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Bringing Realism Back In: Explaining
China's Strategic Behavior in the Asia-
Pacific
Kazuhiko Noguchi
Published online: 15 Dec 2011.
To cite this article: Kazuhiko Noguchi (2011) Bringing Realism Back In: Explaining China's Strategic
Behavior in the Asia-Pacific, Asia-Pacific Review, 18:2, 60-85, DOI: 10.1080/13439006.2011.640580
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Bringing Realism Back In:
Explaining China’s
Strategic Behavior in the
Asia-Pacific
KAZUHIKO NOGUCHI
This article argues that offensive realism is applicable to explain China’s
strategic behavior. Contrary to constructivist and liberal arguments,
ideational and domestic factors are not the primary causes of China’s
strategic behavior. Instead, structural and material factors such as anarchy
and the distribution of relative power significantly shape how China behaves
in the Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, they have a larger impact relative to non-
material/unit-level variables on China’s policymaking. Available evidence
strongly indicates that China’s strategic behavior is driven by power
maximizing calculation. China’s grand strategy, its maritime ambition as well
as naval modernization, and rapid growth rate of military expenditure all
confirm the hypotheses of offensive realism.
Introduction
C
hina’s rise and its hegemonic ambition are the most important factors in Asia-
Pacific security. This emerging strategic reality produces “China threat argu-
ments”1 and has driven researchers to ask what theoretical framework best
explains the causal relations between China’s rise and its strategic behaviors.
With the end of the Cold War, realist explanation for China’s security policies
appeared in, and once took the greater part of, academic security journals.2
However, recently, constructivist as well as liberal arguments seem to have
replaced realist theory in the study of China’s strategic behavior.3
Constructivism and liberalism are different from realism. Realism empha-
sizes the structural/systemic effect of material power on state behavior. In con-
trast, constructivism assumes that non-material factors such as identities, norms,
ISSN 1343-9006 print; 1469-2937 online/11/020060–26
Routledge Publishing, Taylor and Francis,http//www.tandfonline.com/. 60
# Institute for International Policy Studies,http://www.iips.org/.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2011.640580
Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2011
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and ideas constituted by social (inter-subjective) interactions shape state behav-
ior.4 The term “liberalism” here refers to “bottom-up” liberalism defined as a
theory that explains how domestic factors affect the state’s policy preferences.5
These “theories” have become the dominant approach to the analysis of China’s
ascent and its implications for Asia-Pacific security.6
A growing body of literature argues that ideational and/or domestic factors
are more important than systemic factors at the international-system level for
explaining Chinese behavior.7 Constructivists emphasize the role of identity
and/or socialization in shaping China’s strategic behavior. They argue that
China is socialized by political and economic interactions through various insti-
tutions such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), the ARF
(ASEAN Regional Forum) and some organizations of the United Nations
(UN).8 They also argue that China’s “pacifist” identity is constructed through
its current interactions and this has become the central factor in framing how
other states perceive China as a peaceful rising power.9 In short, constructivists
conclude that these non-material or ideational factors shape Chinese preferences
in the economic development and peaceful environment to territorial expansion.
They also contend that China’s benign identity enables it to rise peacefully
without provoking hostile reactions from neighboring countries.10
Likewise, liberals argue that China prefers a stable environment for economic
prosperity because the survival and legitimacy of the Communist regime largely
depend on how well the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can satisfy the
Chinese people through raising their incomes.11 Thus, a growing literature attri-
butes observed China’s self-restrained behavior to non-material and domestic
variables.12
This paper challenges these conventional explanations for China’s behavior. I
demonstrate that offensive realist explanations are still more persuasive than con-
structivist and liberal explanations: careful observations of China’s strategic be-
havior after the Cold War lead us to find that structural and material factors still
define the course of Chinese behavior in the Asia-Pacific region. This does not
deny that various factors work in the formation of China’s strategic policy in
the real world. Although I recognize that theoretical parsimony sometimes sacri-
fices the complexity of international relations, a more parsimonious explanation
has a theoretical advantage as far as it does not sacrifice its explanatory power
too large because any theoretical work inevitably simplifies the reality.13
In order to evaluate the explanatory power of offensive realism that accounts
for China’s strategic behavior, this paper conducts simple multiple case studies.
The cases selected here are China’s grand strategy and its practice, military spend-
ing, and Taiwan policy. These cases are not chosen because they favor realism but
rather because the constructivist and liberal literatures typically use these cases as
evidence for their theoretical models’ explanatory value. Therefore, they are
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rather appropriate cases for testing the validity of realist theory. At the same time,
I examine whether competingtheories such as constructivism and liberalism can
explain these phenomena better than realism.
Realist explanations for China’s strategic behavior
Offensive realism is one of the most important international relations theories. My
argument here is that offensive realism can explain China’s strategic behavior.
This version of realism consists of the following hypotheses. First, states seek
to maximize their power to ensure their survival under conditions of anarchy.
Second, states maximize relative power until they establish regional or global
hegemony. Please note that the concept of hegemony is different from that of
empire. Hegemony here refers to the leadership and governance of a dominant
state (hegemon) over other states.14 Of course, a hegemon often uses force to dom-
inate them rationally. But hegemony is not equivalent to empire which conquers
the weaker states exclusively by using its physical violence. Third, military power
is one of the most important ingredients among power components.15
Specifically, the first and second primary hypotheses can be put in an inte-
grated way: that states construct a grand strategy for establishing at least regional
hegemony and allocate military resources to achieve their goal. In addition,
because the process of establishing hegemony entails changes of the current
order, relative power seekers necessarily have revisionist intentions.16 As for
the third primary hypothesis, offensive realism does not assume that states
always prefer military power to economic power. Rather it assumes that states
convert their wealth into military might if other states cannot easily match their
effort. Under this condition, states have strong incentives to increase their military
budgets at some expense of prosperity if necessary. Finally, states do not dominate
their neighbors when a regional balancer exists. As any regional balancer is likely
to prevent a potential hegemon from expanding by taking countermeasures, dom-
ination of the region is difficult.17
Constructivists and liberals deny the utility of offensive realism in analyzing
China’s external behaviors. They assert that China is the theoretical and empirical
deviation of the standard realist theory including offensive realism.18 First,
China’s diplomatic track record looks more like a status quo power rather than
a revisionist power.19 They contend that if realists are right, China ought to
expand its sphere of influence as its power grows and will inevitably cause conflict
with other powers.20 But the reality is different from realist predictions, according
to them. Some researchers also point out that China’s slow nuclear buildup,
despite its inferiority to the US, poses a puzzle for realist theory.21 Second,
China has in fact launched no major military attack against its neighbors since
the end of the Cold War. While China has clashed militarily with other powers
(the 2001 EP-3 reconnaissance incident involving the clash between a Chinese
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fighter and a US intelligence-gathering aircraft, for example), it seemed to care-
fully eschew the escalation of conflict. This observed evidence, they argue, indi-
cates that realism is contradictory. Third, one commentator more specifically
asserts that “offensive” realism’s explanation is wrong because China’s behavior
is not driven by insecurity caused by structural change in the international system.
