The Politics of Public Policy

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The Politics of Public Policy 
Module Outline, 2013–14 
 
 
School of Politics, Economics, and International Relations 
University of Reading 
 
Module Code: PIM49 
Module Convenor: Alan Renwick 
a.renwick@reading.ac.uk 
 
 
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Introduction 
Welcome to the MA module on The Politics of Public Policy. This is one of the core modules in the 
Master’s in Public Policy programme and it is designed to introduce students to the nature of the 
processes through which policy decisions are made and implemented. It considers how these vary 
across policy areas and policy-making venues. It provides a basis upon which analysis of policy-
making in particular policy areas can be pursued during the second term. 
In particular, the aims of the module are to: 
 develop students’ understanding of the nature of policy-making, including the roles of 
actors, institutions, ideas, and interests in policy-making, in the stages of the policy process, 
and in the determination of policy outcomes; 
 develop students’ critical engagement with policy-making processes, for example, through 
consideration of theories of power and the challenges created by democracy; 
 give students a foundation in the practicalities of policy-making that will help their 
engagement with other parts of the programme. 
 
Structure of Teaching 
The module is taught through ten two-hour seminars, which take place during the Autumn Term. It 
is essential that all students read ahead of every seminar: what you get out of the seminar depends 
crucially upon what you and your fellow students put in. You will receive guidance ahead of each 
seminar on what you should read. 
The first six seminars are led by the module convenor, Dr Alan Renwick. Thereafter, two seminars 
are led by Dr Jonathan Golub, and then the final two seminars are led by Dr Daphne Halikiopoulou. 
The seminars take place this year on Mondays from 11am to 1pm in Palmer G01. 
In addition, you are always welcome to come to the module tutors’ office hours in order to discuss 
aspects of the module in more detail. Their office hours will be posted outside HumSS 408 and on 
Blackboard. 
 
Assessment 
The module has five assessed components: 
1. Students will give one individual presentation on a seminar topic, which will be between 5 
and 7 minutes in length. This presentation will count for 10% of the overall module mark, of 
which 75% will be based on the visual aids used (PowerPoint or handouts) and 25% on the 
oral presentation itself. The deadline for the submission of visual aids (on Blackboard) will 
be 1 hour before the start of the seminar. Students who cannot give their oral presentation 
and are granted extenuating circumstances will have the full presentation mark based on the 
visual aids. 
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2. Students will contribute to one group presentation on a seminar topic. The group 
presentation as a whole will be between 8 and 10 minutes in length. Groups will comprise 
three or four students. This presentation will count for 10% of the overall module mark. 
75% of this mark will be based on the visual aids used (PowerPoint or handouts) and will be 
the same for all participants in the group how have submitted the visual aids as directed 
below. 25% of the mark will be based on each participating student’s contribution to the 
oral presentation. The deadline for the submission of visual aids (on Blackboard) will be 1 
hour before the start of the seminar: each participating student should submit the same 
visual aids. Students who cannot give their oral presentation and are granted extenuating 
circumstances will have the full presentation mark based on the visual aids. 
3. Students will write one essay of 3,000 words (+/- 10%) on one of the seminar topics. The 
deadline for submission of the essay on Blackboard will be two weeks after the seminar in 
which the topic is discussed. The essay will count for 20% of the overall module mark. 
4. Students will write one case report of 3,000 words (+/- 10%), which will analyse a particular 
case or set of cases of policy-making in light of the material covered in the module. The 
deadline for submission of this report on Blackboard will be the first day of the Spring Term. 
The report will count for 20% of the overall module mark. 
5. One two-hour examination in the Summer Term, counting for 40% of the overall module 
mark. 
We will discuss these in further detail during the first half of the first seminar and assign topics for 
presentations and essays. Please therefore think about which topics you would like to present or 
write on in advance of that seminar. 
 
Core Texts 
The following texts are useful for many topics. The first two are included in the introductory 
readings for most topics, and we advise you to buy copies. 
 Knill, Christoph and Jale Tosun (2012). Public Policy: A New Introduction. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Cairney, Paul (2012). Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Goodin, Robert E., Martin Rein, and Michael Moran (2008). The Oxford Handbook of Public 
Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Sabatier, Paul A., ed. (2008). Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd edition. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Overview of Seminar Topics 
1. Questions and Definitions 
2. Is Policy-Making Rational? 
3. Problem Definition and Agenda-Setting 
4. Policy Formulation and Adoption 
5. Implementation and Evaluation 
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6. The Effects of Policy Area 
7. The Effects of Democracy 
8. The Effects of Arena: Domestic v. International Policy Processes 
9. The Effects of Institutions: Executives and Legislatures 
10. The Effects of Agency: Leaders, Advocates, Experts 
 
This Module Outline 
If you find any mistakes in this outline or if you have suggestions for any further material that might 
be included, please contact Alan Renwick at a.renwick@reading.ac.uk. 
 
