The Behavioral and Brain Sciences (Vol

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The Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Editor
Stevan Harnad 
20 Nassau St., Suite 240 
Princeton, NJ 08542
Assistant Editor
Helaine Randerson
Associate Editors
Behavioral Biology
Jack P. Hailman/U. Wisconsin
Hubert Markl/Universität Konstanz
Biosocial Behavior
Glendon Schubert/U. Hawaii, Manoa
Cognition and Artificial Intelligence 
Zenon Pylyshyn/U. Western Ontario
Cognitive Development
Annette Karmiloff-Smith/MRC, London and MPI, Nijmegen
Cognitive Neuroscience 
Lynn Nadel/U. California, Irvine
Developmental Psychology
Charles J. Brainerd/University of Alberta
Evolutionary Biology
Michael T. Ghiselin/California Academy of Sciences
Experimental Analysis of Behavior
A. Charles Catania/U. Maryland, Baltimore County
History and Systems 
Julian Jaynes/Princeton
Language and Cognition
Peter Wason/University College, London
Language and Language Disorders 
Max Coltheart/U. London
Neurobiology 
Graham Hoyle/U. Oregon
Neuropharmacology
Susan D. Iversen/Mercke Sharp and Dohme, Ltd. 
Neuropsychology
Jeffrey A. Gray/Inst. Psychiatry, London
Neurophysiology
Sten Grillner/Karolinska Institutet
Paleoneurology 
Stephen Jay Gould/Harvard
Philosophy
Daniel C. Dennett/Tufts 
Psychobiology
Victor H. Denenberg/U. Connecticut 
David S. Olton/Johns Hopkins
Quantitative Methods 
Donald B. Rubin/U. Chicago
Vision and Artificial Intelligence 
Stuart Sutherland/U. Sussex
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© Cambridge University Press 1984
Contents Volume 7:4 December 1984
CANONICAL PAPERS OF B. F. SKINNER
A. C. Catania, S. Harnad, editors
Introduction
Catania, A. C. The operant behaviorism of B. F.
Skinner 473
Skinner, B. F. Selection by consequences 477
Open Peer Commentary
Barlow, G. W. Skinner on selection - A case study of
intellectual isolation 481
Bolles, R. C. On the status of causal inodes 482
Boulding, K. E. B. F. Skinner: A dissident view 483
Campbell, C. B. G. Behaviorism and natural selection 484
Dahlbom, B. Skinner, selection, and self-control 484 
Dawkins, R. Replicators, consequences, and
displacement activities 486
Donahoe, J. W. Skinner - The Darwin of ontogeny? 487 
Gamble, T. J. The wider context of selection by
consequences 488 
Ghiselin, M. T. The emancipation of thought and
culture from their original material substrates 489
Hallpike, C. R. Fitting culture into a Skinner box 489
Harris, M. Group and individual effects in selection 490 
Honig, W. K. On the stabilization of behavioral
selection 491
Katz, M. J. Cause and effect in evolution 492
Maynard Smith, J. A one-sided view of evolution 493 
Plotkin, H. C. & Odling-Smee, F. J. Linear and
circular causal sequences 493
Provine, R. R. Contingency-governed science 494 
Rosenberg, A. Fitness, reinforcement, underlying
mechanisms 495
Rumbaugh, D. M. Perspectives by consequences 496
Schull, J. Selectionism, mentalisms, and behaviorism 497 
Solomon, P. R. Bridges from behaviorism to
biopsychology 498
Stearns, S. C. Selection misconstrued 499 
Timberlake, W. Selection by consequences: A
universal causal mode? 499
Vaughan, W. Jr. Giving up the ghost 501 
Wyrwicka, W. Natural selection and operant behavior 501
Author’s Response
Skinner, B. F. Some consequences of selection 502
Skinner, B. F. Methods and theories in the experimental analysis of 
behavior 511
Open Peer Commentary Roberts, S. What then should we do? 532
Deitz, S. M. Real people, ordinary language, and Rozeboom, W. W. The dark side of Skinnerian
natural measurement 524 epistemology 533
Luce, R. D. Behavior theory: A contradiction in Sayre, K. M. Current questions for the science of
terms? 525 behavior 535
Mackenzie, B. The challenge to Skinner’s theory of Schagrin, M. L. Theories and human behavior 536
behavior 526 Shimp, C. P. The question: Not shall it be, but which
M arriott, F. H. C. The role of the statistician in shall it be? 536
psychology 527 Sosa, E. Behavior, theories, and the inner 537
Millward, R. Cognitive science: A different approach Townsend, J. T. Psychology: Toward the mathematical
to scientific psychology 527 innerman 539
Moravcsik, J. M. E. Should we return to the Wolins, L. Behavioral and statistical theorists and
laboratory to find out about learning? 529 their disciples 540
Nelson, R. J. Skinner’s philosophy of method 529
Nicholas, J. M. Lessons from the history of science? 530 Author’s Response
Richelle, M. N. Are Skinner’s warnings still relevant Skinner, B. F. Theoretical contingencies 541
to current psychology? 531
Skinner, B. F. The operational analysis of psychological terms 547
Open Peer Commentary
Bennett, J. Stimulus-response meaning theory 553
Brinker, R. P. & Jaynes, J. Waiting for the world to 
make me talk and tell me what I meant 554
Danto, A. C. Skinner on the verbal behavior of verbal 
behaviorists 555
Dennett, D. C. Wishful thinking 556
G arrett, K. R. Private reference 557
Graham, G. Sensation and classification 558
Harzern, P. Operationism, smuggled connotations,
and the nothing-else clause 559
Hineline, P. N. What, then, is Skinner’s 
operationism? 560
Hocutt, M. Skinner on sensations 560
Kenrick, D. T. & Keefe, R. C. Social traits, self­
observations, and other hypothetical constructs 561
Lowe, C. F. The flight from human behavior 562 Stalker, D. & ZifT, P. B. F. Skinner’s theorizing 569
Meehl, P. E. Radical behaviorism and mental events: Terrace, H. S. A behavioral theory of mind? 569
Four methodological queries 563 Wright, C. On the operational definition of a
Moore, J. On Skinner’s radical operationism 564 toothache 571
Place, U. T. Logic, reference, and mentalism 565 Zuriff, G. E. Radical behaviorism and theoretical
Rachlin, H. Mental, yes. Private, no. 566 entities 572
Ringen, J. D. B. F. Skinner’s operationism 567
Robertson, L. C. There is more than one way to Author’s Response
access an image 568 Skinner, B. F. Coming to terms with private events 572
Skinner, B. F. An operant analysis of problem solving
Open Peer Commentary
Cohen, L. J. On the depth and fit of behaviorist
explanation 591
Dodwell, P. C. Can we analyze Skinner’s problem­
solving behavior in operant terms? 592 
Feldman, J. A. Learning from instruction 593 
Grossberg, S. The microscopic analysis of behavior:
Toward a synthesis of instrumental, perceptual, and 
cognitive ideas 594
H arré, R. Psychology as moral rhetoric 595
Hogarth, R. M. On choosing the “right” stimulus and 
rule 596
Hunt, E. A case study of how a paper containing good 
ideas, presented by a distinguished scientist, to an 
appropriate audience, had almost no influence at all 597 
Julià, P. Contingencies, rules, and the “problem” of 
novel behavior 598
Kaufmann, G. Can Skinner define a problem? 599
583
599Kochen, M. Problem solving as a cognitive process 
Raaheim, K. Is there such a thing as a problem
situation? 600
Rapoport, A. Questions raised by the reinforcement
paradigm 601
Rein, J. G. Response classes, operants, and rules in 
problem solving 602
Scandura, J. M. New wine in old glasses? 602
Stabler, E. P., Jr. Rule-governed behavior in 
computational psychology 604
Sternberg, R. J. Operant analysis of problem solving: 
Answers to questions you probably don’t want to ask 605 
Verplanck, W. S. The egg revealed 605
Wetherick, N. E. Negation in Skinner’s system 606
Author’s Response
Skinner, B. F. Contingencies and rules 607
Skinner, B. F. Behaviorism at fifty
