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A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 
 DATE : June 2006
 
 
SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE DEVELOPMENT 
 
A380 
PPOOLLIICCYY AANNDD PPRROOCCEEDDUURREESS 
HHAANNDDBBOOOOKK 
 
 
 
 
For further information about this handbook, please contact: 
AIRBUS S.A.S. 
Customer Services Directorate 
Maintenance Engineering Department 
B.P. No. 33, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, FRANCE 
 
 
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 
ISSUE number: 12 
ISSUE Date : June 2006 
 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 Record of Revisions ROR - PAGE: 1
DATE : June 2006 
 
 
ACCEPTANCE LETTERS 
 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 Record of Revisions ROR - PAGE: 1
DATE : June 2006 
 
 
 
RECORD OF REVISIONS 
 
Issue 
Number 
Issue 
Date Reason for Revision 
1 Dec. 2002 Initial Issue. Distribution to MRB / ISC. 
2 January 2003 Comments received from MRB. 
3 April 2003 Comments received from ISC 1 
4 June 2003 Comments received from ISC 2 and intermediate ISC 2A meeting in PARIS May 26. 
5 January 2004 Comments received from ISC 3 & ISC 4 
6 April 2004 Comments received from ISC 5 
7 July 2004 Comments received from ISC 6 
8 December 2004 Comments received from ISC 7 and ISC 8 
9 March 2005 Comments received from ISC 9 
10 October 2005 Comments received from ISC 10 
11 February 2006 Comments received from ISC 11 
12 June 2006 Comments received from ISC 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 History of Changes- PAGE: HOC-1
 DATE : June 2006
 
 
HISTORY OF CHANGES 
 
PPH Ref Issue 
Date 
Description of Change 
Cover sheet February 
2006 
Picture of the cover sheet changed 
 January 2003 Acceptance Letter, first line, 'approval' added. 
 June 2003 Insertion of MRB and ISC acceptance letters for A380 PPH 
HOC June 2003 Foot pages revised 
HOC January 2004 Incorporation of issue 5 revisions 
HOC April 2004 Incorporation of issue 6 revisions 
HOC July 2004 Incorporation of issue 7 revisions 
HOC December 
2004 
Incorporation of issue 8 revisions 
HOC March 2005 Incorporation of issue 9 revisions 
HOC October 
2005 
Incorporation of issue 10 revisions 
HOC February 
2006 
Incorporation of issue 11 revisions 
HOC June 2006 Incorporation of issue 12 revisions 
TOC June 2003 Revised 
TOC January 2004 Pagination changes for sections 3, 4, 5, 6, and appendix C 
TOC July 2004 Revised 
1-4 January 2003 FAR' reference deleted (mistake). 
 
1-4 June 2003 Clarification about airworthiness standards 
1-4 March 2005 SFAR88 airworthiness standards included 
1-4 June 2006 Additional references for Fuel Tank Safety 
2-1 January 2003 Date of JAA AGM added. Any document referenced should have an issue/date. 
2-2.1.1 June 2003 Added reference to Appendix F 
2-2.1.3 January 2003 Function a). Wording improved. 
2-2.1.3 January 2003 Function d) expanded. 
2-2.1.4 January 2004 Clarification of the role of the MRB/FAA specialist 
2-2.2.2 January 2003 Significant Structure Selection and Significant Structure / Zonal analysis results added to 
ISC review. 
 
2-2.2.3 January 2003 Function h). 'recommendations' changed to 'proposals'. 
2-2.2.3 April 2003 Replacement of ‘transmit proposal’ by ‘provides agreement for proposal’ 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
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DATE : June 2006 
 
2-2.2.4 January 2003 Function f) added to the list. 
2-2.2.4 January 2004 Addition of paragraph h) for ISC meeting report 
2-2.2.6 April 2003 New paragraph. Functions of the ISC advisor to the MWG. 
2-2.3.1 January 2003 Paragraph related to MWG composition added to require an adequate 
knowledge/experience from people involved in the activity. 
 
2-2.3.1 January 2003 Table with the allocation of ATA chapters to MWGs modified to ensure consistency. 
NOTE added. 
 
2-2.3.1 June 2003 Name of the MWG 9 reworded ‘Interior’ instead of ‘Payload’ 
2-2.3.1 January 2004 Structure analysis of ATA 71-80 transferred from MWG3 to MWG 5. 
2-2.3.1 April 2004 Pylon drains analysis of ATA 54 transferred from MWG3 to MWG 9. 
2-2.3.3 January 2003 Function a). 'ISC' removed (mistake). 
2-2.3.3 January 2003 Functions c) and g) revised. New functions n) and o) added. 
2-2.3.3 January 2003 Two new types of data to be presented by the MWG Chair to ISC added: i) and j). 
2-2.3.3 April 2003 Function q) added to ensure structure specialists representation at MWG3 and MWG8 
when dealing with structure MSG-3 analysis. 
 
2-2.3.3 June 2003 Revision of functions g) and m) ’ 
2-2.3.3 January 2004 Revise paragraph m) to specify the preparation of two MWG reports 
2-3 
2-3.1 
2-3.2 
April 2003 Training paragraph enhanced with ‘personnel requiring training’ and ‘training content’ 
2-3.3 June 2003 New paragraph to address training sessions. 
2-3.3 January 2004 Addition of zonal analysis training schedule 
2-4.4 January 2003 Paragraph added to request the use of 'Transfer Sheets' between MWGs. Reference to 
the form added. 
 
2-4.4 April 2004 Clarification of data requirements for task transfers to the Zonal Working Group 
(MWG 6) 
2-5.3 April 2004 Clarification of the analysis issue. 
2-5.4.1 January 2003 Paragraph reviewed. 
2-5.4.1 April 2003 Statement added to improve the management of the ISC action items. 
2-5.4.1 June 2003 Added method of identifying ISC action items and editorial change re: required action 
prior to meeting adjournment and maintaining visibility of closed action items. 
2-5.4.1 January 2004 Added Appendix G as reference for meeting report content. 
2-5.4.2 January 2003 Paragraph reviewed. 
2-5.4.2 April 2003 Statement added to improve the management of the MWG open items. 
2-5.4.2 June 2003 Added method of identifying MWG open items and editorial change re: required action 
prior to meeting adjournment and maintaining visibility of closed action items. 
2-5.4.2 January 2004 Addition of MWG Chair Report 
2-7.2.3 April 2004 Clarification of the status of the MRBR TR 
2-7.2.3 July 2004 MRBR TR process amended 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 History of Changes- PAGE: HOC-3
 DATE : June 2006
 
3-3.2 October 
2005 
Incorporation of freighter applicabilities 
3-3.3 June 2003 LROPS requirements addressed in section 7-5 
3-3.3.1 March 2005 Paragraph concerning the purpose of the PPH amended 
3-3.4 
3-3.4.1 
April 2003 Paragraph about modification tracking deeply reviewed 
3-3.4 June 2003 Statement regarding traceability of design changes. 
3-3.4 January 2004 Section restructured to incorporate a more comprehensive description and to refer to the 
new Mod review process. 
3-3.4.1 June 2003 Revision of the modification review process 
3-3.4.2.1 January 2004 MFU process paragraph updated. 
3-3.4.2.1 April 2004 MFU process paragraph updated. 
3-3.4.2.4 January 2004 Deletion of MFU record table reference Notes. 
3-3.4.2.4 April 2004 Paragraph creation concerning Mod prioritisation for MRBR Revision.. 
3-3.4.2.6 April 2004 Creation of an additional paragraph called “Modification Review Process for Major 
Suppliers”. 
3-3-4.2.6 July 2004 Reference for Rolls Royce MFU process added 
3-3.5 April 2003 ‘Assumptions affecting analysis’ chapter added. 
3-3.5 January 2004 Added reference to MSG3 Analysis Status List in Appendix B 
3-3.6 June 2006 Incorporate newly approved text for EASA Policy on Fuel Tank System Ignition Source 
Prevention requirements 
3-4 January 2004 Clarification of aircraft utilisation assumptions. 
3-5 January 2003 Terms related to 'Maintenance Check / Event' deleted, as intervals do not imply a 
type/level of maintenance and it could be confusing. 
 
3-5 January 2003 Last paragraph revised and completed. 
3-5 April 2003 Introduced greater flexibility in interval selection 
3-5 June 2003 Additional usage parameters incorporated. 
3-5 January 2004 Clarification of maintenance interval and design objectiveswith respect to fatigue and 
environmental damage. 
3-6 March 2005 SFAR 88 Ignition Prevention paragraph created 
4-4 June 2003 The roles and the responsibilities of OAM and OEM were clarified. 
4-4.1 January 2003 PPH references for several working steps added/changed 
4-4.1 April 2003 Clarification added regarding administrative pages 
4-4.1 January 2004 Changed PPH-reference for step 1.5 
4-4.2 January 2003 Clarification added regarding History of Changes sheet 
4-4.2 April 2003 Clarification added regarding administrative pages and reference to the substantiation of 
fault-tolerant functions deleted 
4-4.2 January 
2004 
Added reference to modification data in step 2.2 
4-4.3 April 2004 Added reference to the need for interval justification in steps 3.4 and 3.7. 
4-4.4 January 2003 PPH reference for one working step added 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
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DATE : June 2006 
 
4-4.4 April 2003 Statement regarding dispatch of analyses changed from “4 weeks prior to meeting” to 
“sufficiently in advance of meeting” 
4-4.4 June 2003 Reference to Paragraph 2-5.3 made in order to clarify when the analysis data for a 
meeting need to be dispatched. 
4-4.5 January 2003 PPH reference for one working step added 
4-4.5 January 2003 Clarification added that History of Changes needs to be established when reworking an 
analysis. 
 
4-4.5 April 2003 Clarification added regarding administrative pages (Step 5-6) 
4-4.5 January 2004 Changed PPH-reference for steps 5.1 to 5.5 
4-4.6 January 2003 PPH references for two working steps added/changed. 
4-4.6 January 2003 Statement added that MRBR Interface sheet is to be used for ISC review of MWG 
results. 
 
4-4.6 Junel 2003 Correction of MRBR acronym (Step 6.2) 
4-5.1 April 2003 Clarification added that MSI selection does not have to be revised after completion of 
MSI analysis and that this is an optional step only. 
4-5.1 June 2003 Need for keeping the MSI selection up-to-date was stressed. Distinction made to case 
where selection data are revised solely for the purpose of bring selection and analysis 
results in agreement with each other. 
4-5.1 March 2005 Step 2 of the MSI Selection process amended 
4-5.1 October 2005 Reference the MSI Validation List for new A380 models, at the end of this paragraph. 
4-5.2 January 2003 Example of MSI Selection sheet added. 
 
4-5.2 April 2003 Paragraph split into 4-5.2.1, 4-5.2.2, 4-5.2.3 and 4-5.2.4. 
4-5.2.1 April 2003 Statement added to clarify that ATA-chapters not containing any hardware do not have 
to be listed. 
4-5.2.1 April 2003 Statement about justification of items not selected as MSI transferred to the new 
paragraph 4-5.2.4. 
4-5.2.1 June 2003 1st paragraph reworded in order to bring it in line with wording in paragraph 4-5.1. 
4-5.2.1.1 
 
October 2005 (Items on Selection List) transferred from 4-5.2.2 (old) 
4-5.2.1.2 October 2005 (Determination of Analysis Level) transferred from 4-5.2.3 
4-5.2.1.3 October 2005 (Justification of Items not Selected) transferred from 4-5.2.4 
4-5.2.2 April 2003 Clarification added that components only have to be listed if no MSI analysis has been 
selected at the level of the sub-sub-system and at higher levels. 
4-5.2.2 April 2003 Statement added that items not installed or not applicable but covered in the ATA-
breakdown do not need to be covered in the MSI selection. 
4-5.2.2 
(old) 
 
October 2005 (Items on Selection List) renumbered as 4-5.2.1.1 
4-5.2.2 
(new) 
October 2005 New subject (MSI Validation List) added to 4-5.2.2 
4-5.2.2.1 October 2005 New subject (General) added to 4-5.2.2.1 
4-5.2.2.2 October 2005 New subject (Data to be Entered) added to 4-5.2.2.2 
4-5.2.2.3 October 2005 New subject (Additional Guidance) added to 4-5.2.2.3 
4-5.2.3 April 2003 Clarified that for every item on the selection list, a statement is given in either the column 
“MSI” or in the column “Highest Manageable Level”. Example page modified 
accordingly. 
4-5.2.3 April 2003 Statement added to clarify the handling of items used for maintenance purposes only 
and therefore do not need to be analyzed. 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 History of Changes- PAGE: HOC-5
 DATE : June 2006
 
4-5.2.3 October 2005 (Determination of Analysis Level) renumbered as 4-5.2.1.2 and paragraph number 
4-5.2.3 deleted 
4-5.2.4 April 2003 Modified statement about justification of items not selected as MSI transferred from 
paragraph 4-5.2.1. 
4-5.2.4 October 2005 (Justification of Items not Selected) renumbered as 4-5.2.1.3 and paragraph number 
4-5.2.4 deleted 
4-5.3 January 2003 Paragraphs about revision and applicability control added 
4-5.3 April 2003 Clarification added that any suitable identification letter can be used to differentiate 
between the different selection lists for the same ATA-chapter (as in the case of the 
engines). 
4-5.3 June 2003 Statement on MSI selection cover sheet changed to clarify that the sheet should state 
the aircraft models covered by the selection document, not the model definitions. 
4-5.3 October 2005 Incorporation of freighter applicabilities. 
4-6 April 2003 Statement about a “modified analysis process for fault-tolerant functions” changed to 
“guidance on how to handle fault-tolerant functions” 
4-6 January 2004 Statement for content of paragraph 4-6 was corrected (taking into account that 
paragraphs 4-6.1.2 and 4-6.1.3 were transferred to paragraph 4-7). 
4-6.1 January 2004 Title of paragraph 4-6.1.1 was deleted (paragraph 4-6.1.1 becomes 4-6.1). 
4-6.1.2 (old) January 2004 Complete paragraph (including sub-paragraphs) was transferred to paragraph 4-7.2. 
4-6.1.2.2 April 2003 Second paragraph deleted referring to the need for a specific analysis methodology for 
fault-tolerant functions. 
4-6.1.2.3 January 2003 Clarification added that fault-tolerance method may only be used if sufficient 
substantiation is provided in Data Sheet A. 
 
4-6.1.2.3 January 2003 Reference to task effectiveness criteria in paragraph 4-6.6.1.2 added. 
4-6.1.2.3 April 2003 Paragraph significantly changed and all statements referring to a separate 
analysis methodology for fault-tolerant functions deleted. 
4-6.1.2.3 June 2003 Last paragraph reformatted. 
4-6.1.3 January 2004 Complete paragraph (including sub-paragraphs) was transferred to paragraph 4-7.3. 
4-6.1.3.2 June 2003 Reference to a certain number of AFDX switches deleted and spelling mistake 
(analogue) corrected. 
4-6.1.3.3 April 2003 Requirement for an additional work sharing and consequences-of-failure matrix 
in MSI analysis for ATA 42 added. 
4-6.2.1 January 2003 Paragraph added on how to state the applicability of the analysis on the Cover sheet. 
4-6.2.1 June 2003 Clarification provided that aircraft models quoted are passenger aircraft models only. 
4-6.2.1 October 2005 Incorporation of freighter applicabilities 
4-6.2.4 April 2004 Clarified the use of the “History of Changes” sheet 
4-6.3.3 January 2003 Statement added that modifications covered by analysis must be listed in Data Sheet A 
4-6.3.3 January 2003 Statement added that fault-tolerance substantiation must include data on indications 
when redundancy has degraded. 
 
4-6.3.3 April 2003 Statement regarding assumption transferred section 3 paragraph 3.5. 
4-6.3.3 June 2003 Clarification provided that paragraph 3.5 referred to in previous change is in Section 3 of 
PPH. 
4-6.3.3 January 2004 Information added about modification details to be provided in Data Sheet A. 
Clarification provided that more detailed data for fault-tolerant functions in Data Sheet A 
is optional (as the same method is used for all functions, including those that are fault-
tolerant). 
4-6.3.3 April 2004 Changed wording regarding modification data by referring to chapter 3-3.5 of the PPH. 
Added clarification that all failure causes need to be adequately covered in the Data 
Sheet A. 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURESHANDBOOK 
 
HOC - PAGE: 6 REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02
DATE : June 2006 
 
4-6.3.3 June 2006 Clarification of how a new Model is reflected in Data Sheet A 
4-6.4.1 June 2006 Clarification of how a new Model is reflected in Data Sheet B 
4-6.4.2 April 2003 Statement added that functions used for maintenance purposes only do not need to be 
covered in the analysis. 
4-6.4.2 April 2003 Statement referring to the need of separately identifying fault-tolerant functions by means 
of “FTF” deleted. 
4-6.4.2 June 2003 Handling of maintenance functions clarified (to be stated on Data Sheet B but without 
Level 1 or 2 analysis). 
4-6.4.2 March 2005 Selection of function concerning Ignition prevention included 
4-6.4.3 April 2003 Sentence requiring at least one functional failure for fault-tolerant functions deleted. 
4-6.4.4 April 2003 Clarification added on how to state failure effects for functional failures that the later 
analysis proves to be hidden. 
4-6.4.5 April 2003 Sentence requiring at least one failure cause for functional failures associated with fault-
tolerant functions deleted. 
4-6.4.5 April 2004 Clarification provided for failure causes in other MSIs/ATA-chapters. 
4-6.5.2 January 2003 New heading for paragraph 4-6.5.2 introduced; all subparagraphs of paragraph 6.5.2 
renumbered. 
 