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1. Questions and Definitions 
This is an introductory seminar. You are therefore not expected to read anything in advance of the 
seminar. Rather, the readings listed below indicate what you might look at after the seminar in 
order to follow up our discussions. The first part of the seminar will be taken up with organizational 
matters; the second part will address the discussion questions and will take as its starting point a 
presentation by the seminar leader. 
Seminar Aims 
The seminar will aim to address the following issues: 
 the definition and forms of public policy; 
 the notions of policy outputs, outcomes, and impacts; 
 the stages of the policy process; 
 the kinds of question that we ask about the politics of public policy; 
Discussion Questions 
Key concepts will be introduced and discussed in relation to the following issues: 
 How should “public policy” be defined? Is there anything controversial about this 
definition? 
 Does it make sense to talk of stages in the policy process? 
 What are the key factors that influence processes of public policy-making and, therefore, 
policy outcomes? 
Readings 
As indicated above, you are not expected to read these in advance of the first seminar. It will be 
useful, however, to follow them up afterwards. 
 
Introductory: 
 Knill, Christoph and Jale Tosun (2012). Public Policy: A New Introduction. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, ch. 1. 
 Cairney, Paul (2012). Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, ch. 1–2. 
To get into debates about whether it makes sense to think of the policy process in terms of stages, it 
would be a good ideato look at some point at these: 
 Nakamura, Robert T. (1987). “The Textbook Policy Process and Implementation Research”. 
Policy Studies Review 7, no. 1 (autumn), 142–54. 
 Sabatier, Paul A. (2007). “The Need for Better Theories”. In Paul A. Sabatier, Theories of the 
Policy Process, 2nd edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 3–17. 
 
 
 
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2. Is Policy-Making Rational? 
In the module on the Economics of Public Policy, you will look at the kinds of analytical tools that 
(economists say) ought to be used in order to make policy decisions. These tools involve a very 
rational analysis of problems and possible solutions. But are policy-making processes actually like 
that? In this seminar, we explore some of the basic futures of human nature that shape how policy 
decisions are actually made. Are political actors really “rational” as economists conceive that term? 
Or do they think in rather different ways? And can even “rational” actors go down routes that end 
up producing undesirable outcomes? 
Seminar Aims 
The seminar will address the following: 
 the meaning of “structures” and the variety of structural factors that might influence policy-
making; 
 the particular impact of globalization upon the politics of public policy; 
 the meaning of “institutions” and the variety of forms of institutional theory; 
 the nature of rational choice theory, game theory, and bounded rationality. 
Discussion and Essay Questions 
 Can the assumption of perfect rationality contribute usefully to studies of public policy-
making? 
 To what extent do “collective action problems” condemn us to policy failure? 
 Is policy-making still just a process of “muddling through”? 
 To what extent are current policy decisions constrained by decisions made in the past? 
Readings 
Introductory: 
 Knill, Christoph and Jale Tosun (2012). Public Policy: A New Introduction. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, ch. 4. 
 Cairney, Paul (2012). Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, ch. 5 and 7. 
Rational choice and game theory: 
 Olson, Mancur (1965 or 1971). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 Scharpf, Fritz W. (1997). Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy 
Research. Boulder: Westview. 
 Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Mark S. Bonchek (1997). Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, 
and Institutions. New York: W. W. Norton. Esp. ch. 1, 2, 8, and 9. 
 Ostrom, Elinor (2000). “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (summer), 137– 58. 
 
Bounded rationality 
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 Jones, Bryan D. (1999). “Bounded Rationality.” Annual Review of Political Science 2, 297–
321. 
 Jones, Bryan D. (2003). “Bounded Rationality and Political Science: Lessons from Public 
Administration and Public Policy.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 13, 
no. 4, 395–412. 
 Kahneman, Daniel (2003). “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics.” American Economic Review 93, no. 5 (December), 1449–75. 
 Ostrom, Elinor (1999). “Coping with Tragedies of the Commons.” Annual Review of Political 
Science 2, 493–535. 
Incrementalism: 
 Lindblom, Charles E. (1959). “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’.” Public Administration 
Review 19, no. 2 (spring), 79–88. 
 Lindblom, Charles E. (1979). “Still Muddling, Not Yet Through.” Public Administration 
Review 39, no. 6 (November–December), 517–26. 
Contemporary theories of gradual change and path dependence: 
 Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Thelen (2005). “Introduction: Institutional Change in 
Advanced Political Economies”. In Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (eds.), Beyond 
Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1–39. 
 Hogwood, Brian W., and B. Guy Peters (1982). “The Dynamics of Policy Change: Policy 
Succession.” Policy Sciences 14, no. 3, 225–45. 
 Rose, Richard, and Phillip L. Davies (1994). Inheritance in Public Policy: Change without 
Choice in Britain. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 David, Paul A. (1985). “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY”. American Economic Review 75, 
no. 2 (May), 332–7. 
 North, Douglass C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Mahoney, James (2000). “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology”. Theory and Society 29, 
no. 4 (August), 507–48. 
 Pierson, Paul (2000). “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”, 
American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (June), 251–67. 
 
