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<p>Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at</p><p>https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rbjh20</p><p>British Journal for the History of Philosophy</p><p>ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbjh20</p><p>On the significance of A. A. Robb’s philosophy of</p><p>time, especially in relation to Bertrand Russell’s</p><p>Richard T. W. Arthur</p><p>To cite this article: Richard T. W. Arthur (2023) On the significance of A. A. Robb’s philosophy</p><p>of time, especially in relation to Bertrand Russell’s, British Journal for the History of Philosophy,</p><p>31:2, 251-273, DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2022.2060181</p><p>To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2022.2060181</p><p>Published online: 05 May 2022.</p><p>Submit your article to this journal</p><p>Article views: 69</p><p>View related articles</p><p>View Crossmark data</p><p>https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rbjh20</p><p>https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbjh20</p><p>https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/09608788.2022.2060181</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2022.2060181</p><p>https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rbjh20&show=instructions</p><p>https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=rbjh20&show=instructions</p><p>https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/09608788.2022.2060181</p><p>https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/09608788.2022.2060181</p><p>http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/09608788.2022.2060181&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2022-05-05</p><p>http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/09608788.2022.2060181&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2022-05-05</p><p>ARTICLE</p><p>On the significance of A. A. Robb’s philosophy of</p><p>time, especially in relation to Bertrand Russell’s</p><p>Richard T. W. Arthur</p><p>Department of Philosophy, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada</p><p>ABSTRACT</p><p>The aim of this paper is to explain the significance of Alfred A. Robb’s</p><p>philosophy of time stemming from his interpretation of relativity theory; and</p><p>at the same time, to investigate the reasons for the failure of his</p><p>philosophical contemporaries to appreciate its significance, with special</p><p>attention to its reception on Russell’s part. The study of Russell’s reaction to</p><p>Robb exposes shortcomings in Russell’s own philosophy of time, which has</p><p>been extremely influential through the years. It also highlights the</p><p>philosophical differences between Minkowski and Robb, the shared idealistic</p><p>premises of Russell and McTaggart, and the confluences between the views</p><p>of Russell, Eddington and McTaggart. The paper closes with an account of</p><p>how Robb’s interpretation has been vindicated by its adoption in modern</p><p>physics.</p><p>ARTICLE HISTORY Received 23 October 2021; Revised 20 December 2021 and 20 February 2022;</p><p>Accepted 28 March 2022</p><p>KEYWORDS Robb; Russell; time; relativity; spacetime</p><p>1. Introduction</p><p>The aim of this paper is to explain the significance of Alfred A. Robb’s philos-</p><p>ophy of time; and at the same time, to investigate the reasons for the lack of</p><p>appreciation of its significance by his contemporaries. Robb was a Northern</p><p>Irish physicist whose novel views on time stemmed from his interpretation</p><p>of relativity theory. Although his contributions to the understanding of rela-</p><p>tivity have been increasingly appreciated by mathematicians and physicists</p><p>since the 1960s, their philosophical basis has not generally been appreciated</p><p>by philosophers of time. In this respect, Bertand Russell’s reception of Robb’s</p><p>views takes on particular significance, not only because he was exposed to</p><p>them at the time he was himself coming to terms with the implications of Ein-</p><p>stein’s relativity, but also because of his subsequent powerful influence in the</p><p>field. After noting the philosophical differences between Robb, Einstein and</p><p>Minkowski, I will argue that a study of Russell’s reactions to Robb’s views</p><p>© 2022 BSHP</p><p>CONTACT Richard T. W. Arthur rtwarthur@gmail.com McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada</p><p>BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY</p><p>2023, VOL. 31, NO. 2, 251–273</p><p>https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2022.2060181</p><p>http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/09608788.2022.2060181&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2023-01-14</p><p>mailto:rtwarthur@gmail.com</p><p>http://www.tandfonline.com</p><p>exposes certain shortcomings in Russell’s own views, in particular the ideal-</p><p>istic premises he shared with McTaggart and Eddington.</p><p>The main theses of Robb’s interpretation are these: (1) the idea that there</p><p>is a unique world-wide present instant, encompassing all those events that</p><p>are happening now, must be jettisoned; (2) the idea that what is really</p><p>before or after a given event may change depending on the observer’s</p><p>state of motion must likewise be rejected; (3) according to relativity theory</p><p>there are invariant notions of before and after determined by the order of</p><p>possible causal influence, and these give a strict partial ordering of the</p><p>coming-to-be of events, Robb’s ‘conical order’.</p><p>The implications of these theses are profound. The first thesis is fatal to</p><p>the classical view of becoming as occurring in a global present; this is the</p><p>Figure 1. Portrait of A. A. Robb, National Portrait Gallery x159941, Creative Commons</p><p>License.</p><p>252 R. T. W. ARTHUR</p><p>case whether becoming is conceived in terms of a ‘moving now’ or in</p><p>terms of a ‘growing block’. The second is a rejection of a still widespread</p><p>misinterpretation of relativity as entailing that what is before or after an</p><p>event is relative to the observer, so that temporal becoming is an obser-</p><p>ver-dependent notion. The third constitutes a robust grounding not only</p><p>for relativity theory, as has been amply verified by more recent scholarship,</p><p>but also for an observer-independent notion of becoming that is local, and</p><p>not global.</p><p>In order to understand these points, we need first to understand some of</p><p>the salient aspects of relativity theory, insofar as they relate to Robb’s views.</p><p>Here I am referring to the Special Theory, set out by Einstein in his 1905 paper</p><p>“Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper”, and as then amplified on and given a</p><p>profound four-dimensional rendering by Hermann Minkowski in 1908. Ein-</p><p>stein spent some ten years generalizing his theory so that it would encom-</p><p>pass gravitation, culminating in his General Theory of Relativity (GR),</p><p>published in 1915 and 1916. But although GR has its own profound impli-</p><p>cations for time, I will not primarily be concerned with those here. For</p><p>Robb’s first formulations of relativity theory in his Optical Geometry of 1911</p><p>and Theory of Time and Space of 1914 predate GR: they are interpretations</p><p>of the Special Theory, to which I now turn.