subtleties of real foreign pol icy situations and the razor-sharp</p><p>assumptions and deductions of theory.</p><p>I n this chapter, I show that realism's promise for the analysis of foreign pol icy stems from</p><p>its twin com mitments to particular and general knowledge, and that most of the pitfalls of</p><p>applying realism derive from a fai lure to get this balance right. I outl ine an approach to real­</p><p>ist theory designed to connect the ins ights of general theory to the details and uncertainty</p><p>of analysing specific foreign policy situations. This approach reflects a sustained effort on</p><p>the part of a new generation of scholars to gain the analytical benefits of realist theory with­</p><p>out fal l ing prey to its potentially misleading over-generalization. To understand this new</p><p>approach, however, one fi rst needs to know what realism is, how it has developed over the</p><p>years, and how the general theories that have developed as part of the realist canon have</p><p>been used to analyse foreign pol icy.</p><p>What is real ism?</p><p>Real ism is a school of thought based on three core assumptions about how the world works. 1</p><p>• Groupism Humans face one another mainly as members of groups. To survive at</p><p>anything above subsistence level, people need the cohesion provided by group</p><p>solidar i ly, yel Lhc:1.L very same in-group cohesion generates the potential for conflict with</p><p>other groups. Today the most important human groups are nation states, and the most</p><p>important source of in-group cohesion is nationalism. However, it is important to stress</p><p>that realism makes no assumption about the nature of the pol ity. It may apply to any</p><p>social setting where groups interact.</p><p>Egoism Self-interest u lti mately drives pol itical behaviour. Although certain conditions</p><p>can facil itate altruistic behaviour, egoism is rooted in human nature. When push comes</p><p>to shove and ultimate trade-offs between co l lective and self-i nterest must be confronted,</p><p>egoism tends to trump altruism. As the classic realist adage has it, ' Inhu man ity is just</p><p>humanity under pressure'.</p><p>• Power-centrism Power is the fundamental feature of pol itics. Once past the hunter­</p><p>gatherer stage, human affairs are always marked by great inequalities of power in both</p><p>senses of that term: social influence or control (some groups and ind ividuals always have</p><p>an outsized i nfluence on politics) and resources (some groups and individuals are always</p><p>disproportionately endowed with the material wherewithal to get what they want). Key</p><p>to politics in any area is the interaction between social and material power, an interaction</p><p>that unfolds in the shadow of the potential use of material power to coerce. As Kenneth</p><p>Waltz put it, 'The web of social and political l ife is spun out of incl inations and incentives,</p><p>deterrent threats and punishments. E l imi nate the latter two, and the ordering of society</p><p>depends entirely on the former-a utopian thought impractical this side of Eden' (Waltz</p><p>1 979: 1 86).</p><p>C H A PTER 2 R E A L I S M A N D F O R E I G N POL ICY</p><p>I f one believes the world generally works by these rules, then many important consequences</p><p>follow for how one thinks about international pol itics: that the main groups with which</p><p>people identify-be they tribes, city states, empires, or nation states-will exert a major influ­</p><p>ence on human affairs; that the group's collective interest, however defined, wil l be central to</p><p>its pol itics; that necessity as the group interest defines it wi l l trump any putatively un iversal</p><p>morality and ethics; and thus that humankind is un l ikely ever to wholly transcend power</p><p>politics through the progressive power of reason.</p><p>Th is way of th inking about IR leads immediately to an identifiably realist approach to foreign</p><p>po l icy: an orientation towards the most powerfu l groups (i.e. the most resource rich and influ­</p><p>ential) at any given time (today this means major powers l ike the USA or China); a scepticism</p><p>towards professed aims of foreign pol icy other than the state interest; a tendency to question</p><p>the abil ity of any state's foreign po l icy to transcend power pol itics; and a penchant for look­</p><p>ing beyond rhetoric to the power realities that real ists expect nearly always underl ie policy.</p><p>These precepts represent a simple realist checklist for FPA: look for where the power is, what</p><p>the group interests are, and the role power relationsh ips play in reconci l ing clashing interests.</p><p>Certain types of thinkers tend to share simi lar bets about how the world works. Critics l ike</p><p>to say that the kind of person most l i kely to accept the core realist assumptions is a congenital</p><p>pessimist and cynic. Realists counter that these assumptions are simp ly realistic-based on the</p><p>dispassionate observation of human affai rs the way they are, as opposed to the way we might</p><p>wish them to be. There is a degree of truth to both views, and they add u p to produce a unity</p><p>of realist thought stretching from Thucydides to Machiave l l i , Weber, Carr, Morgenthau, and</p><p>Waltz. Even though the thinkers indel ib ly associated with realism are a h ighly d iverse lot, and</p><p>even though their ideas often contradict each other, the th reads of those three core assump­</p><p>tions tie them al l together into a coherent intellectual school. Read ing any of the writings of</p><p>any of these th inkers concern ing the foreign policies of their day, one immediately d iscerns</p><p>the unmistakably realist approach to foreign policy I identified above.</p><p>To be sure, realism is more than academic theory. It is also a trad ition of statecraft that tends</p><p>to reflect these same basic assumptions. But the focus here is on the use of scholarly theory to</p><p>inform the analysis of foreign policy. For that purpose, it is important to be clear about how</p><p>scholars transform the basic assumptions about the world into theories. And that d emands</p><p>clarity about what we mean by the word 'theory'. Confusingly, scholars use 'theory' to refer</p><p>to three distinct things: real ism itself (a large and complex school of thought), subschools</p><p>with in real ism such as neorealism (smaller but sti l l complex schools of thought fitting within</p><p>the realist trad ition), and specific realist theories such as the balance of power, the security</p><p>di lemma, or the offence-defence balance {all propositions about patterns of relations</p><p>among states or pressu res facing a particular state). In this chapter, I keep these things clear,</p><p>reserving the term 'theory' for specific propositions or arguments. These distinctions are not</p><p>academic qu ibbles. The foreign pol icy analyst may well be sceptical of realism in general, but</p><p>sti l l find specific realist theories very</p><p>helpful indeed.</p><p>The development of real ist theories</p><p>Trademark real ist theories al l proceed from real ism's three core assumptions of groupism,</p><p>egoism, and power-centrism. The first and most general of al l these theories, and the</p><p>one from which most others proceed, can be stated simply: if hu man affai rs are indeed</p><p>37</p><p>38 W I L L IAM C . WOH LFORTH</p><p>characterized by groupism, egoism, and power-centrism, then pol itics is l ikely to be con­</p><p>flictual unless there is some central authority to enforce order. When no authority which can</p><p>enforce agreements exists-a condition theorists call anarchy-any state can resort to force</p><p>to get what it wants. Even if a state can be fairly sure that no other state wil l take up arms</p><p>today, there is no guarantee against the possibi l ity that one might do so tomorrow. Because</p><p>no state can rule out this prospect, states tend to arm themselves against this contingency.</p><p>With al l states thus armed, politics takes on a different cast. Disputes that would be easy to</p><p>settle if states could rely on some higher authority to enforce an agreement can escalate to</p><p>war in the absence of such authority. Therefore the classic realist theoretical argument is that</p><p>anarchy renders the security of states problematic and potentially conflictual, and is a key</p><p>underlying cause of war.</p><p>To move from this very general argument about the potential importance of power and</p><p>conflict in IR to any real foreign policy situation requi res three steps: a knowledge of theoreti­</p><p>cal schools with in realism, fami l iarity with specific realist theories, and, perhaps most impor­</p><p>tant, clarity about how theories, assumptions, and conditions are related.</p><p>Theoretical schools within realism</p><p>The development of realist thought can be seen as a series of refinements, amendments,</p><p>qual ifications, and extensions of the basic argument. For simpl icity, scholars often lump</p><p>together al l realist thought from Thucydides to the m iddle years of the Cold War as classical</p><p>realism. They describe distinctions within the massive classical realist canon by reference to</p><p>individual thin kers. The classical real ists al l sought to translate the distil led wisdom of genera­</p><p>tions of practitioners and analysts into very general theories. However, they were not always</p><p>clear about when their theories applied to specific situations as opposed to general patterns.</p><p>This ambiguity in the classical realist writi ngs led to endless debates about what was actually</p><p>being claimed for any particular theory.</p><p>As interest i n the scientific approach to the study of pol itics grew (especially in the USA),</p><p>Kenneth Waltz sought to revivify realist thinking by translating some core realist ideas into</p><p>a deductive top-down theoretical framework that eventually came to be called neoreal ism.</p><p>Waltz (1 959) held that the classical realists' powerful i nsights i nto the workings of interna­</p><p>tional politics were weakened by their fai lure to distinguish clearly among arguments about</p><p>human nature, the internal attributes of states, and the overall system of states. In Theory of</p><p>International Politics Waltz (1 979) brought together and clarified many earlier realist ideas</p><p>about how the features of the overal I system of states affect the ways states interact. He restat­</p><p>ed in the clearest form yet the classic argument about how the mere existence of groups in</p><p>anarchy can lead to powerful competitive pressure and war-regard less of what the internal</p><p>politics of those groups might be l ike.</p><p>The advent of neoreal ism caused scholars to think much harder and more clearly about</p><p>the underlying forces that drive I R. Realists d iscovered that, depending on how they thought</p><p>about the core assumptions and what they saw as the most reasonable expectations about</p><p>real-world conditions, neoreal ism could lead to very different predictions. Written in a h ighly</p><p>abstract manner, Waltz's neorealism ignored important variations in IR , including geography</p><p>and technology. Depending on how one conceptual ized those factors, the exact same neo­</p><p>realist ideas could generate widely disparate impl ications about the dynam ics of inter-state</p><p>C H A P T E R 2 R E A LI S M A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y</p><p>politics. Out of this real ization were born two new theoretical subschools, each of which bui lt</p><p>on the basic insights of neorealism.</p><p>Defensive realists reasoned that, under very common conditions, the war-causing poten­</p><p>tial of anarchy is attenuated. Geography or technology may make conquest hard and thus</p><p>lower states' fear of being conquered or subjugated. For example, it is difficult to contem­</p><p>plate the conquest of states that have the capacity to strike back with nuclear weapons. Thus,</p><p>even accepti ng all of Waltz's arguments about how difficult it is to be secure in an anarchic</p><p>world, under these kinds of conditions states could sti l l be expected to find ways of defending</p><p>themselves without threatening others, or could otherwise signal their peaceful intentions,</p><p>resulting in an international system with more bui lt- in potential for peace than many real ists</p><p>previously thought. The result was to push analysts to look inside states for the domestic or</p><p>ideational causes of war and peace.</p><p>Offensive realists, by contrast, were more persuaded by the confl ict-generating structural</p><p>potential of anarchy itself. They reasoned that, with no authority to enforce agreements,</p><p>states could never be certain that any peace-causing condition today would remain operative</p><p>in the future. Even if conquest may seem hard today owing to geography or technology, there</p><p>is no guarantee against the prospect that another state wi l l develop some fiendish device for</p><p>overcoming these barriers. Given this uncertainty, states can rarely be confident of their secu­</p><p>rity and must always view other states' increases in power with suspicion. As a result, states</p><p>are often tempted to expand or otherwise strengthen themselves, and/or weaken others, in</p><p>order to survive over the long haul. The result is to reinforce the classic realist argument about</p><p>the competitive nature of l ife under anarchy, regardless of the internal properties of states.</p><p>As clear and elegant as neoreal ism and its immediate outgrowths were, it remained unclear</p><p>just how relevant they were to any given foreign policy problem. So focused were realists on</p><p>defin ing the single best and most un iversal formulation of their theory that it began to seem</p><p>as if the development of realism had taken a completely d ifferent path from the analysis of</p><p>foreign policy. Waltz (1 996) himself argued famously that 'i nternational pol itics is not foreign</p><p>pol icy', implying that theory development and FPA had become two d istinct endeavours with</p><p>l ittle connection to each other.</p><p>Neoclassical realism is a subschool within real ism that seeks to rectify this imbalance</p><p>between the general and the particular. It began as efforts to explain anomalies or puzzles</p><p>that neoreal ism could not account for, such as foreign pol icies seemingly too aggressive or</p><p>not aggressive enough (Rose 1 998). This was partly a reaction to the once common practice of</p><p>immediately reaching for non-realist theories to account for any foreign pol icy that seemed</p><p>inexplicable according to neorealist theory. While retaining the new penchant for careful</p><p>theorizing of the external systemic setting, neoclassical realists reached back into classical</p><p>real ism's toolkit for arguments and theories that provided better FPA. They looked inside</p><p>states to see how governmental actors registered and processed systemic pressures, tracking</p><p>how various aspects of domestic politics could alter the effect of a given external incentive on</p><p>the resulting foreign policy choice (Lobell et al. 2009).</p><p>Neoclassical realism is currently in the process of coming into its own as a fu lly devel­</p><p>oped realist subschool. Its advocates</p><p>have developed a much ful ler theoretical picture of</p><p>the international system that bui lds on, and adds more complexity to, defensive real ism's</p><p>scheme, a wel l -developed set of 'interven ing variables' (e.g. perception, decision making, and</p><p>pol icy implementation) that mediate the international system's effect, and a more expansive</p><p>39</p><p>40 W I LL IAM C . WOHLFORTH</p><p>u nderstanding of the approach's 'dependent variables' to encompass not just specific for­</p><p>eign policy decisions but patterns of outcomes across the international system (Lobell et al.</p><p>forthcoming).</p><p>Neoclassical realism is thus consistent with the other subschools of realism. For neoclas­</p><p>sical realists, the question is: Which realist school (if any) is most useful for analysing issues</p><p>of foreign pol icy at a given place and time? To some extent, the choice is contextual. For</p><p>example, offensive realism provides a powerful shorthand portrayal of the incentives and</p><p>constraints faced by states in parts of Eu rope for long stretches of the eighteenth to twentieth</p><p>centuries. In other periods, and for some groups of states in Europe, defensive real ism argu­</p><p>ably provides a more accurate model of the international setting. And many analysts hold</p><p>that, i n today's EU, anarchy is sufficiently attenuated that neither is much use. The degree to</p><p>which a theoretical picture of the i nternational system really applies thus is a matter of judge­</p><p>ment, based on the analyst's read ing of the context.</p><p>From the perspective of realism, a basic set of questions constantly recurs in FPA. To what</p><p>degree is state X's policy a response to external pressures and incentives as opposed to inter­</p><p>nally generated? If a new party were to come to power, how much would the policy change?</p><p>Would state X respond more favourably to incentives or threats? To answer these questions,</p><p>one has to imagine what any state would do in X's position. The key contribution of neo­</p><p>realism and its offshoot subschools of offensive and defensive realism is rigorous thinking</p><p>about exactly these questions. For neoclassical realists, theoretical structures l i ke offensive</p><p>and defensive real ism are not always and everywhere true or false. Rather, they make it easier</p><p>to perform the key mental experiments that l ie at the core of FPA by helping analysts frame</p><p>thei r assessments of the external constraints and incentives states face.</p><p>This, I shal l argue, is the approach most l ikely to exploit the benefits of real ism for the analy­</p><p>sis of foreign policy whi le avoiding the potential pitfal ls. To see why this is so, it is necessary to</p><p>be fami l iar with more specific realist theories, and to be aware of how theories actually relate</p><p>to specific situations.</p><p>Theories within realism</p><p>Theoretical subschools do not capture realism's fu l l d iversity. Equally important are specific</p><p>theories about the fundamental constraints and incentives that shape foreign policy. Knowl­</p><p>edge of realist theories prompts one to ask questions about foreign policy one would not</p><p>otherwise ask, to look for patterns that would not otherwise seem relevant, and to see com­</p><p>monalities through time and so help distinguish the mundane from the remarkable.</p><p>Arguably the best-known theoretical proposition about I R is balance of power theory. Given</p><p>the basic problem that under anarchy any state can resort to force to get what it wants, it fol­</p><p>lows that states are likely to guard against the possibil ity that one state might amass the where­</p><p>withal to compel all the others to do its will and even possibly el iminate them. The theory posits</p><p>that states wi l l check dangerous concentrations of power by building up their own capabili­</p><p>ties ('internal balancing') or aggregating their capabilities with other states in all iances ('external</p><p>balancing'). Because states are always looking to the future to anticipate possible problems,</p><p>balancing may occur even before any one state or al l iance has gained an obvious power edge.</p><p>Balance of threat theory adds complexity to this picture. As its name im plies, this theory</p><p>predicts that states will balance against threats. Threat, in turn, is driven by a combination of</p><p>CHAPTER 2 REAL ISM A N D FORE IGN POLICY</p><p>th ree key variables: aggregate capabil ities (i.e. a state's overall mi l itary and economic poten­</p><p>tial), geography, and perceptions of aggressive intentions. If one state becomes especially</p><p>powerful , and if its location and behaviour feed threat perceptions on the part of other states,</p><p>then balancing strategies wil l come to dominate their foreign policies. Thus the USA began</p><p>both external and internal balancing after the end of the Second World War even though</p><p>the Soviet Union remained decidedly inferior in most categories of power. U ltimately, the</p><p>Western all iance overwhelmed the Soviet-led all iance on nearly every d imension. Balance</p><p>of th reat theory holds that it was the location of Soviet power in the heart of Europe, as wel l</p><p>as the threat i nherent in its secretive government and perceived aggressiveness, that pro­</p><p>duced this outcome.</p><p>Hegemonic stability theory bui lds on the observation that powerful states tend to seek</p><p>dominance over all or parts of any i nternational system, thus fostering some degree of hier­</p><p>archy within the overall systemic anarchy. It seeks to explain how cooperation can emerge</p><p>among major powers and how international orders, comprising rules, norms, and institu­</p><p>tions, emerge and are sustained. The theory's core prediction is that any i nternational order is</p><p>stable only to the degree that the relations of authority with in it are sustained by the u nderly­</p><p>ing distribution of power. Accord ing to this theory, the current order is sustained by US power</p><p>and is l i kely to come undone as challengers such as China gain strength.</p><p>Power transition theory is a subset of hegemonic stabil ity that seeks to explain how orders</p><p>break down into war. Bui lding from the premises of hegemonic stabi l ity theory, it deduces</p><p>that dominant states will prefer to retain leadersh ip, that the preference of lesser states for</p><p>contesting that leadership will tend to strengthen as they become stronger relative to the</p><p>dominant state, and that this clash is l ikely to come to the fore as the capabilities of the two</p><p>sides approach parity. Applied to the current context, the theory posits that the stronger</p><p>China becomes, the more l i kely it is to become dissatisfied with the US-led global order.</p><p>ft pred icts that a war, or at least a Cold War style rivalry, between the USA and China wil l</p><p>become l ikely un less China's growth slows down or Wash ington finds a way to accommodate</p><p>Beij ing's preferences.</p><p>Assumptions, conditions, and theories</p><p>The chief challenge for FPA is: How do we know whether one of these theoretical subschools</p><p>or specific theories applies to a specific foreign policy issue? The answer lies in being clear</p><p>about how the various parts of any theory fit together. Recal l the general argument I spel led</p><p>out about how anarchy fosters conflict. Th is contains three components: the three assump­</p><p>tions of group ism, egoism, and power-centrism; a postulated scope condition (anarchy); and</p><p>a very general theory (given those assumptions, politics in anarchy is conflictual). Many real­</p><p>ists and critics of real ism confuse these th ree things. For example, many assert that anarchy</p><p>or confl ict are assumptions that define real ism. This is wrong, and leads to major analytical</p><p>mistakes on the part of scholars both favourably and unfavourably disposed towards real ism.</p><p>Realists do not assume anarchy. Rather, they create theories about what happens in anarchical</p><p>settings. Realists do not assume that inter-state interaction will be conflictual. Rather, real ism</p><p>contains theories that identify the conditions under which inter-state interactions are l i kely to</p><p>be conflictual. Thus, two common ways in</p><p>which analysts can go astray when applying realism</p><p>to foreign policy are apparent.</p><p>41</p><p>42 W I L L I A M C . WOHLFORTH</p><p>The first error is to confuse assumptions with scope cond itions. If you th ink that anarchy is</p><p>a core assumption about international pol itics, then you are l ikely to th ink that realist theo­</p><p>ries which h ighl ight anarchy apply equally strongly to all states everywhere; but in practice</p><p>anarchy is variable. The abil ity of states to rely on some authority to enforce agreements</p><p>is a matter of degree. For example, great powers sometimes seek to enforce order among</p><p>nearby small states. For those smaller states, anarchy is attenuated. On some set of issues,</p><p>those states m ight reasonably expect the local great power to enforce agreements. Therefore</p><p>realist theories that h igh l ight anarchy would not apply particularly strongly to those states on</p><p>that set of issues. Thus, for example, the USA in Central America, the EU in the Balkans, and</p><p>perhaps Russia or China in Central Asia may all perform this anarchy-attenuating role (albeit</p><p>in very d ifferentways). The only way to know where and to what degree anarchy is attenuated</p><p>is to acqu i re in-depth knowledge about specific states-just what foreign policy analysts are</p><p>supposed to do.</p><p>The second kind of error is to confuse assumptions with predictions. If you mistakenly think</p><p>that conflict is a core assumption of realism, you might well conclude that whenever states</p><p>are n ice to each other, realist theories must not apply; but this is not necessarily so. Because</p><p>realist theories explain war, they also explain peace. For realists, peace results when the key</p><p>causes of war are absent. Thus the amity you m ight observe among some group of states</p><p>may be a result of the attenuation of anarchy among them caused by a local order-provid ing</p><p>great power. Or amity among one group of states may arise from their shared need to oppose</p><p>another state or group. I n either case, realist theories predict that the absence of confl ict is</p><p>contingent on a particular configuration of power and that conflict might return when that</p><p>configuration changes (see Figure 2.1 ).</p><p>The upshot is that realist theories can be powerful tools i n FPA, but applying them is harder</p><p>than it might seem. The trick is to recogn ize the contingent nature of all theories. The ques­</p><p>tion of whether a theory applies to a given case is hard to answer, and often requi res precisely</p><p>the kind of deep local knowledge that analysts of foreign pol icy tend to possess. Neoclassical</p><p>real ism, I have suggested, best captures this delicate combination between the general and</p><p>the particular. So far, I have made this case at a very general level. It becomes much clearer</p><p>when we exam ine actual realist analysis of foreign policy.</p><p>Realist analysis of foreign pol icy</p><p>While the analysis of foreign policy might begin with theory, it should never end there. To</p><p>generate explanations of foreign policy, one must combine the general and timeless causes</p><p>that theories identify with the particulars of a given situation. As I have stressed, real ism is</p><p>the school of thought arguably most firmly grounded in real foreign pol icy practice while</p><p>also most committed to creating highly general theories. How have realists reconci led these</p><p>potentially contradictory commitments?</p><p>Practitioners' realist foreign policy approaches</p><p>Examples are easy to find. Frequently, one encounters the explicit or impl icit use of realist</p><p>theory balanced with in-depth case-specific knowledge in the analysis "Of real policy makers.</p><p>C H A PT E R 2 R E A L I S M A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y</p><p>Prop ·itio c mmonJ seen a</p><p>definitive assumpti n of reali m'</p><p>ctua1 relation to three c re as mpU n</p><p>'States are main actors' ; Current manifestation of the groupism</p><p>l assumption</p><p>'Universal moral principals</p><p>·</p><p>· ( Predi�tions/arguments derived from</p><p>. do .not apply to_states' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . j three assumptions</p><p>'States calculate interest in r</p><p>terms of power' · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · - · · · · · · · · ·- · · · · ·-· ·· · · · · · · · · .. · · · · · · · · · · · "'·</p><p>'Scepticism toward international law and</p><p>institutions'</p><p>cln ternaLioual poli tics i ess ntial ly ;</p><p>conflictual l</p><p>· ·Humankind cannot ttansce.o . c�nflict ;</p><p>through the progressive power of reason'</p><p>p'rim cy of balance of pow r p�litics' l</p><p>Tnternationnl system is anarchic' · · 1 Scope conditions</p><p>· ·uncertainty' ·</p><p>·</p><p>1</p><p>'Th uti l ity of force' :</p><p>. . . . . . .. .. .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ..... .. . . . . . . .. . .. . . . ... . .. . . . r- •-· · · · · · · ·· · · · · · ·· · · · · · · · · · ._ . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. _,. .. . . .</p><p>' Poli tics not -a funct ion of ethic ; reasons f l Implication of egoism</p><p>state trump ethic ' l</p><p>· · · · · - · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · - · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ··· · · · · .. · · · · · · • • • t f'" • • 4 •� · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·· · · · · · · · · · · ·</p><p>' tate interest · urvival' j Impl ication o groapism</p><p>.. . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . .... .... . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ..... . .. . . . . - . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . ... . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . .. . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 'Realist assume tendency to evil j M is-stated implication f egoism</p><p>Figure 2.1 Many propositions thought to be definitive of real ism are actual ly derivative of the three core</p><p>assumptions.</p><p>I n 1 900, the Russian M in ister of War, Pri nce Ku ropatk in , wrote a comprehens ive report</p><p>for Tsar Alexander I I on the strategic s i tuation. It provided th ree important assessments, a l l</p><p>of which were controvers ial at the t ime, but i n h indsight appear presc ient . given the fate</p><p>that we now know wou ld soon befal l the Russian Emp i re: that Russia was a satisfied power</p><p>need ing no fu rther expans ion for any of i ts core interests; that any expans ion wou ld on ly</p><p>frighten other states, causing them to bu i ld u p their own forces or al ly against St Petersburg;</p><p>and that , given its own power and that of its potential enemies, Russia could i l l afford any</p><p>such confrontat ion and needed to do al l it cou ld to reduce tensions with other major pow­</p><p>ers. Focus i ng on the relative power of states and the ever- present potential for confl i ct ,</p><p>Ku ropatkin's analys is bu i lt on al l the core real ist assumptions. Most importantly, the report</p><p>recognized that , whatever i ts un iversa l val idity as a genera l portrayal of i nternational pol i ­</p><p>tics, i n 900 balance of power theory was work i ng agai nst Russia . I n today's terms, t he report</p><p>rel i es on balance of threat theory and the general assessment of the secu r ity d i lemma found</p><p>in defensive real ism. The bri l l iance of Kuropatkin's analysis was its sophi sticated recogn i ­</p><p>t ion that even though Russia was weak, i t cou ld sti l l seem strong and threatening to others,</p><p>causing them to take countermeasures that could end up making Russia even less secure.</p><p>43</p><p>44 WI LL IAM C . WOH LFORTH</p><p>This report was, h istorian Wil l iam Ful ler (1 992: 379) notes, 'a masterly effort and inspires</p><p>admiration'.</p><p>In 1 907 a B ritish d i plomat, Sir Eyre Crowe, wrote a memorandum for the government</p><p>outl in ing the need for a thoroughgoing reorientation of Britai n's foreign policy. At its core</p><p>was a dispassionate analysis of the Empire's overa l l power position and the fundamen­</p><p>tal chal l enges presented by the rise of Germany. Crowe used balance of power theory to</p><p>explain why Br i la.in had to concentrate</p><p>its dwindl ing resources on the problem of contain ­</p><p>i ng German power. The memorandum brought together the typical realist emphasis on sys­</p><p>tem ic power concerhs with a detailed exam ination of German domestic pol itics, statecraft,</p><p>and i ntentions.</p><p>In 1 946, George Kennan, the US Ambassador to the Soviet U nion, drafted one of the most</p><p>famous memoranda of modern times, the 'long telegram', urging Washington to adopt a pol­</p><p>icy of containing Soviet power. He argued that the Soviet Un ion was in a position that threat­</p><p>ened the global balance of power and that the country was internally disposed to continue</p><p>expanding un less it met a powerful counterweight. Once again we see the general realist</p><p>precepts (a dispassionate analysis of Soviet, US, and British capabi l ities and of the fundamen­</p><p>tal importance of the world's key power centres, a penchant for discounting the universalistic</p><p>rhetoric on both sides, a focus on narrow group interest, and the potential for co.nfl ict), a very</p><p>general timeless theory (again, the balance of power), and an in-depth and insightful analysis</p><p>of domestic Soviet pol itics.</p><p>In the early 1 970s, President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger,</p><p>engineered a reorientation of US foreign policy. Underlying this shift was Kissinger's hard­</p><p>headed analysis of the relative decline in US power against the backdrop of the increasing</p><p>power of the USA's own all ies in Europe and Asia, as well as that of their main rival, the Soviet</p><p>Union, and many other regional states. The chiefargument of this study was that, in view of its</p><p>weakened power position, Washington should do less by itself, work to get all ies and partners</p><p>to shoulder more of the burden of containing Soviet power, reduce the number of potential</p><p>enemies by reaching out to China, and attenuate the rivalry with the Soviet Un ion by pursu­</p><p>ing a relaxation of tensions known in diplomatic parlance as detente.</p><p>These examples are all from foreign pol icy practitioners steeped in the realist intel lectual</p><p>tradit ion. They share the trademark real ist emphasis on a d ispassionate analysis of the rela­</p><p>tive power positions of groups i n anarchy and the ubiquity of power pol itics. Their realism</p><p>becomes clearer when compared with what others were saying at the t ime. In each case,</p><p>these analysts confronted competing analyses that d id not share the basic realist features</p><p>noted above. The h istorian Ful ler observed that Kuropatkin's report was 1the first occasion</p><p>in Russian history in which a statesman had tried to commit to paper a synoptic vision of</p><p>Russia's pol itical and mil itary strategies in the past, present, and future'. Crowe's memo­</p><p>randum met with a sceptical response from the Liberal cabinet of the day, and both Ken­</p><p>nan's and Kissinger's mode of thinking struck many of their fel low countrymen as somehow</p><p>un-American.</p><p>These practitioners deployed arguments that would later develop into rigorous academic</p><p>theories such as the secu rity dilemma or balance of threat theory; but they are also based on</p><p>a deep famil iarity with specific players involved in each situation, their h istory, culture, and</p><p>collective mindsets. Needless to say, this balancei between theory and case is just what today's</p><p>neoclassical real ists seek to recapture (see Box 2.1 ).</p><p>C H A P T E R 2 R E A L I S M A N D F O R E I G N P O L I CY</p><p>eox 2 . 1 Russia ancl �merica play ttie E.H. Carr fl ip-f op</p><p>'Morality is the product of power', E.H. Carr wrote in his real ist classic The Twenty Years' Crisis. He meant</p><p>that standards of right and wrong tend to be defined by the powerful in ways that further their narrow</p><p>group interest. Carr effortlessly cited case after case of principles fl ip-flopping in response to changing</p><p>relations of power and interest. It is just as easy to find cases today. In 1 999, NATO bombed Serbia to</p><p>force it to cease its violent suppression of an independence movement in its provi nce of Kosovo. Russia</p><p>protested strongly, claiming that the intervention violated the principle of sovereignty enshrined in the</p><p>UN Charter, and, moreover, that it was i l legal because it was neither taken in self-defence nor authorized</p><p>by the UN Security Council. NATO defended the action as a response to a humanitarian crisis and a threat</p><p>to regional securlly.