 
 
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3. Problem Definition and Agenda-Setting 
In this seminar and the following two seminars, we examine stages in the policy-making process. 
The idea that it is useful at all to think in terms of such stages is contested: it is certainly not the case 
that real-world policy processes develop from the first stage to the last in a neat and ordered fashion 
(see the first section of readings below). Nevertheless, many scholars find it helpful to concentrate 
on one stage or another as a heuristic tool: a means of achieving focus. This week, we focus on the 
early stages of problem definition and agenda-setting. 
Seminar Aims 
The seminar will address the following: 
 the nature of power and the importance of agenda-setting to it; 
 the multiple streams (or garbage can) approach to problem definition and agenda-setting; 
 the punctuated equilibrium approach to understanding agenda-setting; 
 the meaning of ideational concepts, such as frames, norms, and policy paradigms, and the 
roles these play in problem definition and agenda-setting. 
Discussion and Essay Questions 
 “The power to set the agenda is more important than the power to resolve the issues on the 
agenda.” Discuss. 
 To what extent is it accurate to say that agenda-setting is determined by random 
coincidences rather than skilful leadership? 
 “Policy agendas are shaped by ideas, and change in ideas cannot be controlled by any 
individual.” Discuss. 
Readings 
Introductory: 
 Knill, Christoph and Jale Tosun (2012). Public Policy: A New Introduction. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, ch. 5. (Also refer back to ch. 1, pp. 9–10, on the stages of the policy 
process.) 
 Cairney, Paul (2012). Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, ch. 3, 9, and 11. 
Core theories of agenda setting: 
 Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz (1962). “Two Faces of Power.” American Political 
Science Review 56, no. 4 (December), 947–52. 
 Cobb, Roger, Jennie-Keith Ross, and Marc Howard Ross (1976). “Agenda Building as a 
Comparative Political Process.” American Political Science Review 70, no. 1 (March), 126–38. 
 Lukes, Steven (2005). Power: A Radical View, 2nd edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Multiple streams/garbage can perspectives on agenda setting: 
 Cohen, Michael D., James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen (1972). “A Garbage Can Model of 
Organizational Choice”. Administrative Science Quarterly 17, no. 1 (March), 1–25. 
 Kingdon, John W. (1995). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd edition. New York: 
Longman. 
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 Zahariadis, Nikolaos (2007). “The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations, 
Prospects”. In Paul A. Sabatier, Theories of the Policy Process, 2nd edition. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 65–92. 
The punctuated equilibrium framework: 
 Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones (1991). “Agenda Dynamicsand Policy 
Subsystems.” Journal of Politics 53, no. 4 (November), 1044–74. 
 Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones (1993 and 2009). Agendas and Instability in 
American Politics (1st or 2nd edition). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 Comparative Studies of Policy Agendas. Special issue of Journal of European Public Policy 13, 
no. 7 (2006). 
The role of ideas and ideational change: 
 Campbell, John L. (2003). “Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy.” Annual Review of Sociology 
28, 21–38. 
 Dolowitz, David, and David Marsh (1996). “Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the 
Policy Transfer Literature.” Political Studies 44, no. 2 (June), 343–57. 
 Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). “International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change”. International Organization 52, no. 4 (autumn), 887–917. 
 Hall, Peter A. (1993). “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of 
Economic Policymaking in Britain”. Comparative Politics 25, no. 3 (April), 275–96. 
 Surel, Yves (2000). “The Role of Cognitive and Normative Frames in Policy-Making.” Journal 
of European Public Policy 7, no. 4 (October), 495–512. 
 