According to Alastair Iain Johnston, the evidence that China’s post Cold War inse-
curity toward the United States predates the end of the Cold War undermines
offensive realism.22 They argue that these Chinese behavioral patterns pose the
empirical and theoretical puzzle to the research program of realism.
Contrary to the claims of constructivists and liberals, Chinese strategic behav-
ior is consistent with the logic of offensive realism. Although non-material and
unit-level variables might have some impact on China’s current behavior, we
must explore how other systemic factors influence its behavior before we jump
into the conclusion that realism is obsolete in the study of modern Chinese secur-
ity. As I will demonstrate later, considerable evidence—China’s grand strategy, its
military modernization in terms of military budget growth rate—still support the
offensive realism hypothesis. Of course, China has never stated that it seeks
“hegemony” because its constitution bans hegemonism (baquanzhuyi).
However, we should note that strategic deeds do not necessarily reflect official
laws or words. Although China’s declaratory policy literally denies its pursuit
of so-called hegemony, a lot of evidence shows that China is seeking a regional
hegemony, maximizing its relative power so that it governs all the other regional
states and prevent other powers from influencing the region. For one notable
example, China tried to expel the US presence from the Western Pacific in
order to establish its predominant position in East Asia. According to the US
Pacific Commander Timothy J. Keating’s statements at congressional hearings
in March 2008, a China senior admiral said to him that “[y]ou guys can have
the east part of the Pacific, Hawaii to the States. We’ll take the west part of the
Pacific, from Hawaii to China.”23
China’s low profile nuclear posture, sometimes cited as strong evidence
against realism, is not likely to refute the structural theory of hegemony. Construc-
tivism might argue that China’s strategic culture, not structural factors, has caused
its low profile nuclear strategy and dampened its hegemonic ambition. They say
that Mao Zedong and Deng Xiao-ping traditionally regarded the role of nuclear
weapons as a tool to deter nuclear aggression only. Therefore, this strategic
culture has led China not to seek to match its nuclear capabilities to other
nuclear powers and produced a no-first-use policy.24 In fact, the number of
China’s strategic missiles is still small compared to the US. While the US pos-
sessed 500 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 336 submarine
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in 2007, China had fewer than 50 strategic
missiles altogether. One reliable estimate suggests that China will likely have
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only 120-152 strategic missiles and warheads even in 2020. China’s 2006 National
Defense White Paper states that “China remains firmly committed to the policy of
no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances.”25
Does China’s domestic culture produce these strategically benign behaviors?
Unfortunately, this is not the case for liberalism and constructivism. First, China’s
no-first-use policy has some reasons to be doubted. Masashi Nishihara, the presi-
dent of the Research Institute for Peace and Security, says that the PLA’s internal
documents, reportedly suggesting China’s nuclear first use in case of emergency,
cast doubt on this policy.26 Some experts point out that China’s no-first-use policy
may be a kind of political manifesto, not a strategic doctrine, because it is
irrational for China, far behind in its nuclear modernization and backward relative
to the US in conventional weapons, to abandon a first-use strategy.27
Second, the number of bombs does not matter in the nuclear world. Assured
destruction/retaliation capability matters. As Robert Jervis demonstrated, the
quantitative increaseof nuclear weapons beyond the “assured destruction capa-
bility” does not raise a state’s political power. If a state develops enough
nuclear weapons to inflict unbearable damage on its enemies, it can effectively
deter its adversaries’ military attacks.28 When a state has assured destruction capa-
bility, it can reach its maximum power. Now China is developing solid-fuel
ICBMs and SLBMs for acquiring an assured retaliation capability. According to
the U.S. Defense Department, the Chinese road-mobile, solid propellant DF-31
and DF-31A have entered service and China may be developing a new road-
mobile ICBM. China also continues construction of its newest JIN-class (Type
094) nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).29 Thus, the fact that
China is searching for nuclear assured retaliation capability is a case for offensive
realism.
Furthermore, some of the critiques of realism lack appropriate theoretical
grounding. Johnston argues that because the pace of China’s military moderniz-
ation does not match the timing of the alternation of power redistribution (the
increase of China’s military expenditure began prior to the collapse of the
Soviet Union), offensive realism loses its explanatory power.30 This counterargu-
ment is not sound since the serious declining process of the Soviet Union just
before its collapse provided China with a good opportunity to maximize its rela-
tive power. Moreover, such a refutation neglects the primary cause offensive
realism identifies; anarchy compels states to maximize their power in order to
ensure their survival, regardless of shifts in the international distribution of
power.31 The constructivist critique does not adequately contend with these
points.
It is no wonder, then, that China does and did attempt to maximize its relative
power before and after the Cold War. As Johnston himself admits, “The motiv-
ation for the. . .modernization of Chinese military capabilities—particularly its
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power projection forces—is more consistent with the desire to improve relative
power.”32 Therefore, China’s strategic behavior fits offensive realism. If the
theory of offensive realism is plausible, as John J. Mearsheimer concludes, we
can predict that “China is likely to try to dominate Asia. . .It is unlikely that
China will go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries. Instead, China
will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring coun-
tries. . .In the anarchic world of international politics, it is better (for China) to
be Godzilla than Bambi.”33 In sum, China’s post-Cold War strategic behavior
in the Asia-Pacific region can be explained in terms of offensive realism.
China’s grand strategy and its naval ambitions
Deng’s legacy and China’s naval strategy
China’s grand strategy is a product of realist power politics in an anarchical world
and its naval ambition was driven by a power shift in its favor. The demise of the
Soviet Union enabled China to turn its focus from land to sea. China has made the
most of this opportunity and created a sophisticated long term strategy. The most
important element of its post-Cold War strategy is represented in Deng Xiao-
ping’s guidance expressed on September 1989. He constructed an international
strategy known as the “24 character strategy” designed to enhance China’s
power and international position for the future. Some of these characters manifest
as “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our
capacities and bide our time (until the completion of modernization); maintain a
low profile.”34 As I will demonstrate hereafter, these imperatives have framed
China’s grand strategy and its security behavior since the end of the Cold
War.35 In accordance with Deng’s guidance, his successors, Jiang Zemin, and
Hu Jintao, have sought to increase China’s “comprehensive national power
(CNP, zonghe guoli)” in order to catch up the United States and other powers.36
The track record of post-Cold War Chinese strategic behavior not only follows
Deng’s statements but also corresponds with his imperatives.37
Deng’s grand strategy emphasized the enhancement of China’s sea power.
