Análise sobre o THAAD sigla em inglês paraTerminal de Defesa Aérea para Grandes Altitudes, a partir da ótica da teoria dos jogos de dois níveis, de Robert D. Putnam

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UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE UBERLÂNDIA
INSTITUTO DE ECONOMIA
BACHARELADO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS
LABORATÓRIO DE PESQUISA EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS I
DOCENTE NICOLE GAYARD
SILVA, Luiza Godinho
Análise sobre o THAAD – sigla em inglês paraTerminal de Defesa Aérea para Grandes Altitudes, a partir da ótica da teoria dos jogos de dois níveis, de Robert D. Putnam
2017
Introdução
Em julho de 2016, o Departamento de Defesa do EUA e o Ministério de Defesa Nacional da Coreia do Sul anunciaram, numa declaração conjunta, a intenção de instalar o sistema THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense – em tradução livre para o português: Terminal de Defesa Aérea para Grandes Altitudes), um sistema antimísseis, à 300 quilômetros de Seoul, capital da Coreia do Sul. O sistema desenhado para proteger o país asiático de seu vizinho mais próximo, o qual, justamente um dia antes do início da operação, havia lançado quatro mísseis - em desafio a sanções internacionais vigentes, a Coréia do Norte, suscitou discussões por todo o continente, principalmente na China, país que se posicionou publicamente contra a instauração do sistema, especulando a possibilidade de a operação abalar o equilíbrio da segurança regional. 
Em resposta à decisão da Coreia do Sul de instalar o THAAD, o governo chinês lançou uma agressiva campanha pública de retaliação econômica, empregando uma variedade de alavancas coercivas para tentar forçar a Coreia do Sul a abandonar o sistema, levando a uma série de implicações significativas para os Estados Unidos e aos países da zona Ásia-Pacífico. 
Neste trabalho propomo-nos a examinar resposta da China à implementação do sistema de defesa de mísseis em solo sul-coreano e suas implicações, trazendo ainda reflexões quanto ao curso de ação chinês, resultante de um processo decisório em dois níveis, com noções originadas da abordagem de Robert D. Putnam, desenvolvidas em sua obra “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games” (1988). 
A primeira parte será, portanto, dedicada à contextualização do assunto apreciado, em um aporte histórico, levando-se em consideração os vários atores e os eventos, relevantes para a compreensão do caso, ocorridos até o final de novembro de 2017. Na segunda parte do trabalho será enfocado o tema com o apropriado engajamento teórico. Posteriormente, o grupo apresentará as conclusões extraídas em relação ao averiguado.
Contexto
A origem dos conflitos na Coreia remonta, claro, à Guerra da Coreia e, anteriormente, ao fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial e aos primeiros momentos da Guerra Fria. Toda a questão se inicia devido ao fato de que, desde 1905, a península coreana como um todo havia sido um protetorado japonês. No entanto, com a derrota japonesa na Segunda Guerra Mundial, o território foi ocupado em sua região norte pela então União Soviética (URSS) e em sua região sul pelos Estados Unidos, que logo após se tornariam os dois pólos contrários do período histórico conhecido como Guerra Fria, sendo a URSS a grande potência socialista e os EUA a grande potência capitalista.
Inicialmente, tal situação foi resolvida na Conferência de Potsdam (1945), logo após o fim da guerra, estabelecendo uma divisão da península no paralelo 38, o que significa que o território ao norte do paralelo 38 permaneceria sob domínio soviético, enquanto o território ao sul do mesmo ficaria sob controle estadunidense. Pode-se considerar que houveram tentativas de reunificação do território, mas estas nunca foram efetivas, devido à não desistência de nenhum dos lados quanto aos seus sistemas econômicos (socialismo x capitalismo).
Em 1948, a Coreia do Norte declara independência, oficializando a separação do território em dois países distintos: a República Democrática Popular da Coréia, socialista, e a República da Coréia, capitalista. Nesse momento, os líderes Syngman Rhee (sul) e Kim Il-Sung (norte) começaram, ambos, a reivindicar o domínio sobre toda a península, o que vai gerar tensão nas fronteiras.