Open Peer Commentary
Adler, J. E. A defense of ignorance 621 
Belth, M. The fruitful metaphor, but a metaphor,
nonetheless 622
Davis, L. H. Skinner as conceptual analyst 623 
Farrell, B. A. Treading the primrose path of dalliance
in psychology 624 
Furedy, J. J. & Riley, D. M. Undifferentiated and 
“mote-beam” percepts in Watsonian-Skinnerian
behaviorism 625 
Gallup, G. G. Jr. Consciousness, explanation, and the
verbal community 626
Gopnik, A. In search of a theory of learning 627
Gordon, R. M. A causal role for “conscious” seeing 628 
Gunderson, K. Leibnizian privacy and Skinnerian
privacy 628
Heil, J. I ve got you under my skin 629 
Hitterdale, L. B. F. Skinner’s confused philosophy of
science 630 
Irwin, F. W. J. B. Watson’s imagery and other
mentalistic problems 632
Johnson, C. N. What’s on the minds of children? 632
Lebowitz, M. Artificially intelligent mental models 633
Lycan, W. G. Skinner and the mind - body problem 634
Lyons, W. Behaviorism and “the problem of privacy” 635
Marr, M. J. Philosophy and the future of behaviorism 636
Marshall, J. C. Mechanism at two thousand 637
Moore, R. C. A cognitivist reply to behaviorism 637
Mortensen, C. Introspection as the key to mental life 639
615
Perlis, D. Belief-level way stations 639
Rey, G. Ontology and ideology of behaviorism and 
mentalism 640
Robinson, D. N. Behaviorism at seventy 641
Rosenthal, D. M. The behaviorist concept of mind 643 
Schnaitter, R. “Behaviorism at fifty” at twenty 644
Schustack, M. W. & Carbonell, J. G. Cognitive 
science at seven: A wolf at the door for 
behaviorism? 645
Simon, M. A. Explaining behavior Skinner’s way 646
Staddon, J. E. R. Skinner’s behaviorism implies a 
subcutaneous homunculus 647
Stich, S. P. Is behaviorism vacuous? 647
Terry, W. S. “Mental way stations” in contemporary 
theories of animal learning 649
Thomas, R. K. Are radical and cognitive behaviorism 
incompatible? 650
Toates, F. M. Models, yes; homunculus, no 650
Wellman, H. M. The development of concepts of the 
mental world 651
Woodruff, M. L. Operant conditioning and behavioral 
neuroscience 652
Wyers, E. J. Is “Behaviorism at fifty” twenty years 
older? 653
Zentall, T. R. In support of cognitive theories 654
Author’s Response
Skinner, B. F. Representations and misrepresentations 655
Skinner, B. F. The phylogeny and ontogeny of behavior 669
678
679
Open Peer Commentary
Albnann, S. A. Skinner’s circus 
Baerends, G. P. Ontogenetic or phylogenetic— 
another afterpain of the fallacious Cartesian 
dichotomy
Barash, D. P. Contingencies of selection,
reinforcement, and survival 680
Barkow, J. H. Of false dichotomies and larger frames 680 
Blanchard, D. C., Blanchard, R. J. & Flannelly, K.
J. A new experimental analysis of behavior—one for 
all behavior 681
Brown, J. L. Cost-benefit models and the evolution
of behavior 682
Burghardt, G. M. Ethology and operant psychology 683 
Colman, A. M. Operant conditioning and natural
selection 684
Delius, J. D. Consequence contingencies and 
provenance partitions 685
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. Difficulties with phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic concepts 685
Eysenck, H. J. Skinner’s blind eye 686
Ghiselin, M. T. B. F. Skinner versus Dr. Pangloss 687 
Gottlieb, G. Lingering Haeckelian influences and 
certain other inadequacies of the operant viewpoint 
for phylogeny and ontogeny 688
Hailman, J. P. Ethology ignored Skinner to its
detriment 689
Hogan, J. A. The structure versus the provenance of 
behavior 690
Hoyle, G. Behavior in the light of identified neurons 690 
Kacelnik, A. & Houston, A. The use of evolutionary 
analogies and the rejection of state variables by B.
F. Skinner 691
Kaplan, S. Molar concepts and mentalistic theories: A
moral perspective 692
Perzigian, A. J. B. F. Skinner and the flaws of 
sociobiology 693
Plomin, R. & Daniels, D. Hereditary 5* innate 694
Plotkin, H. C. Nature and nurture revisited 695
Rapoport, A. Is evolution of behavior operant 
conditioning writ large? 696
Salthe, S. N. Skinner’s practical metaphysic may be 
impractical 696
Staddon, J. E. R. Reinforcement is the problem, not 
the solution: Variation and selection of behavior 697
Wahlsten, D. Each behavior is a product of heredity 
and experience 699
Wassermann, G. D. Neuropsychology vis-à-vis 
Skinner’s behaviouristic philosophy 700
Author’s Response
Skinner, B. F. Phylogénie and ontogenic 
environments 701
Summing up
Catania, A. C. Problems of selection and phylogeny, 
terms and methods of behaviorism 
Skinner, B. F. Reply to Catania
Ham ad, S. What are the scope and limits of radical 
713 behaviorist theory? 720
718 Skinner, B. F. Reply to Hamad 721
Continuing Commentary 725
On Corballis, M. C. and Morgan, M. J. (1978) On the biological basisof human laterality: 
I. Evidence for a maturational left-right gradient; II. The mechanisms of inheritance. 
BBS 1:261-336.
Boklage, C. E. On the inheritance of directional 
asymmetry (sidedness) in the starry flounder, 
Platichthys stellatus: Additional analyses of 
Policansky’s data 
Harris, L. J. Louis Pierre Gratiolet, Paul Broca, et al. 
on the question of a maturational left-right gradient: 
Some forerunners of current-day models
725
730
McManus, I. C. The inheritance of asymmetries in 
man and flatfish 
Policansky, D. Do genes know left from right?
Author’s Response
Corballis, M. C. Human laterality: Matters of 
pedigree
725
731
733
734
On Cohen, L. J. (1981) Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? BBS 
4:317-370. 735
Author’s Response
Cohen, L. J. Can irrationality be discussed accurately? 736
On Multiple Book Review of Lumsden and Wilson’s Genes, mind, and culture. BBS 
5:1-37. 738
Almeida, J.-M. G. Jr. Genetic and cultural evolution: Alper, J. S. & Lange, R. V. Mathematical models for
The gap, the bridge, . . . and beyond 738 gene-culture coevolution 739
Rushton, J. P. & Russell, R. J. H. Gene-culture 
theory and inherited individual differences in 
personality
Vetta, A. Natural selection and unnatural selection of 
data
740
741
Lumsden, C. J. & Wilson, E.
mathematical modeling
Author’s Response
O. On incest and
742
On Multiple Book Review of Gray’s The neuropsychology of anxiety: An enquiry into the 
functions of the septo-hippocampal system. BBS 5:469-534.
Pitman, R. K. The septo-hippocampal system and ego 744 Author’s Response
Schmajuk, N. A. Information processing in the Gray, J. A. From angst to information processing
hippocampal formation 745
Willner, P. The neuropsychology of depression 746
744
747
On Schwartz, S. (1982) Is there a schizophrenic language? BBS 5:579-626.
Neufeld, R. W. J. Are semantic networks of Author’s Response
Schwartz, S. Semantic networks, schizophrenia, and 
language
sch izophren ic sam ples in tact? 749
749
750
On Masterson, F. A. and Crawford, M. (1982) The defense motivation system: A theory of
avoidance behavior. BBS 5:661-696.
Rakover, S. S. Avoidance theory: The nature of innate 
responses and their interaction with acquired 
responses 752
752
Author’s Response
Masterson, F. A. A theory of defense behavior: Innate 
responses, consummatory goal stimuli, and cognitive 
expectancies 754
On Prioleau, L., Murdock, M. & Brody, N. (1983) An analysis of psychotherapy versus 
placebo studies. BBS 6:275-310.
Butler, S. F ., Schacht, T. E ., Henry, W. P. & Author’s Response
Strupp, H. H. Psychotherapy versus placebo: Brody, N. Is psychotherapy better than a placebo?