While China has traditionally been a land power, the disappearance of the Soviet
threat made it possible for China to shift its strategic focus from land to sea. In
other words, this new emerging distribution of power clearly encouraged Deng’s
decision to shift the strategic focus from total war to limited war in 1985.38 And
his decision helped to produce the new naval strategy and buildup. Deng acknowl-
edged the importance of command of the sea for China’s future. His unprecedented
appointment of Admiral Liu Huaqing to the vice chair of the Central Military Com-
mission (CMC) reflected Deng’s strong belief that China should make efforts to
increase its naval power. Deng urged Huaqing to develop a modernized naval strat-
egy. As a result, he elaborated the concept of “offshore (near-seas) active defense,”
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envisioning stubborn defense near the shore, mobile warfare at sea, and surprise
guerrilla-like attacks in the Western Pacific Ocean.39
The main purposes of this strategy are to reunify Taiwan, restore lost and dis-
puted islands, protect China’s maritime resources, protect sea lines of communi-
cation (SLOCs), and deter and defend against aggression from the sea.40 Above
all, SLOCs are very important for China’s security and economy because its sur-
vival and prosperity are increasingly dependent upon the Western Pacific, the
South China Sea. For Chinese strategists, these sea lines are crucial not only for
securing access to energy resources, foreign trade, and direct investment but
also for ensuring its protection from possible external threats since the control
of waters provides China with a large buffer zone that could be utilized to elim-
inate military interventions from foreign powers.
China’s changing naval strategic goals
China’s strategic goal is allegedly to establish an area of sea control within the first
island chain in the near term and an area of sea denial capability within the second
Figure 1 The First and Second Island Chains
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China, August 2010, p. 23.
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island chain in the long term (see Figure 1).41 In order to achieve these goals,
China has engaged in a modernization program of its naval and air forces since
the end of the Cold War.42 In the early stage of this naval modernization, the
Chinese leadership probably wanted to build a blue water navy.43 However, the
Beijing leadership soon acknowledged that a full-fledged blue water navy was
beyond China’s capabilities.44 Instead, China shifted focus to the construction
of a brown water navy for a resource efficient naval buildup while preserving
the building of its blue water navy as a long-term strategic goal.45 A brown
water navy is useful for defending the surrounding East and South China Sea
littorals, and preventing the United States and other navies including the
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) from taking hostileactions
against China.
To establish command of its coastal waters, China has recently increased the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) movements in the Asia-Pacific region.
China’s frequent dispatches of submarines to the East and South China Seas,
and recent PLAN investigations of the topology of the East China Sea and the
Western Pacific Ocean and possible responses from the United States and Japan
are necessary activities for this purpose.46 While China makes efforts to complete
its strategic planning, the timetable for the modernization of China’s naval forces
has been delayed mainly by technological backwardness. According to some mili-
tary specialists, the PLAN is clearly inferior to the US navy and the JMSDF, even
to the Taiwanese navy. For example, Chinese submarines have limited war fight-
ing capabilities. As a result of their outdated designs, they can be easily detected
by western navies such as the JMSDF.47 Moreover, the PLAN possesses only
limited power projection capabilities. For example, China’s nuclear submarines
and aircraft carrier are not ready to go to the Pacific. Hence, China has had to con-
centrate on modernizing its conventional submarines (replacement of the obsolete
and noisy Type 033 and 035 SSKs with modern 039 Song attack submarines),
deploying destroyers equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles (production of the
new Luyang Il/Type 052C destroyer), and short-range ballistic missiles (WS-1,
WS-2, DF-15, etc),48 to overcome its military weakness and inferiority. Therefore
it lacks the means to be actively aggressive towards other states in the Asia-
Pacific.49
Some pundits might deny China’s expansive ambition by citing evidence of
China’s cooperative diplomacy in border talks with the Russia and other continen-
tal countries. China has solved its border disputes even in cases where this has
resulted in unfavorable terms for China. A recent comprehensive study shows
that China has demilitarized and compromised in many border negotiations
with continental neighbors in the 1990s.50 Although China’s cooperative attitude
in territorial disputes can be interpreted as evidence that China does not have
expansive ambitions, an alternative explanation remains possible. From a strategic
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point of view, avoiding a two-front confrontation by lessening the risk of continen-
tal conflict is rational for China if it wants to be a sea power. It also makes sense
for China to compromise in land border talks for moving its defensive perimeter
seaward from the coast because the resources it can allocate are limited.
It can even be argued that China swallowed these unfavorable deals with its
continental neighbors as a necessary cost in order to focus its resources on its naval
and air forces efficiently in southern coastal area. The solution of border disputes
enabled China to reduce military equipment spending and the number of soldiers
in the PLA. Several reductions have downsized the PLA from approximately 4
million personnel in 1985 to 2.3 million personnel in 2007. The main purpose
of the PLA’s personnel reduction, according to Chinese explanations, is to
strengthen the PLAN, PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force), and
nuclear forces by correcting the greater emphasis that had previously been
placed on the PLA.51 This shows that China’s strategic focus has already
Figure 2 Main Activities of Chinese Navy in Waters near Japan
Source: The National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report, Tokyo:
The National Institute for Defense Studies, March 2011, p. 15.
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shifted from land security to maritime security. In short, China’s compromises on
border issues can also be understood in the context of grand strategy.
Generally speaking, the course of China’s strategic behavior has been
directed by structural imperatives embodied in Deng’s grand strategy; it is rational
for a rising China to solve border conflicts and act peacefully until its military
modernization of the PLAN is complete. Building a powerful brown water navy
as well as developing short-range ballistic missiles (for securing its position),
and maintaining a low-profile diplomacy (for coping with affairs calmly) serves
China’s coastal strategy ( jinhai fangyu zhanlue) well. Thus, the post-Cold War
record of China’s strategic behavior is quite consistent with offensive realism’s
predictions: states construct a grand strategy (Deng’s 24 charters) for establishing
“regional hegemony” (its maritime ambition represented in the first and second
island concept) and allocate military resources to achieve their goal (relative
emphasis on the PLAN).52
China’s military spending
China’s priority of military to economy
China’s consistent military build-up in the post-Cold War period also offers strong
evidence that China is still following the offensive realist grand strategy. China
has invested more money into military forces than other public welfares for
nearly two decades: the growth rate of Chinese military spending is almost con-
sistently higher than that of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since Deng’s gui-
dance and the end of the Cold War (see Figure 3). Why does China’s military
spending increase at such an unusually rapid pace? To what ends does China
invest in its armed forces while facing no clear external threat?
China’s long-term military spending trends give us clues in finding answers.