</p><p>Nine years later, Russia invaded its neighbour Georgia, ostensibly to force it to cease its violent sup­</p><p>pressior, of separatists in the Georgian provinces or South Ossetfa and Abkhazia. Now, NATO countries</p><p>protested hls violat ion of Georgiars sovereignly, crt ing the very same principles that Russia had touted in</p><p>the Kosovo case. Russia's response? Its d ip lomats l i teral ly repeated to the Western powers the very same</p><p>arguments that NATO had used nine years earl ier concern ing Kosovo. Then in 2014 , President Vlad imir</p><p>V. Putin again cited the Kosovo precedent in justifying Russia's annexation of Crimea from sovereign</p><p>Ukraine. Had these governments really chan_ge<:I their views on the pr inciple of sovereignty? Hardly. D if­</p><p>ferent constellations of power and interest called forth different justifytng pr incipJ�.</p><p>Scholars' realist foreign policy approaches</p><p>Academic analysts of foreign pol icy frequently reach for rea l ist theo ries to inform the lr criti ­</p><p>cal studies. Hans Morgenthau , the most renowned US real ist scholar of the m id-twenti eth</p><p>century, period ical ly used real i st ideas to i nform trenchant critiques of h is government's for­</p><p>e ign pol icy. He argued that waging a co ld war agai nst all states led by commun ist parties, no</p><p>matter what the d ifferences among them, on ly mu l t ip l ied US enem ies and commitments.</p><p>The analyses (see Box 2.2) , made just as the USA was gear i ng up for a major and u ltimately</p><p>d i sastrous m i l i tary commitment to Vietnam, show many hal lmarks of real i st FPA .</p><p>Let us consider another example i n detai l . I n the_ late 1 980s, the Cold War had defined</p><p>i nternational pol i tics for over a generation and i t seemed set to endure far i nto the futu re; but</p><p>there was a new actor on the scene. The Soviet leader, M i kha i l Gorbachev, had i naugurated a</p><p>new d ip lomatic strategy that ental led maki ng concess ions on key outstand i ng issues d ivid ing</p><p>the Soviet Un ion from the USA and its a l l ies. At the same t lme 1 Gorbachev espoused a new set</p><p>of fo reign pol icy pri nci p les cal led 'new pol it ical th i n k i ng' that ca l l ed for transcending confl ict</p><p>and bu i ld ing a new world order. Most foreign p.ol icy analysts i n the USA d iscounted the new</p><p>th ink ing as an attempt to hoodwink the Western powers i nto making dangerous cor,cess ions,</p><p>and he ld that real change i n Moscow's course wou ld be strictly l im ited . A sma l l m i nority took</p><p>the ideas serious ly, contend ing that major changes were poss ib le, provided that the West</p><p>reciprocated Gorbachev's concess ions .</p><p>I nto th is debate came an article whose title said i t a l l : 'Gorbachev's Foreign Pol icy: D ip lo ­</p><p>macy of Decl i ne?' The author, Stephen Sestanovich (1 988) , proceeded from the core rea l i st</p><p>assumptions to suggest that group interest and power (not the global vis ions of new th ink ing)</p><p>are the key to pol i tics. Th is led h im to look at the underlyi ng power posit ion of the Sovi et</p><p>Un ion 1 which was arguably decl i n i ng. Against the majority position , he held that the new</p><p>45</p><p>46 W I L L I A M C . WO H L F O R T H</p><p>eox 2 . 2 Morgenthau oi1 S Cold ar foreign policy and Vietnam</p><p>From New York Times Magazine, 1 8 April 1 965:</p><p>IL is iron c that th s 1mple Jm«aposf1 1nn or 'Cornmunlsr:n' and ·r1t:e wa,, ld was erected by John Fostet</p><p>Dulles's crusading mora!lsm mto rhe guiding pnndple of Ame11can forelro,, poltcy at a 1 1me when the</p><p>mwonal Communism o Y1.1goslav1a , the neutral sm of rhe third world and the tncjpi nt split between</p><p>he Soviet Union and China were render mg that JUXtapos 1 tion invalid</p><p>Today.</p><p>It 1 s belaboring Lile obvious to say that we are faced not with one monolith fc Cornrponism</p><p>whb� \Jr11form host1 hty must be countered w, I I equally uniform hostility. but with a number of dlf­</p><p>feren Communisms whose hCl!itll !ly, Qetermmed by differer, national lnteresis. vanes. In fact, he USA</p><p>encountets today less hostilay from nto, who Is a Communist . than rrom de G,aulte ,vho Is noL .</p><p>We car1 o ay distin�1sh four d1f'fe1em l)lpes or Commumsm r , view of tt,e kind and degree of</p><p>hosl1 l ity to he USA hey represent: a Co111munlsm tdeml ffod with lhe Soviet Urnon-eg Poland, a</p><p>Communism ldentlfled wi h Ch1na-e Albania: a Comn,unrsm that straddles the fence between the</p><p>Sovl l:Jh1on and Ch1na�eig, R\irnan1a, and independent Commun ,sm-e.g Yugoslavia. 8.lch or these</p><p>C�mm1,misms must be dealt with In te1 ms of the bearing 1rs forelgt:i policy has upon the 1n1eres15 of the</p><p>USA in a concrete instance.</p><p>ll Would. ct course be absurd lo suggest hat the officials responsible for the conduce of Am rican</p><p>ore1gn policy are unaware of these d 1st incllons and of the dem 11ds they mak for discnmmatu,g sub ­</p><p>Llety. Yel s an obvtous ract of expenence that hese officials are mcapable of l iv1 11g up to these demands</p><p>When they dea,l With Vietnam</p><p>n,us they maneuver th m5ielves mm a posit on wt,lch is allltt-revotuuonary per se arid vhich requires</p><p>m I haw opposmon to revGilu1 lon wl erevet 1t 1s found In Asia. regardless of how It affects he In erests-</p><p>nd how susceptible 11 ,s to tile power�of I.he USA. There ls a histQrfC" precedem for th s ·ind of polrc;y</p><p>M Hem ch's mlli1.ary opposition 10 l lberahsm after he Nap0leonic Wars. �h ch collapsed in 1 848 For</p><p>b etter or f(!.)r worsr we l ive again in an ii8e of 1woll) on It 1s the tµsk of statesmanship not to oppose</p><p>wha canno be opposed without a chance of succe$s, I \1l to bend ft to one's own 1 1 1 ter�iS.</p><p>From Meet the Press 1 6 May 1 965:</p><p>Q: Professor. do you thin because we m y not be able to stop tt,em {the Chinese}, ts. t 11ac a g1;1od reason</p><p>ro, not lJ)ll ng 1 f they are dangerous ilnd they want to get he whole world under 1he1 r thumb?</p><p>Morgenthau. lh 1s 1 s the best reason In the world If you took L lhe problem of potl t1cs n general, you</p><p>realii:e l1at poh 1 ics is the art of the posslb l Th •re are certain things that you would hke to <:lo but yo11</p><p>can't o because you haven't got the means to do 1 hem</p><p>Soviet pol icy was seriou5 precise ly because it was a response to power sh ifts. Agai nst the</p><p>m inority position, he contended that the new th i nking ideas were not important in them­</p><p>selves, but rather reflected the attempt to put the best face on a concessionary pol icy of</p><p>appeasement driven by decl ine. He observed that states tend to generate ideas for transcend­</p><p>ing cohfl ict just when they see that they lack the power to carry on the struggle. Sestanovich</p><p>rea l ized that decl i n ing states do in fact have other options. For example, real ist think ing also</p><p>emphasizes that a decl i n ing power can use force to try to rescue its posit ion . I t was on ly by</p><p>combin i ngthe general theory with h i s detai led knowledge of the Cold War and Soviet pol itics</p><p>that he cou ld be (easonably confident that Moscow would choose appeasement over war.</p><p>As th ings turned out, Sestanovich was right about many th i ngs. Remember: the pol icy</p><p>debate was over whether the new Soviet course was serious and whether the West had</p><p>to move towards Go rbachev's new th l nking and reci procate his concessions i n order to</p><p>CHAPTER 2 REAL I SM A N D F O R E I G N POL ICY</p><p>attenuate the Cold War rivalry. As i t happened , US policy makers never accepted new think­</p><p>ing and never reciprocated Gorbachev's major concessions, yet the Soviet Union continued</p><p>to back away from its Cold War positions and the rivalry was ended on Western terms; and,</p><p>although scholars continue to debate its relative importance, there is no q uestion that decl ine</p><p>was a major driving force behind Soviet foreign pol icy during the Cold War's endgame.</p><p>One issue on which Sestanovich was less than clear was whether Gorbachev actually believed</p><p>his new thinking rhetoric. The diplomacy may well have been a response to decline, and the ideas</p><p>may have been rational izations for the tough decisions Gorbachev had to make, but nonetheless</p><p>they may have been sincerely believed. This brings us to the Soviet side of the story. I n Moscow,</p><p>at exactly this time, there was a group of Russian realist analysts. Looking at them is instruc­</p><p>tive, because realist analysis had been forbidden in the Soviet Union for many decades. All FPA</p><p>had formally to adhere to the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism. As Soviet society began to</p><p>loosen up, Russian analysts were able to express realist ideas openly for the first time i n decades.</p><p>By 1 988, young Russian realist analysts felt emboldened enough to publish careful critiques</p><p>of official Soviet policy.2 Their studies are instantly recognizable as belonging to the same</p><p>(classical realist) tradition as Kuropatkin , Crowe, Kennan, and Kissinger. Conducting the fami l­</p><p>iar realist assessment of relative power trends, these analysts agreed with Sestanovich that</p><p>Soviet foreign pol i cy had to respond to decl ine by making concessions to ease the burdens of</p><p>empire. However, they criticized Gorbachev's new thinking for obscuring rather than clarify­</p><p>ing the tough trade-offs facing Moscow. In their view, the grand visionary ideas were delaying</p><p>tough decisions, particularly regard ing Germany. Pre-emptive concessions on that issue, they</p><p>argued , would allow Moscow to get ahead of the curve, gain control of the agenda, and buy</p><p>time for critical domestic reforms. Given what occurred in the two years after these analyses</p><p>were publ ished-Moscow's total loss of its al l iance system and u ltimately the col lapse of the</p><p>Soviet Union itself-they look prescient indeed.</p><p>Recent examples of scholars' realist FPA i nclude the opposition of many self-proclaimed</p><p>realists to the US invasion of I raq in 2002-2003 and to NATO's i ntervention i n Libya in 201 1 ,</p><p>and, more general ly, opposition to unqualified support for Israel. As the USA and many if</p><p>its key all ies entered a prolonged economic s lump after the financial crisis of 2008, placing</p><p>intense strains on m i l itary and foreign affairs budgets, realists began arguing strongly for the</p><p>need to pare down security comm itments and move to a more restrained posture in world</p><p>affairs. Real ists such as john Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt warn their government against</p><p>needlessly provoking potential great power adversaries such as Russia and China by expand­</p><p>ing commitments in their neighbourhoods-e.g. to Vietnam or Ukraine. The detai ls are dif­</p><p>ferent, but the thrust is redolent of Morgenthau's arguments four decades earl ier-that an</p><p>overly idealistic definition of US interest ran the risk of multiplying enemies and expanding</p><p>commitments beyond the country's means.</p><p>Using realism in analysing foreign pol icy</p><p>Guidelines</p><p>To i l lustrate the potential analytical power of real ism, I have selected examples in which ana­</p><p>lysts struck an ideal balance between real ism's aspiration to general theory and its equally</p><p>strong commitment to grounding in foreign policy practice. Whi le they show that realism can</p><p>inform the analysis of foreign policy, they do not tell us how this occurs. Despite the apparent</p><p>47</p><p>48 W I L L I A M C . WOH LFORTH</p><p>overlap between realist principles and the dynamics of foreign policy, real ist theories do not</p><p>necessarily guarantee a clear and accurate analysis of foreign policy. It is al l too easy to find</p><p>examples of analyses reliant on realist theories that do not read so well in retrospect. Examin­</p><p>ing some of these less successfu l examples helps to clarify the potential pitfalls of realism as a</p><p>gu ide to foreign policy.</p><p>Example 1 : The never-ending Cold War</p><p>The most renowned real ist theorist of the last generation,</p><p>Kenneth Waltz, proclaimed in 1 988</p><p>that the Cold War was 'fi rmly rooted in the structure of postwar i nternational pol itics and wil l</p><p>last as long as that structure endures' (Waltz 1 988: 52). No one read ing that article would have</p><p>expected the Cold War structure to come crashing down in the next few years. The contrast</p><p>with Sestanovich's article and the analysis by the Russian realists noted above is instructive.</p><p>The ch ief difference is that those analyses were deeply immersed in the analysis of Soviet</p><p>foreign policy. They were acutely aware that the bipolar structure was the product of the</p><p>abil ity of the two superpowers to sustain it, and that the depths of Soviet decl ine placed a</p><p>question mark over the stabil ity of the Cold War order. They did not question Waltz's theory</p><p>l inking bipolarity to the Cold War; rather, their case-specific knowledge led them to question</p><p>whether the theory's in itial conditions-two relatively equally matched superpowers-would</p><p>remain in place. To his cred it, Waltz understood this as wel l , having posed the question of</p><p>whether the Soviet Un ion could long keep up its side of the Cold War; but the passage j ust</p><p>cited is an example of reasoning from theory to a case without using case detail to i nterrogate</p><p>the theory. It exempl ifies the pitfal ls of applying a theory without due regard to whether its</p><p>scope conditions are actually present.</p><p>Example 2: Major power war in 1990s Europe</p><p>The fol lowing year, John Mearsheimer, argued that the end of the Cold War would lead to</p><p>a more war-prone Europe. As such, 'the West has an interest in maintain ing the Cold War</p><p>order, and hence has an interest in mainta in ing the Cold War confrontation', meaning, of</p><p>course, that Western powers should support 'the continued existence of a powerful Soviet</p><p>· Un ion with substantial mi l itary forces in Eastern Europe' (Mearsheimer 1 990: 1 25). Need­</p><p>less to say, policy makers did not heed this advice. Simi lar to the above case, one problem</p><p>with this appl ication of realist theory to a specific foreign pol icy situation was that the Soviet</p><p>Union was losing the material wherewithal to maintain a massive troop presence in Central</p><p>Europe. Hence, even setting aside the wi l l i ngness of Central European publ ics to tolerate</p><p>the Soviet presence, it was unclear that Moscow could afford to sustain it. More impor­</p><p>tantly, Mearsheimer d id not question whether the scope conditions of polarity theory really</p><p>appl ied. The theory that multipolarity (an i nternational system shaped by the power of three</p><p>or more major states) is more prone to war than bipolarity (an international system shaped</p><p>by the power of two major states, or superpowers) may well be right, but it is not clear</p><p>whether it appl ied to a region such as Europe in which a powerful outside actor, the USA,</p><p>maintained a strong security presence. Hence, even i n terms of a spare realist theory that</p><p>ignores the EU and new domestic politics and identities, it was doubtfu l that Mearsheimer's</p><p>analysis applied to that case.</p><p>CH APTER 2 REAL I SM A N D FORE IGN POL ICY</p><p>Example 3: Anti-US counterbalancing in the 1990s</p><p>Waltz and other realists began to argue that, with the end of the Cold War, a new multi polar</p><p>balance of power order would quickly re-emerge in which other major powers would coun­</p><p>terbalance the USA. They held that overly provocative US pol icies, such as the expansion of</p><p>NATO to former Soviet all ies i n Central Europe, wou ld push Russia and other major powers</p><p>i nto an anti-US all iance. Again , pol icy makers in Wash ington and Europe chose to ignore</p><p>this advice. NATO expansion occurred, accompan ied by a high ly active and interventionist</p><p>US foreign pol icy. No trad itional counterbalancing occurred. As i n the other cases, there are</p><p>plenty of non-real i st theories that m ight account for this outcome. However, more to the</p><p>point here, this appears to be another case of applying a theory to a situation without due</p><p>regard to whether its scope conditions are actually present. Realists' predictions of counter­</p><p>balancing and the accompanying policy analysis were based on balance of power theory, but</p><p>it became increasingly clear that that theory's scope conditions did not apply to the 1 990s</p><p>USA (Wohlfarth 1 999) in a condition of unipolarity. The theory predicts reactions to a rising</p><p>hegemonic power, not responses to a power whose hegemony is al ready firmly establ ished.</p><p>All the centuries of theory, practice, and lore about the balance of power may wel l be right,</p><p>but they simply did not apply to the case at hand. Belatedly recogn izing this, realists began</p><p>developing a new theory of soft balancing to explain constraint actions against a dom inant</p><p>power in a unipolar setting (see Pape 2005).</p><p>Avoiding pitfalls</p><p>Assessing the veracity of FPA from the comfortable vantage of h indsight is hard to do fai rly.</p><p>The point is not to play the 'Gotcha!' game against ind ividual scholars-a l l scholars have</p><p>mixed records of p rognostication and policy assessment-but to understand where spe­</p><p>cific discussions of foreign pol icy might have gone astray in their particular appl ication of</p><p>real ism.</p><p>Realist theories clearly generate widely disparate impl ications for foreign policy, some of</p><p>which may i l luminate while others may be perceived as flat wrong. How does one i ncrease</p><p>the l ike l ihood that realist theories will help rather than h inder FPA? The key is a knowledge­</p><p>able use of these theories. Knowing how to use these theories requ i res careful thought about</p><p>how precisely they are related to realism's own core assumptions, scope conditions. and</p><p>expected outcomes as well as to the real-world foreign pol icy scenarios to which they are</p><p>appl ied. As i l lustrated above, i n the s imple confusion of scope conditions with assumptions,</p><p>analysts of foreign policy may try to apply real ist theories to international settings where they</p><p>are profoundly mislead ing (see Figure 2.2).</p><p>The two major lessons for avoiding erroneous or inaccurate foreign pol icy analyses are to</p><p>know the specifics of the foreign pol icy case at hand and to pay close attention to the scope</p><p>conditions that may connect it more generally to key realist precepts. Theories, especially</p><p>real ism, are sometimes assumed to be un iversal-applying a lways and everywhere without</p><p>alteration. In reality, as Fig. 2.2 suggests, theories and even subschools within real ism apply i n</p><p>very different cond itions. Only by knowing the detai ls of a given foreign pol icy issue can one</p><p>determine whether the circumstances under analysis truly correspond to the known parame­</p><p>ters of a given theory. Applying these lessons is much harder to do than it seems. for it requi res</p><p>49</p><p>50 W I L L I A M C. WOH LFORTH</p><p>Offensive realism</p><p>ain theorist What it xplain</p><p>! Mearsheimer</p><p>1</p><p>i Expansionism/war</p><p>cope condit ion.</p><p>l Security is scarce; j offence/defence cannot ; be distinguished; j technology/geography</p><p>. . j favour off nee</p><p>Defensive T Jervis, Glaser l Over-expansi nism: l Security is plentiful; realism ·</p><p>1 cooperation j offence/defence f l distinguishable;</p><p>. ; l technology/geography</p><p>l 1 j favour defence ·</p><p>. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . .. . . . . ,;. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . j . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . , . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . Balance of power j Waltz j Alliances, military j One great power rising</p><p>1 j build-ups, l to potential</p><p>j j militarized rivalries l hegemony/predominance</p><p>. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . ... . . ... . . .. .. . .. . . . . . _. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . � . . .. . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . --. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . , .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .</p><p>institutions that form the bases of societies, economies, and pol ities. Put succinctly,</p><p>l ittle of human behaviour falls outside the scope of the analysis of foreign policy phenomena.</p><p>xiv F O R E W O R D</p><p>Some possible sources of fragmegration at four levels of aggregation</p><p>levels of MICRO MACRO MACRO-MACRO M ICRO-MACRO</p><p>aggregation -+</p><p>Sources of</p><p>fragmegration</p><p>!</p><p>Sk i l l revolution expands people's en la rges the mu lt i p l ies q uantity constrains pol icy</p><p>horizons on a capacity of and enhances making th rough</p><p>g lobal scale; government q ual ity of l i n ks increased capacity</p><p>sensitizes them agencies to th ink among states; of ind ividua ls to</p><p>to the relevance 'out of the box', so l id ifies their know when, where,</p><p>of d istant events; seize opportun ities, a l l i ances and and how to engage</p><p>fac i l itates a and analyse enm ities in col lective action</p><p>reversion to local chal l enges</p><p>concerns</p><p>Authority crises red i rect loyalties; weaken abi l ity of en large the fac i l i tate the</p><p>encourage both governments competence of capacity of pub l i cs</p><p>ind ivid uals to and other some IGOs and to press and/</p><p>replace trad it ional organ izations NGOs; encou rage or paralyse their</p><p>criter ia of to frame and d ip lomatic governments , the</p><p>legit imacy with implement pol icies wanness i n wro, and other</p><p>performance negotiations organizations</p><p>criteria</p><p>B i furcation of adds to ro le faci l itates generates empowers</p><p>global structu res confl icts, d ivides formation of institut ional transnational</p><p>loy;i ltiRs, and new :.µ l i � res of c1 1 1 a 1 115e 1 1 1e 1 1 l� [or advou,.cy groups</p><p>foments tensions authority and cooperat ion on and special</p><p>among i nd iv iduals; consol idation of major global issues 1 n terests to pursue</p><p>orients people existi ng spheres in such as trade, i n fluence through</p><p>towards local the multicentric human rights, the d iverse channels</p><p>spheres of world environment. etc</p><p>authority</p><p>Organizational faci l i tates multip le i ncreases capacity renders the global contr ibutes to</p><p>explos ion identities, of opposition stage ever more the plural ism</p><p>subgroup ism, groups to form and transnational and and dispersion</p><p>and affi l i ation press for altered dense with non- of authority ;</p><p>with transnational po l icies; d ivides governmental heightens the</p><p>networks publ ics from their actors probab i l i ty of</p><p>el ites author ity cri ses</p><p>Mobi l i ty upheaval stimu lates en larges the size heightens need i ncreases</p><p>imaginations and and re levance for international movement across</p><p>provides more of su bcu ltures, cooperation to borders that</p><p>extensive contacts diasporas, and control the flow lessens capacity</p><p>with foreign eth n ic confl icts of d rugs, money, of governments to</p><p>cultu res; heightens as peop le seek imm igrants, and control national</p><p>sal ience of the new opportunities terrorists boundar ies</p><p>outs ider abroad</p><p>F O R E WO R D</p><p>Microelectron i c enable l i ke-m i nded empower acce le rate constra in</p><p>technologies people to be i n governments to d ip lomatic governments</p><p>touch with each mob i l ize support; p rocesses: by enab l i ng</p><p>other anywhere i n render the i r secre ts fac i l i tate e l ectron ic oppos 1 t 1on groups</p><p>the world vu l ne rab le to s urvei l l ance and to mobi l ize more</p><p>spying i nte l l igence work effectively</p><p>Weaken i ng of underm i nes adds to the i n creases need lessens confidence</p><p>terr itor ia l i ty, states, nat iona l loyal t ies poros i ty of nat ional for i nte rstate i n governments;</p><p>and sovereignty and i ncreases boundaries and the cooperation on renders nationwide</p><p>d i strust of d i ffi cu l ty of fram i ng global issues; consensus d i fficu l t</p><p>governments and nationa l pol i c i es l essens control to ach ieve and</p><p>other i nst itut ions over cascad i ng ma 1 nta 1 n</p><p>events</p><p>G loba l ization swe l l s ran ks comp l i cates i n tens i fies trade i ncreases efforts</p><p>of national of consumers; tasks of state and i nvestment to p rotect</p><p>economies promotes un i form governments confl icts; generates local cultu res</p><p>tastes; heightens vis-a-vis markets; i ncentives and industries;</p><p>concerns for jobs promotes bus iness for bu i l d i ng faci l i tates vigour o f</p><p>al l i ances g lobal fi nanc ia l p rotest movements</p><p>i n sti tut ions</p><p>More impo rtant than its vast scope , however, th i s fo rm u l ati on i s not eas i ly s ubjected to</p><p>ana lys i s . One not on ly needs to be fam i l i ar with the dynam ics whereby states i nteract with</p><p>each other, but the i nternal p rocesses whereby fore ign po l i c ies are formed a lso n eed to be</p><p>pro bed. To ignore these p rocesses by c l ass ify i ng them as 'domest ic ' , and thus as outs i de</p><p>the ana lyst's concerns , wou ld be to om it centra l featu res of the behav iour one wants to</p><p>i nvest igate. Students of domest i c phenomena may be ab le to ho ld fo re ign i nputs constant ,</p><p>but the same can not be said about the phenom ena that cu l m i nate i n fo re ign po l i c ies . I n ­</p><p>evi tab ly the student of a cou ntry's foreign pol icy must a l so be concerned with i ts i nterna l</p><p>affai rs . Put d ifferently, he o r she must be a student of socio l ogy and psycho logy as wel l as</p><p>po l i t ica l sc ience, econom i cs , and h isto ry. N o less i m portant , they shou ld have some knowl ­</p><p>edge of the prob lems i n he rent i n com parative enq u i ry. The methodo logies of the fie ld are</p><p>as sal ient as are the su bstant ive p rob lems that cou ntr ies face i n l i n k i ng themse lves to the</p><p>i nte rnat ional system .</p><p>I n short , fo reign po l i cy phenomena are i nord i nate ly comp lex . They encompass i n puts that</p><p>can give rise to a variety of outputs , with a s l i ght variation i n one of the i n puts havi ng s izeab l e</p><p>conseq uences for t he outputs they foste r. Thus t he causal p rocesses are not eas i ly traced.</p><p>They can be h igh ly e l us ive when the i r variatio n spans , as i t usua l ly does , a wide range of i n puts</p><p>that may vary from time1 to time2. Nor can the complexit ies be assumed away. They are too</p><p>central to the dynam ics of fore ign pol i cy to ignore or bypass. One has no cho ice but to al l ow</p><p>for them and trace thei r conseq uences across d iverse s ituations. Such a procedu re faci l itates</p><p>cogent analys i s even as it ri sks d rawing a l ess than compl ete p ictu re.</p><p>The mai n characteristi cs of fore ign pol i cy-and the requ i rements they impose on analysts</p><p>of the subject-are fu l ly observab le i n the ensu i ng chapters . Thei r authors demonstrate a keen</p><p>sensit iv ity to the prob lems of the fie ld and the rewards for analys i ng them . They understand</p><p>the need for theory as wel l as em pi ri cal ana lys is of how any country conducts itself i n the</p><p>xv</p><p>xvi F O R EWORD</p><p>i nternational community. More than that, this understanding includes a grasp of how the</p><p>analysis must be varied to accommodate different approaches to the field.</p><p>In order to cope with the enormous variety of phenomena that may be relevant to the</p><p>study of foreign pol icy one has to select some of them as important and dismiss others as</p><p>trivial in so far as one's enqui ry is cor1cernecJ. This process of selection is what being theo­</p><p>retical means. More accu rately, the selected phenomena have to be examined in relation to</p><p>each other, as interactive, and the theoretician needs to grasp the dynamics of the interactive</p><p>processes as well as the domestic variables of the country of concern. Constructing incisive</p><p>theoretical perspectives is not easy, however. The process of explicating causal dynamics can</p><p>be very frustrating as well as very compl icated. I t is fairly easy to have a general sense of the</p><p>phenomena that underlie the foreign policy behaviour of interest, but it is quite another thing</p><p>to transform one's general understanding into concrete, testable, and relevant hypotheses.</p><p>Put d ifferently, specifying the</p><p>. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Balance of threat 1 Walt 1 Alliances, military J One great power rising</p><p>: l build-ups, j to potential</p><p>Soft bnJnncing</p><p>r militarized rivalries j hegemony/predominance ! j whose geographical</p><p>! location, military j posture, and overall j behaviour engender threat j perceptions</p><p>t : • . r Pape I Subtle constraint j One great power too</p><p>1 ; actions vs. unipole [ strong to be balanced:</p><p>[ l j unipolarity : ; :</p><p>'f • . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v . . . . .. . . . . . � . . . . • i . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . : • • . .. . ·- · · . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . � - · . .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . � - · - . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . •· · � . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . Hegemonic 1 Gilpin l Cooperahqn ; 1 One great power stability l l institution-norm l predominant in system</p><p>I : • : • ; ! construction; j or region</p><p>j j 'order' j Power transition 1 Orga��ki ( 1958), 1 War i Capab llitie �f a d ing l Gilpin 1 ; challenger approaching</p><p>l l j pari wi th d minant</p><p>l \ i hegernon</p><p>Figure 2.2 Theories and scope conditions.</p><p>deep fami l iarity with both genera l theory and the specifics of the foreign pol icy case, as wel l</p><p>a s a continual mental back-and-forth check between the case and the theory.</p><p>Conclusion: hedgehogs, foxes, and analysing foreign pol icy</p><p>Aside from the admon it ion to study both rea l i5t theories and the specifics of contem porary</p><p>foreign pol l cy problems-and the un helpfu l warn ing that th i_ s is in fact qu ite hard to do-what</p><p>other concrete lesso ns <::an be taken away? Analysts. frequently academ ics themselves, make</p><p>C H APTER 2 R E A L I S M A N D FO R E I G N P O L I C Y</p><p>mistakes by fai l i ng to recognize the contingent nature of theory; whether a theory appl ies to</p><p>a given situation depends on the degree to which its scope conditions are actually present.</p><p>However, one can be very critical of academic realist theory and yet sti l l find real ism very use­</p><p>ful in FPA. Indeed, many practitioners will tel l you that this is exactly how they approach FPA.</p><p>I ronical ly, academic real ists can be their own worst enemies when it comes to FPA. Theo­</p><p>rists face two incentives to treat thei r theories as universal as opposed to contingent. First, to</p><p>clarify their theories they need pure and clean conceptual bu i ld ing blocks. In other words,</p><p>they strive to put the basic ideas out of which their theories are bui lt in the clearest possible</p><p>way so that the basic logic at work is clear for al l to see. The notion of 'anarchy' is an example.</p><p>Theorists requ i re a clear understanding of anarchy in order to construct a coherent theory</p><p>of what i nternational politics in an anarchical setting looks l i ke. Scholars mainly interested in</p><p>building theory are thus very resistant to understanding anarchy as I have d iscussed it here­</p><p>as a matter of degree. Hence, real ist scholars squabble over whether the logic of anarchy</p><p>spelled out in defensive or offensive realism is universally valid. Foreign policy analysts, by</p><p>contrast, must be sensitive to the fact that anarchy i n the real world is a variable, not a con­</p><p>stant. In order to know how strongly realist theories app ly, one needs to know to what degree</p><p>anarchy might be attenuated. As I have noted, anarchy can be attenuated for purely 'rea l ist'</p><p>reasons, as in a regional order created by a local hegemon. Or. of cou rse, it may be attenu­</p><p>ated for reasons not identified in real ist theory, as in the i nstitutions-based order of the EU. ln</p><p>either case, realist theories about the conflict-generating potential of anarchy do not apply</p><p>particularly strongly. As scholars move from theory to the real world, they sometimes fai l to</p><p>adjust their pure conception of anarchy to the messy reality they confront.</p><p>Second, theorists operate in a competitive scholarly world, where theories and schools</p><p>of thought are often seen to be competing against others. Adjustments to the theory­</p><p>recogn ition of its conti ngent nature-may be seized upon by intel lectual nvals as admissions</p><p>of the theory's weakness or i rrelevance. Real ism is the fulcrum of these academic debates.</p><p>Most other schools of thought and theories are written in one way or another as a response</p><p>to real ism. Perhaps responding in turn, realist scholars sometimes seem very reluctant to</p><p>acknowledge the contingent nature of their theories. Analysts of foreign policy, by contrast,</p><p>generally have no reason to increase competition between theories. To understand foreign</p><p>pol icy d i lemmas from as many angles as possible, such analysts naturally gravitate towards</p><p>the idea that theories are complementary rather than competitive.</p><p>Over half a century ago, the ph i losopher Isaiah Berl in wrote an essay that bui lt on a l ine</p><p>among the fragments of the Greek poet Archi lochus which says: 'The fox knows many things,</p><p>but the hedgehog knows one big th ing.' Berl i n argued that:</p><p>. . . taken figuratively, the words can be made to yield a sense in which they mark one of</p><p>the deepest differences which divide writers and thinkers, and, it may be, human beings in</p><p>general. For there exists a great chasm between those, on one side, who relate everything</p><p>to a single central vision, one system less or more coherent or articu late. in terms of which</p><p>they understand, think and feel-a single, universal, organizing principle in terms of which</p><p>alone all that they are and say has significance-and, on the other side, those who pursue</p><p>many ends, often unrelated and even contradicto,y, connected. if at all, only in some de</p><p>facto way, for some psychological or physiological cause, related by no moral or aesthetic</p><p>principle; these last lead l ives, perform acts, and entertain ideas that are centrifugal rather</p><p>than centripetal. their thought is scattered or diffused, moving on many levels, seizing upon</p><p>51</p><p>52 W I LL IAM C . W O H LFORTH</p><p>the essence of a vast variety of experiences and objects for what they are in themselves,</p><p>without, consciously or unconscious ly, seeking t0 fit them into, or exclude them from, any</p><p>one unchanging, all-enibracing, sometimes self-contradictory and incomplete, at times</p><p>fanatical, unitary inner vision (Berlin 1 953).</p><p>Academrc theorists tend to be hedgehogs, not foxes. Berl in {1 992) suggested that foxes</p><p>wil l be better at practical tasks such as FPA. There is more than intuition to support this</p><p>conclusion; practitioners themselves argue that they have to be foxes. For Instance, a twenty­</p><p>five-year- long research project tracked experts' real analytical and forecasting acumen. The</p><p>result? Foxes systernatically outperform hedgehogs (Tetlock 2006).</p><p>The impl ication is that analysts should not be dogmatic real lsts-or anti-reallsts. They</p><p>should know theories without becoming overly comm itted to any one. And noth ing in the</p><p>real ist approach makes one inevitably a hedgehog. On the contrary, many realist scholars</p><p>and analysts are foxes. Fox- l ike FPA involving a constant d ialogue between case expertise and</p><p>general theory is possible. All the examples cited above are cases i n point. As explored above,</p><p>a whole scholarly approach is devoted to putting these ideas i nto practice. After neoreal ism</p><p>gave birth to defensive and offensive real ism, a new subschool came into its own. Neoclassi­</p><p>cal realism is, s imply put, realist theory for the foreign policy analyst. While this prol iferation</p><p>of realisms causes some physics-envying purists to gripe about a 'decl in ing research pro­</p><p>gramme', it is only a boon to FPA.