4-6.5.2 January 2003 References mentioned in paragraph 4-6.5.2 corrected 
4-6.5.2.1 January 2004 Reference to paragraph dealing with BITE changed from 4-6.5.3 to 4-7.1. 
4-6.5.2.2 January 2004 Reference to paragraph 4-6.5.5.1 changed to 4-6.5.4.1. 
4-6.5.2.3 January 2004 Reference to paragraphs 4-6.5.5.4 and 4-6.5.5.5 changed to 4-6.5.4.4and 4-6.5.4.5. 
4-6.5.2.3 April 2004 Clarification provided regarding the need to state the “additional failure” when answering 
Level 1 question 3. 
4-6.5.2.4 January 2004 Reference to paragraphs 4-6.5.5.2 and 4-6.5.5.3 changed to 4-6.5.4.2and 4-6.5.4.3. 
4-6.5.3 January 2003 Paragraph 4-6.5.2 and all subparagraphs renumbered 
4-6.5.3 (old) January 2004 Complete paragraph (including sub-paragraphs) transferred to paragraph 4-7.1. 
4-6.5.3.2 January 2003 Minor correction of text 
4-6.5.3.4 April 2003 Clarification added to definition of failure class 4: Indication to the flight crew is not given 
at the exact time determined by the SSA but at an earlier period fixed by operational 
considerations. Minor correction added to definition of failure class 6. 
4-6.5.3 
(new) 
January 2004 Paragraph 4-6.5.4 (old) renumbered 4-6.5.3. 
4-6.5.4 January 2003 Paragraph 4-6.5.3 renumbered 
4-6.5.4 
(new) 
January 2004 Paragraph 4-6.5.5 (old) renumbered 4-6.5.4 (including all sub-paragraphs and figure 
references). 
4-6.5.4 (old) January 2004 Paragraph renumbered (now 4-6.5.3). 
4-6.5.5 January 2003 Paragraph 4-6.5.4 and all subparagraphs renumbered 
4-6.5.5(old) January 2004 Paragraph renumbered (now 4-6.5.4). 
4-6.6.1.2 January 2003 Effectiveness criteria for failure-finding tasks in fault-tolerant applications added 
4-6.6.1.2 April 2003 Effectiveness criteria for failure-finding tasks in fault-tolerant applications deleted 
4-6.6.1.2 April 2003 Minor reformatting of several statements under “Additional Guidance”. 
4-6.6.1.3 June 2003 Explanations about the ‘touching’ distance restriction of the GVI 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 History of Changes- PAGE: HOC-7
 DATE : June 2006
 
4-6.6.1.3 January 2004 Minor change of text regarding explanations about the ‘touching’ distance restriction for 
GVIs. 
4-6.6.1.6 April 2003 Statement added on how to justify non-selection of a task in FEC 8. 
4-6.6.2 April 2003 Clarification added that level 2 analyses for different failure causes can only be made on 
the same page if they belong to the same functional failure. 
4-6.6.2 April 2003 Reference to specific effectiveness criteria for failure finding tasks associated with fault-
tolerant functions deleted. 
4-6.6.2 April 2003 Clarification added for data required for tasks that are to be transferred to Zonal 
Program. 
4-6.6.2 April 2004 Statement added that interval justification needs to be provided on the Level 2 sheets 
4-6.7.1 April 2004 Statement added about the need for interval justification 
4-6.7.2 January 2003 Clarification added that specification requirements cannot be the only justification for 
interval selection 
 
4-6.7.2 April 2003 Wording regarding the use of specification requirements changed: Requirements are not 
to be considered as compulsory but as “validated”. 
4-6.7.3 April 2003 Statement added that a secondary usage parameter should always be stated in 
the analysis. 
4-6.7.3 June 2003 Clarification that usage parameters different from the ones quoted may be 
used. 
4-6.7.3 January 2004 Explanations about the second usage parameter 
4-6.7.3 April 2004 Minor clerical corrections made. 
4-6.7.6 April 2004 Paragraph regarding interval justification deleted. 
4-6.7.6 July 2004 Paragraph regarding policy to be used to take into account corrosion on systems added 
4-6.7.6 December 
2004 
Paragraph added to address other factors influencing task interval. 
4-6.8 January 2003 New paragraphs added to highlight the need for acceptance/approval of any sampling 
procedure 
 
4-6.9.2 April 2003 Clarification added that zonal task reference needs to be added to MRBR Interface 
sheet when available. 
4-6.9.2 April 2004 Statement added regarding the need for ISC approval of combined tasks. 
4-6.9.2 March 2005 Policy of the system MRBR task numbering included 
4-6.9.2 February 
2006 
Policy to consolidate tasks from different MSIs 
4-6.9.2 June 2006 • Policy to accomplish tasks in conjunction with other ones. 
• Policy to utilise Months (MO) as the unique usage parameter 
• Policy on reflecting task transfers to the Zonal Program in the MRBR Interface 
Sheet 
• Clarification on identifying the A380-800F in the MRBR Interface Sheet 
4-6.9.3 April 2003 Statement added: Reason why the predominant usage parameter was chosen and what 
the secondary usage parameter was is to be added to the field “Interval Justification”. 
4-6.9.3 June 2003 Clarification provided regarding the purpose of the planning data on the Task Data sheet 
and about the fact that the figures quoted do not include access and preparation times. 
4-6.9.3 April 2004 Statements added about the need for interval justification if tasks are combined. 
4-7 (old) January 2004 Paragraph 4-7 (old) renumbered 4-8 (including all sub-paragraphs). 
4-7.1 January 2003 New paragraph for Change Control added 
4-7.2 January 2003 Paragraph renumbered 
4-7.2 January 2003 Clarification that applicability "All" only refers to passenger (not freighter) aircraft 
4-7.3/4/5/6 January 2003 Paragraphs renumbered 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
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4-7.6 June 2003 Reference to A380-800F deleted. 
4-7 (new) January 2004 New paragraph created as repository for procedures on BITE/failure classes (4-7.1), 
fault-tolerance analysis (4-7.2) and IMA (4-7.3). 
4-7.1 January 2004 New paragraph for procedures on “BITE, Monitoring, Tests and Failure Classes” 
(formerly in paragraph 4-6.5.3). 
4-7.1.1 January 2004 Clarification added that the maintenance of the avionics systems on A380 is primarily 
based on the failure detection capabilities of Built-In Test Equipment and that faults or 
failures detected by BITE result in failure messages that will be used to provide the 
necessary indications to the operating crew (and that will also be sent to the Centralized 
Maintenance System (CMS)). 
4-7.1.4 January 2004 Clarification added that any failure detected by BITE is covered by a failure message 
that can be used to trigger an indication to the operating crew (if required) and that will 
also be transmitted to the Centralized Maintenance System. Definition of all failure 
classes was amended by replacing “indication” with “effect”. Definition of failure class 2 
was changed bydeletion of the reference to “safety repercussions as per SSA”. 
4-7.1.5 January 2004 Statement added that for Failure Classes 1, 2 and 3, it must be ascertained that the 
indication provided to the crew is indeed such that it is definitely noted by the crew. 
Otherwise, the functional failure needs to be treated as a hidden failure. 
4-7.1.6 January 
2004 
New paragraph added dealing with selection of tasks that make use of the Centralized 
Maintenance System. 
4-7.2 January 2004 New paragraph for procedures regarding systems with fault-tolerant functions (formerly 
in paragraph 4-6.1.2). 
4-7.2.2 January 
2004 
Replacement of the term OMS by the term CMS. 
4-7.2.3 January 
2004 
Additional clarification provided to stress that method for analysis of fault-tolerant 
functions is the same as the one used for all other functions. Deletion of paragraph that 
can be interpreted to refer to separate method. 
4-7.3 January 2004 Paragraph for procedures on Integrated Modular Avionics (formerly in 4-6.1.3) was 
transferred to 4-7.3.. 
4-7.3 January 2004 The entire paragraph was reworked on the basis of experience gained with the 
establishment of IMA-related analyses and the results of the 3rd ISC-meeting. 
4-7.3.2.3 December 
2004 
Table amended for CPIOM-F and CPIOM-G, and addition of the FQMS for CPIOM-F 
4-7.3.3.3 April 2004 Statement added about the handling of failure causes in other MSIs if one of the 
possible failure causes is a CPIOM. 
4-8 January 2003 Paragraph split into 4-8.1 and 4-8.2. Last two paragraphs are now in 4-8.1. Two new 
paragraphs added at the end of 4-8.2. 
 
4-8 April 2003 Minor change to title of paragraph. 
4-8 (old) January 2004 Paragraph 4-8 (old) renumbered 4-9 (including all sub-paragraphs). 
4-8.1 January 2003 Statements added stressing the importance of tracking assumptions and concerns 
raised by ISC and MRB advisers. 
 
4-8-1 March 2005 Change control of MSI analysis amended. 
4-8.2 October 2005 Incorporation of freighter activities 
4-8.3 January 2003 New paragraph added on administrative aspects of systems working group activity. 
4-8.3 March 2005 Page numbering of MSI analysis amended. 
4-8.6 October 2005 Removal of A380-800 Model from Part 5 of the table 
4-8 (new) January 2004 Paragraph 4-7 (old) renumbered 4-8 (including all sub-paragraphs). 
4-9 (old) January 2004 Paragraph 4-9 (old) renumbered 4-10. 
4-9 (new) January 2004 Paragraph 4-8 (old) renumbered 4-9 (including all sub-paragraphs). 
4-9.3 January 2004 Addition of Appendix B reference for MSG3 Analysis Status List 
4-10 (new) January 2004 Paragraph 4-9 (old) renumbered 4-10. 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 History of Changes- PAGE: HOC-9
 DATE : June 2006
 
4-10 March 2005 Definition of fuel ALIs included following SFAR 88 requirements 
5 April 2003 Acronym ‘DI’ is replaced by ‘DET’ in several paragraphs to put it line with the agreed 
acronym to be used. 
5-2.1 January 2003 Last paragraph deleted. CPCP details included in the relevant paragraphs. 
5-2.3 January 2003 Glare' is declared as metallic material in order to avoid misunderstandings and confusion 
with 'non-metallic' definition. 
5-2.4 December 
2004 
Amendment to the Environmental Deterioration definition 
5-3.1 January 2003 Paragraph added for SSIs containing 'metallic' and 'non-metallic' structure. 
5-3.3 January 2003 New paragraph added to include documentation process. 
5-4.4 January 2003 Step 4.2 amended: Form Sheet STR14a added (LEP). 
5-4.6 June 2003 The paragraph has been modified such that the main text under “What” refers directly to 
paragraph 2-5.3. 
5-6.1.1 January 2003 Paragraph added on how to state the applicability of the analysis on the SSD Cover 
sheet. 
5-6.1.1 October 2005 Incorporation of freighter applicabilities 
5-6.1.4 January 2003 Description of List of Effective SSI Analyses revised to include the 'Issue Number'. 'SSI 
Description' changed to 'SSI Title'. 
5-6.2.2 January 2003 
June 2003 
Statement added that modifications relevant and covered by the analysis must be listed 
in the Supporting Data Sheet. 
5-8.1.3 January 2003 Paragraph describing an individual List of Effective Pages for the SSI added. 
5-8.2.5 March 2005 Explanation of the meaning of the Note D1. 
5-8.2.7 January 2003 Glare' is mentioned as metallic material. 
5-8.2.8 January 2004 Paragraph added to list attaching and/or connecting elements under the related SSI, 
where appropriate. 
5-8.2.9 January 2004 Paragraph slightly modified to emphasize that ‘interactive or adjacent parts must be 
identified. 
5-8.2.10 January 2004 Paragraph added to identify areas where specified protection schemes have been 
replaced during assembly. 
5–8.3.3 January 2004 Lightning strike transferred from f) to g) ”weather effects” and ‘rain’ is deleted from 
“weather effects”, f)g)h)I) re-identified. 
5-8.5.4 April 2003 Error in the flow chart. ‘… on SSR?’ is added to the third question. 
5-8.6.1 December 
2004 
Amendment to the Environmental Deterioration definition 
5-8.6.3 December 
2004 
Definition of the galvanic couple to use for the galvanic rating 
5-8.6.4.1 January 2004 Definition of Galvanic corrosion revised, crevice corrosion redefined and highlighted, 
galvanic corrosion rating table updated. 
5-8.6.4.1 April 2004 Definition of Galvanic corrosion revised, galvanic corrosion rating table updated. 
5-8.6.4.1 December 
2004 
Definition of Galvanic corrosion revised and incorporation of rules. 
5-8.6.4.1 March 2005 Definition of Galvanic corrosion revised in case of AD and incorporation of rules. 
5-8.6.4.1 February 
2006 
Galvanic rating table amended 
5-8.6.4.1 June 2006 Galvanic rating table amended 
5 - 8.6.4.3. January 2004 ‘Hydraulic fluid spillages’ and ‘rain water at entrance areas’ added as examples of 
environmental rating ‘2’. 
5-8.6.4.3. December 
2004 
Environmental rating table amended with new criteria 
5-8.6.4.3. February 
2006 
Environmental rating table amended with new criteria 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
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DATE : June 2006 
 
5-8.6.4.4 December 
2004 
Protection Rating table amended 
5 - 8.6.4.6 January 2004 Crevice corrosion is added to the combination of ratings chart. 
5-8.6.5 December 
2004 
Limit the CPCP parts of the ED/CPCP analysis to the “in service “ experience 
5-8.6.7. January 2004 TPS code explanation added. 
5-8.6.8. January 2004 Paragraph added to state that no sampling is allowed whenever TPS is required. 
5-8.7.1.2 June 2006 Environmental parameter paragraph amended 
5-8.9.1 April 2003 Reference to the SCCC is included. 
5-8.9.1 June 2003 Text explaining the concept and definition of ‘independent’ fatigue inspection 
requirements. 
5-8.9.3.5 April 2003 Typing error. Rating 4. In the ‘examples’ column, it should read:’… ten (10) centimetres 
square’, instead of ‘… ten (10) square centimetres’. 
5-8.9.3.3 June 2003 Explanations about the ‘touching’ distance restriction of the GVI. 
5-8.9.4 April 2003 Typing error. The wording below the chart has been revised in accordance with the 
nomenclature used inside the chart. 
5-8.9.5 April 2003 Weight Variants and modifications are mentioned as a possibility in the ‘applicability’ 
affecting the fatigue damage requirement. 
5-8.9.6 June 2003 On fatigue damage analysis flow chart DI replaced by DET. 
5-9.2.4 June 2003 Explanations about the ‘touching’ distance restriction of the GVI. 
5-9.5.2 January 2003 Paragraph slightly modified to reflect the place where the MPP reference is to be found. 
5-9.5.2 December 
2004 
Amendment to remove the link to the MPP reference to be in line with the new structure 
format 
5-9.6 December 
2004 
SSI consolidation chart amended 
5-9.7 June 2006 Policy to accomplish tasks in conjunction with other ones. 
5-9.7.2 December 
2004 
MPP Task reference paragraph removed to be in line with the new structure format. 
5-9.7.2 March 2005 MRBR Task numbering rule included5-9.7.7 March 2005 Definition of the meaning of YE 
5-9.7.7 June 2006 Policy to utilise Months (MO) as the unique usage parameter 
5-9.7.8 March 2005 Definition of the meaning of YE 
5-9.7.8 June 2006 Policy to utilise Months (MO) as the unique usage parameter 
5-9.7.9 March 2005 Definition of the meaning of YE 
5-9.7.9 June 2006 Policy to utilise Months (MO) as the unique usage parameter 
5-9.8 June 2003 Clarification about the purpose of the planning data on the Task Data sheet. 
5-10.1 January 2003 Explanation of applicability control revised to put it in line with Systems. 
5-10.1 October 2005 Incorporation of freighter applicabilities 
5-10.2 January 2003 Numbering of Analysis Forms revised to include an individual LEP for the SSI Analysis. 
5-10.2 April 2003 Numbering of Analysis Form STR09. Note ‘Reserved’ changed to ‘Deleted’ to avoid 
confusion. 
6-2 June 2003 Abbreviations corrected to 3 letters 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 History of Changes- PAGE: HOC-11
 DATE : June 2006
 
6-3.1 June 2003 Abbreviations corrected to 3 letters 
6-3.2 January 2004 Reference of the consolidation procedure added to the flow chart. 
6-4.1 January 2004 Revision of the column MSG3 form. 
6-4.2 January 2004 Assurance plan coordination not applicable to initial L/HIRF analysis. 
6-4.3 January 2004 Revision of the column MSG3 form. 
6-4.4 June 2003 The paragraph has been modified such that the main text under “What” refers directly to 
paragraph 2-5.3. 
6-4.4 January 2004 Paragraph “Preparation for review” totally revised 
6-4.5 January 2003 Step 5.1 - 'On aircraft review during last MWG meeting' added. 
6-4.5 January 2004 Revision of the column MSG3 form. 
6-4.6 January 2004 Revision of the column “remarks”. 
6-5.1 January 2004 Administrative data paragraph totally revised. 
6-5.1.1 January 2003 Fifth paragraph is amended. 
6-5.1.1 
6-5.1.2 
6-5.1.3 
January 2004 Wording improvements. 
6-5.2 
6-5.2.1 
6-5.2.2 
January 2004 Wording improvements. 
6-5.3.1 January 2003 Wording added for Installed wiring (Location and Route). 
6-5.3.1 January 2003 Reference to paragraph 6-5.5.2 deleted). 
6-5.3.1 January 2004 Wiring route ‘M’ added. 
6-5.3.1 April 2004 Wiring “listed and evaluated” instead of “inspected”. 
6-5.3.1 July 2004 Route identification explained 
6-5.3.2 January 2004 • Question 2, 3, 4, and 5. Wording improvement. 
• Steps 6, 7, 8 and 9. Explanations about the use of the form sheets in case of further 
items. 
• Possibility to integrate photos from legacy aircraft. 
6-5.4.1 January 2004 Wording improvement. 
6-5.4.2 January 2003 Some guidance related to 'Importance' has been added to 'Step 3 and 5'. 
6-5.4.2 June 2003 Explanations about the ‘touching’ distance restriction of the GVI 
6-5.4.2 January 2004 • New Standard Zonal Analysis flow chart with deletion of questions 2 and 4 
• New rating table 
• Clarification about question 6 
6-5.4.2 April 2004 ‘Steps 3 and 5’ – Guidance for assessment of importance for fuel tank zones 
added/changed. 
6-5.4.2 February 
2006 
Statement for insulation added 
6-5.5.1 January 2004 New Enhanced Zonal Analysis flow chart. 
6-5.5.1 April 2004 Add of the AC120-XX as a referential for Enhanced Zonal Information. 
6-5.5.1 December 
2004 
Amendment to take into account the L/HIRF protection 
6-5.5.2 June 2003 Abbreviations corrected to 3 letters 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
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DATE : June 2006 
 
6-5.5.2 January 2004 • Clarification about the identification of zones containing wiring 
Question 1 - Title revised. 
6-5.5.2 January 2004 • Instructions revised to reflect updated flow chart in Figure 4. 
6-5.5.2 April 2004 • Question 1 - Manufacturer proposal to re-valuate initial Enhanced tasks after 6-12Y 
added. Combustibility guidance for hydraulic fluid revised. Data amendment for the 
question 1 & 4 for accumulation of combustible material. 
• Question 4 - 5mm accumulation guidance removed. 
• Step 5 - GVI and stand alone GVI levels clarified. 
6-5.5.2 July 2004 Paragraph added for dust accumulation 
6-5.5.2 February 
2006 
Addition of the number of aircraft for the assurance plan 
6-5.5.3 January 2003 Some guidance and information added to 'Environment' under 'Step 6'. 
6-5.5.3 January 2003 Note added at the end of the paragraph requiring justification when interval selected 
differs from guidance matrix. 
6-5.5.3 January 2003 Paragraphs renumbered. 
6-5.5.3 June 2003 Explanations about the ‘touching’ distance restriction of the GVI. 
6-5.5.3 January 2004 • Question 5 title revised and methodology to identify possible task combination 
amended. 
• Step6 - New rating table for interval determination. 
• Step 8 - Amendment of the rating table for task level identification. 
• Step 9 - New rating table for interval determination. 
6-5.5.3 April 2004 • Question 6 - Update of the definition of “high”, “medium” and “low” potential effect of 
fire on adjacent wiring and systems in the zone. 
• Step 9 – Table updated potential effect of fire on adjacent wiring and systems in the 
area. 
6-5.5.3 July 2004 Amendment for the potential effect of fire on wiring systems 
6-5.6 March 2005 Amendment of the possible causes of protection elements degradation 
6-5.6.1 January 2003 Last paragraph of 5-6.2 added to this paragraph. 
6-5.6.1 January 2003 Assurance plan statement transferred chapter 7-4. 
6-5.6.1 April 2004 • Zonal L/HIRF analysis scope clarified. 
• Airbus Zonal L/HIRF analysis policy adoption of MSG3 clarified. 
6-5.6.2 January 2003 Complete paragraph deleted. This information is now in paragraph 7-4. 
6-5.6.2 January 2004 • New L/HIRF Zonal analysis flow chart. 
• New rating table. 
6-5.6.2.1 June 2003 Explanations about the ‘touching’ distance restriction of the GVI. 
6-5.6.2.1 June 2003 Abbreviations corrected to 3 letters 
6-5.6.2.1 January 2004 • Question 1. Inspection level determination revised. 
• Step 2. New rating table for interval determination. 
• Step 4. Explanation about FNC 
• Question 6. Improvements. 
6-5.6.2.1 April 2004 • Question 1 changed to read Step 1. 
• Density of equipment – “raceways” deleted and “congested” changed to “high”. 
• Amendment of the L/HIRF protection deterioration criteria. 
• Step 2 – Title changed to “Determine GVI task interval”. 
• Step 4 – Functional Check selection option included for initial programme and 
Inspection Level selection rating replaced with pure guidance and link L/HIRF 
functional check with the Airbus assurance plan added. 
6-5.6.2.1 March 2005 • Fire deleted of the potential effect of L/HIRF deterioration. 
• Definition of the L/HIRF protection deterioration criteria amended 
6-5.6.2.1 February 
2006 
• “L/HIRF protection deterioration criteria” definition amended 
6-5.6.3 January 2003 Note added at the end of 'Step 2' paragraph requiring justification when interval selected 
differs from guidance matrix. 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 History of Changes- PAGE: HOC-13
 DATE : June 2006
 
6-5.6.3 January 2003 Last paragraph in 'Step 3' is deleted. 
6-5.6.3 January 2003 First paragraph in 'Step 4': 'interval' is changed to 'level' (mistake). 
6-5.6.3 January 2003 Paragraph added for Functional Check 'FNC' to highlight that it is to be selected only 
after Assurance Plan findings evaluation. 
6-6.1 April 2004 Reference to section 2 Chapter 4.4 for transfer requirement details added. 
6-6.2 June 2003 Abbreviations corrected to 3 letters 
6-6.2.1 April 2003 Consolidation. Sheets number removed 
6-6.2.1 June 2003 Abbreviations corrected to 3 letters 
6-6.2.1 March 2005 Deletion of the ZIP reference in the systems/powerplant transfers. 
6-6.2.1 March 2005 Deletion of the ZIP reference in the structure transfers. 
6-6.2.2 April 2003 Consolidation. Sheets number removed 
6-6.2.3 April 2003 Consolidation. Sheets number removed 
6-6.2.4 April 2003 Consolidation. Sheets number removed 
6-6.2.4 June 2003 SDETreplaced by FNC 
6-6.2.4 January 2004 Added note about FNC. 
6-6.2.4 April 2004 Removal of the note concerning the FNC. 
6-7.1 January 2003 Explanation of applicability control revised to put it in line with Systems. 
6-7 June 2003 Explanations about the Task Data sheet 
6-7 March 2005 Renumbered to include the new paragraph “MRBR Interface” 
6-7.1. 6 June 2006 Policy to accomplish tasks in conjunction with other ones. 
6-7.1.8 June 2006 Policy to utilise Months (MO) as the unique usage parameter 
6-8 April 2003 Headline. Word ‘meeting’ written after MWG, removed 
6-8 June 2003 Renumbered 
6-8 March 2005 Renumbered 
6-8.1 June 2003 Renumbered 
6-8.1 March 2005 Renumbered 
6-8.2 June 2003 Renumbered and reference to freighter removed 
6-8.2 March 2005 Renumbered 
6-9 June 2003 Renumbered 
6-9 March 2005 Renumbered 
6-9.1 October 2005 Incorporation of freighter applicabilities 
6-9.2 October 2005 Removal of the A380-800 Model. 
6-10 March 2005 Renumbered 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
HOC - PAGE: 14 REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02
DATE : June 2006 
 
7-2.1.2 January 2003 Last paragraph revised to include wording related to 'SSA/MSG-3 compatibility check'. 
7-3.3 January 2003 Specific document for this process is mentioned for reference. 
7.4 April 2003 L/HIRF sampling every Six years instead of Five years 
7-4 January 2003 Paragraph revised entirely. 
 