As an offensive realist argues, states never feel secure until they establish regional
hegemony or global hegemony. To achieve this goal, states prefer military power
to economic power relative to other countries if many rival regional states cannot
match their efforts.53 China’s behavior is consistent with the expectations of
offensive realism. It is natural and rational for China to spend more money on
building stronger military forces for improving its relative power position
toward “regional hegemony” when other neighboring countries do not counter
the rise of China seriously.54
For example, Japan, the most powerful rival state for China in the region, does
not match China’s efforts at least in terms of military spending. The share of
defense budget in Japan’s general account remained the same just before and
after the Cold War. Moreover, Japan’s defense budget has been flat since 1994
and even declining in nominal and real terms.55 Furthermore, the JDA budget
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has been declining since 2003. ASEAN countries also do not counter China’s mili-
tary build-up effectively (I will discuss this later).
Why has China kept increasing its military spending at an extraordinary high
pace with almost no neighboring states’ arms build-up? The liberal argument faces
difficulty to answer this question. Rather, this evidence offers strong reasons to
challenge the liberal argument that what China really wants is a peaceful inter-
national environment to sustain its economic growth through active foreign
trade and the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).56 Richard Rosecrance
argues that China is especially sensitive to the advantages of intensive growthand
to the potential for the disruption of essential economic arrangements.57 Likewise,
Yong Deng contends that China secures an international environment to persuade
other nations that China’s rise represents an opportunity for economic prosper-
ity.58 If their arguments hold water, China should have eschewed provocative
and risky military modernization so as not to undermine a stable international
environment. However, China has continued strengthening its military power,
which potentially invites hostile reactions from foreign powers, thus risking
harm to its economic interests. Moreover, China sometimes demonstrates and
even uses force when its vital interests are at stake. The 1996 Taiwan Strait
Figure 3 China’s Growth Rate of Military Spending and Economy
Sources: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s
National Defense in 2006, December 29, 2006; The 21st Century China Research Institute
web page (http://www.21ccs.jp); National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical
Yearbook 2007; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan web page (http://www.mofa.go.jp/);
David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 2002), p. 189; NIDS China Security Report (Tokyo: The National Insti-
tute for Defense Studies, 2011); JETRO web page (http://www.jetro.go.jp/world/asia/cn/).
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Crisis is a typical case for challenging the liberal thesis. China’s missile exercise
against Taiwan to prevent the election of Lee Tunghui could undermine the stab-
ility of international environment and cause negative effects on its own economy.
These facts damage the liberal explanation of China’s behavior and the argument
that economic growth has priority in China’s decision-making.
Do domestic politics matter?
The rapid growth of the Chinese military budget is sometimes explained in the
context of Chinese domestic politics. Some Chinese specialists imply that political
bargaining in Beijing shapes its defense spending: civilian leaders’ political power
is not strong enough to ignore demands from China’s military and as a result they
are forced to compromise on some of the PLA’s demands in order to maintain tight
civilian control and political stability and avoid potential domestic turmoil. In
short, China’s strategic choice among possible policies is a function of the chan-
ging dynamics of the power balance among domestic actors, particularly civilian
and military leaders. Certainly, domestic variables affect the details of Chinese
decision-making, but liberal explanations for China’s defense budget are not
robust. Susan L. Shirk argues that a tax reform imposed by Zhu Rongji in 1994
allowed the Chinese central government to take in more revenues and invest
most heavily in military projects.59 Contrary to Shirk’s argument, the double-
digit growth of the Chinese military spending had already begun several years
prior to Rongji’s tax reform initiative and its growth rate shows no substantial var-
iance prior to or after the reform. As Figure 3 shows, the 1994 tax reform did not
substantially affect the growth rate of military spending.
The Taiwan factor, frequently referred to as a critical variable for determining
China’s security policy, has no obvious correlations with the growth rate of the
China’s defense budget. It is almost a cliche´ in modern Chinese security studies
to assert that the Taiwan factor defines the direction of China’s military
buildup. Shirk contends that the greater budget allocation to the PLAN and
PLAAF are crucial for preparing for Taiwan-related contingencies. She cited an
article in The China Daily as evidence that “the double-digit increase in military
Table 1 Chinese and Japanese Military Spending in Comparison (US$ billions)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
China High Estimate 67 71 78 86 94 105 125
Low Estimate 47 50 55 60 66 70 85
Japan 44.2 44.7 44.8 44.4 44.1 43.7 41.7
Source: Richard D. Fisher, Jr., China’s Military Modernization (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2010), p. 17.
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spending did not take place until very recent years when tension escalated across
the Taiwan Strait.”60 By referencing this article, Shirk suggests that the Taiwan
crisis compelled China’s military leaders to demand a larger military budget for
modernizing its military power to counter US naval forces. China could not
match the two aircraft carrier groups dispatched into the Taiwan Strait by the
United States during the crisis. As a result, when PLA leaders demanded an
increased budget to overcome China’s military inferiority to US forces, the civi-
lian leadership had to yield to the PLA’s demand.
Again this interpretation is not necessarily corroborated with the data: the
double-digit growth in Chinese military spending had already started long
before 1996. According to China’s National Defense in 2006, an official
Chinese government document, its growth rate has stayed in the double digits at
least since 1991.61 Thus there is no clear correlation between the 1996 Taiwan
crisis and the Chinese military budget as far as its growth rates are concerned.
Furthermore, the growth rate in 1997, the year following the Taiwan Strait crisis,
actually slightly decreased. Although Taiwan is central to the Chinese leadership’s
political agenda, this analysis suggests that the “Taiwan bias” sometimes oversha-
dows how other variables affect China’s security policy decision-making.62
This suggests that China’s military buildup is not directly caused by its dom-
estic bureaucratic politics. Rather China has consistently strengthened its military
forces in accordance with a coherent long-term national strategy. Although the
distribution of political power or bargaining between civilian political and military
leadership may affect details of China’s defense policy, the long term trend and
pattern of its military spending shows that Beijing is pursuing a monolithic strat-
egy designed to maximize its military power, just as Deng’s 24 character guidance
suggested. This evidence may also indicate that there may exist little opinion gap
between civilian and military decision-makers in China’s strategic directions. As
Jonathan D. Pollack points out, “the PLA had begun to develop a more compelling
rationale and logic of long-term military development that civilian leaders were
prepared to support.”63 In any case, the constant high growth rate of China’s mili-
tary spending corresponds with the predictions of offensive realism: a state enjoy-
ing prosperity is likely to convert its economic resources into military power even
at the expense of economy under some condition.
Does identity matter?
Finally, some constructivists make a counterargument against realists that China’s
increase in defense spending has not invited countermeasures from neighboring
states due to its “pacifist” identity. China more than doubled its defense spending
to $48 billion by 2002, while combined ASEAN spending had risen to only $19
billion. This, David C. Kang asserts, refutes the realist hypothesis of balancing be-
havior because ASEAN countries do not balance against China.64 First, in contrast
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to his interpretation, this data is not contradictory to a hypothesis of offensive
realism: a strong state questing for hegemony maximizes its relative power at
the expense of other nations. China has spent more on its military budget precisely
in order to outcompete the ASEAN countries. China’s military buildup is most
effective for strengthening its relative comprehensive national power. Hence
this confirms offensive realism’s hypothesis mentioned above. Second, ASEAN
countries may carefully avoid provoking China by “passing the buck” to other
great powers. As Mearsheimer argues, threatened states usually prefer buck-
passing to balancing, mainly because the buck-passers avoid the costs of fighting
the aggressor in the event of war.65 Probably this is the case for ASEAN.