</p><p>Examples of work by neoclassical realists can be found in 'Further reading'. All have i n</p><p>common sensitivity to realist core insights and an appreciation of how neoreal ism can aid</p><p>in the mental experiments that lie at the core of FPA, but they lack dogmatic attachment to</p><p>one theory or thP other. Al l are masters, not slaves, of theory. But neorealists, too, can avoid</p><p>the pitfalls</p><p>of hegdehogism. Consider the case of the US neorealists' opposition to the Bush</p><p>admin istration's foreign policy, especially the Iraq war. There is no doubt that realists were</p><p>the most visible IR scholars opposing the march to war. Yet , the analysis behind their pol icy</p><p>prescription was quintessentiGlly fox-like. It did not flow directly from neorea list theory, but</p><p>rather from a careful analysis of the situation informed general ly by realist ideas.</p><p>In a sense, these scholars seek to do what classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau or</p><p>George Kennan d id when they analysed foreign pol icy, or what analysts such as Stephen</p><p>Sestanovich did in his study of Soviet pol icy under Gorbachev, but to do so with a more self­</p><p>conscious attention to the interaction between general theories and specific cases. Take that</p><p>approach, and the qual ity of your FPA will benefit.</p><p>Key points</p><p>• Realism is the foundational approach to IR theory, and other approaches are mainly responses to</p><p>it, so those who wish to use I R theory in FPA must be knowledgeable about realism.</p><p>Realism is a diverse intellectual approach that combines a general school of thought about IR with</p><p>subschools such as neorealism and specific theories such as the security dilemma or the balance of</p><p>power.</p><p>• All this diversity can be understood as derived from three basic assumptions: groupism, egoism,</p><p>and power-centrism.</p><p>CH APTER 2 REALIS M AND FOREIGN POLICY</p><p>• Knowledge of realism as a general school of thought sharpens FPA by inculcating basic realist</p><p>analytical precepts {which themselves reflect centuries of diplomatic practice) as well as helping us</p><p>understand other theoretical approaches in IR.</p><p>• Realism is at once committed to deep grounding in real foreign policy practice and to the</p><p>construction of highly general theories.</p><p>While they often seem as if they are universal in scope, realist theories and subschools are</p><p>conditional; different theories apply i n d ifferent strengths depending on circumstances.</p><p>• Most pitfalls in applying realism to FPA have to do with getti ng the balance wrong-uncritically</p><p>using theory without sufficient cross-checking with detailed knowledge about the foreign pol icy</p><p>situation under scrutiny.</p><p>• When we get the balance right-as today's neoclassical realists seek to do-the result is a powerful</p><p>tool of FPA, as demonstrated by prescient realist analysis of decisions on US policy ranging from</p><p>Vietnam to Iraq.</p><p>Questions</p><p>1 . According to this chapter, how is realism defined?</p><p>2. What are the key components of realism?</p><p>3. What are the main hallmarks of realist FPA?</p><p>4. Name a recent example, not mentioned in the text, of realist FPA.</p><p>5. What is the main mistake people make when applying realist theory to FPA?</p><p>6. What is the most im portant d istinction to keep in mind when applying realist theory to FPA?</p><p>Further reading</p><p>Donnelly,J. (2000), Realism and International Relations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University</p><p>Press).</p><p>The best general introduction to realism.</p><p>International Security (2005 ), 30: 1 -1 40.</p><p>Volume 30 of this journal, subtitled 'Balancing Acts', presents a useful set of articles proposing and</p><p>debating the theory, new at the time, of 'soft balancing' against the USA.</p><p>Rose, G. (1 998), 'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy', World Politics, 51: 1 44-1 72.</p><p>An excellent article reviewi ng several examples of neoclassical realist foreign policy analysis.</p><p>Vasquez,J .A. and Elman C. (eds) (2003), Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate</p><p>(Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall).</p><p>This is an excellent compendium on balance of power theory and balance of th reat theory.</p><p>Wive I, A. (2005), 'Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: The Promise</p><p>and Limitations of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis',Journal of International Relations and</p><p>Development, 8: 355-380.</p><p>This article presents a useful and critical view of real ism and FPA.</p><p>Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for more information:</p><p>www.oxfordtextbooks.eo.uk/orc/smith_foreign3e/</p><p>53</p><p>I ntroduction</p><p>Liberal ism and foreign</p><p>pol icy</p><p>M I C H A E L W. DOYLE</p><p>Chapter contents</p><p>Introduction</p><p>liberalism</p><p>Liberal foreign relations</p><p>Mitigating trade-offs</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>Reader's guide</p><p>54</p><p>55</p><p>56</p><p>69</p><p>76</p><p>For more than two centuries, l i beral countries have tended to maintain peaceful</p><p>relations wrth each other. Uberal democracies are each other's natural allies. They</p><p>tend to respect and accommodate other democratic countries and negotiate rather</p><p>than escalate their inter- l iberal disputes. This provides a positive incentive to try to</p><p>preserve and expand the liberal zone of peace. And that is the fundamental postu­</p><p>late of l iberal foreign policy. But l iberalism has also proved to be a dangerous guide</p><p>to foreign policy, often exacerbatine tensions with non-l iberal states. Exp,mding</p><p>liberalism can sometimes provoke danger and war. This chapter thus addresses a</p><p>l arge and perplexing foreign policy question central to all democracles: Can the l ib­</p><p>eral peace be effectively preserved and expanded without provoking unnecessary</p><p>danger and i nflicting unnecessary harm? The chapter also addresses how scholars</p><p>have analysed l iberalism's effects, distinguishingthree key Interpretations of l i beral</p><p>foreign policy: individualist, commercial, and republican.1</p><p>Liberalism contributes to the understanding of foreign pol icy by highl ighting how individu­</p><p>als and the i deas and ideals they espouse (such as human rights, l iberty, and democracy),</p><p>social forces (capitalism, markets), and poli tical institutions {democracy, representation) can</p><p>have direct effects on foreign relations. It contrasts with the assumptions of structural real ists</p><p>regard ing the determinative role of system structure (unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar} and</p><p>the consequent assumption of state homogeneity (rational, material, and unitary actors).</p><p>By opening the box of state action and al lowing for the effects of varying ideas, interests,</p><p>and institutions, l iberalism compl icates the study of international politics. But ft also pro­</p><p>d uces better predictions of foreign policy behaviour and i ncorporates modern conceptions</p><p>C H A PTE R 3 L I B E RA L I S M A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y</p><p>of eth ical foreign pol icy (Doyle 1 997). Th is chapter begins by defin ing what scholars have</p><p>n eant by l i beral ism, describes the maJor fea u res of l i bera l foreign relat ions, and then shows</p><p>how the th ree schools of l i beral foreign po l i cy analys is have con nected l iberal princ ip les</p><p>and i nstitutions to fore ign pol icy outcomes . I t conc ludes with reflections on preserving and</p><p>expand ing the zone of l i beral peace-wh i l e avo id i ng war with the wider non- l iberal wor ld .</p><p>Liberal ism</p><p>L iberal i sm is identifi ed with an essential pri nc i p le-the i m portance of the freedom of the i nd i ­</p><p>v idual . Above al l , th i s is a bel ief i n the importance of moral freedom-of the r ight to be treated</p><p>and a duty to treat others as eth i cal subjects , and not as objects or means on ly. A concern for</p><p>th i s pri nc ip le generates rights and i nstitutions.</p><p>The chal lenge with i n l i beral i sm i s how to reconci l e the th ree sets of l i beral r ights (see</p><p>Box 3 . 1 ) . The right to private property, for example, can confl ict with equal ity of opportun ity,</p><p>and both rights can be vio lated by democratic legis lation . The l i beral tradition has evo lved two</p><p>h igh roads to i nd ividual freedom and social order: one i s laissez-fai re or 'nee-conservative'</p><p>l i beral i sm , and the other is social welfare or social democratic (o r i n US terms 'l i beral')</p><p>l i beral i sm. Both reconci le these confl icti ng rights (though in d iffer ing ways) by successfu l ly</p><p>o rgan izi ng free i nd ivid uals i nto a pol itical o rder.</p><p>The pol it ical order combining</p><p>l a i ssez-fai re and socia l welfare l i bera l s i s marked by a shared</p><p>com m itment to four i nstitutions.2 F i rst , c it izens possess j u ri d i cal equal ity and other civic</p><p>rights such as freedom of re l igion and the press. Second , the effective sovereigns of the state</p><p>are representative legi s latu res derivi ng the i r authority from the consent of the e lectorate</p><p>and exerc i s i ng thei r authority free from a l l restrai nt apart from the requ i rement that bas ic</p><p>c iv ic rights be p reserved .3 Most perti nent ly for the i mpact of l i beral i sm on foreign affai rs, the</p><p>state i s subject to ne ither the external authority of other states nor the i nternal author ity of</p><p>special prerogat ives he ld , fo r examp le, by monarchs or m i l itary castes over fore ign po l i cy.</p><p>Th i rd , the economy rests on the recogn ition of the rights of p rivate property, i ncl ud i ng the</p><p>ownersh ip of means of p roduction . Property i s justifi ed as a stimu l us to productiv ity and a</p><p>l im it on the monopoly of state authority. The i nstitution of p rivate property exc ludes state</p><p>BOX 3 . 1 Ttie founclations of l itieralism</p><p>A commitment to a threefold set cf rights forms the foundation of liberalism. Liberalism calls for freedom</p><p>from arbi\rary authority, often cal led 'negative freedom', which includes freedom of conscience, a free</p><p>press and free speech, equal ity under the law, and the right to hold, and therefore to exchange, property</p><p>without fear of arbitrary seizure. liberalism a1so cal ls for those rights necessary to protect and promote</p><p>the capadly and opportunity for freedom-the 'positive fr�oms'. Thus. such social and economic rights</p><p>as equal ity or opportunity ,n education and rights to health care and employment, necessary for effective</p><p>self-expression and part,cipat lon, are among l iberal rights ( B�rl in 1 969). A third l lberal right , democratic</p><p>participation or representation. rs necessary to guarantee the other two. To ensure ha morally</p><p>autonomous ind ividuals remain free in those areas of sodal action where public authority is needed,</p><p>public legislation has to express the wil l of the citizens making laws for their own community.</p><p>55</p><p>56 M I C H A E L W. DOYLE</p><p>social ism or state capital ism, but it need not exclude market social ism or various forms of</p><p>the mixed economy. Fourth, economic decisions are predominantly shaped by the forces</p><p>of supply and demand, domestically and internationally, and are free from strict control by</p><p>bureaucracies.</p><p>In order to protect the opportunity of the citizen to exercise freedom, laissez-faire l iber­</p><p>alism has leaned towards a highly constrained role for the state and a much wider role for</p><p>private property and the market. In pursuit of the same goal of freedom, welfare l iberal ism</p><p>reverses its approach, and instead has expanded the role of the state and constricted the</p><p>role of the market.4 However, both perspectives accept the four institutional requirements</p><p>and, as a result, contrast markedly with the monarchical regimes, mi l itary d ictatorsh ips, and</p><p>single-party governments, including communist dictatorsh ips, with which they have shared</p><p>the political governance of the modern world. Not even overwhelmingly liberal countries are</p><p>purely l iberal. Liberal principles and institutions sometimes vie with autocratic or racist rivals</p><p>for the allegiance of the publ ic (Skowronek 2006). There are also domestic variations with in</p><p>l iberal regimes. For example, Switzerland was l iberal only in certain cantons; the US was l i b­</p><p>eral only north of the Mason-Dixon Line until 1 865, when it became li beral throughout.</p><p>These l ists also exclude ancient 'republ ics', s ince none appear to fit modern l iberal criteria of</p><p>individualism (Holmes 1 979).</p><p>The domestic successes of l i beralism have never been more apparent. Never have so</p><p>many people been included in , and accepted the domestic hegemony of, the l iberal order;</p><p>never have so many of the world's leading states been l iberal, whether as republ ics or as</p><p>constitutional monarchies. Indeed, the success of l iberalism as an answer to the problem</p><p>of masterless men in modern society is reflected in the growth in the number of l iberal</p><p>regimes from the handfu l of semi-l iberal regimes that existed in the first half of the n ine­</p><p>teenth century (e.g. Britai n, France, and the USA) to more than 1 00 that exist today. But we</p><p>should not be complacent about the domestic affairs of l iberal states. Sign ificant practical</p><p>problems endure: enhancing citizen participation i n large democracies; d istributing 'posi­</p><p>tional goods' (for example, prestigious jobs) ; control l ing bu reaucracy; reducing unemploy­</p><p>ment; paying for a growing demand for social services; and curbing wealth inequal ity and</p><p>achieving large-scale restructuring of industries in response to growing foreign competition</p><p>(Hirsch 1 977; Stiglitz 201 2). Whi le these domestic problems have been widely explored , they</p><p>are by no means solved. Liberalism's foreign record is more obscure and warrants greater</p><p>consideration.</p><p>Liberal foreign relations</p><p>The h istorical record of l iberal international relations includes incentives for a separate zone</p><p>of peace among liberal states, but also, unfortunately, for imprudent aggression against non­</p><p>liberals and complaisance in vital matters of security and economic cooperation.</p><p>The liberal zone of peace</p><p>The fi rst and most important of the effects of l iberal ism on the foreign relations of l iberal</p><p>states is the establishment of a peace among them.5 Medieval and early modern Europe</p><p>C H A PTER 3 L I B E R A L I S M A N D F O R E I G N POL ICY</p><p>served as the cockpit of warring states, with France, England , and the Low Countries engaged</p><p>i n nearly constant strife. Then i n the late eighteenth century there began to emerge l i beral</p><p>regimes. At fi rst hesitant and confused, and later clear and confident as li beral regimes gained</p><p>deeper domestic foundations and greater i nternational experience, a zone of peace became</p><p>establ ished among the l i beral states.</p><p>One key example of this peace was Anglo-American relations. During the n ineteenth cen­</p><p>tury, the USA and Great Britain engaged in nearly continual strife, i ncluding one war, the War</p><p>of 1 81 2. However, after the Reform Act of 1 832 defined representation as the formal source of</p><p>the sovereignty of the British parliament, Britain and the USA settled their d isputes dip lomati­</p><p>cally despite, for example, British grievances against the North's blockade of the South, with</p><p>which Britain had close economic ties. Nearly a century later, despite severe Anglo-French</p><p>colonial rival ry, liberal France and l iberal Britain formed an entente against i l l i beral Germany</p><p>before the Fi rst World War. In 1 91 4-1 91 5, Italy, the li beral member of the Triple All iance with</p><p>Germany and Austria, chose not to fulfil its treaty obl igations to support its all ies. Instead,</p><p>it joined in an all iance with Britain and France that prevented it from fighting other l iberal</p><p>states, and then subsequently declared war on Germany and Austria. And despite generations</p><p>of Anglo-American tension and Britai n's wartime restrictions on American trade with Ger­</p><p>many, the USA leaned towards Britain and France from 1 91 4 to 1 91 7, before entering the war</p><p>on thei r side. Nowhere was this special peace among l iberal states more clearly proclaimed</p><p>than in President Woodrow Wilson's War Message of 2 April 1 91 7:</p><p>Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the l ife of the</p><p>world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self­</p><p>governed people of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as wi ll henceforth</p><p>ensure the observance of those principles. (Wilson 1 924: 378)</p><p>Beginning in the eighteenth century, a zone of peace, which the l i beral phi losopher Imma­</p><p>nuel Kant called the 1pacific</p><p>federation' or 'pacific union', was slowly establ ished among l iberal</p><p>societies. Today, more than 1 00 l iberal states with at least three years of consolidation make</p><p>up this zone of peace.6 Most are in Europe and North America, but they can be found on</p><p>every continent (see Map 3.1 ).</p><p>Of course, the outbreak of war in any given year, between any two given states, is a low­</p><p>probability event. The occurrence of a war between any two adjacent states, cons idered over</p><p>a long period of time, is more probable. Thus, the near absence of war between l iberal states,</p><p>whether adjacent or not, for almost 200 years may have significance. More sign ificant, per­</p><p>haps, is that when states are forced to decide on which side of an impending world war they</p><p>will fight, l iberal states will tend to wind up on the same side, despite the complexity of the</p><p>paths that take them there. These characteristics neither prove that the peace among l iber­</p><p>als is statistically sign ificant nor that li beralism is the peace's sole valid explanation;7 but they</p><p>do suggest that we consider the possibi l ity that l iberals have indeed establ ished a separate</p><p>peace-but only among themselves.</p><p>Foreign relations among any other group of states with simi lar social structures or with</p><p>compati ble values or pluralistic social structures are not s imi larly peacefu l.8 Feudal warfare</p><p>was frequent and very much a sport of the monarchs and nobil ity. Civil izations may clash,</p><p>but there have been as many wars with in Islam or Christianity as between them. There have</p><p>not been enough truly total itarian fascist powers (nor have they lasted long enough) to test</p><p>57</p><p>.. ).</p><p>Liberal republics in 1900</p><p>Liberal republics in 2000</p><p>�</p><p>'</p><p>� ........ �l</p><p>J In 1 1;1"",</p><p>Map 3.1 Liberal republ ics i n 1 900 and 2000. Note: Only countries with populations greater than 1 mi l l ion.</p><p>/ (�</p><p>.....</p><p>..</p><p>� '-- J</p><p>Ruula j</p><p>"· l'iJ:</p><p>,, \ ,_.,_,.</p><p>\)</p><p>V1</p><p>00</p><p>�</p><p>ffl</p><p>I""</p><p>:E</p><p>m</p><p>C H APTER 3 L I B E R A L I S M AND F O R E I G N POLICY</p><p>fai rly the i r pacific compatibi l i ty, but fascist powers in the wlder sense of natfonal ist mi l itary</p><p>dictatorsh ips clearly fought each other in the 1 930s i n Eastern Europe. Commun ist powers</p><p>have engaged in wars more recently in East Asia, when China i nvaded Vietnam and Vietnam</p><p>invaded Cambodia. Equal ly, we have not had enough democratic socialist societies to con­</p><p>sider the relevance of socialist pacification. The more abstract category of p luralism does not</p><p>suffice. Certainly Germany was pluralist when it engaged in war with liberal states in 1 91 4;</p><p>Japan as well i n 1 941 . But they were not l iberal. Peace among l iberals thus appears to be a</p><p>special characteristic.</p><p>Here the predictions of l iberal pacifists are borne out: l iberal states do exercise peace­</p><p>ful restraint and a separate peace exists among them. This separate peace provides a solid</p><p>foundation for the crucial al l iances of the USA with the l iberal powers (NATO , the US­</p><p>Japanese all iance, the all iance with Australia cind New Zealand), and it appears impervious</p><p>to the quarrels with a l l ies that have bedevi l led many U S adm inistrations. It also offers the</p><p>promise of a continu ing peace among l iberal states and, with i ncreasing numbers of l iberal</p><p>states, it announces the possib i l ity of a self-enforcing global peace without establ ish ing a</p><p>world state.</p><p>Imprudent aggressiveness</p><p>As ide from restraint in warring against other l i beral states, l i beral ism carries with it a second</p><p>effect-what David H ume called 'imprudent vehemence' or aggression against or enmity</p><p>towards non- l iberals (Hume 1 963: 346-347).9 Peacefu l restraint seems to work only i n</p><p>l iberals' relations with other l iberals; l iberal states have fought numerous wars with non­</p><p>l iberal states.</p><p>Many ofthese wars have been defensive, and thus prudent by necessity. Liberal states have</p><p>been attacked and threatened by non-liberal states that do not exercise restraint in their deal­</p><p>ings with l iberal states. Authoritarian rulers both stimulate and respond to an International</p><p>pol itical envi ronment in which conflicts of prestige, of i nterest, and of pure fear all lead states</p><p>towards war. Thus, war and conquest have characterized the careers of many authoritarian</p><p>rulers and ru l ing parties-from Louis XIV and Napoleon to Mussol in i's fascists, H itler's Nazis,</p><p>and Stalin's communists.</p><p>But imprudent aggression by the l iberal states-liberal imprudence-has also character­</p><p>ized many of these wars. Both liberal France and l iberal Britain fought costly expansionist</p><p>colonial wars throughout the nineteenth century. The USA fought a sim i lar war with Mexico</p><p>in 1 846-1 848, waged a war of ann ih i lation against the Native Americans, and i ntervened</p><p>mi l itarily against sovereign states many times before and after the Second World War. Liberal</p><p>states invade weak non-l iberal states and display exceptional degrees of distrust in their for­</p><p>eign pol icy relations with powerful non-l iberal states.10</p><p>Nonetheless, establ ish ing the statistical s ign ificance of Hume's assertion appears</p><p>remarkably d ifficult . Most wars seem to arise out of calculations and m iscalculations</p><p>of i nterest, misunderstand ings, and mutual suspicions, such as those that characterized</p><p>the origins of the Fi rst World War. But the best statistical evidence ind icates that ' l ib­</p><p>ertarian' o r 'democratic' states appear to be more war- prone than the average state.11</p><p>War-p roneness is not, however, a measure of imprudent aggression s ince many wars are</p><p>defensive. But that does not mean that we can s imply blame warfare on the authoritarians</p><p>59</p><p>60 M I C H A E L W. D OY L E</p><p>or tota l itar i ans , a s m any of o u r m ore enth us iasti c po l i ti c ians wou l d have u s do . 1 2 L ibe ra l</p><p>states acted as i n it i ato rs in twenty-fou r out of the fifty- s i x i nte rstate wars in wh ich they</p><p>part ic i pated between 1 8 1 6 and 1 980, wh i l e non - l i bera ls were o n the i n it iat i ng s ide i n</p><p>n i nety-one o u t of the 1 87 t imes i n wh i ch th ey part i c i pated i n i nte rstate wars (Chan 1 984:</p><p>636). L i bera l metropo les ( im peria l centres) were the overwhe l m i ng parti c i pato rs i n</p><p>extrasystem i c wars, co lon ia l wars, wh i ch we can assume t o have been by a n d large i n it i ­</p><p>ated by the metropole . Furthermore , the USA i n tervened i n the Th i rd Wor ld mo re than</p><p>twi ce as ohen in the per iod 1 946- 1 976 as the Sov iet U n io n d id in 1 946- 1 979 (C l emens</p><p>1 982 : 1 1 7- 1 1 8) . Fu rther, the USA devoted one-quarter and the Sov iet U n ion one-tenth of</p><p>the i r respect ive defence budgets to forces des igned for Th i rd Wor ld i nte rvent ions , where</p><p>respond i ng to perce ived th reats wou l d pres umab ly have a l ess than pu re ly d efensive</p><p>cha racter ( Posen and Van Evera 1 980) .</p><p>We shou l d reca l l as wel l that authoritarian states have a record of imprudent aggress ion . It</p><p>was not sem i - l i beral B rita in that co l l apsed i n 1 8 1 5 , but Napoleon i c France. I t was the Kaiser's</p><p>Germany that d isso lved i n 1 91 8, not repub l i can France and l i beral Britai n and democrati c</p><p>America. It was imperial Japan and Nazi Germany that d isappeared i n 1 945 , not the USA or</p><p>the UK . 1 3 I t i s the contrast with ideal rat ional strategy and even more the comparison with</p><p>l i beral accommodation with fel l ow l i be rals that h igh l ight the aggress ive imprudence of l i bera l</p><p>relat ions with non- l i berals.1 4</p><p>I n relat ions with powerful non - l i beral states, l i bera l states have m i ssed opportun it ies to</p><p>pursue the negotiat ion of arms reduction and arms contro l when it h as been in the i r mutual</p><p>strategic i nterest , and they have fai l ed to construct wider schemes of accommodat ion that</p><p>are needed to supplement arms contro l . Prio r to the outb reak of</p><p>the Fi rst World War, th is is</p><p>thp charge that Lord Sanderson l eve l led agains l Si r Eyre Crowe in h i s response to Crowe's</p><p>class ic memorandum on the state of B ri t i sh relations with GPrmany1 5 (see Box 3 .2) .</p><p>In the post-Second World War period , and particu l arly fo l l owing the outbreak of the</p><p>Korean War, US foreign pol icy equated the ' I nternational Commun ist Movement' (a l l com­</p><p>mun ist states and parties) with 'commun ist imper ia l i sm' a nd with a domest ic tyranny i n the</p><p>BOX 3 .2 Relations witli powerful non- ilieral states</p><p>Deeply held suspicion appears to have characterized US d iplomacy towards the Soviet Union. I n a</p><p>fasci nati ng memorandum to President Wilson written in 1 91 9, Herbert Hoover (then one of Wilson's</p><p>advisers) recommended that the President speak out against the danger of 'world domination' which</p><p>the 'Bolsheviki'-a 'tyranny that is the negation of democracy'-posed to free peoples. Rejecting m i l itary</p><p>intervent ion as e><cessively costly and I kely to 'make us a party in re-establistting the reactionary dasses</p><p>in their economic domination over the lower classes', Hoover proposed a 'rel i ef programme' designed</p><p>to undercut some of ihe popular appeal which the Bolsheviks were garnering in goth the Soviet Union</p><p>and abroad. Although acknowledging that the evidence was not yet clear, he concluded: 'If the mi l itant</p><p>features of Bolshevism were d rawn in colours with thei r true paraUe1 I wi th Prussian sm as an attemp at</p><p>world dominat ion that we do not stand for: it would check the fears that loday haunt al l men's h1 nds'</p><p>(Herbert Hoover to President Wilson, 29 March 1 91 9, Paterson 1 978: 95).;</p><p>1 The actual US intervention in the Soviet Union was l imited to supporting anti-Bolshevik Czechoslovak soldiers in</p><p>Si beria and to protecting mil itary suppl ies in Murmansk from German seizure.</p><p>CHAPTER 3 L I B E RAL I SM A N D FORE IGN POL ICY</p><p>Soviet U nion that required a Cold War contest and international subversion as means of legit­</p><p>imizing its own police state. Secretary of State John Foster Dul les most clearly expressed this</p><p>conviction, together with his own commitment to a strategy of ' l iberation', when he declared:</p><p>'[W]e shall never have a secure peace or a happy world so long as Soviet communism doml­</p><p>nates one-th ird of al l the peoples that there are, and is i n the process of trying at least to</p><p>extend its rule to many others' (US Senate 1 953: 5-6).1 6</p><p>Imprudent vehemence i s also associated with l iberal foreign policy towards weak non­</p><p>l iberal states, such as the many in the Third World. This problem affects both conserva­</p><p>tive l iberals and welfare 11 berals, but the two can be disti nguished by d iffering styles of</p><p>interventions.</p><p>Protecting 'native rights' from 'native' oppressors, and protecting universal rights of prop­</p><p>erty and settlement from local transgressions, i ntroduced especially l iberal motives for impe­</p><p>rial aggression. Ending the slave trade and encouraging 'legitimate trade' (whi le protecting the</p><p>property of European merchants) destabil ized n ineteenth-century West Afrlcan ol igarchies.</p><p>Declaring the i l legitimacy of suttee (self-im molation as practised by widowed women In India)</p><p>and domestic slavery also attacked local cultural traditions that had sustained the stability of</p><p>indigenous political authority. Europeans settl i ng in sparsely populated areas destroyed the</p><p>l ivel i hood of tribes that relied on hunting. When the locals retal iated defensively in force, the</p><p>settlers called for i mperial protection (De Tocquevi l le 1 945: 351 ). I n p ractice, once the exi­</p><p>gencies of rul ing an empire came into play, l iberal imperialism resulted in the oppression of</p><p>'native' l iberals seek ing self-determination in order to maintain imperial security, avoid local</p><p>chaos, and preclude international i nterference by another imperial power attempting to take</p><p>advantage of local d isaffection.</p><p>Thus ni neteenth-century l iberals, such as British Prime Min i ster Wi l l iam Gladstone, pon­</p><p>dered whether Egypt's proto-national ist rebel l ion (1 881 - 1 882) was truly l i beral -national­</p><p>ist (they di5covered that it was not) before Interven i ng to protect strategic l ifel l nes to Ind ia,</p><p>commerce, and i nvestment. 1 7 These d i lemmas of l iberal imperial ism are also reflected i n</p><p>US im perialism in the Caribbean where, for example, fo l lowing the Span ish-American</p><p>War of 1 898, Article I l l of the Platt Amendment gave the USA the 'right to intervene for</p><p>the preservation of Cuban i ndependence, the main tenance of a government adequate for</p><p>the protection of l i fe, property, and ind ividual l iberty . . . ' (Paterson 1 978: Vo l . I, 328) (see</p><p>also Box 3 .3).</p><p>The record of l iberalism in the non-l iberal world is not solely a catalogue of oppression</p><p>and imprudence. The North American West and the settlement colonies-Australia and</p><p>New Zealand-represent a successfu l transplant of l iberal i nstiMions, albeit in a temperate,</p><p>underpopulated, and then depopulated environment and at the cost of Native American and</p><p>Aboriginal rights. Similarly, the twent1eth-century expansion of l iberalism into less powerful</p><p>non-l iberal areas has also had some stri king successes. The forcible l iberalization of Germany</p><p>and Japan fol lowing the Second World War and the long covert financing of l iberal parties</p><p>i n I taly are the more significant instances of successful transplant. The covert financing of</p><p>l iberal ism i n Chi le and occas ional diplomatic de.marches to nudge aside mil itary threats to</p><p>non-communist democratic parties (as in Peru i n 1 962, South Korea in 1 963, and the Domini­</p><p>can Republic in 1 96z l8 and again in 1 978) i l lustrate policies that, though less successful, were</p><p>d irected towards l iberal goals. These particular post-war l iberal successes are also the product</p><p>of special circumstances: the existence of a potential l iberal majority, temporarily suppressed,</p><p>61</p><p>62 M I C H A E L W . D OY L E</p><p>sox 3 . 3 The 2003 invasion of Iraq: geostrategic an · i6eral factors at worl<</p><p>The invasion of Iraq in 2003 I l l ustrated another in tervent on1 one wJdely regarded as Imprudent. US</p><p>and UK host ility towards Saddam Hussein stemmed from factors that any grea t power and any state</p><p>committed to the i nternational rule of law would have found provoki ng. These included Saddam's record</p><p>o aggress ion ag�lns his neighbours (particularly Kuwal �. he iml l it: i t t h reat he posed to the security of</p><p>oi l supplies In lie Petsian Gulf, and his unwil l ingness.to assu re the Interim onal community hat he had</p><p>eliminated programmes to acquire weapons of mass des truct on as he had been required to do as part</p><p>of the settlemen l of the first Gulf War In 1 991 (UN Security Counc:U Resolution 687), Vrslbly l iberal factors</p><p>and goals were also at wock. Saddarri's- genoddal campa gns -aga nst the Kurds and h is record of flagrant</p><p>abuses of the I raq population shaped his lntemaUonal reputat ion.</p><p>BuL the partkuliir circumstances of the ,un-1.1p to lhe 2003 nvasTon appeaced more significant than</p><p>either of the longer trends In hosti l ity. The Bush adminlstratjc;>n, aware that the American publ ! held it</p><p>respons ble for preventing another 9/1 1 attac:k nd benefi ting frorn a pubfk chat pol it 1cal ly rewarded a</p><p>' 'war on terror presidency'. read-and presented to the publ i c-almost every p iece of pre- i nvasion Intel­</p><p>l igence accord·ng to the most threaten ing interpretation. ' The Bush admin i s tatlon ttempted to justify</p><p>tne war by denouncing al leged lraqj programmes to bui ld weapons of mass destrud;iol'I (WM Os) and al ­</p><p>leged I raqi ties to 9/1 1 and al-Qaeda (for whi�h no su,pport could be ound afterwards), and it promised</p><p>to lnquce a transformat1ve spread or democrncy io the region , beginn ing wi th lraq. 11</p><p>Reacting o he nsurgency tha greeled he invasion. (he poor</p><p>planning that characterized the oc­</p><p>cupation, and the mounting US and Iraqi casualties, by 2005 a majo ity of the US publi , and publ ics of</p><p>other democracies earl ier, had Mned against the war. The lof1g- term results of the invas ion and effort to</p><p>democr atize r raq were far from clear. Iraq had experienced a referendum on a constitution and national</p><p>elections. but spl ts among its ttiree major communities (Shia , Sunn i . and Kurd} produced a civil war that</p><p>in 201 made Iraq vulnerable to an incurs on from the Islamic State, spreading from its Syrian base. Even</p><p>aggress ive l iberals who might h,wP welcomed a democrati c transfu 1 1 nalion of the region questioned the</p><p>method in l ight of the d isputed legal ity of the invas ion and the long-run US costs expected by some to</p><p>amount to two tri l l ion dol lars_iii</p><p>' Ohe ,mancewas the neglect of in otrnatlon widely avai lab le in the Bush administra t ion Iha Nig r was very unl ikely</p><p>to have sold \Jran lum ore to I raq. The charge that l e did non theless wound Up as V)e notonous sixteen words in the</p><p>p�es d ofs 2003 Stare or the Unlon Address Justifying �lie march to war (Lichtblau 2006).</p><p>11 For n fn forma�lve collec1;lon of speeches by Presldel'll Sush nd Sectet.oy Pow II jurtifymg t e war .md by Senator</p><p>Byrd and o thers cr1hti . Ing ttiom rationales see 'Why Attack t raqr {Gutmann ilnd Tl'\ornpson 2Q05: 45-60, 88-95)</p><p>Gotd.srnitfi (2002) nd F'rnndc (2003) offer thoughtful pro Mid con legal analyses, whi le Pollack (2002: Ch.,p s 5 and 1 1 )</p><p>and Kaufmanh (2004) prov de pro and con policy analrscs.</p><p>1 4</p><p>1 flllrnes and St.iglitz (2006) eslfmal. one trfihon dollafS as the low gure and two tri l l ion the h igh, taking into account</p><p>the long-1 rm medical and ot fler ind i rect costs assoclllled with the wa</p><p>wh ich cou ld read i ly be re-establ ished by outs ide a id , or unusual ly weak o l igarch ic , m i l itary,</p><p>or com m u n ist opponents 1 9 (see Box 3 .4}.