Interpretive Sociology

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<p>Interpretive Sociology</p><p>MICHAEL ADORJAN</p><p>University of Calgary, Canada; University of Hong</p><p>Kong, Hong Kong</p><p>BENJAMIN KELLY</p><p>Nipissing University, Canada</p><p>Often set in contrast to more structural or critical</p><p>perspectives, interpretive sociology is concerned</p><p>with how people go about defining and making</p><p>sense of their situations, others, and themselves.</p><p>Such a mandate lends itself to inquiry that is</p><p>more sensitive to qualitative methodologies and</p><p>subjectively based analysis. Rather than establish-</p><p>ing specific correlations between operationalized</p><p>variables and causation, analytical attention is</p><p>given to the processual nature of the human lived</p><p>experience as it relates to people’s everyday lives.</p><p>Data are collected and analyzed through various</p><p>forms of participant observation, interviewing,</p><p>and historical documents.</p><p>Max Weber’s Verstehende Soziologie</p><p>Sociology as a formal discipline was originally</p><p>modeled by Émile Durkheim in the late nine-</p><p>teenth and early twentieth centuries, on the</p><p>natural sciences and the success of psychology.</p><p>Durkheim’s “social facts” suggested a positivist</p><p>objective reality “out there,” which could be</p><p>naturally observed, studied, and “tested.” While</p><p>this view retains purchase today, it came to be</p><p>challenged early on, most notably by Max Weber.</p><p>Weber laid the groundwork for what has been</p><p>broadly dubbed interpretive sociology, or Verste-</p><p>hende Soziologie, which embraces the principle</p><p>that social life is subjective and that those who</p><p>systematically study social life should attend to</p><p>how people make sense and interpret their social</p><p>world, actions, and identities.</p><p>Weber was one of the first sociologists to</p><p>recognize the role “human understanding” and</p><p>interpretation play in social action and the</p><p>The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Edited by George Ritzer.</p><p>© 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2016 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</p><p>DOI: 10.1002/9781405165518.wbeos0698</p><p>fashioning of the social order without losing sight</p><p>of what he termed “causal adequacy.” He argued</p><p>that sociology is a science “concerning itself</p><p>with the interpretive understanding of social</p><p>action and thereby with a causal explanation</p><p>of its course and consequences” (Weber, 1978:</p><p>1.4). Weber’s balanced “subjectivist” position</p><p>was in direct contrast to the prevailing positivist</p><p>doctrine in Germany at the time. Weber spent the</p><p>early years of the twentieth century engaged in a</p><p>series of methodological debates within the neo-</p><p>Kantian tradition. Along with his contemporaries</p><p>Wilhelm Dilthey and Heinrich Rickert, Weber</p><p>sought to establish a valid social science (Geis-</p><p>teswissenschaften) that possessed a methodology</p><p>better suited to study the social world than the</p><p>positivist models provided by the natural sciences</p><p>(Naturwissenschaften). Although committed</p><p>to causal analysis, Weber believed that it was</p><p>inappropriate to apply the hypothetico-deductive</p><p>model to the study of history, culture, society, and</p><p>individual motive. Because human beings have a</p><p>subjective inner world, a different methodology</p><p>and conceptual framework was necessary. More-</p><p>over, this model had to emphasis the uniqueness</p><p>of social action. Weber felt that action is social</p><p>“insofar as the acting individual attaches a sub-</p><p>jective meaning to his behavior … takes account</p><p>of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented</p><p>in its course” (1978: 1.4). Concerned with the</p><p>objective nature of an external world, Weber</p><p>believed that the natural sciences were unable to</p><p>accommodate this intersubjective reality.</p><p>A majority of Weber’s work focused on explor-</p><p>ing the unique significant cultural conditions</p><p>that gave rise to specific historical outcomes. This</p><p>line of inquiry moved him to design a method-</p><p>ology within the social sciences that integrated</p><p>both hermeneutical concerns and explanatory</p><p>objectives. He stressed that sociology must reject</p><p>the presumption that understanding and causal</p><p>explanation have no relationship to each other</p><p>(Weber, 1981 [1913]).