 
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4. Policy Formulation and Adoption 
In this seminar we move beyond broad agenda-setting to consider how particular policy options are 
formulated and how top-level decisions (such as new laws or regulations) are made. In looking at 
policy formulation, we focus on various accounts of the sorts of networks of actors that shape 
decisions: iron triangles, issue networks, policy communities, epistemic communities, and so on. In 
looking at policy adoption, we focus on political decision-making and the impact of different 
structures of political institutions. In the next seminar we extend this to include the role of 
bureaucracy. 
Seminar Aims 
The seminar will address the following issues: 
 the definition of concepts such as iron triangles, issue networks, policy communities, and 
epistemic communities, and the value of theories that use such concepts; 
 the nature of political institutional systems and the ways in which these systems can 
influence policy choices. 
Discussion and Essay Questions 
 To what extent can variation in the nature of policy networks be shown to explain variation 
in policy outcomes? 
 “The number of political veto players determines the ease with which policy change can be 
passed.” Discuss. 
Readings 
Introductory: 
 Knill, Christoph and Jale Tosun (2012). Public Policy: A New Introduction. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, ch. 6. 
 Lijphart, Arend (1999 or 2012) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance 
in Thirty-Six Countries, 1st or 2nd edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, ch. 1–3. 
Issue networks, policy networks, policy communities, and epistemic communities: 
 Heclo, Hugh, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment”, in Anthony King (ed.), The 
New American Political System, 1st edition (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research, 1978), 87–124. 
 Marsh, David, and R. A. W. Rhodes (1992). Policy Networks in British Government. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 Dowding, Keith (1995). “Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network 
Approach.” Political Studies 43, no. 1, 136–58. 
 Haas, Peter M. (1992). Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. 
Special issue of International Organization 46, no. 1 (December). 
Political institutions: 
 Immergut, Ellen M. (1990). “Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results: A Comparative 
Analysis of Health Care.” Journal of Public Policy 10, no. 4, 391–416. 
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 Lijphart, Arend (1999 or 2012) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance 
in Thirty-Six Countries, 1st or 2nd edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 Tsebelis, George (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
 Tsebelis, George (1995). “Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in 
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” British Journal of 
Political Science 25, no. 3 (July), 289–325. 
 Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Mark S. Bonchek (1997). Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, 
and Institutions. New York: W. W. Norton. 
 Gerring, John, Strom C. Thacker, and Carola Moreno (2005). “Centripetal Democratic 
Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry.” American Political Science Review 99, no. 4 
(November), 567–81. 
 
 
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5. Implementation and Evaluation 
In this seminar we turn to the issues of how top-level policy decisions are implemented and how the 
success or failure of policies is evaluated. We shall concentrate primarily on the first of these. Core 
questions concern the degree to which political control over implementation processes is possible or 
desirable and the factors that explain variation in such control. 
Seminar Aims 
The seminar will address the following issues: 
 the meaning and value of concepts such as policy implementation and street-level 
bureaucracy; 
 the nature of bureaucracy and its relationship with the world of politics; 
 new public management and its impact on processes of policy implementation; 
 types and processes of policy evaluation. 
Discussion and Essay Questions 
 To what extent and for what reasons should we expect variation in the degree of 
“bureaucratic drift” from case to case? 
 Does the New Public Management provide more effective mechanisms for ensuring the 
political accountability of bureaucracy than did traditional models of public administration? 
Readings 
Introductory: 
 Knill, Christoph and Jale Tosun (2012). Public Policy: A New Introduction. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, ch. 7–8. 
Studies of implementation: 
 Pressman, Jeffrey L, and Aaron Wildavsky (1979). Implementation: How Great Expectations 
in Washington are Dashed in Oakland, 2nd edition. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 Lipsky, Michael (1980). Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public 
Services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 Sabatier, Paul A. (1986). “Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation 
Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis.” Journal of Public Policy 6, no. 1 
(January), 21–48. 
The challenge of achieving political control over bureaucracy: 
 Weber, Max (1048 [1921]). “Bureaucracy.” In H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From 
Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. London: Routledge, pp. 196–244. 
 Niskanen, William A. (1998). Policy Analysis and Public Choice: Selected Papers by William A. 
Niskanen. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 Dunleavy, Patrick (1991). Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic 
Explanations in Political Science. London: Harvester. Chapters 6–8. 
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 McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz (1984). “Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Policy Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political Science 28, no. 
1 (February), 165–79. 
Steering v. rowing: the new public management: 
 Hood, Christopher (1991). “A Public Management for All Seasons?” Public Administration 
69, no. 1 (spring), 3–19. 
 Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler (1992). Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial 
Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector. New York: Plume. 
 Pollitt, Christopher, and Geert Bouckaert (2004). Public Management Reform: A 
Comparative Analysis, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Moynihan, Donald P. (2006). “Managing for Results in State Government: Evaluating a 
Decade of Reform.” Public Administration Review 66, no. 1 (January),77–89. 
 Boyne, George A., and Alex A. Chen (2007). “Performance Targets and Public Service 
Improvement.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 17, no. 3 (July), 455–
77. 
Policy evaluation: 
 Bovens, Mark, Paul ‘t Hart, and Sanneke Kuipers (2006). “The Politics of Policy Evaluation.” 
In Michael Moran, Marin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public 
Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 319–35. 
 
