The Military Balance 2013

Prévia do material em texto

contents
Indexes of Tables and Maps 4
Editor’s Foreword 5
Part One Capabilities, Trends and Economics
Chapter 1 conflict analysis and conflict trends 7
 trends in defence capability 16
 anti-access/area denial: Washington’s response 29
 Global trends in defence economics 32
 europe’s defence industrial base 37
Chapter 2 comparative defence statistics 41
 Defence Budgets and Expenditure 41
 Selected C-130H Hercules operators 43
 Key defence statistics 44
 IEDs and the rise of the MRAP 46
 Sea-denial capabilities for selected countries in East Asia 47
 Revamping China’s tactical air power 48
Chapter 3 north america 49
Chapter 4 europe 89
Chapter 5 russia and eurasia 199
Chapter 6 asia 245
Chapter 7 middle east and north africa 353
Chapter 8 latin america and the caribbean 415
Chapter 9 sub-saharan africa 477
Chapter 10 country comparisons – force levels and economics 543
Part Two Reference
Explanatory Notes 557
List of Abbreviations for Data Sections 567
Index of Country/Territory Abbreviations 571
Index of Countries and Territories 572
Chapter One
Conflict Analysis and Conflict Trends
Armed conflict continued around the world in 2012. 
Many are captured on the 2013 Chart of Conflict 
included with this volume, and further details can be 
found in the IISS Armed Conflict Database. In a section 
new to The Military Balance this year, the IISS exam-
ines the wars in Afghanistan and Syria, analysing 
the course of both wars from November 2012 to 
November 2013. Both involve conflict between insur-
gents and governments, but with varying degrees 
of external assistance to all warring parties. A short 
concluding analytical essay compares the role of 
key military factors in both conflicts, offering some 
general conclusions about modern insurgency and 
counter-insurgency.
The war in afghanisTan
NATO and the Afghan government are racing 
against the clock to improve security, grow the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), develop 
the capacity of the Afghan state, reduce corruption, 
and persuade ‘reconcilable’ insurgents to lay down 
their arms, all in time to allow Afghan authorities to 
assume the lead for security across the country and 
for NATO to withdraw from combat operations by 
the end of 2014. This does not require elimination of 
the insurgency but it does need to be reduced suffi-
ciently so as to no longer pose an existential threat 
to the Afghan state and to be containable by Afghan 
security forces without NATO’s combat power. 
security transition
At its May 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO declared that 
‘the Afghan security forces are well on track to take 
full security responsibility across the country by the 
end of 2014’. Pledges of military and financial assis-
tance made at Chicago and subsequently at Tokyo 
were designed to reassure Afghans that the country 
would continue to receive political, development and 
financial support after 2014. The additional 33,000 US 
‘surge’ troops deployed from 2009 had withdrawn by 
October, leaving 68,000 US troops alongside 28,000 
troops from other nations. After Washington and 
Kabul agreed that Afghans would assume the lead for 
special operations and would take over the US prison 
and detainees at Bagram, a US–Afghan strategic part-
nership agreement was signed in May, which led the 
US to designate Afghanistan a major non-NATO ally. 
Since the surge began in 2009, security has 
improved. Improved intelligence and special forces 
capabilities caused significant attrition of insurgent 
leaders inside Afghanistan. Three tranches of districts 
and provinces across the country, including most of 
Kabul, entered the security-transition process. Two 
further tranches are due to do so next year. Transition 
does not mean that NATO-led forces withdrew 
from these areas, but rather that their role shifted to 
providing mentoring and support. 
Despite insurgent ambitions to stage a counter-
offensive, security gains made in the surge have not 
been rolled back. In September 2012, the UN assessed 
that ‘there has been no significant deterioration of 
public order or security in areas in which the tran-
sition has taken place’. NATO claimed that violence 
was being held at arm’s length from much of the 
Afghan population, and displayed cautious opti-
mism that the improving confidence and capability 
of the ANSF meant improvements in security would 
endure. Evidence suggested that ISAF and the ANSF 
were gaining an advantage over the Taliban: NATO 
statistics showed an 8% reduction in insurgent attacks 
during 2011, while the UN assessed a 30% decrease 
in security incidents in the first nine months of 2012, 
and NATO claimed a 38% drop in its casualties in the 
same period. There was evidence that insurgents had 
difficulties in acquiring IED components and credible 
reports of local popular uprisings against the Taliban 
in Ghazni Province and elsewhere. The Afghan rein-
tegration programme has persuaded over 5,000 insur-
gents to lay down their arms, although this has yet to 
have strategic effect.
Countervailing trends
Targeted killings of civilians (especially Afghan 
government officials) continued with, for example, 
over 230 people killed between May and July 2012 
alone. Most were believed to be victims of Taliban 
assassinations. There were also reports of a small but 
steady stream of defections from the ANSF to the 
Taliban as well as indications of some local accom-
8 The MiliTAry BAlAnCe 2013
modations between the ANSF and insurgents. And 
there has been less military progress in southeastern 
Afghanistan, including the provinces bordering North 
Waziristan, the heartland of the Haqqani network 
in Pakistan. US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told 
Congress that ‘in eastern Afghanistan the topography, 
the cultural geography and the continuing presence 
of safe havens in Pakistan give the insurgents advan-
tages they have lost elsewhere in the country’. 
Kabul was the location of only 1% of security inci-
dents, but it was the focus of concerted efforts by the 
Haqqani network to launch spectacular attacks, mostly 
by infiltrating from Pakistan into eastern Afghanistan, 
through the border provinces of ISAF’s Regional 
Command-East. NATO and Afghan forces claimed 
to have pre-empted many attacks on the city; citing 
the lack of any such successful attacks after April 2012. 
Earlier attacks that got through were successfully 
contained by Afghan forces and then counter-attacked 
by Afghan commandos, with ISAF support limited 
to helicopters and military advisers. But, as ‘propa-
ganda of the deed’, such attacks had some success in 
portraying the transition as failing and eroding confi-
dence within NATO nations. Meanwhile, an attack 
on Camp Bastion that destroyed six US Marine Corps 
AV-8B aircraft showed that well-planned attacks by 
determined insurgents are likely to continue. 
Pakistan
In 2011 Congressional testimony, outgoing US 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mike 
Mullen criticised support provided to the insurgents 
by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), 
claiming that the Haqqani network acted as a ‘veri-
table arm of ISI’, though a January 2012 leaked NATO 
report contained evidence that both parties distrusted 
each other. 
A deterioration in US–Pakistani relations, espe-
cially after the killing of Osama bin Laden and acci-
dental killing of 24 Pakistani troops by US forces, 
halted cooperation and closed NATO’s supply lines. 
Although Pakistan eventually re-opened these supply 
lines, air-strikes against Pakistani targets from armed 
US UAVs continued to stoke Pakistani resentment of 
the US and contaminate attitudes towards ISAF. 
It is not clear that Pakistan has sufficient civilian 
and military security capacity to further suppress 
Afghan insurgent safe havens,at the same time 
as countering its domestic militants. But the chal-
lenge to the state posed by the Pakistan Taliban may 
have changed attitudes of some securocrats who 
see a Taliban victory in Afghanistan as encouraging 
Pakistan’s insurgents. This may have been reinforced 
by popular and military shock at the October Pakistan 
Taliban attack on a teenaged schoolgirl. 
The ansf
The planned expansion of ANSF strength to 157,000 
Afghan National Police (ANP) officers and 195,000 
Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel by the end 
of 2012 was ahead of schedule. An estimated 146,000 
police officers and 185,000 army personnel were in 
place by October. NATO’s training mission, there-
fore, shifted its efforts from increasing force size to 
building support and logistic capabilities. NATO 
and Afghan initiatives sought to reduce attrition and 
absence rates, including initiatives to improve troop 
rotation and leave schedules. 
By April 2012, some 40% of operations were led 
by the ANSF, with only 10% conducted solely by 
ISAF. Brigade-level operations were being mounted 
in Helmand by the Afghan army with little ISAF 
assistance, reflecting a considerable improvement in 
its capability. NATO was especially confident about 
the rapidly maturing capabilities of Afghan army and 
police special forces. 
Until the surge the ANP was a lower international 
priority. But its capability development subsequently 
received more international support. As a result, attri-
tion in the ANP fell below the 16.8% annual target. 