</p><p>2. Einstein’s relativity theory</p><p>One of the main revolutionary implications of Einstein’s Special Relativity (SR)</p><p>is that simultaneity is not absolute, but relative to the inertial frame fromwhich</p><p>it is being reckoned. To give a graphic example (from Roger Penrose’s</p><p>Emperor’s New Mind, 201), if two people are walking past each other on</p><p>Earth, say at a relative velocity of about 8 km per hour, and we take their</p><p>motion to be approximately inertial, then the events on some planet in the</p><p>Andromeda Galaxy (some 109 km away) that each would infer to be happen-</p><p>ing now as they pass one another will be days apart. Thus there is no absolute</p><p>fact about what is happening now elsewhere in the universe. Rather, associ-</p><p>ated with each inertial observer there is a local time t, and these different local</p><p>times are related to each other by certain transformations, the famous Lorentz</p><p>transformations. In his 1905 paper, Einstein showed how to derive these trans-</p><p>formations between one local time and another based on two assumptions</p><p>only: (1) the fact that light is always propagated in empty space with the</p><p>same speed c whatever the speed of the propagator, and (2) the relativity</p><p>of inertial motions (constant velocity in a straight line), already assumed in</p><p>mechanics. With x and t the coordinates within one frame of reference that</p><p>is moving in the x-direction with velocity v with respect to a second one,</p><p>the transformed co-ordinates as viewed from the latter</p><p>[</p><p>/None</p><p>]</p><p>/PDFX1aCheck false</p><p>/PDFX3Check false</p><p>/PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false</p><p>/PDFXNoTrimBoxError true</p><p>/PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [</p><p>0.00000</p><p>0.00000</p><p>0.00000</p><p>0.00000</p><p>]</p><p>/PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true</p><p>/PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [</p><p>0.00000</p><p>0.00000</p><p>0.00000</p><p>0.00000</p><p>]</p><p>/PDFXOutputIntentProfile (None)</p><p>/PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier ()</p><p>/PDFXOutputCondition ()</p><p>/PDFXRegistryName ()</p><p>/PDFXTrapped /False</p><p>/Description ></p><p>>> setdistillerparams</p><p>> setpagedevice</p><p>are (with c = 1)</p><p>BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 253</p><p>given by:</p><p>x′ = g(x–vt), g = 1/</p><p>√</p><p>(1–v2)</p><p>t′ = g(t–xv), g = 1/</p><p>√</p><p>(1–v2)</p><p>These transformations were called Lorentz transformations by Henri Poin-</p><p>caré because he had derived them on the basis of Hendrick Lorentz’s aether</p><p>theory. Poincaré’s very elegant derivation of them (appearing in print after</p><p>Einstein’s) were corrections and generalizations of transformations already</p><p>derived by Lorentz himself and by Sir Joseph Larmor (Poincaré, “Sur le dyna-</p><p>mique”). For Lorentz, the local times were simply auxiliary times for frames in</p><p>motion with respect to the luminiferous aether; the real times would be those</p><p>in the rest frame of the aether.</p><p>The revolutionary twist that Einstein gave this state of affairs was to</p><p>propose that, since the aether and its associated absolute time are in principle</p><p>unobservable, they are redundant and should be dispensed with.1 Then the</p><p>various local times t, t’, etc. related by the Lorentz transformations are all that</p><p>there are, and they are all ontologically on a par: there is no one absolute</p><p>time. On this understanding, the length contraction and time dilation are</p><p>not dynamical effects of motion relative to the aether, since there is no</p><p>aether; rather they must be conceived as alterations of space and time them-</p><p>selves. Each observer in her own inertial frame has her own standard of</p><p>length, and her own local time by which she judges the simultaneity of</p><p>distant events and the durations of distant processes.</p><p>3. Salient features of Robb’s theory</p><p>Like many of his contemporaries, Robb took exception to the idea that time is</p><p>relative to the observer (and his state of motion). In his Optical Geometry of</p><p>Motion: A New View of the Theory of Relativity, published in 1911, he wrote:</p><p>The view which was put forward by Einstein was that events could be simul-</p><p>taneous for one observer but not simultaneous for another moving with</p><p>respect to the first.</p><p>This view, in my opinion, gives an air of unreality to the external world which</p><p>cannot be justified.</p><p>(Robb, Optical Geometry, 11)2</p><p>1As C. D. Broad comments lyrically, “The results do not, of course, prove that there is no such thing ; but</p><p>they do show that, if there be an ether, it is of such a singularly retiring disposition that we need never</p><p>intrude on its privacy” (Broad, “Euclid, Newton, and Einstein”, 436).</p><p>2Similarly, in the Preface to his The Absolute Relations of Time and Space, Robb wrote: “From the first I felt</p><p>that Einstein’s standpoint and method of treatment were unsatisfactory, though his mathematical</p><p>transformations might be sound enough, and I decided to proceed in my own way in search of a suit-</p><p>able basis for a theory. In particular, I felt strongly repelled by the idea that events could be simul-</p><p>taneous to one person and not to another; which was one of Einstein’s chief contentions” (p. v).</p><p>254 R. T. W. ARTHUR</p><p>To Robb, the idea that each individual observer would be in possession of her</p><p>own space and time smacked of solipsism. He thought that, far from being a</p><p>necessary consequence of the physical facts on which relativity is based, it</p><p>was instead an unwarranted intrusion of a subjectivist philosophy. For it is</p><p>one of the idiosyncratic features of his take on relativity that he sees its phys-</p><p>ical basis as having been established prior to Einstein’s contribution. Thus in</p><p>his of 1914 he asserted that “Although generally associated with the names of</p><p>Einstein and Minkowski, the really essential physical considerations under-</p><p>lying the theories are due to Larmor and Lorentz” (Robb, Theory of Time</p><p>and Space, 1). For, he reasoned, these two men had already established</p><p>that (in electromagnetic theory as well as mechanics) “even if such a thing</p><p>as ‘absolute rest’ did exist, we should not be able to distinguish it in this</p><p>way from motion with a uniform velocity” (Theory of Time and Space, 1).</p><p>The basic assumption that he thought relativity undermined was not the</p><p>objectivity of time order, but the very concept of the simultaneity of distant</p><p>events. Indeed, he argued, one could already question this from a classical</p><p>point of view, given the finite velocity of light: “the instant of one’s visual per-</p><p>ception of a distant event cannot be identical with the instant at which the</p><p>event occurs, and we perceive near and distant events simultaneously which</p><p>certainly do not occur simultaneously” (Robb, Optical Geometry, 8). Given this,</p><p>he thought that the concept of an instant of time should be revised. In place</p><p>of the Einsteinian conception of simultaneity he, therefore, proposed that</p><p>An instant is localised and does not range all over the universe… : so that the</p><p>present instant does not extend beyond here, and the only really simultaneous</p><p>events are events which occur at the same place.3</p><p>(Robb, Optical Geometry, 18; italics in original)</p><p>In other words, where Einstein had taken the instants of the various local</p><p>times to be hyperplanes of simultaneity – three-dimensional surfaces repre-</p><p>senting space at the same time – Robb starts out instead with situated</p><p>points in spacetime, which are what he called instants. Robb’s fundamental</p><p>idea is that one of these instants is before another if and only if a physical</p><p>process, either of light, or of something going at a velocity less than c, can</p><p>go from the first to the second. If a physical process cannot extend from</p><p>one such instant to another, then they have no time relation.</p><p>The result is a partial ordering of instants: each instant is before or after other</p><p>instants, namely those with which it is in possible causal contact – but only those.</p><p>The others lie outside its temporal horizon, in its ‘elsewhere’. Suppressing a</p><p>dimension of space, this gives what Robb calls a ‘conical order’. His diagram</p><p>(from Robb, A Theory of Time and Space, 5) explains the name (Figure 2).</p><p>3Similarly, Robb wrote in 1914: “According to the view here put forward, the only events which are really</p><p>simultaneous are events which occur at the same place.” (Robb, A Theory of Time and Space, 6; italics in</p><p>original).</p><p>BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 255</p><p>In Robb’s figure, A is a given instant, and any instant within the top cone is</p><p>in its future, and any instant within the its bottom cone, in its past. Instants on</p><p>the surface of the cone are reachable by light to or from A along ‘optical lines’,</p><p>Figure 2. B in the ‘elsewhere’ of A; from Robb (1914, 5).</p><p>256 R. T. W. ARTHUR</p><p>those in the interior of the cone by ‘inertial lines’. But A has no time relation to</p><p>the instant B situated in its ‘elsewhere’: B is an event sufficiently far from A</p><p>that no physical process occurring at speeds less than or equal to the</p><p>speed of light could connect them. Thus the event A could be the two ped-</p><p>estrians passing each other in Penrose’s example, and the event B occurring</p><p>some 109 km away on a planet in the Andromeda Galaxy that one of the ped-</p><p>estrians would infer to be happening now (Einstein-simultaneous with him),</p><p>days apart from a third event C happening there that the other pedestrian</p><p>would regard as now, which would also be in A’s ‘elsewhere’. Robb would</p><p>say that there is no fact of the matter whether B or C is simultaneous with</p><p>A; but that if a physical process could pass from B to C then B would be objec-</p><p>tively earlier than C (and vice versa).