App. A-3 January 2003 The JAA AGM Sec.2, Part 2, Chapter 16 included is now a 'clean' version without 
identification of changes. 
 
App. B January 2003 New form added 'MWG Transfer Sheet' (TRS01). 
App. B January 2003 Structure Analysis Form STR08. 'Issue' column added.'SSI Description' changed to 'SSI 
Title'. 
 
App. B January 2003 New Form Sheet (STR14a). Individual LEP for SSI Analysis. 
App. B January 2003 Structure Analysis Forms for SSIs (STR22 and STR24) have been re-arranged. No 
thechnical content changed. 
 
App. B January 2003 Structure Analysis Forms for SSIs (STR13 to STR25). The footer has been slightly 
changed. 
 
App. B January 2003 Structure Analysis Form STR27. Order of 'MPP' column and 'SSI Requirement' column 
has been changed'. 
 
App. B April 2003 The Structure Analysis Forms have been amended to state ‘DET’ instead of ‘DI’, 
according to the acronym used in the PPH. 
 
App. B January 2003 Zonal/LHIRF Protection Analysis - Evaluation Sheet 2. Step 3 reworded to read:'3. Item 
Description'. According to modification of paragraph 6-5.6.3. 
 
App. B April 2003 MSG3 analysis form sheets added. 
Appendix B April 2003 Standard Zonal analysis evaluation sheet 1. Numbering of question revised 
Appendix B April 2003 L/HIRF protection analysis. Evaluation sheet 1 and 2. Interval determination rating table revised to be in accordance with the PPH 
Appendix B June 2003 SSI STR numbers added and MWG Transfer sheet added 
Appendix B June 2003 SSI STR numbers added and MWG Transfer sheet added 
Appendix B January 2004 Zonal analysis work sheets revised 
Appendix B January 2004 A380 MFU Record table added (Details TBD) 
Appendix B January 2004 MSG3 Analysis Status List added 
Appendix B January 2004 Enhanced Zonal Analysis evaluation sheet 1 revised 
Appnedix B April 2004 Enhanced and L/HIRF form sheets revised according to PPH changes. 
Appendix B April 2004 A380 MFU Record table added. 
Appendix B July 2004 Evaluation sheet 2 & 3 of the enhanced zonal amended 
Appendix B December 
2004 
Page 4.3.1 and 5.2.1 of the zonal form sheets amended 
Appendix B December 
2004 
New structure form sheets included 
Appendix B March 2005 Page 5.3.1, 5.4.1, 5.5.1 of the zonal form sheets amended. 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 History of Changes- PAGE: HOC-15
 DATE : June 2006
 
Appendix B March 2005 New system form sheets included 
Appendix B October 2005 MSI validation list layout included as item 7 
App. C April 2003 Corrosion Rating Tables added. 
App. C January 2004 Corrosion sensitivity ratings updated on pages C5, C10, C15, C20 and C34. 
App. C December 
2004 
Corrosion Rating Tables updated. 
App. C February 
2006 
Corrosion Rating Tables updated. 
App. D April 2003 The ‘Significant Structure Definition’ is amended to put it in line with the one included in 
the text of the PPH (paragraph 5-2.3). 
App D October 2005 Environmental deterioration definition amended 
App. D1 April 2003 GVI Stand-alone definition added 
App. D1 June 2006 Term added (Modification Follow-up) 
App. D2 June 2003 Acronyms added 
App. D2 January 2004 Acronyms added (ECAM, ADCN, V&V) 
App. D2 June 2006 Acronym added (MFU) 
App. E January 2003 Schedule added. 
App. F January 2003 New. Appendix created to include composition of MRB / ISC / WG. 
App. F April 2003 Organization revision (MRB composition, ISC composition) 
App. F June 2003 Name of the MWG 9 reworded ‘Interior’ instead of ‘Payload’. Revision of MRB and ISC 
composition. 
Appendix F January 2004 Revision of ISC. Operators and manufacturer Lists. 
Appendix F April 2004 Revision of ISC. Operators and manufacturer Lists. 
Appendix F December 2004 Revision of authorities (observers) Lists and MWG5 & MWG9 Chairperson name. 
Appendix F March 2005 Revision of authorities (observers) Lists. 
Appendix F June 2006 Update of Airworthiness Authorities/Airlines/ Airbus participants Lists. 
App. G June 2003 New appendix: Required data for MWG report to ISC 
App. G January 2004 Appendix expanded to include MWG meeting reports, MWG Chair reports and ISC meeting reports. 
App. G April 2004 MWG Chair reports contents to ISC updated. 
 
 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 Table of Contents - PAGE: TOC-1
 DATE : June 2006
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE DEVELOPMENT .................................1 
ACCEPTANCE LETTERS..................................................................................................................2 
RECORD OF REVISIONS ...........................................................................................................................4 
HISTORY OF CHANGES ....................................................................................................................1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................1 
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................. 1-1 
1 BACKGROUND.............................................................................................................................................. 1-1 
2 PURPOSE ....................................................................................................................................................... 1-1 
3 STANDARD OF MSG-3 REVISION................................................................................................................ 1-1 
4 AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................................ 1-1 
SECTION 2: ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.............................................................................. 2-1 
1 GENERAL ....................................................................................................................................................... 2-1 
2 ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................................................................ 2-3 
3 TRAINING....................................................................................................................................................... 2-9 
4 COMMUNICATION ..................................................................................................................................... 2-11 
5 MEETING ORGANIZATION AND MEETINGS REPORTS .........................................................................2-11 
6 MRB REPORT APPROVAL.......................................................................................................................... 2-13 
7 REVISION PROCESS ................................................................................................................................... 2-14 
SECTION 3: ANALYSIS PROCEDURE. GENERAL......................................................................................... 3-1 
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................ 3-1 
2 OBJECTIVES .................................................................................................................................................. 3-1 
3 SCOPE ............................................................................................................................................................ 3-2 
4 AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION ASSUMPTIONS................................................................................................. 3-11 
5 INTERVAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................................... 3-12 
SECTION 4: SYSTEMS AND POWERPLANT ANALYSIS PROCEDURE.................................................... 4-1 
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................ 4-1 
2 PRINCIPLES................................................................................................................................................... 4-1 
3 BASIC ANALYSIS PROCEDURE ................................................................................................................... 4-2 
4 DETAILED PROCEDURAL STEPS ............................................................................................................... 4-3 
5 MSI SELECTION ............................................................................................................................................ 4-7 
6 MSI ANALYSIS PROCEDURES ................................................................................................................... 4-15 
7 SUPPLEMENTARY METHODOLOGIES .................................................................................................... 4-55 
8 ANALYSIS ADMINISTRATION .................................................................................................................... 4-70 
9 MWG ANALYSIS REVIEW PROCEDURE .................................................................................................. 4-75 
10 INTERFACE WITH TYPE CERTIFICATION PROCESS ......................................................................... 4-77 
SECTION 5: STRUCTURE ANALYSIS PROCEDURE..................................................................................... 5-1 
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................ 5-1 
2 PRINCIPLES................................................................................................................................................... 5-1 
3 BASIC ANALYIS PROCEDURE ..................................................................................................................... 5-4 
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4 DETAILED PROCEDURAL STEPS ............................................................................................................... 5-7 
5 PROCEDURE FOR IDENTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURE................................................. 5-11 
6 SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURE DOSSIER DOCUMENTATION..................................................................... 5-15 
7 SSI IDENTIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................. 5-19 
8 SSI ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................................... 5-23 
9 SSI REQUIREMENTS CONSOLIDATION ................................................................................................... 5-62 
10 ANALYSIS ADMINISTRATION................................................................................................................. 5-69 
11 SAMPLING PROGRAM............................................................................................................................ 5-71 
12 MWG MEETING ANALYSIS REVIEW PROCEDURE ............................................................................. 5-71 
SECTION 6: ZONAL AND L/HIRF ANALYSIS PROCEDURE ....................................................................... 6-1 
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................ 6-1 
2 PRINCIPLES................................................................................................................................................... 6-1 
3 BASIC ANALYSIS PROCEDURE ................................................................................................................... 6-2 
4 DETAILED PROCEDURAL STEPS ............................................................................................................... 6-4 
5 ZONAL AND L/HIRF ANALYSIS PROCEDURE............................................................................................ 6-6 
6 CONSOLIDATION OF REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................... 6-30 
7 MRBR INTERFACE ...................................................................................................................................... 6-31 
8 TASK DATA................................................................................................................................................... 6-33 
9 ANALYSIS ADMINISTRATION..................................................................................................................... 6-33 
10 MWG ANALYSIS REVIEW PROCEDURE ............................................................................................... 6-35 
SECTION 7: TYPE CERTIFICATION INTERFACE ........................................................................................ 7-1 
1 GENERAL ....................................................................................................................................................... 7-1 
2 CERTIFICATION MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS (CMRs).................................................................... 7-1 
3 AIRWORTHINESS LIMITATION ITEMS (ALIs) ............................................................................................ 7-2 
4 L/HIRF ............................................................................................................................................................ 7-3 
5 LONG RANGE OPERATIONS (LROPS) ........................................................................................................ 7-4 
SECTION 8: RESERVED ...................................................................................................................................... A-1 
APPENDIX A: REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION............................................................................................ A-2 
1 GENERAL .......................................................................................................................................................A-2 
2 SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE RELATED JARs / FARs ..............................................................................A-2 
3 MAINTENANCE REVIEW BOARD PROCEDURES......................................................................................A-9 
4 MSG-3 REVISION 2002.1 .............................................................................................................................A-12APPENDIX B: A380 MSG-3 ANALYSIS FORM SHEETS ................................................................................ B-1 
1 MSI ..................................................................................................................................................................B-1 
2 SSI ...................................................................................................................................................................B-8 
3 Zonal & L/HIRF ............................................................................................................................................B-21 
4 Communication .............................................................................................................................................B-34 
5 Analysis Status List........................................................................................................................................B-35 
6 A380 MFU Record Table ..............................................................................................................................B-36 
7 A380 MSI Validation List Layout:.................................................................................................................B-37 
APPENDIX C: CORROSION RATING TABLES................................................................................................ C-1 
APPENDIX D: GLOSSARY, ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................. D-1 
1 GLOSSARY..................................................................................................................................................... D-1 
2 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................ D-6 
APPENDIX E: SCHEDULING ..............................................................................................................................E-1 
APPENDIX F: ORGANIZATION..........................................................................................................................F-1 
1 GENERAL .......................................................................................................................................................F-1 
2 MRB COMPOSITION .....................................................................................................................................F-1 
3 ISC COMPOSITION .......................................................................................................................................F-2 
APPENDIX G: REQUIRED DATA FOR MWG AND ISC MEETING REPORTS .................................................. G-1 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 1 - PAGE: 1-1
 DATE :June 2006
 
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
1 BACKGROUND 
The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) requirements and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations 
require Airbus -as the A380 type certificate holder- to prepare, revise as necessary, and submit for approval 
to the relevant Airworthiness Authorities the initial minimum scheduled maintenance/inspection requirements 
that are applicable to the A380 aircraft. 
These initial maintenance/inspection requirements are developed by members from a representative number 
of customer airlines, aircraft manufacturers and regulatory advisors who combine knowledge and experience 
with the final aim to compile a Maintenance Program Proposal (MPP) that is acceptable to the Maintenance 
Review Board (MRB). 
Once approved by the MRB, this proposal becomes the MRB Report (MRBR). 
2 PURPOSE 
The purpose of this Policy and Procedures Handbook (PPH) is to compile all the necessary information 
required by the relevant working bodies involved in the development of the A380 initial minimum scheduled 
maintenance/inspection requirements. 
This PPH sets forth the policies and details those procedures to be followed by the joint Airline/Manufacturer 
Working Groups (WGs), Industry Steering Committee (ISC) and Maintenance Review Board (MRB). 
3 STANDARD OF MSG-3 REVISION 
The document “Operator/Manufacturer Scheduled Maintenance Development”, as developed by the 
Maintenance Steering Group -3 Task Force (MSG-3), Revision 2002.1, published by the Air Transport 
Association of America (ATA) and referred to as ‘MSG-3 Rev.2002.1’ is the basis for the analysis procedures 
described in this PPH. 
Any reference within this PPH to the MSG-3 document must be understood, unless otherwise stated, as the 
MSG-3 Rev.2002.1 document. 
4 AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS 
The initial certification basis for the A380 aircraft regarding airworthiness standards for issue of type 
certificates are JAR 25 at Change 15 and 14 CFR part 25, (FAR 25) including Amendments 25-1 through 
25-98. 
JAR stands for Joint Aviation Requirements and JAR 25 is the European counterpart to Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FAR) 25. 
The JAR/FAR used for Type Certification of the A380 aircraft requires that maintenance information be 
established prior to delivery of the first aircraft. The particular requirements concerning maintenance 
programs are: 
 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
SECTION 1 - PAGE: 1-2 REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02
DATE : June 2006 
 
 
FAR/JAR Title 
25.1529 and Appendix H Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
25.571 Damage Tolerant and Fatigue Evaluation of Structure 
SFAR 88 Amdt 21-78 Fuel Tank Safety Special Federal Aviation Regulation 
25.981 Fuel Tank Ignition Prevention 
INT/POL/25/12 Fuel Tank Safety 
25.1309 Equipment, Systems and Installations 
EASA D 
2005/CPRO/RH/50213 
EASA policy statement on the Process for developing 
instructions for maintenance and inspection of fuel tank 
system ignition source prevention. Includes Guidance 
Material. 
EASA D 
2006/CPRO/LAP/PME/50761 
EASA policy statement on fuel tank safety 
(supersedes 50213 Part A and B). Guidance Material 
provided in 50213 remains valid. 
FAA Memo ANM 112-05-001 
6th Oct 04 
FAA policy statement to standardise guidance for compliance 
with Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 
 
In APPENDIX A, an extract of these regulations is provided. 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 2 - PAGE: 2-1
 DATE : June 2006
 
SECTION 2: ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 
1 GENERAL 
The organization and administration of the Maintenance Review Board (MRB), Industry Steering Committee 
(ISC) and Maintenance Working Groups (MWG) follows the guidelines as established in the following 
documents: 
• JAA Administrative & Guidance Material (AGM), Section 2, Part 2, Chapter 16: 'Procedures for 
Maintenance Review Boards'. (Dated 01.Dec.98). 
• FAA Advisory Circular AC No: 121-22A: 'Maintenance Review Board Procedures' 
NOTE: These documents are included in Appendix A. 
According to these guidelines, the organization that develops the MRB Report consists of the following 
working bodies: 
• Maintenance Review Board (MRB) 
• Industry Steering Committee (ISC) 
• Maintenance Working Groups (MWG) 
This section provides the composition and functions of each working body as well as the main 
responsibilities of the manufacturer. 
On the following page, a figure showing the interaction between these working bodies, their basic 
composition and the main documents produced is shown. 
Also this section describes the basic procedures to be followed by the working bodies administrative issues, 
such as those related to communication among them, meeting organization, approval of the MRB Report 
and revisions of the documents. 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
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WORKING BODIES AND DOCUMENTS 
 
 
PARTICIPANTS REPORTS/DOCUMENTS WORKING BODIES 
MSG-3 
ANALYSES 
INDUSTRY
STEERING 
COMMITTEE 
POLICY AND 
PROCEDURES 
HANDBOOK 
MAINTENANCE
WORKING 
GROUPS 
INDUSTRY
STEERING 
COMMITTEE 
MAINTENANCEPROGRAM 
PROPOSAL 
MAINTENANCE
REVIEW 
BOARD 
MAINTENANCE 
REVIEW BOARD 
REPORT 
 Operators
Manufacturers
Airworth. Authorities
 Operators
Manufacturers
Airworth. Authorities
 Airworth. Authorities 
 Operators
Manufacturers
Airworth. Authorities
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2 ORGANIZATION 
2.1 MAINTENANCE REVIEW BOARD (MRB) 
The A380 Maintenance Review Board (MRB) is responsible for approving the initial minimum scheduled 
maintenance requirements, which are contained in the MRB Report and revisions thereto. 
2.1.1 COMPOSITION 
See Appendix: F 
2.1.2 FUNCTIONS OF THE MRB 
The duties and responsibilities of the MRB Chair and members are described in JAA Administrative & 
Guidance Material Chapter 16.12 and FAA Advisory Circular AC 121-22A, Chapter 3. 
The main function and responsibilities of the MRB, under the direction and management of the MRB-Chair, 
include: 
a) Provide the ISC with a list of MRB members and MRB advisers to the MWGs 
b) Review and accept the Policy and Procedures Handbook (PPH) prepared by the manufacturer and 
approved by the ISC 
c) Establish the extent of regulatory authority participation and assignment of MRB advisors to the 
MWGs 
d) Coordinate all MRB activities and associated matters with the ISC Chair through the MRB Chair 
e) Offer advice and guidance to the ISC and MWGs 
f) Ensure that the appropriate regulatory authorities are in attendance at all MWG meetings 
g) Participation in the CMR process as described in AMJ 25-19 / AC 25-19 
h) Participation in the ALI process as described in Section 7-2 of this PPH 
2.1.3 FUNCTIONS OF THE MRB ADVISERS TO THE MWG 
The main functions of the MRB advisers to the MWGs are: 
a) Attend MWG meetings and provide advice (e.g. on how to ensure compliance with PPH guidelines) to 
the MWG members 
b) Attend MRB meetings if required 
c) Advise the MWG as early as possible of concerns or issues with the MSG-3 analysis results or interval 
selection 
Provide progress reports to the MRB Chair prior to the next scheduled ISC meeting. This report will contain 
an assessment of MWG activities, including notification of controversial or potential problem areas. A copy of 
the progress report may be sent to MWG Chair. 
2.1.4 FUNCTIONS OF THE MRB/FAA SPECIALIST 
Where the issue under discussion requires specific competencies (such as L/HIRF, GLARE, 
IMA…) an additional representative from the regulatory authorities may be needed to join the 
MWG. He will not substitute for the MRB advisor. He will assist the MRB advisor and MWG by 
providing any technical information when required. 
 