 
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6. The Effects of Policy Area 
Having looked during the first half of the term at some of the key concepts in policy-making and 
general theories of the policy process, in this seminar we begin to look at some more specific factors 
and the impact that they have on policy processes and policy outcomes. This week we look at the 
relationship between the area of policy being debated and the nature of the policy process. For 
example, are processes of economic policy-making different from processes of constitutional policy-
making? Within economic policy, are there differences between redistributive policies and, say, 
trade policy? We will also explore whether and how variations between policy areas should shape 
the questions you ask for your own case report. 
Seminar Aims 
The seminar will address the following issues: 
 the key classifications of policy areas; 
 whether such classifications map in any meaningful way on to aspects of the policy process 
or the nature of policy outcomes. 
Discussion and Essay Questions 
 To what extent was Theodore Lowi right to argue that “policies determine politics” (Lowi 
1972: 299)? By what methods of empirical enquiry might we test hypothesized answers to 
this question? 
 Compare and contrast the politics of public policy in relation to two specific policy decisions 
or debates. To what extent can differences between these be explained by differences in 
the nature of the policy problems or by other factors. 
Readings 
Introductory: 
 Knill, Christoph and Jale Tosun (2012). Public Policy: A New Introduction. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, ch. 2, pp. 15–28. 
Three particularly influential classifications of public policies have been proposed, by Lowi, Wilson, 
and Hood: 
 Lowi, Theodore J. (1964). “American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political 
Theory.” World Politics 16, no. 4 (July), 677–715. 
 Lowi, Theodore J. (1972). “Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice.” Public 
Administration Review 32, no. 4 (July–August), 298–310. 
 Wilson, James Q., (1980). “The Politics of Regulation.” In James Q. Wilson (ed.), The Politics 
of Regulation. New York: Basic Books, pp. 357–94. 
 Hood, Christopher C. (1983). The Tools of Government. London: Macmillan. 
More recent literature has continued the debates about these: 
 Cook, Brian J. (2010). “Arenas of Power in Climate Change Policymaking.” Policy Studies 
Journal 38, no. 3 (August), 465–86. 
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 Heckathorn, Douglas D., and Steven M. Maser (1990). “The Contractual Architecture of 
Public Policy: A Critical Reconstruction of Lowi’s Typology.” Journal of Politics 52, no. 4 
(November), 1101–23. 
 Lascoumes, Pierre, and Patrick Le Galès (2007). Understanding Public Policy through Its 
Instruments. Special issue of Governance 20, no. 1 (January). 
See especially the article by Christopher Hood, which reflects on his 1983 contribution. 
 Linder, Stephen H., and B. Guy Peters (1989). “Instruments of Government: Perceptions and 
Contexts.” Journal of Public Policy 9, no. 1, 35–58. 
 Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram (1990). “Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools.” 
Journal of Politics 52, no. 2 (May), 510–29. 
 Smith, Kevin B. (2002). “Typologies, Taxonomies, and the Benefits of Policy Classification.” 
Policy Studies Journal 30, no. 3, 379–95. 
 
