1 Understanding public policy

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6 CHAPTER l a Po#cy 4na/ys/s
their actions are is not the some u saying what governments oqgóz to do or bringing about
changes in what they do. Policy advocacy requires the skills ofrhetoric, persuasion, organiza-
tion, and activism. Policy analysis encourages scholars and students to attack criticam policy
issues with the tools ofsystematic inquiry. There is an implied assumption in policy analysis
that developing scientific knowledge about the 6orces shaping public policy and the conse-
quences of public policy is itself a socially relevant activity, and that policy analysis is a
prerequisite to presarÜ'tios, aduocac}. avidacdutsm.
Speciâcally, policy analysis involves :
l A pHmaq con.cem u)iü OQhnation Talher tban prescription. Pohcy tecommendaúons
if they are made at aH rdinate to description and explanation. There is an
implicit judgment that understanding is a prerequisite to prescription and that under-
standing xs best adiiwed through care6.d analysis rather than rhetoric or polemics.
A 7'igorú4s searcb.br tlx causa a7üc07wquen.ces ofpubLüpolicies. T\çxs seaxch lanches üle use
ofsdenl:i6c standards of infêrence. Sophisticaüed quantitative techniques may be helpRil
in establishing valid infêrences about caules and consequences, but they are not essential.
An effoTt to dwetop and tm gFnaalpvopositions about tbe caules and consequences ofpüb-
licpoliq alü to accumulate nliable nsearcb .P7üings ofgenera! reLeuance. 'The ob\ect K \o
develop general theories about public policy that me reliable and that apply to diÊFerent
government agencies and diüerent policy ueas. Policy analysts clearly prever to develop
explanations that fit more than one policy decision or case study--explanations that
stand up over time in a variety ofsettings.
2.
3.
However, it must be remembered that polia issues are decided not by analysts but by polit-
icas actors---elected and appointed government oflicials, interest groups, and occasionally
even voters. Social science reses.rch oâ:en does not Eue well in the politicas arena; it may be
interpreted, misinterpreted, ignorei, or even used a a weapon by politicas combatants. Pol-
icy analysis sometimes produces unexpected and even politically embarrassing findings. Pub-
lic policies do not always work u intended. And politico interests will accept, reject, or use
findings to fit their own purposes.
Policy Analysis and the (àuest for Solutions to America's Problems
It is questionable that policy analysis can ever "solve" America's problems. lgnorance, crime,
poverty, racial conflict, inequality, poor housing, ill health, pollution, congestion, and
unhappy lives have afHicted people and societies 6or a long time. Ofcourse, this is no excuse
eor failing to work toward a society free ofthese maladies. But our striving 6or a better society
should be tempered with the realization that solutions to these problems may be very difn-
cult to find. There are many reasons 6or quali9ing our enthusiasm eor policy analysis.
Limits on Government Power. First, it is easy to exaggerate the importance, both âor good
and eor ill, of the policies of governments. It is not clear that government policies, however
ingenious, could cure all or even most of society's ills. Governments are constrained by many
powerâil social 6orces--patterns offàmily lide, class structure, child-rearing practices, religious
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CHAPTER l
\
PolicyAnalysis 7
belie6s, and se on. These 6orces are not easily managed by governments, nor could they be
controlled even ifit seemed desirable to do se. Some ofsociety's problems are very intractable.
Disagreement over the Problem. Second, policy analysis cannot oüer solutions to problems
when there is no general agreement on what the problems are. For example, in educational
policy some researchers assume that raising achievement leveis (measures of verbal and
quantitative abilities) is the problem to which our eüorts should be directed. But educators
often ergue that the acquisition ofverbal and quantitative skills is not the only, or even the most
important, god of the public schools. They contend that sçhools must also develop positive
self-images among pupils of all races and backgrounds, encourage social awareness and the
appreciation of multiple cultures, teach children to respect one another and to resolve their
diüerences peacehlly, raise children's awareness of the dangers of drugs and educate them
about sex and sexually transmitted diseases, and se on. In other words, many educators deâne
the problems con6ronting schools more broadly than raising achievement leveis.
Policy analysis is not capable of resolving value conflicts. If there is little agreement on
what values should be emphasized in educational policy, there is not much that policy
research can contribute to policymaking. At best it can advise on how to achieve certain
results, but it cannot determine what is truly valuable eor society.
Subjectiviq in Interpretation. Third, policy analysis deals with very subjective topics and
musa rely on interpretation ofresults. Proeessional researchers 6equently interpret the results
oftheir analyses difFerently. Social science research cannot be vague-Êee. Even the selection of
the topic for research is aüected by one's values about what is important in society and
worthy ofattention.
Limitations on Design of Human Research. Another set ofproblems in Wstematic policy
analysis centers around inherent limitations in the design of social science resemch. It is not
really possible to conduct some 6orms of controlled experiments on human beings. For
example, researchers cannot order children to go to poor schools eor several years just to see if
it adversely impacts their achievement leveis. Instead, social researchers mulsc find situations in
which educationd deprivation has been produced "naturally" in order to make the necessary
observations about the causes ofsuch deprivation. Because we cannot control all the eactors in
a real-world situation, it is difficult to pinpoint precisely what causes educational achievement
or nonachievement. Moreover, even where some experimentation is permitted, human beings
frequently modi$ their behavior simply because they know that they are being observed in an
experimental situation. For example, in educational research it 6equently turns out that
children pereorm well under .zmW new teaching method or curricular innovation. It is diflicult
to know whether the improvements observed are a product of the new teaching method or
curricular improvement or merely a product ofthe experimental situation.
Complexity of Human Behavior. Perhaps the most serious reservation about policy analysis
is the eact that social problema are se complex that social scientists are unable to make accurate
predictions about the impact of proposed policies. Soca/ .fr;e /üzs .f;#p/7 do moz É om é oz g&
about irai idu andgoup bebaui,ov to be abk to Úoe retiabk aduice to pol,ic)makers. Qçc;agvonaNy
8 CHAPTER l a Po#cy 4na/ys/s
policymakers turn to social scientists 6or "solutions," but social scientists do not have any. Most
of society's problems me shaped by se many variables that a simple explanation of them, or
remedy 6or them, is rmely possible. The Eact that social scientists give se many contradictory
recommendations is an indication of the absence of reliable scientific knowledge about social
problems. Although some scholns ngue that no advice is better than contradictoryor
inaccurate advice, policymakers stiH must make decisions, and it is probably better that they act
in the light of whatever little knowledge social science can provide than that they act in the
absence of any knowledge at all. Even if social scientists cannot predict the impact of ature
policieÊ, they can at least attempt to measure the impact ofcurrent and post public policies and
make this knowledge available to decision makers.
PoliqAnalWis as Art and Craft
Under$anding public policy is both an an and a crer. It is an art because it requires insight,
creativity, and imagination in identilying societal problems and describing them, in devising
public policies that might alleviate them, and then in finding out whether these policies end
up making diings better or worse. It is a craâ: because these tasks usually requere some knowl-
edge ofeconomics, politicas science, public administration, sociology, law and statistics. Pol-
icy analysis is reany an applied subfield ofaH ofthese traditional academic disciplines.
We doubt that there is any ofchoice" in policy analysis--that is, a single model
or method that is pre6erable to all others and that consistently renders the best solutions to
public problems. Instead we agree with politicas scientist Aaron Wildavsky, who wrote:
Policy analysis is one activity 6or which there can be no fixed program, for policy analysis is syn-
onymous with creativity, which may be stimulated by theory and sharpened by practice, which
can be learned but not taught.J
Wildavsky goes on to wmn students that solutions to great public questiona are not to be
expected:
In large part, it must be admitted, knowledge is negative. It tells us what we cannot do, where
we cannot go, wherein we have been wrong, but not necessarily how to correct these errors.
After all, ifcurrent eüorts were judged wholly satisEactory, there would be little need for analysis
and less eor analystf.
There is no one model of choice to be found in this book, but if anyone wants to begin
a debate about difFerent ways of understanding public policy, this book is a good place
to begin.
Notes
1 . This book discourages elaborate academic discussions ofthe definition ofpublic policy--we say simply that
public policy is whatever governments choose to do or not to do. Even the most elaborate definitions of
public policy, on dose examination, seem to boil down to the some thing. For example, political scientist
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CHAPTER l
\. Po//cy,4na/Ks;s 9
David Easton defines public policy as "the authoritative allocation ofvalues eor the whole society"--but it
turns out that only the government can "authoritatively" act on the "whole" society, and everything the gov-
ernment chooses to do or not to do results in the "allocation ofvalues.