Revisiting a pseudo issue 756
W einberger, J. Is the meta-analysis/placebo 
controversy a case of new wine in old bottles? 757
756
758
THE B E H A V I O R A L A N D BRAIN S C I E N C E S (1984) 7, 473-475
Printed in the United States of America
The operant behaviorism 
of B. F. Skinner
A. Charles Catania
Department of Psychology, University of Maryland Baltimore County, 
Catonsville, Md. 21228
Of all contemporary psychologists, B. F. Skinner is per­
haps the most honored and the most maligned, the most 
widely recognized and the most misrepresented, the 
most cited and the most misunderstood. Some still say 
that he is a stimulus-response psychologist (he is not); 
some still say that stimulus-response chains play a central 
role in his treatment of verbal behavior (they do not); 
some still say that he disavows evolutionary determinants 
of behavior (he does not). These and other misconcep­
tions are common and sometimes even appear in psychol­
ogy texts (e.g. Todd & Morris 1983). How did they come 
about, and why do they continue? Although the present 
BBS treatments will probably not provide an answer, 
they may help to clarify some of the misunderstandings.
The articles sampled here represent a range of Skin­
ner’s work (in the treatments, each article is referred to by 
its abbreviated title). The first but most recent, “Selec­
tion by Consequences” (“Consequences,” Skinner 1981), 
relates operant theory to other disciplines, and in particu­
lar to biology and anthropology. The second, “Methods 
and Theories in the Experimental Analysis of Behavior” 
(“Methods”), outlines some of the basic concepts of oper­
ant theory in the context of a discussion of methodological 
and theoretical issues; it is an amalgamation of revised 
versions of “The Flight from the Laboratory” (Skinner 
1961) and “Are Theories of Learning Necessary?” (Skin­
ner 1950) and a portion of the preface to Contingencies o f 
Reinforcement (Skinner 1969). “The Operational Analy­
sis of Psychological Terms” (“Terms,” Skinner 1945) is 
the earliest work treated; its special concern is with the 
language of private events, and many features of Skin­
ner’s analysis of verbal behavior are implicit in it. “An 
Operant Analysis of Problem Solving” (“Problem Solv­
ing,” Skinner 1966a), continues the interpretation of 
verbal behavior in distinguishing between rule-governed 
and contingency-shaped behavior. “Behaviorism at 
Fifty” (“Behaviorism-50,” Skinner 1963) addresses the 
status of behaviorism as a philosophy of science, and 
points out some of the difficulties that must be overcome 
by any science of behavior. “The Phylogeny and On­
togeny of Behavior” (“Phylogeny,” Skinner 1966b), the 
last of the works sampled, considers how evolutionary 
variables combine with those operating within an organ­
ism’s lifetime to determine its behavior.
Biography
Burrhus Frederic Skinner was born on March 20,1904, in 
Susquehanna, Pennsylvania. After majoring in English at 
Hamilton College, he tried a career at writing but gave it 
up after finding he had nothing to say. Having a long­
standing interest in human and animal behavior and some 
familiarity with the writings of Watson, Pavlov, and 
Bertrand Russell, he then entered the graduate program 
in psychology at Harvard University (Skinner 1976). 
There he began a series of experiments that led to more 
than two dozen journal articles and culminated in The 
Behavior o f Organism s (1938). In the manner of The 
Integrative Action o f the Nervous System (Sherrington 
1906) and Behavior o f the Low er Organisms (Jennings 
1906), the work presented a variety of novel research 
findings and provided a context for them. The extensive 
data illustrated many properties of reinforcement and 
extinction, discrimination and differentiation; the con­
cept of the three-term contingency was to become the 
cornerstone for much else that would follow.
In 1936, after three years as a Junior Fellow in the 
Harvard Society of Fellows, Skinner moved to the Uni­
versity of Minnesota. His basic research continued, but 
during World War II he also worked on animal applica­
tions of behavior principles, including the training of 
pigeons to guide missiles (Skinner 1960; 1979). Although 
the project never got beyond demonstrations, a major 
fringe benefit was the discovery of shaping, the technique 
for creating novel forms of behavior through the differen­
tial reinforcement of successive approximations to a 
response.
Another product of those days was the Aircrib, which 
Skinner built for his wife and his second daughter (Skin­
ner 1945). It was a windowed space with temperature and 
humidity control that improved on the safety and comfort 
of the ordinary crib while making the care of the child less 
burdensome. It was not used for conditioning the infant 
(contrary to rumor, neither of Skinner’s daughters devel­
oped emotional instability, psychiatric problems or sui­
cidal tendencies). Soon after came the utopian novel, 
Walden Two (1948). Some who later criticized the specif­
ics of that planned society failed to observe that its 
experimental character was its most important feature:
1984 Cambridge University Press 0140-525XI84I040473-03I$06.00 473
Any practice that did not work was to be modified until a 
more effective versionwas found.
In 1945, Skinner assumed the chairmanship of the 
Department of Psychology at Indiana University. Then, 
after delivering the 1947 William James Lectures at 
Harvard University on the topic of verbal behavior, he 
returned permanently to the Harvard Department of 
Psychology (Skinner 1983). There he completed his book 
Verbal Behavior (1957) and, in collaboration with Charles
B. Ferster, developed the subject matter of schedules of 
reinforcement (Ferster & Skinner 1957). Much else has 
been omitted here (e.g. Science and Human Behavior 
[1953] and teaching machines); the articles and books 
Skinner has since written are too numerous to list. All but 
one of the articles treated (“Terms”) are drawn from those 
later pieces; they constitute a sample of his most seminal 
works. Many others are cited in the course of the treat­
ments.
Catania: Skinner’s behaviorism
Operant behaviorism
Operant behaviorism (or radical behaviorism) is the vari­
ety of behaviorism particularly identified with Skinner’s 
work. It provides the systematic context for the research 
in psychology sometimes referred to as the experimental 
analysis of behavior. Behavior itself is its fundamental 
subject matter; behavior is not an indirect means of 
studying something else, such as cognition or mind or 
brain.
A primary task of an experimental analysis is to identify 
classes of behavior on the basis of their origins. Some 
classes of responses, respondents, originate with the 
stimuli that elicit them (as illustrated by the stimulus- 
response relations called reflexes). Others, called oper­
ants, are engendered by their effects on the environment; 
because they do not require eliciting stimuli, they are 
said to be em itted rather than elicited. Admitting the 
possibility that behavior could occur without eliciting 
stimuli was a critical first step in operant theory. Earlier 
treatments had assumed that for every response there 
must be a corresponding eliciting stimulus. The rejection 
of this assumption did not imply that emitted responses 
were uncaused; rather, the point was that there are other 
causes of behavior besides eliciting stimuli. Adding oper­
ants to respondents as behavior classes did not exhaust 
the possibilities, but it was critical to recognize that the 
past consequences of responding are significant determi­
nants of behavior.
The consequences of a response may either raise or 
lower subsequent responding. Consequences that do so 
are respectively called reinforcers and punishers (punish­
ment has sometimes been confused with negative rein­
forcement, but positive and negative reinforcement both 
involve increases in responding; they differ in whether 
the consequence of responding is the addition to or 
removal of something from the environment, as in the 
difference between appetitive procedures and those in­
volving escape or avoidance). The particular reli; tions that 
can be established between responses and their conse­
quences are called contingencies of reinforcement or 
punishment.
But the consequences of responding are also typically 
correlated with other features of the environment (some
consequences of stepping on the brake pedal or the gas 
pedal, for example, depend on whether the traffic light is 
red or green). When a stimulus sets the occasion on which 
responding will have a particular consequence, the stim­
ulus is said to be discrim inative. If responses then come to 
depend on, or come under the control of, this stimulus, 
the response class is called a discrim inated operant. Both 
respondents and discriminated operants involve an ante­
cedent stimulus, but the distinction between them is 
crucial and depends on whether consequences of re­
sponding play a role. A response that depends only on the 
presentation of a stimulus, as in a reflex relation, is a 
member of a respondent class. One that depends on the 
relations among the three terms - stimulus, response, 
consequence - is a member of a discriminated operant 
class. Thus, discriminated operants are said to be defined 
by a three-term contingency. The three-term contingen­
cy is often neglected by those who think of behavior 
change only in terms of the instrumental and classical 
procedures of earlier conditioning theories.
Much of the research that helped to establish this 
vocabulary was conducted in the experimental chamber 
that for a while was known as the Skinner box (that term 
was more often used by those outside than by those 
within the experimental analysis of behavior). Simple 
stimuli (lights, sounds), simple responses (lever presses, 
key pecks), and simple reinforcers (food, water) were 
arranged for studying the behavior of rats or pigeons. 
