Andre Gunder Frank - The Cuban Revolution - Some Whys and Wherefores The Economic Weekly, July, 1961

Prévia do material em texto

THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 
The Cuban Revolution 
Some Whys and Wherefores 
Andrew Guilder Frank 
Did the Cuban Revolution grow out of the dictatorial repression of Batista ? Yes, certainly, but the 
repression of Batista generated no more cause for revolt than that of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic 
ot Jimenez in Venezuela, 
Is it a movement to liberate Cuba from American domination of its economy ? Undoubtedly, but 
other Carribean countries, like Guatemala and Honduras, are no less famed for American influence in their 
economic life. 
Does the Cuban Revolution represent a battle against poverty, hunger disease and illiteracy ? Cer-
tainly', but poverty in Haiti is much more severe than in Cuba. Indeed per capita income in Cuba- is higher 
than almost anywhere else in Latin America. 
The absence of indigenous Indians perhaps facilitates the success of the Revolution, but Costa Rica 
similarly has no Indians, nor does Uruguay. 
The author does not attempt to describe or explain the Cuban Revolution exhaustively. He merely 
wants to expose for inspection the background and the sources of the developments that Cuba and the world 
now witness. 
He leaves it to the understanding and research of others to explore the many questions only raised 
here. 
C U B A N S p roc l a im themselves the 
f i r s t free country in L a t i n 
Amer ica . W h a t do they m e a n ? 
W h y d i d the revolut ion which is 
developing in Cuba take place pre-
cisely there and not elsewhere? 
W h y does the Cuban Revolu t ion 
take the f o r m it does rather than 
the f o r m , for instance, of our of 
the L a t i n Amer ican revolutions 
w h i c h preceded it ? 
Several causes of the Cuban Re-
vo lu t ion immedia te ly suggest them-
solves, but none of them singly or 
in combina t ion appear to offer a 
satisfactory explanat ion of the 
t ime and place of the Revolut ion. 
D i d the Revolution grow out of the 
d ic ta tor ia l repression of Batista ? 
Yes. cer tainly i t d i d . Bu t the re-
pression of Batista generated no 
more cause, for revolt than that of 
T r u j i l l o in the Domin ican Republ ic 
or that of Jimenez in Venezuela ; 
yet the Domin i can Republic has 
witnessed no revolut ion at a l l , and 
Venezeula one w h i c h has taken a 
f o r m qui te different f rom the 
Cuban Revolu t ion . 
Is the Cuban Revolut ion a move-
ment to l iberate Cuba f r o m A m e r i -
can domina t ion of i ts economy in 
the fields of sugar, pub l i c ut i l i t ies , 
and large parts of commerce? U n -
doubtedly . Bu t other Carr ibean 
countries, l i k e Guatemala and H o n -
duras, are no less famed for Ame-
r ican influence in the i r economic 
l i f e , Honduras has witnessed no 
revolut ion and Guatemala one 
wh ich took a different f o r m . 
Does the Cuban Revolution re-
present a battle against poverty, 
against hunger, disease and i l l i tera-
cy ? Cer ta inly . But pover ty in 
H a i t i is much more severe than 
in Cuba. Indeed, per capita income 
in Culm is higher than almost any-
where else in Lat in America. M a r 
be it is this very relative wealth 
which has given Cuba the ab i l i ty 
and the strength to make so far-
reaching a revolut ion. But such 
resources are available in concen-
trated f o r m also in the Montevideo 
of Uruguay or the Rio de Janeiro 
and Sao Paula regions of Braz i l . 
The absence of indigenous 
Indians probably facilitates the 
success of the Cuban Revolu t ion . 
But Cost a Rica s imi la r ly has no 
Indians, nor does Uruguay . 
Maybe it is less the absence of 
Indiana than the presence of a 
middle class and of a pool of 
potential intellectual leadership 
which has faci l i tated the Cuban 
Revolu t ion . But Braz i l , Argen t ina , 
and Chile have s imi la r sources of 
potential leadership; and there is 
evidence that in Mexico , wh ich 
witnessed its o w n revolut ion f if ty 
years ago, it is precisely the m i d -
dle class which is the source of the 
increasing conservatism w h i c h 
mi l i t a t e against the extension of 
economic development i n t o the 
M e x i c a n countryside. Thus, w i t h o u t 
1101 
invoking the charisma of Fidel , an 
exhaustive causative explanat ion of 
the Cuban Revolut ion may not be 
possible. At any rate. I cannot 
provide one. 
Historical Source 
However a Iess ambi t ious expla-
nat ion should not be beyond our 
reach, Every resolution is a reac-
tion to the past, and that past is 
certainly open to our inspection. 
Indeed, today's revolut ion is a p ro-
duct as well of past reactions, that 
is. of earlier revolutionary at-
tempts. By looking at the earl ier at-
tempts to deal w i t h s imi la r 
problems, pa r t i cu la r ly by p r i o r re-
volutions in La t in America , we 
should be able to suggest how some 
al ternat ive forms of the Cuban Re-
volut ion may have come to be 
excluded. Fur thermore , no revolu-
t ion can change every th ing . Para-
doxical ly , a revolut ion must re ly on 
well-entrenched social forms, such 
as paternal ism in Cuba, to effect a 
radical change in other forms of 
social relations. Thus, a study of 
social and c u l t u r a l forms wh ich d i d 
and d i d not exist in the Cuba of 
o l d should y i e ld some indicat ions 
of the revolut ionary possibilit ies 
for the Cuba of tomorrow. The 
present paper, then, is an attempt 
to explore these three sources of 
explanat ion of the Cuban Revolu-
t ion : the his tor ical source of the 
revolu t ion , al ternative solutions- to 
L a t i n A m e r i c a n p r o b l e m s w h i c h 
SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY 
have been found want ing , and the 
socio-cultural forms wh i ch deter-
mine not on l y the revolut ionary 
necessities, but also the revolut ion-
ary possibi l i t ies. In pursu ing these 
explorat ions, we should not how-
ever expect to find impor tant ans-
wers as instead we find impor tant 
new questions. 
The history of L a t i n Amer ica 
might be summed up by saying 
that the Spanish came to exp lo i t 
and their successors remained to 
exp lo i t . The main social features 
of large parts of La t in Amer ica 
were well known : the consolida-
t ion of agr icu l tu ra l lands under 
la t i fundis la ownership, the role of 
the church in keeping people quiet 
and of the army if they were not, 
the role of the r is ing middle classes 
based in commerce and the profes-
sions wh ich account for the very 
one-sided economic development 
that does occur, the al l iance of 
Amer ican capi ta l w i th a l l these 
groups, the r igh t -w ing dictatorships 
that are the capstone wh ich ties the 
social fab r i c together by force and 
terror. Probably more than total 
mass poverty and ignorance, it has 
been the exclusion of the vast ma-
j o r i t y of Lat in Americans f r o m the 
social, po l i t ica l , and economic bene-
fits enjoyed by some people in 
these societies wh ich has resulted in 
the many sporadic social upheavals 
ranging f r om changes in the palace 
guard to fu l l scale social re-
volut ions. 