Political scientist Harold Lasswell and philosopher Abraham Kaplan define policy as a "a projected
program ofgoals, values, and practices," and politicas scientist Carl Friedrick says, "lt is essential 6or the pol-
icy concept that there be a goal, objective, or purpose." These deânitions imply a diüerence between specific
government actions and an overall program ofaction toward a given goal. But the problem raised in insist-
ing that government actions must have goals in order to be labeled "policy" is that we can never be sure
whether or not a particular action has a goal, or ifit does, what that goal is. Some people may assume that if
a government chooses to do something there must be a goal, objective, or purpose, but all we can really
observe is what governments choose to do or not to do. Realistkally, our notion of public policy must
include zz# acãomi of government, and not what governments or officials say they are going to do. We may
wish that governments act in a "purposeful, goal-oriented" fahion, but we know that all too frequendy they
Still another approach to defining public policy is to break down this general notion into various
component parts. Political scientist Charles O. Jones asks that we consider the distinction among vari-
ous proposals (specified means for achieving goals), programs (authorized means for achieving goals),
decisions (specific actions taken to implement programs), and eKects (the measurable impacts of pro-
grams). But again we have the problem of assuming that decisions, programs, goals, and efFects are
linked. Certainly in many policy áreas we will see that the decisions ofgovernment have little to do with
announced "programs," and neither are connected with national "goals." it may be unfortunate that our
government does not function neatly to link goals, programs, decisions, and effects, but as a matter of
fact it does not.
So we shall stick with our simple definition: .pz/ó#c.po#g à móaz?z/e/"goz'rrmmrmzs c&oo.fr /o do or /zoZ fa
zü. Note that we are eocusing not only on government action but also on government inaction, that is, what
government chooses /zof to do. We contend that government /naction can have just as great an impact on
society as government action.
See David Easton, Z»e Eo#r/ca/ 8/sí?m (New York: Knopf1 1953), p. 129; Harold D. Lasswell and
Abraham Kaplan, nome/" amZ Soc/eg (New Haven, CT: l?ãle University Press, 1 970), p. 71 ; Carl J. Friedrich,
.Ajam a/zz//?h Goz,rr mrnf (New York: McGraw-Hil1, 1963), p. 70; Charles O. Jones, .H# /mfraZwc//o fo /&e
Sr #7 ofP#ó#c no#g (Boston: Duxbury, 1977), p. 4.
Harold Lasswel1, 2o#ücs; Wbo Gezs WBaf, W%rm amZ/Zoa, (New York: McGraw Hil1, 1936).
Aaron Wildavsky, Spe.zZ';ng 7}'wzÁ fo 2om?r (New York: John Wiley, 1 979), p. 3.
do not
2
3.
Bibliography
ANDERsoN, JAMES E. /)wó#c Po#(ym 4';/z.g, 6th ed. Boston: Hloughton Mifflin, 2006.
COCHRAN, CI.ARKE E., et al. .Hmrr;can ./)zzó#c Po#(y.: .,4zz /nfrozZucr;o , 8th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth,
2006
Duna, Wlu,IAM N. P#ó#c no#q.Hzza4fü, 3rd ed. Upper Saddle Rever, NJ: Prentice HaH, 2004.
HIEINEMAN, RoBERT A., 'D«ILLIAM T. BLUHM, STEVEN A. PETERSON, and EDwIARD N. KEARNY. 7%e Wã7'.Ü (Z/'zÁe
Poço/.HmaÓKZP. New York: Chatham House, 2000.
KRAFT, MlcHAn. E., and ScoTT R. FuRLONG. ./)üÓ#c no#g.: no.ÜÚcs. .Hnzz4fü á/zz/Afemádz,'es. 2nd ed. Washington,
DC: CQ. Press, 2008.
PETEKS, B. Guv. .dmez"zícam ])#ó#c Po#g.: /%omàe amz/2?/forma/zce, 7th ed. Wuhington, DC: C(2. Press, 2008.
RusHEPSKV, MIARK E. P#ó#c Po#g / zÁ ZIZm;/eZSkaíes, 4th ed. Armonk, NY M. E. Sharpe, 2008.
WILOAvsKY, AAKON. SpeaÉ;mg Zr zÁ zo Eom?r. New York: John Wiley, 1 979.
]0 CHAPTER l PolicyAnalysis
Web Sites
OrpicE or TnE PRESloENT. VP'hite Hlouse home page, with president's policy positions, speeches, press release
etc. totow.tobiteboase.got;
U.S. House OF REpp.t.SEnTKmrK Oficial Hlouse Web site, with links to individual House members' Wzeb site
miou. house. gou
U.S. SEN.A:rE. Of]icia] Senate ]Meb site, with ]inks to individual senators' Web sites. mmm..femaü'.goz/
U.S. CONGRESS ON TliE llNTERNEr. Library ofCongress Thomu search engine 6or finding bílis and tracing the
progress through Congress. Á'/p:,g2óa/zza.baga'
FEDERAL. STAnSTICS ONUNt. Links to lidera statistical reports, listed by topic A-Z. mmm$?1úía/s.goz/
U.S. CENsus BuREAu- The oflicial site of the Census Bureau, with access to all current reports--population
income and poverty, govemment finances, etc mz.w.ceniw.gm,
FIRsr (1)0d' U.S. gox-emment's oflicial portal to aH independent agencies and government corporations. a,mm.
Fmgou.g)u
FEOERAE JunlciAxv. U.S. judiciary of]icia] site, with ]inks to aU federal courts. mmm. zz.fcoz/rzs.goz/
SUPRE\Q Cot;Kr C\sts- Compilation ofaH kq U-S. Supremo Court decisions. mmm.iapci.ázm.cor e#edw
s,
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Models of Politícs
Some Help in Thinking About Public Policy
Models for PolicyAnalysis
A model is a simplified representation of some aspect ofthe real world. It may be an actual
physical representation a modem airplane, for example, or the tabletop buildings that plan-
ners and architects use to show how things will look when proposed projects are completed.
Or a modem may be a diagram a road map, eor example, or a flow chartthat politicas scien-
tists use to show how a bill becomes law.
Uses of Models. The models we shall üse in studying policy are como)/ z / moz&6. These
me word models that try to
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Simpli$ and clarim our thinking about politics and public policy.
Identi$ important aspects ofpolicy problems.
Help us to communicate with each other by 6ocusing on essential fêatuês ofpolitical lide.
Direct our efForts to understand public policy better by suggesting what is important
and what is unimportant.
Suggest explanations eor public policy and predict its consequences.
Selected Policy Models. Over the years, political science, like other scientific disciplines,
has developed a number of models to help us understand politicas lide. Throughout this
volume we will try to see whether these models have any utility in the study ofpublic policy.
Specifically, we want to examine public policy from the perspective ofthe eollowing models:
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Institutional model
Process model
Rational model
11
12 CHAPTER2 H/Made/sofro/üfcs
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Incremental model
Group model
Elite model
Public choice modem
Game theory model
Each ofthese terms idendfies a major conceptual modem that can be âound in the literature of
political science. None ofthese models wu derived especially to study public policy, yet each
ofFers a sepMate way of thinking about policy and even suggests some of the general causes
and consequences ofpublic policy.
I'pese modems are not competitiue in tbe sente tbat an) one oftbem coral,d be 3üdged"best:'
Each on6 provides a separate âocus on political ligo, and each can help us to understand dif-
6erent ihings about public policy. Although some policies appear at first glance to lend them-
selves ço explanation by one particular motel, most policies are a combination of rational
planning, incrementalism, interest group activity, elite preeerences, game playing, public
choice, polidcal processos» and institucional influences. In later chapters these models will be
employed, singuLady and in combination, to describe and explain speciâc policies. Follow-
ing is a brief description of each model, with particular attention to the separate ways in
which public policy can be viewed
Institutionalism: Policy as Institutional Output
Government institutions have long been a central 6ocus of political science. Traditionally,
political science was defined as the study ofgovernment institutions. Political activities gen-
erally center around particular government institutions Congress, the presidency, courts,
bureaucracies, states, municipalities, and se on. Public policy is authoritatively determined,
implemented, and eneorced by these institutions.
The relationship between public policy and government institutions is very dose.
Strictly speaking, a policy does not become a.pzzZ'Zb policy until it is adopted, implemented,
and en6orced by some government institution. Government institutions give public policy
three distinctive characteristics. First, government lenda &g/ãmzzq/ to policies. Government
policies are generally regarded m legal obligations that command the loyalty ofcitizens. People
may regard the policies: of other groups and usociations in society--corporations, churches,
proeessional organizations, civic associations, and se 6orth--as important and even binding.