Many responses automatically have particular conse­
quences (to see something below eye level, for example, 
we look down rather than up). But natural environments 
do not ordinarily include levers on which presses produce 
food pellets only when lights are on. Operant chambers 
were designed to create arbitrary contingencies; they 
were arbitrary, but only in this sense. As for responses 
such as the pigeon’s key peck;
Such responses are not wholly arbitrary. They are 
chosen because they can be easily executed, and be­
cause they can be repeated quickly and over long 
periods of time without fatigue. In such a bird as the 
pigeon, pecking has a certain genetic unity; it is a 
characteristic bit of behavior which appears with a well- 
defined topography. (Ferster & Skinner 1957, p. 7) 
Given this recognition of genetic determinants in the 
specification of operant classes, it is ironic that some 
species-specific characteristics of lever presses and key 
pecks later became the basis for criticisms of operant 
theory. Perhaps these responses were not arbitrary 
enough. But given that the concern was to study the 
effects of the consequences of responding, it would hardly 
have been appropriate to have sought out response class­
es so highly determined in other species-specific ways 
that they would have been insensitive to their conse­
quences.
There are “natural lines of fracture along which behav­
ior and environment actually break” (Skinner 1935, p. 
40). “We divide behavior into hard and fast classes and 
are then surprised to find that the organism disregards 
the boundaries we have set” (Skinner 1953, p. 94). Oper­
ant theory is not compromised by demonstrations that 
some response classes are more easily established than 
others, or that some discriminations can be more easily 
established with some reinforcers than with others. Con­
sequences are important, but they do not operate to the
474 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1984) 7:4
References/Catania: Skinner’s behaviorism
exclusion of other sources of behavior, including phy­
logénie ones. Phenomena such as autoshaping (producing 
a pigeon’s pecks on a key by repeatedly lighting the key 
and then operating the feeder) were discovered in the 
course of operant research, and present no more of a 
problem to operant accounts than do the respondent 
conditioning phenomena studied by Pavlov.
The discovery that behavior could be maintained easily 
even when only an occasional response was reinforced led 
to the investigation of schedules of reinforcement. Sched­
ules arrange reinforcers on the basis of the number of 
responses, the time at which responses occur, the rate of 
responding, or various combinations of these and other 
variables. In more complicated cases, different schedules 
operate either successively or simultaneously in the pres­
ence of different stimuli or for different responses. Rein­
forcement schedules have proven useful in such areas as 
psychopharmacology and behavioral toxicology. The per­
formances generated by complex schedules are also 
sometimes analogous to performances that in humans are 
discussed in terms of preference, self-control, and so on 
(e.g. see “Methods”).
In its extension to verbal behavior, a primary task of an 
operant analysis isagain that of identifying the various 
sources of behavior. Its concern is with the functions of 
language rather than with its structure. In the tact rela­
tion, for example, an object or event is a discriminative 
stimulus that sets the occasion for a particular utterance, 
as when one says “apple” upon seeing an apple (tacting is 
not equivalent to naming or referring to; the relation 
called reference involves another class of behavior, called 
autoclitic). Through the tact relation, verbal behavior 
makes contact with events in the world. Other relations 
include (but are not limited to) the in traverbal, in which 
verbal behavior serves as a discriminative stimulus for 
ather verbal behavior (as in learning addition or multi­
plication tables), the textual, in which written text pro­
vides the discriminative stimuli (as in reading aloud), and 
:he mand, in which the verbal response specifies a conse­
quence (as in making a request or asking a question). Any 
utterance, however, is likely to involve these and other 
relations in combination; verbal behavior is a product of 
multiple causation. Novel utterances may be dealt with 
by showing how their various components (words, 
phrases, grammatical forms) have each been occasioned 
by particular aspects of a current situation; novelty, in 
other words, comes about through novel combinations of 
existing verbal classes.
More important, these elementary relations are only 
the raw materials from which verbal behavior is con­
structed. A sentence cannot exist solely as a combination 
of these elementary units. Speakers report on the condi­
tions under which they are behaving verbally (as when 
someone says, “I am happy to report that . . .”), they 
cancel the effects of their own verbal behavior (as when 
they include “not” in a sentence), they indicate its 
strength (as when they speak of being sure or uncertain), 
and so on. In each of these cases, some parts of the 
speaker’s verbal behavior are under the discriminative 
control of the various other verbal relations. These pro­
cesses, called autoclitic, are the basis for larger verbal 
units (e.g. sentences) and for the complexities of self­
editing, logical verbal behavior, and so on. The nestings 
and orderings and coordinations of these processes are 
intricate, but they can nevertheless be accommodated by 
the discriminative stimuli and the responses and the 
consequences of the three-term contingency. This sort of 
analysis is illustrated in “Terms”; although that article 
predated Skinner’s development of the vocabulary of 
Verbal Behavior, these relations are implicit in it, and 
more is involved in it than simply the tacting of private 
events.
These and other aspects of operant behaviorism are 
discussed in the treatments that follow. For the commen­
tators, the articles are the stimuli, their commentaries are 
the responses, and Skinner’s replies are the conse­
quences. For Skinner, the commentaries are the stimuli 
and his replies are the responses; some of the conse­
quences will be evident only in the effects of the treat­
ments on their readers. Other potential responses and 
consequences produced by these treatments are even 
more remote and also remain to be seen. To the extent 
that they may correct some misreadings of operant theo­
ry, they are steps in the right direction. Given that we 
have already taken more than a single step, our journey 
has already begun. This is as it should be, because there is 
much to explore and the journey will not be short.
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T
Preparation of the introductory and concluding remarks was 
supported in part by NSF grant BNS82-03385 to the University 
of Maryland Baltimore County. Some passages from the intro­
duction were excerpted from Catania (1980), with permission of 
the publisher.
References
Catania, A. C. (1980) Operant theory: Skinner. In: Theories o f learning,, ed. 
G. M. Gazda & R. Corsini. F. E. Peacock.
Ferster, C. B. & Skinner, B. F. (1957) Schedules o f reinforcem ent. Appleton- 
Century-Crofts.
Jennings, H. S. (1906) Behavior o f the low er organisms. Macmillan.
Sherrington, C. (1906) The integrative action o f the nervous system .
Scribners.
Skinner, B. F. (1935) The generic nature of the concepts of stimulus and 
response. Journa l o f G eneral Psychology 12:40-65.
(1938) The behavior o f organisms. A p p le to n -C e n tu ry -C ro f ts .
(1945) The operational analysis of psychological terms. Psychological Review 
42:270-77; 291-94.
(1948) W alden two. Macmillan.
(1950) Are theories of learning necessary? Psychological Review 57:193-216.
(1953) Science and hum an behavior. Macmillan.
(1957) Verbal behavior. Appleton-Century-Crofts.
(1960) Pigeons in a pelican. Am erican Psychologist 15:28-37.
(1961) The flight from the laboratory. In: C urren t trench in psychological 
theory , ed. Wayne Dennis et al. University of Pittsburgh Press.
(1963) Behaviorism at fifty. Science 140:951-58.
(1966a) An operant analysis of problem solving. In: Problem solving: 
Research , m ethods, and theory , ed. B. Kleinmuntz. John Wiley & Sons.
(1966b) Phylogeny and ontogeny of behavior. Science 153:1205-13.
(1969) Contingencies o f reinforcem ent: A theoretical analysts. Prentice-Hall.
(1976) Particulars o f m y life. Knopf.
(1979) The shaping o f a behaviorist. Knopf.
(1981) Selection by consequences. Science 213:501-4.
(1983) A m atter o f consequences. Knopf.
Todd, J. T. & Morris, E. K. (1983) Misconception and miscducation:
Presentations of radical behaviorism in psychology textbooks. Behavior 
Analyst 6:153-60.
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1984) 7:4 475
Call for Papers
Investigators in 
Psychology, 
Neuroscience, 
Behavioral Biology, and 
Cognitive Science
Do you want to: 
• draw wide attention to a particularly 
im portant or controversial piece of work?
• solicit reactions, criticism, and feedback 
from a large sample of your peers?
• place your ideas in an interdisciplinary, 
international context?
The Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences ?
an extraordinary journal now in its seventh year, provides a 
special service called Open Peer Commentary to re­
searchers in any area of psychology, neuroscience, 
behavioral biology or cognitive science.
Papers judged appropriate for Commentary are circulated 
to a large number of specialists who provide substantive 
criticism, interpretation, elaboration, and pertinent com­
plementary and supplementary material from a full cross- 
disciplinary perspective.
Article and commentaries then appear simultaneously with 
the author s formal response. This BBS “treatment” 
provides in print the exciting give and take of an interna­
tional seminar.