However, delivering results to ordinary Afghans 
depends on corresponding improvements in the 
whole machinery of justice, including courts, lawyers 
and prisons, as much as it did on bolstering police 
capacities. These areas lagged even further behind, 
as shown by NATO’s refusal to send detainees to 
Afghan prisons betraying evidence of human-rights 
abuses. The Afghan Local Police, small self-defence 
forces in villages that have opted to resist the Taliban, 
are mentored by embedded teams of US special-
operations forces. The UN assessed that ‘by mid-
August, more than 16,266 personnel were operating 
at 71 validated sites. While these local security forces 
have contributed to stability in several areas, concerns 
remain about issues of impunity, vetting, lack of 
clear command and control, and the potential re- 
emergence of ethnically or politically biased militias.’
There are ambitious plans to provide the Afghan 
Air Force with a robust fixed- and rotary-wing airlift 
capability, as well as attack helicopters and light 
turboprop attack aircraft. They may achieve an initial 
casualty evacuation capability in 2013. But personnel 
9Conflict Analysis and Conflict Trends
© IISS
KABUL
BADAKSHAN
TAKHAR
BAGHLAN
KUNAR
LAGHMAN
KHOST
PAKTIKA
GHAZNI
KANDAHAR
HELMAND
NIMRUZ
FARAH
HERAT
URUZGAN
DAY KUNDI
GHOR
FARYAB
JAWZJAN
BALKH
SAMANGAN
KUNDUZ
SAR-E PUL
WARDAKBAMIYAN
PANJSHIR
KAPISA
ZABUL
LOGAR
PAKTIA
NANGARHAR
PARWAN
NURISTAN
BADGHIS
4 (UK)
 23 (GEO)
 6 (US)
 (DNK)
 33 (ROM)
||
 21 (ROM)
||
 (TUR)
||
 (TUR)
||
 2 (FRA)
×
×
 (US)
×
1 209 (AFG) 3 209 (AFG)
×
2 209 (AFG)
ISAF Provincial
Reconstruction Team
and troop nationality
(see above for key)
Now-withdrawn US 
surge formations
 Kunduz (GER)
||
 Mazar-e Sharif (GER)
||
×
2 207 (AFG)
 3 RAR (US)
||
×
2 215 (AFG)
 (US)
 101
 25 3 USMC
 12
Regional Command Air Assets
North
South
East
Southwest
×
×
×
×
||||
|||
|||
×
3 2 (US)
×
2 2 (US)
×
 6 (ESP)
×
3 207 (AFG)
×
 TAURINESE (ITA)
×
×
1 207 (AFG)
Sources: ISAF, IISS research. Military symbols depict unit/formations’ standard organisation, but many have been ‘re-roled’ for deployment to Afghanistan with protected 
patrol vehicles and counter-IED equipment.
× ×
1 215 (AFG)
×
3 205 (AFG)
×
1 205 (AFG)
×
4 205 (AFG)
×
 76 (US)
×
3 201 (AFG)
1 111 (AFG)
3 215 (AFG)
6 25 (US)
×
×
1 203 (AFG)
 173 (US)
×
×
4 203 (AFG)
4 4 (US)
×
×
2 201 (AFG)
×
2 111 (AFG)
×
4 1 (US)
×
×
2 203 (AFG)
×
3 203 (AFG)
×
××
 (US)
×
 6 (POL)
1 201 (AFG)
×
 (US)
×
 (US)
Qal’eh-Now
Herat
Farah
Lashkar Gah
Kandahar
Qalat
Tarin Kowt
Ghazni
Pol-e Alam
Wardak
Pul-e Khumri
Sharan
Khost
Jalalabad
Mehtar Lam
Kunduz
Gardez
Shibirghan
Chaghcharan
Bamiyan
Kunar
Regional Command
Capital – Kabul
Regional Command West
Regional Command North
Regional 
Command South
Regional 
Command East
Regional Command
Southwest
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
POL
CZE
TUR
NZL
US
ITA
ESP
LTU
TUR
GER
HUN
US
 UK
AUS
Albania 212
Armenia 126
Australia (AUS) 1,550
Austria 3
Azerbaijan 94
Bahrain 95
Belgium 283
Bosnia-Herzegovina 54
Bulgaria 572
Canada 950
Croatia 260
Czech Republic (CZE) 422
Denmark (DNK) 613
El Salvador 24
Estonia 155
Finland 136
France (FRA) 2,418
Georgia (GEO) 800
Germany (GER) 4,737
Greece 12
Hungary (HUN) 555
Iceland 3 (civilians)
Ireland 6
Italy (ITA) 4,000
Jordan 720
Rep. of Korea (ROK) 350
Latvia 40
Lithuania (LTU) 221
Luxembourg 10
Macedonia (FYROM) 168
Malaysia 46
Mongolia 88
Montenegro 41
Netherlands 500
New Zealand (NZL) 155
Norway 145
Poland (POL) 1,800
Portugal 141
Romania (ROM) 1,762
Singapore 39
Slovakia 343
Slovenia 77
Spain (ESP) 1,450
Sweden 506
Tonga 55
Turkey (TUR) 1,328
Ukraine 25
United Arab Emirates 35
UK 9,500
US 68,000
US (OEF-A) 7,000 
Estimated troop contributions of ISAF/OEF-A nations – October 2012
Total 112,622
Map 1 afghanistan 
10 The MiliTAry BAlAnCe 2013
shortages and presence of a criminal patronage 
network in the air force make December 2017 the 
earliest it can achieve full capability. The Border 
Police are similarly challenged. 
friction and insider attacks
2012 saw increasing friction between Afghans and 
ISAF. A particular incident was the mistaken burning 
of copies of the Koran by US forces at Bagram, reports 
of which led to nationwide riots. In general, these 
were successfully contained by Afghan police forces, 
as were protests in September against the provocative 
‘Innocence of Muslims’ web video. 
Attacks on ISAF by Afghan troops and police have 
occurred since at least 2006, but greatly increased 
in 2012. Some 56 ISAF troops were killed between 
January and October 2012, 40% more than in the 
whole of 2011. NATO and the Afghan authorities 
announced initiatives to improve security against 
Taliban infiltration as well as drives to improve vetting 
and counter-intelligence. A spike in these attacks in 
late 2012, together with the tension resulting from 
the ‘Innocence of Muslims’ video, led ISAF to order 
a ‘reduction in low level tactical partnering with the 
Afghan forces below battalion level’. As of October 
2012, it was unclear when these restrictions would 
be lifted, but the impending US election meant they 
were unlikely to be relaxed in the short term. While 
suspending partnering could affect security provi-
sion, some in the ANSF would welcome the increased 
authority and responsibility this suspension provides 
as long as their troops do not suffer major reversals in 
combat, which could affect confidence.
Insurgents will have taken comfort from this. 
It will reinforce the view that despite heavy attri-
tion, they should continue to attack ISAF in order to 
exploit NATO and Western states’ casualty aversion. 
Insider attacks were invariably claimed by the 
Taliban. But evidence, including an analysis by the 
Pentagon, suggested that a significant proportion 
of these attacks is insteadcarried out by Afghans 
who have unexpectedly ‘snapped’, often as a result 
of an apparently minor grievance or provocation. It 
is likely that war fatigue and accumulated Afghan 
resentment of the NATO presence are major moti-
vating factors and, as a consequence, improved secu-
rity measures may not have a decisive effect; such 
attacks will probably continue until NATO troops 
withdraw completely. But they have become a major 
threat to NATO’s strategic narrative and to the polit-
ical commitment of all troop-contributing nations. 
Plans and prospects for 2013–15
From 2012–14, NATO plans to adjust its force ‘from 
a combat force with advisors, to an advisory force 
with combat capabilities’. In March 2012, US defence 
official James Miller summarised plans for transition: 
‘at some point in 2013, the ANSF will be in the lead 
for providing security across Afghanistan. At that 
time, US and Coalition forces will be in a support 
role … This includes US and coalition forces part-
nered with Afghan units … and it will include the 
smaller footprint associated with US and coalition 
forces in a train, advise and assist role.’ While NATO 
Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has made 
great efforts to portray NATO nations as united in 
the transition strategy, national approaches to force 
reductions have diverged. Further US reductions will 
probably be at least matched by similar troop reduc-
tions by other ISAF nations.
There is little evidence that military efforts are 
having sufficient coercive effect to bring insurgents to 
the conference table, let alone generate an acceptable 
deal. Meanwhile, it is far from clear that there will be 
sufficient improvement in Afghan governance and 
reduction in corruption to neutralise the root causes of 
the insurgency, even in areas that have been ‘cleared 
and held’. Transition may have proceeded as planned 
at the military level, but the UN assesses that, despite 
improvements in the security situation, ‘these gains 
have not … generated public perceptions of greater 
security and do not reflect improvements to the insti-
tutional structures required for longer-term stability. 