But only government policies involve legal obligations. Second, government policies involve
zzn;z,erszzZ/g Only government policies extend to all people in a society; the policies of other
groups or organizations reach only a pan of the society. Finally, government monopolizes
co?m;om in society:--only government can legitimately imprison violators of its policies. The
sanctions that can be imposed by other groups or organizations in society are more limited. It
is precisely this ability ofgovernment to command the loyalty ofall its citizens, to enact poli-
cies governing the whole society, and to monopolize the legitimate use of force that encour-
ages individuais and groups to work 6or enactment oftheir preeerences into policy.\
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CHAPTER 2 Modems ofPolitics \ 3
Institutionalism: Applying the Model
In Chapter 12. 'American Federalism: Institutional Arrangements and Public Policy," we
shall examine some of the problems of American federalism--the distribution of money
and power among federal, state, and local governments.
The Constitution of the United States establishes the fiindamental institutional struc-
ture eor policymaking. It is "the supreme Law of the Land" (Article VI). Its key structural
components separation ofpowers and checks and balances among the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of the national government together with eederalism--dividing
power between the nation and the states were designed by the Founders in part "to 6orm a
more pereect Union." These institutional arrangements have changed significantly over more
than two centuries, yet no other written constitution in the world has remained in place for se
long. Throughout this volume we will be concerned with the eKect of these institutional
arrangements on public policy. And in Chapter 12 we shall explore in some detail the eüect of
eederalism.
Federalism recognizes that both the national government and the state governments
derive independent legal authority from their own citizens (Figure 2--1): both can pass their
own laws, levy their own taxes, and maintain their own courts. The states also have impor-
tant roles in the selection of national oÊficeholders in the apportionment of congressional
seats, in the allocation of two U.S. senators to each state, and in the allocation of electoral
FEDERAL SYSTEM
Federal government and
states derive authority
independently from the people
National Government
States
People
FIGURE 2--1 An Institutional Modem: American Federalism Governmental institutional
arrangements aÊFect public policy, including federalism the distribution of money and power
among federal, state, and local governments.
1 4 CHAPTER 2 a Jt4ode/s ofPo//tics
votes for president. Most important, perhaps, both the Congress and three-quarters ofstates
must consent to any changes in the Constitution itself
Process: Policy as Politicas Activity
Today political processes and behaviors ne a central 6ocus of political science. Since World
War 11, modem "behavioral" political science hu studied the activities of voters, interest
groups, legislators, presidente, bureaucrats, judges, and other political actors. One ofthe main
purposes has been to discos'er pattems ofactivities--or "processes." Political scientists with an
interest in policy have grouped various activities according to their relationship with public pol-
icy. The result is a set ofpoZü7.p/ocaso, which usually 6ollow the general outline in Table 2--1 .
In short, one can view the policy process as a series ofpolitical activities problem identifica-
tion, agenda settiing, 6ormulation, legitiination, implementation, and evaluation.
The process model is usefid in helping us to understand the various activities involved
in policymaking. IMe want to keep in mind that .po#gma&;ng envolves agenda setting
(capturing the attention of policymakers), formulating proposals (devising and selecting
polia options), legitimating policy (developing politicas support; winning congressional,
presidencial, or court approval), implementing policy (creating bureaucracies, spending
money, enÉorcing laws), and evaluating policy (finding out whether policies work, whether
they are popular).
Pro«sses: Apptying the Model
Political processes and behaviors are considered in each of the policy áreas studied in this
book. Additional commentary on the impact of polkical activity on public policy is found
in Chapter 3. "íhe Policymaking Process: Decision-Making Activitiesr'
TABLE 2--1 The Policv Process
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Proó&m ]2Zm/@caMn. The identi6caton ofpolicy problems through
demand from individuais and groups 6or government action.
v4g?mzZz Se/d/2K. Focusing the attentionofthe mass media and public
ofíicials on speciâc public problems to decide what will be decided.
no#g Eorma&zdon. The development ofpolicy proposals by interest
groups, N«'hite House staff congressional committees, and think
tanks.
no#g .[ég2ãmaúon. The se]ection and enactment ofpo]icies through
actions by Congress, the president, and the courts.
no#g 7zmp&'memzaóon. The implementation ofpolicies through
government bureaucracies, public expenditures, regulations, and
other activities ofexecutive agencies.
Po#g Eua/#aãon. The evaluation ofpolicies by government agencies
themselves, outside consultants, the media, and the general public.
CHAPTER 2 H /b#ode/s o//b#tics 15
Rationalism: Policy as Maximum Social Gain
A rational policy is one that achieves "maximum social gain"; that is, governments should
choose policies resulting in gains to society that exceed costs by the greatest amount, and
governments should refrain from policies ifcosts exceed gains.
Note that there are really two important guidelines in this definition of maximum
social gain. First, no policy should be adopted ifits costs exceed its benefits. Second, among
policy alternatives, decision makers should choose the policy that produces the greatest ben-
eât over cost. In other words, a policy is rational when the difFerence between the values it
achieves and the values it sacrifices is positive and greater than any other policy alternative.
One should moz view rationalism in a narrow dollars-and-cents framework, in which basic
social values are sacriâced eor dollar savings. Rationalism involves the calculation of aZZ
social, politicas, and economic values sacrificed or achieved by a public policy, not just those
that can be measured in dollars.
To select a rational policy, policymakers must (1) know all the society's value preeer-
ences and their relative weights, (2) know all the policy alternatives available, (3) know all the
consequences of each policy alternative, (4) calculate the ratio of benefits to costs for each
policy alternative, and (5) select the most efficient policy alternative. This rationality
nsumes that the value preferences ofioc;eO ai a móo& can be known and weighted. It is not
enough to know and weigh the values ofsome groups and not others. There must be a com-
plete understanding of societal values. Rational policymaking also requires ;mXo meão
about alternative policies, the ./)xez#cüz/e rapar;g to 6oresee accurately the consequentes of
alternate policies, and the ; zeZlólg mce to calculate correctly the ratio of costs to benefits.
Finally, rational policymaking requires a arca/ozz-m/zZ';nK ÍWsü'm that Eacilitates rationality in
policy eormation. A diagram of such a system is shown in Figure 2--2.
However, there are many barriers to rational decision making, se many, in eact, that it
ruely takes place at all in government. Yet the model remains important eor analytic
purposes because it helps to identi$ barriers to rationality. It assists in posing the question,
'«rhy is policymaking moz a more rational process? At the outset we can hypothesize severas
unpot\ant obstacles to rationaLpoLic)maleing.
' Many conflicting benefits and costs cannot be compared or weighted; 6or example, it is
difficult to compare or weigh the value ofindividual lide against the costs ofregulation.
b.
Rationalism: Applying the Model
Chapter 4, "Criminal Justice: Rationality and Irrationality in Public Policy," shows that
rational policies to deter crime--policies ensuring certainty. swiftness, and severity of
punishment--have seldom been implemented. The problems of achieving rationality in
public policy are also discussed in Chapter 5, "Health and Welfare: The Search for Rational
Strategies:' We will consider the general design of alternative strategies in dealing with
poverV. health, and welfare. We will observe how these strategies are implemented in
public policy, and we will analyze some of the obstacles to the achievement of rationality
in public policy.
16 CHAPTER 2 Modems of Politics
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CHAPTER 2 : a /H(xíe/s ofPD/f&cs
\.
e
e
e
e
Policymakers may not be motivated to make decisions on the bases ofsocietal goals but
instead try to maximize their own rewards power, status, reelection, and money.
Policymakers may not be motivated to maximize net social gain but merely to satisq
demands 6or progress; they do not search until they find "the one best way"; instead
they halt their search when they íind an alternative that will work.
Large investments in existing programs and policies (sunk costs) prevent policymakers
from reconsidering alternatives foreclosed by previous decisions.
There are innumerable barriers to collecting all the ineormation required to know all
possible policy alternatives and the consequences of:each, including the cost of inEor-
mation gathering, the availability of the information, and the time involved in its
collection.
Neither the predictive capacities of the social and behavioral sciences nor those of the
physical and biological sciences are sufíiciently advanced to enable policymakers to
understand the full benefits or costs ofeach policy alternative.
Policymakers, even with the most advanced computerized analytical techniques, do
not have sufficient intelligence to calculate accurately costs and bene6lts when a large
number ofdiverse political, social, economic, and cultural values are at stake.
Uncertainty about the consequences ofvarious policy alternatives compels policymak-
ers to stock as closely as possible to previous policies to reduce the likelihood of unan-
ticipated negative consequences.