The editor of BBS is calling for papers that offer a clear 
rationale for Commentary, and also meet high standards of 
conceptual rigor, empirical grounding, and clarity of style. 
Contributions may be (1) reports and discussions of empiri­
cal research of broader scope and implications than might 
be reported in a specialty journal; (2) unusually significant 
theoretical articles that formally model or systematize a 
body of research; and (3) novel interpretations, syntheses or 
critiques of existing theoretical work.
Although the BBS Commentary service is primarily devoted 
to original unpublished manuscripts, at times it will be ex­
tended to précis of recent books or previously published 
articles.
Published quarterly by Cambridge University Press. Edi­
torial correspondence to: Stevan Harnad, Editor, BBS, 
Suite 240, 20 Nassau Street, Princeton, NJ 08542.
. . superbly presented . . . the result is 
practically a vade mecum or Who's Who in 
each subject. [Articles are] followed by pithy 
and often (believe it or not) witty comments 
questioning, illuminating, endorsing or just 
plain arguing . . . I urge anyone with an inter­
est in psychology, neuroscience, and behav­
ioural biology to get access to this jour­
nal.” — New Scientist
"Care is taken to ensure that the commentaries 
represent asampling of opinion from scientists 
throughout the world. Through open peer com­
mentary, the knowledge imparted by the target 
article becomes more fully integrated into the 
entire field of the behavioral and brain sciences. 
This contrasts with the provincialism of special­
ized journals . . — Eugene Garfield Current 
Contents
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fered in the past from the drawing of battle 
lines between prematurely hardened posi­
tions: nature v. nurture, cognitive v. behav­
iourist, biological v. cultural causation. . . . 
[BBS] has often produced important articles 
and, of course, fascinating interchanges.. . . 
the points of dispute are highlighted if not 
always resolved, the styles and positions of 
the participants are exposed, hobbyhorses 
are sometimes ridden with great vigour, and 
mutual incom prehension is occasionally 
made very conspicuous . . . . commentaries 
are often incisive, integrative or bring highly 
relevant new information to bear on the sub­
ject.”— Nature
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cussion. It should serve as one of the major
stimulants of growth in the cognitive sciences 
over the next decade.” — Howard Gardner 
(Education) Harvard
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merely good, but essentia l. . .’’— D.O. Hebb 
(Psychology) Dalhousie
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appreciation for current topics in the brain sci­
ences . . . [and] by which original hypotheses 
may be argued openly and constructively."— 
Allen R. Wyler (Neurological Surgery) 
Washington
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rarity among scientific periodicals: a crea­
tive forum . . ."— Ashley Montagu (Anthro­
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(Linguistics) M.I.T.
. . open peer commentary . . . allows the 
reader to assess the ‘state of the art' quickly 
in a particular field. The commentaries pro­
vide a ‘who’s who’ as well as the content of 
recent research.” — Journal of Social and Bi­
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. . presents an imaginative approach to learn­
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their subject is In an explosive phase of de­
velopment . . . we frequently wish for a fo­
rum for the exchange of ideas and interpre­
tations . . . plenty ofjournals gladly carry the 
tacts, very few are willing to even consider 
promoting ideas. Perhaps even more impor­
tant is the need for opportunities publicly to 
criticize traditional ana developing concepts 
and interpretations. [BBS] is helping to fill 
these needs ."— Graham Hoyle (Biology) 
Oregon
TH E BE HA V I OR A L A N D BRAIN S C I E N C E S (1984) 7, 477-510
Printed in the United States ot America
Selection by consequences
B. F. Skinner
Department of Psychology and Social Relations, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 02138
Abstract: Human behavior is the joint product of (i) contingencies of survival responsible for natural selection, and (ii) contingencies 
of reinforcement responsible for the repertoires of individuals, including (iii) the special contingencies maintained by an evolved 
social environment. Selection by consequences is a causal mode found only in living things, or in machines made by living things. It 
was first recognized in natural selection: Reproduction, a first consequence, led to the evolution of cells, organs, and organisms 
reproducing themselves under increasingly diverse conditions. The behavior functioned well, however, only under conditions 
similar to those under which it was selected.
Reproduction under a wider range of consequences became possible with the evolution of processes through which organisms 
acquired behavior appropriate to novel environments. One of these, operant conditioning, is a second kind of selection by 
consequences: New responses could be strengthened by events which followed them. When the selecting consequences are the 
same, operant conditioning and natural selection work together redundantly. But because a species which quickly acquires behavior 
appropriate to an environment has less need for an innate repertoire, operant conditioning could replace as well as supplement the 
natural selection of behavior.
Social behavior is within easy range of natural selection, because other members are one of the most stable features of the 
environment of a species. The human species presumably became more social when its vocal musculature came under operant 
control. Verbal behavior greatly increased the importance of a third kind of selection by consequences, the evolution of social 
environments or cultures. The effect on the group, and not the reinforcing consequences for individual members, is responsible for 
the evolution of culture.
Keywords: behaviorism; consequentialism; culture; evolution; law of effect; learning; natural selection; operant conditioning; 
reinforcement contingencies; social environment; verbal behavior
The history of human behavior, if we may take it to begin 
with the origin of life on earth, is possibly exceeded in 
scope only by the history of the universe. Like astrono­
mer and cosmologist, the historian proceeds only by 
reconstructing what may have happened rather than by 
reviewing recorded facts. The story presumably began, 
not with a big bang, but with that extraordinary moment 
when a molecule came into existence which had the 
power to reproduce itself. It was then that selection by 
consequences made its appearance as a causal mode. 
Reproduction was itself a first consequence, and it led, 
through natural selection, to the evolution of cells, 
organs, and organisms which reproduced themselves 
under increasingly diverse conditions.
What we call behavior evolved as a set of functions 
furthering the interchange between organism and en­
vironment. In a fairly stable world it could be as much a 
part of the genetic endowment of a species as digestion, 
respiration, or any other biological function. The involve­
ment with the environment, however, imposed limita­
tions. The behavior functioned well only under condi­
tions fairly similar to those under which it was selected. 
Reproduction under a much wider range of conditions 
became possible with the evolution of two processes . 
through which individual organisms acquired behavior 
appropriate to novel environments. Through respondent 
(Pavlovian) conditioning, responses prepared in advance 
by natural selection could come under the control of new 
stimuli. Through operant conditioning, new responses
could be strengthened (“reinforced”) by events which 
immediately followed them.
A second kind of selection
Operant conditioning is a second kind of selection by 
consequences. It must have evolved in parallel with two 
other products of the same contingencies of natural selec­
tion - a susceptibility to reinforcement by certain kinds of 
consequences and a supply of behavior less specifically 
committed to eliciting or releasing stimuli. (Most oper­
ants are selected from behavior which has little or no 
relation to such stimuli.)
When the selecting consequences are the same, oper­
ant conditioning and natural selection work together 
redundantly. For example, the behavior of a duckling in 
following its mother is apparently the product not only of 
natural selection (ducklings tend to move in the direction 
of large moving objects) but also of an evolved susceptibil­
ity to reinforcement by proximity to such an object, as 
Peterson (1960) has shown. The common consequence is 
that the duckling stays near its mother. (Imprinting is a 
different process, close to respondent conditioning.)
Since a species which quickly acquires behavior appro­
priate to a given environment has less need for an innate 
repertoire, operant conditioning could not only supple­
ment the natural selection of behavior, it could replace it. 
There were advantages favoringsuch a change. When
© 1984 Cambridge University Press 0140-525XI84I040477-34I$06.00 477
members of a species eat a certain food simply because 
eating it has had survival value, the food does not need to 
be, and presumably is not, a reinforcer. Similarly, when 
sexual behavior is simply a product of natural selection, 
sexual contact does not need to be, and presumably is not, 
a reinforcer. But when, through the evolution of special 
susceptibilities, food and sexual contact become reinforc­
ing, new forms of behavior can be set up. New ways of 
gathering, processing, and ultimately cultivating foods 
and new ways of behaving sexually or of behaving in ways 
which lead only eventually to sexual reinforcement can be 
shaped and maintained. The behavior so conditioned is 
not necessarily adaptive; foods are eaten which are not 
healthful, and sexual behavior strengthened which is not 
related to procreation.