</p><p>Elsewhere in the post-war period, when the USA sought to protect l i berals in the Th i rd</p><p>World from the 'commun ist th reat', the consequences of l i beral foreign pol icy on the non­</p><p>l iberal society often became far removed from the p romotion of i nd iv idual rights or national</p><p>secu rity. In Vietnam and elsewhere, i nterven ing aga inst 'armed m inorities' and 'enemies of</p><p>free enterprise' meant i nterven ing for other 'armed minorities', some sustained by o l igarch ies</p><p>and others resti ng on l ittle more than US foreign aid and troops. I nd igenous l i berals s im­</p><p>ply had too narrow a base of domestic support. These i nterventions d id not advance l i beral</p><p>C H A P T E R 3 L I B E R A L I S M A N D FO R E I G N P O L I C Y</p><p>eox 3 . 4 President Obama's grancl strategy? 'A jusf ana lasting peace'</p><p>ln his Nobel Peace P,ize lecture in December 2009, fess than a year after taking office, President Ob�ma</p><p>modest ly acknowledged that his prize seemed designed more to reward aspiration than accomplishment</p><p>He then outlined his aspirations !br a Just and lasting peace in words that resonated with l iberal theories</p><p>of forei$n pol icy. Separating himselfftom Gandh1an paclflsm, Obama acknowledged that war was</p><p>somedmes necessary. Separating him:.elf from George Bush's mi l itarl!im, tie also saw international law</p><p>and just war doctrines of self-defence as appl icable to all states. Obama hen joined Clin ton and Bla i r</p><p>n ins sting tha just wars must be broadened to Include humanitarian wars that protect a people froni</p><p>massacre and concluded by outl in ing what it takes to make a just and lasting peace practicable: firs is</p><p>adeq1,1ate deterrence and sanctions against aggressTon and massacres; second is not merely an absence</p><p>of conflict, but a. positive commitment to the 1nherenl rights and dign ity of every indMdual'. 'For.' argued</p><p>Obama., 'I believe that peace is unstable where citizens are denied the right to speak freely or worship as</p><p>they please; choose the r own lead�rs or assemble without fear.' As examples, Obama added: 'On ly when</p><p>Europe became free die;! it find peace. America has never fough t a war against a c;lemocracy.'Third, th is</p><p>lastmg peace must be bolstered with 'econom rc security and opportunity',</p><p>I nspiring as the speech was, a speech is not the same as policy. After a l l , in it Obarna promised to dose</p><p>Guantanamo {stl l l open .six years later). But a speech by a head of govemmen is more than a single</p><p>individual's pr vate thoughts. It tends to be widely vetted with in the bureaucracy as an expr�ssien of a</p><p>government's policy intentions; and i serves o coordinate govemment actlon and generates reputa­</p><p>tional costs if it is flouted.</p><p>rights, and to the extent that they were driven by ideological motives, they were not necessary</p><p>for national security.</p><p>To the conservat ive l i berals , the alternatives were starkly cast: Th i rd World authoritar­</p><p>ians with al legiance to the l i beral cap ital i st West, or 'commun ists' subject to the total itarian</p><p>East (or leftist national ists who, even if elected , were seen as but a s l i ppery stepping stone</p><p>to total itarian ism) {Kirkpatrick 1 979).2° Conservative l i berals were prepared to support the</p><p>al l ied authoritar ians. The commun ists attacked property in add ition to l i berty, thereby pro­</p><p>voki ng conservative l iberals to covert or overt i ntervention , or 'do l lar-d ip lomacy' imperia l ism.</p><p>The i nterventions against Mossadegh i n I ran, Arbenz in Guatemala , Al lende in Ch i le, and the</p><p>Sand in istas i n N icaragua appear to fal l i nto this pattern (Barnet 1 968: Chapter 1 0). President</p><p>Reagan's s imu ltaneous support for the m i l itary i n El Salvador and guerri l la 'freedom-fighters'</p><p>in N icaragua also tracked th i s pattern , whose common thread was rhetorical commitment to</p><p>freedom and operational support for conservative free enterp rise.</p><p>To the social welfare l iberals , the choice was never so clear. Aware of the need for state</p><p>actio n to democratiz,e the d istri bution of social power and resources, they tended to have</p><p>more sympathy for social reform. Th is could produce, on the part of 'rad ical' welfare l i berals,</p><p>a more tolerant pol icy towards the attempts by reforming autocracies to red ress i negal i ­</p><p>tarian d istributions of property in the Th ird World. This more compl icated welfare- l i beral</p><p>assessment cou ld itself be a reci pe for more extens ive i ntervention. The conservative o l i ­</p><p>garchs or mi l itary bureaucrats with whom the conservative l i beral was wel l a t home were</p><p>not so congen ial to the social welfare l i bera l , yet the commun ists were sti l l seen as enem ies</p><p>of l iberty. In thei r foreign pol icy, left l i berals justify extens ive in tervention fi rst to encourage,</p><p>and then to susta in , Th i rd World social democracy in a pol it ical envi ronment that is either</p><p>63</p><p>64 M IC H A E L W. DOYLE</p><p>barely participatory or h ighly polarized. Thus, Arthur Sch lesinger recal led President Kennedy</p><p>musing shortly after the assassination of President Truj i l lo (former dictator of the Domin ican</p><p>Republ ic): 'There are three possi bil ities in descending order of preference, a decent demo­</p><p>cratic regime, a continuation of the Truj i l lo regime [by his fol lowers] or a Castro regime. We</p><p>ought to a im at the first. but we can't really renounce the second until we are sure we can</p><p>avoid the third' (Schlesinger 1 965: 769: afso quoted i n Barnet 1 968: 1 58). Another instance</p><p>of th is approach was President Carter's support for the land reforms in El Salvador, which</p><p>one US officia l explained in the fol lowing analogy: 'There is no one more conservative than</p><p>a small farmer. We're going to be breeding capitalists l ike rabbits' (Simon and Stephen 1 981 :</p><p>38). President Cl inton's admin istrat ion seems to have succumbed to a s imi lar dose of optimis­</p><p>tic rntervention ism i n its conviction that friendly nations coufd be rebui l t democratically in</p><p>both Somalta and Haiti, although</p><p>democracy had never existed In the first and was led in the</p><p>second by Jean Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic socialist and an eloquent critic of American</p><p>imperial ism.</p><p>Complaisance and isolationism</p><p>The third effect apparent in the international relations of l iberal states is David Hume's second</p><p>assertion, that of 'supine complaisance'. This takes two forms: one is the fai lure to support</p><p>al l ies; the other is a fai lure to oppose enemies.</p><p>Liberal states have often been short-sighted in preserving their basic preconditions under</p><p>changing international circumstances., particularly in supporting the l iberal character of the</p><p>constituent states. Self- indulgent isolationism or appeasement by democratic majorities,</p><p>reluctant to bear the fiscal cost, has failed on occasion-as it did with regard to Germany in</p><p>the 1 920s-to provide the timely international economic support for l iberal regimes whose</p><p>market foundations were in crisis. Liberal democratic majorfties faf led in the 1 930s to provide</p><p>mi l i tary aid or pol itical mediation to Spain, which was challenged by an armed minority, orto</p><p>Czechoslovakia, Which was caught i n a d i lemma of preserving national security, or acknowl­</p><p>edging the claims (fostered by H itler's Germany) of the Sudeten minority to self-determina­</p><p>tion. Farsighted and constitutive measures seem to have only been provided by the l iberal</p><p>international order When one l iberal state stood pre-eminent among the rest, prepared and</p><p>able to take measures, as did Britain before the Fi rst World War and the USA fof lowing the</p><p>Second World War, to sustain economically and politfcally the foundations of l iberal society</p><p>beyond its borders. Then measures such as British antislavery and free trade, the US loan to</p><p>Britain in 1 947, the Marshall Plan , NATO, GAIT, the IMF, and the liberal ization of Germany</p><p>and Japan helped construct buttresses for the i n ternational l iberal order (Kindleberger 1 973;</p><p>G i lp in 1 975; Krasner 1 976; Hirsch and Doyle 1 977; I kenberry 2001 ).</p><p>Of course, ideologically based policies can also be self- indu lgent. Oli'garchic or authoritar­</p><p>ian al lies in the Third World do not find consistent support i n a l iberal policy that stresses</p><p>human rights. Conservative and realist critics claim that the secu rity needs of these states</p><p>are neglected, and that they fail to obtain mi l itary aid or more direct support when they</p><p>need it {the Shah's I ran, Humberto Romero's El Salvador, Somoza's Nicaragua, and apart­</p><p>heid South Africa). Equally disturbing from those points of view, communist regimes were</p><p>shunned even when a detente with them cou ld have furthered the strategic interests of the</p><p>USA {China before 1 976, Cuba until 201 5). Welfare liberals particularly shun the fi rst group,</p><p>CHAPTER 3 L I BERAL I SM AND FORE IGN POL ICY</p><p>while laissez-faire l iberals baulk at close deal ings with the second. I n both cases economic</p><p>interests or strategic interests are allegedly sl ighted.21</p><p>A second manifestation of complaisance lies in a reaction to the excesses of i ntervention­</p><p>ism. A mood of frustrated withdrawal affects policy towards strategically and economically</p><p>important countries. Just as interventionism seems to be the typical fai l ing of the l iberal great</p><p>power, so complaisance characterizes declined or 'not quite risen' l iberal states.22 Follow­</p><p>i ng the exhaustion of wars, representative legislature may become especially reluctant to</p><p>undertake international commitments or to fund the mi l i tary establlshment needed to play</p><p>a geopolitical role. Purely domestic concerns seem to take priority, as they did in the USA i n</p><p>the 1 920s. Rational incentives for free riding on the extended defence commitments of the</p><p>leader of the l iberal al l iance also induce this form of complaisance. During much of the ni ne­</p><p>teenth century the USA i nformally relied upon the British fleet for many of its security needs.</p><p>During the Cold War, the Europeans and the Japanese, according to some American strategic</p><p>analysts, fai led to bear the ir 'fair share of defence burdens.</p><p>Liberal ism, if we take i nto account both Kant and Hume, thus carries with i t three lega­</p><p>c ies: peace among l iberals, imprudent vehemence towards non-l iberals, and complaisance</p><p>towards threats. The fi rst legacy appears to be a special feature associated with l iberalism</p><p>and it can be demonstrated both statistically and through historical case studies (Owen 1 996;</p><p>O'Neal and Russett 1 997; Rousseau 2005). The latter two legacies cannot be shown to be</p><p>special to l iberal ism, though their effects can be i l lustrated h istorical ly in l iberal foreign pol icy</p><p>and reflect laissez-faire, and social democratic, welfare variants. But the survival and growth</p><p>i n the number of l iberal states suggests that imprudent vehemence and complaisance have</p><p>not overwhelmed l iberalism's efficacy as a form of governance.</p><p>Liberal foreign policy analysis</p><p>Liberalism has complicated impl ications for theories of foreign pol icy (Nincic 1 992; Zacher</p><p>and Matthew 1 995; Doyle 1 997; Moravcsi k 1 997). Defined by the central ity of i ndividual</p><p>rights, private property, and representative government. l iberalism is a domestic theory.</p><p>Transposed to the i nternational plane, l iberals share a common framework or zone of peace</p><p>with fel low l iberals, where they vary according to whether property or welfare should guide</p><p>international preferences and whether the risks of isolation are greater or less than those</p><p>of i nternationalism. Foreign policy analyses strive to account for these patterns by focus­</p><p>ing on whether i ndividual rights, domestic commercial interests, or a more com pl icated</p><p>combination of both, together with republ ican i nstitutions and international perceptions,</p><p>shape policy.</p><p>Liberal theorists agree with the real ists that states exist under anarchy, but they di sagree as</p><p>to the nature of anarchy. Un l i ke the realists, l iberals do not assume that i nternational anarchy</p><p>is a 'state of war'-a time 'wherein', i n Hobbes's phrase, 'the will to contend by battle is suf­</p><p>ficiently known' (Hobbes 1 962: l 00). The real ist 'state of war' is a time in which all states fear</p><p>the possib i l ity of war such that they are driven i nto contests of relative 'positional' (Grieco</p><p>1 988) zero-sum games that produce balance of power al ignments. Thus cooperation tends</p><p>to be disadvantageous other than within an al l iance. In contradistinction, the contest among</p><p>l iberal states can be a positive- or negative-sum game with in a separate zone of peace among</p><p>fellow l iberals. Liberal relations are not harmonious. A failure to credibly inform others may</p><p>65</p><p>66 MICHAEL W. DOYLE</p><p>undermine coordination when l iberals are seeking compatible goals. In more competitive</p><p>situations, a fai l u re to trust others may undermine cooperation when each would prefer at</p><p>least one alternative to a fail u re to cooperate; but these problems tend to be less severe than</p><p>they are for less constitutional ly constrained polities. (Mattes and Rodriguez {201 4) argue that</p><p>autocracies with constraints that resemble democratic constitutional restraints (autocratic</p><p>parties rather than personalist dictatorshjps) also tend to succeed i n cooperation.) The l i ber­</p><p>als' inter-liberal security d i lemma is general ly solved by stable accommodation, rather than</p><p>balancing. They can come to appreciate that the existence of other l iberal states constitutes</p><p>no threat, but i nstead constitutes an opportun ity for mutually beneficial trade and (when</p><p>needed) alliance against non-l iberal states.</p><p>Thus liberals differ significantly from the realists. But l iberal theorists also differ from each</p><p>other, and they do so i n systematic ways. Like realists, each of the l iberal theorists must make</p><p>assumptions about human nature, domestic society, and international structure as found in</p><p>Kenneth Waltz's th ree images (Waltz 1 959). Liberals pay more attention to domestic</p><p>struc­</p><p>tures and individual differences than do realists, and believe that the i nternatlonal system (or</p><p>Third I mage) has a less than overriding influence and so d istinguish themselves not only from</p><p>structural realists but also from almost all realists. For the present analysis, we can identify</p><p>three types of l iberals: F1rst Image Lockean (human nature), Second Image Commercial</p><p>(societal), and Third Image Kantian (republ ican international ist). Each of these images can</p><p>explain the th ree features of liberal foreign relations, and each h ighlights special aspects and</p><p>reveals difficult choices with in l iberal foreign pol icy.</p><p>Locke's in ternational system, l i ke that of realists such as his fellow seventeenth-century</p><p>phi losopher Thomas Hobbes, is anarchic. But the Lockean state Is based on representation</p><p>and ultimately on consent, whi le the Hobbeslan state is indifferent to these matters as long</p><p>as the state is sovereign. Locke's citizens, l ike Hobbes's, are rational independent individur1lc;.</p><p>The difference then lies in the importance that Locke attributed to the duties to protect life,</p><p>l iberty, and property that Locke thought accompanied citizens' rights to the same. It is these</p><p>duties that lead just commonwealths to maintain peace with each other provided that their</p><p>natural partiality and the poorly institutionalized character of world politics do not overcome</p><p>their duties to try to resolve disputes peaceful ly.</p><p>But partial ity and weak i nternational institutions are difficult to overcome, and so impru­</p><p>dent aggress ion and complaisance often occur. Thus, Locke portrayed an i nternational condi­</p><p>tion of troubled peace, only one step removed from the real ist state of war and one fraught</p><p>with 'I nconveniences' that could detertorate into war through the combined effects of bias,</p><p>partial ity, and the absence of a regular and objective system of international adjudication</p><p>and enforcement. There is, for example, much of Hobbesian rational unitary egoism in the</p><p>Lockean 'Federative Power', with its pursuit of 'national advantage'. Locke is prepared, un like</p><p>most l iberals, to delegate foreign policy to the executive, trusting that no better i nstitution can</p><p>pursue the public ihterest. I n troubled times, Lockean international 'I nconveniences' might</p><p>wel l approach a nearly general state of war. But we also see one crucial difference. Locke's</p><p>statespersons, l ike his citizens, are governed by the duties of natural law-life, l iberty, and</p><p>property. Lockean states are then distinguished by a commitment to mutual trust u nder the</p><p>law. In the l iterature expla in ing the logic of negotiation, trust ls c;:rucial for stable agreements,</p><p>and all rational egoistic bargainers wi l l want to cultivate a reputation for it (Heymann 1 973;</p><p>Dunn 1 984).</p><p>CHAPTER 3 L I B ERAL ISM AND F O R E I G N POLICY</p><p>The commercial l i berals-a second tradition of l iberal scholarsh i p focusing on Second</p><p>Image domestic social forces-h ighl ight the pacifying i nternational effects of markets and</p><p>commercial capital ism. The tradition that Albert Hirschman has called doux commerce (sooth­</p><p>ing commerce) originates in the eighteenth-century attack on the realist doctrine of relative</p><p>economic power then advocated by the Mercanti l ists (H i rschman 1 982). Although the com­</p><p>mercial l iberals such as Smith and Schum peter argued that representative government con­</p><p>tributed to peace-when the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments,</p><p>wars become unattractive-for them, the deeper cause of the zone of l iberal peace was com­</p><p>merce. A�er all, democracies had been more than war-prone in history. Thucydides' story of</p><p>democratic Athens was familiar to all with a classical education. Passions could wreak havoc</p><p>among democrats as well. What was new was manufacturing and commerce-capital ism.</p><p>Thomas Paine, the eighteenth-century radical American democrat, announced: ' If commerce</p><p>were permitted to act to the universal extent it is capable, it would extirpate the system of</p><p>war' {Paine 1 995: Chapter 5). Paine contributed to a growing recognition of a powerful insight</p><p>systematically developed by Enl ightenment philosophers: war does not benefit commercial</p><p>manufacturing societies. This view was articulated most comprehensively by the great Scot­</p><p>tish phi losopher, economist Adam Smith, and was then extended i nto a general theory of</p><p>capitalist pacification by the Austrian economist Joseph Schum peter.</p><p>Like the realists, Schumpeter regards the i nternational system as anarchic. Like many</p><p>realists (includ ing Hobbes), he regards citizens as i nd ividual istic, rational, and egoistic, and</p><p>usually material istic. But Schum peter sees the combi nation of democracy and capital ism as</p><p>opening up a revolutionary transformation of domestic state and social structure. These soci­</p><p>eties are as self- interestedly determin istically pacific as the Hobbesian Leviathan is bellicose.</p><p>Hobbesian Leviathans, after al l , were merely Hobbesian i ndividuals writ large, with a l l their</p><p>individual competitiveness and egoism. Schumpeter's state is a structured whole, d istinct</p><p>from its parts, transformed as it were by an 'invisible hand' (to borrow the classic commer­</p><p>cial metaphor from Adam Smith). According to Schumpeter ( 1 955: 68), when the people's</p><p>energies are daily absorbed in production, 'economic rationalism', or the instabi l ity of mar­</p><p>ket competition, necessitates calculation. It also ' individual izes' as 'subjective oppo.rtunit ies'</p><p>replace the ' immutable factors' of traditional h ierarch ical society. Rational ind ividuals then</p><p>demand democratic governance. Market capitalism and democratic majoritarianism make</p><p>individual material egoism and competitiveness into pacifism.</p><p>Democratic capital ism means free trade and a peaceful foreign policy simply because they</p><p>are, Schum peter claimed, the first best sol utions for rational majorities in capitalist societies.</p><p>{ In related recent scholarship, Mansfield et al. (2000) have shown that democratic pairs had</p><p>much more open trade relations than mixeq pai rs (when one state was not a democracy), and</p><p>as developing countries became more democratic in the 1 970s and 1 980s they also adopted</p><p>more trade l iberalization (Mi lner and Kubota 2005).)</p><p>This is the heart of the contemporary enthusiasm, expressed by many liberal politicians,</p><p>for global democratization and capitalism as the i nevitable and pacific routes to peace at the</p><p>'end of history'.23 It does well i n accounting for the sometimes complaisant l iberal attitude</p><p>towards threats and provides another account of the l iberal peace, but does not qu ite offer a</p><p>convincing account of l iberal aggression.</p><p>Thus First and Second Image l iberals differ from each other. Schum peter makes the peace,</p><p>which is a duty of the Lockean l i beral statesman, i nto the structured outcome of capitalist</p><p>67</p><p>68 M ICHAEL W. DOYLE</p><p>democracy. Both highlight for us powerfu l elements of l iberal world politics, but if there I s a</p><p>long state of peace between l iberal republics, Locke offers us a weak explanation for it. (How</p><p>do they avoid partiality and bias so regularly ln their relations?) He also misses the persistent</p><p>state of war between l iberals and non- l iberals. (Why are the liberals so regularly more par­</p><p>tial here?) Schumpeter misses the l iberal sources of war with non-l i berals, unless we should</p><p>blame all these wars on the non -liberals.</p><p>Kant and the republ ican internationalists try to Al l these gaps as they i l lustrate the larger</p><p>potential of the liberal tradition. Immanuel Kant1s 1 795 essay 'Perpetual Peace' offers a coher­</p><p>ent explanation of two Important regularities in world politics-the tendencies of l iberal states</p><p>s imu ltaneously to be peace-prone in their relations with each other and unusually war-prone</p><p>in their relations With non-l iberal states. Republ ican representation, l</p><p>i beral respect, and</p><p>transnational interdependence (to rephrase Kant's three 'definitive articles' of the hypotheti�</p><p>cal peace treaty he asked states to sign) are three necessary and, together, sufficient causes of</p><p>the two regularities taken in tandem.</p><p>Kant's theory held that a stable expectation of systemic peace among states would be</p><p>ach ieved once these three conditions were met. Together they constitute a l iberal republic</p><p>and explain the foundations of the three featu res of l lberal foreign relations. We can rephrase</p><p>them as fol lows.</p><p>• Representative republican government, which includes an elected legislative,</p><p>separation of powers, and the rule of law. Kant argued that together those i nstitutional</p><p>features lead to caution because the government is responsible to its citizens. This does</p><p>not guarantee peace. It should select for popular wars.</p><p>A commitment to peac.P based upon a principled respect for the non-d iscriminatory</p><p>rights that all human beings can rightfully claim. Thrs sh0uld produce a commitment</p><p>to respect the legally institutional ized rights of fel low li beral republics (because they</p><p>represent free citizens, who as individuals have rights that deserve our respect) and a</p><p>suspicion of non-republics (because if those governments cannot trust their own citizens,</p><p>what should lead us to trust them?).24</p><p>• The possibil ity of social and economic interdependence. Trade and social i nteraction</p><p>generally engender a mix of conflict and cooperat ion. A foreign economic pol icy of</p><p>free trade tends to produce material benefits superior to optimum tariffs if other states</p><p>wi l l reta l iate against tariffs, as they usually do. Li beral ism produces special material</p><p>incentives for cooperation because, among fel low l iberals, economic interdependence</p><p>should not be subject to security-motivated restr ictions and, consequently, tends to be</p><p>more varied, less dependent on single issues, and less subject to s ingle confl icts25 (see</p><p>Box 3.5) .</p><p>Kant suggested that each was necessary and together they were sufficient to establ ish a</p><p>secure expectation of peace. The first principle specifies representative government respon­</p><p>sible to the maJorlty: the. second and th ird specify the majority's ends and interests. Together</p><p>the three generate an expectation of peaceful interaction among fellow l iberal.s-the l iberal</p><p>zone of peace-and suspicion towards non-liberals. Liberal aggressive imprudence and com­</p><p>plaisant indifference are the choices that elected legislatu res and executives make, reflecting</p><p>the preferences (ideas, ideals, and interests) of the governing coal itions elections produce.</p><p>C H A P T E R 3 L I B E R A L I S M A N D FORE I G N P O L I CY</p><p>BOX 3 . s Ttie li6eral foreign pol icy process</p><p>Liberal sm could shape foreign policy in democracies either because public opinion Is l iberal and</p><p>demands it , or because the political elite has l iberal values and implements them. But a more l ikely</p><p>process ls that neither the public nor the elite is umted in a single se of values and that the el fte typically</p><p>manages policy, but non- l iberal members of the elite are deterred from choosing anti - l lberaJ po f ief es</p><p>because they have good reason to doubt that anti- l i beral policies would be susta ined by a majority o lhe</p><p>publ ic at the next election. In an important recent set of experiments embedded in publ ic opin. ion surveys</p><p>m the US and UK, the publ ic of both countries are shown LO be opposed to the use of force against</p><p>democracies (sign ifkan Jy more opposed to the use of force than they are against autocracies in s mi lar</p><p>kinds of confl icts) This result reflects fewer differences in I kely costs and more an appreciat ion that</p><p>democracies pose less threat and represent rights worthy of moral respect (Tomz and Weeks 201 3).</p><p>When galvan ized by in ternational th reats , or outraged by human rights v io lations , o r pushed</p><p>by commercial i nterests , e lected governments become aggressive towards non- l i berals.</p><p>When exhausted by war, they become compla isant. Govern ing coal i t ions also choose con­</p><p>servative, la issez-fai re, or reformist socia l welfare variants of l i beral i sm which, as d i scussed ,</p><p>lead to d ifferi ng foreign po l i cies.</p><p>Mitigating trade-offs</p><p>If a concern for protect ing and expand i ng the range of i nternational freedom is to shape</p><p>l i beral strategic aims, then foreign pol icy towards both l i beral and non- l i bera l worlds shou ld</p><p>be gu ided by general l i beral pri nciples. At a m in imum, th is shou ld mean rejecting the real i st</p><p>balance of power as a general strategy by refusing to balance against the capab i l i t ies offel low</p><p>democratlc l i berals, and trusti ng the l i beral commun ity. At its fuUest , th i s also means going</p><p>beyond the standard obl i gat ions of general in tet'hationa l law. Membersh ip i n the l i beral</p><p>community should imply accepti ng a positive duty to defend other mem bers of the l iberal</p><p>commun ity, to d iscrim inate in certa l n i n stances in the i r favour, and to override in some c i r ­</p><p>cumstances the domestic sovere lgnty of states fn order to rescue fel low human bei ngs from</p><p>i ntolerab l e oppressions such as genocide and ethn ic deanslng. Authentica l ly l i bera l po l ic ies</p><p>should in some c i rcumstances cal l for attempts to secure personal and civi l r ights, to foster</p><p>democrat i c government , and to expand the scope and effectiveness of the world market</p><p>economy as wel l as to meet those basic human needs that make the exercise of human ri ghts</p><p>possib le (see Table 3 . 1 ) .</p><p>In order to avo id the extrem ist poss ib i l it ies of its abstract u n iversal i sm, l iberal po l i cy should</p><p>be constrai ned both by a respect for consequences measu red i n terms of l iberal values and</p><p>by a geopol itical budget. Strategy i nvolves match ing what we are prepared to spend with</p><p>what we want to achieve; it ldent i , es aims, resources, th reats, and a l l i es. Balandng the fi rst</p><p>two, m in im izing the th i rd , and fostering the fourth are the core e lements of a l i beral foreign</p><p>pol icy that seeks to preserve and expand the commun ity of l i beral democracies without vio­</p><p>lati ng l i beral princ ip les or bankrupting l i beral -states (Muravch ik 1 99 1 ; Deudney and I ken­</p><p>berry 1 991 /92; Sm ith 1 994).26</p><p>69</p><p>70 M I C H A E L W . DOY L E</p><p>Table 3 . 1 The l iberal community by date</p><p>Historical</p><p>period</p><p>Country Total number</p><p>1 8th century</p><p>1 800- 1 850</p><p>1 850-1 900</p><p>1 900-1 945</p><p>1 945</p><p>Swiss Cantonsi French Rerubl ic 1 790-1 795, USA 1 776- 3</p><p>Swiss Confederation, USA , France ( 1 830-1 849), Belgium ( 1 830-), Greal 8</p><p>Brita in (1 832-), the Netherlands (1 848-), Piedmont (1 848-), Denmark</p><p>(1 849-)</p><p>Switzerland , USA. Belgi um, Great Britain , the Netherlands , 1 4</p><p>Piedmont (1 861 ) , Italy (1 861 -) , Denmark (1 866), Sweden (1 864-)</p><p>Greece ( 1 864-), Canada;; (1 867-), France ( 1 871 -), Argenti na (1 880-),</p><p>Ch i le ( 1 891 -)</p><p>Switzerland, USA, Great Br itai n , Sweden, Canada, Greece ( 1 9 1 1 , 29</p><p>1 928- 1 936) , Italy ( 1 922), Belgium ( 1 940) , the Netherlands ( 1 940),</p><p>Argentina ( 1 943), France ( 1 940), Ch i le (1 924 , 1 932) , Austra l ia ( 1 901 ) ,</p><p>Norway (1 905- 1 940), New Zealand ( 1 907), Colombia ( 1 91 0-1 949),</p><p>Denmark (1 91 4- 1 940), Poland (1 91 7- 1 935) , Latvia ( 1 922- 1 934),</p><p>Germany (1 9 1 8-1 932), Austr ia ( 1 91 8-1 934) , Eston ia (1 91 9-1 934),</p><p>F in land (1 9 1 9-) , Uruguay ( 1 91 9-) , Costa Rica ( 1 9 1 9-),</p><p>Czechoslovak ia (1 920- 1 939) , I re land (1 920-), Mexico (1 928-),</p><p>Lebanon (1 944-)</p><p>Switzerland, USA, Great Britai n , Sweden, Canada, Austral ia, 66</p><p>New Zealand, F in land, I reland , Mexico, Uruguay ( 1 973, 1 985) ,</p><p>Ch i le (1 973, 1 990-), Lebanon ( 1 975), Costa R ica ( 1 948, 1 953-),</p><p>Iceland (1 944-), France (1 945-) , Denmark (1 945-), Norway (1 945-),</p><p>Austria ( 1 945-) , Brazil</p><p>(1 945-1 954, 1 955-1 964, 1 985-). Belgi um</p><p>( 1 946-), t he Netherlands (1 946-), I taly (1 946-), Phi l i ppines ( 1 946-</p><p>1 972, 1 987-), I nd ia (1 947-1 975, 1 977-), <;ri Lanka (1 9'18- 1 961 , 1 'JGJ-</p><p>1 971 1 978- 1 983, 1 988-), Ecuador (1 948- 1 963, 1 979-), Israel ( 1 949-),</p><p>West Germany (1 949-), Greece (1 950-1 967 1 975-), Peru ( 1 950- 1 962,</p><p>1 963-1 968, 1 980-), Turkey (1 950-1 960, 1 966-1 971 , 1 984-), Japan</p><p>(1 95 1 -), Bo l iv ia ( 1 956-1 969, 1 982-), Colombia (1 958-). Venezuela</p><p>(1 959-), N igeria ( 1 961 -1 96'1 , 1 979- 1 984) , J amaica (1 962-), Trin idad</p><p>and Tobago (1 962-), Senegal (1 963-). Malaysia (1 963-), Botswana</p><p>(1 966-), Portugal (1 976), Spain ( 1 978-), Dom in ican Republic ( 1 978-),</p><p>Ecuador (1 978-), Honduras (1 981 -), Papua New Gu inea (1 982-),</p><p>El Salvador (1 984-), Argentina (1 983 -) , Uruguay (1 985-) , Mauritius</p><p>( 1 987-), South Korea (1 988-) , Taiwan (1 988-), Thai land (1 988-201 4),</p><p>Pakistan (1 988-), Panama (1 989-), Paraguay (1 989-), Madagascar</p><p>(1 990-), Mongol ia (1 990-), Namibia (1 990-), Nepal ( 1 990-),</p><p>N icaragua (1 990-), Poland (1 990-), Hungary (1 990-), Czechoslovakia</p><p>(1 990-1 993)</p><p>(continued)</p><p>Table 3 .1 (continued)</p><p>Historical</p><p>period</p><p>1 990-</p><p>C H A P T E R 3 L I B E R A L I S M A N D FO R E I G N P O L I C Y</p><p>Country Total number</p><p>Switzerland, USA, Great Br ita in , Sweden , Canada, Austral ia , New 1 1 5</p><p>Zealand , F in l and . I re land, Mexico, U ruguay. Costa Rica, Iceland, France,</p><p>Denmark, Norway, Austr ia , B razi l , Belg i um , the Netherlands, I taly,</p><p>Ph i l i pp ines, I nd ia, Sri Lanka , Ecuador, I s rael . West Germany, Greece,</p><p>Tu rkey, Japan. Bol ivia, Colombia, Venezuela , Jamaica, Tri n idad and</p><p>Tobago, Senegal , Malays ia , Botswana, Portuga l . Spain , Domin ican</p><p>Republ ic , Ecuador, Honduras, Papua New Gu inea , El Salvador,</p><p>Argenti na , Maurit ius , South Korea , Taiwan, Tha i land , Panama, Paraguay,</p><p>Madagascar, Mongol ia , Namibia , Nicaragua , Poland , Hungary,</p><p>S i ngapore ( 1 993), Pakistan ( 1 998), Russia (1 991 -1 999), Jordan</p><p>( 1 991 -2001 ) , Nepal (2003) , Bu lgaria (1 990-), Chi le (1 990-) , Mongo l i a</p><p>(1 990-) , Alban i a (1 991 - ) , Bangladesh (1 991 -) , Ben in ( 1 991 -), Cape</p><p>Verde ( 1 991 -) , Croatia ( 1 991 -) , Eston ia ( 1 991 -) Latvia ( 1 991 -),</p><p>Li thuania (1 991 -), U kra ine ( 1 99 1 -), S loven ia (1 991 -), Zambia ( 1 991 -),</p><p>Armen ia (1 992-) , Indonesia (1 992-), Macedonia ( 1 992-), Mali (1 992-),</p><p>Roman ia (1 992-) , Burki na Faso ( 1 993-) , Czech Republ ic ( 1 993-},</p><p>S lovakia ( 1 993-) . Guatemala (1 993-} , Lesotho ( 1 993-} , Yemen ( 1 993-</p><p>2009) , Guinea-Bissau ( 1 994-) , Malawi ( 1 994-), Mozamb ique ( 1 994 -) ,</p><p>South Africa ( 1 994-) , Georgia ( 1 995-) , Ghana ( 1 995-), Sierra Leone</p><p>( 1 998-} , Kuwait ( 1 999-), N igeria (1 999-) , Tanzan ia ( 1 999-), Bosn ia­</p><p>Herzegovina (2000-), Dj i bout i (2000-), Peru (2000-}, N iger (2000-) ,</p><p>Serbia (200 1 -) , East Timor (2002-) , Gambia (2002-), Kenya (2002-) ,</p><p>S i ngapore (2003-) . Uganda (2003 -201 2) , Liberia (2004 -) , Burundi</p><p>(2005-201 4 ) , Lebanon (2005-), Hait i (2006-) , Paki stan (2008-) , Togo</p><p>(2009-) ,Tunis ia (201 1 -)</p><p>This is an approximate l ist of ' l iberal regimes' (through to 201 4, thus including regimes that were l iberal democratic as of</p><p>201 1 ) drawn up according to the four 'Kantian' i nstitutions described as essential : ( 1 ) market and private property economies;</p><p>(2) pol ities that are external ly sovereign; (3) citizens who possess juridical rights; (4) 'republican' (whether republ ican or</p><p>parl iamentary monarchy) representative government. The last of these includes the requ i rement that the l egislative branch</p><p>have an effective role in publ ic pol icy and be formally and competitively (either i nter- or intra-party) elected. Furthermore, I</p><p>have taken i nto account whether male suffrage is wide (i e. 30 per cent) or, as Kant would have had it, open to 'achievement'</p><p>by inhabitants (for example, to pol l -tax payers or householders) of the national or metropol itan territory (Kant's 'Metaphysics</p><p>of Morals', i n Kant 1 970a: 1 39). This l i st of l iberal regimes is thus more inclusive than a l ist of democratic regimes or</p><p>polyarchies (Powell 1 982: 5). Female suffrage is granted withi n a generation of its being demanded by an extensive female</p><p>suffrage movement, and representative government is internally sovereign ( i ncluding especially over m i l itary and foreign</p><p>affairs) as well as stable ( in existence for at l east three years) ( Banks and Overstreet 1 983; The Europa Yearbook 1 985; Gastil</p><p>1 985; McColm and Freedom House Survey Team 1 991 ; Finn et al. 1 995). The contemporary list, excluding l iberal regimes</p><p>with popu lations less than one mi l l ion, includes al l states categorized as 'Free' by Freedom House and those 'Partly Free' (four</p><p>pol itical and five civi l l i berties or more free).