Structure of Latin American 
Society 
The Cuban Revolut ion has its 
roots in this general s t ructure of 
La t in Amer ican society, in this 
same Lat in Amer ican social move-
ment to wh ich that social structure 
has given risie ( indeed, in the 
twent ieth century wor ld revolut ion 
as a whole) but it has its own his-
tory as wel l , in the pecul iar Cuban 
condit ions arid the long history of 
revo lu t ionary and l iberat ion move-
merits which have t ime and again 
attempted but failed to alter sub-
stant ial ly the structure of Cuban 
society. Near ly a century ago, in 
1 8 ' 8 , Cuba revolts against Spain . 
The revolut ion is intel lectual ly in-
spired and led, though it has some 
measure of popular suppor t . The 
revolut ion fa i ls and Spain retains 
i ts po l i t i ca l supremacy. In the 
years wh ich fo l low, Amer ican capi-
t a l begins seriously to be invested 
in Cuban sugar. Indeed,, a U S 
consular report of 1878 notes that 
" commerc ia l l y Cuba has becomea 
dependency of the Un i ted States 
al though po l i t i ca l ly it remains a 
dependency of Spa in . " By 1895 
Cuba is ready to wage a f u l l scale 
revolut ionary war of independence 
against Spain. Three years later, in 
1808, the Un i ted States enters the 
war against Spain on the side of 
Cuba. V iewed in the context of a 
hundred years of U S and Confe-
derate designs on Cuba, combined 
w i th more recently acquired direct 
economic interests, the Plat t 
Amendment of 1902 wh ich reser-
ves the r ight to the United States 
to intervene at its pleasure in the 
domestic af fairs of the supposedly 
sovereign Cuba need come as no 
surprise, Cuba, exhausted by its 
war of l iberat ion against Spa in , is 
faced w i th the choice of ou t r igh t 
annexat ion by the Uni ted States as 
befell P i e r t o Rico and the P h i l i -
ppines or presumpt ive sovereignty 
w i t h Amer ican intervent ion. I t 
chooses the latter and is visi ted 
by Amer ican m i l i t a ry intervent ion 
three times unt i l the repeal of the 
Piat t Amendment in 1933 and by 
other forms of intervent ion un t i l 
this day. 
In the meantime the in t roduct ion 
of rai l roads and electr icity into 
Cuba rad ica l ly increases the dis-
tance over which sugar cane could 
bo transported and the size of the 
mi l l s in wh ich it could be process-
ed. As a result, the ear l ie r small 
holdings of land and l i t t le mi l ls in -
creasingly become consolidated in-
to large-scale la t i fund is la holdings 
of land and of large sugar centrales 
which re ign over the landscape 
l ike feudal castles. As elsewhere in 
La t in Amer ica to this day, this fer-
ti le ground fo r r igh t -w ing dictator-
ships easily produces and supports 
the dictatorship of Machado d u r i n g 
the nineteen twenties. When this 
dictatorship is over th rown in 1931, 
the re fo rm movement wh ich seeks 
to remove some of the social, po l i -
t ical , and economic sources of such 
dictatorships fai ls, and, let i t be 
noted, fai ls w i th the a id and inter-
vent ion of the U S Department of 
Stat? and Embassy in the person of 
Sumner Wel les who supports the 
conservatives, and on ly a moderate 
re form prevai ls. 
When the effects of the depres-
sion and the decl ine of Cuba's 
sugar for tunes were combined w i t h 
the substantial cont inuance of the 
o ld regime and after the temporary 
r u i n of the second war has again 
disappeared, the t ime is r ipe fo r a 
renewed dictatorship of the Ma-
chado type. A f te r years of va ry ing 
amounts of inf luence, Batista takes 
power in the coup of March 10, 
1952. In the years of his power, 
he k i l l s and often tortures twenty 
thousand people. As a nutshell i n -
dex of the fortunes of Cuba du r i ng 
these years past, one might observe 
that f o l l ow ing the 1895 war of l iber-
at ion the l i teracy rate grew mar-
ked ly ; du r i ng the years of Ma-
chado's dictatorship the l i teracy rate 
again dec l ined; i t rose s lowly dur-
ing the years after Maehado's exit 
and before Batista's e n t r y ; and 
l i teracy decl ined again du r i ng the 
six years of Batista's government. 
Not Made in a Day 
The current revolut ion in Cuba 
was not made in a day. It was 
born out of three hundred years of 
h istory and at least a hundred years 
o f p r i o r revolut ionary act iv i ty . But 
even as the revo lu t ion was born in 
the decade of the 1950s it d id not, 
l ike Athena, emerge ful l g rown out 
of Fidel Castro's head. Indeed, the 
fo rms which the revolut ion was to 
take and sti l l w i l l take in the fu ture 
grew out of its own eight-year his-
tory in Cuba and the revolut ionary 
experience elsewhere in La t in A m -
erica. To understand even in the 
most superf ic ial sense the nature 
and causes of the radical ism which 
characterizes the Cuban Revo lu t ion 
today, it is necessary to examine 
the Revolut ion in the l igh t of this 
recent h istory wh ich has made it 
what it is. But as we do so, it w i l l 
again he possible to do no more 
than raise questions as to how and 
why certain circumstances led to 
the decisions that were taken. In a 
sense what the f o l l o w i n g explora-
t ion can do is roughly to map the 
road of the revolut ion ind ica t ing 
some of the road fo rks at wh ich 
choices had to be made to guide it 
one way or another. Much closer 
acquaintance w i t h circumstances of 
the times wou ld be neceteary to as-
sign serious explanations to these 
choices. 
Elections were scheduled for the 
s p r i n g of 1952. When i t became 
clear that the impend ing vote wou ld 
not b r i ng h i m in to office, Bat ista as-
sumed power by a m i l i t a r y coup on 
M a r c h 10, 1952. Soon thereafter, 
F ide l Castro, then a lawyer, fi led a 
b r ie f in the courts changing Batista 
1102 
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 
w i t h several count a of v io la t ion of 
the Cuban Consti tut ion of 1940. 
Th is b r i e f represents Fidel Castro's 
first pub l ic challenge. But as an 
attack on the i l l ega l i ty of the 
Batista dictatorship rather than as 
an attempt to in i t ia te a far-reaching 
social revolut ion, this first challenge 
of the statua-quo was a far cry f r o m 
the revolut ion w h i c h Fidel 's name 
has become associated. T h i s revolu-
t ion was to assume its present f o r m 
only as a result of many events 
st i l l to come in the six years 
fo l lowing . 
Weapons for Legal Arguments 
The f i rs t fur ther development in 
the direct ion of radical ism was to 
substitute weapons where legal 
arguments had fai led. On July 26, 
1953, Fidel led 125 men in an at-
tack on For t Moncada in the hope 
of cap tur ing the weapons and sup-
plies which might be used in an 
attack on the a rmy, the real source 
of Batista's power. The attack was 
unsuccessful. Most of the attackers 
were k i l l e d , not so much in battle as 
after becoming prisoners. Through 
a series of fortunate accidents. 
Fidel 's l i fe was spared and he was 
brought to t r i a l . A c t i n g as his own 
attorney for defense, Fidel spoke 
four hours in defense of his attack 
against an unconsti tut ional govern-
ment. His defense ended w i t h the 
words, "Condemn me. I don't care. 
H i s to ry w i l l absolve me.'' Under 
that t i t le his defense plea has be-
come famous as an impor tan t docu-
ment of the Revolu t ion . Most of 
Fidel 's discussion was devoted to 
the circumstances immedia te ly sur-
round ing the i l l-fated attack of 
July 26. But a par t of his defense 
was devoted to the reform pro-
gramme fo r which he had fought 
and the measures he wou ld have 
in i t ia ted had his rebel l ion been 
successful. 