Much of the behavior studied by ethologists - court­
ship, mating, care of the young, intraspecific aggression, 
defense of territory, and so on - is social. It is within easy 
range of natural selection because other members of a 
species are one of the most stable features of the environ­
ment of a species. Innate social repertoires are supple­
mented by imitation. By running when others run, for 
example, an animal responds to releasing stimuli to which 
it has not itself been exposed. A different kind of imita­
tion, with a much wider range, results from the fact that 
contingencies of reinforcement which induce one organ­
ism to behave in a given way will often affect another 
organism when it behaves in the same way. An imitative 
repertoire which brings the imitator under the control of 
new contingencies is therefore acquired.
The human species presumably became much more 
social when its vocal musculature came under operant 
control. Cries of alarm, mating calls, aggressive threats, 
and other kinds of vocal behavior can be modified through 
operant conditioning, but apparently only with respect to 
the occasions upon which they occur or their rate of 
occurrence.1 The ability of the human species to acquire 
new forms through selection by consequences presum­
ably resulted from the evolution of a special innervation of 
the vocal musculature, together with a supply of vocal 
behavior not strongly under the control of stimuli or 
releasers - the babbling of children from which verbal 
operants are selected. No new susceptibility to reinforce­
ment was needed because the consequences of verbal 
behavior are distinguished only by the fact that they are 
mediated by other people (Skinner, 1957).
The development of environmental control over the 
vocal musculature greatly extended the help one person 
receives from others. By behaving verbally people coop­
erate more successfully in common ventures. By taking 
advice, heeding warnings, following instructions, and 
observing rules, they profit from what others have al­
ready learned. Ethical practices are strengthened by 
codifying them in laws, and special techniques of ethical 
and intellectual self-management are devised and taught. 
Self-knowledge or awareness emerges when one person 
asks another such a question as “What are you going to 
do?” or “Why did you do that?” The invention of the 
alphabet spread these advantages over great distances 
and periods of time. They have long been said to give the 
human species its unique position, although it is possible 
that what is unique is simply the extension of operant 
control to the vocal musculature.
Skinner: Selection by consequences
A third kind of selection
Verbal behavior greatly increased the importance of a 
third kind of selection by consequences, the evolution of 
social environments or cultures. The process presumably 
begins at the level of the individual. A better way of 
making a tool, growing food, or teaching a child is rein­
forced by its consequence - the tool, the food, or a useful 
helper, respectively. A culture evolves when practices 
originating in this way contribute to the success of the 
practicing group in solving its problems. It is the effect on 
the group, not the reinforcing consequences for indi­
vidual members, which is responsible for the evolution of 
the culture.
In summary, then, human behavior is the joint product 
of (i) the contingencies of survival responsible for the 
natural selection of the species and (ii) the contingencies 
of reinforcement responsible for the repertoires acquired 
by its members, including (iii) the special contingencies 
maintained by an evolved social environment. (Ultimate­
ly, of course, it is all a matter of natural selection, since 
operant conditioning is an evolved process, of which 
cultural practices are special applications.)
Similarities and differences
Each of the three levels of variation and selection has its 
own discipline - the first, biology; the second, psychol­
ogy; and the third, anthropology. Only the second, oper­
ant conditioning, occurs at a speed at which it can be 
observed from moment to moment. Biologists and an­
thropologists study the processes through which varia­
tions arise and are selected, but they merely reconstruct 
the evolution of a species or culture. Operant condition­
ing is selection in progress. It resembles a hundred 
million years of natural selection or a thousand years of 
the evolution of a culture compressed into a very short 
period of time.
The immediacy of operant conditioning has certain 
practical advantages. For example, when a currently 
adaptive feature is presumably too complex to have oc­
curred in its present form as a single variation, it is usually 
explained as the product of a sequence of simpler varia­
tions, each with its own survival value. It is standard 
practice in evolutionary theory to look for such se­
quences, and anthropologists and historians have recon­
structed the stages through which moral and ethical 
codes, art, music, literature, science, technology, and so 
on, have presumably evolved. A complex operant, how­
ever, can actually be “shaped through successive approx­
imation” by arranging a graded series of contingencies of 
reinforcement.2
A current question at level i has parallels at levels ii and 
iii. If natural selection is a valid principle, why do many 
species remain unchanged for thousands or even millions 
of years? Presumably the answer is either that no varia­
tions have occurred or that those which occurred were 
not selected by the prevailing contingencies. Similar 
questions may be asked at levels ii and iii. Why do people 
continue to do things in the same way for many years, and 
why do groups of people continue to observe old practices 
for centuries? The answers are presumably the same: 
Either new variations (new forms of behavior or new
478 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1984) 7:4
Skinner: Selection by consequences
practices) have not appeared or those which have ap­
peared have not been selected by the prevailing con­
tingencies (of reinforcement or of the survival of the 
group). At all three levels a sudden, possibly extensive, 
change is explained as due to new variations selected by 
prevailing contingencies or to new contingencies. Com­
petition with other species, persons, or cultures may or 
may not be involved. Structural constraints may also play 
a part at all three levels.
Another issue is the définition or identity of a species, 
person, or culture. Traits in a species and practices in a 
culture are transmitted from generation to generation, 
but reinforced behavior is “transmitted” only in the sense 
of remaining part of the repertoire of the individual. 
Where species and cultures are defined by restrictions 
imposed upon transmission - by genes and chromosomes 
and, say, geographical isolation, respectively - a problem 
of definition (or identity) arises at level ii only when 
different contingencies of reinforcement create different 
repertoires, as selves or persons.Traditional explanatory schemes
As a causal mode, selection by consequences was dis­
covered very late in the history of science - indeed, less 
than a century and a half ago - and it is still not fully 
recognized or understood, especially at levels ii and iii. 
The facts for which it is responsible have been forced into 
the causal pattern of classical mechanics, and many of the 
explanatory schemes elaborated in the process must now 
be discarded. Some of them have great prestige and are 
strongly defended at all three levels. Here are four 
examples:
A prio r a c t o f c rea tio n , (i) Natural selection replaces a very 
special creator and is still challenged because it does so. 
(ii) Operant conditioning provides a similarly controver­
sial account of the (“voluntary”) behavior traditionally 
attributed to a creative mind, (iii) The evolution of a social 
environment replaces the supposed origin of a culture as a 
social contract or of social practices as commandments.
Purpose or intention. Only past consequences figure in 
selection, (i) A particular species does not have eyes in 
order that its members may see better; it has them 
because certain members, undergoing variation, were 
able to see better and hence were more likely to transmit 
the variation, (ii) The consequences of operant behavior 
are not what the behavior is now for; they are merely 
similar to the consequences which have shaped and 
maintained it. (iii) People do not observe particular prac­
tices in order that the group will be more likely to survive; 
they observe them because groups which induced their 
members to do so survived and transmitted them.
Certain essences, (i) A molecule which could reproduce 
itself and evolve into cell, organ, and organism was alive 
as soon as it came into existence without the help of a vital 
principle called life, (ii) Operant behavior is shaped and 
brought under the control of the environment without 
the intervention of a principle of mind. (To suppose that 
thought appeared as a variation, like a morphological trait 
in genetic theory, is to invoke an unnecessarily large
saltum.) (iii) Social environments generate self-knowl­
edge (“consciousness”) and self-management (“reason”) 
without help from a group mind or Zeitgeist.
To say this is not to reduce life, mind, and Zeitgeist to 
physics; it is simply to recognize the expendability of 
essences. The facts are as they have always been. To say 
that selection by consequences is a causal mode found 
only in living things is only to say that selection (or the 
“replication with error” which made it possible) defines 
“living.” (A computer can be programmed to model 
natural selection, operant conditioning, or the evolution 
of a culture but only when constructed and programmed 
by a living thing.) The physical basis of natural selection is 
now fairly clear; the corresponding basis of operant condi­
tioning, and hence of the evolution of cultures, has yet to 
be discovered.
C erta in d e fin itio n s o f go o d an d va lu e , (i) What is good for 
the species is whatever promotes the survival of its 
members until offspring have been born and, possibly, 
cared for. Good features are said to have survival value. 
Among them are susceptibilities to reinforcement by 
many of the things we say taste good, feel good, and so on.
(ii) The behavior of a person is good if it is effective under 
prevailing contingencies of reinforcement. We value 
such behavior and, indeed, reinforce it by saying “Good!” 