Thus, we should regard China’s recent low-profile cooperative policy not as a
grand strategy per se but as a tactic to buy time for completing the modernization
of the PLA. Of course, the statistical data on China’s military spending alone
cannot tell us the whole story or a complete picture of its grand strategy, but
this still offers evidence that China continuously seeks to become a strong military
power.
China’s policy towards Taiwan
The most difficult theoretical puzzle to explain is China’s attitudes toward
Taiwan. For China’s leadership, the Taiwan issue is the top priority of its
“foreign” policies. China is likely to do anything to prevent Taiwan from
gaining independence. China clearly asserts that it will launch a war against
Taiwan if it declares political independence. Although the use of force inevitably
poses the potential of doing serious damage to China’s identity, reputation, and
prosperity, China has committed to stopping Taiwanese independence at any
cost. Why does China consider Taiwan’s political status such a serious issue?
Pitfalls of constructivist explanations
There are two competing explanations advanced in previous studies: one is the
realist-oriented explanation and the other is a constructivist-oriented explanation.
On one hand, realists emphasize the geopolitical importance of Taiwan for China.
On the other hand, constructivists interpret Taiwan as a matter of identity politics.
From the strategic point of view, the geopolitical constraint imposed by Taiwan on
China’s naval activities is a serious problem for Beijing. As far as Taiwan holds its
virtual independence and alignment with the United States, China cannot effec-
tively control the coastal waters vital to its security and economy. Thus it is
necessary for China to control Taiwan politically and militarily in order to estab-
lish its command of the sea in the near coastal waters and move forward into the
Western Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea.66 As Toshi Yoshihara and James
Holmes point out, “for China . . .Taiwan’s geographic position. . .imposes a phys-
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ical barrier to power projection from the mainland and prevents Beijing from com-
pleting its offshore defense perimeter. . .Taiwan sits conspicuously and directly
across from the center point of the mainland’s coastline.”67 In sum, Taiwan is a
matter of national security: whether China successfully achieves its strategic
goals or not largely depends upon Taiwan’s future position.
I think that these realist explanations above are strong and sound. However,
some constructivists try to provide quite different explanations from realist ones:
they emphasize the role of identity in accounting for China’s Taiwan policy.
David C. Kang argues that the Taiwan issue is a matter of identity. According
to him, “Taiwan is not an issue because of power politics: it’s an issue because
of competing conceptions of whether Taiwan is an independent, sovereign
nation state, or whether it is a part of China. . .this disagreement over Taiwan’s
identity, Taiwan’s status remains an issue in international politics. . .control of
Taiwan could (not) tip the balance of power in the region. . .Chinese view
Taiwan as an issue of nation building, not of territorial expansion (emphasis
added).”68 Although his view has some merit, he overemphasizes the impact of
identity and underestimates the strategic importance of Taiwan for China’s ambi-
tions. If we take Taiwan’s geographical position into account, a different strategic
picture emerges.69
Geographic importance of Taiwan
China’s maritime strategy shows how important Taiwan’s geographic position is.
As I demonstrated above, China seeks to establish an area of sea denial, and
hopefully sea control, within “the first island chain.” Taiwan is located at the
center of the Chinese southern coastal waters within the first island chain. In
order to eliminate this geographic obstacle, China has modernized its military
capability. China has constantly increased the number of its short-range ballistic
missiles directed against Taiwan and has also built naval vessels such as destroy-
ers and cruisers equipped with cruise missiles. If the identity of Taiwan simply
matters for China, why does China constantly demonstrate an intention to
conquer or control Taiwan and acquire the state-of-art military equipment now
targeting Taiwan? Why do interactions between China and Taiwan not construct
a “peaceful” identity that downplays the role of military forces in China’s
Taiwan policy?
No matter who takes political power in Taiwan, whether a pro-China poli-
tician such as Ma Ying-jeou or anti anti-China and pro-independence politician
such as Chen Shui-bian, no matter how many mutual economic activities
increase between mainland China and Taiwan,70 China continues to strengthen
the military forces it has deployed against Taiwan.71 As has been indicated
above, China continues to modernize its naval vessels and increase the
number of short-range ballistic missiles arrayed against Taiwan. According to
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the United States Department of Defense, as of 2009 the PLA has deployed
between 1050-1150 CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM)
against Taiwan. “China is increasing the size of this force at a rate of more
than 100 missiles per year.”72 This not only suggests the robustness of the offen-
sive realist explanation for China’s revisionist intention and hegemonic ambition
and its military resource allocation but also casts strong doubt on the role of
identity in China’s Taiwan policymaking.
Status quo power vs. revisionist: Where does China
fit in?
China’s revisionist intentions
The analysis thus far indicates that China cannot be categorized as a genuine status
quo power but rather as a cautious revisionist. First, China shows a clear intention
to expand its power toward the Western Pacific Ocean as the first and second
island chain concept demonstrates.73 China’s ambition to control Taiwan is
only one of the political goals in its grand strategy. Second, for nearly two
decades China has consistently invested capital in its military forces even at
some expense to economic welfare.74 The growth rate of China’s military spend-
ing constantly exceeds that of GDP and has almost never changed no matter what
has happened in international and domestic settings. These Chinese behavioral
patterns and strong will to modernize its military forces can be aptly explained
in terms of offensive realism.As one commentator rightly points out, today’s China may not be a revisionist
in the sense that it is not using forces to change the existing order.75 However,
what is more important is to infer why China has refrained from employing
forces while expanding its power seaward. As Figure 1 shows, China’s strategic
aim is to extend its political and military influence far beyond its territorial
waters. In order to achieve this goal, “China pursues a development strategy in
modernizing its national defense.”76 Needless to say, when Taiwan declares inde-
pendence, China is willing to use force to prevent it.
China’s revisionist intention is arguably evidenced by its diplomacy in the
Asia-Pacific. As Deng’s grand strategy suggests, China is willing to establish a
new international security order in its own favor by utilizing diplomatic activities.
China tends to regard both Japan and the United States as potential adversaries;
therefore, it tries to undermine the United States-led hub-and-spoke security
mechanism in the Asia-Pacific as much as possible.77 This does not necessarily
mean that China will go to war with the United States, but instead will make
use of available tools to marginalize the United States’ influence in the Asia-
Pacific. This policy preference can be observed even in China’s multilateralism.