</p><p>Although Weber avoided universal causal laws,</p><p>he did suggest that we seek to uncover specific</p><p>singular causal relationships (Ringer, 1997). It was</p><p>his use of ideal types as a conceptual apparatus</p><p>2 I N T E R P R E T I V E SO C I O L O G Y</p><p>that allowed him to establish various forms of</p><p>causal understanding and interpretation within</p><p>his diverse substantive areas of study. Ideal types</p><p>act as heuristic tools that encourage researchers to</p><p>draw out the defining traits of a historical event,</p><p>social institution, or belief system. These key</p><p>characteristics, in their abstract form, are then</p><p>isolated and compared with actual historical or</p><p>contemporary empirical features of social reality.</p><p>This exercise accentuates differences and pro-</p><p>motes analytical comparisons, providing greater</p><p>understanding into possible causal relationships</p><p>and overall social change.</p><p>Max Weber’s most popular application of his</p><p>Verstehen style of sociology can be found in</p><p>his book entitled The Protestant Ethic and the</p><p>Spirit of Capitalism. Weber acknowledged that</p><p>economic factors could influence how people</p><p>define themselves and their world. However,</p><p>he presented an alternative subjective causal</p><p>example by demonstrating that a group’s inter-</p><p>pretive schema could also affect material reality.</p><p>In contrast to Karl Marx’s historical materialism,</p><p>Weber believed that people’s interpretation and</p><p>implementation of societal ideas and values (i.e.,</p><p>Weltanschauung), could have a dramatic impact</p><p>on economic and social change. The “Protestant</p><p>work ethic” is perhaps Weber’s most famous ideal</p><p>type as it best exemplifies his commitment to a</p><p>methodology that is sensitive to the integration of</p><p>causal analysis with human subjective meaning.</p><p>Weber sought to answer the question “Why did</p><p>capitalism originate in Western Europe and not</p><p>anywhere else on the globe?” Through the anal-</p><p>ysis of historical documentation, he crafted the</p><p>“Protestant work ethic” as an ideal type and used</p><p>it in his analysis to demonstrate how a sacred</p><p>belief system became partially responsible for the</p><p>current secular global free market system.</p><p>Ultimately, Weber employed the ideal type</p><p>methodology to uncover the “elective affinity”</p><p>and “causal chain” between people’s motives,</p><p>“means–ends” calculations, values, and overall</p><p>interpretation of their world and altering histor-</p><p>ical and social conditions that, given a different</p><p>constellation of cultural interpretations, could</p><p>have been otherwise. Although many of today’s</p><p>interpretive sociologists are not completely enam-</p><p>ored with Weber’s emphasis on causal under-</p><p>standing, his interpretive analysis of how a group</p><p>of people shaped the world with their beliefs</p><p>inspired generations of sociologists to acknowl-</p><p>edge the power that subjective meaning-making</p><p>activities have on the social construction of reality.</p><p>Pragmatism and Symbolic Interaction</p><p>While Max Weber built the classical interpretive</p><p>foundation, it is symbolic interactionism and</p><p>ethnomethodology that now provide contempo-</p><p>rary sociologists with an interpretive paradigm</p><p>that is both conceptually and methodologi-</p><p>cally robust. While symbolic interactionism</p><p>as a perspective and methodology was formu-</p><p>lated by Herbert Blumer (1969), his inspiration</p><p>came from the American pragmatists, including</p><p>Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey,</p><p>and most notably George Herbert Mead. The</p><p>pragmatists rejected John Locke’s view of human</p><p>beings as a tabula rasa, a blank slate onto which</p><p>socialization is poured. Moreover, they argued</p><p>that humans do not act through a normatively</p><p>applied rational calculus. These thinkers devel-</p><p>oped concepts which emphasized human life as</p><p>one of shared understandings between reflective</p><p>and interpretive members.