A Guerra da Coreia em si se dá entre 1950 e 1953, sendo considerado o primeiro conflito armado da Guerra Fria. Trata-se de um conflito pela delimitação de fronteiras com avanços e recuos, que nunca teve um Tratado de Paz assinado, apenas um armistício, e mesmo este teve uma negociação difícil. Quanto ao que levou à guerra, poderia ser tanto resultado de um acordo secreto entre Coreia do Norte, Rússia e China quanto uma resposta à provocações vindas da Coreia do Sul (sob a influência dos EUA, visto que quem comandava era MacArthur), ou ainda simplesmente o resultado das tensões entre políticos e mesmo a população. Poderia ainda, é claro, ser resultado de uma somatória dos fatores acima.
Assim, o envolvimento da União Soviética, dos Estados Unidos e da China, em especial dos dois primeiros, é não só esperado como intrínseco, quando enxergamos a Guerra da Coreia como parte do contexto da Guerra Fria. Já com um histórico de militarização na Coreia do Norte, em 1950 a URSS envia tropas para a Coreia do Norte, com o intuito de realizar uma ofensiva à Coreia do Sul, forçando um recuo da segunda mais para o sul, o que recebeu uma resposta dura de Rhee (líder da Coreia do Sul): evacuação de Seoul e eliminação de suspeitos indivíduos comunistas.
A complicação do conflito leva a ONU, fortemente influenciada pelos Estados Unidos, a buscar uma intervenção militar contra a Coreia do Norte na região, enviando tropas compostas em especial por soldados norte-americanos; dessa forma, ocorre uma contra-ofensiva sul-coreana, que causa um grande recuo norte-coreano para o norte, levando o conflito para perto da fronteira sino-coreana. Num efeito cascata, tal intervenção leva ao envolvimento da China, país que também já tinha passado pela Revolução Comunista, pois esta se sentia ameaçada pela intervenção de Estados capitalistas tão próxima às suas fronteiras. Com a intervenção chinesa, o conflito se reequilibra, levando a fronteira de volta para a região do paralelo 38. Durante os anos seguintes de conflito, a guerra continua sem avanços consideráveis de nenhum dos lados.
Com o armistício em 1953, diversas medidas para a garantia de seu funcionamento foram tomadas, incluindo a separação oficial dos países e a manutenção de uma área desmilitarizada na região da fronteira, entre outros. No entanto, a divisão acaba sendo problemática, pois as duas Coreias se desenvolveram de maneiras muito diferentes, criando um grande abismo entre as duas, isso numa região já conflituosa e instável.
Devido a isso e às oscilações de intenções da Coreia do Norte, desde o fim do conflito houveram tentativas de negociações de paz que nunca deram certo, e as relações entre os dois países passam por períodos de piora e melhora.
Nos últimos anos, observa-se um acirramento das tensões entre os dois países e as demais potências envolvidas; um exemplo disso é a declaração de invalidez do armistício de 1953 feita pela Coreia do Norte em 2013, colocando a região novamente em estado de guerra.
Cronologia de eventos principais que levaram à implantação do THAAD
2014
June 3 -- The United States Forces Korea (USFK) commander Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti tells a forum that Washington is considering deploying THAAD in South Korea to counter North Korea's threats.
2015
Feb. 4 -- China's defense minister Chang Wanquan expresses concerns over the possible deployment of the advanced U.S. missile defense system in South Korea during talks with his South Korean counterpart Han Min-koo.
March 11 -- South Korea's presidential office says no decision was made on whether to allow the U.S. to deploy the THAAD battery in South Korea. It added that there was neither request from the U.S. to deploy the system nor consultations between the allies.
April 10 -- U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter says his country is not ready to begin discussions on the possible deployment of the THAAD system on South Korean soil.
May 21 -- South Korea's defense ministry says that Seoul would join consultations with Washingtonif the U.S. requests a discussion on the possible deployment of the THAAD system.
2016
Jan. 6 -- North Korea conducts its fourth nuclear test, claiming that it succeeded in detonating a hydrogen bomb.
Jan. 13 -- President Park Geun-hye says in a press conference that her country will review the issue of whether to allow the American forces here to deploy the THAAD system from the perspective of national security and interests.
Feb. 7 -- South Korea and the U.S. announce that they agreed to begin negotiations for the "earliest possible" deployment of the THAAD battery on South Korean soil in response to North Korea's launch of a long-range rocket.
March 4 -- South Korea and the U.S. officially launch a joint working group to discuss the possible deployment of the THAAD system in the Northeast Asian country.