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2.2 INDUSTRY STEERING COMMITTEE (ISC) 
The ISC establishes policies, directs the activities of the MWGs and is responsible for the establishment of 
the Maintenance Program Proposal (MPP). The ISC activities will be coordinated with the MRB Chair 
through the ISC Chair /Co-Chair. 
 
2.2.1 COMPOSITION 
The ISC is composed of members from a representative number of operators and representatives of the 
prime airframe and engine manufacturers. 
Operators may delegate ISC participation to nominated representatives such as personnel from contracted 
Maintenance Organisation for the specific type of aircraft. Such delegated person should act on behalf of the 
operator. The attendance of maintenance organisation personnel in the working groups and other MRB 
related activities would have to be sanctioned by the ISC Chair. In such case the ISC Chair should preferably 
ensure a good balance between operators and maintenance organisation representatives. 
 
MRB representatives will be invited to ISC meetings. 
The A380 ISC is chaired by an airline member and co-chaired by an airframe manufacturer member. In 
addition, an Assistant to the ISC Co-chair is nominated. 
An ISC advisor is assigned to each MWG to advise on overall policy and report any difficulties to the ISC. 
2.2.2 FUNCTIONS OF THE ISC 
It is the responsibility of this committee to establish policy, set initial goals for scheduled maintenance check 
intervals, direct the activities of Working Groups or other working activity, carry out liaison with the 
manufacturer and other operators, prepare the final program recommendation and represent the operators in 
contacts with the Regulatory Authority. 
The ISC should see that the MSG-3 process identifies 100 % accountability for all Maintenance Significant 
Items and Significant Structure, whether or not a task has been derived from the analysis. 
Prior to the MWGs starting the analysis review, and as early as possible during the ISC activities, the ISC 
conducts a preliminary review of the MSI and Significant Structure Selection: 
a) Review of “Candidate” MSI / Significant Structure selection lists 
b) Provisional approval of items selected by manufacturer (before the analysis of an item is established) 
c) Allocation of MSIs / Significant Structure to the working groups (to allow estimation of workload and 
detailed planning for WG activities) 
The ISC review of the working group results will concentrate on the following issues: 
- Review of MSI / Significant Structure Selection: Review and agreement of MSI / Significant Structure 
selection lists presented by the working groups, including approval of items selected for analysis and 
those not selected for MSG-3 analysis 
- Review of MSI / Significant Structure / Zonal analyses results: Review, discussion and approval of tasks 
selected by the MWG, including task description, interval and other data necessary for inclusion in the 
MRB Report. This review is to be done by means of the respective MRB Report Interface sheets 
- Review of items raised for ISC consideration: Review, discussion and decision of items raised for ISC 
consideration and decision in order to allow the MWG to close open procedural items of a general nature 
and items for which no agreement could be reached in the WG. 
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2.2.3 FUNCTIONS OF THE ISC CHAIR 
The Chair should be elected from within the operators present at the ISC. He/she is responsible for the 
general oversight of the ISC activities. The ISC Chair: 
a) Presides at meetings of the ISC. 
b) Certifies the accuracy of the ISC Meeting Reports in collaboration with the ISC Co-Chair. 
c) Invites new customers to become ISC members. 
d) Encourages ISC members to actively participate. 
e) Ensures that working groups have a balanced membership. 
f) Monitors the progress of working groups. 
g) Conducts in-depth reviews of working group reports. 
h) Provides agreement for proposals (e.g. PPH, MPP, etc.) to the MRB. 
i) Provides agreement to manufacturer’s Temporary Revision proposals. 
 
 
2.2.4 FUNCTIONS OF THE ISC CO-CHAIR 
The ISC Co-Chair is appointed by Airbus. He/she: 
a) Assists in maintaining liaison with the ISC members and their organizations to enhance its 
effectiveness. 
b) Certifies the accuracy of the ISC Meeting Reports in collaboration with the ISC Chair. 
c) Establishes appropriate working groups. 
d) Proposes appropriate chairpersons for working groups. 
e) Assumes all responsibilities of the ISC Chair in the absence of the ISC Chair. 
f) Notifies respective MWG Chairs on decisions affecting their activity 
g) Ensures that the presentation material for the ISC meetings meets the required technical standard. 
h) Prepares an ISC meeting report (i.e. Minutes) in accordance with section 2-5.4.1 and Appendix G. 
2.2.5 FUNCTIONS OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE ISC CO-CHAIR 
The Assistant to the ISC Co-chair is appointed by Airbus. The Assistant: 
a) Assists the ISC Co-chair. 
b) Administers ISC matters. 
c) Ensures that notes are taken, motions voted and recorded, and all decisions/consensus documented 
at each meeting.d) Follows-up the action items created by the ISC. 
e) Monitors the overall planning and advises the ISC Chair and the ISC Co-chair of any difficulties 
encountered. 
 
2.2.6 FUNCTION S OF THE ISC ADVISOR TO THE MWG 
 
The ISC Advisor assigned to the respective MWG has the following primary responsibilities: 
 
a) Represents ISC operator participation during MWG meetings. 
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b) Ensures compliance with PPH guidelines and policies during all phases of the MSG-3 analysis process. 
c) Confirms 100% accountability of all Maintenance Significant Items (MSIs) and Structural Significant 
Items (SSIs). 
d) Provides guidance from an overall operator perspective during each step of the analysis. 
e) Assists in resolving disagreements among MWG members, including MRB Advisors, regarding analysis 
methodology and results (i.e. failure class, type of task if selected, applicability, interval, 
justification…etc.). 
f) Reports the progress of MWG activity to the ISC Chair and Co-Chair. 
g) Notifies the ISC of unresolved issues and potential problem areas identified at the MWG level. 
h) Clarifies the ISC position concerning decisions that override MWG proposals. 
 
 
 
2.3 MAINTENANCE WORKING GROUPS (MWGs) 
The MWGs will review, amend and endorse the MSG-3 analysis proposals made by the manufacturer and 
provide an initial list of minimum scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals to the ISC. 
2.3.1 COMPOSITION 
There are nine (9) Maintenance Working Groups consisting of specialist representatives from the 
participating operators, the prime airframe manufacturer and engine manufacturers. Regulatory authorities 
attend in an advisory capacity. In addition, the ISC will nominate a representative to advise MWG on policy 
issues, as necessary. 
In order to cope with the complexity involved in some aircraft systems and features, it is required that the 
MWG members possess an adequate level of knowledge and experience regarding the relevant 
system/portion of the aircraft whose analysis is to be discussed. 
Zonal analysis introduces significantly different expertise than before, consequently, operators knowledge 
and experience will be requested to support the analysis process specially in the following fields: 
- In-service wiring condition 
- In-service combustible material accumulation 
- L/HIRF wiring protection 
The MWGs are chaired by a manufacturer’s representative, which is appointed by Airbus and accepted by 
the ISC. 
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For the A380 scheduled maintenance initial development, the following Working Groups have been 
established: 
 
MWG # Name Allocated ATA Chapters / Zones Remarks 
MWG 1 Hydraulics and Flight Controls 
27: Flight Controls 
29: Hydraulic Power 
55: Stabilizers (systems only) 
Structure analysis of ATA 
55 will be discussed in 
MWG5. 
MWG 2 Environmental 
21: Air Conditioning 
26: Fire Extinguishing 
30: Anti-Ice (except 30-21) 
35: Oxygen 
36: Pneumatics 
 
MWG 3 Powerplant (RR & EA) and APU 
71 to 80 
49: Airborne Auxiliary Power 
 
30-21: Engine Anti-Ice 
Structure analysis of ATA 
71-80 will be discussed in 
MWG5. 
MWG 4 Avionics 
22: Autopilot 
23: Communications 
24: Electric 
31: Instruments 
33: Lights 
34: Navigation 
42: Integrated Modular Avionics and 
Avionics Data Communication Network 
44: Cabin Systems 
45: On Board Maintenance System 
46: Information System 
 
MWG 5 Structure 
52: Doors 
53: Fuselage 
54: Pylon 
55: Stabilisers 
56: Windows 
57: Wings 
Structure analysis of ATA 
32 will be discussed in 
MWG8 
MWG 6 Zonal and L/HIRF All aircraft zones 
MWG 7 Fuel 28: Fuel 
MWG 8 Landing Gear 
32: Landing Gears Structure analysis of ATA 
32 will be discussed in 
MWG8. 
MWG 9 Interior 
25: Equipment / Furnishing 
38: Water / Waste 
50: Cargo and Accessory Compartments 
52: Doors (systems only) 
53: Fuselage (systems only) 
54: Pylon (drainage) 
56: Windows (systems only) 
57: Wings (systems only) 
Structure analysis of ATA 
52, 53, 56 and 57 will be 
discussed in MWG5. 
 
NOTE: Within MWG-5, only structure analysis will be reviewed. Some structure analyses will be discussed in 
MWG-8. 
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2.3.2 FUNCTIONS OF THE MWG 
The responsibilities of the MWGs are the following: 
a) Review the manufacturers selection of significant items, 
b) Review the MSG-3 analysis proposals performed by the manufacturer and revise as required 
c) Select the most suitable interval for each task in accordance with the PPH guidelines 
d) Prepare a list of initial minimum scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals 
e) Provide the ISC with meeting report including a progress report and a list of open items and inform the 
MRB as required 
2.3.3 FUNCTIONS OF THE MWG CHAIR 
The MWG Chair is responsible for ensuring an adequate technical representation and diversity within the 
working group and for ensuring consideration of all technical viewpoints in accomplishing the task. The MWG 
Chair: 
a) Works with the ISC Co-Chair and the Assistant to the ISC Co-chair to select MWG members. 
b) Works with the ISC Co-Chair and Assistant to the ISC Co-chair to secure and maintain a balanced 
MWG membership that will materially contribute to the final product and team success. The MWG 
Chair may expand or contract the working group as necessary to attain final product and team 
success. 
c) Has the casting vote where MWG members are evenly split on a decision. 
d) Ensures that all MWG members have a clear understanding of the task assignment and schedule 
completion date. 
e) Ensures that the PPH rules are followed by the MWG. 
f) Considers all background material relevant to the task. 
g) Ensures that notes are taken, motions voted and recorded, and all decisions/consensus documented 
at each meeting. This should include any concerns or advice raised by the MRB or ISC advisors. 
 
NOTE: Prior to the meeting adjournment, the following items shall be summarised and agreed 
upon : 
• Any changes to the MSG-3 analysis 
• Follow-up action for existing and/or new open items 
• Other major decisions made during the course of the meeting 
The availability of an electronic copy of the revised analysis, revised open item list and meeting 
summary by the end of the meeting, would assist participants in disseminating this information more 
efficiently. 
 
h) Must promote collaboration, consider all elements contributed by participants, ensure each suggestion 
receives full consideration by the working group, combine all constructive suggestions/ideas to reach a 
positive, useful outcome or decision, and resolve conflict. 
i) Calls meetings of the working group, including preparation meetings of appropriate specialists. 
j) He/she endeavours to balance meeting locations to minimize participant costs and to schedule 
tentative meeting dates to reduce work conflicts and maximize participation. 
k) Advises the ISC Co-Chair and the Assistant to the ISC Co-chair of any meetings to be included in the 
overall planning of the Maintenance Program development. 
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l) Compiles agenda items and documents to be reviewed at MWG meetings, and distributes them to 
each MWG member well in advance (4 weeks) to working group meetings. 
m) Prepares a MWG Meeting Report (i.e. minutes) and a MWG Chair Report in accordance with section 
2-5.4.2 and Appendix G and presents the MWG Chair Report at the ISC meeting. Any other status 
report should be submitted to the ISC Co-Chair and Assistant to the ISC Co-chair no later than (two 
weeks) prior to each ISC meeting. 
n) Ensures that MWG members are informed of ISC decisions. This may be achievedby means of the 
distribution of ISC meeting report. 
o) Ensures that where the ISC overrides the MWG decision, the justification for this is reported back to 
the MWG. 
p) Coordinates with other MWG Chair persons to ensure that there is no duplication of efforts, missing 
analyses or conflict of interests. 
q) Coordinates with other MWG Chair persons to ensure that appropriate structure specialists are 
available during the structure MSG-3 analyses presentation when this is done in MWG3 and MWG8 
meetings. 
 
2.4 MANUFACTURER 
The prime aircraft manufacturer and engine manufacturers will support the MWGs with the information 
necessary to establish the MPP within the timeframe as set forth in the scheduling included in this PPH. 
2.4.1 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MANUFACTURER 
The main functions and responsibilities of the aircraft manufacturer are: 
a) Provide the ISC with a draft PPH 
b) Provide the ISC with an initial Maintenance Significant Item and Significant Structure List 
c) Provide procedural training to the MRB / ISC / MWGs 
d) Provide technical training to the MRB / ISC / MWGs 
e) Provide the MWGs with an initial MSG-3 analysis 
f) Provide the ISC with information concerning certification issues and resolutions regarding proposed 
tasks originating from the certification process 
g) Provide the ISC with a draft MPP 
h) Submit the MPP to the MRB Chair 
i) Publish the MRB Report 
j) Participate in the CMR process 
k) Participate in the ALI process 
3 TRAINING 
The aircraft manufacturer will provide training on the application of MSG-3 analysis and PPH procedures 
preferably prior to the first MWG meeting. 
 
3.1 PERSONNEL REQUIRING TRAINING 
 
This training is directed at all levels of participation in the MRBR development process (i.e. MWG, ISC and 
MRB), including personnel from the manufacturer, as required. The objective of this training program is to 
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ensure that a consistent approach is applied during all phases of program development, review and 
approval. 
 
3.2 TRAINING CONTENT 
 
a) The curriculum should include but not be limited to: 
 
• The detailed application of MSG-3 methodology for Systems/Powerplant, Structures and Zonal 
analysis, including EZA and L/HIRF, in the context of the PPH. 
• Realistic examples and exercises demonstrating the procedural requirements. 
• A description of the MRBR development process as defined in the PPH, including the composition 
and functions of the MRB, ISC and MWG. 
• An explanation of how these groups interface and their responsibilities. 
• A description of the Type Certification process, including CMRs and ALIs. 
• Overview of regulatory requirements. 
• General familiarisation of A380 characteristics and design principles. 
• Introduction of new technologies that have been incorporated into the design philosophy. 
 
b) Additional detailed technical presentations focused on particular systems or structural parts 
requiring analysis, should also be made at the beginning of each MWG meeting, to substantiate MSI/SSI 
selection. Similar information may also be presented prior to the review or analysis of a new ATA chapter or 
an individual MSI/SSI. This opportunity should be used to review typical examples of the analysis 
techniques, as necessary. 
 
3.3 TRAINING SESSIONS 
 
A formal training course on A380 Maintenance Program Development (MSG-3/PPH) has been conducted by 
Airbus to date at the following locations (Frankfurt, Memphis, London, Sydney and Singapore). Airbus has 
also completed internal training at Toulouse and Hamburg. This course is 5 days in duration and covers the 
content described in section 3.2, except for Zonal analysis, EZA and L/HIRF. These subjects have been 
addressed in an initial training session for MWG 6 members over a 3 day period, in Toulouse immediately 
prior to the first MWG 6 (Zonal) meeting.in Nov 03 A supplemental zonal analysis training session for 
ISC/MRB members was conducted prior to ISC 4 in Jan/04 for 1½ days. 
 
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4 COMMUNICATION 
4.1 GENERAL 
It is intended that all communications, except those that require a formal approval (e.g. submittal of MPP to 
MRB for approval), be sent by using either digital format (CD-ROM) or the e-mail system (internet). 
The following paragraphs describe the rules for communications among the different working bodies and 
also for the organization of the working body meetings. 
4.2 COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ISC AND MRB 
Normally, communications will be accomplished through the ISC meetings, which are attended by the MRB. 
In addition, communication between MRB. and the ISC will be made through the MRB Chair, or his delegate, 
and the ISC Chair, Co-Chair or Assistant to the ISC Co-chair. 
4.3 COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MWG AND ISC 
In each MWG meeting, a member of the ISC acts as adviser. The ISC adviser should report to ISC members 
after each MWG meeting and provide a brief summary of proceedings and difficulties encountered. 
The MWG Chair will distribute the meeting report to all ISC members and attend ISC meetings to report on 
proceedings as necessary. 
4.4 COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MWGs 
The communication and coordination of activities between the MWGs has to be handled by the respective 
MWG Chair. 
Transmission of information and requests from one MWG to another has to be made in writing form by using 
the ‘MWG Transfer Sheet’. This form is included in Appendix B (TRS01). 
If the request is agreed by the other group, the responsibility for the item and the results of any further 
analysis is transferred to the other group. 
If this request is not answered positively or not answered at all, the originating group retains the 
responsibility for the item. 
For tasks that are transferred to the Zonal Working Group for consideration, completed Transfer Sheet and 
Task Data Sheet is to be provided, including the following minimum information: 
- MSI/SSI/ZIP task reference number, 
- Task description, 
- Task applicability, 
- Task interval, 
- Task source/FEC if applicable 
- Zones affected/required access 
5 MEETING ORGANIZATION AND MEETINGS REPORTS 
5.1 GENERAL 
It is intended that all invitations, analyses and supporting documentations be sent by using either digital 
format (CD-ROM) or e-mail system (internet). Initially, no paper copies will be distributed and no paper 
copies will be distributed during the meetings. 
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The following paragraphs provide guidelines that should be followed in order to ensure an adequate and 
efficient meeting. 
All meeting notes, communications, and analyses will be published in English. 
5.2 MEETING ORGANIZATION 
Invitations to ISC / MRB & MWG meetings will be sent out eight (8) weeks prior to each meeting. The 
invitation will be distributed to all nominated participants. For MWG meetings the MRB & ISC Chairs / Co-
Chairs will be informed. Before each meeting of the MRB, ISC and MWGs, the Chairs / Co-Chairs will 
prepare and distribute an agenda to the respective members at least four (4) weeks prior to each meeting. 
ISC meetings will normally be held at AIRBUS Headquarters, Blagnac, Toulouse. 
As far as possible, the MWG meetings will be held at the facilities of that part of the manufacturer’s 
organization responsible for the major content of the design under analysis. 
Normally, each MWG meeting will be scheduled for 4 ½ days, starting on Monday and finishing on Friday at 
around midday. 
5.3 DISTRIBUTION OF MSG-3 ANALYSES 
The manufacturer will prepare the preliminary MSG-3 analyses, which will be reviewed by the MWG Chair 
and revised if required. These preliminary analyses will be sent to all MWG members, the ISC Chair / Co-
Chair,the ISC Adviser, the MRB Adviser and the MRB Chair / Co-Chair not later than four (4) weeks prior to 
the MWG meeting (so that the material is in the hands of the recipients sufficiently in advance of the 
meeting). The aim of the early distribution is to allow MWG members and advisers an adequate time frame 
to review all data from the manufacturer prior to the meeting. 
The MSG3 analysis issue should follow the following guidance: 
- The issue number is increased every time the analysis is published with 
changed/revised content 
- Analysis updated in accordance with previous MWG meeting is provided to MWG for 
acceptance at next meeting 
- On case by case basis different issue from issue 1 may be presented at the first meeting 
depending on MWG decision 
 
The internal review of the analysis package provided by the manufacturer as preparation for the working 
group meeting is intended to make the recipient fully familiar with the manufacturer’s proposal in order to 
enable her/him to 
- Critically review the analysis proposal, 
- Propose improvements, 
- Judge the acceptability of the tasks proposed. 
It is important for the working group members and advisors to bring their own paper copies of the analyses 
along to the meeting (as no paper copies will be distributed during the meeting). 
 