</p><p>i There are domestic variations with in these l iberal regimes.. For example, Switzerland was l iberal only in certain cantons; the</p><p>USA was l iberal on ly north of the Mason-Dixon l ine until 1 865, when it became l iberal throughout. These l i sts also exclude</p><p>ancient 'republ ics', s ince none appear to fit Kant's criteria (Holmes 1 979).</p><p>i i Canada, as a commonwealth within the British empire, did not have formal control of its foreign pol icy during this period</p><p>Liberals should not embark upon crusades for democracy because in a world armed with</p><p>nuclear weapons, crusad ing is su icidal ; and in a world where changes in regional balances of</p><p>power cou ld be extreme ly destab i l izi ng for ourse lves and our al l i es , ind iscrim i nate provoca­</p><p>t ions of hosti l ity (such as agai nst the Peop le's Republ ic of China) could create i ncreased inse­</p><p>cu rity (for Japan and ourselves). Li berals-even l i beral superpowers such as the US-simply do</p><p>71</p><p>72 M I C H A E L W. DOYLE</p><p>not have the excess strength that frees them from the need to economize on dangers (as the</p><p>US painful ly rediscovered in I raq and Afghanistan).</p><p>I nstead, l iberal strategy for expanding the international commun ity of l iberal states</p><p>should lean towards the defensive. It should strive to protect the l iberal community, foster</p><p>the conditions that migh t al low the !lberal community to grow, and save the use of force</p><p>for clear emergencies that severely threaten the survival of the commun ity or core l iberal</p><p>values. The strategy should first preserve-protecting the com mun ity and managing and</p><p>mitigating the normal tensions among l iberal market economies-and then expand. Ruling</p><p>out an offens ive state strategy, one should rely primarily on transnational civil soclety for</p><p>expansion by three methods; it should begin with 'i nspiration'. and cal l upon 'interventfon'</p><p>only when necessary.</p><p>Preservation</p><p>Above all , l iberal foreign policy should strive to preserve the pacific unioh of simi larly l iberal</p><p>societies, which is not only currently of immense strategic value (being the political founda­</p><p>tion of both NATO and the US-Japanese alliance), but is also the single best hope for the</p><p>evo lution of a peaceful world. Therefore, l iberals should be prepared to defend and formally</p><p>al ly with authentically l iberal democratic states that are subject to th reats or actual instances</p><p>of external attack or i nternal subversion. Liberals have taken for granted and underestimated</p><p>the importance of the democratic al l iance. Their al liances in NATO, with Japan, and in ANZ US,</p><p>and al ignments with other democratic states, are not on ly crucial to their present security,</p><p>but the best hopes for long-term peace and the real ization of their ideals. Liberals shoulrl</p><p>not trec1t them as once useful but now purposeless Cold War strategic alignments against the</p><p>power of the USSR.</p><p>Global problem-solving in areas ranging from climate change to nuclear prol iferation</p><p>to economic growth,</p><p>dependent variables-the outcomes of a foreign pol icy input-is</p><p>readi ly conceived, but identifying and operationalizing the i ndependent variables that foster</p><p>alterations in the dependent variable serves to chal lenge one's grasp of the field. Everything</p><p>can seem relevant as an independent variable, but the analyst has to be selective and focus</p><p>on those dynamics that account for most of the variance conceived to be relevant to the</p><p>analysis. There is no need to account for 1 00 per cent of the variance, as some of it may be</p><p>due to chance factors that cannot read ily be anticipated, but even accounting for, say, 90 per</p><p>cent can be d ifficult. Not only do analysts need to calculate the relative importance of the</p><p>d ifferent factors, but they also have to have some idea of how they i nteract with each other.</p><p>Consider, for example, the d istinction between large and small countries. To d ifferentiate</p><p>between the two, one has to have some sense of how a country's size affects its conduct in</p><p>the i nternational arena. Are small countries more aggressive abroad because of their l imita­</p><p>tions? Do their foreign policies avoid confrontation because of an imbalance between the</p><p>resources at the ir disposal and those of the adversaries they contemplate taking on abroad?</p><p>Are their decision-making processes, i n effect, paralysed by the relative size of their potential</p><p>adversaries? Such questions are not easily answered at fi rst glance. And they become even</p><p>more d ifficult if one has to assess the amount of the variance involved.</p><p>However, many analysts have not been deterred by the problems encountered in estimat­</p><p>ing variances. They know that such estimates are essentially arbitrary, as few have a perspec­</p><p>tive founded on clear-cut notions of the range with in which the causal potency of a variable is</p><p>specified. Nor are matters helped by stressing the relevance of a finding-'other things being</p><p>equal'. Usually other things are not equal, so that clustering them together as if they were</p><p>equal can be m islead ing.</p><p>How, then, to proceed? If the available conceptual equ ipment cannot generate reliable hy­</p><p>potheses, and if a ceteris paribus (i.e. all things being equal} context has l imited util ity, how does</p><p>the analyst confront the task of framing and probing meaningful insights? The answer l ies in</p><p>maintain ing a focus on the potential rather than the pitfalls of comparative analysis. Even if the</p><p>underpinni ngs of a country's foreign policy are ambiguous, one can nonetheless proceed to</p><p>examine what appear to be the main sources of the ambiguity, noting throughout the factors</p><p>that may underm ine the analysis. To focus on the obstacles to an enquiry is to ensure that the</p><p>enqu i ry wil l fall short of what can be gleaned from the empirical materials at hand.</p><p>The best technique for moving ahead is that of specifying what independent variables</p><p>seem especially relevant to the phenomena to be explained even as one acknowledges that</p><p>FOREW ORD</p><p>the sum of the variance they account for may fal l short of 1 00 per cent. Such an acknowledge­</p><p>ment is not so much a statement of fact as it is a noting of the l imits that confine the analysis.</p><p>Furthermore, even if only 80 per cent or 90 per cent of the variance is accounted for, such</p><p>find ings are l ikely to be valuable despite the fact that they fal l short of a ful l explanation. The</p><p>goal is not to account for all the variabil ity, but to explain enough of it to enlarge our under­</p><p>standing of the key dynam ics at work in the examined situation. Foreign pol icy phenomena</p><p>are too complex to aspire to a fu l l accounting of al l the dynamics at work in a situation. It is</p><p>enough to compare them careful ly and d raw conclusions about the central tendencies they</p><p>depict. A close read ing of the ensuing chapters demonstrates that proceeding in this way can</p><p>yield deep and important i nsights into the d iverse ways societies interact with their external</p><p>environments.</p><p>While most of the relevant independent variables are amply assessed throughout the for­</p><p>eign pol icy l iterature, two are less widely cited and thus can usefu l ly be elaborated here. One</p><p>involves what I call the ski l l revolution and the other is the organizational explosion. Each ac­</p><p>counts for a sufficient proportion of the variance to warrant ampl ification and together they</p><p>sign ificantly shape the conduct of any country's foreign pol icy.</p><p>The skill revolution</p><p>Considerable evidence is available to demonstrate that people everywhere, in every country</p><p>and commun ity throughout the world, are increasingly able to trace distant events through</p><p>a series of interactions back into their own homes or pocketbooks. The ski l l revo lution is</p><p>understood to consist of th ree main d imensions: the analytical, the emotional, and the im­</p><p>aginative. The first of these involves an intel lectual talent, an expanding abil ity to l ink the</p><p>course of events to the observer's personal situation. Faci l itated by the Internet and many</p><p>other tech nological i nnovations, people are ever more able to construct scenarios that depict</p><p>how situations in the arenas of world politics i mpact on their l ives and wel l-being (Rosenau</p><p>2003: Chapter 1 0). The expansion of ski l ls is presumed to occu r through adding new scenarios</p><p>to those people employed in order to perceive and assess the situations of interest to them.</p><p>The emotional d imension of the ski l l revolution focuses on the way people feel about situ­</p><p>ations-to judge them as good or bad, welcoming or threatening-capacities that have also</p><p>expanded as a consequence of a world that is shrinking and impinging ever more closely on</p><p>thei r daily l ives. The imaginative d imension depicts the capacity of people to envision alter­</p><p>native futures, l ifestyles, and circumstances for themselves, their fami l ies, and their cherished</p><p>organizations.</p><p>The materials for wide-ranging imaginative m usings are abundantly available in al l parts</p><p>of the world. They include global television, soap operas, letters from relatives working as</p><p>maids in Hong Kong, cousins who find employment i n Saudi Arabia, and chi ldren who marry</p><p>foreign spouses. The learning embedded in messages sent home is less d i rectly experiential</p><p>for the recipients than are the encounters reported by their authors, but nevertheless it can</p><p>be a major contributor to the more worldly ski l ls of those who do not travel . It may even</p><p>be that the letters and phone cal ls from relatives abroad can be as much a window on the</p><p>norms and practices of distant places as those offered on the television screen. These stimu l i</p><p>are especially relevant for peoples in developing countries whose circumstances previously</p><p>l imited contacts with other cultures and alternative l ifestyles. Indeed, from the perspective</p><p>xvii</p><p>xviii FOREWO RD</p><p>of those who have long been hemmed in by the realities of l ife on o r below the poverty l ine ,</p><p>the freeing up of their imaginative capacities is among the most powerful forces at work in</p><p>the world today.</p><p>The organizational explosion</p><p>Hardly less so than the population explosion, recent years have witnessed a veritable explo­</p><p>sion in the number of vo luntary associations that have crowded onto the global stage. In all</p><p>parts of the world and at every level of com munity, people-ordi nary folk as well as el ites and</p><p>activists-are coming together to concert their efforts on behalf of shared needs and goals.</p><p>Exact statistics on the extent of this pattern do not exist (largely because so much of it occurs</p><p>at local levels and goes unreported), but few would argue with the propositions that the pace</p><p>at which new associations are formed and old ones enlarged is startl i ng, so much so that to</p><p>cal l it an explosion is almost to understate the scale of growth. It has been calculated, for</p><p>example, that in 1 979 Indonesia had only a si ngle i ndependent</p><p>wi l l reqUlre diplomacy that involves all states, incl uding China and</p><p>Russia and many other non-democracies. For these purposes l iberal states wil l need to</p><p>work across ideological divides and strengthen multi lateraJ institutions such as the UN, IMF,</p><p>World Bank, and WTO. The l iberal world also needs to strengthen its own col lective security</p><p>multilaterally, not replacing the UN with an 'alliance of democracies,' but supplementing UN</p><p>multl latera.lism with democratic collective security.27</p><p>The current need to redefine NATO and the i ncreasing Importance of the US relationsh ip</p><p>with Japan offer an opportunity to broaden the organization of l i beral secutity. Join ing all</p><p>the democratic states together in a s ingle democratic security organ ization would secure</p><p>an I mportant forum for the defin ition and coordination of common interests that stretch</p><p>beyond the regional concerns of Europe and the Far East. With the end of the Cold War,</p><p>pressures towards regionalism are l ikely to become i ncreasingly strong. In order to avoid the</p><p>desperate reactions that might follow regional crises such as those of the 1 920s and 1 930s, a</p><p>collective security organization for l lberal democracies seems necessary. It could reduce pres­</p><p>su res on Japan and Germany to arm themselves with nuclear weapons, mitigate the strategic</p><p>vulnerabiHties of isolated l iberal states such as Israel , and allow for the complementary pool­</p><p>ing of strategic resources (combin ing, for example. Japanese and German fi nancial clout with</p><p>American nuclear deterrence, and with American, British, and French exped ltionary thrust).</p><p>The expansion of NATO on the European continent is one part of this security umbrella. It</p><p>CHAPTER 3 L IBERAL ISM A N D FORE IGN POLICY</p><p>should i nclude al l established l iberal democratic members and then establish a transitional</p><p>category of security assistance (without col lective defence guarantees) for al l democratizing</p><p>states that have yet to establish the rule of law and experience two democratic elections.</p><p>I mportantly, the door to cooperation and eventually (should they choose) ful l participation</p><p>should be kept open for Russia and China.</p><p>However, much of the success of m ultilateral management will rest on shoring up its eco­</p><p>nomic supports. J\bove $6000 GDP per capita', Adam Przeworski and colleagues have noted,</p><p>'democracies are Impregnable and can be expected to live forever' (Przeworski et al. 1 995:</p><p>297). Below that per capita income level, steady low-inflation economic growth is one key</p><p>to protecting democratic government ( Przeworski et al. 1 995: 298). Un i lateral solutions to</p><p>national economic growth (exchange rate depreciation, increased taxation) may be neces­</p><p>sary. but they are not sufficient and some (long-term protectionism) are neither. Avoidance</p><p>of a costly global economic recession calls for continued trade l iberalization and expansion</p><p>of trade adjustment assistance to compensate sectors adversely affected.</p><p>Discovering ways to manage global interdependence wil l call for difficult economic adjust­</p><p>ments at home and institutional innovations in the world economy. Under these c i rcum­</p><p>stances, l iberals will need to ensure that those suffering losses, such as from market d isruption</p><p>or restriction. do not suffer either a permanent loss of income or e)(clusion from world mar­</p><p>kets. Although intense economic interdependence generates conflicts, it also helps to sustain</p><p>the material wel l-bei ng underp inning l iberal societies and to promise avenues of develop­</p><p>ment to Th i rd World states with markets that are currently l imited by low income. To this</p><p>should be added mutually beneficial measures designed to improve Thi rd World economic</p><p>performance. Export earnings insurance, i nternational debt management assistance, export</p><p>diversification assistance, and technical aid are among these. I n the case of the truly desper­</p><p>ate poor; more di rect measures of international aid and relief from famine are requ i red, as a</p><p>matter of both political prudence and moral duty.</p><p>Furthermore, if measures of temporary economic protection are needed, l iberal states</p><p>should undertake these measures only by i nternational negotiation and only when the result­</p><p>i ng agreements are subject to a regular review by all the parties. Otherwise, emergency meas­</p><p>ures could reverberate into a spiral of isolationism. Thus. the l iberal com munity needs to</p><p>create a d iplomatic atmosphere conducive to mu lt i lateral problem-solving. Foreign policies</p><p>conveying a commitment to collective responsib i l ity in US d iplomacy wi l l go far i n this d i rec­</p><p>tion (Bergsten et al. 1 978; Cooper et al. 1 978; Stigl itz 2002: Chapters 1 0 and 1 6).</p><p>Expansion</p><p>Preserving the community is important i n part because there are few d irect measures that the</p><p>l iberal world can take to foster the stab il ity, development, and spread of l iberal democratic</p><p>regimes. Many di rect efforts, including mi l itary i ntervention and ove,t or covert funding for</p><p>democrati c movements i n other countries, discredit those movements as the foreign interfer­</p><p>ence backfires through the force of local national ism.</p><p>Therefore, much of the potential success of a policy designed to foster democracy rests</p><p>on an abi l ity to shape an economic and political environment that indi rectly supports or</p><p>instigates democratic governance and creates domestic pressures for the democratic reform</p><p>of authoritarian rule.</p><p>73</p><p>74 MICHAEL W. DOYLE</p><p>Politically, there are few measures more valuable than an a<::tive human rights diplomacy,</p><p>which enjoys global legitimacy and (if successful) can assure a political environment that tol­</p><p>erates the sort of dissent that can nourish an indigenous democratic movement. There is rea­</p><p>son to pay special attention to those countries entering what Huntington (1981 b) has called</p><p>the socio-economic transition zone-countries having the economic development typically</p><p>associated with democracy (see also Przeworski et al. 1995). For them, more direct support</p><p>in the form of electoral infrastructure (from voting machines to international observers) can</p><p>provide the essential margin persuading contentious domestic groups to accept the fairness</p><p>of the crucial first election.</p><p>Following the Second World War, the allied occupation and re-making of Germany and</p><p>Japan, and the Marshall Plan's successful coordination and funding of the revival of Europe's</p><p>pre-war industrial economies and democratic regimes, offer a model of how much can be</p><p>achieved with an extraordinary commitment of resources and the most favourable possible</p><p>environment (Schwartz 1991 ). In practice today, short of those very special circumstances,</p><p>there are few direct means to stimulate democratic development from abroad apart from</p><p>inspiration.</p><p>Inspiration</p><p>The simplest programme for liberal expansion is to be the 'City on a Hill'. The success of lib­</p><p>eralism at home stands as an example for emulation and a refuge for beleaguered liberals in</p><p>oppressive countries everywhere. Liberalism, moreover, taps into deep chords of common</p><p>humanity that lend confidence that all may, some day, follow a similar path towards libera­</p><p>tion, allowing for the appropriate nationi:ll and cultural d1fterences. Peoples will liberate them­</p><p>selves by modernizing themselves. One liberal 'strategy' is simply to live up to liueral principles</p><p>at home, and wait for others to modernize themselves.</p><p>Francis Fukuyama's striking argument about the 'End of History' presents a radical restate­</p><p>ment of the liberal modernization theme, bringing together both its materialist and idealist</p><p>strains. His study envisions the failure of all forms of autocracy, whether in Eastern Europe</p><p>or elsewhere, and the triumph of consumer capitalism and democracy under the irresistible</p><p>onslaught of modernization. Today, however, we have mounting evidence that free-market</p><p>capitalism</p><p>may not even be the quintessential capitalist answer to growth under the condi­</p><p>tions of late-late capitalism. The most striking rates of growth of the post-war period appear</p><p>to have been achieved by the semi-planned capitalist economies of East Asia-Taiwan, South</p><p>Korea, Singapore, Japan, and now China and India. Indicative planning, capital rationing by</p><p>para-statal development banks and ministries of finance, managed trade, and incorporated</p><p>unions-capitalist syndicalism, not capitalist libertarianism-seemed to describe the wave of</p><p>the capitalist future.28</p><p>While China's current success (7-10 per cent growth annually) with 'market-Leninism' or</p><p>'national corporatism' seems to confirm the non-liberal path, the potential for liberalism need</p><p>not be completely discounted. Economists have raised concerns about whether Asian capi­</p><p>talism can evolve from capital accumulation to 'total factor productivity', which may require</p><p>a loosening of indicative planning. Thus, in China market forces have stimulated the forma­</p><p>tion of thousands of business and professional groups and greater village-level (democratic)</p><p>self-management. Another route to democratization lies in the institutional routinization of</p><p>CHAPTER 3 LIBERALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY</p><p>authority, what Minxin Pei has called 'creeping democratization' in the Chinese context {Pei</p><p>1995). Even when leaders are opposed to democratization, and even when the forces of civil</p><p>society lack the power or the interest to promote a democratization of the state, democ­</p><p>ratization may 'creep' in. When leaders seek to defend their authority by recruiting allies,</p><p>ceding to them competency embodied in institutional routines and government structures,</p><p>the beginnings of constitutional checks and balances are set in motion. Representing diverse</p><p>and sometimes extensive interests, the new institutions limit arbitrary power and begin to</p><p>delegate power in their turn, further institutionalizing a regime. Step by step. the founda­</p><p>tions of the rule of law are laid, as they are now being (albeit slowly) in China, where new</p><p>clusters of authority in the National People's Congress-such as the court system and the legal</p><p>profession, and village councils-have emerged.</p><p>Here the roles of global civil society and international civil politics are particularly impor­</p><p>tant. Tourism, educational exchanges, and scientific meetings spread tastes across borders;</p><p>indeed, such transnational contacts with the liberal world seem to have had a liberalizing</p><p>effect on the many Soviet and East European elites who visited the West during the Cold War,</p><p>demonstrating both Western material successes (where they existed) and regimes that toler­</p><p>ated and even encouraged dissent and popular participation (when they did) (Deudney and</p><p>Ikenberry 1991 /92). The international commitment to human rights, including the Helsinki</p><p>Watch process, found a reflection in Gorbachev's 1universal human values'. The 'Goddess of</p><p>Democracy' erected in Tian'anmen Square represented another transnational expression of</p><p>ideas shared on a global basis (see Chapter 17).</p><p>Intervention</p><p>Liberal principles can also help us think about whether liberal states should attempt to res­</p><p>cue fndividuals oppressed by their own governments. Historically, liberals have divided on</p><p>these issues.29 Traditionally, and in accord with current international law, states have the right</p><p>to defend themselves, come to the ajd of other states aggressed against, and take forcible</p><p>measures to protect their citizens, where necessary, from wrongful injury and release them</p><p>from wrongful imprisonment (Cutler 1985). However, modern international law condemns</p><p>unilateral force designed to redress the domestic oppression of states. The UN Charter is</p><p>ambiguous on this Issue, since it permits the Security Council to intervene to prevent what it</p><p>determines to be 'threats' to 'international peace and security'.30 In 2005 the General Assem­</p><p>bly unanimously urged the Security Council to intervene and exercise a 'responsibility to</p><p>protect1 if states fail to protect their populations from 'war crimes, crimes against humanity,</p><p>ethnic cleansing or genocide' (Doyle, 2015). Choosing a foreign policy of non-interven­</p><p>tion has important moral foundations. Non-intervention helps to encourage order-stable</p><p>expectations-in a confusing world without international government. It rests on a respect</p><p>for the rights of individuals to establish their own way of life free from foreign interference.</p><p>The basic moral presumption of liberal thought is that states should not be subject to foreign</p><p>intervention, by military or other means. States should therefore be taken as representing the</p><p>moral rights of individuals unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. Although liberals and</p><p>democrats have often succumbed to the temptation to intervene to bring'civillzation', metro­</p><p>politan standards of law and order, and democratic government to foreign peoples who have</p><p>expressed no demand for them, these interventions find no justification in a conception of</p><p>75</p><p>76 MICHAEL W. DOYLE</p><p>equal respect for individuals. This is simply because it is to their sense of their own self-respect</p><p>and not our sense of what they should respect that we must accord equal consideration.</p><p>What it means to respect another's sense of self-determination is not always self-evident.</p><p>Ascertaining what it might mean can best be considered as an attempt at both subjective</p><p>and objective interpretation. One criterion is subjective. We should credit the voice of their</p><p>majority. Obviously, this means not intervening against stales with apparent majority sup­</p><p>port. In authoritarian states, however, determining what the wishes of the majority are is</p><p>particularly difficult. Some states will have divided political communities with a considerable</p><p>share, but less than a majority, of the population supporting the government, a large minority</p><p>opposing, and many indifferent. Some will be able to suppress dissent completely. Others will</p><p>not. Therefore, widespread armed resistance sustained by local resources and massive street</p><p>demonstrations against the state (and not just against specific policies) can provide evidence</p><p>of a people standing against their own government. Still, one will want to find clear evidence</p><p>that the dissenters actually want a foreign intervention to solve their oppression. The other</p><p>criterion is objective. No group of individuals, even if apparently silent, can be expected to</p><p>consent to having their basic rights to life, food, shelter, and freedom from torture systemati­</p><p>cally violated. These sorts of rights clearly cross-cut wide cultural differences.</p><p>Whenever either or both of these violations take place, one has a prima facie consideration</p><p>favouring foreign intervention;31 but even rescuing majorities suffering severe oppression</p><p>or individuals suffering massive and systematic violations of human rights is not sufficient</p><p>grounds to justify military intervention. We must also have some reasonable expectation</p><p>that the intervention will actually end the oppression. We need to expect that it will end the</p><p>massacre or address starvation (as did India's intervention in East Pakistan and Tanzania's</p><p>in Ur;and.i.). Or, if pro-Llernocratic, that it has a reasonable chance of establishing authentic</p><p>self-determination, rather th,rn (as J.S. Mill w.irned in his famous 1859 essay on 'Non-inter­</p><p>vention') merely introducing puppet rulers who, dependent on outside support, soon begin</p><p>to replicate the oppressive behaviour of the previous rulers. Moreover, the intervention must</p><p>be a proportional response to the suffering now endured and likely to be endured without</p><p>an intervention. Countries should not be destroyed in order to be saved. We must consider</p><p>whether means other than military intervention could achieve the liberation from oppres­</p><p>sion. And we must ensure that the intervention, if</p><p>necessary, is conducted in a way that mini­</p><p>mizes casualties, most particularly non-combatant casualties. In short, we must be able to</p><p>account morally for the expected casualties of an invasion, both to our own soldiers and the</p><p>non-combatant victims. Lastly, interventions should incorporate a normal sense of fallibility,</p><p>together with a decent respect for the opinions of the entire community of nations. Meeting</p><p>these standards requires, wherever feasible, a resort to multilateral organizations to guide</p><p>and legally legitimate a decision to violate the sovereignty of another state.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>Liberal foreign policy presents both a promise and a warning. Alliances founded on mutu­</p><p>al strategic interest among liberal and non-liberal states have been broken, economic ties</p><p>between liberal and non-liberal states have proved fragile; but the political bonds of liberal</p><p>rights and interests have proved a remarkably firm foundation for mutual non-aggression. A</p><p>CHAPTER 3 LIBERALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY</p><p>separate peace exists among liberal states. But in their relations with non-liberal states, liberal</p><p>states have not escaped from the insecurity caused by anarchy in the world political system</p><p>considered as a whole. Moreover, the very constitutional restraint, international respect for</p><p>individual rights, and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among</p><p>liberal states establish grounds for additional conflict irrespective of actual threats to national</p><p>security in the relations between liberal and non-liberal societies. In their relations with all</p><p>states, liberal states have not solved the problems of international cooperation and com­</p><p>petition. Liberal publics can become absorbed in domestic issues, and international liberal</p><p>respect does not preclude trade rivalries or guarantee farsighted collective solutions to inter­</p><p>national security and welfare.</p><p>Key points</p><p>• For more than two centuries, liberal countries have tended to maintain peaceful relations with</p><p>each other. Liberal democracies are each other's natural allies.</p><p>Therefore, a fundamental postulate of liberal foreign policy is preserving and expanding the liberal</p><p>zone of peace.</p><p>LiberaITsm contributes to the understanding of foreign policy by highlighting how individuals and</p><p>lhe ideas and ideals they espouse (such as human rights, liberty, and democracy), soclal forces</p><p>(capitalism, markets), and political institutions (democracy, representation) can have direct effects</p><p>on foreign relations.</p><p>• But liberalism has also proved to be a dangerous guide to foreign policy, often exacerbating</p><p>tensions with non-liberal states.</p><p>• The foreign policy question essential for all democracies is thus: Can the liberal peace be</p><p>effectively preserved and expanded without provoking unnecessary danger and inflicting</p><p>unnecessary harm?</p><p>Scholars have analysed liberalism's effects by distinguishing three key interpretations of liberal</p><p>foreign policy: individualist, commercial, and republican.</p><p>Questions</p><p>1. What characteristics identify a typical liberal state? How well does an actual liberal sta-te that you</p><p>know-the US, UK, France, Germany.Japan. South Africa-match those characteristics?</p><p>2. What differences are said to distinguish individualist, commercial, and republican liberalisms? How</p><p>and why do their foreign policies dfffer?</p><p>3. What might the citizens and leaders of liberal states do to improve the prospects that the good</p><p>features of liberal foreign policy (the liberal peace) are enhanced and the bad ones (imprudence,</p><p>interventionism) constrained?</p><p>4. Under what circumstances should a liberal theorist of foreign policy support or reject international</p><p>military intervention?</p><p>5. What should a llberal theorist expect to happen in US-European relations and US-Chinese</p><p>relations if Europe unites in a powerful democratic federatlon or G1ina both continues to grow and</p><p>democratizes? Would these expectations differ from those that a realist balance of power theorist</p><p>would expect?</p><p>77</p><p>78 MICHAEL W. DOYLE</p><p>Further reading</p><p>Brown, M., Lynn-Jones, S., and Miller, S. (eds) (1996), Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge,</p><p>MA: MIT Press).</p><p>A valuable collection of essays by proponents and critics of the democratic peace proposition.</p><p>Doyle, M.W. (1 997), Ways of War o.nd Peace (New York: W.W. Norton).</p><p>A Wide-ranging survey of international relations theory, including l iberalism, realism, and socialism,</p><p>and their policy implications.</p><p>Kant, I. {1970 [1795}), 'Perpetual Peace', in H. Reiss (ed.) (transl. H.B. Nisbet), Kant's Political</p><p>Writings (Cambridge, UK: Caml>ridge University Press).</p><p>Written by the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant in 1 795, when there were few, if any, liberal</p><p>republics; nonetheless, the classic source for the liberal peace.</p><p>Mill,J.S. {1 973 [1859]), 'A Few Words on Non-intervention', in G. Himmelfarb (ed.), Essays on</p><p>Politics and Culture {Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith).</p><p>The classic nineteenth-century liberal defence of both non- intervention and liberal imperialism.</p><p>Rousseau, D. (2005), Democracy and War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).</p><p>A quantitative assessment of the democratic peace, with insightful case studies.</p><p>Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for more information:</p><p>www.oxfordtextbooks.eo.uk/orc/smith_foreign3e/</p><p>I ntroduction</p><p>Constructivism and foreign</p><p>pol i cy</p><p>TR I N E F LOCKHART</p><p>Chapter contents</p><p>Introduction</p><p>What is constructivism?</p><p>Applied constructivism</p><p>The essence of constructivism</p><p>Constructivism meets foreign policy</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>Reader's guide</p><p>79</p><p>81</p><p>82</p><p>83</p><p>90</p><p>93</p><p>This chapter is about one of the newer theories in international relations­</p><p>constructivism. As a relative 'newcomer' constructivism has been viewed with</p><p>scepticism from within the discipline and from foreign policy making circles alike,</p><p>where many have questioned its utility and its ability to say anything about 'the real</p><p>world of policy'. This chapter aims to show that although some of its concepts and</p><p>propositions may seem unsettling at first, constructivism is a useful tool not only for</p><p>understanding foreign pol icy, but also as a guide for prescribing foreign policy, and</p><p>that practitioners over the past quarter of a century largely have worked accord­</p><p>ing to a constructivist perspective. The chapter starts out by discussing what con­</p><p>structivism is, outlining the constructivist view that anarchy exists in different forms</p><p>with major implications for how agents act. The chapter then outlines some of the</p><p>main propositions and conceptual tools of constructivism, especially its views on</p><p>identity, social construction, rules, and practice. Although many of the propositions</p><p>and concepts may appear a little abstract, the chapter uses examples from 'the real</p><p>world' of European security, to show constructivism's alternative understandings</p><p>of NATO's role after the end of the Cold War and in present-day European security.</p><p>The chapter points out that theory matters in foreign policy making-including con­</p><p>structivism-because d ifferent theories i mply d ifferent policies and may make alter­</p><p>native policy options visible which would otherwise easily have been overlooked.</p><p>On 1 July 1 991 the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist after its European members withdrew their</p><p>support and mi l itary contributions to the organization, bringing an end to a thi rty-six-year­</p><p>long foreign policy based on a mi l itary stand-off between the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact and the</p><p>80 T R I N E F LO C K H A RT</p><p>US-led NATO All iance. The event immediately sparked off speculation about NATO's future</p><p>and relevance. The general wisdom in realist ci rcles was that without a clear threat, NATO</p><p>had outl ived its purpose, famously expressed by the late Kenneth Waltz, who proclaimed that</p><p>although 'NATO's days were not numbered-its years were'. 