</p><p>Without going into more detail, what Robb did was erect a vast theoretical</p><p>edifice on these foundations. By successively adding axioms to those describ-</p><p>ing the conical order, he was able to construct the whole ‘conformal struc-</p><p>ture’ of spacetime out of these optical lines, and even the metrical</p><p>structure of the hypersurfaces of the Einsteinian theory.</p><p>4. Minkowski, Einstein, and Robb</p><p>At this point, we should say something about Minkowski’s contribution to SR,</p><p>which was very significant. For to anyone familiar with that, Robb’s diagram</p><p>of the cone structure would seem to have come straight out of Minkowski’s</p><p>1908 paper. What Robb called ‘before’ and ‘after’, Minkowski had called ‘the</p><p>absolute</p><p>relations of before and after’; Robb’s ‘optical’ intervals between</p><p>instants are for Minkowski ‘null’ intervals between pairs of spacetime</p><p>points, his ‘inertial lines’ are for Minkowski ‘time-like vectors [zeitartige</p><p>Vektoren]’, and what Robb calls ‘separation lines’ are for Minkowski ‘space-</p><p>like vectors [raumartige Vektoren]’, joining pairs of events in ‘space-like</p><p>separation’. In all these cases, modern physics has followed Minkowski’s</p><p>terminology – although the standard diagram is much more like Robb’s</p><p>than Minkowski’s from his Raum und Zeit, which I reproduce here (Figure 3).4</p><p>What Minkowski had done was to give a four-dimensional exposition of Ein-</p><p>stein’s theory. Whereas Einstein had concentrated on coordinate systems repre-</p><p>senting inertial reference frames, each frame having three dimensions of space</p><p>and one of time, with the spaces and times specific to the frame conceived as</p><p>belonging to an ‘observer’, Minkowski (following Poincaré) concentrated on</p><p>what was invariant over change of such frames. Pre-eminently this is the</p><p>space–time intervalσ, between twopoints. Thus ifwe represent the infinitesimal</p><p>4Minkowski’s terms Vorkegel and Nachkegel (‘before-cone’ and ‘after-cone’), have not taken on, and are</p><p>now called the past and future lightcone, respectively; likewise diesseits von O and jenseits von O (’this</p><p>side of O’ and ‘beyond O’) would now be termed ‘absolutely before’ and ‘absolutely after’; on the other</p><p>hand, curiously, the term ‘the elsewhere of O’ is Robb’s, not Minkowski’s.</p><p>BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 257</p><p>spatial distance in some inertial reference frame between neighbouring points</p><p>on the trajectory of a point-body by the differential ds = √</p><p>(dx2 + dy2 + dz2),</p><p>and their temporal distance apart by dt, then the fact that no process can go</p><p>faster than the speed of light c is represented by the condition:</p><p>ds2 = c2dt2–ds2 ≥ 0</p><p>But the quantity on the left-hand side of the inequality has the same value</p><p>whatever inertial reference frame is chosen, i.e. it is invariant under a change</p><p>from the coordinates x, y, z, and t, to x’, y’, z’, and t’. That is, the differential of</p><p>the spacetime interval, ds = √</p><p>(c2dt2–ds2), is invariant. This follows from the</p><p>fact that the Lorentz transformations may be regarded as a group of trans-</p><p>formations GC corresponding to a rotation in a four-dimensional space. This</p><p>space is not a Euclidean space, but rather a hyperbolic or Lobachevskian</p><p>one. Looking at the situation from the perspective of group theory and</p><p>rotations in an abstract space, it was clear that what are invariant in the</p><p>theory of relativity so conceived are not 3- or 1-dimensional quantities like</p><p>velocity, spatial interval, momentum, or time interval, energy, or electric</p><p>field, but 4-dimensional ones: spacetime (Minkowski coined the term), space-</p><p>time interval, energy–momentum, and the electro-magnetic field. This had</p><p>been argued by Poincaré before him, but the great French philosopher-phy-</p><p>sicist did not think the existence of the group GC to be of particular physical</p><p>significance, rather only a matter of which conventions are adopted. Min-</p><p>kowski, on the other hand, took it to show that whatever was absolutely</p><p>real in physics was four-dimensional. Moreover, Minkowski defined a new</p><p>physical quantity, the proper time τ, which is an invariant measure of the</p><p>time elapsing along a given trajectory of a slower-than-light process – or</p><p>‘worldline’, to use Minkowski’s term. This is defined by the formula</p><p>dt = (1/c)ds = (1/c)</p><p>√</p><p>(c2dt2–ds2). To find the time elapsing along a</p><p>section of a worldline, this formula is integrated along that path: t = dt.</p><p>(We will come to the significance of proper time in due course.)</p><p>Figure 3. Minkowski’s Diagram; from Raum und Zeit, 1908, p. 82.</p><p>258 R. T. W. ARTHUR</p><p>This much is mainly physics. But there are philosophical differences of</p><p>interpretation, even between Minkowski’s formulation and Einstein’s point</p><p>of view in his 1905 paper. In Minkowski’s eyes, Einstein had not appreciated</p><p>the implications of his theory for the philosophy of space, and his emphasis</p><p>on relativity missed the true significance of the theory:</p><p>I think the expression relativity postulate used for the requirement of invariance</p><p>under the group GC is very feeble. Since the meaning of the postulate is that</p><p>through the phenomena only the four-dimensional world in space and time</p><p>is given, but the projection in space and in time can still be made with a</p><p>certain freedom, I want to give this affirmation rather the name the postulate</p><p>of the absolute world, (or the world postulate, for short).</p><p>(Minkowski, Space and Time, 117; Petkov’s translation slightly modified)</p><p>Einstein eventually, if not completely, came around to this point of view; at</p><p>any rate, his adoption of a spacetime framework was crucial for the develop-</p><p>ment of his theory of General Relativity. But where Minkowski regarded space</p><p>and time as mere projections of the fundamental reality, his absolute world,</p><p>Einstein remained wedded to the idea that the local times of observers,</p><p>while mathematically projections of the four-dimensional reality, were episte-</p><p>mologically more fundamental, in that they were defined in terms of the</p><p>measures available to observers.5</p><p>There are even more profound differences of philosophical interpret-</p><p>ation between Minkowski and Robb. From the point of view of the absolute</p><p>world, both time and space are mere projections of four-dimensional</p><p>reality, subjectively grasped. Time is accordingly stripped of its former</p><p>pre-eminence, as Minkowski proudly announced: “space by itself and</p><p>time by itself will recede completely, to become mere shadows, and only</p><p>a type of union of the two will stand independently on its own” (Min-</p><p>kowski, Space and Time, 111).</p><p>For Robb, by contrast, time takes pride of place. Because his construction</p><p>of spatial hypersurfaces was erected on his axioms concerning before</p><p>and after,</p><p>the theory of space becomes absorbed in the theory of time, spacial relations</p><p>being regarded as the manifestation of the fact that the elements of time</p><p>form a system in conical order: a conception which may be analyzed in terms</p><p>of the relations of after and before.</p><p>(Robb, Theory of Time and Space, 9)</p><p>5. The early reception of Robb’s views</p><p>In one of his papers, Bertrand Russell gave a favourable reference to Robb’s</p><p>book, A Theory of Time and Space, which he had just recommended for</p><p>5For an analysis of this aspect of Einstein’s understanding, see Arthur (Reality of Time Flow, ch. 6).