Little has changed in the underlying dynamics to miti-
gate a deep-seated cycle of conflict. Furthermore, a 
diminished international presence will have a signifi-
cant financial impact in many areas that, at least in the 
short term, may even exacerbate predatory behaviour, 
with a reduced flow of money encouraging criminality.’ 
On present trend, it is likely that the ANSF will 
reach full strength and will improve its capability. So 
as NATO reduces, they will, for example, likely hold 
onto those areas in southern Afghanistan now clear 
of insurgents. But the outcome most likely in 2015 is 
a situation much like today – a security patchwork 
with the ANSF suppressing much insurgent activity 
in many areas. In these places, the insurgency would 
probably have a residual presence, and an ability to 
mount limited attacks. But, other areas, particularly 
in eastern Afghanistan, will probably remain under 
insurgent influence. 
The end of the surge makes it unlikely that 
further major offensive operations will be mounted 
11Conflict Analysis and Conflict Trends
to clear more areas of Helmand and Kandahar. As 
ISAF reduces in size, the troops available to train 
and mentor the ANSF will reduce, unless contrib-
uting nations choose to reinvest in these areas. The 
US drawdown makes it far less likely that Haqqani 
network strongholds in southeast Afghanistan can 
be cleared, let alone ‘held and built’. However, if 
ISAF and the ANSF make insufficient military prog-
ress in eastern Afghanistan, the insurgents’ ability to 
mount ‘spectacular’ attacks in Kabul will continue to 
pose a strategic threat to NATO’s narrative, creating 
in Afghanistan and internationally an impression of 
un-governability and failure of the transition process. 
syria
By the end of 2012, the conflict in Syria was a full-
fledged insurgency, showing increasing elements 
of sectarian civil war. The UN estimated that as of 
October 2012, 30,000 people had died, over 2.5 million 
Syrians needed humanitarian assistance within the 
country, and over 340,000 had fled into neighbouring 
countries. The rebels sought to depose the regime of 
President Bashar al-Assad through either military 
defeat or forcing him to cede power. To prevent this, 
Assad and his forces sought to contain the insur-
gency, then progressively neutralise the rebels, whilst 
re-establishing political control. 
The war so far
Civil protests erupted against the Assad regime in 
March 2011. In the absence of meaningful reform, 
protests increased and a ‘security solution’ was 
implemented from July 2011. Syrian security forces’ 
heavy-handed efforts at repression were broadcast 
internationally by traditional media as well as social 
media and YouTube, rapidly giving the opposition 
information dominance in Western and Arab media. 
With both sides increasingly radicalising, and the 
opposition joined by self-organising armed groups, 
attacks on government forces gradually increased 
throughout 2011. By early 2012, the ‘security solution’ 
had failed, as had an Arab League peace initiative and 
monitoring mission. The regime then pursued a ‘mili-
tary solution’. 
The first major government offensive focused on 
Homs, and particularly the Baba Amr district. The 
army surrounded and then shelled the area, causing 
significant destruction and loss of life. At the end of 
the operation, the armed opposition and most civil-
ians had fled. This provided the model for subse-
quent government offensives: first, ring the area 
with checkpoints, and then engage with coordi-
nated artillery, rocket and tank fire complemented 
by attacks from helicopters and fighter aircraft. The 
army appeared to forgo using combined arms tank/
infantry tactics to mount close assaults on rebel posi-
tions and it displayed no capability to counter impro-
vised explosive devices (IEDs). Once bombardment 
was judged to have neutralised most opposition, 
troops would enter, often accompanied by snipers 
and the pro-government Shabbiha militia, to conduct 
house-to-house searches, often detaining (and alleg-
edly executing many) young men of military age who 
had not fled. There was no meaningful reconstruction 
by the government.
Fighting intensified through the year with the 
armed opposition increasing in strength and effective-
ness, and absorbing some defectors from regime forces. 
The rebels increasingly employed all the methods of 
modern insurgency including hit-and-run attacks, 
ambushes, assassinations and suicide bombings. They 
destroyed armoured vehicles using rocket-propelled 
grenades, land mines and IEDs, and learned to shoot 
down low-flying regime aircraft with small arms, anti-
aircraft artillery, and possibly man-portable missiles. 
Weapons were largely seized from regime forces, 
or purchased in Libya, Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey. 
Attacks against air force bases sought to reduce regime 
airpower and capture anti-aircraft weapons. 
The Russian–Chinese veto of a UN Security 
Council Resolution in February emboldened the 
regime to increase repression in Homs, Aleppo and 
Damascus. A subsequent UN peace plan, ceasefire 
and monitoring mission was used by both sides as an 
opportunity to regroup. 
The regime’s strategy was to secure loyalists and 
loyalist areas, and repress the opposition, while 
keeping level of conflict below that which would 
trigger international intervention. Assad’s narrative 
was that the uprising was a conspiracy of dark forces 
including al-Qaeda, Western states and other Arab 
nations. At the operational level, the regime sought 
to secure the Alawite heartland in western Syria, the 
road from Aleppo to the Jordanian border and those 
running southeastinto Iraq, as well as the energy 
infrastructure and agricultural areas in the eastern 
Euphrates valley. But over time, the regime increas-
ingly abandoned efforts to control much of the coun-
tryside and withdrew from most of Syrian Kurdistan, 
providing a significant boost to PKK insurgents 
fighting in Turkey.
12 The MiliTAry BAlAnCe 2013
The only common objective of the opposition 
groups was to remove the Assad regime. There was 
no evidence of any effective higher-level command 
or direction at the operational or strategic level. Some 
groups operated under the umbrella of the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA), some autonomously. In some provinces, 
notably Idlib, rebel Provincial Military Councils coor-
dinated activities by disparate rebel groups. Tensions 
emerged between the local population and the rebels, 
and between military defectors and armed civil-
ians. Defectors brought military skills, but could be 
resented by those who switched sides earlier. There 
was some inflow of foreign fighters, many of whom 
were jihadis, some claiming membership of al-Qaeda. 
Home-grown radical factions such as Jabhat as-Nusra 
embraced terrorist tactics. Rebel forces committed 
atrocities, including killing prisoners, though in 
response to resulting outrage in Syria and abroad, 
prominent rebel brigades issued a code of conduct 
and pledged to uphold international law.
Concurrent with an 18 July bomb attack on 
Assad’s security council, there was a major uprising 
in Damascus and attacks on government border posts 
increased. But rebel limitations were exposed in the 
summer fighting around Aleppo. This showed stra-
tegic overreach, as well as a lack of coordination 
and tactical and logistical shortcomings. The rush to 
liberate the city clashed with previously successful 
guerrilla tactics aimed at securing the countryside, 
harassing supply lines and complicating the move-
ment of regime forces. Aleppo residents, including 
opposition sympathisers, failed to rally behind the 
rebel operation.
On several other occasions, rebel groups took over 
key urban areas, only to be subject to counter-attacks 
forcing eventual withdrawal. Provided government 
forces concentrated in sufficient strength, the rebels 
could not avoid eventual eviction. But these offensives 
caused such destruction that they reduced government 
support, while each counter-offensive served to weaken 
government control elsewhere. The rebels were waging 
a modern guerrilla war – although less effectively 
than if they had a unified political–military strategy, 
campaign plan and a central military command.
Nonetheless, the rebels could, by October 2012, 
move freely in much of the countryside. They 
controlled significant parts of Idlib and Aleppo prov-
inces bordering Turkey, and part of Damascus prov-
ince, as well as several border-crossing points. The 
regime controlled the Alawite heartland of Latakia 
province and much of Damascus and Aleppo, but 
they could not prevent repeated uprisings by the 
rebels in and around those key cities. 
By October, it also became apparent that the 
government forces were over-extended and no 
longer had the military capability to re-assert control 
over the whole country. The regime lost control over 
several army and air force installations. There was 
evidence of exchanges of prisoners and of local cease-
fires between rebel and regime commanders, for 
example in Ain al-Fijeh, a village with natural springs 
that provided water to Damascus.
The Syrian Air Force and Navy suffered few casu-
alties, but the army’s combat power considerably 
reduced, losing up to 20–30 killed daily, more during 
intense fighting, with probably two or three times as 
many seriously wounded. Strength was also sapped 
by the steady stream of defections. Reserves were 
mobilised, but only half reported for duty. Despite 
its notional strength of 220,000 troops, the effective 
strength of the army was by autumn 2012 probably 
about half that. Perhaps half of these could be trusted 
with routine security duties, such as guarding instal-
lations, manning checkpoints and escorting convoys. 