</p><p>The pragmatists inspired an onslaught of</p><p>empirically oriented research at the University</p><p>of Chicago that, through in-depth interviewing,</p><p>participant observation, and ethnography, sought</p><p>to capture the order and flux of social life in an</p><p>urban context. These early sociologists rejected</p><p>the idea that capturing social life is amenable to</p><p>the methodologies and tenets of the natural sci-</p><p>ences. Rejecting the research laboratory as a site</p><p>for legitimate science, they looked to the city as</p><p>a natural laboratory for exploration. Sociology’s</p><p>axiom “If men define situations as real, they are</p><p>real in their consequences,” which was formu-</p><p>lated in the 1920s by W.I. Thomas and his research</p><p>assistant Dorothy Swain Thomas, exemplified the</p><p>interpretive sociological epistemology inspired</p><p>by the Chicago School (see Thomas, 1923).</p><p>Not all of these early sociologists rejected</p><p>quantitative procedures; nevertheless, it was</p><p>ethnography and witnessing social life as it hap-</p><p>pens that Chicago sociologists felt best addressed</p><p>the problem of the “double hermeneutic,” or</p><p>the task of interpreting subjects that them-</p><p>selves interpret their world (Giddens, 1984).</p><p>It was the Chicago School and pragmatism</p><p>I N T E R P R E T I V E SO C I O L O G Y 3</p><p>that inspired Herbert Blumer’s formulation of</p><p>symbolic interactionism in 1969.</p><p>Blumer proposed that sociologists should focus</p><p>on the subjective and interpretive aspects of</p><p>people’s shared meanings. He argued that social</p><p>structures are ongoing accomplishments of “joint</p><p>action,” and emphasized human agency to shape</p><p>social contexts that are never completely external</p><p>to the individual nor obdurate in their influence</p><p>and impact. It is not roles and values that guide</p><p>action; what matters are our perceptions and</p><p>interpretations of these. Blumer’s focus on shared</p><p>meanings emphasized the examination of lan-</p><p>guage and interaction, leading to his endorsement</p><p>of the direct examination of the empirical world</p><p>through ethnography, participant observation, as</p><p>well as life history (i.e., the examination of diaries</p><p>and letters) and interviews.</p><p>Also drawing from pragmatism and emerging</p><p>symbolic interactionism was the formulation of</p><p>“grounded theory” by Barney Glaser and Anselm</p><p>Strauss (1967). Glaser and Strauss emphasized</p><p>a comparative method that avoids mapping</p><p>empirical data onto pre-existing theory. Unlike</p><p>natural science methodology (which, because of</p><p>its emphasis on validity and reliability, requires</p><p>antecedent operationalization), grounded theory</p><p>seeks to push researchers to perpetually revise</p><p>their ideas regarding social life by going back</p><p>and forth between the empirical world and their</p><p>own concepts and ideas. Grounded theory allows</p><p>methodology to take precedence insofar as it</p><p>informs theoretical generation through ongoing</p><p>comparison.</p><p>Ethnomethodology</p><p>Harold Garfinkel sought to formulate a more</p><p>interpretive sociology than that of his thesis</p><p>supervisor, Talcott Parsons, which centered on</p><p>the method in which people engage to uphold</p><p>their every day sense of identity, action, and con-</p><p>tinuity between individual and society. Garfinkel</p><p>asked how, within our daily actions, society is</p><p>perpetuated and how transactions of equilibrium</p><p>are enacted. Similar to symbolic interaction-</p><p>ism, ethnomethodology (developed during the</p><p>mid-1950s but gaining prominence during the</p><p>1960s) seeks to capture the real lived experiences</p><p>of members within society, favoring the direct</p><p>observation of people, especially focusing on</p><p>microinteractions. Both perspectives emphasize</p><p>negotiation and interpretation, and suggest that</p><p>only through direct participation can researchers</p><p>explicate the life world of members. It also</p><p>emphasizes the importance of language and the</p><p>typifications that socially construct the experi-</p><p>enced world. Ethnomethodology criticizes the</p><p>use of natural science methodology, concepts,</p><p>and theories to build normative or positivistic</p><p>models of social life. It favors methods such</p><p>as conversation and situational analysis, often</p><p>through direct participant observation. Eth-</p><p>nomethodologists argue that sociologists have</p><p>become too distanced from the people they seek</p><p>to study, and that theoretical categories developed</p><p>by sociologists should be replaced by empirically</p><p>situated observations of the methods people</p><p>use to act in every day life, that is, that theory</p><p>is as people do, not as objectivist sociologists</p><p>conjecture. This rejection of the development of</p><p>formal sociological terminology distances eth-</p><p>nomethodology from symbolic interactionism,</p><p>the latter favoring the development of concepts as</p><p>“sensitizing instruments” generated from direct</p><p>empirical contact and observation of social life.