Fidel l i s ted f ive revolut ionary 
laws w h i c h w o u l d have been imme-
diately procla imed. They dealt w i t h 
the re- inst i tut ion of the Constitution 
of 1940 and the assumption of 
legislative, executive and jud ic i a l 
powers by the revolut ionary move-
ment, the g ran t ing of property in 
land to those who work , two profit-
shar ing measures, and confiscation 
of i l l -got ten gain . He went on in five 
pages out of eighty to outline the 
six major problems w i t h which a 
Cuban Revolut ion would have to 
deal : land re form, industr ial iza-
t i on , housing, unemployment , edu-
cation, and health, "along w i t h the 
restoration of publ ic liberties and 
po l i t i ca l democracy." He offered 
solutions to on ly two of these— 
land : expropr ia t ion , redis tr ibu-
t i o n and agr icu l tura l co-operatives; 
and housing : cut t ing rents in half 
and financing new housing. I em-
phasize this revolutionary docu-
ment because it is today widely 
claimed in Cuba that "His to ry W i l l 
Absolve M e " represents the blue-
p r i n t of the revolution we are now 
witnessing. I suggest that this 
widespread Cuban view is mistaken. 
It does not appear that the fo rm 
the Cuban Revolution takes today 
was conceived in 1953. Examina-
tion of the document w i t h this ques-
t ion in mind — the emphasis on 
recourse to legali ty, therelative 
moderat ion of the five immediate 
laws, the fa i lure to indicate, much 
less to spell out. any programme of 
attack on the six major p r o b l e m s -
w i l l , I believe, demonstrate that 
" H i s t o r y W i l l Absolve M e " may 
have contained some, goals and 
direct ional signposts, but that it cer-
tainly was not a b luepr in t , plat-
form, or programme, wri t ten in 
1953, of the revolution which was 
to take place after 1959. To say so 
does not. and is not meant; to con-
demn either Fidel's 195 3 position 
or his I 9 6 0 act ion. It is only to 
say that to find the roots of today's 
revolution we must look a good 
deal further. 
Landing in Oriente 
The next step in the development 
of the revolut ionary movement, 
wh ich by then had taken the 26th 
of July as its name, was s t i l l fur-
ther to radicalize the means of 
revolut ion. F ide l had, of course, 
been condemned by the court, but 
had regained his freedom shortly 
thereafter as a result of a general 
amnesty which Batista declared to 
reduce the g rowing pressure against 
his regime. Fidel used his free-
dom to plan a well-conceived co-
ordinated m i l i t a r y attack on the 
Batista government. On December 
2, 1956, he landed wi th eighty-two 
men on a beach in Oriente Pro-
vince. The land ing was to have 
coincided w i t h an upr i s ing in San-
tiago. Orientes largest c i ty . Bad 
weather delayed the ship's a r r i v a l 
f rom Mexico, the upr i s ing alerted 
the government, and the l and ing 
force was all but w iped out. Twelve 
men escaped death and reached 
the protect ion of the Sierra Maes-
tre Mountains . It is probable that, 
1103 
had this 1956 rebel l ion succeeded, 
Cuba would not be experiencing 
the radical and profound social 
revolution wh ich the wor ld is w i t -
nessing today. For even then the 
revolu t ionary movement had not 
developed and matured into the 
radical ism and profundi ty which i t 
was to have more than two years 
later. St i l l other events had to 
transpire, experiences had to arise, 
before the revolution could assume 
its present form. 
Fidel had selected his landing 
place in Oriente not only because 
of the tactical advantage that the 
mountains could afford. There are 
mountains as well elsewhere in 
Cuba. However, Oriente has long 
been at once the poorest and the 
most mi l i tan t ly rebellious province 
in Cuba. Possibly due. in part, to 
the much greater prevalence of 
small pr ivate holdings in the coffee 
and tobacco country of Oriente, its 
peasants and its intellectuals at the 
provinc ia l University of Oriente 
had been more active supporters of 
the revolutionary movement of the 
hundred years preceding. Fidel 
counted on their support. 
Ear ly in 1957 Fidel and his ele-
ven companions sought to init iate 
gueri l la warfare against Batista's 
a rmy from their mounta in hideouts. 
Batista had sometimes fifteen thou-
sand, sometimes twenty thousand 
men under arms: Fidel had twelve. 
What were the sources of the sup-
port Fidel needed to fight such 
odds? The Communist Party, w i t h 
a membership of possibly ten 
thousand, mostly in Havana, offer-
ed no support whatever. Not sur-
pr is ingly , it regarded F ide l as a 
romantic. latter-day version of a 
Lord Byron or Robin Hood. Nor 
d id the peasants of the Sierra, on 
whose account Fidel had landed 
there, support h i m or his move-
ment. If they were interested at 
a l l . they regarded Fidel w i t h sus-
pic ion and his movement as another 
intellectual and middle-class re-
fo rm, not unl ike that of 1933, 
wh ich would promise no improve-
ment in the lives of the large pea-
sant major i ty . Who , then, d i d lend 
support to Fidel ? Students mostly 
in Santiago, rather than Havana, 
and members of the middle-class in 
Havana. Not un l ike the peasants, 
they thought that Fidel's movement 
was one of middle-class reform. The 
middle-class supplied the money 
for weapons, and the students 
SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY 
1104 
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 
of Santiago supplied the com-
mi tment and courage to smuggle 
them into the mountains . 
Movement Rallies Support 
D u r i n g 1957 and 1958 Fidel 's 
group waged guer i l la warfare in 
the mountains and sent an expedi-
t ion across the plains of Camaugey. 
W i t h the matura t ion and attendant 
repression of the Batista dictator-
ship and its combattal by Fidel 's 
group, the Movement of the 26th of 
Ju ly increasingly ra l l ied support to 
its side. Seeing some peasants and 
Fidel 's men fighting side by side, 
other peasants came to gain confi-
dence in Fidel and his cause. 
Havana Negroes had lent some sup-
port to Batista, apparent ly because 
the combinat ion of his Mul la to 
blood w i t h his rise to power bad 
appealed to them, as a symbol of 
thei r own ascendance and recogni-
t ion in the society. In the mean-
time, in Oriente (the only other pro-
vince in which Negroes l ive in large 
numbers ) , Negroes came to sense 
that Fidel's movement represented 
so thorough a movement toward 
social equal i ty that it augured 
emancipat ion for them as wel l . The 
g r o w i n g popular support for Fidel's 
movement, combined w i t h the com-
plete fa i lu re of the M a r c h 1959 
general str ike wh ich represented 
the capstone of their earlier tactics 
against Batista, resulted in the sup-
por t of and subsequent collabora-
t ion w i t h the 26th of July move-
ment of the Communis t Party of 
Cuba in A p r i l 1959. 
Add i t i ona l sources of support , 
campaigns against urban m i l i t a r y 
garrisons w i th gun in one hand and 
microphone in the other ; demora-
l i z i n g Batista's a r m y by d isa rming 
prisoners and then setting them 
free, that is, t reat ing them as fellow 
vic t ims of Batista rather than as 
his defenders, increasingly faci l i ta-
ted Castro's m i l i t a r y campaign. 
Late in 1958, three hundred men 
under arms withstood and even-
tua l ly destroyed the arms of twen-
ty thousand men which sent a sin-
gle expedi t ionary force of twelve 
thousand men to crush the rebellion 
once and fo r a l l . 