March 31 -- Chinese President Xi Jinping tells U.S. President Barack Obama during a summit that China is "firmly opposed" to the deployment of a THAAD battery in South Korea, according to China's assistant foreign minister Zheng Zeguang.
June 4 -- Defense Minister Han Min-koo says that South Korea has the clear intention to deploy the THAAD system on its soil during the Asia Security Summit held in Singapore.
June 24 -- Defense Minister Han Min-koo tells reporters that the THAAD system is believed to be capable of intercepting North Korea's intermediate-range ballistic missiles if it is deployed in South Korea.
July 5 -- South Korea's defense ministry says Seoul and Washington have yet to decide when and where to deploy the THAAD system.
July 8 -- South Korea and the U.S. announce the decision to deploy THAAD on South Korean soil.
O que é o THAAD
THAAD was recently deployed to South Korea for its ability to spot, track, and destroy shorter-range ballistic missiles like the ones North Korea threatens to arm with nuclear warheads and rain down on US forces and South Korean cities.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a transportable system that intercepts ballistic missiles, particularly well-suited to intercept and destroy short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase, inside or outside the atmosphere, at a range of 200 kilometers. THAAD uses a one-stage hit-to-kill interceptor to destroy incoming ballistic missile targets, mitigating the effects of weapons of mass destruction before they reach the ground. 
The concept development for the THAAD program began in 1989 and the official program office was chartered in 1992. Since reaching Program Initiation status, in 2000, THAAD is 14 for 14 in intercept testing. Although the first contract with the U.S. government was signed in January 2007, it was only initially fielded in April 2012 with two batteries at Fort Bliss, Texas. By the end of 2015, five THAAD batteries have been activated. Four are operationally ready for deployment and the fifth was scheduled to finish training in 2016.
There’s a lot more to THAAD’s feature set. The missile itself can travel at “hypersonic” speed. Indeed, THAAD American manufacturer Lockheed Martin is interested in developing an extended range THAAD variant to counter hypersonic glide vehicles, including China’s own WU-14.
The stated purpose of THAAD is to defend U.S. troops, allied forces, population centers, and critical infrastructure from short- and medium-range missiles. The first foreign sale of the system was to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with the deal signed at the end of 2011.3
Qual a relação do programa com a China
China has consistently expressed its strong opposition to THAAD since the initial February 2016 announcement of formal talks between South Korea and the United States. On the day of the announcement, Beijing summoned the
But despite THAAD being the world's most advanced system of its type, its missile batteries don't scare China, as they are nonoffensive missiles, used solely for crashing into an incoming missile.
South Korean ambassador to China to formally protest the move.18 Hours after the July 2016 decision to deploy THAAD, Beijing demarched the U.S. and South Korean ambassadors to China to lodge a formal protest and convey its strong disapproval.19 Beijing has also undertaken an aggressive public campaign to denounce the deployment through official statements and state-run media. In the months since the decision to deploy the system was announced, Beijing’s opposition to THAAD has been a consistent theme in official statements, as China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone has spoken out against it more than 50 times.20 Beijing appeared to be intensifying its anti-THAAD campaign as the system moved closer to deployment, reflected in the uptick in foreign ministry remarks and heightened rhetoric of Chinese media commentary as well as rising economic retaliation against certain segments of South Korea’s economy.21 In addition to its own remarks, Chinese officials have issued multiple joint statements with their Russian counterparts expressing opposition to THAAD.22
Chinese officials, media commentaries, and experts have expressed concerns about THAAD and offered justifications why South Korea should cancel the plan to deploy the system. However, these arguments overlook or ignore important details about the missile defense system’s technical capabilities and misrepresent the security dynamics in Northeast Asia.
A preocupação chinesa se baseia em 4 principais conclusões:
THAAD’s X-band radar weakens China’s nuclear deterrence: China doesn't fear THAAD's inert warheads or a South Korea soundly defended against its missile attacks, but an early-warning system that could cripple its nuclear deterrent. To China, THAAD poses an existential threat. China has spent billions developing a nuclear arsenal to ensure its sovereignty and ability to deter a great power from attacking it. Having THAAD on its border puts that in jeopardy.