 
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7. The Effects of Democracy 
This seminar examines the relationship between different types of regime (e.g. democracy, 
autocracy) and public policy. We start by considering what we mean by “democracy”, and the 
various ways scholars have measured it to classify regimes. We then examine theoretical arguments 
and empirical evidence about whether democracy produces either positive or negative effects on 
policymaking and policy outcomes, especially national economic performance, corruption, and the 
likelihood of war. Finally, we consider a fairly new perspective known as ‘selectorate theory’, which 
claims that certain regime characteristics other than democracy affect policy. 
Seminar Aims 
The seminar will address the following issues: 
 the meaning and measurement of democracy; 
 traditional theories of how regime type (e.g. democracy) affects public policy; 
 empirical findings about the relationship between democracy and property rights, economic 
growth, fighting and winning wars, and corruption; 
 introduction to selectorate theory, including its novel arguments about democracy and 
public policy 
Discussion and Essay Questions 
 What are the advantages and disadvantages of the available measures of regime type? 
 To what extent can variation in the nature of regime type be shown to explain variation in 
policy outcomes? 
Readings 
Defining and Measuring Democracy: 
 Clark, Golder, and Golder (2013) “Democracy and Dictatorship: Conceptualization and 
Measurement”, Chapter 5 in Principles of Comparative Politics, 2nd ed. (CQ Press). 
 P. Schmitter and L. Karl (1991) “What Democracy is…and is not,” Journal of Democracy 
2(3):75-88. 
Democracy and Economic Performance: 
 A. Przeworski, M. Alvarez, J. Cheibub and F. Limongi (2000) Democracy and Development, 
(Cambridge UP), chapter 3. 
 Olson, Mancur (1993) “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American political 
Science Review 87(3): 567-576. 
 J. Siegle, M. Weinstein and M. Halperin (2004) “Why Democracies Excel,” Foreign Affairs, 
Sept/Oct pp.57-71 
 McFaul and Stoner-Weiss (2008) “The Myth of the Authoritarian Model,” Foreign Affairs, 
Jan./Feb. pp.68-84 
 R. Barro (2000) “Rule of law, democracy and economic performance,” in Index of Economic 
Freedom (Washington DC: Heritage Foundation), available at 
http://www.geser.net/Barro.pdf. 
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 D. Rodrick (2006) Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?” Journal of 
Economic Literature (December) 44:973-987. 
 M. Amin & J. Djankov (2009) “Democracy and Reforms,” World Bank Policy Research Paper 
4835, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344720## 
Democracy and Corruption: 
 C. Blake and C. Martin (2006) “The dynamics of political corruption: Re-examining the 
influence of democracy,” Democratization 13(1):1-14. 
 D. Treisman (2000) “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-national Study,” Journal of Public 
Economics 76:399-457. 
Democracy and Peace: 
 J. Ray (1998) “Does Democracy Cause Peace?” Annual Review of Political Science 1:27-46, at 
http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/g/gDf5Ty/ray%20does%20democracy%20cause%20pe
ace.pdf 
 S. Rosato (2003) “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” American Political Science 
Review 97(4):585-602. 
 D. Kinsella (2005) “No Rest for the Democratic Peace,” American Political Science Review 
99(3):453-7. 
 V. Danilovic and J.Clare (2007) “The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited),” American Journal of 
Political Science 51(2):397-414. 
Selectorate theory: 
 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow 
(2003). The Logic of Political Survival. The MIT Press . 
 Morrow, James D., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 
2008. “Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating theEffects and W from Other Elements of 
Democracy.” American Political Science Review 102(3): 393-400. 
 Hicken, Allen, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti (2005) “Political Institutions and 
Economic Performance: The Effects of Accountability and Obstacles to Policy Change.” 
American Journal of Political Science 49(4): 897-907. 
 M. Gallagher and J. Hanson (2009) “Power Tool or Dull Blade? Resilient Autocracy and the 
Selectorate Theory,” available at 
 http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/johanson/papers/gallagher_hanson07.pdf 
 
 
18 
 
8. The Effects of Arena: Domestic v. International Policy Processes 
Policymaking increasingly occurs beyond the level of the individual state, whether through 
international institutions (e.g. WTO, IMF, UN), treaties (e.g. environmental, human rights), or 
Transnational networks of public and private actors. Yet the two levels are intimately connected: 
interests and incentives of actors at the national level both shape, and are shaped by, the 
international level. The European Union represents the most extreme example of international 
institutionalisation, and of this two-level interplay. In this seminar we first examine theories about 
the factors that influence both the demand for and supply of international policy, paying partcicular 
attention to interest constellations, formal and informal decisiomaking rules, and bargaining 
dynamics that involve simultaneous attention to the domestic and international level. in The second 
half of the seminar we utilise these theories to analyse policymaking in the European Union. 
Seminar Aims 
The seminar will address the following issues: 
 The demand for and supply of international policy 
 The application of Bargaining and decisionmaking theories to international policymaking 
 Policymaking in the European Union 
Discussion and Essay Questions 
 Which factors typically determine whether a state will support or oppose international 
policy? 
 Do institutions primarily serve the policy interests of the rich and powerful states? 
 Under what conditions would you expect European Union policies to deviate from lowest 
common denominator outcomes? 
 
Readings 
Introductory: 
 Knill, C. and J. Tosun (2012) Public Policy: A New Introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, ch 10. 
 Florini, A., “Who does what? Collective action and the changing nature of authority,” pp. 15-
29. in Richard Higgot, Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, and Andreas Bieler (eds), Non-State Actors 
and Authority in the Global System, Routledge, 2000. 
Linking the domestic and international arenas: 
 H. Milner (1999) “The Political Economy of International Trade,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 2:91-114, at http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci243c/readings/v0002017.pdf 
 Putnam, R. (1988) “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 
International Organization 42: 427-460. 
The European Union: 
 M. Pollack (2010) “Theorizing EU Policymaking,” chapter 2 in H. Wallace, M. Pollack and A. 
Young (eds.) (2010) Policy-Making in the European Union (6th ed.) (Oxford: OUP). 
 R. Thomson (2011) Resolving Controversy in the EU (CUP), Chapters 7-10. 
19 
 