Peasants Influence Movement 
But for the long r u n of Cuba 
and o f L a t i n Amer ica , possibly 
more impor t an t than Castro's i n -
fluence on the peasants and others 
was the influence of the peasants 
on Castro and his movement. Not-
wi ths tand ing Fidel 's emphasis on 
land reform in 1953 and his selec-
t ion of r u r a l Oriente as the place 
f r o m w h i c h to wage his war, the 
two years he and his men spent 
f ight ing and l i v ing among the 
peasants in the mountains undoub-
tedly resulted in an empathy and a 
depth of understanding of the pea 
sants and their problems which they 
would have lacked had the 1956 
attempt, to say noth ing of the 1953 
attempt, been immediately success-
fu l . The events and experiences of 
the years 1957 and 1958 thus be-
came cruc ia l ly impor tan t in shap-
i n g the form that the. revolution 
eventually was to take, and, to ant i -
cipate an argument below, for the 
lesson that La t in Americans have 
undoubtedly learned about the dif-
ference between a resolution fought 
in ihe city and a revolution fought 
in the country . 
No Reliance on Professional 
Army 
On New Year's eve of 1958 
Batista flees the country, and on 
January 1, 1959 Fidel Castro and 
his forces take control of the go-
vernment. The rebellion against the 
dictatorship of Batisla which grew 
out of 1952. 1953 and 1956 had 
ended in 1958. But the Revolution, 
whose antecedants were 1492. 1808, 
1895 and 1933 had only just begun 
on that same day. In a sense, the 
six year rebellion was only the la-
bour w h i c h made possible the b i r t h 
of a revolution conceived in 1492. 
How would the new-born revolution 
develop, what fo rm would it take ? 
I ts per iod of pregnancy and indeed 
its period of labour would deter-
mine the form it wou ld take, but 
so would the environment into 
wh ich i t was born and into w h i c h 
it must grow. The firstact of the 
revolutionary movement was to 
establish a government headed by a 
president, a pr ime minister, and 
important ambassadors. 
What f o r m might the Cuban 
Revolution take ? In a sense, any 
of a large variety of forms. W h y 
does it take precisely the f o r m that 
i t does ? It is probably impossible 
to say. But the foregoing sections 
have pointed to the nature of 
Cuban society ( i t must be left to 
the reader to fami l ia r ize himself 
w i t h the themes and details of 
Cuban and L a t i n Amer ican society) , 
and they have sketched the develop-
ment of response to these condi-
tions. We have seen that some 
reforms have been relied upon in 
1105 
the past and have been found want-
ing . Cubans have seen it too, and 
i t should not be su rpr i s ing i f they 
w o u l d geek not to make the same 
mistakes again. A rough and ready 
classification of some other alter-
native forms the revolution migh t 
take can be gleaned f rom the ex-
perience of other La t in Amer ican 
countries in their attempts to face 
in part s imilar problems. An out-
sider cannot, of course, c la im that 
this experience elsewhere Mas steer-
ed the Cuban Revolution precisely 
into the course it has taken. But 
it is certain that the leaders of the 
Cuban Revolution, and in a less 
sophisticated way large masses of 
the Cuban people, have fami l ia r ized 
themselves w i t h this L a t i n A m e r i -
can revolut ionary experience and 
that they have sought to avoid its 
mistakes. We may thus briefly 
review this La t in American expe-
rience and suggest some lessons 
which, f rom the Cuban point of 
view, this experience has to offer. 
It is common knowledge that in 
recent decades the largest par t of 
rapid pol i t ica l change in La t i n 
America has taken the f o r m of 
intra-army changes in the palace 
guard . It is as obvious as it is 
f ami l i a r that such rebellions are 
s t i l l b o r n and in no way further the 
revolut ionary reform movement 
which Cuba has harboured all these 
years. Moreover, given the role 
that the La t in Amer ican army t y p i -
cal ly plays in safeguarding the con-
servatism of the .society, keeping 
the professional army intact means 
that a major road block to social 
change has failed to be removed. 
Exiling the o l d leadership, as is so 
customary in La t in America , s imi-
l a r l y maintains or provides a nu-
cleus for the resurgence of the o ld 
regime. An alternative, impor tan t 
if the rebellion has been long and 
violent, is that the o ld leadership is 
mobbed by the angry people, in 
French Revolution style. But this 
alternative is also costly to the peo-
ple themselves. Thus reliance on 
revolut ionary courts. even though 
they may look l ike kangaroo 
courts and convict ion and execu-
t ion hold impor t an t benefits over 
the other two l ike ly alternatives. So 
does rehabi l i t a t ion of lower echelon 
leadership where i t is possible. In 
this context, Cuban reliance for the 
rebellion on m i l i t a r y forces out-
side of the professional army, and 
its subsequent destruction and e l i -
mina t ion of the dic ta tor ia l leaders 
SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY 
1106 
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 
seems a plausible course f o r the 
pursu i t of the reforms al ready in-
tended by generations of Cuban 
revolutionaries. 
Shift from City to Country 
To the extent that L a t i n A m e r i -
can rebell ions have involved large-
scale f igh t ing , this f igh t ing has, 
w i t h the notable exception of the 
Mexican and Bol iv ian cases, occur-
red p r i n c i p a l l y in the major c i ty or 
c i t iea Th is m i l i t a r y action in the 
cities has been at the same t ime 
symptom and cause of the urban 
rebellions wh ich have so wide ly 
characterized the ru ra l societies of 
L a t i n A m e r i c a . These urban rebel-
lions have in tu rn resulted p r i m a r i -
ly in urban reforms. Where they 
have led to changes in the ru r a l 
society as we l l , these changes have 
been largely brought to, if not for-
ced on, the countryside. Even the 
most cursory acquaintance w i th 
urban- rura l conflict, denied though 
it may be by generations of Soviet 
and Western wri ters , w i l l forbode 
unhappy consequences for this pro-
cess. The more intensive and ex-
tensive changes in the ru ra l and 
rura l -urban social relations wh ich 
have been associated w i t h the pa r t i -
c ipa t ion of Zapata's peasants in the 
Mexican revolut ion of 1910 and the 
two years of gueri l la warfare by 
Castro's forces in the mountains of 
Cuba foreshadow a shift in the lo-
cus and nature of rebell ion and 
revolu t ion f rom c i ty to country in 
the L a t i n Amer ican upheavals 
which arc soon to come. 
Argentina and Venezuela 
An alternative f o r m for the Cu-
ban Revolut ion, more radical than 
the clearly inadequate changes of 
the palace guard considered and 
rejected above, may be represented 
by recent reforms in Argent ina and 
Venezuela. Peron's government in 
Argen t ina adopted the course of a 
welfare state. In facing Argentina 's 
economic problems, Peron sought to 
rely on the re-dis t r ibut ion of the 
income pie i m p l i c i t in the welfare 
state, w i t h h a r d l y any concern for 
increasing the size of that pie. Ur -
ban workers were favoured, and in 
the meantime agr icu l tu ra l produc-
t i v i t y decl ined. To continue to 
enforce the d i s t r i bu t ion his govern-
ment desired, Peron became increas-
singly d ic ta tor ia l and his govern-
ment increasingly repressive. In the 
mean t ime far ther no r th , Jimenez 
dealt w i t h Venezuela's economic 
problems by resort ing neither to re-
d i s t r ibu t ion , nor to investment in 
g rowth , w i t h the exception of the 
pet roleum industry which filled the 
coffers of his treasury, but whose 
benefits ha rd ly t r ick led in to the 
countryside beyond Caracas' luxu-
ry housing and l u x u r y highways. 