The segmentalized nature of policymaking in large bureaucracies makes it difficult to
coordinate decision making se that the input ofall the various specialists is brought to
bear at the point ofdecision.
e
e
e
e
Incrementalism: Policy as Variations on the Past
Incrementalism views public policy as a continuation ofpast government aciivities with only
incremental modifications. Politicas scientist Charles E. Lindblom ârst prespnted the incre-
mental model in the course ofa critique ofthe rational model ofdecision ntaking.l According
to Lindblom, decision makers do mof annually review the whole range of existing and pro-
posed policies, identi$ societal goals, research the beneâts and costs ofalternative policies in
achieving these goês, rank order ofpre6erences 6or each policy alternativo in terms ofthe max-
imum net beneâts, and then make a selection on the bois ofall relevant inEormation. On the
contrary, constraints of time, in6ormation, and cost prevent policymakers 6om identi$ing
the âill range ofpolicy alternativos and their consequences. Constraints ofpolitics prevent the
establishment ofclear-cut societal goês and the accurate calculation ofcosts and benefits. The
incremental model recognizes the impractical nature of "rational-comprehensive" policy-
making, and describes a more conservative process ofdecision making.
Incrementalism is conservative in that existing programs, policies, and expenditures are
considered as a ózzie, and attention is concentrated on new programs and policies and on
increases, decreases, or modiíications of current programs. (For example, budgetary policy
6or any government activity or program eor 20 1 2 might be viewed incrementally, as shown in
18 CHAPTER2 a Made/sofro//tzcs
Policy
Increment
Past Policy
Commitments
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
FIGURIE2--3 The Incremental Model Thê incremental model assumes that policymakers rarely
examine post policy commJtments, but rather 6ocus their attention on changes in policies and
apenditura;n
Figure 2--3.) Policymakers generally accept the legitimacy ofestablished programs and tacitly
agree to continue previous policies.
They do this because they do not have the time, information, or money to investigate
alll the alternatives to existing policy. The cost of collecting all this ineormation is too great.
Policymakers do not have sufficient predictive capacities to know what all the consequences
of each alternative will be. Nor are they abre to calculate cost--beneât rabos for alternative
policies when many diverso political, social, economic, and cultural values are at stake. Thus
completely "rational" policy may turn out to be "inefHcient" (despite the contradiction in
terms) ifthe time and cost ofdeveloping a rational policy are excessive.
Moreover, incrementalism is politically expedient. Agreement comes easier in policy-
making when the items in dispute are only increues or decreases in budgets or modifications
to existing programs. Conflict is heightened when decision making eocuses on major policy
shiâs involving great gains or losses, or r-nothing," ''es-or-no" policy decisions. Becáuse
the politicas tension involved in getting new programs or policies passed every year would be
very great, post policy victories me continued into filture years unless there is a substantial
politicas realignment. Thus, incrementalism is important in reducing confllict, maintaining
stability, and preserüng the political system itself
B.ut tbe incremental mo&l ma)mail wbm policymaleers are confonted witb crises. ''q/h.en
faced with potential collapse of the nation's financiam markets in 2008, the president, Con-
gress, the Treasury Department, and the Federal Reserve Board come together to agree on an
Incrementalism: Applying the Model
Special attention to incrementalism is given in the discussion of government budgeting in
Cbapter 7. "Economic Policy: Incremental and Nonincremental PolicymakíngJ'
's
CHAPTER2'" a Modos ofl'o/Mcs 19
X
!
unprecedented, mom;mcx?mrmza/ expansion ofeederal power (see Chapter 7, "Economic Pol-
icy: Incremental and Nonincremental Policymaking"). Overall, federal spending and deficits
increased dramatically, well beyond any leveis that might have been predicted by the incre-
mental model. The Treasury Department was given unprecedented authority and $700 bil-
lion to "bail out" the nation's m4or financial institutions. The Federal Reserve Board
reduced interest rates to their lowest in history and provided unprecedented amounts of
credit to the ânancial system. Congress itself passed a "stimulus package," the largest single
spending bill in the nation's history. Incrementalism was abandoned.
À
Group Theory: Policy as Equilibrium in the Group Struggle
Group theory begins with the proposition that interaction among groups is the central eact
ofpolitics.2 Individuais with common interests band together formally or informally to press
their demands on government. According to political scientist David Truman, an interest
group is "a shared-attitude group that makes certain claims upon other groups in the soci-
ety"; such a group becomes political "if and when it makes a claim through or upon any of
the institutions ofgovernment."S Individuais are important in politics only when they act as
part oC or on behalfoC group interests. The group becomes the essential bridge between the
individual and the government. Politics is really the struggle among groups to influence
public policy. The task of the political system is to mam«g? .gro#p com/#cf by (1) establishing
rudes of the game in the group struggle, (2) arranging compromises and balancing interests,
(3) enacting compromises in the eorm ofpublic policy, and (4) eneorcing these compromises.
According to group theorists, public policy at any given time is the equilibrium
reached in the group struggle (see Figure 2--4) . This equilibrium is determined by the relative
inflluence ofvarious interest groups. Chadges in the relative influence ofany interest groups
Added Influence
/
/
/
\
\
\
\
\
\
\
/
/
/
Influence of
Group B
Influence of
Group A
Public
Policy
Alternative
Policy
Positions
Policy
Change
Equilibrium
FIGURE 2-4 The Group Model The group model assumes that public policy is a balance of
interest group influence; policies change when particular interest groups gain or lose influence.
20 CHAPTER 2 a /Idade/s ofPo/ü/cs
Group Theory: Applying the Model
Throughout thís volume we will describe struggles over public policy. In Chapter 6,
"Education: Group Struggles,' we will examine group conflict over public policy in the dis-
cussions of education and school issues. In Chapter 8. Tax Policy: Battling the Special
Interests," we will observe the power of interest groups in obtaining special treatments in
the tax code and obstructing efforts to reform the nation's tax laws.
can be expected to result in changes in public policy; policy will move in the direction
desired by the groups gainrng inHuence md away from the desires ofgroups losing influence.
The influence of groups is determined by their numbers, wealth, organizational strength,
leadership, access to dedsion makers, and internam cohesion.4
I''he whole interest group system the political system itselF--is hem together in equi-
[ibrium by severas 6orces. First, there is a ]arge, near]y universa], ázü'mz .gro#@ in American
society that supports the constitutional system and prevailing rudes of the game. This group
is not always visible but can be activated to administer overwhelming rebuke to any group
that attadcs the svstem and threatens to destroy the equilibrium.
Second, aMpp;nKgm#p memóenóáo helps to maintain the equilibrium by preventing
any one group 6om moving too eu 6om prevailing values. Individuais who belong to any
one group algo belong to other groups, and this eact moderates the demands ofgroups who
must avoid oRending their members who have other group afíiliations.
FinaUy, the cáechng zznz/ óa&ncinK xesw#;nK.Pum .growp co zpeóãom also helps to main-
tain equilibrium in the system. No single group constitutes a majority in American society.
The power of each group is checked by the power of competing groups. "Countervailing"
centers ofpower hnction to check the inflluence ofany single group and protect the individ-
ual from exploitation.
Elite Theory: Policy as Elite Pre6erence
Public policy may also be viewed as the pre6erences and values of a governing elite.5
Although it is open asserted that public policy reflects the demands of"the people," this may
express the myth rather than the reality ofAmerican democracy. Elite theory suggests that
the people are apathe.[ic and ill ineormed about public policy, that elites actually shape mass
opinion on policy questions more than messes shape elite opinion. Thus, public policy really
turns out to be the preeerences ofelites. Public ofTicials and administrators merely carry out
the policies decided on by the elite. Policies flow downward from elites to messes; they do
not crise from mass demands (see Figure 2--5).
Elite theory can be summarized briefly m 6ollows:
e
e
Society is divided unto the eew who have power and the many who do not. Only a small
number ofpersons allocate values 6or society; the messes do not decide public policy.
The eew who govern are not typical of the messes who are governed. Elites are drawn
disproportionately from the upper socioeconomic strata ofsociety.
CHAPTER 2 H A,laje/s of/)o/ócs 21
Elite
lPolicy Direction
Policy Execution ]
FIGURE 2--5 The Elite Model The elite modem implies that public policy does not
flow upward from demands by the people, but rather downward 6om the interests,
values, and preeerences ofelites.
e
e
e
e
The movement ofnonelites to elite positions must be show and continuous to maintain
stability and avoid revolution.Only nonelites who have accepted the buic elite con-
sensus can be admitted to governing circlés.
Elites share consensus in behalf of the basic values of the social system and the preser-
vation ofthe system. In America, the bases ofelite consensus me the sanctity ofprivate
property, limited government, and individual liberty.