1 Si nce then, NATO's relevance has</p><p>been a recurrent</p><p>theme, but following Russia's annexation of Crimea i n 201 4, and the subse­</p><p>quent crisis in Ukraine, pol icy-makers are once again re-evaluating their view of NATO. Had</p><p>Waltz been al ive today, it is l i kely he would have agreed that Vlad im i r Putin has done more to</p><p>make NATO relevant than could have been wished for.2</p><p>The example of the debate about NATO's relevance raises the question of why students and</p><p>practitioners of foreign pol icy should care about abstract theories that claim to be able to say</p><p>something about foreign pol icy and even to prescribe the 'right' foreign policy option (Walt</p><p>1 998: 29), and it particularly indicates why constructivism may offer a more nuanced per­</p><p>spective for u nderstanding, and for conducting, foreign policy. Theories are always needed</p><p>as a form of organ izing framework to make sense of a complex world. Without theories, we</p><p>would s imply be overwhelmed by the masses of information that have to be processed i n</p><p>the daunting task of understanding and making foreign pol icy. Yet, theories do more than</p><p>organize data, they also imply different pol icy options and they contain different assump­</p><p>tions about how the world works. I n this sense theories have profound impl ications for the</p><p>actual conduct of foreign pol icy and it matters what perspective practitioners subscribe to,</p><p>even if they do so subconsciously.</p><p>Constructivism challenges realism and l iberal ism on a number of important points-especial­</p><p>ly deeply ingrained assumptions about how the world works. The constructivist conviction that</p><p>'the world is of our making' (Onuf 1 989) challenges the real ist view that we can do little to change</p><p>things, as unpleasant as they m ight seem, and it challenges the l iberal perspective that there is</p><p>a particular route to human progress. Applyine a constructivist per�pcctive to the queslior I uf</p><p>NATO's relevance gives different answers than a l iberal ora realist perspective would have done.</p><p>At the time of the end of the Cold War, neither real ists nor l iberals were able to correctly predict</p><p>the consequences of the demise of the Warsaw Pact for NATO and realism was unable to pre­</p><p>scribe a ro le for an organization such as NATO once the Soviet threat had dissipated. Moreover,</p><p>neither of the two dominant theories were able to imagine a more, rather than a less, influential</p><p>role for NATO, where the All iance would play a pivotal role in managing the transition to a new</p><p>European order by preparing the 'new Europeans' for membership in the 'Western club'-and in</p><p>the process change their identities and interests and deeply ingrained foreign policy practices.</p><p>Although constructivism has arguably been able to best capture the finer nuances of</p><p>NATO's post-Cold War role, and has offered the most persuasive alternative interpretations of</p><p>the momentous changes in international relations and their foreign pol icy impl ications, real­</p><p>ist and l iberal perspectives are often assumed to sti l l be the 'theories of choice' among foreign</p><p>pol icy makers and scholars of international relations (IR). Many believe that the assumptions</p><p>of real ism and l i beral ism resonate more easily with a generation of academics and fore ign</p><p>policy makers who have themselves been schooled in realist and l iberal theories, and to</p><p>whom the constructivist perspective is an unknown entity and perhaps a bit too abstract. Yet,</p><p>in actual pol icy-making in the case of NATO after the Cold War, the practitioner perspective</p><p>appear to have been more i nfluenced by constructivism (and elements of l iberalism) than by</p><p>real ism as policy essentially has focused on re-constructing previously conflictual relation­</p><p>sh ips into rule-based and cooperative relationships.</p><p>C H A P T E R 4 C O N ST R U CTI V I S M A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y</p><p>BOX 4. 1 Practitioner perspect ve-NA.TO Secretary eneral Jens Stolten6erg</p><p>on the NATO-Russia relationship</p><p>Both NATO and Russia are here to stay. So we s imply cannot ignore each other. One way or the other,</p><p>we wi l l have a relationsh ip. The question is what k ind I bel ieve that only a strong NATO can bui ld a tru ly</p><p>constructive and cooperative relat ionsh i p with Russia. I n the past , we looked at each other with suspicion.</p><p>rel i ed on deterrence, and tal ked to each other mainly to avoid dangerous m i sunderstandings and</p><p>escalation And let's face i t , we can see echoes of that now. The other a l ternative is a re l ationship based</p><p>on mu ual respe . not suspic ion . On the rule of law. not the l aw of the stronge5t. On commor, lntE!resr ,</p><p>not i l lusions. ATO has i nvested a lot i n bui lding such a rela ionship with Rusi;la ever since the end of che</p><p>Cold War. NATO cont inues to asp i re to a cooperative relationsh ip with Russ ia . But to get there, Russia</p><p>would need to want it, and to take clear steps to make i t possible.3 (NATO Secretary General speech,</p><p>28 October 201 4 , http://www.nato. int/cps/en/natohq/opin ions_ 1 1 4 1 79.htm?selectedlocale = en)</p><p>Compare th is statement, made at a time where poltcy practitioners were coming to erms with having</p><p>to re-evaluate the NATO-Russia relationship, with the constructivist example of Al tet and Ego on a desert</p><p>is land in Box 4.2.</p><p>Th i s chapter ai ms to u n pack the bas i c assu mpt ions and po l i cy re levance of constructiv­</p><p>ism so that it m ight i ncreas i ngly be i nc l uded in the conceptual toolbox u sed by students and</p><p>po l i cy makers i n thei r attempt to u nderstand and do foreign po l i cy. The chapter exp lores the</p><p>natu re of constructiv i sm and i ts added val ue for exp la i n i ng and understand i ng fore ign po l icy</p><p>us ing European secu r ity as an i l l ustrative examp le.</p><p>What is constructivism?</p><p>The fai l u re o f t he two mai nstream theories to pred i ct , and i n it ia l ly even to explai n , t he end of</p><p>the Cold War is usua l ly seen as hav ing faci l itated constructivi sm 's arrival i n the I R d isci p l i n e. It</p><p>i s true that the fai l u re of real ism in p red ict i ng the momentous even ts , i ts overa l l stat ic natu re,</p><p>and i ts i n it ia l i ns i stence after the Co ld War that essentia l ly noth i ng had changed4 contri buted</p><p>to the rap id sp read of constructiv i sm i nto I R from the early 1 990s onwards . However, the</p><p>o rigi ns of constructivism in I R can actua l ly be traced back to the early to m id - 1 980s5 when</p><p>cr it ical and post- modern theor ies suggested a lternat ive read i ngs of the very not ions of real ­</p><p>ity, truth, a nd structu re (Sm ith 1 995 : 25) a nd questioned wide ly accepted u nderstand i ngs of</p><p>con cepts of I R and subfi e lds such as the study of foreign po l icy (see Chapter 5) .</p><p>Although constructiv ism i s presented i n th is book as one of the mai nstream theories, many</p><p>wou l d actua l ly say that constructiv i sm is an approach rather than a theory. Th i s v iew is ground­</p><p>ed i n the understand i ng that constructiv ism has noth i ng substantial to say about who the mai n</p><p>actors are and what the mai n p rob lems or issues are i n i nte rnationa l re lat ions . Constructivism</p><p>offers no solutions to specific p rob lems i n i nternat ional rel at ions, nor does it p rescr ibe any</p><p>particu lar pol i cy d i rections . I ndeed , constructiv ism can be seen as an empty vesse l that mere ly</p><p>specifies a soc ia l ontology without , however, specifying which socia l relationsh ips it is con­</p><p>cerned with . Moreover, constructiv ism i s 'empty' in the sense that it does not chal l enge the i de­</p><p>o logi cal convictions of either real i sm or l i beral i sm , and it i s neither optim i st ic nor pess im i st ic</p><p>81</p><p>82 T R I N E FLOCKHART</p><p>by design (Adler 1 997: 323). Even so. constructivism does offer alternative understandings of</p><p>some of the most central themes i n international relations such as the meaning of anarchy</p><p>and balance of power, the relationship between state identity and interest, and the prospects</p><p>for change {Hopf 1 998: 1 72). Moreover, with its roots in critical theory and post-modernism,</p><p>constructivism has remained committed to problematizing that which is taken for granted and</p><p>to 'making strange' what is commonly regarded to exist {Pouliot 2004: 323).</p><p>Appl ied constructivism</p><p>Strictly speaking, it is true to say that constructivism is not a theory in the sense that it does</p><p>not, un l i ke l iberal ism, provide visions of particular world orders. However, constructivism</p><p>is perhaps closer to being a substantial theory than its critics suggest, and it certainly holds</p><p>considerable potential as an applied framework for understanding foreign policy. Th is is</p><p>especially clear in relation to European security where, arguably, constructivism is closest to</p><p>becoming a substantive theory, as constructivists are concerned with the specific question</p><p>of how old practices of rivalry and war-making can be changed through institutionalization,</p><p>which m ight over time change identities, interests, and practices. This form of constructiv­</p><p>ism could be called 'applied constructivism' and bui lds on the work of, among others, Karl</p><p>Deutsch and his associates {Deutsch 1 957) who theorized that changed interactions across</p><p>borders m ight lead to new social relationships and eventually lead to the establishment of</p><p>a 'security community'.6 Si nce the publ ication of Security Communities (Adler and Barnett</p><p>1 998), the concept of a 'secu rity community' has experienced a revival in IR thinking. The</p><p>security commun ity l iter�turc has s ince produced convincing em1,Ji r iLal evidence that the</p><p>processes taking place in , for example, the enlargement of NATO and the European Un ion, or</p><p>through some forms of democracy promotion, are aimed precisely at forging new relation­</p><p>ships based on friendship and cooperation rather than rivalry or enmity, and that identities</p><p>and interests have been fundamentally changed in the process.</p><p>The clearest constructivist statement on these processes is found in the i nfluential article</p><p>'Anarchy is What States Make of It' by Alexander Wendt {1 992). Wendt asked if it is really the</p><p>case that the absence of pol itical authority in the international system forces states into the</p><p>patterns of behaviour based on self-help, as suggested by realists. His answer was an emphat­</p><p>ic 'no'. Self-help and power pol itics do not follow logically from anarchy, because self-help is</p><p>not a structu ral feature, as suggested by Waltz, but an institution based on particular inter­</p><p>subjective understandings about self and other that are reinforced through agents' practice.</p><p>The argument bui lds on one of the most central featu res of constructivism, which holds that</p><p>people act towards objects (includ ing other people) on the basis of the meanings the object</p><p>(or person) has for them. Th is means that states act differently towards enemies than they</p><p>do towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not (Wendt 1 992: 396).</p><p>Moreover, Wendt suggested the existence of three different 'cultures of anarchy' character­</p><p>ized by different institutions. The th ree cultures of anarchy could be conflictual and based</p><p>on self-help as suggested by realists, competitive and based on rivalry as suggested by many</p><p>liberals, or friendly and based on cooperation as suggested by, for example, Deutsch. The</p><p>impl ication was that not only is anarchy what states make of it, but that cu ltures of anarchy</p><p>can be changed.</p><p>C H A P T E R 4 C O N S T R U CT I V I S M A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y</p><p>BOX 4 . 2 Ego anit Alter on a itesert islancl</p><p>Relations, whether confl ictual. competitive, or friendly. are always a product of social interactions rather</p><p>than just material capabi l i t ies To Uustrate this poi nt . Wendt uses an example of two space avatars, Alter</p><p>nd Ego, who meet on a desert island for the first- time. From their first encounter on the beach, their</p><p>relationship wi l l develop from their initial understanding or the situation and from the development of</p><p>shared understandings through thei r In teractions. which might lead to enmity, competi\ion, or f rjendsh p.</p><p>depending on their actions and reactions. The 'material structu re' is the same in each situation: lhey each</p><p>have a knife and are on the samec desert island. Thlrtk about wh ich 'culture of anarchy' is likely to result</p><p>from the three desert island situations outl i ned below.</p><p>SITUATION 1 Ego notices Alter on the island. Ego judges the situation as potential ly threatening and</p><p>approaches Al ter brandishing hls knife.</p><p>SITUATION 2 Ego notices Alter on the Island. Ego considers that Alter wil l be a competitor for the known</p><p>scarce resources on the island, but wonders lf Alter knows of other resources. Ego approaches Alter with</p><p>h is kn ife in his belt, but his hand resting on it.</p><p>SITUATION 3 Ego notices Alter on the island. Ego wonders if Alter might want to cooperate on d igging a wel l</p><p>(and whether he might l ike to play chess). Ego approaches Alter wi th h is hand outstretched arid the knife</p><p>s imply dangl ing from his belt.</p><p>How wi l l Alter respond and what wi l l be Ego's i nterpretation of Alters response-which shared under­</p><p>stand ings and practices might develop?</p><p>The argument tha anarchy is not necessari ly based on confl ict and sel f-he l p was a dev­</p><p>astati ng blow to neorea l i sm, b ut it was also a completely new conceptual tool for th i nking</p><p>about options for foreign pol icy maki ng, as 1 t opened up enti re ly new possib i l it i es where the</p><p>overarch ing question became how to change from one cu l ture to another. I f, as maintai ned</p><p>by Wendt. the on ly reason why we m ight be in a se l f-he lp system is because practice made</p><p>it that way (Wendt 1 992: 407) , then practice cou ld also 1un -make1 a confl ictual cu ltu re. I n the</p><p>aftermath of the Cold War, constructivists argued that it was precisely i n such 'un -maki ngs' of</p><p>past confl i ctual patterns that NATO and the EU cou ld p lay important ro les.</p><p>The big question here, of course, is how we move from one cu ltu re ta another, because</p><p>once a cu ltu re has become inst itutional ized, it is d ifficu lt to change. To answer th is question ,</p><p>it is necessary to take a c loser look at some of the essentia l parts of constructivi sm wh ich</p><p>provide a conceptual toolbox for understand i ng how agents' shared knowledge, idehti ties,</p><p>and i n terests are i nterl i n ked and may contribute to chang ing deep ly embedded practices</p><p>and structu ral cond itions. Doing so, however, requ i res a fundamental b reak with some of the</p><p>real ist and l i beral assumptions about how the world works (see Box 4.2).</p><p>The essence of constructivism</p><p>Constructiv ism d iffers from real i sm and l i beral i sm on a n umber of crucial poi nts, some of</p><p>wh ich may appear a l i tt le unsettl i ng to those who have been schooled i n the so-cal led ration ­</p><p>al i st thought that u nderp ins rea l i sm and l i bera l i sm. Moreover, al l essential e lements of con ­</p><p>structivism are i nterconnected i n ways that can also make i t d ifficu lt to d ivide constructivi sm</p><p>83</p><p>84 T R I N E F L O C K H A R T</p><p>into 'bite-sized' pieces. Ir, this section I wil l present some of the essentials of constructivism</p><p>divided into four core propositions, and in the next section I wi l l i l l ustrate how these core</p><p>propositions of constructivism can be utilized to answer how foreign policy might be able to</p><p>bring about change from one culture of anarchy to another.</p><p>The four key constructivist propositions and some of the key constructivist concepts can</p><p>be summarized as fo llows:</p><p>1 . A belief in the social construction of reality and the importance of social facts.</p><p>2. A focus on ideationaf as well as material structures and the importance of norms and rules.</p><p>3. A focus on the role of identity in shaping political action and the importance of 'logics of</p><p>action'.</p><p>4. A belief in the mutual constitutiveness of agents and structure,</p><p>and a focus on practice</p><p>and action.</p><p>Social construction and social facts</p><p>As the name 'constructivism' indicates, the major common proposition by constructivists is</p><p>that reality, which we mostly take as given, is in fact a project under constant construction.</p><p>Constructivists understand the world as coming into being rather than existing as a pre-given</p><p>entity. Moreover, as argued in the seminal work The Social Comtruction of Rea.lity (Berger</p><p>and Luckmann 1 966), our understanding of reality is derived from inter-subjective knowl­</p><p>edge and the interpreted nature of social reality. The fact that constructivism is often called</p><p>social constructivbm is indicative of the considerable role attached to the social processes of</p><p>interaction for the production of shared knowledge about the world. From this perspective.</p><p>constructivists agree that, although some aspects of reality clearly exist as 'brute facts' whose</p><p>concrete existence is not contested, their meaning is. Ayers Rock, or Uluru, in Australia clearly</p><p>exists, but its significance and meaning varies greatly depending on whether it is regarded</p><p>from a European or an Aboriglnal perspective. Simi larly, a North Korean nuclear warhead</p><p>may look sim i lar to a French nuclear warhead, and both have the same devastating conse­</p><p>quences, but despite their sim i la r material attributes, we attach different meanings to each</p><p>This Is of relevance to the 'cultures of anarchy' because different meanings wi l l also imply</p><p>different practices and different foreign policy choices, as witnessed in the d ifferent American</p><p>foreign pol icies vis-a-vis a nu dear-armed France and a nuclear-armed North Korea.</p><p>Apart from brute facts with different shared meanings, constructivists agree that there are</p><p>portions of reality that are regarded as facts only through human agreement and which are</p><p>made observable only through human practice. As suggested by Vincent Pouliot (2004: 320),</p><p>all constructivists share a focus on those portions of the world that are treated as if they were</p><p>real. Many of the most important concepts and understandings in international relations­</p><p>even the state-are social facts rather than brute facts. Social facts exist only through human</p><p>agreement and shared knowledge reinforced through practice. A common example of a</p><p>social fact is money, which is clearly more than its material existence-what matters Is the</p><p>shared meanings we attach to money and the practices surrounding it. Without shared agree­</p><p>ment that pieces of paper can be swapped for goods and services, money would no longer</p><p>exist because i t exists only through practice. I nternational relations also consist of social facts</p><p>C H A PT E R 4 C O N ST R U C T I V I S M A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y</p><p>BOX 4 . 3 NATO-a social fact?</p><p>NATO dearly exists, and as seen through its past actions in Libya. Afghanistan, Lhe Bal kans, and elsewhere</p><p>it ls an important foreign policy actor. Yet who or what exactly is NATO? What do we mean when we say</p><p>that NATO has bombed targets in Ubya or when Russia dalms that NA10 is a th reat? In material terms</p><p>NATO is no more lian an agemg headquarters bui ld ing on he outskirts of Brussels, a home-page, and</p><p>an international staff: apart from a few AWACS reconnaissance p lanes, a command 5'ructure and a (f!.N</p><p>other very l im ited assets, NATO has no mil i tary equ ipment or forces of its own. Yet, despite the Hmired</p><p>material man ifestations of NATO, lhe organization clearly has a presence in international pol it ics and</p><p>se,urity, and 1s commonly cons dered lo be an object ive reality with the ability to act (to have agency).</p><p>Yet, NATO only exis as a sod I fact canst tuted by social relalionships, shared practice, and shared</p><p>understandings.</p><p>NATO was establ ished in 1 949 through the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, which c:ommittecl</p><p>ilS signatories to come to the help of any fel low NKfO member rn case of artack. Therefore, NATO's</p><p>presence and existence as a foreign policy actor is based on the promise contained in a document that</p><p>is nearly seventy years old. Everything tha NATO is assumed to be is based on the shared mean ing at­</p><p>tached to the treaty, the shared identity and shared values of its members, and the many shared practices</p><p>which have since been established. In this sense NATO only exists through its actions in concrete for�ign</p><p>and security pol icy, where during the Cold War i acted as the most Important forum for foreign pol icy</p><p>vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and where since the end or he Cold War it has been en�ged in forging new</p><p>social relationships with former enemies.</p><p>that have no exi stence outs ide the mean ings and practkes associated with them. Over time</p><p>social facts become reifi ed through social relat ionsh ips, rules, and rout i ne practices so that</p><p>they appear as an objective real ity with an i ndependent existence from those who construct­</p><p>ed the social fact i n the fi rst p lace. Therefore, key quest ions for constructiv i sts are necessarr ly:</p><p>How are social facts social ly constructed and how do they affect global po l itics (Pou l i ot 2004:</p><p>320)? How can they be changed and even 'un -constructed'? (See Box 4.3 . )</p><p>ldeational and material structures</p><p>The i ns i stence that the world is soc ia l ly constructed is l i n ked to the second essential propos i ­</p><p>t ion of construct iv ism-that structure can not be understood th rough reference on ly to mate­</p><p>rial forces such as natu ral resources and m i l itary power, but that it cons ists of both material</p><p>and ideational factors. Constructivists emphasize the importance of shared knowledge about</p><p>material 'th i ngs', ru les, symbols , and language, which a l l shape how we interpret the world</p><p>and the actions of others . Neither actions nor materia l forces have mean ng outside shared</p><p>forms of knowledge, and it is co l lective mean ings along with material forces that constitute</p><p>the structu re and that organ ize our act ions. For constructivi sts it is s imp ly imposs ib le to get</p><p>a grasp on real ity by look ing on ly at the materia l world . I n th is sense construct iv ism d i rectly</p><p>chal lenges the materia l i sm of neoreal lsm and neo l i beral i sm , wh ich see the most fundamental</p><p>feature of society as the d i stri but ion of material forces . Constructivists argue that although</p><p>structure cons ists partly of materia l facts, such as the existence of Korean and French n uclear</p><p>warheads, material facts alone have no meaning without understand ing the social context ,</p><p>the shared knowledge, and the practices surround ing it . I n the case of nuclear weapons, one</p><p>85</p><p>86 T R I N E F LO C K HART</p><p>North Korean nuclear warhead matters more to the USA than many French or Brit ish nuclear</p><p>warheads because the mean ing of the latter is i nterpreted with in a social context of friend­</p><p>sh ip , where cooperation is the dominant practke, rather than being interpreted with i n a</p><p>social context of enmity as i n the case of the Korean nuclear warhead .</p><p>Structu res are often cod ifi ed i n formal ru l es and norms, which agents are social ized i nto</p><p>fol lowi ng (Wendt 1 992: 399) {see Box 4.'1 ) . The ru les that are fol lowed may be fo rmal ru les</p><p>that exist i n a wrltten or spoken form , but they may also be a less formal form of ru le concep­</p><p>tual ized as norms, wh ich are usual ly ta.ken for granted , are unquestioned, and are associated</p><p>with specific identities and be longing to a spec ific commun ity or social group. Norms are</p><p>col lecti ve understand ings that make behaviou ra l c la ims on those actors who {because of thei r</p><p>i dentity) see the norm as sal ient. A norm wi l l specify the approp riate behaviour fo r an agent</p><p>with a given identity. In that sen se norms are at once cogn itive 'maps' for actors to determ ine</p><p>what i s appropriate and i nappropriate behaviou r, and are also a major constitutive i nfl uence</p><p>on actor identities and interests. Constructivists agree that norms have</p><p>a structu ral function,</p><p>which i s both constrai n i ng and constitutive, but only in so far as the norm is seen by the agents</p><p>themselves as of relevance-norms i n th i s sense can be thought of as 'structures of re l evance'.</p><p>Moreover, norms are mportant for constituti ng social relations because to become a mem­</p><p>ber of a certain social group , such as NATO or the EU, appl icant states have to fol low the norms</p><p>ofthe group to which membership is des fred. The impl i ed logic here is that structural change</p><p>can be ach ieved by changi ng the norms of certain actors, especial ly if those actors seek mem­</p><p>bersh ip of a new social group. The fdea that norms could be changed i n order to change identi­</p><p>ties and interests had a l ready been used i n the immediate aftermath of the Second World War</p><p>in (We.st) Germany and Japan, but has s lnce been adopted as a major foreign pol icy project i n</p><p>the aftermath o f the Cotd War as pol icy makers real ized the eagerness o f the Central and East</p><p>European states to gain membersh ip of the 1Western club'. W1U i n a short space of time, both</p><p>the EU and NATO, together with other i nternational actors, had engaged i n a gigantic project</p><p>to social ize the norms of the West based on l iberal and democratic ideas to those Central and</p><p>Eastern European states who wished to become members of NATO and the EU (F lockhart 2006).</p><p>I n the process , new identities and new social relat onsh lps were constructed, which changed</p><p>the logic of anarchy in Eu rope (between East and West) from one character zed by enmity and</p><p>self- help to one characterized by friendsh i p and a practice of cooperation.</p><p>eox 4.4 Rules matter</p><p>Constructivists bel ieve that rules are a 11ecessary element for al l blll the mosl elementary forms of</p><p>interaction, and they contend tha ru les are often fotlowed blindly-even in sr \.lat ions where we might</p><p>th ink tha no ru1es ex ist �or example, tourists In London very quickly ffnd out about the unspoken</p><p>ru le on -the Underground nol to stare al fel low passengers seated opposite. Instead, travel lers on the</p><p>Underground team the practice of directing lhelf gaze above their fel, low passenger, a practice that is</p><p>e>1pertly exploited by advettisers with very deta! led dvertrs:lng boards.</p><p>Rules matter because lhey provide order and predict:abf ll .ty a.nd th�y pro"ide gu idance for how to</p><p>behave. Ru les are general fn,peratjve principles , wh1cb reqU f re or authorize certain behaviour �Bull</p><p>1 977 Ji 995: 52). Ru les may have the status of formal zed law, but they may rso be moral ity, norms, cus­</p><p>tom or etiquette, or simply operating procedures or 'ru les of the game:</p><p>CHAPTER 4 C O N S T R U C T I V I S M A N D FO R E I G N P O L I C Y</p><p>Identity, interests, and 'logics of action'</p><p>The third core feature of constructivism is its focus on i dentity. Identity is the agent's under­</p><p>standing of self, its place in the social world , and its relationships with others. An understand­</p><p>ing of self is always dependent on an 'other' for its constitution and, although relatively stable,</p><p>is a condition that is always in a process of reconstitution and is always supported by a narra­</p><p>tive to ensure biographical conti nu ity that makes any changes seem natural. Constructivists</p><p>place a key importance on identity because it is bel ieved that identities strongly imply a par­</p><p>ticular set of i nterests or preferences in respect of choice of action (Hopf 1 998: 1 75). This view</p><p>of identity as constitutive of interests and action stands i n stark contrast to the realist and l ib­</p><p>eral assumption that actors in international politics have only one pre-existing identity-that</p><p>of a self-i nterested state engaged in producing and reproducing a predictably stable world.</p><p>By conceptualizi ng agents in i nternational politics as i nfluenced by their identity, construc­</p><p>tivists aJso acknowledge the importance of the historical, cultural, pol itical, and social context</p><p>of the agents i n question, as these are (some of) the factors that would have contributed to the</p><p>construction of identity in the first place. Constructivists maintain that a sole focus on mate­</p><p>rial factors provides an incomplete basis for analysis. For example, in a material ist i nterest­</p><p>based analysis, Denmark and Sweden would be assumed to be 'l ike units' as small states and</p><p>therefore would be assumed to display simi lar patterns of action. Yet, Sweden's self-identity</p><p>as a middle power rather than as a small state has had profound effects for Swed ish policy</p><p>choices, such as a long trad ition of a policy of armed neutrality and an expectation of 'being</p><p>heard ' in international negotiations-a policy that stands in contrast to the seemingly simi­</p><p>lar state Denmark, whose self-understanding as a small state has produced a foreign policy</p><p>based on protection through all iances and close mil itary cooperation with trusted partners.</p><p>Constructivists attach such importance to identity because to have a particular identity</p><p>impl ies that actors wil l be fol lowing the norms that are associated with the identity, which</p><p>suggests that some forms of action are more appropriate than others. As norms specify behav­</p><p>iour, it is clear that a normative structure wil l define certain forms of behaviour as appropriate</p><p>and others as not. Therefore, constructivism stands in contrast to real ism and l iberalism by</p><p>assum ing that people are not simply led by assumed i nterests based on rational cost-benefit</p><p>calculations, but that they will consider options for action reflexively and consider whether</p><p>the action is appropriate for thei r identity.</p><p>March and Olsen (1 989) include both logics of action i n their analysis of pol itical institu­</p><p>tions. They agree with realists and liberals who think that action is driven, in their words, by</p><p>a 'logic of consequences'. Here, the assumption is that agents calculate the consequences</p><p>of a particular course of action and wi ll choose the action that offers them the most uti l ity.</p><p>However, they contend that actors may also act from a 'logic of appropriateness', where the</p><p>assumption is that as agents are rule fol lowers, they wi l l try to fol low rules that associate par­</p><p>ticular identities to particular situations (Risse 2003: 1 63), and they will consider which action</p><p>is the most appropriate behaviour for them. The two logics are useful for understanding the</p><p>kind of reflections that precede foreign policy action, but they should not be seen as exclusive</p><p>to each other. Constructivists assume that agents will try to do the right thing in accordance</p><p>with thei r identity, but they acknowledge that much will depend on the context of the situa­</p><p>tion, or indeed that some actions may simply be the result of habit. The point is that it cannot</p><p>always be assumed that all agents only util ize the 'logic of consequence' (see Box 4.5).</p><p>87</p><p>88 T R I N E F L O C K H A RT</p><p>BOX 4 . 5 L:ogics of action</p><p>Since the elections in Burma and the subsequent release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in</p><p>201 1 , the prospects for pol itical change in Burma and in its relations with the external world improved</p><p>significantly. The new pol itical situation cal led for reconsiderations of foreign policy and dip lomatic</p><p>relations with Burma. In reformulating foreign pol icy vis-a-vis Burma both logics of action can be</p><p>Invoked.</p><p>Imagine that a l iberal state, a strong supporter of human rights and a supporter of the economic sanc­</p><p>tions imposed on Burma since 1 997, is now reconsidering its foreign pol icy options vis-a-vis a Burma</p><p>that shows strong, though not i rreversible, signs of political change. The l iberal state m ight have the</p><p>following considerations.</p><p>New investments in Burma have been prohibited since 1 997, with detrimental economic conse­</p><p>quences for Burma and for foreign investors. However, n the context o f financial austerity, and with the</p><p>prospects of pot ltical change in Burma, the</p><p>nega ive consequences of ecenom ic sanctions have become</p><p>less tolerable, wh i le the reasons for maintain ing economic sanctions are less convincing. Therefore,</p><p>our l iberal state might conclude that the costs of maintaining economic sanctions are greater than any</p><p>further pol itical benefits to be achieved through political sanctions. The log, would suggest l ifti ng , or at</p><p>least easing, the economic sanctions.</p><p>Burma has a huge potential as a tourist destination, yet , duri ng the years of pol itical isolation and</p><p>economic sanctions, tourism in Burma has been regarded as i nappropriate because travel there was seen</p><p>as an implicit support of the mil itary regime. However, with the signs of pol itical change, 'responsible'</p><p>tourism is viewed as a means of supporting local commun ities economically and of i ncreasing social and</p><p>cultural exchanges between Burma and the outside world. Therefore, tourism in Burma would no longer</p><p>constitute inappropriate action.</p><p>Whar other considerations from a 'logic of consequence' and from a 'logic of appropriateness' might</p><p>be par of a pmrP'>S of reformt.Jlating the foreign p�lky of a l iberal state vis -a-vis Burma? What wou ld be</p><p>the posit ron on human rights?</p><p>Agents, structure, and practice</p><p>The fourth key feature of constructivism is the claim that structu res and agents are mutual ly</p><p>const ituted . This is a v iew that i s based on the work known as structuration by Anthony G id ­</p><p>dens , wh ich ho lds that structu res i nfl uence agents, but that agents are also ab le to i nfl uence</p><p>structu re th rough thei r p ractice. As has been shown i n relation to a l l four core propositi ons</p><p>of constructivism , constructiv ists p lace a great deal of im portance on the ro le of routi n ized</p><p>practice. It is th rough p racti ce that social facts are external ized and hab itual ized , and thereby</p><p>ensure an i ndependent exi stence from the agents who fi rst constructed the social fact , and</p><p>it is through practice that i n stitut ions such as self-he lp or cooperation become embedded.</p><p>However, once i t is embedded as taken for granted day-to-day routines , pract ice wi l l not on l y</p><p>underp i n the existence of social facts and inst i tutions, but may also be constitutive of struc­</p><p>tu re and identity (Ad ler 2008: 1 96). Moreover, it i s through pract ice that a stable cogn it ive</p><p>environment is ensured , which is itself what re i nforces the i nd ividual's i denti ty and provides</p><p>agents with confidence that the i r cogn itive world wi l l be rep roduced. Th i s is of rel evance for</p><p>the p rospects of effect ing change from one cu lture of anarchy to another.