In both countries, but pa r t i cu la r ly 
in Venezuela, socio-political in-
equali ty was felt us repression by 
the rura l majori t ies. Both dictators 
were overthrown after the mid-
1950's. Both dictatorships were re-
placed by substantially middle-class 
based holders of power w h i c h have, 
pa r t i cu la r ly in the United States, 
been widely hailed as "Democrat ic 
Reform Governments." "Free elec-
tions" and par l iamentary coalitions 
have accompanied the Frondiz i go-
vernment in Argent ina and the 
Bentacourt government in Venezuela. 
Note that the first step of the Cu-
ban Revolu t ion also resulted in 
filling the h igh government offices 
w i t h s imi la r h i g h l y respectable 
middle-class personnel. In several 
years of office, neither the Frondizi 
nor the Bentacourt government have 
brought any notable re form to the 
countryside, neither socially, p o l i t i -
cally, nor economical ly; not land 
reform, not education, not invest-
ment, nor, in the case of Venezuela, 
channel l ing the large income f rom 
its petroleum industry into diversi-
fied economic development. 
F r o m where the Cubans sit, 
hav ing fai led to introduce any re-
fo rm in the structure, par t icu la r ly 
in the ru ra l structure of these 
societies, the pressures which La t in 
Amer ican .social structure exerts on 
governments to become increasingly 
r igh t -wing dictatorships (or to put 
it the other way around, the condi-
tions which permit these dictator-
ships to flower have reasserted 
themselves), and both countries al-
ready find themselves again threa-
tened w i t h imminen t re turn to 
Peron-Jimenez type dictatorships — 
just as Batista inevi tably grew out 
of the undisturbed roots of the 
Machado regime in Cuba. F rom the 
Cuban point of view and f rom that 
of this wr i t e r , the fact that as these 
pages are being wr i t t en , Bentacourt 
is p a t r o l l i n g the ci ty w i t h tanks 
and shooting students in the streets 
is not an accident. Such are the 
f rui ts of r e ly ing on the ou tward 
t rappings o f democracywi thou t 
any at tempt to reform, never m i n d 
democratize, the society. I t should 
come as l i t t l e surprise to discover 
that the Frondizi Bentacourt f o r m of 
revolution or type of r e fo rm is 
what the Uni ted States and, indeed, 
the middle and upper class ele-
ments in Cuba and L a t i n Amer i ca 
would l ike to have seen as the f o r m 
of the Cuban Revolut ion. But i t 
should come as no less of a surprise 
that the leaders of the Movement 
of the 26 th of July should have 
interpreted Argent ine and Vene-
zuelan experience as a sign that 
more radical and more wide-spread 
social change must be wrought in 
Cuba if the sacrifices of the rebel-
l ion and the past are not to have 
been made in va in . 
Guatemala and Bolivia 
A model of the fo rm more rad i -
cal than that discussed above may 
be found in the revolutions of 
(Guatemala in 1944 and Bol iv ia in 
1952. Both revolutions were in part 
ru ra l in character, in socio-political 
and economic change in the coun-
tryside. Yet, as is well known, both 
revolutions fai led. The Bol ivian 
one never even really got off the 
ground. The governments of Are-
valo and later Arbenz in Guatemala 
d id introduce social change to the 
countryside. but they d i d so gra-
dually and on a catch-as-catch-can 
basis. The revolut ion d id call for 
some popular par t ic ipa t ion , though 
not in the f o r m of m i l i t a r y defense 
by the armed populace; and when 
the counter-revolution attacked in 
1954. the reform governments and 
wi th them ten years of work were 
an easy pushover. (As a sidelight, 
some Cubans have observed that 
the presence at the time of the re-
volutions of the American ambassa-
dor Bonsial in Bol iv ia and in 
Guatemala and then again in Cuba 
may not have been altogether coin-
cidental.) 
F ina l ly , i f none of the foregoing 
models for a L a t i n Amer ican revo-
lu t ion appear to promise the results 
which revolu t ionary Cubans desire 
and require, the example of Mexico, 
w i t h the oldest, longest, and most 
far-reaching revolut ion which L a t i n 
Amer i ca has- witnessed, st i l l remains 
available fo r examina t ion . . The 
Mexican Revolut ion of 1910 came 
on the heels of the Diaz dictator-
ship of the preceding century 
wh ich has universally been charac-
terized as an alliance between p r i -
vate land owners, the Church, and 
A m e r i c a n investment interests in 
Mexico . The rebellion was fought 
1107 
SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY 
long and h a r d by various factions, 
some of w h i c h represented the pea-
sants; it resulted in a revolut ion 
wh ich made sweeping land re forms; 
eventually, though not un t i l decades 
later, conducted a widespread and 
successful l i teracy campa ign ; i n -
creased educat ion; expropr ia ted a l l 
p r iva te and fore ign holdings of 
subterranean minera l and petro-
leum resources in 1936; began the 
indus t r ia l iza t ion of the coun t ry ; and, 
has raised the investment rate to a 
respectable 10 per cent per annum. 
Yet , per capita income in Mexico 
remained one-haIf of what i t is in 
Cuba, the peasantry seems to have 
been a l l but bypassed by economic 
development, and every government 
since that of Cardenas in the mid-
thir t ies have moved increasingly to 
the r igh t un t i l the middle-class i n -
dustr ial and commercia l govern-
ment of Lopez Mateos is today 
regarded as excessively conserva-
tive, even by Time magazine. 
Forced into More Radical Forms 
W i t h o u t going in to the details of 
the r e fo rm measures undertaken by 
the revolut ions reviewed above and 
the revolut ion now un fo ld ing in 
Cuba, it appears clear to this wr i t e r 
that, if the Cuban Revolut ion is no 
also to be either s t i l lborn or to die 
in infancy, Cuba is forced in to s t i l l 
more radical forms of revolu t ion 
than any of those yet seen in L a t h 
Amer ica . The haste w i t h which re-
volu t ionary reforms are being under 
taken; the exp ropr i a t ion of la t i 
fundista ownership of sugar am 
grazing lands; the d i s t r ibu t ion of 
land and agr icu l tura l credit to small 
holders; fo rmat ion o f ag r icu l tu ra l 
co-operatives for diversif icat ion of 
crops and employment of the. eight 
to twelve month unemployed rura l 
prole tar ia t which characterize 
Cuba's popula t ion as it does no 
those of many of the countries exa 
mined above; the immediate dr ive 
for indust r ia l iza t ion, small and 
large, l i gh t and heavy, the establish-
ment o f I N R A (Nat iona l Institute 
of A g r a r i a n Reform) as a sort of 
super T V A ; 64 per cent increase of 
pr imlary school enrolment and the 
three-fold increase of first-grade 
enrolment in the very first year of 
the r e v o l u t i o n ; the d i s t r ibu t ion of 
f ire-arms to the near ly one m i l l i o n 
m i l i t i a (na t iona l guard) members; 
the asceticism of those active in 
the revolu t ion f r o m the smallest 
r u r a l communi ty to the office of the 
p r i m e min i s t e r ; a l l these dist in-
guished the Cuban Revolut ion as 
one more radical , more serious, 
more active, than any p r i o r L a t i n 
Amer ican revolut ion wh ich Cuba 
migh t use as its mode). 