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5.4 MEETING REPORTS 
5.4.1 ISC MEETING REPORTS 
The Co-Chair will prepare a an ISC Meeting Report to serve as minutes for each ISC meeting. This meeting 
report shall include the required data identified in Appendix G. A revised list of open items should be 
available for agreement at the end of the meeting. 
All action items should be recorded accurately regarding the nature of the required follow-up action, the 
responsible group or person and the deadline for completion. Additional details may be incorporated under 
Remarks, to comment on status and provide other relevant details. It is equally important to use an effective 
numbering system that links each action item to particular ISC meetings. This is essential in order to 
accurately monitor the progress of individual actions and to facilitate historical reviews. Once an action item 
is “Closed”, that status will be reflected in the action item list. The method of identification selected for these 
action items adopts the following format (ISCy.zzz, y=mtg #, z=continuing sequence no.). 
 The major conclusions, most significant discussions, decisions and actions taken shall also be summarised 
at the end of the meeting and documented in the final report. Justification for decisions should be clearly 
recorded, particularly where alternatives were identified and subsequently rejected. The report will be 
distributed to all participants, MRB/ISC members, MRB Report correspondents and MWG Chairs within four 
weeks of the meeting. Decisions that affect MWG activity must be communicated to any absent MWG chairs 
immediately after the meeting. MWG chairs shall cascade this information to MWG members within a 
timescale dictated by their meeting planning schedule. Papers distributed for the first time during the meeting 
shall be appended to the meeting report. 
5.4.2 MWG MEETING/CHAIR REPORTS 
The MWG Chair will prepare a a MWG Meeting Report to serve as minutes for each MWG meeting. This 
meeting report shall include the required data identified in Appendix G. A revised list of open items should be 
available for agreement at the end of the meeting. 
All open items should be recorded accurately regarding the nature of the required follow-up action, the 
responsible group or person and the deadline for completion. Additional details may be incorporated under 
Remarks, to comment on status and provide other relevant details. It is equally important to use an effective 
numbering system that links each open item to particular MWG meetings. This is essential in order to 
accurately monitor the progress of individual actions and to facilitate historical reviews. Once an open item is 
“closed”, that status will be reflected in the open item list. The method of identification selected for these 
open items adopts the following format (MWGx.y.zzz, x=group #, y=mtg #, z =continuing sequence no.). 
The major conclusions, most significant discussions, decisions and actions taken shall also be summarised 
at the end of the meeting and documented in the final report. Justification for decisions should be clearly 
recorded, particularly where alternatives were identified and subsequently rejected. The meeting report will 
be distributed to all participants, absent MWG members and MRB/ISC members within four weeks of the 
meeting. 
Furthermore, the MWG Chair will also prepare a MWG Chair Report for presentation at the ISC meeting. 
This report shall include the required data identified in Appendix G. 
6 MRB REPORT APPROVAL 
Upon acceptance of the MSG-3 analyses by the MWG members, the MWG Co-Chair will present the results 
of the analyses to the ISC & MRB. 
Upon final approval by the ISC, the ISC will establish a Maintenance Program Proposal (MPP). The aircraft 
manufacturer will present this MPP to the MRB for approval. The relevant MSG-3 analyses that support the 
MPP should also be sent to the MRB along with the MPP. 
The approval of the MPP (including the draft MRB Report) will be evidenced by an approval letter signed by 
the MRB Chair, and an approval letter signed by the FAA Representative. 
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The approval by the MRB Chair is expected within 90 days of submittal. 
7 REVISION PROCESS 
7.1 PPH REVISION PROCESS 
If policies and / or procedures as described in the PPH change or additional requirements must be 
incorporated into the PPH, the PPH will be revised accordingly. The manufacturer will propose such changes 
and will submit them to the ISC & MRB Chair for acceptance / approval. 
7.2 MRB REPORT REVISION PROCESS 
7.2.1 PERIODIC REVIEWS 
Since the MRB Report is intended to be an up-to-date document, the manufacturer and the MRB Chair 
should conduct a joint review, at least annually, to determine the need for a revision. 
Results of these reviews should be documented by the MRB Chair for inclusion in the MRB historical file. 
7.2.2 PROPOSED CHANGES 
Proposals for MRB Report revisions may arise through the introduction of new type variants, modifications, 
new regulatory requirements, results of analysis and tests not available at the time of the publication of the 
original MRB Report, and program improvements resulting from service experience. 
Proposed changes will be submitted to the ISC Co-Chair for coordination with all members of the ISC and 
should be accompanied by supporting data. 
If needed, the manufacturer and the MRB will convene and evaluate the proposed changes. If a revision of 
the MRB Report is considered necessary, the manufacturer will advise ISC members and MRB and will 
convene, if necessary, ISC meetings. Specialists MWGs may need to be formed to consider new or 
amendments to existing MSG-3 analyses. 
Proposed changes are submitted with supporting data to the MRB Chair. 
 
7.2.3 TEMPORARY REVISION SYSTEM 
JAR/FAR 25.1529 compliance requires that the Type Certificate holder identifies and publishes any 
necessary Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICAS) associated with design changes / modifications 
before embodiment on an in service aircraft. 
With respect to tasks that do not justify Airworthiness Limitation status, a MRB Report Temporary Revision 
process is created to allow timely promulgation of tasks/intervals in those cases where the modification 
embodiment timescale is not compatible with the next planned MRB Report revision. 
Temporary Revisions will be prepared by the manufacturer and submitted to the ISC Chair for agreement 
prior to submitting to the MRB Chairfor approval. 
The status of the MRBR Temporary Revision is equivalent of the status of a normal MRBR revision during 
the validity period of the Temporary Revision (5 years maximum). 
 
 
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7.2.3.1 Purpose and scope 
The MRB Process ensures that applicable maintenance requirements are published in a MRB Report prior to 
issuance of Certificate of Airworthiness of a new aircraft variant or modifications to an existing aircraft. 
Due to continuous design evolutions and as a result of in-service experience, a scheduled MRB Report 
revision may not be feasible or possible in the required timeframe. Therefore a TR of the approved MRBR 
requirements may be put in place, which are valid until the forthcoming MRBR Revision. 
The objective of any TR is therefore to provide applicable MRBR requirements prior to the full review by the 
MWG/ISC. The manufacturer will justify the TR by suitable supporting data, e.g. a revised MSG-3 analysis. 
The scope of the TR Process is limited to the following: 
- There is an effect on airworthiness / safety and there is insufficient time for the normal MRBR process to be 
followed. 
Or 
- Any other specific need, at the discretion of the MRB/ISC chairmen (e.g. modifications, in-service 
experience with significant economic/operational impact 
7.2.3.2 Procedural steps of the MRBR TR Process 
- Preparation of the MRBR TR documentation: 
The TR has to be initiated by the ISC Co-Chair. The TR has to be prepared by the ISC Assistant Co-Chair. 
The TR proposal will contain the following information: 
- Accompanying cover letter. 
This letter will explain why the TR has been raised and a request for approval. In addition, the following 
documents are to be attached: 
- MRBR TR document 
This consists of: 
- MRBR TR Transmittal Letter (each TR can be identified by a TR number which contains the 
MRBR revision number and a TR sequential number). e.g. TR 5.3 is the 3rd TR of MRBR issue 5. 
- TR Requirements 
- MSG-3 analysis 
- ISC Chair acceptance: 
The ISC Co-chair releases the MRBR TR documentation by signing the Transmittal Letter and forwards it to 
the ISC Chair for acceptance. The MRB signatories will be put in copy of this correspondence as advance 
information. 
It is the responsibility of the ISC Chair to distribute the MRBR TR documentation to the ISC members and 
coordinate their comments. 
In case there is any concern, the ISC Chair should directly contact the ISC Co-chair for a resolution, after 
which the ISC Co-Chair Assistant will revise the TR documentation if necessary. 
The ISC Chair acceptance process is compete after the ISC Chair has forwarded the signed TR transmittal 
letter back to the ISC Co-Chair. 
This entire acceptance procedure should be expedited (i.e.. approx. two weeks from receipt). 
- MRB Signatories approval: 
The ISC co-chairman will send the TR Proposal to the MRB Signatories for approval. 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
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In case there is any concern, the MRB signatories should directly contact the ISC Co-chair for a resolution. 
The MRB TR approval process is complete when the signed TR transmittal letter is returned to the ISC Co-
chair. 
This entire approval procedure should be expedited (i.e.. approx. two weeks from receipt). 
- Post TR approval activities: 
After approval by the MRB signatories, the assistant to the ISC Co-chair launches the distribution of the MRB 
TR to the MRB Report recipients and the dispatch of on OIT that informs about the highlights of the MRBR 
TR. 
The ISC has to be informed about any TR issued since the last ISC meeting. 
The contents of each TR and the justification data must be reviewed at each subsequent ISC meeting. The 
ISC/MRB may also require the complete TR dossier to be reviewed in a MWG. 
7.2.3.3 MRBR TR / MRB Process Time Frames: 
 
The MRBR TR Process is designed to address urgent needs for approved (new or revised) MRB tasks. 
Nevertheless, any addition or change to the current MRB Report must be submitted for ISC acceptance / 
MRB approval per the MRB process, in accordance with the PPH, whether or not a MRBR TR is issued. 
The validity of any MRBR TR expires at the next revision to the MRB Report. This will be stated in the MRBR 
e.g. MRBR issue 6 cancels and supercedes TRs 5.1 to 5.5. 
Depending on the number and content of TRs, the MRB may require the manufacturer to initiate a full 
revision of the MRBR. 
A TR will be valid for a maximum of five years from its approval date. In certain cases, the MRB may apply a 
more restrictive calendar limit of validity to an individual TR. 
The following example illustrates when a MRBR TR can be issued for a given modification, in relation to the 
time frame for the routine MRB Process. 
NOTE: The MRBR TR process should take advantage of the MRB Process wherever possible. In the 
above shown diagram i.e. a TR proposal should be reviewed by a MWG and/or an ISC if time permits. 
Follow-on process of a particular modification for which a 
MRB Report TR is required
TR TR 
ProcessProcess
MRB MRB 
ProcessProcess Last MRB Report 
approval date
MOD review 
in MWG
ISC Approval Next MRB Report 
approval date
MOD 
certification date
MOD Entry 
Into Service
Date when 
TR validity 
expires
TimeTime
TimeTime
Period for TR IssuePeriod for TR Issue
TR ValidityTR Validity
Follow-on process of a particular modification for which a 
MRB Report TR is required
TR TR 
ProcessProcess
MRB MRB 
ProcessProcess Last MRB Report 
approval date
MOD review 
in MWG
ISC Approval Next MRB Report 
approval date
MOD 
certification date
MOD Entry 
Into Service
Date when 
TR validity 
expires
TimeTime
TimeTime
Period for TR IssuePeriod for TR Issue
TR ValidityTR Validity
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REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 
 
 
Flow chart of MRBR TR Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
MSG-3 Analyst 
 
 
 
 
Analyse design change / manufacturer 
data / in-service reports
Prepare analysis 
Repercussion 
on MSG-3 
analysis / 
MRB Report?
MRBR TR 
required? 
Incorporation of TR topic into the MRB 
revision 
Compile TR Document 
to MRB Report 
Forward TR Documentation 
to ISC Chair for acceptance
ISC Chair 
Forward TR Document to 
MRB Chair for approval 
MRB Chairs 
Distribution of TR 
Report to the next 
ISC/ Meeting
Yes 
ISC C
- R
ISC
END 
END 
RESPONSIBILITY 
SECTION 2 - PAGE: 2-17
DATE : June 2006
 
MSG-3 Analyst 
 
 
 
 
 
MSG-3 Analyst 
 
 
 
 
 
ISC Co-Chair 
 
 
 
 
Assistant Co-Chair 
 
 
 
ISC Co-Chair 
 
 
o-Chair: 
eviews 
/MRB Chairs
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 3 - PAGE: 3-1
 DATE : June 2006
 
 
 
SECTION 3: ANALYSIS PROCEDURE. GENERAL 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This Section contains the basic principles and assumptions to be used for the development of the scheduled 
maintenance tasks and their intervals that will be proposed to be included in the A380 Maintenance Review 
Board Report. 
As stated in Section 1, paragraph 3, the ATA MSG-3 Document based on which this PPH has been 
developed is MSG-3 Revision 2002.1. 
The analysis procedures described in this PPH are split into three different main sections, as each individual 
section uses specific methodologies, which at the end will enable the development of independent sections 
within the MRB Report. 
The individual sections defined in this PPH are: 
SECTION 4: Systems and Powerplant Analysis Procedures. 
SECTION 5: Structure Analysis Procedures. 
SECTION 6: Zonal and Lightning / High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) Analysis Procedures. 
The approach followed within this PPH is to cover the Zonal Inspection analysis and the L/HIRF analysis in a 
single Section (6) and using a unified procedure. The reason for this approachis to take advantage of the 
similarity existing between both procedures and in order to ensure a full compatibility of the relevant L/HIRF 
inspection requirements and the Zonal inspection requirements. 
2 OBJECTIVES 
The intent of the group of scheduled maintenance tasks resulting from the application of the procedures and 
guidelines provided in this PPH is to maintain the inherent safety and reliability levels of the aircraft and 
become the basis for an efficient scheduled maintenance which is later on developed by each operator. It is 
understood that initial adjustments may be necessary to address operational and/or environmental 
conditions unique to the operator. 
The objectives of efficient aircraft scheduled maintenance are: 
a) To ensure realization of the inherent safety and reliability levels of the aircraft. 
b) To restore safety and reliability to their inherent levels when deterioration has occurred. 
c) To obtain the information necessary for design improvement of those items whose inherent reliability 
proves inadequate. 
d) To accomplish these goals at a minimum total cost, including maintenance costs and the costs of 
resulting failures. 
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These objectives recognize that scheduled maintenance, as such, cannot correct deficiencies in the inherent 
safety and reliability levels of the aircraft. The scheduled maintenance can only prevent deterioration of such 
inherent levels. If the inherent levels are found to be unsatisfactory, design modification is necessary to 
obtain improvement. 
3 SCOPE 
3.1 PURPOSE 
This PPH addresses the development of initial scheduled maintenance requirements for the purpose of 
developing an MRB Report by using the MSG-3 analysis procedure. Any additional requirements developed, 
using different ground rules and procedures from MSG-3, must be submitted with selection criteria to the 
Industry Steering Committee for consideration and inclusion in the MRB Report recommendation. 
3.2 BASIC DESIGN STANDARD 
The following basic aircraft design standards to be used for the analysis are the following model definitions: 
Series A380-800 
− A380-840 with engine Rolls-Royce Trent 970 
− A380-860 with engine Engine Alliance GP7270 
Series A380-800F 
− A380-840F with engine Rolls-Royce Trent 970 
− A380-860F with engine Engine Alliance GP7270 
3.3 OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES 
The analysis process is intended to identify all scheduled tasks and intervals based on the operating 
capabilities to be certificated on the A380 aircraft (i.e. Cat III, RVSM). The procedures for the development of 
the LROPS maintenance requirements are addressed in Section 7.5. 
The following is a brief explanation of the above Cat III and RVSM operating capabilities: 
Category III: This is meant to refer to precision approaches and landings using ILS or MLS where minima for 
decision heights and runway visual range are to be observed. The minima are as follows: 
• For Category III A operations: 
• A decision height lower than 100 ft; and 
• A runway visual range not less than 200 m. 
 
• For Category III B operations: 
• A decision height lower than 50 ft, or no decision height; and 
• A runway visual range lower than 200 m but not less than 75 m. 
RVSM (Reduced Vertical Separation Minima): RVSM airspace is any airspace or route between FL 290 and 
FL 410 inclusive where aircraft are separated vertically by 1,000 ft (300 m). 
b0521632
Sticky Note
CAT II and III RVSM...
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 Aircraft related characteristics that may affect the integrity of RVSM operation are, among 
others, the alignment of pitot/static probes, dents, or deformation around static plates. 
Maintenance considerations focus on ensuring that the airframe geometry has proper surface 
contours and that no skin waviness has occurred. 
 The autopilot should ensure continued accuracy and integrity of the automatic altitude control 
system to meet the height-keeping standards for RVSM operations. 
 Other considerations involve altitude alerting, automatic altitude control system, ATC altitude 
reporting equipment and altimetry systems. 
3.4 DESIGN EVOLUTION AND ANALYSIS REPERCUSSION 
3.4.1 DEFINITION OF AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION 
 
Depending on the design phase, the design and definition status of the A380 and all related design changes 
are tracked by different means. The two design phases relevant to configuration management are the 
following: 
• Before Design Freeze 
The design status and all design changes before design freeze are tracked by means of Change Notes 
and/or Modification Proposals. 
At the official Design Freeze 
(identified by closure of the 1st installation/design modification), all related Change Notes and the 
associated Modification Proposals are consolidated in “modifications”. 
• After Design Freeze. 
The design status and the definition of the A380 aircraft are tracked by means of modifications. 
Modification proposal numbers stated for each modification are of importance before the modification is 
officially launched and to distinguish two or more design solutions combined in the same modification. 
 
Therefore, modifications are used to define the configuration of: 
• aircraft models (that are part of the basic aircraft design standards and are covered by the type 
certification process), and 
• customer specific versions and 
• individual aircraft. 
 
Consequently, all changes of an aircraft definition/configuration are defined by modifications as well. 
Modifications are identified numerically by means of a “Modification Number” that can range from 60,000 to 
79,999. “Modification Proposal Numbers” are used to define individual design solutions within a given 
modification. 
The basic aircraft design/configuration standards to be used for the MSG-3 analysis are defined in Section 3, 
paragraph 3.2 of this document. 
 
 
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3.4.2 MODIFICATION REVIEW PROCESS 
 
3.4.2.1 COMPLETE RECORD OF MODIFICATIONS 
 
A complete record of all modifications/design changes and their impact on the maintenance program shall be 
maintained by Airbus. This applies irrespective of the impact these modifications/design changes may have 
on the MSG-3 analysis and/or other parts of the maintenance program. 
The modification record (designated as ”A380 Modifications & Maintenance Program”) will list all 
modifications/design changes, including those that are optional and not part of the basic aircraft definition. All 
modifications/design changes that are part of the basic aircraft definition (i.e. that needs to be covered in 
each issue of the MRB Report), however, will be appropriately identified in the modification record. 
For each modification/design change listed, the record will contain basic modification data (such as 
modification and - if required - modification proposal numbers and the title of the modification) as well as 
data that identify the impact on the maintenance program. 
The statements in the modification record that identify the impact of a modification/design change on the 
maintenance program will initially be restricted to the repercussions on the MSG-3 analysis and the MRB 
Report. At a later time, the record may be expanded to cover the impact on the MPD and other documents 
associated with the maintenance program. The modification record will also distinguish between the initial 
assessment of a modification/design change (i.e. identification of work to be carried out) and the final results 
of the evaluations carried out in response to the initial assessment. This means that, after an analysis has 
been revised, the modification record will be updated to register the fact that the modification/design changerelated activities have been concluded. 
Data elements contained in the modification record will be identified in the A380 MFU Record Table which 
appears in Appendix B of the PPH. Rules and guidelines for this new mod follow-up process are defined in 
an Airbus internal document (SEM2D-247/04, "Mod Follow Up Doc Package", Issue date 04/02/04 & 
subsequent). It focuses on a 4-step process involving the following: 
1) Capture/recording of Modifications (Mod) and Modification Proposals (MP) as Mod/MP couples (MPM) 
2) ATA selection and transfer 
3) Impact Evaluation 
4) Consolidation of data 
MFU Record Tables are used for documentation, monitoring and reporting purposes. They reflect the action 
taken per each of the 4 process steps. 
 
All modifications that apply to the basic Zonal Inspection Programme (ZIP) have to be identified in the MFU 
table. 
The functionality of this process is predicated on the use of a PA (pre-analysis) IT Tool which enables the direct 
capture of mods/mod proposals from the official Airbus configuration management databases and provides an 
automated data distribution to the responsible Maintenance Engineering personnel. A record of all MSG-3 
analysis and subsequent mod evaluations will be readily retrievable with the IT Tool. The outcome of these 
mod evaluations will be automatically documented in the MFU Record Table. 
 
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Since this IT Tool is not available at this time, during the interim, the required data retrieval from the 
configuration data bases and the completion of the MFU Record Table will be done manually. The instructional 
Notes at the bottom of the table indicate what type of data must be collected, how to record it in the table and 
who is responsible to complete which columns. Airbus is responsible for data collection and coordination of 
follow-up action for revisions to the MSG-3 analysis and MRBR. 
 