In sum, the regime could only be certain of the loyalty 
and fighting effectiveness of the mainly Alawite 
Special Forces, Republican Guard, and the elite 3rd 
and 4th divisions – perhaps 50,000 troops in total.
external factors
The government continued to receive military 
equipment from Russia and there were reports of 
Iranian expert, financial and material assistance, 
including credible rebel claims to have captured 
Iranian Revolutionary Guards posing as pilgrims. 
Media reports suggested that at least one member 
of Lebanon’s Hizbullah had been killed fighting for 
the regime. Rebels, meanwhile, drew support and 
recruits from the refugees in Turkey, Lebanon and 
Jordan. Some groups benefitted from foreign exper-
tise, including from Libyans who fought against 
Muammar Gadhafi, but the best financed and armed 
appeared to be Islamist groups. 
As well as providing financial support and report-
edly some material assistance of unknown type, Gulf 
states and Saudi Arabia have allowed discreet fund-
raising on their soil. Western governments feared 
that weapons would end up in the hands of radical 
groups, including al-Qaeda affiliates, so they limited 
assistance to non-lethal equipment such as commu-
nications sets. They also tried to vet Syrian groups 
before providing assistance, and there were reports 
13Conflict Analysis and Conflict Trends
that Western officials offered rebel groups modern 
weapons on the condition that they unite under a 
single leadership. There was evidence that Western 
states provided intelligence to select rebel groups, 
and encouraged regime defections. Covert coordina-
tion centres were established in Turkey to manage 
foreign assistance, notably salary payments to FSA 
fighters. But this effort suffered from infighting 
among rebel groups and between donor countries, 
especially Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
Syria sought to deter external intervention. 
Politically, it relied on Russia and China to block UN 
Security Council initiatives by the UK, the US and 
France. Meanwhile, the regime was aware of foreign 
concern over its conventional and unconventional mili-
tary capabilities, and sought to highlight uncertainty. 
Regime officials declared that its hitherto unacknowl-
edged chemical and biological capabilities would not 
be used against the rebels, but did constitute a deter-
rent against intervention or attack. Israel was deeply 
concerned about surface-to-air missiles, chemical or 
biological weapons and ballistic missiles falling into 
the hands of Hizbullah or other extremist groups. 
Neighbouring countries were all affected. As 
of October 2012, Syrian refugees in Lebanon had 
exceeded 100,000, while an estimated 170,000 were in 
Turkey, 105,000 in Jordan and 42,000 in Iraq, placing 
strains on the receiving governments. Syrian shells 
fell on Jordanian territory. Lebanon saw regular 
cross-border fire, shelling and incursions, as well as 
abductions by Syrian intelligence. It suffered greatly 
increased tension and outbreaks of inter-communal 
fighting sparked by the conflict. In June, a Turkish 
RF-4 jet, which may have been on a reconnais-
sance mission, was shot down by Syria after briefly 
violating its airspace; in September and October, 
Syrian shelling of Turkish territory prompted heavier 
counter fire by Turkish artillery. This may have been 
a deliberately disproportionate tactical response to 
deter further incidents.
neither intervention nor peace deal likely
Citing its difficulties in handling Syrian refugees, 
Turkey advocated a no-fly zone and safe areas, as did 
France, though both countries may have calculated 
the prospects of UN authority for such initiatives as 
DAMASCUS
DeraaHomsHoula
Hama
Deir ez-Zor
1,806
2,106
5,586
Tartus
Latakia
Idlib
Jisr al-Shughour
Aleppo
S Y R I A
Akcakale
Tall Abiaf
J O R D A N
LEBANON
AR RAQQAH
ALEPPO
RIF-DIMASHQ
DEIR EZ-ZOR
HAMA
HOMS
AL-HASAKAH
AS-SUWAYDA
DERAA
IDLIB
LATAKIA
TARTUS
I R A Q
T U R K E Y 
QUINETRA
3,070
8,328
6,923
2,453
149
171
3,813
4,609
2,700
51
614
87
25
45,849
61,086
79,356
110,649
Refugees
Naval base Military air base Major road
Civilian deaths per 
region since March 2011
Gas
reserves
Oil
reserves
Area of armed
rebel activity
Sources: Political Geography Now, Center for Documentation 
of Violations in Syria, UNHCR, Economist, US Geological Survey
614
Israeli-
occupied
Golan 
Heights
Map 2 Conflict in syria
14 The MiliTAry BAlAnCe 2013
remote. The practical challenges of a no-fly zone and 
a ground ‘safe area’, the two most-discussed humani-
tarian options, not least those posed by Syrian air and 
coastal defences, are considerable. Experts assessed 
that Syria’s air-defence network still constituted a 
credible threat. 
Most Western countries showed little enthusiasm 
for military intervention, though US President Barack 
Obama indicated in August that the use or transfer of 
chemical weapons would constitute a clear red line. 
However, the complexity of the crisis, its potential 
regional repercussions, deadlock at the UN and the 
projected costs of any military operations deterred 
other states. A UN mandate for action seemed impos-
sible to obtain given Russian and Chinese refusal to 
accept the premise of Western and certain regional 
states that Assad should cede power.
In late 2012, ethnic and sectarian faultlines were 
deepening, with pro-government fighters sympa-
thetic to the ruling Alawite minority ranged against 
mainly Sunni rebels. Although the regime retained 
the loyalty of a significant number of Sunnis and non-
Alawite minority groups, and the armed opposition 
included many Sunni secular and non-Sunni fighters, 
the sectarian narrative was increasingly shaping 
perceptions and actions. The increasingly bitter 
fighting served to increase polarisation and mutual 
hatred, making the chances of a peace deal remote, as 
shown by the collapse of UN efforts to broker a late 
October ceasefire during the festival of Eid.
If both sides continued the approaches employed 
up to October 2012, rebel capability and internal 
and external support would probably grow, whilst 
government capability and support would reduce. 
Short of using chemical weapons against rebels, with 
attendant risk of international intervention, it was 
difficult to see how Assad could reverse this trend. 
So the balance of forces would, over time, likely shift 
to the rebels. However, should they abandon their 
guerrilla approach and attempt to permanently hold 
urban areas before such a tipping point is reached, 
government forces could tactically defeat them: if 
Assad could not win, the rebels could still lose. And 
without authoritative political and military leader-
ship, competition between rebel groups over terri-
tory and resources could increase, carrying with it 
the potential for inter-factional fighting. This could 
see the country descend into a civil war with the 
government just the strongest faction amongst 
many, increasing the chance of regional destabilisa-
tion. 
ConTrasTing aPProaChes To
insurgenCy and CounTer-insurgenCy
The wars in Afghanistan and Syria are both contests 
between insurgents and government forces, and 
in each case both sides are supported by a variety 
of external actors. Insights can be derived from 
comparing both conflicts against two key principles 
of all military operations: unity of effort; and legiti-
macy and operating in accordance with the law. 
Further insights can also result from comparison 
against two key principles of counter-insurgency: 
intelligence and focusing on the population’s needs 
and security. 
unity of effort
Both wars reinforced the value of unity of effort, both 
politically and militarily. In Syria, the Assad regime 
directly controlled its political strategy and its secu-
rity forces. Meanwhile, the Syrian rebels were greatly 
handicapped by an almost complete lack of unified 
political authority and strategy; they also lacked a 
single overall military command and displayed only 
partial local tactical military coordination. All this 
greatly reduced their military effectiveness. 
In Afghanistan, the Taliban-led insurgency 
achieved a degree of political and military unity of 
effort, although it was unclear if there was sufficient 
common ground between the various groupings that 
share the Taliban’s banner for an over-arching cease-
fire to be implemented. On the government side, 
achieving unity of effort within the Afghan polit-
ical arena appeared to be a major part of President 
Hamid Karzai’s approach in balancing various power 
brokers and factions, though as a result, some egre-
gious corruption may have been tolerated. 
At the strategic level, there appeared to be limited 
effective international coordination of reconstruction 
and development, but at the tactical level, Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams had some effect in achieving 
unity of international civilian effort at provincial and 
district level. Security operations gained unity of 
effort from a single NATO–Afghan campaign plan: 
Operation OMID. At the tactical level, considerable 
unity of effort was achieved by NATO’s ‘partnering’ 
of Afghan units and formations, and by embedding 
teams of advisers. This means that combined Afghan–
NATO tactical operations had become well coordi-
nated, providing few opportunities for the insurgents 
to exploit boundaries or seams between Afghan and 
NATO units. 