Behavior toward others is good if it is good for the others 
in these senses, (iii) What is good for a culture is whatever 
promotes its ultimate survival, such as holding a group 
together or transmitting its practices. These are not, of 
course, traditional definitions; they do not recognize a 
world of value distinct from a world of fact and, for other 
reasons to be noted shortly, they are challenged.
Alternatives to selection
An example of the attempt to assimilate selection by 
consequences to the causality of classical mechanics is the 
term “selection pressure,” which appears to convert 
selection into something that forces a change. A more 
serious example is the metaphor of storage. Contingen­
cies of selection necessarily lie in the past; they are not 
acting when their effect is observed. To provide a current 
cause it has therefore been assumed that they are stored 
(usually as “information”) and later retrieved. Thus, (i) 
genes and chromosomes are said to “contain the informa­
tion” needed by the fertilized egg in order to grow into a 
mature organism. But a cell does not consult a store of 
information in order to learn how to change; it changes 
because of features which are the product of a history of 
variation and selection, a product which is not well 
represented by the metaphor of storage, (ii) People are 
said to store information about contingencies of reinforce­
ment and retrieve it for use on later occasions. But they 
do not consult copies of earlier contingencies to discover 
how to behave; they behave in given ways because they 
have been changed by those contingencies. The con­
tingencies can perhaps be inferred from the changes they 
have worked, but they are no longer in existence, (iii) A 
possibly legitimate use of “storage” in the evolution of 
cultures may be responsible for these mistakes. Parts of 
the social environment maintained and transmitted by a
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1984) 7:4 479
group are quite literally stored in documents, artifacts, 
and other products of that behavior.
Other causal forces serving in lieu of selection have 
been sought in the structure of a species, person, or 
culture. Organization is an example, (i) Until recently, 
most biologists argued that organization distinguished 
living from nonliving things, (ii) According to Gestalt 
psychologists and others, both perceptions and acts occur 
in certain inevitable ways because of their organization,
(iii) Many anthropologists and linguists appeal to the 
organization of cultural and linguistic practices. It is true 
that all species, persons, and cultures are highly orga­
nized, but no principle of organization explains their 
being so. Both the organization and the effects attributed 
to it can be traced to the respective contingencies of 
selection.
Another example is growth. Developmentalism is 
structuralism with time or age added as an independent 
variable, (i) There was evidence before Darwin that 
species had “developed.” (ii) Cognitive psychologists 
have argued that concepts develop in the child in certain 
fixed orders, and Freud said the same for the psychosex- 
ual functions, (iii) Some anthropologists have contended 
that cultures must evolve through a prescribed series of 
stages, and Marx said as much in his insistence upon 
historical determinism. But at all three levels the changes 
can be explained by the “development” of contingencies 
of selection. New contingencies of natural selection come 
within range as a species evolves; new contingencies of 
reinforcement begin to operate as behavior becomes 
more complex; and new contingencies of survival are 
dealt with by increasingly effective cultures.
Selection neglected
The causal force attributed to structure as a surrogate of 
selection causes trouble when a feature at one level is said 
to explain a similar feature at another, the historical 
priority of natural selection usually giving it a special 
place. Sociobiology offers many examples. Behavior de­
scribed as the defense of territory may be due to (i) 
contingencies of survival in the evolution of a species, 
possibly involving food supplies or breeding practices; (ii) 
contingencies of reinforcement for the individual, possi­
bly involving a share of the reinforcers available in the 
territory; or (iii) contingencies maintained by the cultural 
practices of a group, promoting behavior which contrib­
utes to the survival of the group. Similarly, altruistic 
behavior (i)may evolve through, say, kin selection; (ii) 
may be shaped and maintained by contingencies of rein­
forcement arranged by those for whom the behavior 
works an advantage; or (iii) may be generated by cultures 
which, for example, induce individuals to suffer or die as 
heroes or martyrs. The contingencies of selection at the 
three levels are quite different, and the structural sim­
ilarity does not attest to a common generative principle.
When a causal force is assigned to structure, selection 
tends to be neglected. Many issues which arise in morals 
and ethics can be resolved by specifying the level of 
selection. What is good for the individual or culture may 
have bad consequences for the species, as when sexual 
reinforcement leads to overpopulation or the reinforcing
Skinner: Selection by consequences
amenities of civilization to the exhaustion of resources; 
what is good for the species or culture may be bad for the 
individual, as when practices designed to control procrea­
tion or preserve resources restrict individual freedom; 
and so on. There is nothing inconsistent or contradictory 
about these uses of “good” or “bad, ” or about other value 
judgments, so long as the level of selection is specified.
An initiating agent
The role of selection by consequences has been particu­
larly resisted because there is no place for the initiating 
agent suggested by classical mechanics. We try to identify 
such an agent when we say (i) that a species adapts to an 
environment, rather than that the environment selects 
the adaptive traits; (ii) that an individual adjusts to a 
situation, rather than that the situation shapes and main­
tains adjusted behavior; and (iii) that a group of people 
solve a problem raised by certain circumstances, rather 
than that the circumstances select the cultural practices 
which yield a solution.
The question of an initiating agent is raised in its most 
acute form by our own place in this history. Darwin and 
Spencer thought that selection would necessarily lead to 
perfection, but species, people, and cultures all perish 
when they cannot cope with rapid change, and our 
species now appears to be threatened. Must we wait for 
selection to solve the problems of overpopulation, ex­
haustion of resources, pollution of the environment, and a 
nuclear holocaust, or can we take explicit steps to make 
our future more secure? In the latter case, must wc not in 
some sense transcend selection?
We could be said to intervene in the process of selec­
tion when as geneticists we change the characteristics of a 
species or create new species, or when as governors, 
employers, or teachers we change the behavior of per­
sons, or when we design new cultural practices; but in 
none of these ways do we escape from selection by 
consequences. In the first place, we can work only 
through variation and selection. At level i we can change 
genes and chromosomes or contingencies of survival, as 
in selective breeding. At level ii we can introduce new 
forms of behavior - for example, by showing or telling 
people what to do with respect to relevant contingencies
- or construct and maintain new selective contingencies. 
At level iii we can introduce new cultural practices or, 
rarely, arrange special contingencies of survival - for 
example, to preserve a traditional practice. But having 
done these things, we must wait for selection to occur. 
(There is a special reason why these limitations are 
significant. It is often said that the human species is now 
able to control its own genetics, its own behavior, its own 
destiny, but it does not do so in the sense in which the 
term control is used in classical mechanics. It does not for 
the very reason that living things are not machines: 
selection by consequences makes the difference.) In the 
second place, we must consider the possibility that our 
behavior in intervening is itself a product of selection. We 
tend to regard ourselves as initiating agents only because 
we know or remember so little about our genetic and 
environmental histories.
Although we can now predict many of the contingen­
480 THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1984) 7:4
Commentary/Skinner: Selection by consequences
cies of selection to w hich th e hum an species will probably 
be exposed at all th ree levels and can specify behavior 
that will satisfy m any of them , w e have failed to establish 
cultural practices u n d er w hich m uch of th a t behavior is 
selected and m aintained. I t is possible tha t ou r effort to 
p reserve the role of th e individual as an originator is at 
fault, and tha t a w ider recognition of th e role of selection 
by consequences will m ake an im portan t difference.
T he p resen t scene is no t encouraging. Psychology is 
the discipline o f choice at level ii, b u t few psychologists 
pay m uch atten tion to selection. T he existentialists 
am ong them are explicitly concerned w ith th e h ere and 
now, ra th e r than the past and fu ture . S tructuralists and 
developm entalists tend to neg lect selective con tingen­
cies in th e ir search for causal p rincip les such as organiza­
tion or growth. The conviction th a t contingencies are 
stored as inform ation is only one o f th e reasons why th e 
appeal to cognitive functions is no t helpful. T he th ree 
personae of psychoanalytic theory are in m any respects 
close to our th ree levels of selection; b u t th e id does not 
adequately rep resen t th e enorm ous contribu tion o f the 
natural h istory of th e species; th e superego, even w ith the 
help of the ego ideal, does no t adequate ly rep re se n t the 
contribution of th e social env ironm en t to language, self­
knowledge, and intellectual and ethical self-m anage­
m ent; and th e ego is a poor likeness of the personal 
reperto ire acquired u n d e r th e practical contingencies of 
daily life. T he field known as th e experim ental analysis of 
behavior has extensively explored selection by conse­
quences, b u t its conception o f hum an behavior is re ­
sisted, and m any of its practical applications rejected , 
precisely because it has no place for a person as an 
initiating agent. T he behavioral sciences at level iii show 
sim ilar shortcom ings. A nthropology is heavily structural, 
and political scientists and econom ists usually trea t the 
individual as a free initiating agent. Philosophy and le t­
ters offer no prom ising leads.