</p><p>BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 259</p><p>publication by Cambridge University Press.6 After a quick exchange of letters</p><p>pursuant on this, Robb paid him a visit. In a letter to Lady Ottoline of 22nd</p><p>January 1914, Russell wrote a description of Robb’s appearance and demea-</p><p>nour in this visit, which, to say the least, is hardly flattering:</p><p>Yesterday I had a visit from a man named Robb—a wild Irishman, who wrote a</p><p>book called A theory of time and space, not yet published, which I read for the</p><p>University Press and thought highly of it. It comes out of reflections on physics,</p><p>but all the physicists think him mad, and he has never had any success of any</p><p>sort or kind. I think my praise was the first he ever had. He is a man of about 35.7</p><p>He was terribly shy and nervous, and was not made any happier by Littlewood’s</p><p>treading on his hat. I put a reference to his book in my paper on Sense Data and</p><p>Physics, it was this that led me to write to him and so to his coming. I sketched</p><p>his theory to Littlewood, who agreed that it seemed admirable.8</p><p>He continued:</p><p>Physicists are the wrong milieu for him—they have no philosophy and no care</p><p>for logic—one might as well expect people in the French Revolution to have a</p><p>passion for balanced and judicious statement. People who fail to get appreci-</p><p>ation through being in the wrong surroundings are pathetic. Robb is full of</p><p>bad ideas as well as good ones—he might easily spend his life pursuing a</p><p>will-of-the-wisp. He is fat and absurd to look at.</p><p>(Letter from Russell to Lady</p><p>Ottoline dated 22nd January 1914)9</p><p>Putting aside the personal remarks (whichmight reflect more on his own char-</p><p>acter than Robb’s),10 Russell shows notable foresight about Robb’s career. For</p><p>despite the derogatory comment about Robb’s pursuing a “will-of-the-wisp” –</p><p>at odds with Russell’s positive assessment of his book – it is true that Robb did</p><p>indeed spend his life pursuingmuch the same idea, as his publications indicate.</p><p>The book Russell recommended for CUP, A Theory of Time and Space (1914),</p><p>which Robb had published privately under the same title and sent to Russell</p><p>in 1913, was an expansion of his The Optical Geometry of Motion: A New View</p><p>of the Theory of Relativity of 1911, again privately printed; in the slim volume</p><p>The Absolute Relations of Time and Space of 1921 Robb gave a succinct presen-</p><p>tation of the main ideas; and the same theory was reprised in his Geometry of</p><p>Time and Space appearing in 1936, a year before his death. And of the seven</p><p>articles Robb published in his career, three concerned his ‘conical order’.11</p><p>6This was in Russell’s “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics” (29), which we shall analyze below. In 1913</p><p>Russell had sent Robb a copy of this paper as well as a copy of his book report for CUP.</p><p>7In fact, Robb (1873–1936) was only a few months younger than Russell (1872–1970), having celebrated</p><p>his 41st birthday 4 days previously.</p><p>8Russell’s friend, John E. Littlewood (1885–1977), was a noted Cambridge mathematician who collabo-</p><p>rated for many years with G. H. Hardy on number theory.</p><p>9I am indebted to Bridget Whittle, the Digital Archives Librarian of the Archives and Research Collections,</p><p>McMaster University, for supplying me with copies of Russell’s and Robb’s letters.</p><p>10At any rate, Robb does not look particularly shy, fat, or absurd in the portrait I have included at the</p><p>head of the article from the National Portrait Gallery. See Figure 1.</p><p>11See Briginshaw, “Axiomatic geometry of Space-Time”, for a list of Robb’s publications.</p><p>260 R. T. W. ARTHUR</p><p>Russell also presents a clear picture of Robb as falling between two distinct</p><p>milieux: the physicists would not be interested in his axiomatic presentation</p><p>of relativity based on what might seem to them to be dubious philosophical</p><p>premises, while the axiom-based mathematics would be too difficult for most</p><p>philosophers to appreciate. Again, this seems prescient. In the Preface to his</p><p>Absolute Relations, Robb writes:</p><p>Even now, some six years from the date of publication of my book, compara-</p><p>tively few of Einstein’s followers, appear to realise the extreme importance of</p><p>these (before and after) relations, or to recognise how they alter the entire</p><p>aspect of the subject.</p><p>(p. vii)</p><p>Indeed, Robb’s interpretation of relativity is not mentioned by German</p><p>physicist-philosophers who were close to Einstein like Wolfgang Pauli or</p><p>Hans Reichenbach in their writings of 1920–21 (Briginshaw, “The Axiomatic</p><p>Geometry of Space–Time”, 320). Although Reichenbach, in his influential</p><p>Philosophy of Space and Time (Reichenbach, Philosophy of Space and</p><p>Time; German original 1928), draws some conclusions that parallel</p><p>Robb’s, his philosophy of space and time is based rather on Helmholtz’s</p><p>and Poincaré’s conventionalism about geometry. Moreover, he seems</p><p>completely unaware of the Northern Irishman’s axiomatization of relativity</p><p>theory, which is in many respects superior to his own.12 Of course, this lack</p><p>of immediate reception in Germany is partly explicable by the First World</p><p>War (1914–18).13</p><p>The situation with respect to the reception of relativity had in any case dra-</p><p>matically changed by the end of the war with the publication of Einstein’s</p><p>General Theory of Relativity – publicized for English speakers by Arthur</p><p>Eddington in his Report of 1918 – and its triumphant vindication by the obser-</p><p>vations of the total eclipse of the Sun on 29 May 1919, by Dyson, Eddington</p><p>and Davidson in their “A Determination of the Deflection of Light” of 1920.</p><p>The warping of spacetime predicted by Einstein, and corroborated by the</p><p>observations made in the expedition, seemed to confirm Minkowski’s intui-</p><p>tion that spacetime itself was the fundamental object; but even his ‘absolute</p><p>world’ was now no longer quite so absolute, but warped and stretched by its</p><p>12Indeed, Reichenbach’s axiomatization of relativity is criticized by Clark Glymour and Frederick Eber-</p><p>hardt in their SEP article “Hans Reichenbach” not only for its technical deficiencies, but also for Reich-</p><p>enbach’s failure to realize that “much of [his] construction, without the philosophical commentary, had</p><p>been anticipated by A. A. Robb, first in 1914 (A Theory of Time and Space), and then in 1921 (The Absol-</p><p>ute Relations of Time and Space) for both special and general relativity”.</p><p>13In the Preface to his (Absolute Relations, vi) Robb commented: “Unhappily at that period people were</p><p>concerning themselves rather with trying to sever one another’s connexions with Time and Space</p><p>altogether, than with any attempt to understand such things…” During the war, incidentally, and</p><p>contrary to Russell’s portrait of him as a shrinking violet, Robb had served with distinction as an ambu-</p><p>lance driver for the Red Cross in Flanders, earning a Croix de Guerre. (See Briginshaw, “Axiomatic geo-</p><p>metry of Space-Time”, 321).</p><p>BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 261</p><p>material contents, with space and time still differing according to different</p><p>frames of reference. But these frames of reference are equated with the per-</p><p>spectives of (and measures of) ‘the observer’. So we are presented with the</p><p>picture of objective spacetime, on the one hand, with its invariant interval,</p><p>and the varying spaces and times of the observer, on the other, dependent</p><p>on the observing subject. Eddington had an unrivalled knowledge of the</p><p>mathematical physics of relativity theory, as well as a gift for popular expo-</p><p>sition. He presents just such a picture in his masterful Space, Time, and Grav-</p><p>itation of 1920:</p><p>Physical space and time are found to be closely bound up with this motion of</p><p>the observer; and only an amorphous combination of the two is left inherent in</p><p>the external world. When space and time are relegated to their proper source—</p><p>the observer—the world of nature which remains appears strangely unfamiliar;</p><p>but it is in reality simplified, and the underlying unity of the principal phenom-</p><p>ena is now clearly revealed.</p><p>(Preface, Space, Time, and Gravitation, vii)</p><p>On this picture events are simply “there”, independently of any observer:</p><p>“Events do not happen; they are just there, and we come across them”</p><p>(Eddington, Space, Time, and Gravitation, 46). Our lack of acquaintance with</p><p>events in the future of here-now is no more mysterious than our unawareness</p><p>of a star that cannot be seen:</p><p>We can be aware of an eclipse in the year 1999, very much as we are aware of an</p><p>unseen companion to Algol. Our knowledge of things where we are not, and</p><p>of things when we are not, is essentially the same—an inference</p><p>(sometimes a mistaken inference) from brain impressions, including memory,</p><p>here and now.