</p><p>The logic of structuration assumes a mutually constitutive relationsh ip between agent</p><p>and structure. Yet, as argued by Ted Hopf, constructivism effect ively p laces a prem ium on</p><p>CHAPTER 4 C O N STRUCT I V I S M A N D FORE IGN P O L I CY</p><p>structure because, although structuration logically impl ies the possibil ity of change through</p><p>agents' practice, constructivists also assume that agents reproduce their own constraints</p><p>through daily practice (Hopf 1 998: 1 80). Therefore, from this perspective, constructivists con­</p><p>clude that, although change is possi ble, it is difficult to bri ng about. This view is reiterated</p><p>by Jeffrey Checkel, who contends that the causal arrows in constructivism mainly go one</p><p>way-from structure to agent-because constructivists, despite their arguments about mutu­</p><p>ally constituting agents and structure, have focused on structure-centred approaches in their</p><p>empirical work (Checkel 1 998: 342). Indeed, constructivism has difficulty in explain ing where</p><p>the powerful structures (norms) come from, how agents' identity is constituted (Epstein 201 1 :</p><p>331 ), and why and how they change over time (Checkel 1 998: 339).7 Moreover, the mutual</p><p>constitution, which clearly impl ies a causal flow from agents to structures, is precisely where</p><p>foreign policy to effect change is located. This suggests that, for constructivism to be really</p><p>useful as an analytical framework for foreign policy, more sustained attention to agency is</p><p>needed. This is precisely why there is a need for 'actor-specific' complements to constructiv­</p><p>ism (as suggested by Valerie Hudson i n Chapter 1 ) such as psychological and cognitive influ­</p><p>ences on decision makers.</p><p>Foreign policy is by definition an agent-level activity, performed by various policy makers</p><p>(agents) within both domestic and international environments and therefore responsive to</p><p>the structures of both. The fact that foreign policy makers are subject to at least two sets of</p><p>structural influences complicates the task of FPA significantly. Moreover, it is clear that the</p><p>actions in which foreign pol icy makers are engaged, and which are the very focus of analysis</p><p>in FPA. are often not routinized social practices for external izing particular normative struc­</p><p>tures, but, on the contrary, non-routine actions designed to effect, or deal with, change. Yet,</p><p>as we have seen, the power of social practices rests in their capacity to reproduce and thus</p><p>to reify the inter-subjective meani ngs that constitute social structures and actors al ike (Hopf</p><p>1 998: 1 78), and not in their power to effect change. I n fact, some cognitive constructivists</p><p>would point to the fact that actors wil l have a profound rel uctance to change what is a reas­</p><p>suringly stable situation (Giddens 1 99 1 ). It stands to reason that if humans aim to min imize</p><p>uncertainty and anxiety and if they prefer always to confirm their existing beliefs about the</p><p>social world, they also prefer stabil ity to change. This is a finding that echoes the findings from</p><p>FPA research on belief systems, which seemed to suggest h ighly unyielding beliefs among</p><p>foreign policy makers.</p><p>Constructivists place a great deal of importance on the role of routinized practice. It is</p><p>through practice that social facts are external ized and habitualized, and thereby ensure an</p><p>independent existence from the agents who first constructed the social fact. However, once</p><p>practice is embedded as taken-for-granted day-to-day routines, it wi l l not only underpin the</p><p>existence of social facts, but may also be constitutive of structure and identity (Adler 2008:</p><p>1 96). Furthermore, it is through practice that a stable cognitive environment is ensured, which</p><p>may also rei nforce the individual's identity and provide agents with confidence that their cog­</p><p>nitive world wil l be reproduced. This is of relevance for the prospects of effecting change from</p><p>one cu lture of anarchy to another-a point that was acknowledged by Wendt as he pointed to</p><p>the self-perpetuati ng qual ity and path dependency of i nstitutions such as self-help, rivalry, or</p><p>cooperation. However, constructivism faces a di lemma in its quest to explain how change is</p><p>brought about. On the one hand, it is through practice that the mutually constitutive relation­</p><p>ship between agency and structure is operationalized, and it is through practice that change</p><p>89</p><p>90 T R I N E FLOCKHART</p><p>i s made possible, but i t i s also because of the very same practices that change i s d ifficult to</p><p>ach ieve. The problem is described by Checkel (1 998: 346) as 'codetermination', which sees</p><p>constructivism's key concepts as s imu ltaneously sources of stabi l ity and sources of change</p><p>without having a clear answer to what motivates agents to switch from one to the other.</p><p>Clearly the di lemma has important impl ications for foreign pol icy and for the prospects of</p><p>changing a culture of anarchy.</p><p>Two questions arise out of the codetermination problem: how to understand foreign poli­</p><p>cy, and how to undertake intentional transformation. The first question is important because,</p><p>if foreign policy is a practice, then, logically, change through foreign policy wil l be an almost</p><p>im possible undertaking. On the other hand, foreign pol icy can also be understood as</p><p>'action',</p><p>which is agent behaviour that is l inked to intention and di rected at a specific goal (Taylor</p><p>1 964). Foreign pol icy clearly contains pre-intentional practice based on taken-for-granted</p><p>routines (Swidler 2001 ), but it also contains intentional action based on conscious deci­</p><p>sion making and reflexive processes designed to achieve a specific goal which may well be a</p><p>change from the status q uo. Therefore, in order to be fully able to utilize constructivism for</p><p>the analysis of foreign pol icy, it is necessary to distinguish between 'foreign policy as practice'</p><p>and 'foreign pol icy as action'.</p><p>The second question is important because If both structures and agent- level practice</p><p>imply a tendency for stabi l i ty rather than change, it is necessary to ask under what conditions</p><p>change through intentional foreign policy might take place. This is a complicated question,</p><p>which all l R theories grapple with, and which can only be briefly touched on here. However,</p><p>the impl ication of the above analysis is that transformative change is most l ikely to fo l low</p><p>a d isruptive event, which has made existing structures and existing shared mean ings seem</p><p>i narf P(JUate for the new situation. Constructivists speak of a !>i luation of cognitive incons ist­</p><p>ency fol lowing a so-called 'critical juncture', meaning that agents' cognitive environment no</p><p>longer makes sense to them and that existing rules and norms can no longer be used as a</p><p>cognitive map for identifying appropriate behaviour. Even agents' sense of self and other may</p><p>have become unclear. In such a situation new structures of relevance and identity can be</p><p>adopted, which in turn can open up a window of opportunity for intentional po l icy change</p><p>through the adoption of new rules fo l lowed by changes in practice, identity formations,</p><p>and the reconstitution of shared knowledge. In such cases the poss ibil ity exists for changing</p><p>embedded i nstitutions in one culture of anarchy to a different logic of anarchy.</p><p>Constructivism meets foreign policy</p><p>The chapter started out by pointing to realism's and l iberal ism's l imited expectations for NATO</p><p>in the post-Cold War security environment. The l im ited ro le envisaged for NATO is puzzling</p><p>because NATO has always been more than just a defence all iance, with its role defined by</p><p>NATO's fi rst Secretary General, Lord Ismay, as 'keeping the Russians out, the Americans in,</p><p>and the Germans down'. Formulated a little more diplomatical ly, and using constructivist</p><p>terminology, we might say that NATO's post-Cold War roles could be defined as: (1 ) keep­</p><p>ing member states safe from threats to their security; (2) maintaining a common identity,</p><p>shared knowledge, and shared understand ings among all its members; and (3) engaging in</p><p>transforming relationsh ips and practices between NATO members and former adversaries</p><p>C H A P TER 4 C O N ST R U CT I V I S M A N D F O R E I G N P O L I C Y</p><p>through the socialization of appropriate behaviour for NATO membership. In other words,</p><p>NATO's roles after the end of the Cold War remained pretty much the same, but with different</p><p>conceptions of self and other and with more states becoming acquainted with the rules and</p><p>norms of the All iance and learni ng appropriate behaviour.8</p><p>Keeping NATO members safe</p><p>NATO came out of the Cold War with a major identity crisis and a deep sense of cognitive</p><p>i nconsi stency as it was clear that its established practices and shared knowledge about the</p><p>world no longer provided the necessary cognitive map as a guide for appropriate behav­</p><p>iour. From a constructivist perspective, NATO was faced with an existential crisis (a critical</p><p>juncture), which, although experienced as unpleasant, could faci l itate transformative change</p><p>to be undertaken. The depth of the crisis must have concentrated mi nds, because with in a</p><p>relatively short time span NATO had redefined itself as a more political all iance and the threat</p><p>was reformulated from the 'Soviet menace' to political instabi l ity and uncertainty. Not only</p><p>was this an example of reconstitution of NATO's own identity and its understanding of 'the</p><p>other', but it also turned out to be a very precise prediction, vindicated by the Yugoslavian</p><p>tragedy that unfolded on the European continent throughout the 1 990s. As suggested by</p><p>Shea (201 0), amidst the tragedy of the situation 'the Balkans were good for NATO' because the</p><p>conflicts al lowed NATO to undertake foreign pol icy action, which reinforced its new identity</p><p>as a European security and foreign policy actor, and which allowed it to establish new security</p><p>practices based on the new structural environment such as the abil ity to 'go out of area'.</p><p>Although NATO's foreign pol icy actions since the Balkans may have been less successfu l ,</p><p>especially in its operation in Afghanistan, it fundamentally altered its identity from an old­</p><p>fashioned static defence al l iance to a modern expeditionary security organ ization and it</p><p>altered h:s policy maki ng from a practice-based to an action-based foreign pol icy vis-a-vis</p><p>a growing number of external security challenges. This has necessitated internal processes</p><p>to establish new shared knowledge and Interpretations of NATO's found ing document, the</p><p>North Atlantic Treaty, where NATO's role is now defined as protecting members' security</p><p>rather than members' territory. Therefore, if NATO members' security is challenged through</p><p>events in, for example, Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, or on its eastern or southern flanks</p><p>in Ukraine or I raq and Syria, the new shared understanding of the founding treaty and of</p><p>NATO's identity and role suggests a potential foreign and security policy role for the All iance</p><p>i n such places.</p><p>Maintaining shared understandings</p><p>NATO has always been concerned with maintain ing All iance cohesion-especially between</p><p>the European and North American components. Without such cohesion the nuclear guaran­</p><p>tee would not be credible and NATO's major commitment that 'a threat against one member</p><p>is a threatagainst al l'would s imply not make sense. Therefore, to be able to show unity, NATO</p><p>has traditionally engaged in a practice of i ntensive negotiation prior to all decisions, which</p><p>al l had to be agreed in unity. The extensive practical cooperation has reinforced a 'culture of</p><p>anarchy' among the member states based on friendsh ip, shared values, and shared under­</p><p>standings of what constitutes appropriate action.</p><p>91</p><p>92 TR I N E FLOCKHART</p><p>This i s a process that can best be conceptual ized as an internal process of sooal ization of</p><p>Western norms and shared values and appropriate behaviour for member states. The pro­</p><p>cess has been ongoing throughout NAT01s history, starting with the en lafgements to include</p><p>Greece and Turkey in 1 952, West Germany in 1 955, Spain in 1 982, and twelve further enlarge­</p><p>ments after the Cold War. All new members have entered the All iance with considerable 'bag­</p><p>gage', without a fully constituted democratic norm set, and wrth issues relating to bei ng able</p><p>or wil l ing to follow a 'logic of appropriateness' for a NATO member. These internal processes</p><p>of social ization have been highly successful as new members have acquired the new norm set</p><p>reasonably fast, and (generally speaking) have behaved appropriately within the context of</p><p>NATO membersh ip and engaged in extensive cooperation resulting in fundamen�ally altered</p><p>security and foreign policy practices-not just with in NATO, but individually as well. It seems</p><p>fair to say that these internal processes of social ization are perhaps NATO's most important</p><p>foreign pol icy achievements, albeit that they are often overlooked as examples of foreign</p><p>pol icy.</p><p>Reconstitution of new social relationships</p><p>Just as NATO has always been engaged in the construction of shared knowledge and mai n­</p><p>tain ing a unified Identity, early in its h istory it became involved in the task of establishing</p><p>new</p><p>relationships and new practices for interaction and appropriate behaviour. Therefore, NATO</p><p>was as much a forum for establishing and cementing peaceful relations and new socf al rela­</p><p>tionsh ips with new practices among the European member states, as it was a defence al l iance</p><p>designed 'to keep the Soviets out'.</p><p>From a constructivist perspective, the end of the Cold War was a critical juncture, which</p><p>presented NATO with new opportunities as a socializing agent for establishing new social</p><p>relationships and changed practices. Much l i ke the situation with Ego and Alter on the beach</p><p>(Box 4.2), NATO was in a situation where d ifferent 'futures' were possible depending on its</p><p>actions and the response of the Soviet Union and former Warsaw Pact members. The action</p><p>chosen by NATO i n June 1 990 was to 'stretch out the hand of friendship'9 to the countries in</p><p>Central and Eastern Europe. Th is chosen role was subsequently fol lowed up with practice and</p><p>action with the establ ishment in December 1 991 of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council</p><p>(NACC) in wh ich al l former adversaries participated, fol lowed in 1 994 with the Partnersh ip for</p><p>Peaee (PfP) programme, and cu lminating in 1 999 with membership for the Czech Republ ic,</p><p>Pola.nd, and Hungary, as well as the estab l ishment of the Membership Action Plan (MAP),</p><p>which was a consu l tation ptogramme for prospective members. The point here is that all</p><p>these in itiatives can be seen as exampJes of a NATO foreign policy designed to effect change</p><p>through the socialization of states that were not members of NATO, and which might never</p><p>become members of NATO {Gheciu 2005). The process has been one of mutual constitution</p><p>as NATO has presented a number of options and expectations, and the prospective mem­</p><p>bers have then defined their relationship with NATO through their actions and engagement.</p><p>Although a dozen countries have already joined NATO, the process is by no means flnished.</p><p>It is important to note, however, that relat ionsh ips are never 'fi n ished' and that the possibi lity</p><p>for 'backsl id ing' i nto conflictual relationsh ips always is a possibil ity. The dramatic change in</p><p>the relationship with Russia since the annexation of Crimea and support for Ukrai nian sepa­</p><p>ratists is evidence to that effect.</p><p>CHAPTER 4 CONSTR U CTIV I S M A N D F O R E I G N P O L I CY</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>From a constructivist perspective, it i s clear that since the end of the Cold War NATO has fol ­</p><p>lowed a constructivist foreign policy by continuing its efforts to establish a culture of anarchy</p><p>based on friendship and cooperation among its members and a growing number of partners,</p><p>while at the same time maintaining its role identity as a defence alliance. In focusing only on</p><p>this latter role, realism saw NATO's years as numbered, because it is precisely within this role</p><p>that NATO was most challenged by the end of the Cold War and where it has had to undertake</p><p>significant change r n its conceptions of self and other and work hardest on establ ishing new</p><p>shared knowledge and redefining appropriate behaviour. The statist nature of realism lacked</p><p>the conceptual tools for seeing such change as possible. The two traditionally dominant theo­</p><p>ries also lacked a conceptual toolbox enabling NATO's foreign policy to be understood as</p><p>being not only about material capabilities and interest-based cooperation, but also about the</p><p>continuous reconstitution of identities and shared knowledge, reinforced through security</p><p>practices that facil itate a culture of anarchy based on friendship and cooperation rather than</p><p>on rivalry or enmity.</p><p>Constructivism has come a long way since its arrival in the IR discipline in the late 1 980s, and</p><p>even foreign policy practitioners have since acknowledged the role of NATO, and similar inter­</p><p>national organizations, as agents for effecting change-not through force, but through norma­</p><p>tive power and the ability to change long-held identities and embedded practices. Therefore.</p><p>the answer to the question posed by Stephen Walt-about why students and practitioners of</p><p>foreign policy should care about abstract theories such as constructivism-is that they have</p><p>considerable explanatory power in relation to the durability of institutions. At the same time,</p><p>to ignore constructivism as a guide to foreign policy practice is to overlook policy alternatives</p><p>to the standard claim that there is no alternative to the rational pursuit of the national interest.</p><p>Key points</p><p>• Constructivism offers different understandings of some of the most central themes in foreign policy</p><p>making, and implies different policy options from the two mainstream theories.</p><p>• Constructivists ask how old practices of rivalry and war making can be changed through</p><p>institutionalization, which might overtime change identities, interests, and practices.</p><p>• Constructivism asks where interests come from and assumes that different identities wi ll have</p><p>different interests, which will lead to different foreign policies.</p><p>• One of the central features of constructivism holds that people act towards objects (including other</p><p>people) on the basis of the meanings that the object (or person) has for them.</p><p>• Constructivists see structure as material and ideational, where ideational structures are codified in</p><p>formal rules and norms that agents are social ized into following.</p><p>• Constructivism assumes a mutually constitutive relationship between agent and structure,</p><p>although the influence of structures on agents has been in the forefront of constructivist theorizing.</p><p>• Constructivists reject the assumption that agents always calculate the consequences of their</p><p>actions, but argue that they will also consider which action is the most appropriate for their</p><p>identity, even if such action may have costly consequences.</p><p>93</p><p>94 T RI N E FLOCKHART</p><p>Questions</p><p>1. Why should students and practitioners of foreign policy take note of constructivism?</p><p>2. Why is constructivism sometimes called an approach rather than a theory?</p><p>3. Why does self-help not necessarily follow logically from anarchy?</p><p>4. What are social facts?</p><p>5. Why is shared knowledge so i mportant to constructivists?</p><p>6. Why is identity such an important concept in constructivism?</p><p>7. Why are rules and norms so important to constructivists?</p><p>8. What is meant by the ph rase 'The social construction of reality'?</p><p>9. What is the role of 'practice' in constructivist theorizing and how should it be distinguished from</p><p>'action'?</p><p>1 0. What is the relationship between structu res (ideas, norms, material facts) and agents (people,</p><p>states, international organizations) in constructivist thinking?</p><p>Further reading</p><p>Adler, E. (2002), 'Constructivism and International Relations', in W. Calsnaes, T. Risse, and B.</p><p>Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (London, Sage Publications), 95-1 1 8.</p><p>In this essay Adler provides a very detailed and in-depth overview of and introduction to</p><p>constructivism. It is qu ite a difficult text, but well worth reading.</p><p>Adler, E. (2008), 'The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and</p><p>NATO's Post Cold War Transformation', European Journal of International Relations, 1 4: 1 95-230.</p><p>This article applies a constructivist and practice theory approach to NATO in the post Cold War period.</p><p>Checkel,J. (1 998), 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', World Politics, SO:</p><p>324-328.</p><p>Although a review article of three constructivist books, the article gives an excellent outl ine of</p><p>constructivism and draws attention to constructivism's lack of focus on agents.</p><p>Hopf, T. (1 998), 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', International</p><p>Security, 23: 171 -200.</p><p>An excellent article that clearly outlines the difference between conventional and post-modern</p><p>constructivisms.</p><p>Pouliot, V. (2010), International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia</p><p>environmental organization,</p><p>whereas in 1 999 there were more than 2000 l i nked to an environmental network based in</p><p>Jakarta (Bo rnstein 1 999).</p><p>The social media explosion</p><p>Since the fi rst edition of this book was publ ished, we have, of course, witnessed the major</p><p>changes represented by the Arab Spring of 201 1 , which have further blurred the distinctions</p><p>between domestic and i nternational politics, and further i l lustrate the interconnectedness</p><p>of ull poli lics on the planet. This sees its 1 1 1u!:>l exlr eme exam ple in the role of social media i n</p><p>previously seemingly closed societies. The visions of I ranian protestors, or Syrian activists, or­</p><p>gan izing their protests by Twitter and Facebook show only too clearly that governments can</p><p>no longer control i nformation flows. Such control was only ever partial, but the new social</p><p>media fundamentally breach the old wal ls of the state. I n this sense, the rise of social media</p><p>represents a third revolution.</p><p>* * * *</p><p>Integrating the skil l revolution, the organ izational explosion, and the pol itical consequences</p><p>of the social media revolution i nto the analysis of the dynamics that shape foreign policy is</p><p>not an easy task. Not to do so, however, would be to greatly distort the analysis. Clearly, what</p><p>countries do abroad is highly dependent on the skil ls and attitudes shared among their popu­</p><p>lations at home. Taken together, the three variables account for a great deal of the variance</p><p>from one cou ntry to another and from one point in time to another.</p><p>How to use th is book</p><p>This book is enriched with a range of features designed to help you support and</p><p>reinforce your learn ing. This guided tour shows you how to use your textbook fu l ly and</p><p>get the most out of your foreign pol icy study.</p><p>Reader's guide</p><p>This chapter analyses Australia's approach Lo global climate change.</p><p>its engagement with the- climate change reg,me This uJ:e: study l ngt 1</p><p>points The first is that Australia's changing approach to international n</p><p>climate change reHects a complex combination of domestic palhsal to</p><p>the ideology and foreign policy orientation of governments. and the "</p><p>national negotiation, Whi le at times Awtralla's position seems to rc tlc</p><p>pol i tical constraints, at other times the Australian government's po t, ·</p><p>be strongly inOuenced by the state of international cooperation The</p><p>sox 1 3 .5 Obama on the Syrian civil war</p><p>action. because we cannot re<olve ,</p><p>wtr il'l h'� ,m\l fu�11u1i'i1nn</p><p>And that is why. after careful del1beration. I delemiined lhat il is in the I</p><p>Energy security: the combination of demand a</p><p>supply pressures l i nking exporters and importers,</p><p>of whom u lt imately have the same goal , namely to</p><p>ensure access to, transport of, and a market for en</p><p>resources requ i red for the long-term and stable de</p><p>oprnent of national power.</p><p>En</p><p>Key points</p><p>• The international environment is fluid and difficult to manage fot</p><p>alen to the constant feedback it provides and adapt to lts tlr.in5[1� d</p><p>their initial objectives</p><p>• Foreign policy is nol self-executing; the implementation phase is au·</p><p>• The implementation phase may tum out to be mud, tan f than &I d</p><p>new rounds of poltey making..</p><p>• The means of foreign policy ,an distort and even transform its ncln</p><p>' rr,mmflry oeedr 1nbn hirbfvn elhl</p><p>Reader's gu ides</p><p>Each chapter opens with a reader's gu ide to set the</p><p>scene for upcom ing themes and i ssues to be d iscussed</p><p>and ind icate the scope of coverage with i n each chapter</p><p>top ic .</p><p>Boxes</p><p>Throughout the book, boxes prov ide you with</p><p>practiti oners' perspectives, add itional i nformation , and</p><p>practical i l lustrations of the theory descri bed i n the</p><p>111t1 in bouy of the text .</p><p>Glossary terms</p><p>Key terms appear i n bold throughout the text to alert</p><p>you to each new concept . These terms are defi ned in a</p><p>glossary at the end of the boo� , wl 1 ld1 wi l l prove very</p><p>helpfu l when you come to e. am revision</p><p>Key points</p><p>At the end of each chapter, the most important</p><p>concepts and arguments d iscussed are summarized in</p><p>a set of key po i nts.</p><p>Questions</p><p>1 . Should ordinary people be involved in the conduct of foreign policy7</p><p>2. Why is lhe American experience so important to und=tandingpubL</p><p>3 I< public diplomacy simply a euphemism for propaganda?</p><p>4. Is international broadcasting a viable Instrument of pubJI� diplomat'(.</p><p>S. What is ,,.,.. about 'new' public diplomilC)'?</p><p>6. Do you think lhal public diplomacy can bring about change in North</p><p>7. li<>N does publ.c 11111lomny a,nmbu1a IO power?</p><p>Further reading</p><p>Brown, M., Cote, O. , Lynn-Jones, S.E., and Miller, S . (eds), (2000), /Imm</p><p>revised edn (c.mbridp, MA: MIT Press).</p><p>An Informative survey of the competing American grand 111litrjJ1es lor I</p><p>Gray, C. (1999), 'Clausewitz Rules, OIQ Th& Future is the J>Bt-wlth G</p><p>Studies, 25: 161-1 82.</p><p>One of lhe UK's leading strategists arguing for the continuing relevance o</p><p>Posen, Barry R. (2014), Ratn1int: A N<w Foun4a.tiap fa( IJS Grand fual</p><p>H OW TO U S E T H I S B O O K</p><p>Questions</p><p>A set of carefu l ly devi sed questions he lp you to assess</p><p>you r u nderstand ing and critica l ly reflect on core</p><p>themes and issues.</p><p>Further read ing</p><p>To take you r learn i ng further, each section ends with a</p><p>read ing l i st that wi l l he lp you locate the key academic</p><p>l i teratu re i n the fie ld .</p><p>xxi</p><p>Gu ided tou r of the On l i ne Resou rce Centre</p><p>The Onl ine Resource Centre that accompanies th is book provides both students and</p><p>lecturers with ready-to-use teaching and learn ing materials, designed to maxim ize the</p><p>learning experience.</p><p>www.oxfordtextbooks.eo.uk/orc/smith_foreign3e/</p><p>OXFORD on l , ne</p><p>res ource Search - · l':1o •·� �,_·</p><p>t:� l \' 1-' R '> I I \ 1•n1-,, - c e n tres</p><p>�</p><p>Aoshcllrd flo>SN'/</p><p>T.......,. The Oev<iopmenl</p><p>ol F,n,gn Pr.ct """"""</p><p>Smith , Hadfie ld & Dunne: Foreign Pol icy 3e</p><p>A series of interactive flashcards containing key terms and concepts lo test your</p><p>understanding of terminology</p><p>- ��­</p><p>Containing details of the key foreign policy events</p><p>To sites l'.ith further information for research</p><p>Tl1t, 1, ,luwlng resources are 1)3ss,\Qrd protected and for adopting lectu , .,,s · use only</p><p>Not yel registered for a password? Complete the r.<:.. .!�. ' . . c':'.: to choose your</p><p>password Please note your registration can only be processed i f your sales representative is</p><p>aware of your adoption</p><p>Nrcacly reglstCI t!d for a</p><p>FOR STUDENTS</p><p>Flashcard glossary</p><p>A + A reset</p><p>�JXWJ!l!!l!ll!l!l</p><p>i!DOUI thhl alta</p><p>A ser ies of i nteractive flashcards contai n i ng key</p><p>terms and concepts has been prov ided to a l l ow</p><p>you to check you r unde rstand i ng of term i no logy,</p><p>and to a id exam revis ion</p><p>G U I D E D TO U R O F TH E O N L I N E R E S O U R C E C E N T R E</p><p>Conlempornry Foreign Policy Analy�is 1 9BOs­</p><p>pre:.enl The end of lhe. Cdd W� tJrcughl 'Nf!h fl e ,� lntef'e.siln</p><p>aaor--1pedk:lheory. Arl lnb.Jilve undER� d i his �</p><p>� ddw-.g Ir*> !he lnl:Mdual acl0fS �= Ille</p><p>� of lhe �. � advfb" ol va,tous aan, the</p><p>� � dcmedc �. aod 50 on Frcwn tw i..tc</p><p>1 0605 ID the pres.en 1. betgn P*Y reR�<hcn have focused an</p><p>_ ... ____ ,</p><p>Chapter 3</p><p>This tl b-..... d lhc Ur-.d NIIIIDns Dcrnocracy fund (VNDEF), a � funded.</p><p>u� � "� effo1 1o i,,� � lftll'ld the 'wottd</p><p>Teach ing foreign pol icy</p><p>cases</p><p>STEVEN l LAMV</p><p>-·---, , , .. ... •-r - -··•- .. ,, • • • , , 1 , ....... .... -</p><p>Chapter contents</p><p>-.t�• mll dldWDn-�n1casn</p><p>LMmtft1�DM! 1'Dni19n po1Cypnxaaw1tt1�</p><p>TmUnt mkkfi.�ttltiofl.s</p><p>canc1t.auan:wt,ycuewortK11Hft</p><p>ln1r odu<1ion: Stning 1 1 10 S'r.l{Je</p><p>10</p><p>"</p><p>The ,.,...., and A� are undci.bl� !he =ti inhospdl)ft.e ;md rar</p><p>ur,e>.pfo�d, area,; ol !he Fi•ntt PoiH apart lr.jr d!J�nt!l'<..,sn surf�</p><p>oppo,ad Ill c er p�m ..t Ille cr\J, bu! also wl\en lhe tw=> an, conlra>'..,d:</p><p>(YEI ,Mh�irlll) l:,Y•f of �. Ille nr,.1 nwdls ,cr.ett <n .;in <Kffll</p><p>Diplomacy</p><p>(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).</p><p>An excellent book on the 'logic of practicality' within constructivism. with the specific empirical focus</p><p>of NATO's evolving relationship with Russia and why it failed to establish a security community with</p><p>Russia following the end of the Cold War.</p><p>Wendt, A. (1 992), 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics',</p><p>International Organization, 46: 391 -421.</p><p>This is the article that most clearly sets out anarchy as practice, and which gives a full account of the</p><p>three cultures of anarchy.</p><p>Vi5it the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for more information:</p><p>www.oxfordtextbooks.eo.uk/orc/smith_foreign3e/</p><p>I ntroduction</p><p>Discourse analysis,</p><p>post-structural ism, and</p><p>foreign pol icy</p><p>LE N E H A N S E N</p><p>Chapter contents</p><p>Introduction 95</p><p>Post-structuralism 97</p><p>Studying foreign policy discourses 102</p><p>Conclusion-the scope, strengths, and weaknesses of discourse analysis 1 07</p><p>Reader's guide</p><p>This chapter provides an introduction to how discourse analysis can be used to</p><p>study foreign policy. In the study of in ternational relations, discourse analysis. is as­</p><p>sociated with post-structuralism, a theoretical approach that shares realism's con­</p><p>cern with states and power, but differs from realism's assumption that states are</p><p>driven by setf-mlerest. It also takes a wider view of power than realists normaJly do.</p><p>Post-structuralists hold that states, a.nd other political entities, strive to uphold par­</p><p>ticular visions of themselves and that they do so through policy discourses. Foreign</p><p>pol icy dlscotJrse plays a crucial role in the construction of these visions as it draws</p><p>a line between the state and what makes up its identity on the one hand, and that</p><p>which is different from, and outside the scope of, the state on the other. Taking post­</p><p>strtJcturaJist assumptions to the study of foreign policy Implies a focus on the way</p><p>that foreign policy decisions are legitimated or undermined within the wider public</p><p>sphere. Epistemologically and methodologically. to understand foreign policy as</p><p>di5course implies analysis of texts. and this chapter lays out the most important</p><p>insights and challenges that come with this form of analysis.</p><p>Discourse analysis has been brought into the discipl ine of international relations (IR) and its</p><p>subfield of foreign policy analysis (FPA) by scholars from the IR approach known as post­</p><p>structuralism. The fi rst post-structuralist works appeared in the 1 980s when scholars such as</p><p>Ashley (1 987a), Der Derian (1 987), Walker (1 987), and Shapiro (1 988) used the theories devel­</p><p>oped by post-structuralist philosophers, most prominently Michel Foucault and Jacques</p><p>Derrida, to draw attention to the power of language. The concept that post-structuralists used</p><p>96 L E N E H A N S E N</p><p>to emphasize this power was d iscourse-that is, l i nguistic systems through wh ich mean ing is</p><p>generated (Foucault 1 974: 38). Or, as Doty (1 996: 6) puts it, 'A discourse del ineates the terms</p><p>of intelligibi l ity whereby a particular "real ity" can be known and acted upon'.</p><p>Using the concept of discourse, post-structuralists show that the distinction between inter­</p><p>national relations and domestic politics is neither given nor based on objective features, but</p><p>that it is maintained through academic and policy discourses and practices. More di rectly,</p><p>foreign policies are dependent upon particular representations of the countries, places, and</p><p>people that such policies are assisting or deterring, as well as on representations of the national</p><p>or institutional self that undertakes these pol icies. Post-structuralists are keen to point out that</p><p>language is not a transparent medium that simply conveys the empi rical world, but rather,</p><p>as Shapi ro (1 988: 1 1 ) states it, is 'a kind of practice'. As a consequence, one should ask not</p><p>whether statements are true or not, but which values, norms, and identities are being created</p><p>in language. Language has 'political power', not because it is always clear what is being said, but</p><p>because it is 'a medium of both communication and mystification' (Walker 1 986: 495).</p><p>These assumptions about the power of language underpinned the i ntroduction of dis­</p><p>course analysis i nto IR. There was a need for an IR perspective, post-structuralists argued,</p><p>that theorizes foreign pol icy as a discursive practice and which uses those theories to pro­</p><p>duce critical analysis of the way i n which states and i nternational i nstitutions construct thei r</p><p>foreign pol icies and, through them, their own and others1 identities. Post-structuralism first</p><p>came to the field of I R i n the mid-l 980s, a time when the Cold War had reached a heightened</p><p>intensity following the Soviet Un ion's invas ion of Afghanistan. Many scholars, particularly in</p><p>security studies, were deeply concerned not just with the analytics but also with the pol itics</p><p>of nuclear deterrence, and post-structuralists shared that concern. They argued, for example,</p><p>that US President Ronald Reagan's famous description of the Soviet Union as an 'evil empire'</p><p>was a striking indication of the power that d iscursive representations asserted. But post­</p><p>structuralists were not confining themselves to the study of global security. Underdevelop­</p><p>ment, co lonialism, and North-South economic relations were also on the research agenda.