Public policy does not reflect the demands ofmasses but rather the ptêvailing values of
the elite. Changes in public policy will be incremental rather than revolutionary.
Active elites are subject to relatively little direct influence from apathetic mêses. Elites
influence messes more than messes influence elites.
Elite Theory: Applying the Model
Chapter 9, "lnternational Trade and Immigration: Elite-Mass Conflict," expands on the elite
model by arguing that when elite preferences differ from those of the masses, the prefer-
ences of elites prevail. Chapter l l, "Civil Rights: Elite and Mass Interaction," portrays the
civil rights movement as an effort by established national elites to extend equality of
opportunity to blacks. Opposition to civil rights policies is found among white masses in
the states
22 CHAPTER 2 a /Idade/s ofPo//t/cs
'«rhat are the implications ofelite theory 6or policy analysis? Elitism implies that public
policy does not reflect the demands ofthe people se much as it does the interests, values, and
pre6erences of elites. Therefore, change and innovations in public policy come about as a
result of redefinitions by elites of their own values. Because of the general conservatism of
elites that is, their interest in preserving the system change in public policy will be incre-
mental rather than revolutionaq Changes in the politicas system occur when events threaten
the system, and elites, acdng on the bases of enlightened self-interest, institute reforms to
preserve the system and their peace in it. The vdues ofelites may be very "public regarding."
A sense of noó&ssf oóZke may permeate elite values, and the weleare of the messes may be an
important element in elite decision making. Elitism does not necessarily mean that public
policy will be hostile toward mus welfare but only that the responsibility 6or mass weleare
rests on the shoulders ofelites, not mêses.
Public Choice Theory: Policy as Collective
Decision hÍaking by Self-lnterested Individuais
Public choice is the economic study of nonmarket decision making, especially the applica-
tion ofeconomic analyses to public policymaking. Traditionally, economics studied behavior
in the marketplace and asumed that individuais pursued their private interests; politicas sci-
ence studied behavior in the public arena and usumed that individuais pursued their own
notion ofthe public interest. Thus, sepmate versions ofhuman motivation developed in eco-
nomics and political science: the idem of .pomo economia.f assumed a self-interested actor
seeking to maximize personal benefits; that of&omo.po#úm.ç assumed a public-spirited actor
seeking to maximize societal welfare.
But public choice theory chaHenges the notion that individuais act diüerently in politics
than they do in the marketplace. This theory usumes that all political actors ters, taxpay-
ers, candidates, legislators, bureaucrats, interest groups, parties, and governments ieeX' /o
mmimiz,e tbei,r personal bene$ts in politics a.s weU as in tbe marketphce. lances Bu&valvan, ü:ve
Nobel Preze--winning economist and leading scholm in modem public choice theory, ergues
that individuais come together in politics eor their own mutud benefit, just as they come
together in the marketplace; and by agreement (contract) among themselves they can enhance
their own well-being, in the same way as by trading in the marketplace.Ó in short, people pur-
sue their self-interest in both politics and the marketplace, but even with selfish motives they
can mutually benefit through collective decision making.
Government itself arises from a iocZa/ co /xacz among individuais who agree Éor their
mutual beneât to obey laws and support the government in exchange eor protection oftheir
own lives, liberties, and property. Thus, public choice theorists claim to be intellectual heirs
to the English politicas philosopher John Locke, as well as to Thomas JefFerson, who incor-
porated this social contract notion unto the American Declaration oflndependence. Enlight-
ened self-interest leads individuais to a constitucional contract establishing a government to
protect lide, liberty, and property.
Public choice theory recognizes that government musa pereorm certain 6unctions that
the marketplace +s unable to handle, that is, it must remedy certain "market eailures." First,
government musa; provide.p#ó#cgooü---goods and services that must be supplied to everyone
if they ue supplic4 to anyone. The market cannot provide public goods because their costs
K
CHAPTER 2 Modems ofPolMcs 23
Public Choice: Applying the Modem
The public choice theory is employed in Chapter IO, "Energy and Environmental Policy:
Externalities and Interests," to aid in recognizing environmental pollution as a problem in the
control of externalities in human activity. Public choice theory also helps us to understand the
behavior of environmental interest groups in dramatizing and publicizing their cause.
exceed their vague to any single buyer, and a single buyer would not be in a position to keep
nonbuyers from using it. National deeense is the most common example: protection 6rom 6or-
eign invasion is too expensive eor a single person to buy, and once it is provided no one can be
excluded from its benefits. So people musa act collectively through government to provide eor
üe common deeense. Second, exü' ma#ães are another recognized market eailure and justifica-
tion eor government intervention. An externality occurs when an activity of one individual,
íirm, or local government imposes uncompensated costs on others. The most common
examples are air and water pollution: the discharge ofair and water pollutants imposes costs
on others. Governmentk respond by either regulating the activities that produce externalities
or imposing penalties (fines) on these activities to compensate âor their costs to society.
Public choice theory helps to explain why politicas parties and candidates generally edil
to ofEer clear policy alternatives in election campaigns. Parties and candidates are not inter-
ested in advancing principles but rather in winning elections. They eormulate their policy
positions to win elections; they do not win elections to formulate policy. Thus each party
and candidate seeks policy positions that will attract the greatest number ofvoters.7 (Zz/e/z zz
unimodal distribation ofopinion on an.ypolic) question qseeFlgute 2-6Õ, parties and candidatos
Party A Party B
Liberal Conserv ative
Policy Position
FIGA.JRE 2--6 Public Choice: AVote-Maximizing Modem of Party
Competition Public choice theory assumes that individuais and
organizations seek to maximize their own benefits in politics; eor example,
parties and candidates whose policy views may be distinctly liberal or
conservative move to the center at election time to win the most vozes.
24 CHAPTER 2 H Made/s ofR)/ftícs
wiLI move tomara tlJe center to minimize potes. anil " \deaXogueg
motivated people) ignore the vote-maximizing centrist strategy.
(irracional, ideologically
Game Theory: Policy as Rational Choice
in Competitive Situations
Game theory is the study of decisions in situations in which two or more xnffo a/ partici-
pants have choices to make and the outcome depends on the choices made by each. It is
applied to áreas in policymaking in which there is no independently "best" choice that one
can make--in which the "best" outcomes depend upon what others do.
The idea of "game" is that rational decision makers are involved in choices that are
interdependent. "Players" musa adjust their conduct to reflect not only their own desires and
abilities but also their expectations about what others will do. Perhaps the connotation of a
game"'isunÉommate, suggesting that game theory is not really appropriate 6or serious con-
flict situations. But just the opposite is true: game theory can be applied to decisions about
war and peace, the use of nuclear weapons, international diplomacy, bargaining and coali-
tion building in Congress or the United Nations, and a variety of other important politicas
situations. A 'p]ayer' may be an individua], a group, or a nationa] government--indeed,
anybody with weU-defined goals who is capable ofrational action.
Consider the game of'chicken.' Two adolescents drive their cars toward each other at
a high speed, each with one set ofwhee]s on the center cine of the highway. If neither veers
oH' course they wiU crash. Whoever veers is "chicken." Bota drivers prever to avoid death,
but they algo want to avoid the "dishonor" of being "chicken." The outcome depends on
what both drivers do, and each driver must try to predict how the other will behave. This
6orm of "brinkmanship" is common in international relations (see Figure 2--7). Inspection
Fbe game tbeorbt bi7Tiselfor bemq'w?Fila th numeficá valas te tbe paJo$. ifDriverA choeses to star an course anel
Dtiuer B chooses to star on couro algo, tlx rcsub tniglK be stand a -- IOjor bothplayers, who wreck tbeir cais. But if
DúumA cbooses to stayon course alüDritKr B wm, tl)et{ DritlnA migbtget +5('coarüge"} andDritler B 5
I'dishonor"). lfDritier A uem but DritKr B staJS on cou , tbc resulta wouU be reuerseZ lfbotl] ueer, embk
disbanoredstightt] <--1), bKt not as muco as wtlm ow or üc otber stayea on course.
FIGURE 2--7 A Game-Theoretic Matrix for the Game ofChicken Game theory suggests that
policymakers, or."players," adjust their conduct to reflect not only their own pre6erences but algo the
likely choices ofópponents.
l
    DEVER A'S CHOICES
    sw '«
     
  Stay on A: --lO A: --5  course B: --lO B: +5
DEVER B'S CHOICES    
  Vier A: +5 A: --]
    B: 5 B:--l
CHAPrEkí a Modela of PO/ócs 25
Game Theory: Applying the Model
Game theory is frequently applied in international conflicts. We wlll explore the utiltty of
game theoW, especially the notion of deterrence, in Chapter 1 3, "Defense Policy: Strategies
for Serious Games!' We will also explore the weakness of deterrence in defending against
terrorism in Chapter 1 4. "Homeland Securlty: Terrorism and Nondeterrable Threats'
ofthe payoff matrix suggests that it would be better for boú drivers to veer in order to min-
imize the possibility ofa great loss (--10) But the matrix is too simple. One or both players
may peace a difFerent value on the outcomes than is suggested by the numbers. For example,
one player may prever death to dishonor in the game. Each player musa try to calculate the
values ofthe other, and neither has complete ineormation about the values ofthe opponent.