15Conflict Analysis and Conflict Trends
Legitimacy and the law
Both wars also showed the importance of achieving 
legitimacy and operating in accordance with the law. 
Syrian government forces, through repeated human-
rights abuses including torture, rapidly forfeited their 
legitimacy with the civilian unarmed opposition, 
with the Sunni majority and with many Arab and 
Western states. This was reinforced by the pursuit of 
a military solution which saw overwhelming force 
used against rebel strongholds, with no apparent 
constraints on the use of force or attempts to reduce 
civilian casualties. Indeed, the overwhelming use 
of indiscriminate force appeared to be a deliberate 
attempt to intimidate actual and potential opposition 
supporters. 
Despite international legal legitimacy conferred by 
numerous UN Security Council resolutions, NATO 
and Afghan government operations in Afghanistan 
have sometimes struggled to achieve legitimacy, 
particularly at a local level, where NATO found it 
difficult to understand complex tribal dynamics. But 
recognising that collateral damage and civilian casu-
alties both eroded legitimacy and acted as powerful 
recruiting sergeants for the insurgents, NATO sought 
to use force with precision and discrimination. This 
has included highly restrictive rules of engagement 
and increased use of precision weapons, including 
guided missiles and precision artillery. 
In both wars, legitimacy has also been an issue 
for anti-government forces. Taliban propaganda 
and statements have emphasised the importance 
of minimising Afghan civilian casualties, although 
the conspicuous contradiction between these senti-
ments and the many civilian deaths from IEDs and 
suicide attacks rendered this message almost irrel-
evant. Credible evidence of human-rights abuses 
sufficiently threatened the credibility of Syrian rebel 
forces to cause several rebel groups to issue codes of 
conduct.
intelligence
Both wars have emphasised theimportance of intel-
ligence. During the Syrian government’s security-
solution phase, state security forces enjoyed some 
success in disrupting networks of protesters through 
arrest and detention operations. This probably bene-
fitted from extensive background information gath-
ered over many years, as well as tutelage by Iranian 
experts who had learned from the experience of 
repressing civil protest in 2009. But the Syrian Army’s 
subsequent operations appeared to be indiscrimi-
nate, whilst some rebel attacks, such as the July 2012 
bombing of the security headquarters, appeared to be 
very well-informed, possibly by insiders. 
Security operations in Afghanistan, by contrast, 
have been increasingly well-informed by intelligence. 
A decade-long international effort to develop the 
Afghan National Directorate of Security is bearing 
fruit. And following the winding down of the Iraq 
War, large numbers of US intelligence and surveil-
lance systems were shifted to Afghanistan. Combined 
with new techniques of data fusion and analysis, this 
greatly increased the effectiveness of intelligence-
led operations, particularly the attack of insurgent 
networks by special forces. 
focus on the people
This allowed NATO and Afghan forces to increas-
ingly focus on the security and other needs of the 
general population. In security terms, this saw them 
implement the direction of former US General David 
Petraeus, borne of experience in Iraq, to ‘protect the 
population’. And as security improved, civilian devel-
opment efforts increasingly sought to meet the needs 
of the Afghan population, connecting the govern-
ment to the people at village and precinct level. 
In Syria, by contrast, the government appeared 
to have effectively abandoned efforts to protect the 
majority Sunni population, providing opportuni-
ties for the rebels to gain legitimacy. It attempted to 
protect its core Alawite supporters, but it appeared 
that extensive use of irregular militias stoked the 
flames of ethno-religious sectarian tension. And the 
government seemed to largely abandon efforts to 
provide government services to the majority of the 
Syrian population. 
Both wars can be compared against many other 
principles of war, and specific principles of insurgency 
and counter-insurgency. But the greatest contrast is 
in the attitude to the use of force. NATO and Afghan 
operations in Afghanistan seemed overwhelmingly 
conditioned by a desire to use force proportionately 
and precisely, minimising unintended casualties and 
damage, and in conjunction with all the other levers of 
state governance. The Syrian government’s approach 
appeared to be the antithesis of NATO’s, apparently 
regarding force as a means and end in itself and a 
tool of repression and deterrence, accepting that this 
would result in considerable civilian casualties and 
collateral damage. In doing so, they conceded many 
opportunities to the rebels that NATO and Afghan 
forces seek to deny to the Taliban. 
Trends in defence capability
Future intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance
For Western armed forces, the dilemmas highlighted 
in recent editions of The Military Balance continue. 
Budget pressures are forcing states to conduct defence 
reviews that in many cases are leading to reductions 
in military organisations, inventories and capabili-
ties. A key element of this challenge will be to decide 
which capabilities to keep, and in what scale and 
number, and even whether these should be retained 
on a national basis. 
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) capacities, sometimes costly and in recent years 
often procured by using funding for specific mili-
tary campaigns, are central to this debate. At the 
same time, a reduction in overseas operations and a 
consequently smaller global ‘footprint’ will test the 
effectiveness of ISR-relevant ties established in recent 
campaigns with allies, other partner states and even 
other national agencies. The requirement to maintain 
deployable armed forces is unlikely to diminish in 
the near future. The places into which these forces are 
deployed might not, however, resemble the theatres 
of operation of recent decades. Judging what ISR 
capabilities and organisations to maintain, both tech-
nically and operationally, will be the challenge.
In the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
joint operations have increasingly been enabled 
by advanced ISR capabilities. Including mid- and 
low-tier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the 
accompanying command-and-control networks that 
integrate these and their output into force structures, 
these capabilities have developed beyond recognition 
since the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted the Western 
intervention in Afghanistan. The use of ISR capabili-
ties ranging from space-based and unattended ground 
sensors, as well as sensors on manned and unmanned 
aircraft, combined with pre-existing capacities such 
as signals, electronic and human intelligence, have 
given Western armed forces key information advan-
tages in later stages of these recent campaigns. 
After early failures in information collection, 
analysis and intelligence dissemination, the picture 
improved in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was particu-
larly true for US forces, after then-defence secretary 
Robert Gates, in April 2008, expressed his frustra-
tion at failures in intelligence collection, analysis and 
dissemination in Iraq and Afghanistan, and moved 
to fast-track innovative approaches to fielding new 
capabilities. For British forces in Iraq’s Multi-national 
Division South East, until Operation Charge of the 
Knights in Basra in March 2008, there had not been 
enough available ISR capabilities to support intelli-
gence-led strike operations or maintain a counter-IED 
roadwatch. 
Many of these new technical capabilities are 
now filtering down to non-Western armed forces. 
Differences between Western states and newer users 
lie more in the scale and ambition of use and coordi-
nation, and the technological complexity of the capa-
bilities employed. New users will have to be mindful 
of the challenges ISR capabilities bring, such as the 
supply of ever greater amounts of information, as 
well as the benefits. That said, the effect on new users 
of the challenges identified by Western states may be 
limited by the range of capabilities they can afford. 
isr matures, slowly
In their broadest sense, ISR capabilities have been 
used by armed forces for centuries: intercepts of 
written communications would have been familiar to 
the armies of antiquity, while technical means rapidly 
developed in response to advances in telegraphy, 
telephony and wireless communications from the late 
nineteenth century. It was during the Cold War that 
their use was considered to have matured.
However, the ‘persistence’ of present-day ISR plat-
forms is a new development. Designed to loiter for 
hours, days, or longer in the case of some space-based 
systems, such platforms conduct an ever-expanding 
amount of persistent surveillance (perhaps better 
termed data accumulation and assisted by technical 
advances in computer storage and processing power)
on the ground and in cyberspace, and in both civilian 
and military domains. 
Information-gathering capabilities used in Iraq 
ranged from strategic-level satellite reconnaissance 
17Trends in defence capability
and U-2 over-flights to, after the situation received 
top-level attention in the spring of 2008, rela-
tively low-cost airframes fitted with ISR suites like 
the MC-12 Liberty, as well as ground sensors. The 
campaign also saw ISR capabilities devolve down to 
small-unit levels: hand-launched UAVs, such as the 
Raven, Desert Hawk and Skylark, gave ground troops 
direct access to real-time imagery without the rela-
tively time-consumingneed to route tasking orders 
through a higher formation, and thus presumably 
waiting for other assets to be deployed, in the midst of 
a fast-moving environment. Though equipment such 
as this did improve timeliness, troops had first to be 
on the ground in sufficient numbers to either launch 
such assets, develop ‘local knowledge’ and language 
skills, or gather information from interactions with 
local communities. 
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan evolved 
into counter-insurgency campaigns, Western armed 
forces rediscovered the value of cadres of linguists 
and analysts capable of liaising with the local popu-
lation or extracting information from prisoners. 