</p><p>One of the lasting legacies of ethnometholog-</p><p>ical analyses came from Garfinkel’s “breaching</p><p>experiments,” where students were directed to</p><p>transgress informal social norms of conformity in</p><p>order to explore the fragility of social order. For</p><p>example, some students were assigned to act as</p><p>lodgers with their parents when they visited their</p><p>homes, acting more as polite acquaintances than</p><p>as family members (parents were either perplexed</p><p>or angered). Other breaching experiments by eth-</p><p>nomethodologists directed students to stand still</p><p>in public spaces and stare blankly ahead (without</p><p>any actions projecting intention, such as checking</p><p>one’s watch), or to stand at the back of elevators</p><p>facing the wall, similarly still without any indi-</p><p>cation of purpose of action. These experiments</p><p>rendered uncomfortable both the individuals</p><p>encountering these “breachers” and the students</p><p>alike. Importantly, witnesses to the breaching</p><p>experiments adjusted their behavior in order</p><p>to accord with the inexplicable breachers, in a</p><p>process Garfinkel underscored as the ongoing</p><p>reparation of social life. Breaches of expected</p><p>behaviors often were “worked out” through sub-</p><p>tle adjustments, whereby situations were made</p><p>4 I N T E R P R E T I V E SO C I O L O G Y</p><p>“accountable” and social order maintained</p><p>(Garfinkel, 1967: 1). These breaching exercises</p><p>underscore how much of our everyday behaviors</p><p>at the microinterpersonal level of body language</p><p>and communications reinforce social order.</p><p>Interpretive sociology continues to have a</p><p>prominent impact on phenomenological, post-</p><p>modern, and feminist sociology, as well as social</p><p>constructionism. Weber’s core notion remains</p><p>highly influential: that sociologists must attend to</p><p>how social life is interpreted, and follow through</p><p>by examining empirical outcomes through meth-</p><p>ods favoring direct examination of behavior and</p><p>interaction. Such a sociology leads to the insight</p><p>that social arrangements need not be as they are.</p><p>SEE ALSO: Blumer, Herbert George; Construc-</p><p>tionism; Dramaturgy; Feminism and Sociology;</p><p>Grounded Theory; Hermeneutics; Phenomenol-</p><p>ogy; Positivism; Postmodernism; Pragmatism;</p><p>Strauss, Anselm L.; Structural Functional Theory;</p><p>Thomas, William I</p><p>References</p><p>Blumer, H. (1969) Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective</p><p>and Method, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.</p><p>Garfinkel, H. (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology, Pren-</p><p>tice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.</p><p>Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution of Society, Univer-</p><p>sity of California Press, Berkeley, CA.</p><p>Glaser, B. and Strauss, A. (1967) The Discovery of</p><p>Grounded Theory, Aldine, Chicago, IL.</p><p>Ringer, F. (1997) Max Weber’s Methodology: The Uni-</p><p>fication of the Cultural and Social Sciences, Harvard</p><p>University Press, Cambridge, MA.</p><p>Thomas, W.I. (1923) The Unadjusted Girl with Cases</p><p>and Standpoint for Behavior Analysis, Little, Brown,</p><p>Boston, MA.</p><p>Weber, M. (1978) Economy and Society, vol. 1, ed.</p><p>R. Wittich and C. Wittich, University of California</p><p>Press, Berkeley, CA.</p><p>Weber, M. (1981 [1913]) Some categories of interpretive</p><p>sociology, trans. E. Graber. The Sociological Quar-</p><p>terly, 22 (2), 151–180.</p><p>Further Reading</p><p>Prus, R. (1996) Symbolic Interaction and Ethnographic</p><p>Research: Intersubjectivity and the Study of Human</p><p>Lived Experience, SUNY Press, New York.</p>