</p><p>(46)</p><p>Eddington firmly acknowledges Minkowski’s ‘absolute relations of before</p><p>and after’; but for him these are unchanging relations among events that</p><p>are always there, waiting to be apprehended. In fact, this agrees with Min-</p><p>kowski’s conception of absolute world, where “each worldpoint within the</p><p>future lightcone [of O] is necessarily always later than O”, (Raum und Zeit,</p><p>in Minkowski, Space and Time, 119).14 Temporal relations in themselves are</p><p>those given by the time coordinate t, and this is determined by the motion</p><p>of the observer. Eddington writes:</p><p>It is in the external world that the four dimensions are united—not in the</p><p>relations of the external world to the individual which constitute his</p><p>direct acquaintance with space and time. Just in that process of relation to</p><p>14As I argue at length in Reality of Time Flow (chapter 3), describing events as ‘always’ temporally related</p><p>not only presupposes the existence of events independently</p><p>of their coming to be in succession in</p><p>time, but is illicit: ‘always’ connotes ‘at every time’, but time is already included in the four-dimensional</p><p>description, so this would imply another time outside spacetime.</p><p>262 R. T. W. ARTHUR</p><p>an individual, the order falls apart into the distinct manifestations of space</p><p>and time.</p><p>(51)</p><p>For Robb, by contrast, the only events with which the observer has ‘direct</p><p>acquaintance’ are those lying along his or her worldline, not distant events</p><p>whose ordering will vary with the observer’s state of motion. Consequently,</p><p>he insists, there is an objective temporal ordering of events, his conical</p><p>order, independent of the observer’s state of motion. Time does not</p><p>consist in the relation of the external world to the individual.</p><p>6. Philosophical reception of Robb’s views</p><p>Eddington’s distinction between unchanging relations in the absolute world</p><p>and the changing temporal relations of individual subjective experience is of</p><p>course evocative of John Ellis McTaggart’s philosophy. Indeed to get a better</p><p>perspective on the philosophical context in which Robb’s views were being</p><p>received, we need to say more on the general philosophical milieu in late</p><p>nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain.15</p><p>This was by and large a profoundly idealistic one. Eddington’s promotion</p><p>of an unchanging spacetime reality, distinct from the relations of the external</p><p>world to the individual, seemed to be in keeping with the idealist standpoint</p><p>that was then prevalent. The dominant current of idealism in Britain was neo-</p><p>Hegelianism, particularly that of Francis H. Bradley (1846–1924).16 At the</p><p>beginning of his famous paper “The Unreality of Time”, published in Mind</p><p>in 1908, McTaggart adjudged Bradley’s philosophy, along with Hegel’s, as</p><p>the “two most important movements” then current in philosophy, noting</p><p>that both thinkers also denied the reality of time (456). In this paper, McTag-</p><p>gart argues that “If N is ever earlier than O and later than M, it will always be,</p><p>and has always been, earlier than O and later than M, since the relations of</p><p>earlier and later are permanent”. (459). This is certainly reminiscent of the</p><p>quotation from Eddington given above, where temporal relations are also</p><p>regarded as unchanging, thus surreptitiously appealing to a further time in</p><p>which temporal or spatiotemporal relations might or might not change.</p><p>(That they could not change was part of McTaggart’s argument for the unre-</p><p>ality of change, and thus time.) But whether or not Eddington was influenced</p><p>15On this topic, see the excellent article by José M. Sánchez-Ron, “The Early Reception of Einstein’s Rela-</p><p>tivity among British Philosophers”. He concludes that, whatever the differences among their philoso-</p><p>phical standpoints, “most British philosophers argued that Einstein’s new theories favored their</p><p>philosophical positions” (73–74), and also that “the bulk of the philosophers’ reaction was concen-</p><p>trated in a very narrow period, 1920–1922” (75), namely in the wake of the announcement of the</p><p>results of the 1919 British eclipse expedition.</p><p>16Indeed, G. F. Stout, James Ward, and McTaggart at Cambridge, Bradley and Harold Joachim at Oxford,</p><p>and Robert Latta in Edinburgh, could all be counted as neo-Hegelians of one stripe or another,</p><p>although some of their views were also permeated by strains of Kantianism—in part refracted</p><p>through the philosophy of Hermann Lotze (1828–81).</p><p>BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 263</p><p>by McTaggart, the latter seems to have paid no heed at all to the revolutions</p><p>in our understanding of time and spacetime that Eddington was helping to</p><p>bring about in physics.17</p><p>This cannot be said about Bertrand Russell, who, along with his collabor-</p><p>ator A. N. Whitehead (1861–1947), and also C. D. Broad (1887–1971), was</p><p>keenly interested in Einstein’s theories and their philosophical implications.</p><p>But here we must not forget that the young Russell, prior to his encounter</p><p>with Leibniz’s philosophy in 1898–99, was working in a framework dominated</p><p>by the currents of neo-Hegelianism described above, and his early writings</p><p>owed much to Bradley in particular. A brief discussion of Russell’s early</p><p>views will help us to understand not only his reaction to Robb’s philosophical</p><p>position in 1914, but also the wider philosophical climate in which Robb’s</p><p>views had to jockey for position.</p><p>As is well known, Russell’s encounter with Leibniz, in consort with the</p><p>influence of G. E. Moore and his exposure to Cantorian set theory,</p><p>prompted him to abandon monism and idealism in what he called “the</p><p>revolt into pluralism”, with pluralism equated with realism.18 But it</p><p>should not be thought that he had thereby banished all traces of idealism,</p><p>especially in connection with time and change. For in his Principles of</p><p>Mathematics of 1903 he proposed a static theory of change.19 According</p><p>to this theory,</p><p>Motion consists merely in the occupation of different places at different times,</p><p>subject to continuity as explained in Part V. There is no transition from place to</p><p>place, no consecutive moment or consecutive position, no such thing as</p><p>velocity except in the sense of a real number which is the limit of a certain</p><p>set of quotients.</p><p>(Russell, Principles of Mathematics, 473)</p><p>In this abstract construal of motion, “material particles are replaced by many-</p><p>one relations of all times to some places, or of all terms of a continuous one-</p><p>dimensional series t to some terms of a continuous three-dimensional series</p><p>s” (473). Change, he explains,</p><p>is due, ultimately, to the fact that many terms have relations to some parts of</p><p>time which they do not have to others. But every term is eternal, timeless,</p><p>and immutable. It is merely the fact that different terms are related to</p><p>17As Kris McDaniel writes in his SEP article on McTaggart, “his twentieth-century works are almost</p><p>entirely devoid of commentary on the revolutions occurring in fundamental physics.… Unlike some</p><p>of his near-contemporaries, such as A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, McTaggart proceeds as if</p><p>he were blithely unaware of the potential for interplay between physics and philosophy”.</p><p>18See Russell’s own account in his My Philosophical Development of 1959.</p><p>19Of Zeno’s Arrow Paradox, Russell declares that its conclusion that “the arrow in its flight is immovable”,</p><p>which “has usually been thought to be so monstrous a paradox as scarcely to deserve serious discus-</p><p>sion”, is to his mind “a very plain statement of a very elementary fact.… In part VII, I shall set forth a</p><p>theory of change which may be called static, since it allows the justice of Zeno’s remark” (Russell, Prin-</p><p>ciples of Mathematics, §332, 350).</p><p>264 R. T. W. ARTHUR</p><p>different times that makes the difference between what exists at one time and</p><p>what exists at another.