Information gathered from these multiple sources, 
including human intelligence and from ISR platforms 
or other methods such as email and mobile intercepts, 
was often combined in an analytic process termed 
‘fusion’. In this, analysis centres would use sophisti-
cated methodologies to fuse different kinds of intel-
ligence into actionable mission packages that would 
then be disseminated in a timely manner, as noted 
in IISS Strategic Survey 2012 (pp. 36–7). This could 
then enable, where required, targeting by assets such 
as aircraft, ground troops or special-forces teams. 
Persistent surveillance from UAVs and improvements 
in communications also permitted real-time moni-
toring of such operations, with damage assessments 
carried out near-concurrently. 
too much information?
As the amount of information requiring analysis has 
increased, so too have the challenges of aggregating, 
collating and analysing it. This problem is exacer-
bated in ‘conditions of high operational tempo such 
as exist in Afghanistan [where] huge volumes of data 
… need to be analysed and packaged in something 
close to real time. At present the capacity to do this 
is severely limited’ (Ibid.). If anything, this is still a 
growing problem. Greater volumes of information 
are now accessible, for instance through cyberspace, 
giving the collection agencies ever more targets and 
potential sources to assess, and likely more collection 
priorities. Additional analytical complications arise 
from the increased likelihood of circular reporting 
in digital sources (where a story is repeated by many 
sources creating a false impression that informa-
tion has been corroborated) – something clear to any 
regular Internet user.
In operational theatres, one way that Western states 
have sought to overcome challenges to collation and 
analysis is by increasing intelligence staffs. Another is 
by formalising fusion centres and putting these at the 
disposal of commands in peacetime, as well as war. 
In these centres, all-source analysis and information 
exploitation (and sometimes collection) is carried out 
by co-located civilian and military staff from a range 
of countries and agencies in a bid to avoid duplication 
of the collection and analysis effort, and in an attempt 
to enable more effective command and control of 
friendly forces and targeting of hostile forces. These 
groups are working in addition to national and multi-
national intelligence cells and command-and-control 
networks. Meanwhile, the means that national and 
multinational organisations employ to analyse data 
have also evolved, with the emergence of technical 
tools to filter and analyse information. But still, ‘the 
ability of intelligence agencies to collect data far 
outstrips their capacity to analyse it’ (Ibid.). While 
using technical means can help in tasks like filtering 
large amounts of data, making sense of the informa-
tion still requires analysts exercising reasoned judge-
ments. 
operations draw down, and budgets 
contract
NATO forces in Afghanistan are to withdraw from a 
combat role by the end of 2014, with the transition to 
Afghan security control. This reduction in resources, 
coupled with the increasing pressure on Western 
defence budgets because of the financial crisis, means 
that many Western armed forces now see themselves 
at a turning point, where reassessments of defence 
priorities and armed-forces structures and holdings 
will be necessary. 
In relation to ISR, defence ministries will be 
considering which capabilities will form part of 
future military structures. This process is fraught 
with problems, as it requires states to make choices 
on national defence priorities and attempt to predict 
likely strategic challenges. Western armed forces 
will need to retain sufficient flexibility to respond to 
unforeseen crises, possibly including international 
disputes which might precipitate armed conflict 
18 The MiliTary Balance 2013
between states. Changes in the strategic landscape, 
such as in the Middle East and North Africa, may 
also make it more difficult for Western states to 
assume that they will be able to rely on the assis-
tance of regional partners in the same way as before. 
Meanwhile, the ability to field theatre- and tactical-
level technical ISR assets may also be limited by 
factors such as a lack of launching sites or sensitivity 
about overflights. 
operating in new environments
Difficult decisions about which ISR capabilities to 
reduce and which to retain, while ensuring a similar 
level of coverage, analytical capability and timeli-
ness, are unavoidable for Western armed forces. 
Though the operational environments of both Iraq 
and Afghanistan were eventually information-rich, 
the more recent Libyan campaign provided a rather 
different experience in ISR terms. 
The NATO-led Operation Unified Protector imple-
mented a no-fly zone and arms embargo over Libya, 
and NATO-led forces conducted air- and naval strikes 
against regime forces judged to be threatening to 
attack, or attacking, Libyan civilians. In October, rebel 
forces finally ousted Colonel Muammar Gadhafi 
from power. NATO deemed its operation a success, 
but it was a campaign generated from a cold start in 
terms of the availability of ISR assets, as well as up-to-
date intelligence on Libyan force structures, disposi-
tions and capabilities. A key challenge for NATO-led 
air forces and targeting staffs was the adaptation 
by Gadhafi’s forces to their loss of airspace control. 
They went on to use camouflage and dispersal to 
their advantage. The gradual development of rebel 
forces’ combat capability, the provision to them of 
secure communications devices and the incremental 
development of allied ISR coverage – together with 
a suitable array of low-yield air-launched weapons – 
helped in targeting and dismantling Gadhafi’s forces. 
However, the campaign highlighted the difficulties 
that Western forces would face in entering a fresh 
environment without an adequate understanding of 
it or the mature ISR architecture to which they have 
become accustomed. 
In information-poor environments such as these, 
forces looking to intervene can of course generate 
new information sources or deploy whatever ISR 
assets are at their disposal. However, given recent 
experiences in coalition warfare, in which forces 
from NATO states have become used to operating in 
multinational environments and drawing on multi-
national ISR assets and analytical capacities, another 
approach may be to try to replicate these institu-
tional partnership networks using differing groups 
of states. This could be one way of maintaining more 
comprehensive ISR capacities, but trusted networks 
suitable for high degrees of information exchange – 
like NATO’s fusion centres – are likely to take a long 
time to establish, if they are at all feasible, given the 
levels of classification probably applied to some ISR 
output. 
Widening the availability of low-level ISR capa-
bilities to friendly nations – such as the small hand-
launched RQ-11 Raven UAVs provided to Uganda 
and Burundi by the US in 2011 – could also help tomaintain ‘visibility’, or ‘access without presence’, 
though doubts over whether such states would have 
the technical capacity to combine the output of each 
system into an effective information-sharing network 
might mean some residual involvement for Western 
states; this is, of course, assuming that states remain 
on friendly terms and that classification levels permit 
effective collaboration. That said, a number of non-
Western states, such as Brazil, India, South Korea and 
Singapore, possess or are purchasing theatre-level 
UAV assets that could feed information into such 
networks or even assume command-and-control 
functions for themselves.
Cooperation could also include common procure-
ment or operation of ISR assets. Discussions continue 
among NATO and EU member states over the 
pooling and sharing of assets, and there has been 
progress on NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance 
initiative. Cooperation is easier among countries with 
established military-to-military ties, but concerns 
over sovereign control of capabilities and intelligence 
mean that it is not straightforward.
enduring truths
With the withdrawal from relatively benign ISR 
environments in Iraq and Afghanistan, limitations 
on information obtained through technical methods 
mean that, unless the information gathered is judged 
sufficiently reliable, human intelligence will remain 
vital in discerning intent. It is also apparent that 
Western armed forces’ platforms will be fewer in the 
future and personnel numbers will also decline. So 
as well as assessing what lessons should be learned 
from joint operations over the past decade, Western 
military planners will be keen to examine which ISR 
capabilities represent the best value and are discrimi-
nate in terms of the level of information they generate, 
19Trends in defence capability
so that smaller teams of analysts are not swamped 
by information. The risk remains that any capabili-
ties shelved now may be precisely those required 
in the future. Specialist analysts will also have to be 
retained, even if in smaller numbers, as will deploy-
able intelligence specialists from military and civilian 
agencies. Useful capabilities are not simply military 
ones. Developments in civilian forensic technology 
have been applied in tracking bomb-makers, while 
biometrics technology – widely fielded by US forces 
– enables the effective collection of security-relevant 
information on civilians or prisoners that is capable 
of integration with database systems.
Meanwhile, defence establishments, and security 
authorities more broadly, will need to be far-sighted 
in maintaining their investment in language training 
for intelligence specialists and other force members 
who are likely to come into day-to-day contact with 
locals, along with core training for military intelli-
gence staffs down to battalion level, to ensure that the 
skills accumulated in past campaigns do not atrophy. 