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China’s preferences toward regional institutions
China has been recently enthusiastic about enlarging and institutionalizing
ASEAN instead of utilizing Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). There
are several reasons for China’s move towards ASEAN. First, this was partly a
response to the US initiative to promote APEC as a security institution in the
mid-1990s. China moved closer to ASEAN in order to counter the US diplomatic
campaign to isolate China because the US influence in ASEAN was relatively
small. Second, ASEAN is a more favorable institution than APEC for China.
China was once reluctant to strengthen ASEAN in the early 1990s, being afraid
that ASEAN would become an anti-China front. However, the US initiative to
strengthen the alliance with Japan and APEC in the mid-1990s encouraged
China to move closer to ASEAN. Not only did China become positively disposed
to the institutionalization of ASEAN plus 3 (ASEAN plus 1 with no Japan and
Korea is preferable for China though), but also agreed to the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation (TAC) in the late 1990s and the Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea at ARF in 2003.
This Chinese preference shows its willingness to replace the US-centric hub-
and-spoke system with a new Sino-centric order in the Asia-Pacific by reaching an
accommodation with Southeast Asian countries. Since the United States had
already declared a policy of non-intervention in South China Sea conflicts,78
China can now effectively marginalize its US influence by strengthening the ARF
in the region. A series of cooperative agreements with ASEAN countries can be inter-
preted as a Chinese effort to establish a new order. As David Martin Jones and
Michael L.R. Smith explain, “[d]espite signing the Declaration on the South China
Sea, China avoided any commitment to a legally binding code, and did not relinquish
its historical claim to its lost territory or its preference to resolve the dispute bilater-
ally. Rather, China moderated the manner in which it addressed ASEAN. . ..China
had not, therefore, abandoned its goal of achieving control over the South China
Sea or, by extension, securing a wider regional hegemony. Instead, it had prudentially
adjusted the means by which it pursued its grand strategy.”79
What is lacking for China now is not its revisionist intention but “comprehen-
sive national power,” particularly the power projection capability.80 To overcome
its military deficiency, China has made the most of acquiring and modernizing
military hardware, software, and information technologies (C4ISR). According
to some analyses, China is seeking the capacity to hold surface ships at bay
through layered capabilities reaching out to the islands extending south and east
from Japan to Guam in the Western Pacific Ocean. This would provide China
with preemptive and coercive options in a regional crisis.81 In any case, these be-
havioral patterns corroborate the logic of offensive realism that states have always
revisionist intentions for establishing their favored order.82
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Conclusion
Since considerable evidence shows that China is trying to maximize its power and
interest in the Asia-Pacific as other great powers have done, we should bring
realism back into the study of China’s security behavior in order to uncover and
understand the impetus of China’s foreign policy. Contrary to constructivist and
liberal arguments, ideational and domestic factors are not the primary causes of
China’s strategic behavior. Instead, structural and material factors such as
anarchy and the distribution of relative power significantly shape how China
behaves in the Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, they have a larger impact relative to
non-material/unit-level variables on China’s policymaking. Available evidence
strongly indicates that China’s strategic behavior is driven by power-based
rational calculations. China’s grand strategy, its maritime ambition as well as
naval modernization, rapid growth rate of military expenditure all confirm the
hypotheses of offensive realism.
Furthermore, the general patterns of China’s post-Cold War strategic behav-
ior do not pose a puzzle for realism as a whole. Arguably it can also explain the
course China has taken since the end of the Cold War. As one prominent realist
argues, “China’s current foreign policy is grounded in realist ideas. . ..As China
modernizes its economy and enters international institutions. . .it behaves in a
way that realists understand well: developing its military slowly but surely as
its economic power grows, and avoiding a confrontation with superior US
forces.”83 As I have demonstrated in this paper, China’s post-Cold War strategic
behavior is consistent with this explanation and, consequently, the realist account
is persuasive.
Explanations based on identity (non-material factors) are often incoherent and
unit-level analysis is contradictory for various aspects of China’s strategic behav-
ior, hence policy prescriptions inferred solely from them are misleading. Con-
structivist works cited here may implicitly assume that current interactions
among states necessarily produce a positive effect toward normative cooperative
state behaviors a priori. Unfortunately interactions per se can logically produce
any outcome. This can be true of the consequences of Sino-US relations. As
Robert Jervis rightly points out, “interaction effects remind us that the impact
of any two variables (IV and DV) at any point in time may not be additive. . ..[T]he
growth of China’s economy. . .would have a negative effect if it were seen as
menacing the United States’ ally.”84 Thus, interactions themselves can produce
either progressive or destructive results.
This logical problem may come from constructivists’ theoretical tendency
towards overemphasizing identity as well as other social factors and underestimat-
ing the impact of structural and material variables on state behavior.85 Therefore,
scholars should specifythe conditions under which these social variables produce
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cooperative relations between states. Otherwise, constructivism remains a post-
hoc description of phenomena and hence is not very useful for making policy pre-
scriptions.86 Likewise, liberal explanations overstate the effect of domestic vari-
ables on a state’s foreign policy. This theoretical shortcoming makes liberals’
policy recommendations less reliable.
Now is the time to bring realism back in analyzing China’s strategic behavior
and utilize it for better security policymaking.
Notes
The greater part of this paper was written during my research stay at the Institute
of Asian Research, the University of British Columbia. The author would like to
thank colleagues and staff of the Institute for direct and indirect support. My
thanks also go to Brian Job, Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, Akitoshi Miyashita, Cheung Mong,
Regina Titunik, Noato Yoshikawa, Shigemitsu Konno, and John J. Mearsheimer for
reading an earlier draft and giving their comments and suggestions on it. Needless
to say, I take responsibility for the views expressed here.
1 Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, eds., The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths
and Reality (London: Routledge, 2002).
2 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2001), pp. 360-402. Furthermore, standard realism
argued that the rise of China should have fueled rivalry with other powers
under the conditions of anarchy. Aaron Friedberg, “The struggle for
Mastery in Asia,” Commentary, Vol. 110, No. 4 (November 2000), pp. 17-
26; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,”
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41; Richard
K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States
after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993),
pp. 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a
Multipolar Asia,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993),
pp. 5-33. However, East Asia has enjoyed stability for more than decades.
One of realist answers for this stability lies in a Sino-U.S. bipolar regional
order and the distance across the pacific and waters. See Robert S. Ross,
Chinese Security policy: Structure, Power and Politics (London and
New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 45-86.
3 Here I define the key terms used in this paper. The definition of the state
(China) depends upon the theory. Realism regards the state as both
unitary and rational. Liberalism views the state as plural. Constructivism
sees the state as social and relational. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi,
International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and
Beyond (Boston: Allen and Bacon, 1999), pp. 55-57, 199-214; Ian Hurd,
“Constructivism,” in Christian Reus-Smith and Duncan Snidal, eds., The
Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008), pp. 298-316. Strategy refers to the task of statecraft in order
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to preserve and enhance the national interest. Christopher Layne, The
Peace of Illusions (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 13.