</p><p>The arrival of post-structural ism and discourse analysis did not go unnoticed. In a landmark</p><p>article taking stock of security studies i n 1 991 , Walt warned against the field being 'seduced'</p><p>by post-structuralism, holding that it is 'a prolix and self- indulgent discourse that is d ivorced</p><p>from the real world' and that it is 'mostly criticism and not much theory' (Walt 1 991 : 223). At</p><p>the time of Walt's writing, what was at stake was not so m uch that post-structuralists abstained</p><p>from analysis of 'the real world' or bui lding 'theory', but rather that there were fundamental</p><p>disagreements as to what 'the real world' and 'theory' were. Such debates have continued and</p><p>may not be resolved as they concern deeper ontological and epistemological differences.</p><p>Since the first generation of post-structuralist work of the 1 980s, post-structuralism</p><p>has expanded theoretically and empirically through an engagement with issues that have</p><p>appeared on the political agenda, including the ethics and politics of humanitarian i nter­</p><p>ventions (Campbell 1 998), European integration and identity formation (Neumann 1 999;</p><p>Hansen and Woever 2002), the War on Terror (Walker 2006), climate change (Methmann</p><p>201 0), and the beheading of Western hostages by the Islamic State of I raq and Syria ( !S IS) (Fri is</p><p>201 5). Post-structuralism has been and is , in short, driven by current events, arguably more</p><p>so in the field of security than constructivism (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 21 9). This attention</p><p>to foreign pol icy decisions and processes in 'the real world' provides an empirical meeting</p><p>ground between discourse analysis and other forms of FPA.</p><p>C H A PTER 5 D I SC O U R S E A NALYS IS , POST-STRUCTURAL I SM , A N D F O R E I G N POL ICY</p><p>To say that there is a strong nexus between post-structuralism and discourse analysis in I R</p><p>i s to underscore that d iscourse analysis i s not s imply a technique or methodology, but part of</p><p>a larger substantial approach to foreign policy and international relations. One should note,</p><p>though , that not all post-structural ists work exclusively with discourse analysis-there are,</p><p>for exam ple, those who take a more psychoanalytical approach d rawing on Jacques Lacan</p><p>(Epstein 201 1 )-and that discourse analysis comes in forms other than the post-structural ist</p><p>one associated with Foucau lt, which is dominant in I R and therefore the focus of this chapter</p><p>(Titscher et al. 2000). Many constructivists (see Chapter 4) are also analysing l inguistic pro­</p><p>cesses, and the boundary</p><p>{th� Alcx ti</p><p>:a.s e An:tlc O..U,,) hc,sllng " rwmbtlr of islands. whlla Iha � 11</p><p>continanl furi}le:rnTo , d."l>i1"'"'" l'llf\lle from b1Ulfr,«mlV llhc abanco o</p><p>in A.-11amit:;i :md 11,., r-1111].lll1 '" tile Arclol to m�ls o! go,11111Pfl!'� (Ille,</p><p>S11ta.m - or ATS - go· rn• ,� orul .u�odl �nln; 10 Ill" An111</p><p>""1i1 of bodlH ;1110 ir�llllo, - wd, lb !ho �c Co1'nc� Of lhe UNClOS</p><p>� -� I</p><p>Why m 1 ss 1 les in four l1ypotheses</p><p>President Kennedy and his senior advlSor& considered</p><p>Ule following hypothesea tor the build-up in Cuba;</p><p>Hypothesis 1: Cuban defence</p><p>Timel ine</p><p>The On l i ne Resource Centre i ncludes a time/ i ne</p><p>so that you can fi nd out about the d i fferent</p><p>periods i n the evo l ut ion of foreign po l icy</p><p>analysis.</p><p>Web l inks</p><p>A selection of annotated web l i n ks makes it easy</p><p>to research those top ics that are of particular</p><p>i nterest to you .</p><p>FOR LECTU RERS</p><p>Teaching foreign policy cases</p><p>Steve Lamy in troduces the case method of</p><p>teach i ng, an active teach ing and learn ing</p><p>strategy wh ich encourages crit ical analys is ,</p><p>evaluation , and p rob lem-so lvi ng.</p><p>Case studies</p><p>Add itiona l case stud ies , inc lud ing The Artie Race</p><p>and Britain and Iraq, are p rovided to supp lement</p><p>the materia l in the book itself.</p><p>PowerPoint® sl ides</p><p>The fu l ly customizab le PowerPo i nt® sl i des are</p><p>ava i lab le to down load , offeri ng a usefu l resou rce</p><p>to i nstructors preparing lectu res and handouts.</p><p>xxiii</p><p>Acknowledgements</p><p>All three ed itors are teachers of foreign policy. Steve Smith first taught fon�ign pol icy analysis</p><p>in the mid-l 980s wh ile a young lecturer at the University of East Anglia. Tim Dunne, who was</p><p>in Steve's class in 1 987-1 988, taught comparative foreign policy at the University of Exeter,</p><p>and currently teaches and writes about decision making in relation to intervention at the</p><p>School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland. Amelia</p><p>Hadfield first taught foreign pol icy analysis at the Un iversity of Kent, Canterbury, and contin­</p><p>ues to research and teach FPA at the Vrije Un iversiteit Brussel.</p><p>The aim of the first edition was to gather into a single text the waterfront of themes that</p><p>ought to feature on a foreign policy course. The second and third editions continue that</p><p>same goal, with new and revised chapters written by fi rst-rate scholars and instructors whose</p><p>abil ity to communicate their ideas via the research-led teaching of foreign pol icy analysis is</p><p>clearly revealed in the pages that fol low. The book is nothing if not genuinely international;</p><p>the editorial team and the talented line-up of contributors drawn from the corners of the</p><p>globe.</p><p>During the long journey to publ ication, we could not have wished for better and more</p><p>supportive commissioning ed itors than Kirsty Reade and subsequently Sarah l ies at OUP.</p><p>Through various editions, we have been fortunate to draw on the support of several research</p><p>assistants: Dusan Rad ivojevic and NikaJurcova hel ped with the second edition, and M ichal</p><p>Gloznek and Constance Duncombe provided excellent support throughout the process of</p><p>putting together a new third edition.</p><p>We set out to assemble a book that could serve as an ideal resource for bringing courses on</p><p>foreign policy to l ife. If readers and instructors use it to debate and contest the great foreign</p><p>pol icy issues of our day, then the book will have made its mark. If readers and instructors do</p><p>this and draw on the major theories and concepts informing the study of foreign policy, then</p><p>we wi l l have achieved more than we cou ld have reasonably expected.</p><p>We are all three indebted to the work of J im Rosenau in different ways. He graciously wrote</p><p>the Foreword to the fi rst edition. When we first came up with the idea of asking J im , we</p><p>thought it was a long shot. Within minutes of send ing the invitation, we had an enthusiastic</p><p>reply that suggested all kinds of possible ways of opening Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors,</p><p>Cases. Such energy and creativity has marked out Jim's contribution to a field which, more</p><p>than any other writer and thinker, he has shaped and defined.</p><p>Aswewerefinishingthe editing of the second edition, word came through thatJ im Rosenau</p><p>had passed away (he d ied on 9 September 201 1 , aged 86, after suffering a stroke). J im was</p><p>one of the most significant scholars working in foreign policy, and was one of the subject's</p><p>founding fathers. His influence on foreign policy analysis was not only through his publ ished</p><p>works, but also through the personal encouragement he gave to generations of students and</p><p>scholars. J im only gave up teaching at George Washington University in 2009, and sti l l started</p><p>each class by asking students to read out headl rnes from the New York Times and then asking</p><p>them 'What is this an instance of?', and how it related to ideas they had covered in the course.</p><p>His daughter, Margaret, said in one obituary that 'he was in love with teaching and in love</p><p>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</p><p>with the academic world'. The editors of this book-particularly Steve Smith who had a close</p><p>academic and personal relationship with him going back to 1 980-experienced his personal</p><p>kindness and, like countless other academics in the field, we owe Jim a massive debt for his</p><p>always stimulating and stretching thinking about foreign policy analysis and international</p><p>relations. Jim was a true scholar, a wonderful intellect, and an exceptionally kind man.</p><p>We think it is fitting to dedicate this book to him.</p><p>Steve Smith, University of Exeter, UK</p><p>Amelia Hadfield, Canterbury Christ Church University, UK</p><p>Tim Dunne, University of Queensland, Australia</p><p>Notes on contributors</p><p>Karin Aggestam is Professor of Political Science at Lu nd Un iversity and honorary Assodate</p><p>Professor at the School of Political Science and lnternatlonal Studies, U niversrty of Queensfand.</p><p>Her interdiscipl inary research interests include conflict analysis, d iplomacy, peacebullding, and</p><p>hydropolitics in the Middle East. Her most recent book is Rethinking Peacebuildi,19: The Quest</p><p>for Just and Durable Peace in the Middle East and Western Balkans. with Ann ika Bjorkdahl (Rout­</p><p>ledge, 201 3).</p><p>Lisbeth Aggestam is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Univer­</p><p>sity of Gothenburg, Sweden. She has written extensively on European foreign and security policy</p><p>and was the guest editor of a special issue of International Affairs (2008) that examined the EU's</p><p>global role from ethical perspectives. Her forthcoming book wil l be published by Routledge in</p><p>201 6 and is entitled Power and Leadership in European Foreign Pol icy.</p><p>Graham Allison is Director of the Seifer Center for Science and International Affairs and Douglas</p><p>Dil lon Professor of Government at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He has</p><p>served as Special Advisor to the Secretary of Defense under President Reagan and as Assistant</p><p>Secretary of Defense for Policy and Plans u nder President Cli nton, where he coordinated De­</p><p>partment of Defense strategy and pol icy towards Russia, Ukraine, and the other states of the for­</p><p>mer Soviet Union. His first book, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1 971 ),</p><p>was released in an updated and revised second edition ln 1999 and ranks among the all-time</p><p>bestsellers in Political Science. with more than 450,000 copies ih print.</p><p>Lloyd Axworthy retired as President and Vin" ('h,mcellor of the Univer!;ity of Winnipeg, followir rg</p><p>two ful l terms (ten years), in June 2014. He has had a 27-year political career, and is internation­</p><p>ally known for his advancement of the human security concept. He remains involved in interna­</p><p>tional matters and lectures widely in Canada, the US, and further abroad.</p><p>Michael Barnett rs Un iversity Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at the George</p><p>Washi ngton Un lverslty, He has written widely</p><p>on issues of international relations theory and</p><p>h umanitarian ism. H is most recent book is The Star and the Stripes: A History of the Foreign Policies</p><p>of American Jews (Princeton Un iversity Press_, 201 6).</p><p>Elisabetta Brighi is Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and I R at the</p><p>Un iversity of Westminster, London. She has written extensively on I talian and European foreign</p><p>policy, most recently Foreign Policy. Domestic Politics and International Relations: The Case of</p><p>Italy (Routledge, 20 1 3). She also works at the intersection of international pol itical theory and</p><p>international security, Her edited book, Pol/tics and the Sacred, is forthcoming for Bloomsbury</p><p>Academic.</p><p>Caitlin Byrne is Assistant Professor of I nternational Relations and Diplomacy at Bond University</p><p>and a former research fel low of the Un iversity of Southern California's Center for Public Diplo­</p><p>macy. Her research interests are in the area of publ ic d iplomacy theory and practice and soft</p><p>power; with a special focus on the Australian experience. A former diplomat, she consults on oc­</p><p>casion to the Austral ian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on public d iplomacy strategy.</p><p>Walter Carlsnaes is Emeritus Sen ior Professor of Political Science in the Department of Govern­</p><p>ment , Uppsala Un iversity. He was founding editor of the European Journal of International Rela­</p><p>tions (1 995-2000), and has publ ished three monographs and eight co-edited volumes, including</p><p>N OTES ON CONTRIBUTORS</p><p>a five-volume reference set on Foreign Policy Analysis (SAGE Publications, 201 1 ) and the Hand­</p><p>book of International Relations (SAGE Publ ications, 2nd edn, 201 3). His main research interests</p><p>are in foreign policy analysis, intemational relations theory and the phi losophy of social science,</p><p>EU external relations, and Swedish and South African foreign and security pol icy.</p><p>M ichael W. Doyle ls a university professor and director of the Global Policy In itiative at Columbia</p><p>University. He has written on international relations theory, the history of empires, the practice</p><p>of peacekeeping, international ethics, and international law and served as assistant secretary­</p><p>general and special adviser to U N SG Kofi Annan. His latest book is The Question of Intervention:</p><p>John Stuart Mill and the Responsfb1/ity to Protect (Yale Un iversity Press, 201 5}.</p><p>Tim Dunne is Executive Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University</p><p>of Queensland where he is also Professor of International Relations in the School of Political Sci ­</p><p>ence and International Studies. He is widely published on i nternational relations theory, foreign</p><p>pol icy, and the responsibi l ity to protec t His is co-editor of the 201 6 publication The Oxford</p><p>Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect with AlexJ. Bellamy, published by Oxford University Press.</p><p>Trine Flockhart is Professor of International Relations at the University of Kent. Her research fo­</p><p>cuses on l iberal international order, transatlantic relations, European security (especially the EU</p><p>and NATO), and explain ing processes of change from a constructivist perspective. Her most</p><p>recent publications include Uberal World Orders with Tim Dunne {Oxford University Press, 201 3)</p><p>and the Transatlantic Academy Report, Uberal Order m a Post-Westem World (The German Mar­</p><p>shall Fund of the United States, 201 4).</p><p>Rosemary Foot is Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Politics and International Rela­</p><p>tions, University of Oxford, and an Emeritus Fellow of St Antony's Col lege, Oxford. Major re­</p><p>search areas include study of China's role in international relations and of US-China relations.</p><p>Her last book (co-authored) is entitled China, the United States, and Global Order (Cambridge</p><p>Un1versity Press, 201 1 ) and in 201 4 she co-edited The Oxford Handbook of the International Rela­</p><p>tions of Asia (Oxford University Press, 2014).</p><p>Amelia Hadfield is Reader in European Foreign Affai rs, and holds the Jean Monnet Chair in Eu­</p><p>ropean Forefgn Affairs within the Politics and I nternational Relations Programme at Canterbury</p><p>Christ Church Univers ity. She is also Director of the newly established Jean Monnet Centre for</p><p>European Studies (CEFEUS) and Director of the Energy and Governance Group. She researches,</p><p>teaches, and consu lts on European Union international relations, with a special Interest I n</p><p>EU-Russia energy security, European energy and environmental governance, and EU-Canada</p><p>relations.</p><p>Lene Hansen i s Professor of International Relations in the Departrnent of Political Science, Uni­</p><p>versity of Copenhagen. She is the author of Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bos­</p><p>nian War (Routledge. 2006} and co-author with Barry Buzan of The Evolution of International</p><p>Security Studies (Cam bridge Un iversity Press, 2009). She has pub I ished on cyber security, gender</p><p>and security, images and world politics, and securitization theory i n journals such as The Euro­</p><p>pean Journal of International Relations, International Studies Quarterly, and Review of Interna­</p><p>tional Studies.</p><p>Christopher Hill is Sir Patrick Sheehy Professor of I nternational Relations at the Department of</p><p>Politics and I nternational Studies (POLIS} of the Un iv.ersity of Cambridge, where he ls also a Fel­</p><p>low of Sidney Sussex College. He has publ ished widely in the areas of foreign pol icy analysis,</p><p>European foreign pol icy, and general international relations; his most recent publ ications being</p><p>(with Sarah Beadle) The Art of Attraction: Soft Power and the UK's Role in the World (British Acad­</p><p>emy, 201 4) and The National Interest In Question: Foreign Policy in Multicultural Societies (Oxford</p><p>University Press, 201 3). He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy i n 2007.</p><p>xxvii</p><p>xxviii NOTES ON CONTR I B UTORS</p><p>Valerie M. Hudson is Professor and George H.W. Bush Chair at The Bush School of Government</p><p>and Public Service at Texas A&M University. She was named a Distinguished Scholar of Foreign</p><p>Po l icy Analysis by the FPA Section of the International Studies Association in 201 5, and is au­</p><p>thor/ed itor/co-editor of Foreign Pofrcy Analysis: Cfassic and Contemporary Theory, Forei9n Policy</p><p>Analysis Beyond North America, CuUure and Foreign Policy, Pofitical Psychology and Foreign Policy,</p><p>as well as numerous other volum�!) ahd articles on FPA. She was one of the founding editorial</p><p>board members of the Journal Foreign Policy Analysis. and serves nn that board to this day.</p><p>Yuen Foong Khong is Lt Ka Shing Professor of Political Science at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Pub­</p><p>lic Policy, National University of Singapore. His research focuses on Un ited States' foreign pol icy,</p><p>the international relations of the Asia Pacific, and psychological approaches to international</p><p>politics. He is working on two long-term projects, one on the 'rules' of the in ternational politics</p><p>'game', and the other on the American tributary system.</p><p>Matt McDonald is Associate Professor in the School of Political Science and International Studies</p><p>at the University of Queensland, Australia. He has published extensively on the politics of cli­</p><p>mate change, Austral ian foreign pol icy, and climate diplomacy. He is the author of Security, the</p><p>Environment and Emancipation (Routledge, 201 2), co-author with Anthony Burke and Katrina</p><p>Lee-Koo of Ethics and Globa.l Security (Routledge, 201 4), and co-editor of the Australian Journal</p><p>of Politics and History.</p><p>Michael Mastanduno is the Nelson Rockefeller Professor of Government and Dean of the Fac­</p><p>ulty of Arts and Sciences at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, USA. He has writ­</p><p>ten widely on economic statecraft, international political economy, and international relations</p><p>theory.</p><p>Amrita Narlikar is President of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and Pro­</p><p>fessor at the University of Hamburg, Germany. Before joining the GIGA in 201 4, she served as the</p><p>Founding Di rector of the Centre for</p><p>Rising Powers and Reader in International Political Economy</p><p>al L11e Un iversity of Cambridge. Her expertise l ies in the area of multilateral negotiations, rising</p><p>powers, and international trade. She is the author/editor of several books, the most recent of</p><p>which are: co-authored with Aruna Narlikar Bargaining with a Rising India: Lessons from the Ma­</p><p>habharata (Oxford University Press, 2014) and co-edited with Martin Daunton and Robert Stern</p><p>The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization (Oxford U nlversity Press, 201 2).</p><p>Piers Robinson is Professor of Pol itics, Society and Political Journalism, Department of Journal­</p><p>ism Studies, School of Social Sciences, University of Sheffield. He researches commun ications,</p><p>world politics, propaganda, and organized persuasive communication. He has recently pub­</p><p>l ished articles on deception and the I raq War, including 'Report X Marks the Spot: The British</p><p>Government's De<::eptlve Dossier on Iraq and WMD', Political Science Quarterly, co-authored</p><p>with Professor Eric Herring (Winter 2014/1 5). He is also co-author of Pockets of Resistance:</p><p>British News Media Theory and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq with Peter Goddard, Katy Parry, Craig</p><p>Murray, and Phi l ip M. Taylor (Manchester University Press, 201 O) and author of The CNN</p><p>Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention (Routledge, 2002).</p><p>James N. Rosenau (25 November 1 924-9 September 201 1 ) Prior to his death, Professor</p><p>Rosenau held the distinguished rank of University Professor of I nternational Affairs at the George</p><p>Washington University. an honour reserved for the few scholar-teachers whose recognition in</p><p>the academic community transcends the usual discipl inary boundaries. Professor Rosenau had</p><p>held a Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship and was a former president of the International</p><p>Studies Association. He was also the author of some 140 articles and author or editor of more</p><p>than forty books, including Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity</p><p>(1 990), Governance Without Government: Order and Change In World Politics (1 992), Information</p><p>Technologies and G/obaf Politics= The Chang£ n9 Scope of Power and Governance (2002), Along the</p><p>NOTES O N CONTR I B UTO R S</p><p>Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (1 997), Distance Proximi­</p><p>ties: Dynamics Beyond Globalization {2003), and The Study of World Politics {two volumes, 2006).</p><p>Brian C. Schmidt is Associate Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa, Can­</p><p>ada. He is the author of The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International</p><p>Relations (Suny Press, 1 998), co-editor of Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of</p><p>International Relations with David Long (SU NY Press, 2005), and editor of International Relations</p><p>and the First Great Debate (Routledge, 201 2). He has publ ished articles on the history of the field</p><p>in International Studies Quarterly, Review of International Studies, Millennium:Journal of Interna­</p><p>tional Relations, and International Relations.</p><p>Steve Smith is Vice Chancellor and Professor of I nternational Relations at the University of Exeter.</p><p>He was previously Head of the Department of I nternational Politics at Aberystwyth University.</p><p>He is the author or editor of sixteen books, and was the editor of the Cambridge University Press</p><p>Series 'Studies in International Relations' from 1 985 to 2005. From 2003-2005 he was President</p><p>of the International Studies Association. He was kn ighted in the Queen's Birthday Honours List</p><p>in June 201 1 .</p><p>Gareth Stansfield is Professor of M iddle East Politics and Directorofthe lnstitute of Arab and Islamic</p><p>Studies at the University of Exeter. He is the author of Iraq: People, History, Politics (Polity Press,</p><p>2007), and was the guest editor of the November 201 0 special edition of International Affairs,</p><p>which focused on 'Post-American I raq'. H is current research focuses on counter- insurgency</p><p>and stabilization strategies in post-conflict states. He is an Associate Fellow of the Middle East and</p><p>North Africa Programme at Chatham House.</p><p>Janice Gross Stein is Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management and Fou nding Director at Munk</p><p>School of Global Affairs at the University ofToronto. Her work focuses on the application of psy­</p><p>chology to the analysis of decision making, with particular emphasis on international security.</p><p>She has written extensively on international security, with particular emphasis on the Middle</p><p>East. Her latest monograph is entitled The Islamic State in History: The Recurrent Drive for Purifi­</p><p>cation {forthcoming).</p><p>Arlene B. Tickner is Professor of International Relations in the Political Science Department at the</p><p>Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, Colombia. Her main areas of research include Latin American</p><p>and Colombian foreign policy, United States Western Hemispheric pol icy, regional security, and</p><p>the sociology of knowledge in the field of international relations. Her most recent publications</p><p>on Latin America include 'Associated Dependent Police Cooperation: Colombia and the Un ited</p><p>States' in Jana Hanke and Markus-Michael MUiier {eds), The Global Making of Policing: Postco­</p><p>lonial Perspectives (Routledge, 201 6) and 'Securitization and the Limits of Democratic Security'</p><p>in David Mares and Arie M. Kacowicz (eds), Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security</p><p>(Routledge, 201 5).</p><p>William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor at Dartmouth College, where he teaches in</p><p>the Department of Government. H is most recent books are America Abroad: The United States'</p><p>Global Role in the 2 1st Century (Oxford U niversity Press USA, 201 6), written with Stephen G.</p><p>Brooks, and Status in World Politics (Cambridge U niversity Press, 201 4), co-edited with Deborah</p><p>Larson and T.V. Paul. Recent publications on realism include 'G i lpinian Realism and International</p><p>Relations', International Relations (201 2), and 'No One Loves a Realist Explanation: The Cold</p><p>War's End Revisited', International Politics (201 1 ).</p><p>xxix</p><p>-</p><p>I ntroduction</p><p>STEVE S M ITH , A M EL IA HADF I E LD, A N D TI M D U N N E</p><p>Chapter contents</p><p>The contemporary relevance of foreign policy</p><p>Foreign policy theory: disciplinary groundings</p><p>Organization of the third edition</p><p>2</p><p>4</p><p>7</p><p>As each of our contributors will no doubt agree, one of the great pleasures of teach ing</p><p>foreign policy is that the range of theories and instruments used must always be grounded in</p><p>contemporary and appl icable empirical examples: theory is of little interest un less one can</p><p>util ize it in specific case studies. The third edition of this book, following on from the fi rst two</p><p>editions, bui lds on that assumption; our explicit aim as editors is for theoretical chapters that</p><p>i l luminate case studies, with case studies that are themselves theoretically informed. This,</p><p>we believe, makes the subject of foreign policy genuinely fascinating, and, as you will see</p><p>in the chapters that fol low, also raises some of the most problematic questions in the social</p><p>sciences. Courses on foreign policy have, in the experience of the editors, remained popular</p><p>with both undergraduate and postgraduate students and, since the first edition, conti nue</p><p>to claim an increasingly central place in pol itical science, international relations, and a wide</p><p>variety of area studies degree cou rses. Alongside the challenge of examining the international</p><p>structure and its components, students come to see that the study of foreign policy pushes</p><p>them to think clearly about why x did z, whether a given decision maker made the right</p><p>choice at a given time, and the costs/benefits of the available alternatives. Foreign policy as</p><p>a field of study challenges students and scholars al ike, both to explain the broad structure of</p><p>international relations and to understand the specific challenges facing key policy makers, and</p><p>then to judge whether-in light of the context-they</p><p>did the right thing (and for whom?). The</p><p>same challenges also apply to societies as a whole, seen most recently in the uproar and vola­</p><p>tility following the decision of the United Kingdom to bring its membership of the European</p><p>Union to an end, in its June 201 6 referendum. To assist students and scholars in analysing</p><p>both structural and case-specific challenges, the third edition has expanded each of its th ree</p><p>approaches to the analysis of foreign policy, with new chapters in Section 1 (theories), Section</p><p>2 (actors and tools) and Section 3 (case studies). Echoing the rationale of the first two editions,</p><p>the case studies represent a deliberate choice of the editorial team, designed to encourage</p><p>both students and instructors to get as close as they can to the demands of state practice, and</p><p>to ask themselves endlessly fascinating questions about both the reasons for action and the</p><p>wisdom of those choices with the benefit of hindsight.</p><p>To be clear at the outset, we do not believe that case studies can be 'simply' factual, since</p><p>this implies that the theoretical assumptions guid ing the analysis of factual material are merely</p><p>hidden from view. Consider a seemingly empirical question such as 'Why did Russia escalate</p><p>its involvement in Syria in late 201 5?' Was it because the two countries had close historical</p><p>ties, or was it a power play on the part of President Puti n, fuelled by the pursuit of strategic</p><p>2 STEV E S M I T H , A M E L I A HADFI ELD , T I M D U N N E</p><p>interests i n the M iddle East, o r does Russian intervention instead signal a decl ine in the</p><p>priority accorded by the UN Secu rity Council to norms of human protection from atrocity</p><p>crimes? Russia has certai n ly become an ardent critic of the 'responsibi l ity to protect' frame­</p><p>work that has come to dominate the agenda of the UN Secu rity Council during the early</p><p>period of the Arab Spring. Students of foreign pol icy should remember that in April 201 1 the</p><p>Security Council passed a resol ution to use 'all necessary measu res' to protect Libyan civilians</p><p>from the actual and potential harms perpetrated by Gaddafi's loyal mi l itary forces; Russia</p><p>argued that NATO's robust enforcement of a 'no fly zone' exceeded the mandate issued by</p><p>the Security Council . Instead of protecting civilians, Russia argued that the mi l itary action led</p><p>by Washington, London, and Paris had l ittle to do with civi l ian protection, but instead was</p><p>about advancing their economic and security interests. Russia felt betrayed by this episode.</p><p>Was Syria Russia's revenge?</p><p>Pos ing and answering s imi lar questions about key actors and the inputs and outputs</p><p>of foreign policy decisions means placing oneself first within a particular viewpoint of</p><p>what foreign pol icy as a form of state behaviour is , who makes it, how we judge its im ple­</p><p>mentation, and the local and structural effects of that implementation. Possib le answers</p><p>to such questions can be found first in the realm of theory and on ly subsequently in</p><p>the case stud ies that d raw out the actors, contexts, tools , and goals that constitute a</p><p>particular decision.</p><p>In this I ntroduction we need not provide an overview of the history of foreign pol icy</p><p>theory, s ince this is expertly dealt with in Valerie Hudson's opening chapter. However,</p><p>we do want to do th ree things: first, to comment on the contemporary relevance of the</p><p>study of foreign policy; second, to examine some of the definitional issues concern ing the</p><p>study of foreign policy; final ly, to d iscuss the updated organiz;:ition of the third ed ition so</p><p>that lecturers and students alike understand how we intend it to work as a text and an</p><p>onl ine resource.</p><p>The contemporary relevance of foreign policy</p><p>There are two ways in which foreign policy is of continuing relevance to the study of world</p><p>pol itics. The first relates to the agenda of world pol itics in the twenty-first century and the</p><p>renewal of interest in foreign policy per se. The second relates more closely to the academic</p><p>dialogue between the l iteratures on foreign pol icy and international relations ( I R).</p><p>For much of the preced ing thirty years, the dominant d iscussions in the d iscipl ine of I R</p><p>were about the structure of the international system: why bipolarity had declined and the</p><p>nature of its replacement-a unipolar system or a d rift towards multi polarity? But the events</p><p>of 1 1 September 2001 changed this, primarily because they focused attention both on the</p><p>central ity of decisions taken by non-state fundamentalist networks, as wel l as sovereign</p><p>states, and on the al l ies who stood 'shoulder to shoulder' to defeat al-Qaeda.</p><p>Readers m ight be tempted to argue that foreign policy has no role in explaining the specific</p><p>behaviour of a proto-cal iphate such as Islamic State, or a multinational corporation such</p><p>as Apple, or a regional entity such as the European Union. From our perspective, however,</p><p>foreign policy, although trad itionally l inked to the behaviour of states, can apply equally to</p><p>explaining the behaviour of a range of other actors. Thus, it is perfectly possible to speak of</p><p>i nternational organizations, transnational companies, regional governments, transnational</p><p>terrorist groups, and a variety ofother non-state-based actors as having and deploying foreign</p><p>I NT R O D U C T I O N</p><p>policies. A classical defin ition, for example, is provided by Walter Carlsnaes, for whom foreign</p><p>policy entails 'those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commit­</p><p>ments and/or d irectives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of</p><p>their sovereign commun ities, are d i rected towards objectives, conditions, and actors-both</p><p>governmental and non-governmental-which they want to affect and which lie beyond their</p><p>territorial legitimacy' (Carlsnaes et al. 2002: 335). A broader defin ition, with which many con­</p><p>tributors to the book concur, is given by Christopher H i l l , who defines foreign policy as 'the</p><p>sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in inter­</p><p>national relations' (H i l l 2003: 3).</p><p>For many IR scholars, the dual processes of globalization and interdependence that stead­</p><p>i ly gained pace in the 1 990s chal lenged the role of the state as an actor in ways both structural</p><p>and econom ic, thereby making a focus on state-centric foreign pol icy less central to expla­</p><p>nations of IR than during the post Second World War period. Yet, as other scholars argued,</p><p>globalization and interdependence did not lead to the demise of the state; instead they made</p><p>it both more constrained and more central. More constrained because there were an increas­</p><p>ing number of restrictions on the freedom of the state to act as it might wish; globalization</p><p>created a web of i nterdependence that undermined the state's abi l ity to control its own fate.</p><p>But the state was also more central than ever, s imply because populations continued to look</p><p>to the state to mitigate the effects of global ization, and yet now they do so over a sign ificantly</p><p>bigger range of policies than ever before (from inward i nvestment to cl imate change). Thus,</p><p>globalization and interdependence have not eroded the vitality of statehood, but they have</p><p>made more compl icated the practice of statecraft.</p><p>A good example here is the 'blowback' effect of foreign policy decisions on domestic con­</p><p>stituencies; for example, critics of mi l itary intervention in places such as Libya, and more</p><p>recently against Is lamic State, argue that attempts to el im inate th reats through mi l itary means</p><p>more often generate greater societal i nsecurity in the region and for the wider international</p><p>order, which in turn produces volati l ities that im pact on the whole region, as seen most</p><p>recently in the EU's migration crisis.</p><p>This l inks to our earl ier comment about the appl icabi l ity</p>