A p roper recognition of the selective action o f the 
environm ent m eans a change in ou r conception of the 
origin o f behavior which is possibly as extensive as th a t of 
the origin of species. So long as w e cling to th e view tha t a 
person is an initiating doer, actor, or causer o f behavior, 
we shall probably continue to neglect th e conditions 
w hich m ust be changed if we are to solve our problem s 
(Skinner 1971).
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T
This article originally appeared in Science 213: 501-04, 3 July 
1981. Copyright 1981 by the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science. Reprinted with the permission of the 
publisher.
NO T E S
1. The imitative vocal behavior of certain birds may be an 
exception, but if it has selective consequences comparable with 
those of cries of alarm or mating calls, they are obscure. The 
vocal behavior of the parrot is shaped, at best, by a trivial 
consequence, involving the resemblance between sounds pro­
duced and sounds heard.
2. Patterns of innate behavior too complex to have arisen as 
single variations may have been shaped by geologic changes due 
to plate tectonics (Skinner 1975).
Open Peer Commentary
C o m m e n ta r ie s s u b m i t te d b y th e q u a l i f ie d p r o fe s s io n a l r e a d e r s h ip o f 
th is j o u r n a l w il l b e c o n s id e r e d f o r p u b lic a t io n in a la te r is su e a s 
C o n tin u in g C o m m e n ta r y o n th is a r tic le . I n te g r a t iv e o v e r v ie w s a n d 
s y n th e se s a r e e s p e c ia lly e n c o u ra g e d .
Skinner on selection - A case study of 
intellectual isolation
George W. Barlow
Department of Zoology and Museum of Vertebrate Zoology,
University of California, Berkeley, Calif. 94720
Ask yourself the following question: Would “Consequences” 
have been published in Science in 1981 if the author had been 
anonymous? The answer would be a resounding no, and it would 
not be difficult to confirm this assertion experimentally now just 
two years later. Surely the editors of Science must have had good 
reasons for publishing his article. We can only guess the rea­
sons, but I doubt we would be far wrong.
First and foremost, B. F. Skinner is a major figure in modern 
psychology. Almost anything he has to say in the realm of 
behavior is of widespread interest whether one’s opinion is that 
it is right or wrong, and with or without adequate documenta­
tion. He has made enormous contributions to the field and 
demonstrated the awesome control the experimenter can have 
over the behavior of an animal under specified conditions.
That very control seems to have shaped Skinner’s perception 
of the biological world. It has also produced a vision of human 
behavior that can be disquieting. In “Consequences” Skinner 
asserts that a person is not “an initiating doer, actor, or causer of 
behavior.” He states further that it is possible to “construct and 
maintain new selective contingencies” by reinforcing the 
“good” behavior of such a person. Taken at face value that 
sounds harmless enough, except for two things: Someone else 
decides what is good behavior, and we have no clear prescrip­
tion for how that decision might be reached or who makes it. The 
definition of good behavior appears simply to evolve by trial and 
error at three levels, and perhaps it has. That is the major thesis 
of “Consequences. ”
The first level is that of Darwinian natural selection. That kind 
of selection is treated superficially and conventionally. (I return 
to his views on natural selection below.) The second kind of 
selection is that of operant conditioning, and the third is that of 
cultural evolution, the course of both being molded by their 
consequences. His treatment of the last two levels does not find 
universal acceptance.
I take exception to Skinner’s portrayal of selection at the level 
of operant conditioning. For one, I prefer to call this level that of 
phenotypic modification or intraindividual adaptation; the ter­
minology is not important. What is important is that individual 
adaptability is a much richer set of phenomena than is even 
remotely embraced by operant conditioning.
Ectothermic animals, for instance, acclimate to the tem­
perature at which they are found; the thermal preferendum of 
an individual depends on its thermal acclimation, which varies 
with the season and microhabitat (Hutchinson & Maness 1979). 
Sexual maturity, with its attendant changes in behavior, can 
occur at radically different ages in platyfish depending on 
dominance relationships that are independent of the re­
spondent’s behavior (Borowsky 1978). The maternal digger 
wasp learns how much to provision her nest site in one trial, 
without the benefit of overt reinforcement, and the appropriate 
response is delayed several hours (Baerends 1941). Early expe­
rience appears to have pervasive effects on behaviors that are 
first manifest only in adulthood. One such phenomenon is
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1984) 7:4 481
Commentary!Skinner: Selection by consequences
sexual imprinting; attempts to fit it into a conditioning paradigm 
present difficulties and suggest a procrustean resolution.
The manner in which Skinner contrasts natural selection and 
conditioning as two distinct kinds of selection also has a major 
fault. Genetic and experiential factors are conveyed as being 
fundamentally separate. This separation is inherent in the way 
Skinner relegates biologists’ interests to unlearned behavior and 
evolutionary phylogenies. The rigidity is also apparent in his 
insistence that “most operants are selected from behavior which 
has little or no relation to” eliciting or releasing stimuli. An 
epigenetic approach provides a more realistic view.
Evidence is growing rapidly that there are evolved pre­
dispositions for animals to learn to respond in particular ways to 
particular kinds of stimulation. The example most appropriate to 
Skinner’s essay, and also the most debatable, is that of language. 
People learn a given language, and conditioning doubtless plays 
a role. But humans may also be predisposed to speak, and the 
structure of language may have properties that transcend the 
process of operant conditioning (Lenneberg & Lenneberg 
1975). This possibility is ignored in Skinner’s essay.
The range of interaction between experience and species- 
specific constraints on learning is nowhere better and more 
convincingly documented than in the elegant comparative stud­
ies on the acquisition of song among birds (Green & Marler 
1979). Likewise, sexual imprinting is proving increasingly to 
involve both constraints and plasticity; recognizing one’s species 
is an ability that requires little experience. Rather, imprinting’s 
function seems to be the learning of closeness of relationship (P. 
Bateson 1980). Finally, I disagree with Skinner’s easy and 
almost casual equating of genetic with fixed behavior.
I do agree with Skinner, on the other hand, that cultures have 
evolved because of the consequences of their practices. Many 
will differ with us on this.
A major weakness of “Consequences” is that it has been 
written in a vacuum. Skinner’s remarks on natural selection 
show a lack of understanding as well as total isolation from the 
noisy arguments that have been heard throughout the land for 
the last 20 years about group versus individual selection. It is 
almost embarrassing to read in a 1981 paper that “what is good 
for the individual or culture may have bad consequences for the 
species.” - or, when writing about the origins of behavior and 
clearly not about humans, “The behavior so conditioned is not 
necessarily adaptive; foods are eaten which are not healthful, 
and sexual behavior strengthened which is not related to pro­
creation. ” Lest I be misunderstood, let me point out that I am 
not saying that group selection is inconceivable (see D. S. 
Wilson 1975; 1980) but that this loose application of the species- 
benefit argument reveals a fundamental failure to understand 
modem theorizing about natural selection.
This confusion is apparent in the conclusion of “Conse­
quences.” Skinner argues with regard to altruism that selection 
operates at three different levels, paralleling his opening re­
marks. The three kinds of selection are (i) biological (here kin 
selection), (ii) psychological (through reinforcement of indi­
vidual behavior), and (iii) cultural, (as in inducing heroism). He 
claims that “the contingencies of selection at the three levels are 
quite different, and the structural similarity does not attest to a 
common generative principle.”
What we have here is a failure to distinguish between proxi­
mate and ultimate mechanisms (E. O. Wilson 1975). The hero is 
taught to behave that way, which is the proximate mechanism. 
In the small societies in which heroism must have evolved, the 
hero’s kin enjoyed improved reproductive fitness superior to 
that of individuals who were not so easy to train. This is kin 
selection, the ultimate causation. A common generative princi­
ple is reasonable.
I was equally taken aback by the absence of references to 
highly relevant literature closer to home for Skinner. In a classic 
paper Pringle (1951) explored the parallels between learning 
and natural selection. Campbell (1975) has written on almost the
same theme as Skinner and is often cited. Pringle’s and Camp­
bell’s treatments are more sophisticated than the essay before 
us. Skinner has also overlooked the literature on constraints