THAAD provides only minimal defense against North Korean missiles and therefore must be targeted at China
THAAD causes instability on the Korean Peninsula and will lead to a regional arms race
THAAD is aimed at constraining Chinese power in the region
In response to South Korea’s decision to install THAAD, the Chinese government launched an aggressive public campaign of economic retaliation. Since the July 2016 announcement that the THAAD system would be deployed in South Korea, China blocked market access of South Korean goods and services in a range of sectors, including:
Entertainment
Consumer products
Tourism
China also appears to have used diplomatic levers to punish South Korea.
Thus far, South Korea has resisted China’s economic coercion, staying committed to THAAD. In April 2017, South Korea filed a formal complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) over Chinese retaliation, citing restrictions on the sale of baby formula and medical equipment.78 China did not offer a direct response to South Korea’s complaint. When South Korea first lodged an informal complaint with the WTO in March, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman only said, “We support normal business and other exchanges between China and South Korea, but everyone knows this needs a corresponding basis in public opinion.”79 Seoul may find it challenging to prove Beijing’s actions are deliberate retaliation. The Chinese government has not publicly acknowledged any of its retaliatory actions, citing safety regulations or routine investigations as justifications for various bans. Beijing has also tacitly stoked consumer boycotts of South Korean products, which are rationalized as actions of patriotic Chinese protesting foreign aggression.80
China’s economic retaliation against South Korea follows a pattern of Chinese actions toward countries with which it finds itself in a diplomatic or security dispute, como Japão, Filipinas, Noruega e Mongolia. No entanto, o país tem Taiwan como alvo mais frequente de suas retaliações.
Although Beijing has used economic coercion, among other tools, to try to compel Seoul to abandon theTHAAD deployment, China demanded, em agosto de 2017, that the United States immediately withdraw as sanções on companies and individuals trading with North Korea, saying that such punitive measures would damage Sino-U.S. ties. As the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on 10 companies and six people from China and Russia that it said had conducted business with North Korea in ways that advanced the country’s missile and nuclear weapons program.
No entanto, com Pyongyang realizando unprecedented missile testing program, ao longo de 2017, as well as its biggest nuclear test yet in early September, as it seeks to develop a powerful nuclear weapon capable of reaching the United States, suas relações com a China, até então North Korea's only major ally, deterioraram-se. O que pode ter contribuido com o acordo anunciado em 31 de outubro, no qual Seoul e Pequim concordaram em terminar a disputa.
The unexpected detente comes just days before U.S. President Donald Trump begins a trip to Asia where North Korea will again take center stage.
As part of the agreement, South Korean President Moon Jae-in will meet Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the summit of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries in Vietnam on November 10-11. South Korea’s Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha reassured Chinese officials a day earlier that that despite the THAAD deployment, South Korea had no intention of joining the United States’ efforts to build a region-wide missile-defense system aimed at countering China’s expansion of its military capabilities, would not accept any additional THAAD batteries, and would not enter any trilateral military alliance with the United States and Japan.
Sumário dos acontecimentos dps da instalação
The decision to deploy the antimissile defense system THAAD was made in July 2016. The first launchers became operational in May 2017. 
• President Moon Jae-in initially opposed THAAD but has now accelerated its deployment in response to North Korea’s nuclear test on September 3. 
• Both the U.S. and South Korea see THAAD as necessary to defend against North Korea’s missile threat as well as a crucial part of their security strategy in Northeast Asia. 
• THAAD strongly affects South Korea's relationships with its neighbors, especially China which has objected to its deployment, viewing it as an extension of U.S. strategic interests. 
• North Korea sees the deployment of THAAD as an act of aggression and has accelerated its missile and nuclear programs with further tests.
On October 31, Seoul and Beijing agreed to end a year-long dispute over the deployment of a U.S. THAAD battery in South Korea. 
Conclusão
Bibliografia
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Report_China%27s%20Response%20to%20THAAD%20Deployment%20and%20its%20Implications.pdf
http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/internacional-39207356
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21979127
https://www.britannica.com/event/Korean-War 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/07/08/1/0200000000AEN20160708007700315F.html
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-bristles-at-us-imposed-sanctions-on-north-korea-trade/2017/08/23/32bfba3c-87ba-11e7-9ce7-9e175d8953fa_story.html?utm_term=.bbc77ecf404d
http://www.businessinsider.com/china-south-korea-companies-thaad-missile-defense-deployment-2017-10
http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2016/11/THAAD-Backgrounder-ISDP-2.pdf
https://missilethreat.csis.org/china-south-korea-end-thaad-dispute/