Moreover, blufRng or the deliberate misrepresentation of one's values or resources to an
opponent is always a possibility. For example, a possible strategy in the game of chicken is
[o allow your opponent to see you drink heavily before the game, stumble drunkenly
loward your car, and mumble something about having lived long enough in this rotten
world. The effect ofthis communication on your opponent may increase his or her estimate
of your likelihood of staying on course, and vence provide incentive 6or your opponent to
vier and allow you [o win.
An important component ofgame theory is the notion ofde/emf re. Deterrenceis the
eRort to prevent an opponent from undertaking an action by inspiring tear of the conse-
quences ofthe action. Players engage in deterrence when they threaten their opponents with
retaliatory actions that promise to impose cases on their opponents that are far in excess of
any bene6lts their opponents might envision by taking these actions. Z)e/erre/zre li xr'zZ8' zzpsW-
chological defende: it pies to preuent opponentsj'om undertakinga particular action by creating
in tbeir mina tbe.Par ofcostty retaLiation.
The success ofdeterrence dependa on the credibility ofthe retaliatory ihreat and on the
rationa[ity of the opponent. Opponehts musa tru]y be]ieve that their actions wi]] resu]t in
retaliatory responses that inflict unacceptable cosas on themselves, thçir people, or their
nation. Opponents who do not really believe a retaliatory attack will occilr are not deterred.
Moreover, opponents must be xnf/onú/--opponents musa weigh the potencial costa and ben-
e6its of their actions and choose a course of action that does not result in costs that exceed
gains. Opponents who are irracional--who do not consider the cases of their actions to
themselves, or their people, or their narion--are not deterred.
Modems: How to Tell if They Are Helping or Not
A model is merely an abstraction or representation of political liga. When we think of polit-
ical systems or elites or groups or racional decision making or incrementalism or games, we
are abstracting from the real world in an attempt to simpliQ. clarim. and understand what is
really important about politics. Be6ore we begin our study of public policy, let us set 6orth
some general criteria 6or evaluating the usefulness ofconcepts and models.
26 CHAPTER 2 B/Made/s of/)o/i#cs
Order and SimpliR Reality. Certainly the utility of a model nes in its ability to order and
simpli$ political lide se that we can think about it more clearly and understand the
relationships we Rind in the real world. Yet too much simplification can lead to inaccuracies in
our thinhng about reality. On the one hand, if a concept is too narrow or identi6ies only
superficial phenomena, we may not be able to use it to explain public policy. On the other
hand, if a concept is too broad and suggests overly complex relationships, it may become se
complicated and unmanageable that it is not really an aid to understanding. In other words,
some theories ofpolitics may be too complex to be helpfül, while others may be too simplistic.
Identif} What is Significant. A model should also identiR the really significant aspects of
public polia. lt should direct attention away from irrelevant variables or circumstances and
Gocus on the real causei and significant consequences of public policy. Of course, what is
real," =relevant,' or "signi6cant" is to some extent a fiJnction of an individual's personal
valud. But we can aH agree that the utility of a concept is reiated to its ability to identi$
what it is that is really important about politics.
Be Congruent with Reality. Generally, a model should be congruent with reality--that is,
it ought to have real empirical reÉerents. We would expect to have difnculty with a concept
that identifies a process that does not really occur or symbolizes phenomena that do not exist
in the real world. However, we must not be too quick to dismiss unrealistic concepts #'they
succeed in direcdng our anention to why they are unrealistic. For example, no one contends
that govemment decision making is completely rational--public ofRcials do not always act
to maximize societal values and minimize societal costs. Yet the concept of racional decision
making may stiH be usefid, albeit unrealistic, ifit makes us realize how irrational government
decision making reaHy is and prompts us to inquire why.
Provide Meaningful Communication. A concept or model should algo communicate
something meaningfül. If too many people disagree over the meaning of a concept, its
utility in communication is diminished. For example, if no one really agrees on what
constitutes an elite, the concepr ofan elite does not mean the same thing to everyone. Ifone
defines an elite as a group ofdemocratically elected public officials who are representative of
the general public, one is communicating a diKerent idea in using the term than one who
defines an elite as an unrepresentative minority that makes decisions for society based on its
own lnterests.
Direct Inquiry and Research. A modem should help to direct inquiry and research indo
public poliu. A concept should be operational--that is, it should regerdirectly to real-world
phenomena that can be observed, measured, and veri6ied. A concept, or a series ofinterrelated
concepts (which we reger to as a model), should suggest relationships in the real world that can
be tested and verified. Ifthere is no way to prove or disprove the ideas suggested by a concept,
the concept is not really usefiil in developing a science ofpolitics.
Suggest Explanations. Finally, a model should suggest an explanation of public policy. It
should suggest hypotheses about the causes and consequences of public policy--hypotheses
that can be tested against real-world data. A model that merely describes public policy is not
as usehl as aQe that explains public policy, or at least suggests some possible explanations.
iYioaeis OT roiilics
Notes
1. bee Lharles b. Lindblom,' l he bcience ot Muddling l hrough," /'Hó/if .4dmzn/i/znrzan Rez/lem. 19 (Spnng
1 959), 79--88; Aaron Wildavsky, ZBf 2o#flcT ofi&e B ldZfmT /'Fáceis(Boston: Little, Brown, 1 964).
2. The classic statement on group theory is David B. Truman, 7%f (hz,emmfnü/.rbucen(NewYork: Knopf; 1951).
3. Ibid., P. 37
4. Earl Latham,"The Group Bases ofPolitics," /n Bo#f/cu/ Bfóaz,ür, ed. Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and
Morria Janowitz(New York: Free Press, 1 956), p. 239.
5. Elite theory is explained at length in Thomas R. Dye and Hamton Zcigler, TBe/ranW afZ)fmarrug 1 4th ed.
(Belmont, CA; Wadsworth, 2009).
6. James M. Buchanan and Gordon TUlock, ZBe (2Z /w of(bwmr (Ann Arbor: Universicy of Michigan
Press, 1962).
7. Anthony Downs, .4/z Era om/r ZBfaT ofZ)fmaaug(NewYork: Harper & Row 1957)
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WttOAVSKr, AARON. Zbe /Vea, Bo#f/rf offépe B 2gff ZT Praceis, 2nd ed. New York: HarperCollins, 1 992
Web Sites .. J
b. 7
AMERICAN Poi.iTiCAL SCiENCE AssociArioN. Home pago ofacademic politicas scientists' pro6asional organization.
K?ww apsanet. org
PUBLIC AGENDA ONI.INE. Brief guide to a variety of policy issues, including public opinion surveys on these
wua. www.pubticageKcb org
AIMANAC OF Poi,iCV lssuES. Background ineormation on a variety of issues with links to sources. mmmpa#g-
allm nac. org
Pt;BLiC OPiNiON ONI.iNK. Compilation of recent public opinion polis on policy issues, politicas actors, govern-
ment institutions, etc. mmm.po#//zyrparr.cam
TnE GALÃ.up ORGANIZATION. Home pane ofthe Gallup public opinion organization. mmw.gaZyup.rom
N.XnONAL CENTER FOR Poi.iCY RESEAKCH. Conservative policy research organization, with studies on a variety of
policy issues. mww. m.zrian,z/rrnfenorX
PXOGREssivE Poi,iCV INSTITUTO. Liberal policy research organization, with polia briefi on a variety of issues.
Brum.ppieK !ine. 0 7g
X.\l IONAL lssuES. Collection ofcurrent articles on a variety ofpolicy issues. w. afzom.z#ífwes.fam
The Policymaking Process
Decision-MakingAcüvities
The Policy Process: How Policies Are Made
Policy studies open Eocus on óow .pollicws arr wízzü rather than on their content or their
causes and consequences. The study of how policies are made generally considers a series of
activities, or .prwaKsP that occur within the politicas system. These processes, together with
the activities invohed and likely participants, may be portrayed as in Table 3--1.