4 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999); Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist
Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2
(January 1998), pp. 324-348.
5 Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still Realist,”
International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 5-55; Andrew
Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3
(Autumn 1997), pp. 513-553. Although constructivism and liberalism are
different, both logics often come close and are sometimes integrated into
one hypothesis. A combined proposition that deterrence beliefs and
internal political constraints shape China’s nuclear strategy is a good
example of a hybrid of “liberal (unit-level)” constructivism. M. Taylor
Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Destruction:
The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,”
International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 48-87. A causal
hypothesis that a domestic challenge to the government legitimacy
causes the intensification of group identity is another example. See
Alastair Iain Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post-
Cold War Period,” in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, eds.,
Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 291-295, 300.
6 William A. Callahan, “How to Understand China: the Dangers and
Opportunities of Being a Rising Power, Review of International Studies,
Vol. 31, No. 4 (October 2005), pp. 701-714; Amitav Acharya, “Will Asia’s
Past Be its Future,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/
04), pp. 149-164; J. J. Shu, Peter Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds.,
Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); Amitav Acharya,
Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the
Problem of Regional Order (London: Routledge Press, 2001); Amitav
Acharya, “Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building: From the ASEAN Way
to the Asia Pacific Way,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 (January
1997), pp. 319-346.
7 Jeffrey W. Legro, “Purpose Transitions: China’s Rise and the American
Response,” in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power,
Security, and Future of International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2008), pp. 163-187, for example, emphasizes the impact of China’s
domestic factors.
8 Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions,
1980-2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
9 David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
10 However, the accumulation of potentially destabilizing weapons
increases the risks of war in East Asia. See Robert Hartfiel and Brian Job,
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“Raising the Risks of War: Defense Spending Trends and Competitive
Arms Processes in East Asia,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 (March
2007), pp. 1-22.
11 On meanings of stability, see Robert Ayson, “Regional Stability in the
Asia-Pacific: Towards a Conceptual Understanding,” Asian Security, Vol.
1, No. 2 (April 2005), pp. 194-196.
12 Quansheng Zhao and Guoli Liu, “The Challenge of Rising China,” Journal
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4-5 (August/October 2007), pp. 587-
608 provides a good summary of recent academic debate about China’s
rise.
13 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 19.
14 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), p. 116.
15 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of International Politics, 1-167. Although he
argues that land power is the most important element of power (43-45),
the components of military power that states pursue can be contingent
and depend on the strategic setting they face.
16 A revisionist is defined as a state that challengesto the existing order for
enhancing its own power and prestige in the international system.
Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy
of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 24.
17 Colin Elman, “Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and
America’s Rise to Regional Hegemony,” American Political Science
Review, Vol. 98, No. 4 (November 2004), pp. 563-576.
18 One of the notable challengers to the realist explanation of China’s
security behavior is Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States, pp. xv-xiv.
Although Johnston often attacks the standard realism, his theoretical
position is not necessarily coherent and sometimes even contradictory.
For example, in his influential article, he does use the security dilemma
model, which is a core proposition of “defensive realism.” And curiously
he never mentions the offense-defense balance, which is one of the most
important variables in this model. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a
Status Quo Power,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003),
pp. 49-56. Theoretically this omission is problematic. As Zbigniew
Brezezinski points out, if this variable is taken into account, one can say
that the security dilemma matters less in the overall Sino-U.S. security
relations because the mutual nuclear deterrence favors the defense
dominance. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Nukes Change Everything,” Foreign
Policy (January/February 2005), pp. 48-49. Thus, Johnston’s claim that
“Status quo states, particularly those caught in security dilemma can be
quite willing to use military force to defend their territory” (56) makes
little sense as long as China’s minimum or limited nuclear deterrence
works.
19 Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” pp. 5-56.
20 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, “The Coming Conflict with
America,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-32.
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21 Fravel and Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation,” pp. 48-87.
22 Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War
Period,” p. 263.
23 “Hearing to receive testimony on United States Pacific Command and
United States Forces Korea in review of the Defense Authorization
Request for Fiscal Year 2009 and the Future Years Defense Program,” U.S.
Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 12, 2008. http://www.
pacom.mil/ This anecdotic evidence shows China’s regional hegemonic
ambitions and seems to reflect its “Second Island chain” plan (I will
discuss this soon).
24 Fravel and Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Destruction,” p. 86.
25 Richard D. Fisher, Jr., China’s Military Modernization: Building for
Regional and Global Reach (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010),
pp. 77, 128-130.
26 Sankei Shimbun, January 24, 2011.
27 Shin-ichi Ogawa, “Chugoku no Kakuyokushi Seisaku,” Mondai to Kenkyu,
Vol. 32, No. 9 (June 2003), p. 15.
28 Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Winter 1979-80), pp. 617-633.
29 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China, August 2010, p. 2.
30 Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War
Period,” pp. 279-280.
31 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 31-36; Elmann,
“Extending Offensive Realism,” p. 564.
32 Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War
Period,” pp. 279-280.
33 John J. Mearsheimer, “Better to Be Godzilla than Bambi,” Foreign Policy,
(January/February 2005), p. 47.
34 , September 4, 1989 http://zg.people.com.cn.
35 Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the
Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), pp. 142-
155.
36 A Chinese think-tank report on CNP estimates that the time span China
needs to overtake the United States is nearly a quarter of century at the
earliest and more than a half century at the latest. Chikako Kawakatsu,
“Ko Kinto Seiken no Gaiko Seisaku,” Bouei Kenkyujyo Kiyo, Vol. 7, No. 2-3
(March 2005), pp. 57-59. The Chinese concept of CNP is a hybrid of both
hard (military, economic, etc.) and soft (cultural, diplomatic, etc.) power.
37 For example, China’s Ministry of National Defense spokesman, Huang
Xueping, said that building its aircraft carriers is a reflection of a nation’s
comprehensive power. Xinhua News Agency, December 22, 2008. This
statement provides some evidence suggesting that China seeks to
maximize its power as offensive realism predicts.
38 Robert Ross argues that nationalism drives China’s naval ambition.
Robert S. Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and
the U.S. Response,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Fall 2009),
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pp. 46-81. But nationalism itself does not necessarily lead a land power to
pursue its maritime expansion because it cannot concentrate on naval
buildup without a favorable strategic land environment. During the Great
Cultural Revolution era, China, facing the Soviet threat on the Northern
borders, never showed naval ambitions despite its extraordinary
nationalistic mood and movement. This evidence suggests that the
structural imperatives are prerequisites for China before seeking maritime
overreach.
39 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-
First Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 165-169.
40 Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From
‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Sea’ to ‘Far Seas’,” Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 2
(May 2009), p. 150.