</p><p>(1903, 471)</p><p>Evidently Russell is presupposing an ontology where ‘terms’ exist timelessly</p><p>as locations in a presupposed one-dimensional continuum of time, and in a</p><p>three-dimensional continuum of space. Motion is then simply a functional</p><p>relationship between the continuous series of terms in an absolute time</p><p>and the continuous series of terms in an absolute space, respectively.20 As</p><p>McTaggart later makes clear,21 it is this ‘static’ theory of Russell’s that he</p><p>has in mind in his famous 1908 paper, where he dubs Russell’s time series</p><p>the ‘B series’: McTaggart’s claim that relations of before and after in this</p><p>series are ‘permanent’ and unchanging relations among ‘positions’ in an</p><p>absolute time is simply a restatement of Russell’s static theory. McTaggart,</p><p>like Russell, conceives these positions or moments as pre-existing, and</p><p>regards events as the ‘contents’ of these positions.22 He points out that if</p><p>this is all there is to change in time, then in fact there is no change. For an</p><p>event “can never get out of any time series in which it once is” (459). This</p><p>is because the temporal relations it bears to other events in the series do</p><p>not change: “the relations of earlier and later are permanent”.23 Conse-</p><p>quently, McTaggart locates change</p><p>and becoming rather in the ‘A series’, in</p><p>which “each position is either Past, Present, or Future” (“Unreality of Time”,</p><p>458). “We perceive events in time as being present, and those are the only</p><p>events which we perceive directly.… Thus the events of time, as observed</p><p>by us, form an A series as well as a B series” (458). Without the A Series, he</p><p>argues, “there would be no change, and consequently the B series by itself</p><p>is not sufficient for time, since time involves change” (461).</p><p>It is not part of my brief here to analyse in any further detail McTaggart’s</p><p>arguments (about the contradictions contained in the A series, and so forth).</p><p>I want merely to point out that his conception of the B series shares with Rus-</p><p>sell’s static theory the untenable supposition that change is amere difference of</p><p>positions in an abstract, absolute time, these positions being conceived as exist-</p><p>ing independently of any concrete events that would be instances of change.</p><p>20Later in the book Russell commits himself firmly to the necessary existence of absolute motion, remark-</p><p>ing that “Absolute motion is essential to Dynamics, and involves absolute space. This fact, which is a</p><p>difficulty in current philosophies, is for us a powerful confirmation of the logic upon which our discus-</p><p>sion have been based” (Principles of Mathematics, 493).</p><p>21The critique of Russell’s theory of change as temporal difference is given by McTaggart in his posthu-</p><p>mously published Nature of Existence II (315–16). He also critiques Russell’s account of the now as a</p><p>temporal indexical. For an analysis and critique, see my Reality of Time Flow, §3.3.</p><p>22“The contents of a position in time are called events.… A position in time is called a moment” (McTag-</p><p>gart, “The Unreality of Time”, 458).</p><p>23(McTaggart, Nature of Existence II, 12). McTaggart argues that to suppose the moments of absolute time</p><p>as numerically different is to no avail: “Each such moment will have its own place in the B series, since</p><p>each would be earlier or later than each of the others. And as the B series depends on permanent</p><p>relations, no moment could ever cease to be…” (fn. 24)</p><p>BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 265</p><p>7. Russell’s philosophy of time in 1913 in relation to Robb’s</p><p>By 1913, though, Russell has radically changed his position. Now temporal</p><p>relations are conceived as holding among events as concrete particulars,</p><p>and times are constructed from these relations. That is, by 1913 he has aban-</p><p>doned the absolute theories of space and time he had upheld from 1899</p><p>through 1903. “If we adopt a relational theory of time”, he writes in the</p><p>chapter “On the Experience of Time” from his 1913 Manuscript of the</p><p>Theory of Knowledge,</p><p>we may define a time simply as the class of all entities which are commonly</p><p>said to be at that time, i.e. of all entities simultaneous with a given</p><p>entity, or with a given set of entities if we do not wish to define a mathematical</p><p>instant.</p><p>(1913 Manuscript, 70; Our Knowledge of the External World, 221)24</p><p>In his “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics” of 1914, Russell is explicit in</p><p>attributing the suggestion and stimulus for this relational approach to</p><p>defining instants (as well as irrational numbers in mathematics) to “my</p><p>friend and collaborator Dr. Whitehead, who is engaged in applying it to</p><p>the more mathematical portions of the region intermediate between</p><p>sense-data and the points, instants and particles of physics” (Our Knowledge</p><p>of the External World, 157).25</p><p>Strikingly, Russell begins “On the Experience of Time” by adopting McTag-</p><p>gart’s distinction between two different time series, what he calls ‘the phys-</p><p>ical time series’, ordered by earlier and later, and the ‘mental time series’,</p><p>ordered by past, present, and future, corresponding to McTaggart’s ‘B</p><p>series’ and ‘A series’, respectively:</p><p>It will be seen that past, present, and future arise from time-relations of subject</p><p>and object, while earlier and later arise from time-relations of object and object.</p><p>In a world in which there was no experience there would be no past, present, or</p><p>future, but there might well be earlier and later. Let us give the name ofmental</p><p>time to the time which arises through relations of subject and object, and the</p><p>name physical time to the time which arises through relations of object and</p><p>object.</p><p>(1913 Manuscript, 64)</p><p>24(This chapter is reproduced almost verbatim in Russell’s article of the same title in The Monist of 1915.)</p><p>At this point Russell adopts a provisional neutrality between absolute and relational theories of time.</p><p>The quoted passage continues: “With an absolute theory of time, ‘the present time’ will be the time</p><p>occupied by the specious present. We shall not at present attempt to decide between the absolute</p><p>and relative theories of time” (Russell 1913, 70; “On the Experience of Time”, 221). The reason for</p><p>this caution is that on the relational theory he is constructing the physical time series out of the</p><p>actual events of experience, about which he has to make some tentative assumptions in order for</p><p>his construction to succeed.</p><p>25See Russell Principles of Mathematics, 2nd ed., xi. Likewise in Our Knowledge of the External World</p><p>Russell attributes to Whitehead “the whole conception of physics as a construction rather than an infer-</p><p>ence” (viii).</p><p>266 R. T. W. ARTHUR</p><p>We should take note, however, of what Russell means by ‘mental’ and ‘phys-</p><p>ical’. As he explains in “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics”, “the word</p><p>‘physical’ in all preliminary discussions, is to be understood as meaning</p><p>‘what is dealt with by physics’ …whatever their nature may prove to be”; “I</p><p>shall call a particular ‘mental’ when it is aware of something, and I shall call</p><p>a fact ‘mental’ when it contains a mental particular as a constituent” (Our</p><p>Knowledge, 150). Russell’s approach is to take as primitives sense-data; but</p><p>these are conceived as being physical, in the sense just outlined.26 Matter,</p><p>space, and time, the key concepts of physics, are then to be constructed</p><p>out of sense-data. The ontological neutrality of the latter puts Russell on</p><p>the side of the Neo-realists, but the idea of constructing physical and</p><p>mental reality out of particulars that can be experienced is due to Whitehead.</p><p>In this connection, Russell also proposes a dichotomization of places or</p><p>spaces into the mental and physical, analogous to that of times. There are</p><p>the private mental spaces of observers, and the physical spaces in which</p><p>the things perceived are located:</p><p>Two “places” of different kinds are involved in every sense-datum, namely the</p><p>place at which it appears and the place from which it appears. These belong to</p><p>different spaces, although, as we shall see, it is possible, with certain limitations,</p><p>to establish a correlation between them. What we call the different appearances</p><p>of the same thing to different observers are each in a space private to the obser-</p><p>ver concerned.</p><p>(Our Knowledge, 153–54)</p><p>It is in Section X of “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics”, titled “Time”,</p><p>that Russell publicly acknowledges the debt to Robb that incurred the</p><p>latter’s gratitude. In a footnote to the title of the section he writes:</p><p>On this subject, compare A Theory of Time and Space, by Mr. A. A. Robb (Camb.</p><p>Univ. Press), which first suggested to me the views advocated here, though I</p><p>have, for the present purposes, omitted what is most interesting and novel of</p><p>his theory. Mr. Robb has given a sketch of his theory in a pamphlet with the</p><p>same title (Heffer and Sons, Cambridge 1913).