Thus, the very experience of so 
r i a l re form movements elsewhere in 
L a t i n America and in Cuba's own 
history itself, which has led Cuba 
to adopt revolut ionary forms more 
radical than those for which models 
are available also leaves Cuba in 
the posi t ion of having to make and 
find her way in revolut ionary t e r r i -
tory unchartered by earlier exper-
ience in L a t i n America . The radi-
calisrn of the Cuban Revolution, in-
duced par t ly by necessity and p a r t l y 
by design, has already set Cuba on 
a path for which history can no 
longer serve as a guide. It is im-
pl ic i t in the preceding discussion 
that the Cuban Revolution finds it-
self at this poin t wi thout a pre-for-
mulated procedure which might 
guide the revolut ion along its way 
Moreover beyond the design for re-
be l l ion against the o ld dictatorship 
and the general intent for land re-
f o r m and other reforms announced 
in " H i s t o r y Wi l l Absolve Me ' , the 
revolu t ion lacked these guides as 
wel l d u r i n g the recent years that it 
has already traversed. 
Finds its Own Way 
Not. unl ike other social move 
ments. and probably more than 
many, the Cuban Revolution mus 
and does find its way substantially 
in the dark as it goes along its 
way. Under the circumstances, i 
should not be surpr is ing if many 
Cubans seek, and some yearn, for a 
model that might serve them as a 
guide. Quite obviously the West, 
and par t icu la r ly the United Slates, 
can offer it no such model. Even 
where some Amer ican experience 
might serve as a guide, the Uni ted 
States has sought to close the chan-
nels of t ransmit ta l of such exper-
ience by w i t h d r a w i n g technical and 
material a id and trade, while par t i -
cular American measures which 
m i g h t of themselves be inoffensive 
have come to be associated w i t h the 
offensiveness of American imper-
ial ism in La t i n Amer ica as a whole. 
In the meantime, the Un i t ed States, 
far f r o m making an effort to isolate 
the acceptable f r o m the offensive, 
insists on cont inuing to sell the 
Amer ican way as a package deal. 
L o o k i n g between East and West, 
i t is possible to f ind a " T h i r d 
1109 
Force" or a t h i r d or fou r th way. 
But; to the extent to w h i c h they 
exist, these models and sources of 
possible al ignment are largely in the 
f ie ld of in te rna t ional po l i t i cs . I n d i a , 
Burma , the Uni ted A r a b Republ ic , 
the new A f r i c a n states may offer 
alternatives in the United Nations, 
but they have no economic pro-
gramme that Cuba might make its 
own. To this observer, among coun-
tries which are not al igned on either 
side of the cold war, only Yugo-
slavia appears as a source of any 
potential guide to a country l i k e 
Cuba. The presence of a substan-tial number of Yugoslavian techni-
cians in Cuba suggests that Cuba 
may yet come to look in that direc-
t ion . 
West Offers No Guide 
There remain, then, only two other 
places for Cuba to look for guid-
ance to its fu tu re ; one is toward 
Russia-China, and the other is at 
home. The model of the Socialist 
camp, of course, holds profound 
attraction for any country or people 
who, l ike Cuba, have only just be-
come determined to shape their own 
future. Even if the West were not 
so in t imately associated w i t h I m -
perial ism, be it of the Br i t i sh-
French or the American variety, the 
Western and pa r t i cu la r ly American 
programmer would suffer seriously 
f rom their heavy emphasis on eco-
nomic problems alone, But f rom 
the Cuban, and in genera] the L a t i n 
Amercian-African-Southeast-A s i a n 
point of view, the problems they 
fare are in the first instance and 
probably most important ly prob-
lems of social and poli t ical change. 
But it is to precisely these prob-
lems that the West offers no guide 
and Western supported elements 
in the "emergent" societies offer no 
programme. 
It is commonplace among Western 
economists to miss the boat even on 
economic problems. Though they 
r igh t ly po in t out that only increa-
ses and not changes in the d i s t r ibu-
t ion of the economic pie can u l t i -
mately serve to meet the problems 
of economic development, they are 
f rom this led to conclude and ad-
vise that the wor ld-wide attempts at 
re-dis t r ibut ion are misplaced. But 
f r o m the po in t of view of Cuba, or 
any other semi-Feudal country, i t is 
clear that re-d is t r ibut ion of wealth 
and therewi th power are necessary 
to render possibly the increase in 
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 
SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY 
output w h i c h Western economises 
prescribe. I t i s thus not surpr i s ing 
i f Cubans look toward Russia and 
China as the only sources of models 
for fu r the r ing social, po l i t i c a l and 
economic change. 
Most Important Solutions 
Home Grown 
Though the Cubans may look in 
p a r t toward Russia and China, they 
work at home and the largest and 
most impor t an t solutions to thei r 
revolu t ionary problems are met w i t h 
solutions home-grown on the spot. 
Even a casual observer can readi ly 
note how Cuba is r e ly ing on var ied 
solutions to the problems of g u i d i n g 
their revo lu t ion th rough unchartered 
t e r r i to ry , and how these solutions in 
t u r n give rise to var ied new pro-
blems. That is their revolut ionary pro-
gramme, and its procedure is large-
ly devised where and when occasion 
demands. Viewed f rom the perspec-
t ive of a place of s tabi l i ty , the Cu-
ban Revolut ion appears as a tangle 
of confusion, of people r u n n i n g off 
in a l l different directions, of many 
projects started and few concluded 
of changes in d i rec t ion . But viewed 
f r o m the standpoint of the revolu-
t ionary , these are the very marks of 
v i t a l i t y ; they are the marks not of 
weakness, but of strength. Yet, not 
every th ing can be changed. In his 
analysis of the Ana tomy of Revolu-
t ion , Crane B r i n t o n suggested that 
no revolut ion can change everything, 
that the new must be bu i l t upon the 
o ld . 
Bu t for a revolut ion , the old is 
not only a legacy and a base, it is 
also an i n s t r u m e n t Paradoxica l ly , 
it is the very radicalness of change 
to be in t roduced in Cuba which 
necessitates reliance on the o ld well-
entrenched and thus re l iab le social 
arid cul tura l forms as vehicles for 
the in t roduc t ion of that change. An 
attempt at wholesale subst i tut ion of 
a new society and cul ture for the 
o l d would surely result in no society, 
new or o ld . Thus, s t i l l another 
source of understanding of the Cu-
ban Revolut ion lies in an examina-
t i o n of the old and existing socio-
c u l t u r a l forms wh ich serve as vehi-
c l e fo r the Revolut ion, and wh ich 
thereby help to define the possibili-
ties and l imi ta t ions of social change 
th rough the Cuban Revolut ion . 
Family and Kinship 
Now, as before, in Cuba as in 
most other parts of the w o r l d , 
f a m i l y and k insh ip relations serve 
as the most impor t an t bond and 
channel of communica t ion between 
people. M a n y things are necessary to 
w o r k a far-reaching change in a so-
ciety, but one of them surely is to 
communicate the new, the changes in 
social relat ionship that have already 
occurred, the new opportuni t ies and 
responsibili t ies, the s p i r i t of the 
revolut ion — to the people. A n y 
vis i t to Cuba's countryside, to its 
villages and towns, and if one looks 
more closely, to its cities, w i l l show 
that television and other mass me-
dia, commercial and w o r k relations 
notwi ths tanding , the extended f a m i l y 
serves as the Revolution's most im-
por tant medium of communicat ion . 