41 Cole, Great Wall at Sea, pp. 167, 177. The concept of Sea denial means a
limited duration denial of enemy freedom of actions in a certain area.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China 2008 (March 2008), p. 23.
42 Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active
Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications, Naval War College
Review (Summer 1994), pp. 7-32.
43 Recently China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie stated that China’s
possession of aircraft carrier is inevitable because it has the large area of
sea, thus a heavy responsibility to defend it. Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
March 21, 2009.
44 David Lei, “China’s New Multi-faced Maritime Strategy,” Orbis, Vol. 52,
No. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 139-157.
45 The International Institute of Strategic Studies, TheMilitary Balance, 2006
(London: Routledge, 2007), p. 247.
46 Sankei News, October 17, 2008.
47 Toshihide Yamauchi, “Chugoku Kaigun no Hatten to Kadai,” in Tomohide
Murai, Junichi Abe, Ryo Asano, and Jun Yasuda, eds., Chugoku o Meguru
Anzenhosho (Kyoto: Mineruba Shobo, 2007), p. 187.
48 Fisher, China’s Military Modernization, pp. 133-134, 149, 152. Asahi.
Com (http://www.asahi.com/international)
49 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 376.
50 M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and
Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2008), pp. 126-172; “Regime Insecurity and International
Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes,”
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 46-83.
51 Cited in Keiichiro Tomita, “Chugoku no Kokubo Hakusho,” Refarensu,
June 2007, p. 141.
52 Moreover, China’s post Cold War behavior is consistent with another
realist hypothesis that the rising power is likely toavoid conflicts for
seeking a better “relative” power position in the future. Dale C. Copeland,
Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 3;
82 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW V NOVEMBER 2011
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Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 73.
53 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of International Politics, p. 76.
54 Tang Shiping argues that China under Deng is a defensive realist state.
Tang Shiping, “From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social
Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy,” in China’s
Ascent, pp. 141-162. His central thesis is not persuasive. He says that
“China feels more secure perhaps than at any time in the past two
centuries (157).” If so, China should decrease its military spending
because excessive military build-up in a secure environment is
counterproductive for a security-seeker. The important point is that the
data shows the extraordinary rapid and consistent growth of Chinese
military budget while China feels more security. This critical evidence
confirms that China under Deng and his successors is still an offensive
realist state.
55 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the
Future of East Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 41, 79,
195.
56 Economic/commercial liberalism assumes that the more economically
states interact, the more peacefully they behave. Bruce Russett and John
R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and
International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). The origin
of this thought can be found in Kant’s Perpetual Peace. Immanuel Kant,
“Perpetual Peace,” in Carl Friedrich, ed., The Philosophy of Kant
(New York: Modern Library, 1977 (1795)).
57 Richard Rosecrance, “Power and International Relations: The Rise of
China and Its Effects,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 1
(February 2006), p. 35.
58 Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 122.
59 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007), p. 21.
60 Shirk, China, p. 72; China Daily, May 9, 2006, cited in Shirk, China, p. 74.
61 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,
China’s National Defense in 2006, December 29, 2006.
62 M. Taylor Fravel, “Securing Borders: China’s Doctrine and Force Structure
for Frontier Defense,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4-5
(August/October 2007), p. 706. Although he emphasized China’s
adherence to the frontier defense (bianfang), China’s strategic focus
gradually shifts to the maritime defense (haifang).
63 Jonathan D. Pollack, “Chinese Military Power: What Vexes the United
States and Why?” Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Fall 2007), p. 642.
64 Kang, China Rising, p. 59.
65 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of International Politics, p. 139.
66 Taiwan would also provide China with a good submarine base because
the waters off of Taiwan’s east coast have depths of more than 1000
meters, thus the Chinese submarines could maneuver more easily without
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detection of foreign antisubmarine, reconnaissance aircraft, and vessels.
Tomohiko Taniguchi, “A Cold Peace: The Changing Security Equation in
Northeast Asia,” Orbis, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 456.
67 Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, “Command of the Sea with Chinese
Characteristics,” Orbis, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Fall 2005), p. 684.
68 Kang, China Rising, pp. 5, 80.
69 See Alan M. Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Relations for China’s
Territorial Integrity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007) for
extended arguments.
70 In 2002, China became the number one market for Taiwan, replacing the
United States and recently nearly one fourth of Taiwan exports are destined
for mainland China. Richard Bush, “Taiwan faces China: Attraction and
Repulsion,” in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New
Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p. 172.
71 Despite the presidency of pro-China Ma clearly decreases the possibility of
Taiwan’s declaration of independence, we cannot observe any clear
change of China’s military policy towards Taiwan.
72 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China, August 2010, 2; Military Power
of the People’s Republic of China 2008, March 2008, 2. For more detailed
information, see Fisher, China’s Military Modernization, pp. 132-135.
73 While Alastair Johnston describes China’s maritime “ambition” in one
paper, he does not even modestly touch this concept in another paper
when he asks whether or not China’s leadership has a preference for
establishing hegemony in the region. Compare Johnston, “Realism(s) and
Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Period,” pp. 269-270 with “Is
China a Status Quo Power?” pp. 26-27.
74 This evidence corresponds with a revisionism indicator elaborated by
Alastair Johnston that military power is considered to be a critical tool to
realize a redistribution of power. However, he sidesteps this question. “Is
China a Status Quo Power?” pp. 11, 38-48. One crucial point of this
indicator must be whether China’s leadership considers military power as
a critical tool for power redistribution or not. Hence, he should directly
answer to this point, but he does not.
75 Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist
Back In,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), p. 105.
76 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,
China’s National Defense in 2006, December 29, 2006.
77 Satoshi Amako, one of the most prominent specialists on modern Chinese
politics in Japan, argues that the Hu Jintao administration has not given
up undermining the United States hegemony for re-establishing a Greater
China in the long run. Satoshi Amako, Chugoku, Ajia, Nihon (Tokyo:
Chikuma Shobo, 1996), p. 114.
78 Mainichi Shimbun, July 25, 1992.
79 David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, “Making Process, Not
Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order,”
International Security, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Summer 2007), p. 179.
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80 As several security specialists point out, current Chinese military forces do
not have enough ability to conquer Taiwan even if China wanted to do so.
Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International
Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Autumn 2000), pp. 51-86.
81 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008, p. 23. Although the
preemptive war rarely happens, under the condition of offense dominant
the state may launch war for changing the status quo because it enables
the war initiator to achieve conquest quickly and pay the least cost as a
result. The 1974 Paracel incident was the case: China conquered the
Paracel islands by using forces partly because it had a power projection
capability relative to South Vietnam and expected to finish its military
campaign in the very short term at the extremely low cost. In fact, China
faced almost no countermeasures from the United States (because the U.S.
withdrew from Indochina and considered an alignment with China as a
countermeasure against the Soviets) but also from the ASEAN countries.
Kazuhiko