</p><p>(Russell, “Relation of Sense-Data to Physics”, 167, fn 1)</p><p>This raises the question: precisely what was it that Russell saw himself</p><p>indebted to Robb for? If the idea of the construction of the matter,</p><p>space, and time out of experienceable particulars was due to Whitehead,</p><p>as was also the particular way of constructing points and instants out of</p><p>relations by extensive abstraction (which Russell describes in detail in</p><p>26For the notion that sense-data can exist independently of observers, Russell acknowledges a debt to</p><p>Percy</p><p>Nunn, who helped him see the falsity of the usual assumption that different shapes and colours</p><p>(of different people’s sense-data) “cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same place, and cannot there-</p><p>fore both be constituents of the physical world” (Russell, Our Knowledge, 153).</p><p>BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 267</p><p>Our Knowledge), and the construction out of sense-data was his own con-</p><p>tribution, then what exactly was his debt to Robb?</p><p>Russell begins Section X by declaring that it has become clear “through</p><p>the discussions connected with relativity” that “the one all-embracing time</p><p>is a construction, like the one all-embracing space” (“Relation of Sense-Data</p><p>to Physics”, 167). But it would be more accurate to say that what relativity</p><p>has made clear is that there is no “one all-embracing time”! The construction</p><p>of time alluded to, which is given in Our Knowledge (123–129) and in “On</p><p>the Experience of Time” (228–230), is the time of classical physics. In Our</p><p>Knowledge he describes it as “the correlation of the times of different</p><p>private worlds so as to produce the one all-embracing time of traditional</p><p>physics”, and asserts that such a construction is “only approximately poss-</p><p>ible, for the reasons which led to the theory of relativity” (130). This</p><p>suggests that what he found in Robb’s theory was a way of correlating</p><p>the times of different private worlds that would still be approximately</p><p>valid for slower-than-light experiences. This seems confirmed by the con-</p><p>tents of section X, where Russell talks of the time relations of before and</p><p>after “between two perspectives which both belong to one person’s experi-</p><p>ence”. He defines a “biography” as “everything that is (directly) earlier or</p><p>later than, or simultaneous with, a given ‘sensibile’”, which “will give a</p><p>series of perspectives, which might all form parts of one person’s experi-</p><p>ence” (“Relation of Sense-Data to Physics”, 167). But this means that he</p><p>has clearly not understood Robb’s main point about the implications of</p><p>relativity, namely, that the events that are simultaneous with a given space-</p><p>time point where someone might be located cannot strictly speaking be</p><p>part of that person’s experience. Although the points simultaneous with</p><p>a given point, referred to a given frame of reference, constitute a three-</p><p>dimensional space (a perspective space, in Russell’s terms, constructed</p><p>from a class of simultaneous sensibilia), and Robb has given a means of</p><p>constructing these spaces, it is a mistake to identify such a space as a</p><p>‘private world’ in the sense that all the simultaneous events in it could</p><p>be part of any person’s experience.</p><p>Russell does not say much about relativity in his writings in 1913–18, and</p><p>what he does say reveals some troubling confusions.27 But he is clearly inter-</p><p>ested in the theory and its implications for philosophy, and indeed he has his</p><p>friend Littlewood keep him updated on the outcome of Eddington’s</p><p>27In Our Knowledge, for example, Russell writes “Two events which are simultaneous in my experience</p><p>may be spatially separate in psychical space, e.g. when I see two stars at once. But in physical space</p><p>these two events are not separated, and indeed they occur at the same place in spacetime” (132–33).</p><p>What are simultaneous in his experience (and not spatially separated) are his sightings of the two</p><p>stars—but that is the same for his sightings of anything, classically or relativistically. The stars emitting</p><p>the light will be spatially separated in any reference frame, even though the spacetime interval—not</p><p>the spatial interval—between emission and reception (in empty space) will be null.</p><p>268 R. T. W. ARTHUR</p><p>expedition to test Einstein’s General Theory.28 In 1925 he publishes his ABC of</p><p>Relativity, which is justly regarded as one of the very best popular accounts of</p><p>the relativity theories, both special and general. In that work he is clear that</p><p>according to relativity theory there is not “one all-embracing time”,29 and he</p><p>gives a correct account of the difference between a spacelike and a timelike</p><p>interval between two events in spacetime.30 But although he reports Robb’s</p><p>view that events in the ‘elsewhere’ of a point have no relation of before or</p><p>after to it (ABC of Relativity, 47ff.), and notes that an observer’s experiences</p><p>will be governed by the proper time along the worldline that she is</p><p>tracing, giving “a definite time-order for the events in its neighbourhood”</p><p>(39), Russell still does not appreciate Robb’s point that this is sufficient to</p><p>determine an objective time ordering of events connectible by such worl-</p><p>dlines. Instead he insists on the observer-dependence of time and space31</p><p>– even while acknowledging that it is a mistake to think that relativity to</p><p>an observer supports a Kantian view that they are thereby ‘subjective’ or</p><p>mere ‘forms of intuition’.32 On his conception, the spacetime interval is objec-</p><p>tive, while not only “distances and periods of time are confused represen-</p><p>tations” of it, but so is the lapse of time itself.33</p><p>I should also say something about the reception of Robb’s views by Rus-</p><p>sell’s close colleagues. C. D. Broad was extremely active in assessing the impli-</p><p>cations of relativity for philosophers, publishing brief reviews in the main</p><p>philosophical journal Mind of virtually all the books on relativity theory,</p><p>including Robb’s Theory of Time and Space and Absolute Relations of Time</p><p>and Space. But he did not regard the mathematical representation of Min-</p><p>kowski spacetime as “anything more than an attractive mathematical</p><p>28See Sánchez-Ron (“Early Reception”, 98–99), who notes that Littlewood’s cabling him of the positive</p><p>result of Eddington’s expedition was received with much excitement by Russell, who published his</p><p>first essay on relativity theory a mere eight days after the public announcement.</p><p>29“The universal cosmic time which used to be taken for granted is thus no longer admissible. For each</p><p>body, there is a definite time-order for the events in its neighbourhood; this may be called the ’proper’</p><p>time for that body” (Russell, ABC of Relativity, 39); and on p. 151 he writes of “The collapse of the notion</p><p>of one all-embracing time, in which all events throughout the universe can be dated”.</p><p>30“When the interval is ’time-like’, a body can be present at both events; in that case, the ’interval’</p><p>between the two events is what an observer on the body will judge to be the time between them,</p><p>that is to say, it is the ’proper’ time between the two events” (Russell, ABC of Relativity, 42).</p><p>31“The time-order of events is in part dependent upon the observer; it is not always and altogether an</p><p>intrinsic relation between the events themselves” (Russell, ABC of Relativity, 35).</p><p>32“Some people think that it supports Kant’s view that space and time are ’subjective’ and are ’forms of</p><p>intuition’. I think such people have been misled by the way in which writers on relativity speak of ’the</p><p>observer’. It is natural to suppose that the observer is a human being, or at least a mind; but it is just as</p><p>likely to be a photographic plate or a clock” (Russell, ABC of Relativity, 148).