Although it may be helpfül to think about policymaking as a series ofprocesses, in the
real world these acúvities seldom occur in a neat, step-by-step sequence. Rather these
processes open occur simultaneously, each one coUapsing indo the others. [)iüerent politicas
actors and institutions ans, interest groups, lobbyists and legislators, executives and
bureaucrats, reporters and commentators, think tanks, lawyers and judges--may be engaged
in diüerent processem at the same time, even in the same policy área. Policymaking is seldom
as neat as the process model. Nonetheless, it is open useful 6or analytical purposes to break
policymaking inca component units in order to understand better how policies are made.
Problem Identification and Agenda Setting
Who decides what wi]] be decided? The power to decide what wi]] be a policy issue is crucial
to the policymaking process. [)eciding what wi]] be rhe prob]ems is even more important
than deciding what will be the solutions. Many civics textbooks imply that agenda setting
just "happens." it is sometimes argued that in an open plural society such as ouro, channels
of access and communication to government are always open, se that any problem can be
discussed and p]aced on the agenda ofnationa] decision making. Individuais and groups, it is
said, can organize themselves to assume the tasks of denining problems and suggesting
solutions. People can define their own interests, organize themselves, persuade others to sup-
port their cause, gain access to government omcials, influence decision making, and watch
over the implementation of government policies and programs. Indeed, it is sometimes
argued that the absence ofpolitical activity such as this is an indicador ofsatisEaction.
l
28
CHAPTER 3 H 71Ü
L
Plocess 29
l\BLE 3-1 Policymaking as a Process Policymaking can be seen as a process--AoK'
stop-by-step sequence; but in reality these processes overlap and intertwine.
l)obcies are a
Process Activity P«ti.:ip'n"
Problem IdentiGication Publicizing societal problems
Expressing demands 6or
government action
Mass media
Interest groups
Citizen initiatives
Public opinion
&
Elites, including president
Congress
&
Agenda Setting Deciding what issues will be
decided, what problema will be
addressed by government
&
Candidates for elective oMce
Mass media
&
Policy Formulation [)eveloping policy proposals [o
resolve issues and ameliorate
problems
&
Think tanks
President and executivo oítice
Congressional committees
Interest groups
&
&
&
Policy Legitimation Selecting a proposal
Developing politicas support Eor it
Enacting it into law
Deciding on its constitutionality
&
&
Interest groups
President
Congress
Couros
&
Policy Implementation President and White House star'
Executive departments and
agencies
&
Organizing departments and agenciei
Providing payments or services
Levying taxas
&
Policy Evaluation
& &
Reporting outputs ofgovernment
programa
Evaluating inlpacts ofpolicies on
target and nontarget groups
Proposing changes and "reGorms'
Executivo departments and
agenciei
Congressional oversight
committees
Mass media
Think tanks
But, in reality, policy issues do not just "happen." Creating an issue, dramatizing it,
calling attention to it, and pressuring government to do something about it are important
politicas tactics. These tactics are employed by influential individuais, organized interest
groups, po]icy-p]anning organizations, po]itica] candidates and omce-holders, and perhaps
most important, the mass media. These are the tactics of"agenda seuing.
Agenda Setting from the Bottom Up
The prevailing model of policymaking in American politial science is a popularly driven,
bottom-up" portrait ofdecision making. This "democratic-pluralist" modem assumes that any
problem can be identified by individuais or groups, by candidatei seeking election, by political
30 CHAPTER 3 The Policymaking Process
leaders seeking to enhance their reputation and prospects flor reelection, by political parties
seeking to define theirprinciples and/or create Eavorable popular images ofthemselves, by the
mass media seeking to "create" news, and even by protest groups deliberately seeking to call
attention to their problema. And, of course, vmious crises and disasters--from natural disas-
ters such as hurricanes and droughts to man-made tragedies such as school shootings and air-
plane crashes--attract public attention and compel public ofHcials to respond.
Public Opinion and Agenda Setting. Events, and the media's reporting ofthem, can focus
public- attention on issues, problema, and "crises." Concern over terrorism dominated the
public's mind Eollowing the horrMc televised attacks on the World frade Center and the
Pentagon on Seprember 1 1, 200 1 . Later the war in Iraq became "the most important problem
Eacing the country' according to opinion polis. Iraq appeared to be the nation's top policy
issue during the congrcssional elecuons of 2006 in which opposition Democrats captured
control oFboth houses ofCongress.
But the threal offinancia] collapse and deep recession soon replaced all other issues on the
publica agenda Tbe nation's "top prioriW' fõr President Barack Obama became jobs and the
economy(see Tãble 3-2). Ddending against ature terrorist attacks Éell to second place in
the policy priorides of most Americans. Other issues----Social SecuriW, education, healthcare,
budget deficits, the pool, crime, deEense, taxes--Eollowed behind. A minority of Americans
listed the envimnment, immigration, lobbying, and internacional frade as top priority issues.
Global warming was last on üe nation's lisa.
'lABLE 3--2 Polia Prioritics ofthe American Public I'd like to ask you some questions about priorities for
President Obama and Congrcss tais ycar. As l read flom a lisa, tela me ifyou think the item should be a top
priority, imponanr but loner priority, not too important, or should it not be done?
Percent Saying Top Priority
Strengthening the nation's economy
Improving the job situation
DeGending the country ftom fiituK terrorist attacks
Taking steps [o make Social Security linancially sound
Improving the educational system
[)ealing with the nation's energ}, prob]em
Tbking steps to make Medicara financially sound
Reducing healthcare costa
Reducing the budget deâcjt
Providing health insurance to the uninsured
Dealing with che problems ofpoor and needy people
Reducing crime
Dealing with the moral breakdown of the country
Strengthening the U.S. military
Reducing federal income taxes Hor the middlc class
Protecting the environment
Dealing with the issue ofillegal immigration
Reducing the influence oflobbyists in Washington
Dealing with global trade issues
Dealing with global warming
85
82
76
63
61
60
60
59
53
52
50
46
45
44
43
41
41
36
31
30
SOURCE: BTH' ReKearcó C zz/fr S rz,g, January 2009, wzPm.poZZlpiy@orf.rom
CHAPTER 3 The Fblicymaking Process 31
Agenda Setting from the Top Down
When V O. Key wrestled with the same problem confronting us--namely, the determina-
üon of the impact of popular preEerences on public policy--he concluded thar "the missing
prece of the puzzle" was "that thin stratum of persons reEerred to variously as the politicas
elite, the political activists, the leadership echelons, or the influentials.
The longer one frets with the puzzle of how democratic regimes manage to function, the
more plausible it appears that a substantial pare of the explanation is to be Found in the
motives that activate the ZradrrT Ü fr e/an, the values rhat it holds, the rudes of the politicas
game [o which it adheres, in the expectations which it entertains about its own status in soci-
ety, and perhaps in some of the objective circumstances, both material and institutional, in
which it functions. '
Popular Perceptions ofPolicymaking. It is interesting to note that most Americans believe
that the government pays very little attention to their views on public policy and that people
in government have little understanding of what people think (see Table 3--3). An
overwhelming majority of Americana believe that their government is "run by a few big
ll\BLE 3-3 Popular Attitudes Toward Government Policymaking The American public is highly skeptical
ofpoliticians and people in government, believing tear they should pay more attention to the public's views.
Houi muco say do you thing people tire yourseLfbaue about wbat the gouernment ües--a good üal, some,
er not muco?
A good deal 10%
Some'25
Not much 64
#ouU)ou sa)tbe move vimewt is preta maca ran bafew bigintevests ookingout$or thevttsetpes or tbat it is n Pt
üe ben #tt ofatl the people?
Afew big interests . 64%
All ofthe people 28
)o you thing that quite a few oftbe people runningtbe gouemment are crochet not uer)maná 4t, or do )ou üink
krdt] an) oftbe trem are creeked?
Quite a âew 52%
Not verá many 28
Hardly any lO
AJI (volunteered) 5
lfthe kaürs oftbe nation foLlowed the uiews ofthe public more closcl» do }ou thing üat the mtion wouLd be beber
alar worse o$' tban it is to(hy?
Better 8 1 %
Worse 10%
Pk e teta me wbicb stateme7ttycu agree witb vttost: (A) 'Whe7t members ofCongress ave tbiakingabout bow to vete
on an issae, the)sbozU real up on the Folk, as tais can hetp trem ga a smse aftbe public's uiew on tbe ksue.
(B) 'Wben members ofCongress are tbinkingaboKt how to vote OH a% isso, tbc)sbeuUnet re(ütbe Folk, because tais
watt dist aa themPow! thinkingabeut wbat is right.