While financially attractive, focusing language 
training on a core set of ‘approved’ languages runs 
the risk of limiting both the pool of current expertise 
as well as the capacity to ‘surge’ the training provi-
sion in minor languages as required. Civilian agen-
cies, meanwhile, need to consider how to retain the 
links with armed forces that have further developed 
in the past decade, and to remain aware of these 
forces’ intelligence requirements in large- and small-
scale contingencies, while ensuring that the support 
they can offer is scaleable, and can be increased in 
size if required. Above all, the lessons learned from 
campaigns relating to useful assets, analytical tech-
niques and capabilities need to be institutionalised 
within armed forces, at the tactical as well as opera-
tional levels, so that capabilities endure even as forces 
may shrink. Developing assets, information and anal-
ysis into an effective ISR architecture takes time; the 
challenge lies in keeping that time to an affordable 
minimum.
Though the barriers to accessing certain parts of 
the world may well rise, the requirement for Western 
armed forces to exert influence and perhaps estab-
lish a presence internationally will remain; doing so 
will require accurate and timely information, within 
an increasingly information-rich environment. For 
states wishing to preserve the ability to project force 
at speed in unfamiliar environments, the shape of 
future ISR capabilities will remain a key preoccupa-
tion.
land: countering the threat oF 
improvised explosive devices
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been the 
weapon of choice for insurgents in the recent wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. With the raw materials often 
costing less than $20, these devices are cheap, often 
‘home-made’, simple to use and effective, serving as 
an asymmetric counter to advanced armies’ techno-
logical advantage. 
Initially overlooked by many Western military 
planners and advocates of the ‘Revolution in Military 
Affairs’, these devices are now estimated to have 
been responsible for nearly 70% of military casualties 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. By sowing fear, lowering 
troop morale, limiting freedom of movement and 
undermining public support, they have high impact 
at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Tens 
of billions of dollars have been spent in trying to 
neutralise the IED threat. Yet, they remain likely to 
create further problems in future.
IEDs are not new, and in recent decades have been 
used by non-state groups in Colombia, India, Iran, 
Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and 
Thailand. During its conflict with the UK, the IRA 
made extensive use of IEDs, which greatly restricted 
the mobility of security forces, nearly succeeded in 
killing then-prime minister Margaret Thatcher and 
inflicted the majority of military, police and civilian 
casualties.
The unexpectedly heavy casualties inflicted by 
IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan greatly contributed 
to the growing unpopularity of these wars in the 
US and other NATO countries. This was a strategic 
shock that had significant consequences for Western 
policy, tactics and procurement. As the operation in 
Afghanistan winds down, the US and its allies may 
find it difficult to retain expertise in countering IEDs. 
However, the increasing use of IEDs elsewhere means 
that the counter-IED capabilities developed in recent 
years will remain vital for armies and police forces.
challenge in iraq
Following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, insur-
gents used large amounts of ammunition abandoned 
by the disbanded Iraqi Army in order to manufacture 
IEDs. Aided by Internet-based learning, their capabil-
ities improved rapidly and by August 2003, US casu-
alties caused by IEDs overtook those caused by small 
arms and rocket-propelled grenades. By the end of 
the year, IEDs were responsible for two-thirds of US 
20 The MiliTary Balance 2013
deaths. UK forces in southern Iraq quickly applied 
the tactical approaches that they had used to counter 
IEDs in Northern Ireland, though the British Army 
was slow to recognise the vulnerability of its lightly 
armoured Snatch Land Rovers, with the resultant 
British casualties undermining popular support for 
the war. 
US forces did not have the benefit of this 
experience, but the problem was quickly recog-
nised by commanders in Iraq. In December 2003, 
CENTCOM’s commander at the time, General 
John Abizaid, asked Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld to commission a major cross-govern-
mental response to the threat, along the lines of the 
Second World War Manhattan Project to develop 
the atomic bomb. The Pentagon’s initial response 
was slow and under-resourced. But by 2006, the 
12-strong Joint IED Defeat Task Force had evolved 
into Joint IED Defeat Organisation (JIEDDO) with 
several thousand dedicated government, militaryand contract personnel. Countering the new threats 
not only required an array of armoured vehicles, 
electronic jammers and remote-controlled robots, 
it also required close cooperation between intelli-
gence and operations staff, scientists and industry, 
placing demands on the flexibility and agility of 
armies, military-procurement bodies and defence 
ministries of all the coalition nations.
Initially, much of the US response focused on 
improving physical protection, such as personal 
body armour, and reinforcing existing tanks and 
armoured fighting vehicles. But support and logis-
tics units had few, if any, armoured vehicles. So in 
the first two years of the war, these troops resorted 
to desperate expedients, such as adding makeshift 
armour, made from scrap metal, to ‘soft-skinned’ 
vehicles. Although many armoured high-mobility 
multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (or ‘humvees’) were 
fielded in 2004–05, they were quickly overmatched 
by improved insurgent IEDs and it was not until 
November 2006 that the requirement was identi-
fied for the more heavily armoured mine-resistant 
ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle. Some 28,000 
MRAPs had been procured by US and NATO forces 
by August 2012. 
But despite the application of sophisticated intel-
ligence, scientific, industrial and military resources to 
the problem, an ‘action–reaction’ relationship evolved 
between insurgent bombers and coalition troops, 
scientists and engineers. The many ways of config-
uring bombs and the complex technology required to 
counter them meant that it could often take six to 12 
months between the emergence of a new type of IED 
and the fielding of a sufficient technical countermea-
sure by trained troops. 
operational approach
In Iraq, the US military moved from a strategy of 
addressing the IED itself and its consequences (more 
armour and better medical care) to preventing insur-
gent networks from building and laying IEDs in 
the first place. Based on British doctrine, a common 
counter-IED approach was applied by all coali-
tion troops in Iraq and, later, in Afghanistan. This 
case study: explosively formed projectiles
An example of the IED challenge and response was the 
fielding of explosively formed projectile (EFP) devices 
against British forces in southern Iraq from 2005–09. 
There was nothing new about the technology, in which 
explosives detonating behind a disc-shaped charge 
mould it into a high-energy metal slug that is capable of 
punching through even tank armour with lethal results. 
Indeed, during the Cold War the British stockpiled French-
manufactured EFP mines for use against Warsaw Pact ar-
mour. But drawing on expertise from Hizbullah and with 
a supply of EFP components from Iran, Shia militias used 
EFP devices to great effect against coalition vehicles. 
Initially the British had no technical countermeasures 
and could only reduce the threat by adapting tactics. This 
included rigorous control of road movement and devot-
ing considerable resources to force protection. This so re-
duced the available combat power of the British brigade 
that both its operational effect and its ability to train Iraqi 
forces were reduced. It was months before additional ar-
mour and other countermeasures to protect against EFPs 
were fielded. It was only in the aftermath of the 2008 Iraqi 
forces’ surge in Basra, Operation Charge of the Knights, that 
the level of security forces on the streets in Basra City was 
sufficient to disrupt the emplacement of EFPs. 
In the UK, the issue had political significance as many 
British lightly armoured Snatch Land Rover 4×4 patrol 
vehicles were destroyed by EFPs, causing well-publicised 
casualties. This produced considerable criticism that the 
reaction of the government, Ministry of Defence and 
army had been too slow.
21Trends in defence capability
saw three lines of action: ‘defeat the device’; ‘attack 
the network’; and ‘train the force’ at all levels of 
command. All needed to be integrated by rapid infor-
mation exchange across forces, so that counter-IED 
action could quickly be initiated. 
Defeat the device 
Detecting technologies included hand-held devices, 
sniffer dogs and sophisticated search techniques and 
equipment, while electronic jammers were fitted to 
vehicles and carried by troops, to block trigger signals 
sent to bombs. Considerable effort was also devoted 
to the development of explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) technologies that would help in neutralising 
devices detected before detonation and recovering 
them for forensic analysis. 
These measures were complemented by attempts 
to disrupt the laying of IEDs, principally by imposing 
more rigorous control over road movements and with 
more patrols on the ground, though these depended 
on there being sufficient troops to dominate an area. 
Air movement alleviated the threat, although some 
transport aircraft and helicopters struck IEDs placed 
on landing sites. And while many countries bought 
more helicopters and isolated units were supplied 
by parachute, not even the US could move sufficient 
troops and supplies by air. Therefore, previously 
soft-skinned trucks also had armour and jammers 
added. 
Attack the network 
In Iraq, extra intelligence resources were deployed 
to identify insurgents involved in IED construction 
and supply, as well as those planning attacks and 
planting and operating the devices. Airborne surveil-
lance, particularly from long-endurance manned 
and unmanned aircraft, proved particularly useful 
in identifying insurgent teams planting devices. 
These could then be attacked, or in the case of those 
making or moving bombs, followed. The prefer-
ence was to detain insurgents and seize devices and 
bomb-making material for forensic and technical 
analysis and the development of further intelligence. 