It is the fami ly which reaches f rom 
the countryside to the town, f rom 
one region to another, f r o m the 
provinces to the capital , in short 
f r o m one po in t of contact w i t h re-
vo lu t iona ry experience to another. 
A n d the experience w i t h the revolu-
t ion wh ich is meaningful and im-
portant , wh ich permits a sense of 
pa r t i c ipa t ion and produces a feeling 
of empathy, that experience is the 
one which is communicated between 
one member of a f a m i l y and another. 
The Patron Relationship 
It is the experience of the son in 
a new school, the cousin in a new co-
operative f a r m , the uncle in Hava-
na, much more than Fidel 's TV 
speeches, newspapers, mass rallies, 
or even cracker-barrel discussions 
w h i c h lend meaning to the revolu-
t i o n . At the same t ime i t is exist-
i n g f a m i l y relations which continue 
in many instances to serve as the 
vehicles for the d i s t r ibu t ion of the 
new oppor tuni t ies and responsibil i-
ties ar is ing out of the r evo lu t ion in 
land ownership, education, and out 
of the new tasks created in the revo-
lu t ion in general. Thus an acquain-
tance w i t h the Cuban f a m i l y can 
afford much understanding of the 
points at which change is or must 
be int roduced, how it can be com-
municated and accepted or rejected, 
in short, of the possibilities f o r re-
vo lu t ion and the l imi ta t ions on 
change wh ich Cuba's most impor -
tant ins t i tu t ion bodes fo r the Revo-
l u t i o n . 
Probably the most i m p o r t a n t 
social relat ionship in L a t i n A m e r i -
can and Cuban society, bo th inside 
the f ami ly and out is the au thor i ty of 
the father, paternalism or the "pat-
r o n " relat ionship. In the absence o f 
this time-tested f o r m of social in-
1110 
tercourse, i t wou ld be impossible 
for Cuba to organize the construc-
t ion of the new schools, roads, fac-
tories, and most impor t an t , to in -
troduce any new forms of enterprise 
l ike ag r i cu l t u r a l cooperatives. Des-
pite, may be because of, the less 
" indigenous" nature of Cuba com-
pared w i t h other Carr ibean society, 
paternalism has in Cuba played an 
even more pervasive role than else-
where. However, a colleague of 
mine suggests that Cuban paternal 
relations have been less regu-
larized and reciprocal than those of 
feudalism or heavi ly Ind ian popu-
lated societies l ike Bol iv ia . Thus, 
Cubans have often had to approach 
their pa t ron w i t h requests rather 
than r e ly ing only on his fulf i lment 
of already specified reciprocal ob l i -
gations. 
Administrators Run Cooperative 
Farms 
Consider agr icu l ture . As one 
strolls th rough cities and towns al-
most anywhere in the wor ld , A m e r i -
ca, Russia, Europe, Af r i ca , other 
Carr ibean countries, one encounters 
outdoor markets in which 'nearby 
farmers sell vegetables and often 
meat of the i r own produc t ion . Not 
so in Cuba. And the reason is 
s imple : much less than other ru ra l 
countries does Cuba have small 
holders who are In a position to 
raise and marketsuch produce on 
their own . Such small holders as 
there are tend to be isolated in the 
mountains, where they raise coffee 
and tobacco as cash crops and pro-
duce for subsistence. Most other 
Cuban peasants, if one may even 
cal l them that. have long been 
landless agr icu l tu ra l labourers, a 
ver i table r u r a l proletariat . They 
worked (on ly par t of the year) on 
large and medium size landholdings, 
and the relat ionship between them 
and employers and supervisory per-
sonnel was substantial ly paterna-
l i s t ic . Bu t in large part many pea-
sants were not therefore automati-
cally total ly cared fo r . The term 
"guajero" , now generalized to refer 
to all peasants, developed as the 
name of peasants who bu i l t their 
shacks along the roadside, for lack 
of any other land on which to l ive . 
When Castro moved to establish 
cooperative farms, for sugar and 
other produce as we l l , the w o r l d 
expected a repet i t ion of the collec-
t iv iza t ion problems which had pla-
gued Russia, Eastern Europe and 
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 
China , They need have had 
neither fear nor de l ight . I N R A (Na-
t iona l Ins t i tu te of A g r i a r i a n Re-
f o r m ) appoin ted adminis t ra tors f o r 
each cooperative f a r m , and in i m -
por tan t ways Cuba proceeded w i t h 
business as usual. The commun i ty 
elders who pointed to the p ic ture of 
ex-sugar m i l l adminis t ra tor hanging 
in their company-provided club 
house and who noted w i t h salisfac 
l ion that, though the p ic ture is lar-
ger than that of Fidel Castro on the 
other w a l l , they have no reason to 
remove i t , were saying just that . In 
many ways, the Revolut ion has, at 
least for the present, passed much 
of the i n i t i a t i ve in the paternalistic 
re la t ionship to the patron. In sugar 
lands already in product ion , the 
co-op members elect a "coordinator" 
f r o m among their members, bu t the 
au thor i ty is vested in the I N R A -
appointed, non-member, "adminis-
t r a t o r " for the first l ive years or 
un t i l the membership has learned 
itself to assume responsibi l i ty . In 
the new ag r i cu l tu ra l co-ops, w h i c h 
are largely breaking new lands and 
only just beginning construction, 
membership has generally not been 
established yet. 
Continued Paternalism 
The establishment of the f a rm is 
under the au thor i ty of the adminis 
t ra tor , who in t u r n is under the 
d i rec t ion of the chief of his agr i -
cu l tu ra l zone; and the work is done 
by a g r i c u l t u r a l labourers h i red by 
the day. Indeed, some of these 
farms, the largest, w i l l never be 
t ransformed in to cooperatives bu t 
w i l l be maintained as "Granjas del 
Puelbo" w i t h employed workers re-
miniscent of Soviet state farms. For 
the t ime being, none of these farms 
are real ly cooperatives in the sense 
thai responsibil i ty, and the rewi th 
benefits and costs residual ly rest 
w i t h the par t ic ipants . Even casual 
conversation w i t h either the pea-
sants or the supervisory personnel 
easily demonstrates that thei r ex-
perience in the past has been of 
paternal ism and that they continue 
to re ly on i t for the present. The 
government has not t r ied to substi-
tute cooperatives for small pr ivate 
landholdings where it does exist, 
and it is no accident that Cuba is 
p robab ly the only country in the 
w o r l d in wh ich serious land re fo rm 
has not resulted in an i n i t i a l decline 
i n ag r i cu l tu ra l ou tput . 
The cont inued paternalism exhi 
bi ts i t s e l f in the relat ion between 
i n d i v i d u a l peasants and the new 
agr icu l tura l extension and credit 
agencies, the new "stores of the 
people" which supplement and re-
place the pr ivate and company 
stores in r u r a l areas. Paternal ism 
and conversely lack of i nd iv idua l 
responsibi l i ty remain evident in stu-
dent-teacher relationships in the 
many new schools. But at the same 
t ime the youth and non-professional-
ism of many of the new teachers 
and the ind iv idua l in i t ia t ive which 
underlies the very school attendance 
on the par t of many teenagers and 
young adults, undoubtedly attenuate 
the paternalism in the student-tea-
cher relat ionship. The 20-hour t r i p 
by three friends of mine, 18, 19, 
and 20 years of age. f rom isolated 
Sagua de Tanamo to previously 
strange and distant Havana to see 
the Minis te r of Education and ask 
h i m to bu i ld a technical h igh school 
in their town was undoubtedly 
visualized by both parties in the 
context of paternal ism, but the 
same event w o u l d not have occurred 
before the Revolut ion. 