3.4.2.2 MODIFICATIONS/DESIGN CHANGES 
 
All modifications/design changes will be reviewed by Airbus with regard to their potential impact on the 
maintenance program. This review will initially cover the impact of a given modification/design change on the 
MRB Report and/or MSG-3 analysis but may later include the repercussions on other documents associated 
with the maintenance program. 
A summary of this review will be included in a modification record that will comprise all modifications/design 
changes applicable to A380. The statements in this record will be initially based on the assessment made 
when the modification/design change is first approved and will, later on, be modified as required by the 
results of any subsequent detailed evaluations (e.g. after MSG-3 analysis establishment or revision). 
If repercussions have been identified during the initial modification review that require changes to a certain 
MSG-3 analysis, these changes will be introduced into the next issue of the analysis and presented during 
the next suitable working group meeting. The review of modifications/design changes and their impact on the 
MSG-3 analysis will thus be an integral part of the review process in the working groups. Results of this 
review will be included in the MWG Chair’s Meeting Report presented to the ISC. 
If the MSG-3 analysis was initially established before the official “design freeze” has occurred, the design 
solution used as a basis for the analysis will be identified by means of the “design status date”. In this case, 
the MSG-3 analysis will have to track the fact that the analysis was based on a design solution not 
completely frozen as an assumption. This is intended to ensure that, after the eventual design freeze, a 
check is carried out to verify that the latest design status has indeed been analyzed. If several design 
changes have occurred after the last issue of the analysis has been reviewed (based on a pre-design-freeze 
solution), all the design changes incorporated until the “design freeze” will be reviewed for potential MSG-3 
analysis impact as a “batch”. 
Design changes (i.e. modifications) that need to be incorporated in an analysis after the “design freeze” will 
be introduced into the analysis, and reviewed by the respective working group, on an individual basis. 
If a modification affecting the MSG-3 analysis is issued - or finalized - after the last applicable MWG meeting, 
all necessary changes shall be handled via e-mail between the MWG chair, the MWG members and the 
MRB/ISC advisors. The respective MWG chair will present the subsequent results to the ISC. 
3.4.2.3 REPERCUSSIONS OF MODIFICATIONS ON MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 
 
The A380 “maintenance program” comprises all documents that define the scheduled maintenance 
requirements/recommendations and that provide additional planning information and data on how to 
accomplish these scheduled tasks. In the context of the Policy and Procedures Handbook, however, only the 
impact on the MSG-3 analysis (including selection documents for MSIs, SSIs and zones) and the MRB 
Report will be addressed. 
Any change to the MRB Report needs to be justified by a change to the associated MSG-3 analysis. 
Therefore, if a modification/design change is considered to have an impact on the MRB Report, it will first of 
all affect the associated MSG-3 analysis. It is possible, of course, that a modification/design change affects 
an MSG-3 analysis without having repercussions on the MRB Report. 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
SECTION 3 - PAGE: 3-6 REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02
DATE : June 2006 
 
3.4.2.4 INCORPORATION IN MSG-3 ANALYSIS 
 
All modifications/design changes will be assessed for their impact on the maintenance program and those 
that have potential repercussions will be appropriately identified in the modification record. 
Once the repercussions on the affected analysis or analyses have been evaluated in detail, the manufacturer 
shall introduce the required changes to the MSG-3 analysis through an analysis revision that is identified by 
a changed issue date. This may include, for example, incorporation of a new function in an MSI analysis, a 
material change in an SSI analysis or a changed wiring routing in a zonal analysis. 
If a modification/design change has an impact on the descriptive part of an MSG-3 analysis only (e.g. Data 
Sheet A of an MSI analysis), the required change will be incorporated immediately but the analysis will only 
be presented for review in the respective working group: 
 
• after several of these “minor” changes can be covered at the same time, or 
• after it can be combined with the review of a more substantial change to the analysis, or 
• just prior to the conclusion of the main working group activity. 
Each required MSG-3 analysis revision and associated MRBR revision will be prioritized based on the 
Impact Code, Mod Closure Stage, First MSN implementation and the next planned annual MRB Review 
Meeting, as reflected in the A380 MFU Record Table. Mod Closure Stage signifies the maturity status of the 
Mod/MP couple. A Mod Closure Stage 3 meaning the freeze of the Mod/MP couple. 
 
As part of the analysis revision, the modifications incorporated in the analysis will be identified in the History 
of Changes and the descriptive part of the analysis (e.g. Data Sheet A of an MSI analysis). The History of 
Changes will, of course, only be affected if a modification has been added to the analysis after the first issue 
of the document has been released. For each modification/design change relevant to, and covered by, a 
given MSG-3 analysis, the modification number, the MP number (only if necessary to identify a part of a 
modification) and the modification title are to be stated. 
 
3.4.2.5 COMPLIANCE DEMONSTRATION 
 
Prior to the approval of the initial issue and all subsequent revisions of the A380 MRB Report, and at the 
issue of the Type Certificate (if this does not coincide with the2nd issue of the MRB Report), Airbus will 
demonstrate to the ISC and the MRB that all modifications comprising the required definition standard have 
been addressed. 
3.4.2.6 MODIFICATIONS REVIEW PROCESS FOR MAJOR SUPPLIERS 
 
The Modification Follow-Up procedure identified in §. 3.4.2.1 has been created to address modifications 
developed by Airbus according to the Aircraft Configuration Management Rules. Control is through Airbus 
generated numbering systems, which are integrated into Airbus software thus allowing robust follow-up. It is 
not intended that other manufacturers supplying equipment to Airbus use this system. However, where 
products are complex and are subjected to supplier generated MSG-3 analysis proposals (e.g. Powerplants), 
it is required that an appropriate means is identified within the manufacturer's organization to ensure that 
modifications implemented on the product are addressed for their impact on the analyses and compliance 
demonstration is provided by the manufacturer. Internal document to be used for Engine/Nacelles 
Manufacturers are: 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 3 - PAGE: 3-7
 DATE : June 2006
 
 
- Ref ALG_C.039for Rolls-Royce 
- Ref E-01 "GP7000 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT - Technical Coordination Procedure" for Engine 
Alliance 
- Ref TBD for Pratt & Whitney Canada 
- Ref BCD0031 for Hurel Hispano 
 
3.5 ASSUMPTIONS AFFECTING THE ANALYSIS 
At the end of the general description of the item analysed, a section titled “Assumptions Affecting the 
Analysis” is to be included. For the System Analyses, this shall be at the end of the Data Sheet A, for the 
Structure Analyses it will be at the end of the Supporting Data Sheet and for the Zonal Analyses it shall be at 
the end of the Illustration part of the Description Sheet 4. It shall be used to record all assumptions made for 
this specific analysis that have not been verified to be correct/true, including a short statement on the parts of 
the analysis affected. 
Beginning with the first presentation in the working group this section shall be part of the general description 
even when there is no entry in the section. In this case, the following statement is to be given: “No 
assumptions have been made that may affect the content and the results of this analysis”. 
• Once an assumption has been verified as correct/true, a statement explaining the reasons why the item 
has been closed is to be added to the original text. 
• If the assumption was not correct and the analysis had to be modified accordingly, an appropriate 
statement explaining the impact on the analysis is to be added to the original text together with a 
summary of the changes made to the analysis. 
In both cases the information on this former assumption including the date of closure shall be moved to a 
section titled “Closed Assumptions”, which will follow the section titled “Assumptions Affecting the Analysis”. 
All assumptions made in the analysis or as part of the analysis review that could not be verified as 
correct/true need to be tracked as open items. Assumptions are also reflected in the MSG3 Analysis Status 
List shown in Appendix B. 
3.6 EASA POLICY REQUIREMENTS FOR FUEL TANK SYSTEM IGNITION SOURCE 
PREVENTION 3.6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
EASA/FAA Policy requires the design approval holders (Airbus) to conduct a safety review of the fuel tank 
systems. The purpose of the Safety Review is to identify features of the design that may either cause or 
prevent development of ignition sources in the fuel tank system of the aircraft. 
 
Compliance with EASA policy (JAA INT/POL/25/12 and JAA recommendation letter 04/00/02/07/03-L024) 
and FAA SFAR 88 requires the identification of design features whose degradation or failure may result in 
development of ignition sources in the fuel tank systems. These design features are analysed within the 
A380 Fuel Tank Ignition Risk Hazard Analysis (FTIRHA) and MSG-3 analysis. 
 
 
3.6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
SECTION 3 - PAGE: 3-8 REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02
DATE : June 2006 
 
Compliance with EASA/FAA Policy results in two sets of maintenance instructions identified through two 
distinct processes (see process flowchart): 
 
• Those maintenance instructions that are directly related to unsafe conditions and require mandatory 
action. 
• Those maintenance instructions that are not directly related to unsafe conditions and require further 
analysis using MSG-3 
 
3.6.2.1 Those maintenance instructions that are directly related to unsafe conditions and require mandatory 
action.These are identified as Fuel Airworthiness Limitation Items (ALI) Fuel ALIs constitute mandatory 
maintenance of the fuel system that can include Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) 
and inspections to ensure that unsafe conditions, identified by the A380 Fuel Tank Ignition Risk Hazard 
Analysis, do not occur and are not introduced into the fuel system as a result of maintenance actions, 
repairs, or alterations throughout the operational life of the aircraft. Fuel ALIs are divided into two categories: 
• Maintenance / Inspection Tasks 
and 
• Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCLs) 
3.6.2.1.1 Maintenance / Inspection Tasks 
 
ALIs may include repetitive Maintenance / Inspection tasks that shall be performed within a defined interval 
according to specific accomplishment instructions developed by the manufacturer. The need for these 
limitations is derived from compliance with AC 25.981-1B. It shall be noted that all tasks required to support 
25.1309 compliance will be identified as Candidate Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs) and 
assessed in accordance with AMC 25-19 to determine which require CMR status. 
 
3.6.2.1.2 Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) 
In terms of Fuel Tank Safety requirements, a CDCCL is a limitation required to preserve a critical ignition 
source prevention feature of the fuel system design that is necessary to prevent the occurrence of an unsafe 
condition identified by the Fuel Tank Safety review process. 
 
The purpose of the CDCCL is to provide instructions to retain the critical ignition source prevention feature 
during configuration change that may be caused by alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions. 
A critical ignition source prevention feature may exist in the fuel system and its related installation or in 
systems that if a failure condition were to develop could interact with the fuel system in such a way that an 
unsafe condition would develop in the fuel system without this limitation.3.6.2.2 Those maintenance 
instructions that are not directly related to unsafe conditions and require further analysis using MSG-3 
 
In addition to developing ALIs to address unsafe conditions, the design approval holder must develop 
maintenance instructions for those features of fuel tank system design that, while not requiring ALIs, 
contribute to preventing an ignition source from occurring or developing. The A380 Fuel Tank Ignition Risk 
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Hazard Analysis of the fuel tank system will identify all ignition source prevention features of the fuel tank 
system design. 
 
The design approval holder must develop Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) for any ignition 
source prevention feature that has not been directly addressed in the assessment of an unsafe condition. 
These maintenance instructions shall be developed using the guidance in the EASA/FAA policy statement 
together with the existing MSG-3 based maintenance development processes explained in this PPH. The 
instructions shall be added to existing Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. The purpose of these 
instructions is to ensure the preservation of those features of the design intended to precludeignition 
sources in the fuel tank system during the operational life of the aircraft. 
3.6.3 IDENTIFICATION OF MAINTENANCE SIGNIFICANT ITEMS 
The safety review of the ignition-prevention features that is required by EASA/FAA policy (i.e. the A380 Fuel 
Tank Ignition Risk Hazard Analysis) will identify ignition source prevention features as safety significant for 
the fuel tank system. It is necessary to review these features to ensure that they are included in 
Maintenance Significant Items developed to address the need for maintenance and inspection instructions 
for the continued airworthiness of the fuel tank system. 
 
The design approval holder shall identify all ignition source prevention features that are incorporated in the 
design of the fuel tank system and systems adjacent to it. This shall be performed taking into account 
lessons learned from worldwide experience as detailed in the Fuel Tank Safety regulations. To accomplish 
this task, the MSG-3 analyst will refer to the A380 Fuel Tank Ignition Risk Hazard Analysis that is also 
required to identify such features. 
 
Having identified the ignition source prevention features, the design approval holder shall consider them as 
MSIs in accordance with regulatory guidance material. Though these could be handled as dedicated MSIs or 
be addressed as new functions in MSI analyses developed to assess other systems/sub-systems, for the 
A380 they will be included in a single MSI dossier grouping together all airframe related ignition source 
prevention features related to Fuel Tank Safety. 
3.6.4 ANALYSIS OF FUNCTION AND FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OF IGNITION 
PREVENTION FEATURES 
 
For each ignition source prevention feature identified in the MSI, the analyst shall determine the function(s), 
functional failure(s), failure effect(s), and failure cause(s). This will be followed by the determination of failure 
consequences (level 1 analysis) and task selection / interval determination (level 2 analysis) in accordance 
with the standard MSG-3 process. 
 
A detailed understanding of the fuel tank system and the A380 Fuel Tank Ignition Risk Hazard Analysis 
required by the EASA/FAA policy is necessary to formulate the functional failures and develop the 
maintenance instructions. 
 
Application of Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedure (EZAP) logic ensures appropriate attention is given to 
wiring installations in order to minimize risk of deterioration that might develop into a source of ignition. Tasks 
resulting from EZAP application contribute to ignition prevention. These will either be included in the ZIP or 
be identified as dedicated tasks in MRB Report Section C under ATA 20. Tasks related to zones in or 
adjacent to fuel tanks shall be considered as part of the set of tasks required for Fuel Tank Safety 
compliance. 
 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
SECTION 3 - PAGE: 3-10 REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02
DATE : June 2006 
 
As explained previously, features that contribute to airframe related ignition prevention functions will be 
analysed in a dedicated MSG-3 analysis under MSI 28-18-00 titled ‘Ignition Prevention’. This will be 
submitted to MWG/ISC members for review in accordance with the same maintenance program 
development process used for other MSIs. 
3.6.5 TASK TRACEABILITY 
 
It is important that any ignition prevention measure, once established, is maintained for the life of the aircraft 
and due consideration be given to any proposed amendment or escalation. Task traceability and 
identification is achieved for all functional failures associated with ignition prevention by virtue of the fact that 
all are analysed in MSI 28-18-00. 
 
These tasks are to remain in MSI 28-18-00 and are not to be transferred, thus ensuring that tasks for 
ignition prevention will be visible to the Operators, Authorities, and OEMs for the life of the Aircraft. 
To ensure appropriate handling of new or modified functions/functional failures, specialists must check when 
updating any MSG-3 analysis (e.g. when considering modifications using the MFU tool) that systems in fuel 
tanks, and in areas adjacent to fuel tanks, have also to be assessed for potential impact on MSI 28-18-00. 
This additional analysis will need to be taken into consideration before any amendment to the maintenance 
program will be considered complete. To ensure future traceability a “statement of origin” must be included in 
MSI 28-18-00 Data Sheet A dossiers as follows: 
 
 
MSI 28-18-00 and the associated Fuel System A380 Fuel Tank Ignition Risk Hazard Analysis originate from 
the requirements for compliance with: 
1) FAA Document ANM112-05-001 Policy Statement on Process for Developing SFAR 88-related 
Instructions for Maintenance and Inspection of Fuel Tank Systems (dated October 6, 2004), 
2) ‘Guidance on EASA Fuel Tank Safety letter (INT/POL/25/12) and its implementation’ appended to EASA 
letter D2005/CPRO/RH/50213 titled ‘EASA policy statement on the process for developing instructions for 
maintenance and inspection of fuel tank system ignition source prevention’ (dated 5 Aug 05) 
 
In addition, the following statement is to be inserted into the introduction of Section C of 
the MRBR: 
 
During a review of an aircraft system for the purpose of modifying or verifying the maintenance 
requirements, the reviewer must be aware that those functions associated with the ignition 
prevention features of all systems are identified and analysed in MSI 28-18-00 Ignition Prevention. 
Any review of an existing MSI task must therefore consider that it may be necessary to review MSI 
28-18-00 in addition to the specific system MSI identified. 
 
 
 
 
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REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 3 - PAGE: 3-11
 DATE : June 2006
 
Fuel Tank Safety Analysis Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - Also DELETE existing FLOW Chart in PPH Issue 11 for Paragraph 3- 
 
 
 
 
 
This diagram is added to show process flow and should be used in accordance 
with the EASA policy Statement EASA D 2005/CPRO/RH/50213 for process and 
definition. 
4 AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION ASSUMPTIONS 
The assumed range of aircraft utilization to be taken into account by the Working Groups when performing the 
MSG-3 analyses and determining the applicable maintenance requirements and their intervals is as follows: 
− Assumed Flight Hours (FH) range per year: 2,000 to 6,000 
− Assumed Flight Cycles (FC) range per year: 360 to 1100 
No Unsafe 
Condition 
Safety 
Assessmen
Unsafe Condition ?
Unsafe Condition 
Post MSG ICA
Maintenance Task
Development
(EZAP)
 Pre MSG TC/STC 
Holders 
Recommended 
Maintenance 
Tasks (EZAP) 
Yes No
Redesign
(No applicable
task identified)
Update MRB
Report
 Approved 
Maintenance 
Program 
Document 
Recommended
Standard Practices
 Introduction of fuel 
system ALIs, incl. 
CDCCLs, into 
Airworthiness 
Limitation Section 
 Standard Practices 
Manual 
Maintenance
Planning
Document &
MRBR
Highlight in AMM
task
accomplishment
instruction
 Service Bulletin
Airworthiness
Limitation Item
(ALI)
Configuration 
Management 
(CDCCL) 
Maintenance
&
Inspection
Instructions
Examples of where the required ALI and ICA information should be placed 
 
Maintenance Instruction Development
(resulting ICA required to be implemented into existing fuel system
Maintenance programs per ops rules) 
Operational 
Procedures 
 Design 
Modifications 
 Interim Actions 
Associated with 
Design 
Modification 
(if Required) 
 
Mandatory Corrective Action 
(14 CFR part 39) 
Reference - Not addressed in 
Policy Statement
Safety Assessment 
Items Identification
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
SECTION 3 - PAGE: 3-12 REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02
DATE : June 2006 
 
These values are intended to be used as a reference and do not imply a rigid limit to the validity of the analyses 
performed. Should in service utilization data collectedshow that actual utilization figures significantly deviate 
from these values, the ISC/MRB must be informed and appropriate actions established. 
The scope of aircraft utilization under consideration addresses that expected to be achieved by A380 aircraft 
operating medium and long haul routes. It does not address the routine use of the aircraft on short haul 
routes such as domestic shuttle services. Such operations would lead to significantly higher flight cycles per 
year which could impact task threshold and interval selection. The short haul mission would therefore need 
to be addressed separately. 
 
5 INTERVAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The A380 design objective is to have no maintenance task interval below 750FH. The airframe inspection 
aims for structure are: 
- Environmental Deterioration: 12 years as general threshold for initial inspection (exception may be 
granted for corrosive sensitive areas) and a repetitive inspection of 6 years. 
- Fatigue Damage: Threshold of 7600FC/56000FH and repetitive interval of 3800FC/28000FH. 
MWGs are tasked to select the most appropriate usage parameter (flight hours, engine hours, flight cycles, 
calendar time, etc) for the required maintenance tasks. In the absence of related in-service experience for 
similar design and test data, the proposed initial interval can be based on the following interval framework, 
which is intended as guidance material. Eventually the MWG will evaluate actual in-service experience to 
justify the evolution of optimized intervals. 
 