o Text: http://www.robertthomson.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Resolving_controversy_full_text2.pdf 
o Tables and figures: http://www.robertthomson.info/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/Resolving_controversy_figures_tables2.pdf 
 A. Moravcsik (1993) “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmental Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies 31(4):473-524. 
 A. Moravcsik (1999) “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International 
Cooperation,” International Organization 53(2):267-306. 
 G. Tsebelis & G. Garrett (1996) “Agenda Setting Power, Power Indices and Decision-Making 
in the European Union,” International Review of Law and Economics 16:345-61. 
 Lewis, J. (2003) “Institutional Environments and Everyday EU Decision-Making: Rationalist or 
Constructivist?” Comparative Political Studies 1(2) 97-124. 
 Golub, J. (2012) "Cheap Dates and the Delusion of Gratification: are Votes Sold or Traded in 
the EU Council of Ministers?" Journal of European Public Policy 19(2):141-60. 
 Golub, J. (2012) “How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the 
Council of Ministers,” Journal of European Public Policy, available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2012.693413. 
 Smith, M. (1997) “The Commission Made Me Do It: The European Commission as a Strategic 
Asset in Domestic Politics.” In At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European 
Commission, ed. Neill Nugent. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Pp. 167-86. 
 A. Burley and W. Mattli (1993) ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal 
Integration’, International Organization 47(1):41–76. 
 Follesdal, A. and Hix, S. (2005) ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to 
Majone and Moravcsik,’ Journal of Comon Market Studies 44 (3), 533-562. 
 M. Angelova, T. Dannwolf and T. König (2012) “How Robust are Compliance Findings? A 
Research Synthesis,” Journal of European Public Policy 19(8):1269-91. 
 
GATT/WTO: 
 Duchesne, E. 2005. Addressing systemic issues in the WTO, pp. 1–26. RBC Financial Group 
Economic Policy Research Institute, University of Western Ontario, EPRI Working Paper 
#2005-3. 
 F. Jawara & A. Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO (2003), ch. 1 
 “Stalemate at the WTO: TRIPS, Agricultural Subsidies, and the Doha Round,” Harvard 
Business School Publishing, 9-711-043, January 2011 
 “Note on WTO Disputes: Five Major Cases,” Harvard Business School Publishing, 9-703-016, 
September 2002 
 R. Steinberg (2002) In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and 
Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, International Organization 56(2):339-74. 
 Busch, M. and E. Reinhardt. (2003) “Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement,” Journal of World Trade 37 (4):719-735. 
 
 
 
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9. The Effects of Institutions: Executives and Legislatures 
Previous seminars have briefly touched upon the variety of institutionalisms and upon the ways in 
which institutions can structure policy-making processes. This seminar takes the analysis of political 
institutions further by focusing the effects of different arrangements in the core institutions of the 
executive and the legislature. Political scientists commonly distinguish between presidential, 
parliamentary, and semi-presidential systems. The seminar considers whether these distinctions tell 
us anything useful about policy processes or whether other forms of analysis, such as analysis of 
veto players, is more useful. 
Seminar Aims 
The seminar will address the following issues: 
 the meaning and importance of concepts such as vote cycles, structurally induced 
equilibrium, and veto players (revisiting themes introduced in week 4); 
 the meaning of presidentialism, parliamentarism, and semi-presidentialism and the 
significance of differences between these for understanding policy-making processes; 
 the impact of different legislative institutions such as committee structures; 
 the implications of different institutional structures for patterns of accountability within the 
governing system; 
 the impact of institutional structures upon policy outcomes. 
Discussion and Essay Questions 
 Do the distinctions between presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential systems 
matter for students of public policy? 
 Which is the better mechanism for overcoming vote cycles: strong political parties or strong 
legislative committees? 
Readings 
Introductory: Lijphart, Arend (1999 or 2012) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance 
in Thirty-Six Countries, 1st or 2nd edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapters 7 and 
11. 
 Sartori, Giovanni (1997). Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, 
Incentives and Outcomes, 2nd edition. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Chapters 5–7. 
 Shugart, Matthew Søberg (2006). “Comparative Executive–Legislative Relations.” In R.A.W. 
Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 344–65. 
The presidential/parliamentary distinction: 
 Eaton, Kent (2000). “Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena”, 
Comparative Politics 32, no. 3 (April 2000), 355–76. 
 Gerring, John, and Strom C. Thacker (2004). “Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role 
of Unitarism and Parliamentarism.” British Journal of Political Science 34, no. 2 (April), 295–
330. 
21 
 
 Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (2004). “Constitutions and Economic Policy.” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 1 (winter), 75–98. 
 Strøm, Kaare (2000). “Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies.” 
European Journal of Political Research 37, no. 3 (May), 261–89. 
 Siaroff, Alan (2003). “Varieties of Parliamentarism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies.” 
International Political Science Review 24, no. 4 (October), 445–64. 
Semi-presidentialism: 
 Elgie, Robert (2004). “Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences, and Contesting 
Explanations.” Political Studies Review 2, no. 3 (September), 314–30. 
 Roper, Steven D. (2002). “Are all Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of 
Premier-Presidential Regimes.” Comparative Politics 34, no. 3 (April), 253–72. 
Veto players: 
 Tsebelis, George (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
 Tsebelis, George (1995). “Decision-Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in 
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” British Journal of 
Political Science 25, no. 3 (July), 289–325. 
 Birchfield, Vicki, and Markus M. L. Crepaz (1998). “The Impact of Constitutional Structures 
and Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income Inequality in Industrialized 
Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 34, 175–200. 
 Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins (2000). “Political Structure and Economic Policy: 
The Institutional Determinants of Policy Outcomes”. Paper available for download online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1009999. 
Vote cycles, structure-induced equilibrium, and legislative institutions: 
 Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Mark S. Bonchek (1997). Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, 
and Institutions. New York: W. W. Norton. Esp. chapters 3, 4, and 12. 
 Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast (1981). “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and 
Legislative Choice.” Public Choice 37, no. 3, 503–19. 
 Müller, Wolfgang (2000). “Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making 
Delegation and Accountability Work.” European Journal of Political Research 37, no. 3 
(May), 309–33. 
 
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10. The Effects of Agency: Entrepreneurs, Leaders, Advocates, Experts 
This seminar examines in more detail the question of how far individual actors can shape policy-
making processes. Previous sessions have touched upon the notion of political ‘entrepreneurship’, 
but here we examine the various relevant literatures in more detail. We consider how ideas of 
agency fit into the various theories of policy-making that have already been introduced earlier in the 
term and whether different approaches to agency—drawing on concepts such as entrepreneurship, 
leadership, and heresthetics—offer differing or fundamentally similar accounts. 
Seminar Aims 
The seminar will address the following issues: 
 the roles played by agency in the various core theories of agenda-setting; 
 the meaning and value of the concept of ‘heresthetics’; 
 the nature of leadership and its impact upon public policy. 
Discussion and Essay Questions 
 To what extent can the skilful exercise of individual agency make a difference to policy 
outcomes? 
 Is the concept of ‘heresthetics’ any different from any of the other concepts used to describe 
the mechanisms by which individuals can seek to shape policy? 
Readings 
Introductory: 
 Renwick, Alan (2010). The Politics of Electoral Reform: Changing the Rules of Democracy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 69–79. 
Agency in the core theories of agenda-setting (please refer also to the readings for week 3): 
 Mintrom, Michael (1997). “Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation.” American 
Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (July), 738–70. 
 Mintrom, Michael, and Phillipa Norman (2009). “Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy 
Change.” Policy Studies Journal 37, no. 4 (November), 649–67. 
 Pralle, Sarah B. (2003). “Venue Shopping, Political Strategy, and Policy Change: The 
Internationalization of Canadian Forest Advocacy”. Journal of Public Policy 23, no. 3 
(September), 233–60. 
 Roberts, Nancy C., and Paula J. King (1991). “Policy Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structure 
and Function in the Policy Process.” Journal of Public Administration Theory and Research 1, 
no. 2 (April), 147–75. 
 Schneider, Mark, and Paul Teske (1992). “Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: 
Evidence from Local Government.” American Political Science Review 86, no. 3 (September), 
737–47. 
 Sheingate, Adam D. (2000). “Agricultural Retrenchment Revisited: Issue Definition and 
Venue Change in the United States and European Union”. Governance 13, no. 3, 335–63. 
 
23 
 
Heresthetics: 
 Riker, William H. (1984). “The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1789, 
with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice.” American Political Science Review 78, 
no. 1 (March), 1–16. 
 Riker, William H. (1986). The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
 McLean, Iain (2002). “Review Article: William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic(s)”. 
British Journal of Political Science 32, 535–58. 
 Nagel, Jack H. (1993). “Populism Heresthetics and Political Stability: Richard Seddon and the 
Art of Majority Rule.” British Journal of Political Science 23, no. 2 (April), 139–74. 
Leadership: 
 Blondel, Jean (1987). Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis. London: Sage. 
 Edinger, Lewis J. (1975). “The Comparative Analysis of Political Leadership”. Comparative 
Politics 7, no. 2 (January), 253-269. 
 Hargrove, Erwin C. (1966). Presidential Leadership: Personality and Political Style. New York: 
Macmillan. 
 Cronin, Thomas E., and Michael A. Genovese (2010). The Paradoxes of the American 
Presidency, 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.