There is. thus, a difference in the 
qua l i ty of the paternal ism then and 
now. Though the au thor i ty and 
mutual responsibil i ty and respect 
largely remain the basis of organiz-
ing the tasks of the Kevolut ion as 
they d i d the tasks of o ld , both 
" f a the r " and "son" appear to sense 
a difference in the source of that 
author i ty and respect. This change 
in source or base may be traceable 
in part to the very deep and wide-
spread sense of pa r t i c ipa t ion in the 
Revolut ion and the new Cuba, and 
it m i g h t be due in par t to the un-
usual youth of all at the top of much 
of the local leadership in the Revo-
lu t ion . The new Cuban paterna-
l i sm has a qua l i ty of fraternal ism. 
A n d this already represents and 
forebodes a profound social revolu-
t i o n . 
Obligations Particular and Personal 
Thus, a closer examinat ion of 
paternal ism in Cuban society can 
increase our understanding of how 
the new can come to be int roduced 
and accepted, how real cooperatives 
w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l and collective 
responsibil i ty they i m p l y can come 
in to being, w i t h worker par t ic ipa-
t i on in management, maybe on the 
Yugoslavian style, can and w i l l be 
in t roduced, what f ru i t s the educa-
t iona l re form w i l l bear. 
Another q u a l i t y o f L a t i n and 
Cuban social relations, not unrela-
ted to paternal ism, is their p a r t i -
cular ism and personalism. In Catho-
l ic societies more than in Protestant 
ones, obl iga t ions are pa r t i cu l a r and 
to persons rather than universal and 
to pr inc ip les . Glance at any news-
paper photograph of the revolu t ion-
ary leadership, l isten to any state-
ment by "defectors who were close 
to Castro ' , and the intense personal 
qua l i ty of the recru i tment in to posi-
tions of leadership and au thor i ty 
and of the con t inu ing relations 
among those so recruited is imme-
diately evident. The same personal-
ism is the source as well of many 
of the social contacts between top 
leaders and other revo lu t ionary 
actives and among the lat ter them-
selves. In the absence of such 
strong personal ties and their im-
portance, how would people in en-
t i re ly new and often cont inua l ly 
changing revolu t ionary roles and 
incumbencies relate to each other, 
how could the revolu t ionary leader-
ship coordinate its activities at a l l? 
A n d yet, a t least in practice i f 
not in design, the leadership of the 
Cuban Revolut ion scrupulously 
practices the dictates of two ul tra-
universalistic values: honesty and 
asceticism; no charges of f raud or 
financial self-aggrandizement have 
come to my ears — even f r o m the 
l ips of those most unf r i end ly to the 
government, and the spartan exist-
ence and hard work of those active 
in the Revolut ion is common know-
ledge. W h a t the source and appeal 
of this behaviour in La t in America 
is, I do not know. Possibly, and 
paradoxical ly , it is to be traced in 
part to the much stronger influence 
that N o r t h Amer ican culture has 
exerted in Cuba than anywhere else 
in L a t i n Amer ica . Cer ta in ly the 
early days of the Mexican revolu-
t ion were not famed for honesty or 
asceticism. 
Northerners have long regarded 
Lat ins as au thor i t a r i an and yet as 
ind iv idua l i s t i c , free-wheeling and 
rebellious as w e l l .No revolut ion 
can change nat ional character, i f 
that is wha t the above represents, 
o v e r n i g h t ; and i f the revolu t ion is 
to in t roduce and change, i t must 
r e ly on exis t ing cu l tu ra l forms as 
vehicles of that change. A n d so 
one may encounter cooperative f a r m 
adminis t ra tors who w i l l tell you 
that he w i l l plant where and how 
the agronomist (there he sits, fresh 
out of school) tells h i m to. because 
only he has the necessary knowledge, 
1111 
SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY 
whi l e another adminis t ra tor , or i n -
deed the same one, w i l l p o i n t w i t h 
p r ide to the new br ickworks or new 
fu rn i tu re factory he has established 
entirely on his own in i t i a t ive and 
wi thou t the advice or consent of 
anybody; and if someone doesn't 
l ike i t . they can go to he l l . So much 
of the old serves to shape, and also 
to b r i n g f o r t h , the new. 
Pragmatic and Personalised 
The pragmatism of the Cuban 
Revolution in its development and 
the var ie ty of its current forms sug-
gests that, as I argued earlier, the 
Revolut ion has no ideology. But as 
the past gives way to the future , as 
the focus of attention and as the 
variety of at tempted revo lu t ionary 
forms seems increasingly to dissi 
pate the revolut ionary force, pres 
sures w i l l surely fo rm to create and 
adopt an ideology for the Cuban 
Revolut ion. Maybe that t ime is al-
ready here. To serve its purpose, 
that ideology must be widely com-
municated, and to be communicated 
it must be readi ly symbolized. Wha 
then are the exis t ing forms of sym-
bol ic ism and imagery which can 
serve to carry the ideology and there-
w i t h the Revolut ion? One answer, 
but only one, is personalism again. 
Signif icant L a t i n images, as w e l l as 
social relations, tend to be h igh ly 
personal. Thus, probably more than 
the social movements of northern 
countries wh ich tend to be more 
ideal is t ical ly symbolized, the Cuban 
Revolut ion may become increasingly 
associated wi th the leadership and 
personality of F ide l . "We are a l l 
Fidelistas," Cubans say. If the Re-
volut ion is so personalized, how 
wou ld Fidel's death affect the Revo-
Iution's course? 
The foregoing discussion has not 
been an at tempt to describe or ex-
p la in the Cuban Revolut ion exhaus-
t ively. Its intent has been on ly to 
expose for inspection three sources 
of background and explanat ion for 
the developments that Cuba and the 
wor ld now witness: The Cuban 
ancien regime and the development 
of the revolut ionary movement w i t h -
in i t , the experience elsewhere in 
L a t i n America w i t h attempts to 
handle s imi la r problems, and some 
socio-cultural factors in Cuban l i fe 
which inev i tab ly must influence the 
course of the Revolut ion. I t must 
be left to the understanding and re-
search of others to explore the many 
questions on ly raised here. 
T u b e F a c t o r y 
T H E Commonweal th Development 
Finance Company w i l l provide 
a loan of £ 175,000 for the manu-
facture of non-ferrous tubes, pipes, 
rods, and sections in Ind ia . 
The loan w i l l provide the for-
eign-exchange requirements for a 
factory being erected in Bombay by 
Kamani Tubes Private L t d , in col-
laborat ion w i t h Yorksh i re I m p e r i a l 
Metals L t d . an associate of Imper i a l 
Chemical Industries, which has 
arranged the procurement of plant 
in the Uni ted K i n g d o m , and w i l l 
assist in the early per iod of run-
n ing , under a 10- year technical 
collaborat ion agreement. 
The Yorksh i re I m p e r i a l Metals ' 
part in the scheme is largely one 
of supply ing know-how. They also 
hope to provide assistance, f rom 
t ime to t ime by means of short 
visits to India by technicians f rom 
Leeds. 
1112