 
 
Intervals 
750 FH /1.5 months 
1500 FH / 3 months 
3000 FH / 6 months 
6000 FH / 12 months 
24 months and 48 months 
72 months 
144 months 
 
 
However, the MWGs have the flexibility to choose any appropriate interval other than these target 
intervalsTo facilitate the interval selection process, MWGs may also use pre-determined intervals at 
intermediate steps, between the above-mentioned framework figures. These intermediate steps can be 
multiples of 250 FH for intervals below 1500 FH and multiples of 500 FH for intervals above 1500 FH. 
The following figures could possibly be taken into consideration for interval determination: 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 3 - PAGE: 3-13
 DATE : June 2006
 
FH: 250, 500, 750, 1000, 1250, 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000, 3500, 4000, 4500, 5000, 5500, 6000, etc. 
CAL: 1 Month; 2M, 3M, 6M, 9M, 1 Year, 2 Y, 3 Y, 4 Y, 5 Y, 6 Y, 12 Y, etc. 
FC: 100, 150, 200, 300, 400, 500, 750, 1000, 1250, 1500, 1750, 2000, etc. 
Irrespective of what interval is chosen, substantiation must be documented to support every case. 
The following usage parameters can be used: 
• Flight cycles (FC) 
• Flight hours (FH) 
• Calendar time (CT) 
• APU hours 
• Engine cycles 
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 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 4 - PAGE: 4-1
 DATE :June 2006
 
SECTION 4: SYSTEMS AND POWERPLANT ANALYSIS 
PROCEDURE 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This section of the PPH is based on, and a further development of, the information given in section 2.3 of the 
referenced MSG-3 document. It is intended to provide all the procedural details necessary for the 
accomplishment of the analysis of systems and power plant, including APU and components, and does not 
require additional consultation of the MSG-3 document. Therefore, if the text in MSG-3 and the PPH are not 
identical, the procedural arrangements of the PPH will prevail. 
Although this section of the PPH is intended to be a self-contained document, it is recommended that, prior 
to commencing the analysis, the MSG-3 methodology document be studied in depth by all users. Particular 
attention is drawn to the need to fully understand the route or failure effect category selection and the task 
applicability and effectiveness criteria. 
2 PRINCIPLES 
2.1 OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of efficient aircraft scheduled maintenance for systems are the same as for structure, i.e. to 
ensure realization of the inherent safety and reliability levels of the aircraft, to restore safety and reliability to 
their inherent levels when deterioration has occurred, to obtain the information necessary for design 
improvement of those items whose inherent reliability proves inadequate and to accomplish these goals at a 
minimum total cost (including maintenance costs and the costs of resulting failures). 
2.2 CONTENT 
The content of a scheduled maintenance program consists of a group of scheduled tasks to be 
accomplished at specified intervals. The objective of these tasks is to prevent deterioration of the inherent 
safety and reliability levels of the aircraft. 
The scheduled maintenance tasks for systems and power plant, including APU and components, may 
include Lubrication/Servicing (LUB/SVC), Operational/Visual Check (OPC/VCK), Inspection/Functional 
Check (GVI, DET, SDI / FNC), Restoration (RST) and Discard (DIS). 
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A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
SECTION 4 - PAGE: 4-2 REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02
DATE : June 2006 
 
 
3 BASIC ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
The method for determining the scheduled maintenance tasks for systems and power plant is based on a 
progressive logic diagram laid down in the MSG-3 document. This logic is the basis for an evaluation 
technique applied to Maintenance Significant Items (MSI), i.e. items that are considered significant because 
of possible safety, operational or economic repercussions or because they contain failures that are hidden. 
The process to be followed comprises the following basic analysis steps: 
MSI Selection 
1. Establishment of a logical breakdown of the aircraft into functional areas. 
2. Selection of Maintenance Significant Items, i.e. items to which the detailed analysis logic is applied. 
3. Approval of Candidate MSI Selection List by the Industry Steering Committee. 
MSI Analysis 
1. Collection of basic MSI data and establishment of an MSI description. 
2. Development of the MSI’s functions, functional failures, failure effects and failure causes. 
3. Categorization of functional failures in accordance with their failure effects. 
4. Determination of tasks based on rigorous selection criteria. 
5. Establishment of intervals for the selected tasks. 
6. Combination of tasks (if feasible and efficient). 
7. Establishment of data for task planning and task accomplishment. 
8. Review of data prepared by manufacturer in Maintenance Working Group. 
9. Review and approval of MWG data in Industry Steering Committee. 
 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 4 - PAGE: 4-3
 DATE :June 2006
 
 
4 DETAILED PROCEDURAL STEPS 
 
Note: The use of the acronym “OEM” in the steps 2.1 to 2.3, 3.1 to 3.7, 5.1, 5.3, 5.6 and 6.4 of paragraph 4-4 
refers to the fact that MSI analysis proposals may be established, presented and revised on behalf of 
Airbus by engine, APU and landing gear manufacturers as well as by major system suppliers. In these 
cases, Airbus however retains the final responsibility for the content of any analysis that is presented 
on behalf of Airbus. 
4.1 SELECTION OF MSIs 
STEP 
No. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
1.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM 
BREAKDOWN 
- Identification of the system, sub-system, sub-
sub-system and component breakdown for 
every ATA chapter in the ATA-Breakdown of 
the A380 aircraft 
OAM 4-5.1 N/A 
 
1.2 ADMINISTRATIVE 
DATA FOR MSI 
SELECTION 
- Establishment of data for administrative pages 
of MSI Selection (i.e. Cover Sheet, List of 
Effective Pages, List of Revisions) 
OAM 4-5.2 
4-5.3 
MSI 
Selection 
sheets 
1 to 3 
 
 
1.3 MSI SELECTION - Identification of the aircraft systems, sub-
systems, sub-sub-systems and components in 
a top-down manner 
- Determination of the items to be subjected to a 
MSG-3 analysis 
- Determination of the Highest Manageable 
Level for the analysis 
- Identification of those items not subjectedto 
MSG-3 analysis 
- To provide a justification for items not selected 
as MSIs (and for which no MSG-3 analysis will 
be established) 
- Identification of the WG responsible for 
analysis review 
OAM 4-5.1 
4-5.2 
MSI 
Selection 
sheet 
4 
It must be 
ensured that the 
complete aircraft 
(including 
structural ATA - 
chapters) is 
covered during 
MSI selection 
 
1.4 ISC REVIEW OF MSI 
SELECTION 
(To be done as early 
as possible during the 
ISC activities) 
- Review of “Candidate” MSI selection lists 
- Provisional approval of items selected 
- Allocation of MSIs to the working groups 
- Estimation of WG workload and detailed 
planning for WG activities 
ISC 2-2.2.2 N/A Aim is to 
provisionally 
approve the MSI 
Selection before 
the MSG-3 
analysis for an 
item is 
established 
 
1.5 MWG REVIEW OF 
MSI SELECTION 
(To be done in 
conjunction with the 
other WG activities, 
see step 5.2) 
- Detailed review of MSI selection lists 
- Agreement on items for which a full MSG-3 
analysis will be reviewed by the MWG 
- To modify the MSI Selection as required by the 
results of the review in the MWG 
- Reporting of all changes to the MSI Selection 
to the ISC 
MW
G 
2-2.3.2 
4-5.1 
4-9 
N/A 
 - 
4.2 MSI DOCUMENTATION 
STEP 
No. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
2.1 ADMINISTRATIVE 
DATA FOR MSI 
ANALYSIS 
- Establishment of data for administrative pages 
of MSI analysis (i.e. Cover sheet, List of 
Effective Pages, List of Revisions, History of 
Changes) 
OEM 4-6.2 Cover 
sheet, 
LEP, 
LOR,HOC 
 
 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
SECTION 4 - PAGE: 4-4 REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02
DATE : June 2006 
 
STEP 
No. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
2.2 DESCRIPTION OF 
MSI 
- Concise description of all design features 
related to the MSI analysis, including relevant 
schematics and data to facilitate discussion of 
maintenance issues 
- Stating of assumptions relevant to the analysis.
- Listing of all modifications relevant to, and 
covered by, the analysis. 
OEM 4-6.3 
4-6.3.3 
Data 
Sheet A/ 
Item 
Descriptio
n 
 
 
2.3 COMPONENT DATA - Compilation of basic data for all relevant 
components that the MSI comprises of (at the 
analysis level or Highest Manageable Level) 
- Compilation of reliability data and a statement 
about the source of these data 
- Provision of information on redundancies, 
relevant service experience and MMEL status 
OEM 4-6.3
4-6.3.2 
Data 
Sheet A/ 
Compo-
nent Data 
 
 
4.3 MSI ANALYSIS 
STEP 
No. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
3.1 FAILURE ANALYSIS - Determination of the functions (F), functional 
failures (FF), failure effects (FE) and failure 
causes (FC) 
OEM 4-6.4 Data 
Sheet B 
Utmost care is to 
be taken during 
this step as it has 
a significant 
influence on the 
result of the 
analysis 
 
3.2 LEVEL 1 ANALYSIS - Determination of the Failure Effect Category 
(FEC) for each functional failure based on 
failure consequences 
OEM 4-6.5 Level 1 
Analysis 
 
 
3.3 LEVEL 2 ANALYSIS - Application of the task selection logic to each 
failure cause 
- Selection of scheduled maintenance tasks 
based on task applicability and effectiveness 
criteria 
- To justify, by the strict application of the 
analysis logic and the associated selection 
criteria, that for some failure causes, no task 
needs to be selected 
OEM 4-6.6 Level 2 
Analysis 
 
 
3.4 INTERVAL 
DETERMINATION 
- Determination of the most appropriate usage 
parameter 
Determination of an interval for each task 
considered applicable and effective (including 
statement of interval justification) 
OEM 4-6.7 Level 2 
Analysis 
Objective is to 
determine the 
highest possible 
task interval 
 
3.5 TASK SUMMARY - To summarize all tasks selected during Level 2 
analysis in a single place 
OEM 4-6.9.1 Task 
Summary 
Sheet 
 
 
3.6 MRBR INTERFACE 
DATA 
- To combine tasks as appropriate for the MRB 
Report 
- Establishment of those additional data not 
derived from the MSG-3 analysis but 
nevertheless required for the task part of the 
MRB Report 
OEM 4-6.9.2 MRBR 
Interface 
Sheet 
 
 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 4 - PAGE: 4-5
 DATE :June 2006
 
STEP 
No. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
3.7 TASK DATA - Establishment of a concise task 
accomplishment procedure for each task 
proposed for the MRBR 
- Determination of typical planning data for each 
MRBR task 
- Provision of task interval substantiation/ 
justification information for each task on the 
MRBR Interface sheet 
OEM 4-6.9.3 Task Data Aim is to provide 
the working group 
with the 
information 
necessary to 
judge the 
resource 
requirements for a 
proposed task 
and to inform the 
authors of the 
AMM about the 
scope and the 
intentions for a 
task and the 
assumptions 
made 
 
 
 
4.4 PREPARATION FOR REVIEW. 
STEP 
No. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
4.1 DISPATCH OF 
ANALYSIS 
- Distribution of complete MSG-3 Systems 
analysis package to all MWG members and 
advisors prior to a working group meeting in 
accordance with paragraph 2-5.3 of the PPH. 
OAM 2-5.3 N/A Intent is to allow 
MWG members and 
advisors an 
adequate time frame 
to review all data 
from the 
manufacturer 
 
4.2 INTERNAL REVIEW - Review of analysis package provided by 
manufacturer as preparation for the WG 
meeting 
OP
AA 
2-2.3 
2-5.3 
N/A 
 
 
4.5 MAINTENANCE WORKING GROUP REVIEW 
STEP 
No. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO 
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
5.1 SYSTEM DESIGN 
PRESENTATION 
- Presentation of design features for a complete 
ATA-chapter (before review of the MSI 
selection) 
OEM 4-9 N/A 
 
5.2 REVIEW OF MSI 
SELECTION 
(See Step 1.4) 
 
- Presentation, review, discussion and 
eventually agreement on the content of the 
MSI selection per ATA-chapter 
MWG 4-5 
4-9 
 MSI 
Selection 
sheets 
1 to 4 
 
 
5.3 DESIGN 
PRESENTATION 
(Per MSI) 
- Presentation of design features for the part of 
the aircraft covered by an individual analysis 
(before review of an individual analysis) 
OEM 4-9 N/A 
 
5.4 REVIEW OF MSI 
ANALYSES 
- Presentation, review, discussion and 
eventually agreement on the content of each 
MSI analysis 
MWG 4-6 
4-9 
All MSI 
analysis 
sheets 
 
 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
SECTION 4 - PAGE: 4-6 REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02
DATE : June 2006 
 
STEP 
No. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO 
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
5.5 WORKING GROUP 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
- Transfers to other MWGs, including Zonal 
MWG 
- Open items for further WG discussion 
- Items to be raised for ISC consideration and 
decision 
MWG 4-9 --- 
 
5.6 REWORK OF 
ANALYSES 
- Update of the analysis in accordance with the 
decisions of the WG, including Cover sheet, 
List of Effective Pages, List of Revisions and 
History of Changes 
OEM 4-6 All 
affected 
sheets 
 
 
 
 
4.6 INDUSTRY STEERING COMMITTEE REVIEW 
STEP 
No. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO 
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
6.1 ISC REVIEW OF MSI 
SELECTION 
- Review and agreement of MSI selection lists 
presented by the working groups 
- Approval of items selected for analysis 
ISC 
2-2.2
4-5 
 MSI 
Selection 
sheets 
1 to 4 
 
 
6.2 REVIEW OF MSI 
ANALYSES RESULTS 
- Review, discussion and eventual approval of 
tasks selected by WG, including task 
description, interval and other data necessary 
for MRBR coverage 
ISC 2-2.2
4-6 
MRBR 
Interface 
Sheet 
 
 
6.3 REVIEW OF ITEMS 
RAISED FOR ISC 
CONSIDERATION 
AND DECISION 
- Review, discussion and eventual agreement of 
items raised for ISC consideration and decision
ISC 2-2.2 N/A 
 
6.4 REWORK OF 
ANALYSES 
- Update of the analysisin accordance with the 
decisions of the ISC (as required) 
OEM 4-6 As 
required 
Intent is to keep 
the analysis in 
agreement with the 
content of the 
MRB Report 
 
6.5 INTEGRATION OF 
TASKS INTO 
MAINTENANCE 
PROGRAM 
PROPOSAL (DRAFT 
MRB REPORT) 
- Establishment of a draft of the Systems and 
Power plant Section of the MRB Report 
ISC 2-2 N/A 
 
 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 4 - PAGE: 4-7
 DATE :June 2006
 
5 MSI SELECTION 
Before the actual MSG-3 logic can be applied to an item, the aircraft's significant systems and components 
must be identified. A “significant” item for systems and power plant is called a “Maintenance Significant Item” 
or “MSI”. These are items fulfilling defined selection criteria (see Step 3., below) for which MSI analyses are 
established at the highest manageable level. Items fulfilling the selection criteria that are analyzed at 
another, higher, level are not called MSIs but MSI Elements. 
5.1 MSI SELECTION PROCESS 
The process of identifying Maintenance Significant Items is a conservative process (using engineering 
judgment) based on the anticipated consequences of failure. The top-down approach is a process of 
identifying the significant items on the aircraft at the highest manageable level. 
The MSI selection process for A380 is as follows: 
Step 1 
Based on the latest available issue of the A380 Basic Approved ATA Breakdown Index (BAABI), the aircraft 
is partitioned into major functional areas: ATA systems, sub-systems and sub-sub-systems. This process 
continues until all on-aircraft replaceable components have been identified. 
Although this list will not be a part of the MSI selection documentation, the data from this step will be retained 
for reference purposes. 
Step 2 
Using a top-down approach, the list of items to which the MSI selection questions will be applied is 
established by partitioning the aircraft systems (starting with the ATA-system level). 
All ATA-chapters from 21 to 80 should be considered and the results documented in this step (even if no MSI 
analysis needs to be established for a given ATA-chapter). 
Items within the structural ATA-chapters that lend themselves to system analysis (e.g., fuselage drains, door 
mechanisms, etc.) should be included in this step. In addition, all safety/emergency systems or equipment 
should also be included. 
NOTE: 
Regulatory policy developed for fuel tank system safety Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) 
requires the identification of design features whose failure or deterioration may result in development of 
ignition sources in the fuel tank systems; e.g., the bonding subsystem to carry electrical current generated in 
the event of lightning, and the wire harnesses in and around fuel tanks that maintain separation to prevent 
wire contact/chafing. These design features are to be included in MSI selection and analysis. 
This step is carried out concurrently with Step 3. 
Step 3 
The following questions are applied to the items identified in Step 2: 
a) Could failure be undetectable or not likely to be detected by the operating crew during normal 
duties? 
b) Could failure affect safety (on ground or in flight), including safety/emergency systems or 
equipment? 
c) Could failure have significant operational impact? 
d) Could failure have significant economic impact? 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
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DATE : June 2006 
 