Should read the polis
Should not read the polis
67%
26%
SQUB(.E: Tbe PoüingRef)or{ (2QQ83, miolo.pollingre?ort.com
32 CHAPTER 3 H The Po/fcymak;ng Process
interests looking out for themselves" rather than "for the bene6it ofall ofthe people." And an
overwhelming majority believe that the nation would be better oK if public policy Eollowed
the views of citizens more closely. While policymakers often publicly expressed disdain for
opinion polis, most Americans believe that they should pay more attention to them. In short,
most Americans believe that policy is made from the top down.
Elite Agenda Setting. The elitist model ofagenda setting 6ocuses on the role of leaders in
business, 6inance, and the media, as we]] u in government. These leaders may observe
societãl developments they perceive as threatening to their own values or interests; or they
may perceive oppominnics to advance their own values and interests or their own careers.
According to sociologist G. Wiljiam Domhoa. agenda setting "begins ineormally in
corporate boaídrooms, social clubs, and discussion groups, where problems are identified as
issuef to be solved by new policias. It ends in government, where policies are enacted and
impleinented."Z This modal suggests that the initial impetus Gor policy change and initial
resoupces Éor research, planning, and Gormulation of national policy are derived from corpo-
rate aÀd personal wealth. Tais weajth is channeled unto Foundations, universities, and policy-
oriented thing tanks in the Eorm ofendowments, grants, and contracts. Moreover, corporate
presidente, ducaors and top wealth-holders also sit on the governing boards ofthese institu-
tions and oversee the general direcaon of their work.
Polidcal Entreppeneunhip- Candidates Eor public ofHce at all leveis musa keep their names
and faces beEore the voters--in public appearances, interviews, speeches, and press releases.
In order to do se, they mun say something, that is, deliver a message or theme that creates a
Eavorable image of themsdves. Most of these campaign messages, themes, and images are
largely devoid of any speci6c policy content, except in very general terms, 6or example,
'stands up against the specia] inreresK" "fights 6or the taxpayer," or "change you can believe
in." But occasionaHy candidatos Gocus their campaigns on what they perceive to be issues that
wi[[ motivate voters. Po]idca] cha]]engers as we]] as ofHcia]s seeking ree]ection may seize upon
particular problems, publicize üem, and even propose solutions. If they win the election,
they may even claim a "mandate' fiam the people to pursue the policy directionemphasized
in their campaign. Whether or not their success was in Eact a product oftheir policy position,
they may believe that they have a responsibility to put 6orth policy proposals consistent with
their campaign messages and themes.
Opinion--Policy Linkage. The problem in assessing the independent eKect of mass
opinion on the actions of decision makers is that their actions help to mold mass opinion.
Even when public policy is in accord with mass opinion, we can never be fure whether mass
opinion shaped public policy or public policy shaped mass opinion. The distinguished
American policial scientist V. O. Key, Jr., wrote, "Government, as we have seen, attempts to
mold public opinion toward support of the programs and policies it espouses. Given that
endeavor, peúect congruence between public policy and public opinion could be
government ofpublic opinion rather than government ó7 public opinion."J
Policy EKects. Public policy shapes public opinion more often than opinion shapes policy.
for several. reasons. First, 6ew people have opinions on the great bulk of policy questiona
N
CHAPTER 3 B 77fé PDlãqmabng Process 33
confronting the nation's decision makers. Second, public opinion is very unstable. lt can
change in a manter ofdays in response to news events precipitated by leaders. Third, leaders
do not have a clear perception of mass opinion. Most communications received by decision
makers are from other e]ites--newspersons, interest group ]eaders, and other inf]uentia]
persons--and not from ordinary citizens.
Media Eüects. We musa not assume that the opinions expressed in the news media are public
opinion. Frequently, this is a source of confiision. Newspersons believe zÉg are the public.,
often confüsing their own opinions with public opinion. They even tell the mass public what
its opinion is, thus actually helping to mold it to conhorm to their own beliefs. Decision
makers, then, may act in response to news stories or the opinions ofinfluential newspersons in
the beliefthat they are responding to public opinion.
Communicating with Policymakers. Decision makers can easily misinterpret public
opinion because the communications they receive have an elite bias. Members of the mass
public seldom call or write their senators or representatives, much less converse with them at
dinners, cocktail parties, or other social occasions. Most of the communications received by
decision makers are /n/zae#fr, Eram newspersons, organized group leaders, influential
constituents, wea]thy po]itica] contributors, and personal friends--people who, 6or the most
pare, share the some views. It is not surprising, thereeore, that members of Congress say that
most of their mail is in agreement with their own position; their world of public opinion is
self-reiníorcing. Moreover, persons who initiate communication with decision makets, by
writing or calling or visiting their representatives, are decidedly more educated and afHuent
than the average citizen.
The President and White House Staff. The president and the executive branch are generally
expected to be the "initiators" of policy proposals, with members of Congress in the role of
'arbiters" ofpolicy alternatives. (The same division oflabor is usually found at the skate and loal
leveis, with governors, mayors, and even city managers expected to Hormulate policy proposals
and skate legislators and city councils tó approve, amend, or reject them.) The Constitution of
the United Stares appears to endorse this arrangement in Artic]e ]], Section 3h"IThe president]
shall from time to time give to Congress inâormation ofthe Skate ofthe Union, and recommend
to their consideration such measures as he shaH judge necessary and expedient." Each year the
principal policy statements of the president come in the State of the Union message, and more
importantl» in the Budget of the United States(l;overnment, prepared by the OMce of
Management and Budget(see Chapter 7). Many other policy proposals are developed by
executive departments in their specialized áreas; these proposals are usuaUy uansmined to the
White House 6or the president's approva] be6ore being seno to Congress.
Presidents have maná motivations to seize the initiative in policymaking. First-term
presidents musa build a record of success that later can be used in their reelection campaign.
They musa show that they can "get things done in Washington." They musa build and main-
tain their electoral coalition. They musa show that they are capable of 6ollowing through on
at least some of their campaign promises. Second-term presidente are often motivated by a
concern for their "place in history." They seek policy achievements that will contribute to
rheir presidential "greatness" in history.
34 CHAPTER 3 H The PO/íqmaking Process
Congress and Legislative Star. While Congress is generally portrayed as the "arbiter" of
policy proposals initiated by others, occasionally leaders in the Congress will try to set forth
their own agendas. Perhaps the most well-publicized eüort in the Congress [o seize the
initiative in policymaking was the 1994 "Contract with America" led by then Speaker ofthe
House Newt Gingrich. Republicar House candidatei across the counEry united behind a
comprehensive set of proposals, including a balanced budget constitucional amendment,
term limits Eor Congress, welEue re6orm, and se on. But despite a stunning GOP victory in
1 994 congressiona] elections, enthusiasm 6or the Contract with America quickly dissipated,
and President Bill Clinton soon regained policy leadership.
Nonetheless, members of Congress sometimes serve as agenda setters. They may do se
to challenge a president of the opposing party, to gain a reputation as a power broker them-
selves, or indeed to peace on the national agenda an issue they eeel requires attention. Com-
mittee Í:hairs enjoy a specia] advantage in congressiona] agenda setting; they contrai the
agenda oftheir commiuecs' hearings. And these hearings ofFer the best opportunity for con-
gressiona[ invo[vement in agenda setting. Congressiona] staKs--committee staas, staKs of
the legislaúve leadership, and andes to individual legislators--open play an important role in
bringing issues [o the attention of their bosses.
Interest(;roups. Interest groups may initiate their own policy proposals, perhaps in
association with members of Congress or their staüs who share the same interest. Interest
group staff often bring valuable technical knowledge to policy Gormation, as well as political
inEormation about their group's position on the issues. Because Congress members and their
staff vague both kinds of infomlation, interest groups can open provide the precise language
they desire in proposed bílis and amendments. Thus, interest group staüs oâ:en augment the
work of congressiona] staff. Interest groups also provide testimony at congressional hearings
as we]] as technica] reporta and analyses used by congressional staüs.
Agenda Setting: The Mass Media
Television is the major source of inÉormadon íor the vaso majority ofAmericans. More than
two-thirds report that they receive all or most of their news from television. Television is
really the first form of mmi communication, that is, communication that reaches nearly
everyone, including çhildren. More important, television presents a visual image, not merely
a printed word. The visual quality of television--the emotional impact that is conveyed by
pictures--enables the TV networks to convey emotions as well as in6ormation.
Media Power. The media are both players and referees in the game ofpolitics. They not
only report to the people on the struggles [or power in society, but they a]so participate in
those struggles themselves. They are an elite group, competing for power alongside the more
traditional leadership groups from business, labor, government, and other sectors of society.
As politicas journalist Theodore White once observed, "The power ofthe press in America is
a primordial one. It sets the agenda of public