Biometric technology fielded by US forces greatly 
improved their ability to link bomb components to 
bomb-makers. 
Train the force 
Troops would ideally train with the specialist counter-
IED equipment they would use in theatre. However, 
there was often insufficient equipment for pre-oper-
ational training, and troops had to learn on the job, 
with all of the attendant risks. In the case of British 
forces in Iraq, casualties tended to be suffered during 
the first weeks of tours of duty as troops learned on 
operations, until sufficient equipment was provided 
for pre-deployment training. 
ieds in afghanistan
The dominant IED in Iraq was the explosively formed 
projectile (see box, p. 20), which coupled a highly 
engineered warhead with civilian infrared control 
technology, optimised against armoured vehicles. 
The typical IED in Afghanistan has been a much 
simpler home-made bomb initiated by a so-called 
‘victim-operated’ pressure plate. But these IEDs have 
been laid even more widely. In the southern prov-
inces of Helmand and Kandahar, the density of IEDs 
has approached that of minefields previously laid in 
state-on-state warfare. In 2009, 9,304 IED explosions 
were recorded, but this rose to 15,225 in 2010 and 
peaked at 16,554 in 2011. 
Techniques used to attack IED networks in Iraq 
have been refined. Combined with improved counter-
measures and pre-tour training, these techniques 
have resulted in fewer troops being killed or injured 
by roadside bombs; the US has claimed a 40% reduc-
tion in IED casualties in Afghanistan during 2011–
12. JIEDDO assesses that with adequate numbers of 
UAV-borne sensors to detect IEDs, the number of 
bombs found before they explode has increased to 
64%, after stubbornly hovering around 50% for years. 
However, experts repeatedly say that the best tools 
remain sniffer dogs with handlers, a well-trained 
soldier’s eye and information from a supportive local 
population. Using these tools, NATO foot patrols in 
Afghanistan currentlyachieve an average 80% detec-
tion rate. But insurgent IEDs remain the single-largest 
source of civilian deaths in Afghanistan, killing nearly 
1,000 in Afghanistan in 2011, according to the United 
Nations.
In early 2010, at the height of Operation Moshtarak 
in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, US and British 
forces used heavy engineer tanks to clear routes 
through these dense belts of IEDs by firing rocket-
propelled explosive hoses. Later that year, the British 
Army fielded its Talisman system: a dedicated group 
of armoured vehicles and expert personnel with 
powerful surveillance systems, small UAVs/ground 
robots and the Buffalo, an armoured vehicle with a 
remotely operated arm. The US has similar ‘route-
opening detachments’. Both teams also include high-
22 The MiliTary Balance 2013
mobility JCB armoured excavators to repair damage 
caused by IED blasts. Dedicated surveillance systems 
have been fielded, including specially modified 
surveillance aircraft. 
Increased protection has saved lives, but has 
reduced the effectiveness of NATO forces. Soldiers 
have to carry heavy loads – body armour, jamming 
equipment and mine detectors – meaning that their 
mobility is correspondingly reduced. In addition, the 
large numbers and types of protected vehicles create 
logistical challenges, reducing both operational flex-
ibility and NATO troops’ ability to interact with the 
Afghan people. 
Beyond iraq and afghanistan
In 2011, almost 600 IED incidents per month occurred 
in countries outside Iraq and Afghanistan. Anti-
government forces have made increasing use of them 
in Syria, in roadside bombs and suicide car bombs, 
and in assassination attempts. The Syrian govern-
ment claimed that there were over 700 IED incidents 
in May 2012 alone. By August 2012, it was clear that 
not only were Syrian rebels successfully destroying 
government tanks and armoured vehicles with IEDs, 
but also that government forces appeared greatly 
handicapped by an apparent lack of tactical counter-
IED capability. 
Armed forces of countries that may have to fight 
Western forces will have observed the advantages that 
IEDs have given to insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
They are likely to see the overlapping characteris-
tics of IEDs and conventional sea- and landmines. So 
countering both IEDs and conventional landmines 
will remain a core requirement for land forces. 
In an age of austerity, the absence of major opera-
tions will make keeping knowledge and expertise 
alive difficult. A relevant example is British tactical 
intelligence in Iraq, where hard-won tactical intel-
ligence skills and capabilities that had been devel-
oped in Northern Ireland and used to great effect 
against IRA bombers were allowed to atrophy as 
the campaign there wound down, to the consequent 
disadvantage of operations in Basra. The British 
managed to regenerate these capabilities in time 
to have an impact in Afghanistan. This shows how 
difficult it can be to retain the intellectual capital and 
understanding to regenerate idle military capabili-
ties. The recently announced ‘Army 2020’ reorganisa-
tion of the British Army provides for the retention of 
sniffer dog, search and EOD capabilities in a specialist 
brigade. 
Speaking at IISS in February 2012, the JIEDDO 
chief argued that the threat is an ‘enduring and 
global’ one that cannot be solved by any single ‘silver 
bullet’. JIEDDO has proposed that institutionalising 
counter-IED capabilities requires continued invest-
ment in relevant research and development as well 
as forensic capabilities, retaining current techniques 
to fuse operational information and intelligence, 
continuing to train service personnel in counter-IED 
tactics, and a ‘whole-of-government’ response as part 
of wider security efforts. To counter this widening 
threat, greater national and international cooperation 
will be required among intelligence agencies, police 
and security forces, scientists and the defence and 
security industries. However, funding for such efforts 
could be under pressure as NATO troops withdraw 
from Afghanistan: future armies may well, therefore, 
merge counter-IED efforts with broader counter-
mine capabilities.
maritime: suBmarine capaBility 
improvements
A key trend in maritime procurements is the rapid 
development of submarine fleets. States with existing 
fleets are developing the capabilities of their vessels 
while a number of states, particularly in the Asia-
Pacific, are fielding submarines in their inventories 
for the first time.
Submarines offer the ability to project power at 
range and with stealth. They are the most expensive 
type of naval vessel, tonne for tonne, but are afford-
able for an increasing number of states. Most states 
opt for conventionally powered submarines, but 
even the list of countries operating nuclear-powered 
submarines (SSNs) is expanding: India commissioned 
its first SSN in more than 20 years in April 2012, while 
Brazil is developing an SSN capability. 
Submarine capabilities are also developing. 
Air-independent propulsion systems have been 
widely adopted in conventionally powered subma-
rines; these systems increase cruising times and 
reduce acoustic signatures. Weaponry has also 
improved: many submarines now have the capacity 
to launch varying types of missiles beyond the 
ballistic systems long seen in nuclear ballistic-missile 
submarines, while torpedoes have become faster and 
more accurate, with better guidance systems and 
on-board sensors. This will only heighten the imper-
ative for states to improve anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW) capabilities. 
23Trends in defence capability
expanding conventional fleets
While fleets are being developed in Europe, the 
Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America, 
a raft of submarine purchases in the Asia-Pacific has 
provoked more concern, given that Asian defence-
modernisation programmes often reflect efforts to 
hedge against the assumed motives of others. As 
noted in The Military Balance 2012 (p. 208), ‘this risks 
destabilising interaction between defence strategies, 
doctrines and capability-development programmes.’ 
It means that there is increased potential for action–
reaction procurements.
The growth in China’s submarine fleet has encour-
aged this view. Over the past two decades, its fleet has 
grown from 46 to 66. In 1992, the majority comprised 
outdated, 1950s-era Romeo-class diesel-electric 
submarines. Twenty years later, and particularly after 
the creation of the South Sea Fleet’s 72nd submarine 
flotilla in the early 2000s, China could boast 12 Kilos 
imported from Russia, and the indigenously designed 
and constructed Song- and Yuan-class, with the older 
Ming-class now slowly being decommissioned. 
Other regional states are ordering new boats, 
some for the first time, others are updating ageing 
fleets, and still others are increasing the number of 
hulls in service in a concerted effort to expand their 
sub-surface capabilities. Countries such as Malaysia, 
Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Australia, Japan, India and Pakistan are all expanding 
their existing fleets or creating new ones. For states 
surrounding the South China Sea – the location of a 
number of disputes over territory or maritime bound-
aries – or those perceived as potential regional rivals to 
China, these procurements are a reaction to Beijing’s 
growing surface and sub-surface fleet. Procurements 
of these advanced capabilities may also spring from a 
desire to improve military capabilities in the wake of 
economic growth, while there are a number of sub-
regional rivalries and military competitions that also 
go some way to explaining procurements. 
Beyond East Asia, other states are also expanding 
or improving their fleets of conventional submarines, 
particularly