</p><p>33Thus: “we are tempted to say that it [sc. the spacetime interval] is the reality of which distances and</p><p>periods of time are confused representations” (ABC of Relativity, 63)—i.e. representations that will vary</p><p>from one observer to another; “Between two events which are not too remote from each other there</p><p>is, in the general theory as in the special theory, a measurable relation called ’interval’, which appears</p><p>to be the physical reality of which lapse of time and distance in space are twomore or less confused rep-</p><p>resentations” (160). On the contrary, the lapse of time in relativity ismeasured by the proper time: it will in</p><p>general be different along different timelike curve joining two events, but unlike Einstein’s “local time” it</p><p>will be invariant, not observer-dependent, and therefore not a “confused representation” of time order.</p><p>BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 269</p><p>device”, and criticized</p><p>Minkowski and Robb for reading too much metaphy-</p><p>sics into it.34</p><p>As for Whitehead, he differed profoundly from Russell in making the reality</p><p>of temporal becoming a central plank in what would become his process phil-</p><p>osophy. Nevertheless, he took all elements of reality to be experiential.35 His</p><p>conception of how objectivity is related to subjectivity was substantially</p><p>moulded by his understanding of relativity theory, where he followed Ein-</p><p>stein in holding that observers would construct different ‘meanings’ for</p><p>space and time depending on their state of motion. But he opposed Einstein’s</p><p>(1905) operational definition of simultaneity, where “the very meaning of</p><p>simultaneity” is made to depend on light signals, insisting instead that “the</p><p>meanings of our terms” are “physical facts expressible in terms of immediate</p><p>perceptions” (Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 56). Among these</p><p>immediate givens is the relation of world-wide (but non-instantaneous)</p><p>simultaneity, which Whitehead took to be a basic and non-negotiable fact</p><p>of experience.36 In this he would have been in flat disagreement with Robb</p><p>for whom, as we have seen, strict simultaneity of distant events is no part</p><p>of anyone’s immediate experience.</p><p>In sum, none of Robb’s immediate colleagues in Cambridge who are</p><p>sufficiently versed in relativity to understand his theory – despite acknowled-</p><p>ging it as interesting – sees it as having any profound philosophical signifi-</p><p>cance. That it provides for events coming to be out of events in their</p><p>(local) causal past in an objective and observer-independent temporal</p><p>order seems to have escaped them.</p><p>8. Conclusion</p><p>The tide began to turn only after Robb’s death in 1936, as his views</p><p>gained recognition among physicists, mathematicians, and finally philoso-</p><p>phers. There is no space here to go into details, but the most significant</p><p>factors leading to its rehabilitation were the recognition by mathemati-</p><p>cians such as E. C. Zeeman (in “Causality Implies the Lorentz Group” of</p><p>34“There is no need, so far as I can see, to suppose that this representation is anything more than an</p><p>attractive mathematical device; it no doubt invites us to develop metaphysical theories about</p><p>space-time, and this is worth doing when it is undertaken by competent people like Mr Robb, Dr</p><p>Whitehead, and Prof. Alexander. But it certainly does not necessitate anything of the kind, and philo-</p><p>sophers in general will be unwise to rush in where physicists fear to tread” (Broad, “Euclid, Newton, and</p><p>Einstein”, 455).</p><p>35“We confine ourselves to entities disclosed in sense-awareness”, Whitehead declares at the beginning</p><p>of his The Concept of Nature (8), and what he calls “actual occasions” in his Process and Reality of 1930</p><p>are constituted in experience: physics can only treat them as forming a succession in time after they</p><p>have been so constituted.</p><p>36See Hurley (“Time in the Earlier and Later Whitehead”) for an analysis of Whitehead’s views, and Arthur</p><p>(Reality of Time Flow) for further discussion and defence of the points made here. See especially my</p><p>critique of the Whitehead-Russell view that the concepts of physics should be constructed from experi-</p><p>ence rather than inferred.</p><p>270 R. T. W. ARTHUR</p><p>1964) and A. D. Alexandrov (in “A Contribution to Chronogeometry” of</p><p>1967) that the topological, affine, and metric structure of Minkowski</p><p>spacetime is uniquely determined by a system of light cones, based on</p><p>Robb’s chronogeometry.</p><p>In a comprehensive article from 1977, “The Causal Theory of Space–</p><p>time”, John Winnie presents three main reasons for the lack of appreci-</p><p>ation of Robb’s work among philosophers of physics. The first was, of</p><p>course, the off-putting nature of the vast mathematical edifice that Robb</p><p>had created. Second, philosophers failed to appreciate that the causal</p><p>structure he identified accounts not just for temporal order, but “deter-</p><p>mines the topological, differentiable, and conformal structures of a wide</p><p>class of physically ‘reasonable’ space-times”, not just in Special Relativity,</p><p>but even in General Relativity, accounting for its employment in a wide</p><p>variety of recent approaches to forming a quantum theory of gravity com-</p><p>patible with the main features of relativity.37 Third, Robb’s interpretation of</p><p>relativity was ignored by philosophers and physicists who thought them-</p><p>selves to have a superior epistemology, insisting on the need to appeal</p><p>to rods and clocks, or that geometry involved ineradicable conventional</p><p>elements (Winnie, “Causal Theory of Space–time”, 135).</p><p>To this we could add that it was also ignored by philosophers like</p><p>Russell and Whitehead, who sought to construct physical concepts from</p><p>sensibilia or from items of human experience. They did not see, as Robb</p><p>saw clearly, that one of the main lessons of relativity is that times con-</p><p>structed from classes of strictly simultaneous particulars do not correspond</p><p>with any possible experience. Moreover, the coming into being of events is</p><p>not a subjective representation of a static four-dimensional world, as</p><p>Eddington and Russell held. Rather they come into being out of events</p><p>in their local causal past objectively, in a partial order that Robb termed</p><p>the ‘conical order’.</p><p>Although Robb did not live long enough to see his point of view prevail, its</p><p>resurgence in twenty-first century philosophy of physics shows that it was,</p><p>after all, no ‘will-of-the-wisp’.</p><p>Acknowledgements</p><p>It is a pleasure to acknowledge Emily Thomas, Nick Griffin, Jeffrey Elawani, and Filippo</p><p>Costantini for their helpful criticism and feedback.</p><p>37These approaches depend on Alexandrov’s identification of a region enclosed between two cones in</p><p>spacetime as the basis of his chronogeometry, the so-called “causal diamond”. Similar approaches to</p><p>the physics of space-time later taken by Roger Penrose, Steven Hawking and Felix Pirani have helped</p><p>to fortify this Robbian foundation; see Winnie, “Causal Theory of Space-time”. See Savitt, “I Love Dia-</p><p>monds”, for an account of the prevalent use of causal diamonds in research at the frontiers of modern</p><p>physics.</p><p>BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 271</p><p>Bibliography</p><p>Alexandrov, A. D. “A Contribution to Chronogeometry”. Canadian Journal of</p><p>Mathematics 19 (1967): 1119–1128.</p><p>Arthur, Richard T. W. The Reality of Time Flow. Cham: Springer, 2019.</p><p>Briginshaw, A. J. “The Axiomatic Geometry of Space-Time: An Assessment of the Work</p><p>of A. A. Robb”. Centaurus; International Magazine of the History of Science and</p><p>Medicine 22 (1979): 315–323.</p><p>Broad, C. D. “Euclid, Newton, and Einstein”. The Hibbert Journal XVIII, no. 8 (1919-20):</p><p>425–458.</p><p>Dyson, F. W., Arthur S. Eddington, and C. Davidson. “A Determination of the Deflection</p><p>of Light by the Sun’s Gravitational Field, from Observations Made at the Total</p><p>Eclipse of May 29, 1919”. 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New York: Macmillan, 1930.</p><p>Winnie, John. “The Causal Theory of Space-Time”. In Foundations of Space-Time</p><p>Theories, edited by John Earman, Clark Glymour, and John Stachel, 134–205. city:</p><p>University of Minnesota Press, 1977.</p><p>Zeeman, E. C. “Causality Implies the Lorentz Group”. Journal of Mathematical Physics 5</p><p>(1964): 490.</p><p>BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 273</p><p>Abstract</p><p>1. Introduction</p><p>2. Einstein’s relativity theory</p><p>3. Salient features of Robb’s theory</p><p>4. Minkowski, Einstein, and Robb</p><p>5. The early reception of Robb’s views</p><p>6. Philosophical reception of Robb’s views</p><p>7. Russell’s philosophy of time in 1913 in relation to Robb’s</p><p>8. 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