 
This step is carried out concurrently with Step 2 (i.e., while the list of items is established by partitioning the 
aircraft systems, the above selection questions are applied until the Highest Manageable Level is reached). 
In order to refine the answers to the selection questions, it is optionally possible to check the FEC-selection 
of similar analyses from other aircraft programs. 
Step 4 
Depending on the answers to the four selection questions, two cases may be distinguished: 
a) For those items for which at least one of the four questions is answered with a "YES", MSG-3 analysis is 
required, and the highest manageable level must be confirmed. 
Consideration should be given to selecting a higher manageable level that includes this item as part of 
that higher-level system. 
An MSI is usually a system or sub-system, and is, in most cases, one level above the lowest (on-aircraft) 
level identified in Step 1. This level is considered the highest manageable level; i.e., one that is high 
enough to avoid unnecessary analysis, but low enough to be properly analyzed and ensure that all 
functions, functional failures and failure causes are covered. 
Once an analysis has been selected and the Highest Manageable Level determined, MSI selection can 
be terminated. 
 It is not necessary to list components if it has already been determined that the analysis of the 
affected item takes place at a higher level, e.g. sub-system level. 
 However, in all cases, systems, sub-systems and sub-sub-systems (as identified by the first 2, 3 and 
4 digits of the ATA - Breakdown) must be listed on the selection sheet (e.g. 21-00-00, 21-10-00, 21-
11-00, 21-12-00, etc.), even if the analysis takes place at a higher level. 
 Items that are not (or not yet) covered in the ATA-Breakdown may be added if required. 
b) For those items for which all four questions are answered with a "NO", MSG-3 analysis is not required. 
In this case, although MSI selection analysis is not necessary at lower levels (in accordance with MSG-
3), the list of lower-level items not covered by MSG-3 analysis must be presented to the ISC for review 
and approval. Therefore, the MSI selection list shall be used to identify those items that will not be further 
assessed. 
If no analysis has been selected at the sub-sub-system level, the selection list for the sub-sub-system 
must be expanded until a lower-level analysis has been selected or until all items listed in the ATA-
Breakdown are covered. Items that are not (or not yet) covered in the ATA-Breakdown may be added if 
required. 
Step 5 
Once the highest manageable level is confirmed per Step 4, the resulting list of items is now considered the 
"Candidate MSI List" and is presented to the ISC. The ISC, in turn, reviews and approves this list for 
subsequent allocation and distribution to the Working Groups. 
Step 6 
The working groups will review the MSI List provisionally approved by the ISC and validate the selected 
MSIs at their highest manageable level, or (if required) propose modification of the MSI list to the ISC. 
The primary aim of the working group review is to verify that no significant item has been overlooked, and 
that the right level for the analysis has been chosen. 
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Although an item may be selected as an MSI and will be analyzed, this does not imply that a task will 
necessarily result from the analysis. 
Additional guidance: 
The MSI selection process is a conservative process based on the anticipated consequences of failure and 
is being carried out before the full MSI analysis is performed. As the rules for MSI selection and MSI analysis 
are different, it is not considered necessary to modify the results of the MSI selection in order to bring the 
selection data in agreement with the results of the subsequent MSI analysis. If this is done on an optional 
basis, the following can be used as a guide for checking the validity of the initial selection answers: 
- For an item that is associated with a FEC 8 or 9, the selection question a) (hidden failure) should have 
been answered with a Yes. 
- For an item that is associated with a FEC 5 or 8, the selection question b) (safety) should have been 
answered with a Yes. 
- For an item that is associated with a FEC 6, the selection question c) (operational impact) should have 
been answered with a Yes. 
The MSI selectiondata are to be maintained up-to-date during the life of the A380 aircraft in order to provide 
traceability of MSI selection decisions. Therefore, if additional aircraft models or modifications need to be 
covered by the selection or if other reasons require a modification of the selection data, the MSI selection 
documentation is to be updated accordingly. 
The MSI selection process for new A380 models (example A380-800F) also involves the use of the MSI 
Validation List in accordance with paragraph 5.2.2. 
5.2 MSI SELECTION DOCUMENTATION AND DATA 
5.2.1 SELECTION DOSSIER 
The MSI selection data for A380 are contained in a single consolidated document and thus not part of any 
individual MSI analysis document. This document will be kept up-to-date in order to provide the required 
traceability for all selection decisions. It is the responsibility of the Assistant to the ISC Co-Chair to 
incorporate and consolidate all changes made by either the ISC or the working groups 
The document consists of the following parts: 
- A Cover sheet, a List of Effective Pages and a List of Revisions to allow tracking of changes. 
- MSI selection lists covering all relevant ATA-chapters. ATA-chapters that do not contain any hardware 
and are used for procedural information only, do not have to be listed (e.g. ATA-chapters 20 and 70). 
The data package for each ATA-chapter consists of a single consolidated MSI selection list (which may 
consist of several pages) that is reissued complete when the need for revision arises. 
5.2.1.1 ITEMS ON SELECTION LIST 
The following items are to be listed on the selection list for an ATA-chapter: 
- The ATA-system (as identified by the first 2 digits of the ATA-Breakdown, e.g. 21-00-00), 
- All sub-systems (as identified by the first 3 digits of the ATA-Breakdown, e.g. 21-10-00), 
- All sub-sub-systems (as identified by the first 4 digits of the ATA – Breakdown, e.g. 21-11-00, 21-12-00, 
etc.), 
- Components (as required; see below). Items that are not (or not yet) covered in the ATA-Breakdown 
may be added if required. 
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- When listing items on the selection sheets, the following restrictions/qualifications are to be observed: 
o Components are only to be listed if no MSI analysis has been selected at the level of the sub-sub-
system and at higher levels (i.e. sub-system and system level). 
o Any item covered on a selection list that is not applicable to all models/versions/variants is to be 
clearly identified in the column "Applicability / Remarks". 
- Items that are part of the ATA-breakdown but are not applicable to the models covered in the MSI 
selection will not be shown on the selection sheets. 
5.2.1.2 DETERMINATION OF ANALYSIS LEVEL 
For each item listed on the selection sheet, 
- The ATA-reference (six digits) and the associated designation must be given 
- The four selection questions must be answered with either a “YES” or “NO”. A “YES” - answer indicates 
that the item must be analyzed. 
o If the item under consideration is above the level for which an analysis is established, the YES or NO 
answers still have to be given in the four columns. 
o In this case, the upper level answer must reflect the answers given for the lower level items. This 
means that a “NO” shall only be given at an upper level if the lower level answers are all “NO”. On 
the other hand, if at least one lower level answer is “YES”, the upper level answer must also be 
“YES”. 
If one of the four selection questions is answered with a YES, the following cases can occur: 
- If the item under consideration is at the level where the analysis is carried out, a "YES" is placed in the 
column "MSI". 
- If the item is analyzed at a higher level, the ATA-reference of the item which covers/includes the item 
under consideration must be given in the column "Highest Manageable Level". The column “MSI” is not 
marked with a “YES”. 
- If the item is above the analysis level, a hyphen (“-“) is placed in the column "MSI" (as no analysis will 
be established for this item). 
If all four questions are answered with a NO, a “NO” is placed in the column "MSI". 
- Items/components that are used for maintenance purposes only and do not need to be analyzed (as 
their failure cannot, by definition, have an impact on operation and safety) fall into this category as well. 
In addition to the four NOs in the selection question columns and the NO in the column “MSI”, the 
“Applicability/Remarks” column shall be used to identify the items as maintenance items. 
This means that for every item on the selection list, a statement is given in either the column “MSI” (“YES” or 
“NO” or “-“) or the column “Highest Manageable Level”. 
If certain items/components are intentionally not covered by a higher-level analysis (although the ATA-
Breakdown identifies them as part of the higher-level item to be analyzed), then these items/components 
need to be clearly identified as being excluded from the higher-level analysis. These items are then MSIs in 
their own right. For example, if the MSI 35-20-00 does not include MSI 35-24-00 (because a separate 
analysis has been established for this item), then the MSI selection must make this fact obvious. 
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Fig 5.2. Example of MSI Selection Sheet 
5.2.1.3 JUSTIFICATION OF ITEMS NOT SELECTED 
For all items not selected as an MSI, 
- A brief explanation of the reasons why the item was not considered an MSI or MSI element is to be given 
in the column “Applicability/Remarks”. 
- A full justification will be provided during ISC and MWG review of the MSI selection data (if required by 
additional material presented during the review session). 
There is no need to prepare additional justification material for items selected as an MSI. 
5.2.2 MSI VALIDATION LIST (for A380-800F and other new A380 Models ) 
5.2.2.1 GENERAL 
The MSI Validation List must be used in conjunction with the Selection Dossier identified in 
paragraph 5.2.1 , when evaluating the A380-800F model. 
 
For each MSI Validation exercise, the MSI Validation List will be retained as a single central 
document and is thus not a part of any individual MSI-analysis document. 
 
For each ATA Chapter, a single MSI Validation List (See appendix B Item 7) will be 
established by the manufacturer as an input for MWG and ISC presentation. 
 
It is the responsibility of the Assistant to the ISC Co-Chair to incorporate and consolidate all 
changes made by either the ISC or the working groups. 
 
• A YES in this 
column indicates that 
an analysis exists for 
the item. 
• A NO in this 
column indicates that 
all 4 selection 
questions have been 
answered with a NO 
and that no analysis 
is required. 
• A hyphen (--
-) in this column 
indicates that at least 
one of the 4 
selection questions 
has been answered 
with a YES and that 
the analysis is 
carried out at a lower
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5.2.2.2 DATA TO BE ENTERED 
The effect of the A380-800F design differences on the existing A380 MSG-3 analysis, must 
be recorded for each MSI referenced in the MSI Validation List, by entering an “X” in the 
corresponding column for the following categories: 
 
- Analysis not applicable: The existing A380 Analysis is not applicable to the new A380-
800F model. 
- Analysis unchanged: The existing A380 Analysis is also valid for the new A380-800F 
model. (See paragraph 5.2.2.3, Additional Guidance) 
- Analysis modified: The existing A380 Analysis must be modified to accommodate the 
new A380-800F model differences. 
- New Analysis: A completely new MSG3 Analysis must be created for the new A380-
800F model. 
 
The “Remarks” column in the MSI Validation List is intended to record other remarks,for 
example to indicate if MSI Analyses have been combined. 
 
No. STEPS TO FOLLOW WHEN A NEW A380 MODEL IS INTRODUCED 
(example, A380-800F) 
REQUIRED 
FORM 
RESPONSIBILITY 
1 For new systems, sub-systems and components, perform MSI selection 
according to MSG-3 selection criterion in accordance with paragraph 4-5 
-MSI selection list 
(A380-800,-800F) 
Manufacturer 
2 Identify all existing A380- MSIs and determine which are: 
not applicable to A380-800F 
unchanged by A380-800F design differences (see paragraph 5.2.2.3, Additional 
Guidance) 
modified due to A380-800F design differences 
-MSI validation list 
(A380-800F) 
Manufacturer 
3 Integrate results of steps 1 and 2 into the combined MSI selection list for A380-
800 & -800F and revise the MSI applicability as necessary 
-MSI selection list 
(A380-800,-800F) 
Manufacturer 
4 Review & accept combined MSI selection list for A380-800,-800F -MSI selection list 
(A380-800,-800F) 
ISC 
5 For new and modified MSIs resulting from steps 1 & and 2, the manufacturer 
prepares a complete MSI analysis in accordance with the A380 PPH. 
Unchanged MSIs that are also applicable to A380-800F, must have their MSG-3 
analysis dossiers revised, to reflect the expanded applicability. 
Standard MSI 
MSG-3 analysis 
forms 
Manufacturer 
6 Dispatch 
- new and/or revised MSI MSG-3 analyses (excluding unchanged MSIs) to MWG 
members/advisors and ISC/MRB members 
- All MSG-3 
analysis dossiers 
Manufacturer 
7 - Review and acceptance of combined MSI selection list 
- Review and acceptance of new/revised MSI MSG-3 analyses 
 
- Transfer items to other MWGs (as required) 
- Review and acceptance of MWG Mtg Minutes 
- Make a proposal for the Draft MRB Report 
- MSI selection list 
- MSI MSG-3 
analysis forms 
- Transfer sheets 
- MWG MoM 
- MPP forms 
MWG 
MWG 
 
MWG Chairman 
MWG 
MWG 
8 ISC review and approval of MWG results and proposals - MWG Chair 
Reports 
ISC 
9 Prepare Systems and Powerplant Program proposal for the Draft MRB Report -MPP forms Manufacturer 
 
 
5.2.2.3 ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE 
 
Analysis Unchanged: The analysis is considered unchanged, when the introduction of the new 
model has no impact on Data Sheet B, Level 1 & 2 sheets, Task Summary Sheet, MRBR Interface 
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REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 4 - PAGE: 4-13
 DATE :June 2006
 
Sheet and Task Data Sheet. However, the MSG-3 analysis will have to be revised to at least 
introduce the new model applicability. The revised analysis will not have to be presented to a 
MWG as it is only an administrative change. 
 
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DATE : June 2006 
 
 
5.3 PAGE NUMBERING AND REVISION CONTROL 
 
Revision Control 
- Revision bars in the margin of the selection sheets shall indicate changes against the last issue of the 
MSI selection. 
Applicability Control 
- The MSI Selection has to cover the following basic aircraft design standards of the: 
o A380-800 passenger version: A380-840 (with engine Rolls-Royce Trent 970) and A380-860 
(with engine Engine Alliance GP7270). 
o A380-800F freighter version: A380-840F (with engine Rolls-Royce Trent 970) and A380-860F 
(with engine Engine Alliance GP7270). 
- The aircraft models covered by the MSI Selection shall be indicated on the Cover sheet. 
Page Numbering 
- The page number of an MSI selection sheet comprises of the ATA-chapter and a sequence number; 
e.g. “27-02” refers to the 2nd page of the selection sheet for ATA-chapter 27 Flight Controls. 
- If there is more than one MSI selection list for a certain ATA-chapter (as for two different engine 
versions), the different selection lists can be distinguished by adding an “A” or “B” or “C” or any other 
suitable identification letter after the ATA-chapter-reference (e.g. “72B”). 
Issue Date 
- All selection sheets for a certain ATA-chapter display the same issue date. If one of the sheets needs to 
be revised, the issue date of all the sheets is changed. 
- If there is more than one MSI selection list for an ATA-chapter, the different selection lists will have their 
own individual issue date. 
Issue Numbers 
- The issue number of the MSI Selection will only be shown on the Cover sheet and the List of Revisions. 
 A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK
 
REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 
 
 
 
6 MSI ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 
In this section of the systems and power plant analysis procedures, the following information is provided: 
a) A description of the basic MSI analysis process (see paragraph 4-6.1) 
b) Detailed guidance for the individual steps of the MSI analysis and the use of the various form sheets 
(see paragraphs 4-6.2 to 4-6.9). 
Note: For guidance on how to handle fault-tolerant functions
paragraphs 4-7.2 and 4-7.3. 
6.1 MSI ANALYSIS PROCESS 
The method for determining the scheduled maintenance tas
including components and APUs, uses a progressive logic d
technique applied to each maintenance significant item (sys
accessory, unit, part, etc.), using the technical data available
Prior to applying the MSG-3 logic diagram to an item, a wor
MSI, its functions / functional failures / failure effects / failure
item. As the evaluations are based on the item's functional f
identified for each MSI: 
 
The approach taken in the following procedure is to provide
functional failure and failure cause must be processed throu
to the necessity of a task. The resultant tasks and intervals 
The MSG-3 decision logic diagram (see Figure 2-2.1 of the 
begins the analysis at the top of the diagram, and answers t
direction of the analysis flow. 
The decision logic has two levels 
a) Level 1 (questions 1, 2, 3 and 4) requires the evaluation
determination of the Failure Effect Category; i.e., safety
non-safety. 
b) Level 2 (questions "A" through "F", as applicable to the 
takes the FAILURE CAUSE (S) for each functional failu
task(s). 
At level 2, the task selection section, paralleling and def
the answer to the first question regarding "Lubrication/S
be asked in all cases. When following the hidden or evid
must be asked. In the remaining categories, subsequen
exiting the logic. 
a) Function(s) - the normal characteristic actions o
b) Functional Failure(s) - Failure of an item to perfo
c) Failure Effect(s) - what is the result of a function
d) Failure Cause(s) - why the functional failure occ
SECTION 4 - PAGE: 4-15
DATE :June 2006
 and aspects of Integrated Modular Avionics see 
ks and intervals for systems and power plants, 
iagram. This logic is the basis of an evaluation 
tem, sub-system, module, component, 
. 
k sheet will be completed that clearly defines the 
 causes and any additional data pertinent to the 
ailures and failure causes, the following must be 
 a logic path for each functional failure. Each 
gh the logic so that a judgment will be made as 
will form the initial scheduled maintenance. 
MSG-3 document) is designed whereby the user 
o the "YES" or "NO" questions will dictate 
 of each FUNCTIONAL FAILURE for 
, operational, economic, hidden safety or hidden 
Failure Effect Categories 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) then 
re into account for selecting the specific type of 
ault logic have been introduced. Regardless of 
ervicing", the next task selection question must 
ent safety effects path, all subsequent questions 
t to the first question, a "YES" answer will allow 
f an item 
rm its intended function within specified limits
al failure 
urs 
b0521632
Highlight
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NOTE: At the user's option, advancement to subsequent questions after deriving a "YES" answer is 
allowable, but only until the cost of the task is equal to the cost of the failure prevented. 
Default logic is reflected in paths outside the safety effects areas by the arrangement of the task 
selection logic. In the absence of adequateinformation to answer "YES" or "NO" to questions in the 
second level, default logic dictates a "NO" answer be given and the subsequent question be asked. As 
"NO" answers are generated the only choice available is the next question, which in most cases provides 
a more conservative, stringent and/or costly task. 
Assumptions made during the analysis that can result in a change to the analysis, are to be recorded for 
later validation. For example, if an analysis is (partially or as a whole) based on design solutions not 
completely frozen, this should be recorded in the analysis. All assumptions made in the course of the 
analysis are to be checked and validated once the material required for this work step has become available 
(e.g. AFM, MMEL). 
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6.2 ADMINISTRATIVE PAGES 
These are pages intended to allow monitoring of the revision status and of the scope/applicability of the 
analysis. 
6.2.1 COVER SHEET 
The cover sheet must state the MSI number, the MSI description, the applicability of the analysis, the issue 
date and the issue number. 
The applicability of the analysis shall be stated with reference to the aircraft models to which the analysis 
applies (see paragraph 3-3.2 for the basic aircraft design standards to be covered by MSG-3 analysis). It is 
not necessary to list all modifications covered by the analysis on the cover sheet; however, if an analysis is 
specifically established to cover a certain modification, this should be stated. The applicability statement on 
the cover sheet may thus be one of the following possibilities: 
- “A380-800” (if all 800 model aircraft of the passenger version are covered), or 
- “A380-840” (if applicable to passenger aircraft with Rolls-Royce Trent 970 engines only), or 
- “A380-860” (if applicable to passenger aircraft with Engine Alliance GP7270 engines only). 
- “A380-800F” (if all 800 model aircraft of the freighter version are covered), or 
- “A380-840F” (if applicable to freighter aircraft with Rolls-Royce Trent 970 engines only), or 
- “A380-860F” (if applicable to freighter aircraft with Engine Alliance GP7270 engines only). 
The issue date and the issue number on the cover sheet must always reflect the latest status of the analysis. 
This means that the cover sheet will always show the latest issue date occurring in the analysis and that the 
issue number on the cover sheet will be the highest shown on the List of Revisions. 
Whenever a part of the analysis is revised, the issue date and the issue number of the Cover sheet are 
revised as well. 
6.2.2 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES 
The List of Effective Pages (LEP) is to state the following information for each page of the printed/PDF 
version of the analysis: 
- Page identifier (page number) 
- Designation of page 
- Applicability of page 
- Issue Date of page 
The LEP-statement for “Designation” of a given Level 1 sheet should include the FF/FE-reference; the LEP-
statement for a Level 2 sheet should include the FC-reference (or FC-references if more than one failure 
cause is analyzed on a single Level 2 sheet). 
Whenever a part of the analysis is revised, the issue date of the List of Effective Pages is revised as well. 
6.2.3 LIST OF REVISIONS 
The List of Revisions is intended to provide an overview of all issues (revisions) of the analysis, including the 
reasons for the reissue of the analysis. 
Whenever a part of the analysis is revised, a revision statement for the new issue (comprising the fields 
Issue, Date, Reason for Revision and Approval) is added after the statement for the previous issue/revision. 
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The statement under „Reason for Revision“ must contain a brief summary of changes made against the 
previous issue of the analysis. It is not necessary to provide details, as these will be given on the sheet 
“History of Changes”. 
The author and a supervisor must sign the master copy of each issue of the analysis. It is not necessary to 
show the actual signatures in the digital version of the analysis dispatched to the nominated recipients (e.g. 
members and advisors of the MWG). The aim is to ensure that the analysis complies with the general quality 
standards of Airbus and the procedures laid down in the PPH. 
Whenever a part of the analysis is revised, the issue date of the List of Revisions is revised as well. 
6.2.4 HISTORY OF CHANGES 
The statements on the sheet “History of Changes” must identify all significant changes made against 
previous issues of the analysis. For the first issue of the analysis, therefore, the sheet will only display the 
statement “Deliberately left empty”. 
For any subsequent issue, the sheet must identify both the reasons for the change and the parts of the 
analysis affected by the change: 
- If the changes were made as a result of a working group or ISC meeting, the reference of the meeting 
report of the meeting should be given. Alternatively, a condensed version of the meeting report can be 
included. When addressing the reasons for the issue of the revised analysis, it is important that 
modifications first covered in the issue are adequately identified. 
- As a minimum, the History of Changes must individually identify changes to Data Sheet A, Data Sheet B, 
Level 1 analysis, Level 2 analysis, Task Summary/MRB Report Interface sheets, and Task Data sheets. 
Issue 3 and all later issues of the analysis will retain all statements made previously in the “History of 
Changes” because the sheet is intended to provide a complete history of the analysis. 
The entries in the “History of Changes” shall be sorted 1) by analysis sections (e.g. Data Sheet A, Data 
Sheet B, etc.) and 2) within these sections, in a chronological order. 
6.3 MSI DESCRIPTION / DATA SHEET A 
6.3.1 GENERAL 
Prior to applying the MSG-3 logic diagram to an item, data sheets will be established that clearly define the 
MSI, its function(s), functional failure(s), failure effect(s), failure cause(s) and any additional data pertinent to 
the item; e.g., ATA chapter reference, fleet applicability, manufacturer's part number, a brief description of 
the item, expected failure rate, hidden functions, need to be on the MMEL, redundancy (may be unit, system 
or system management), etc. 
The descriptive part of the MSI analysis is an integral part of the analysis and will be included as part of the 
total MSG-3 documentation for the item. 
6.3.2 DATA SHEET A / COMPONENT DATA 
If components from other MSIs / ATA-chapters are listed on Data Sheet B as failure cause(s) and their 
relevant data are known, they can be included in the list of components. 
For all components listed, the component data required by paragraph 4-6.3.1, including reliability data, shall 
be given where pertinent and available. 
It is important to state the source of the reliability data quoted. Preferably, this reliability information should 
be based on relevant service experience. However, if specification or guarantee values are quoted, this 
should me made clear in the analysis. 
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It is to be noted that the reliability data quoted need to be as realistic as possible in order to allow the 
selection of the highest possible intervals commensurate with the inherent reliability characteristics. 
The statement for „Redundancies“ should provide sufficient explanation to allow an assessment of the 
consequences of failures and of the need to search for failures of functions normally inactive or operating in 
parallel. 
The statement for „Experience“ should clarify the extent to which service experience from other Airbus 
programs or similar equipment may be used to draw conclusions for the maintenance program under 
development. 
Under“MMEL Status”, it is normally not sufficient to simply state “Go”, “Go if” or “No go” and if additional 
information is already available, a more detailed statement, e.g. per component, should be provided. In case 
of need, this expanded statement can be made on the Item Description sheet. Consideration should be given 
to the possibility of indicating the operational consequences of failure, e.g. delay, in-flight turn back, etc. 
If assumptions must be made with regard to the MMEL-status (e.g. due to unavailability of data), then these 
assumptions must be documented and verified when the corresponding data become available. 
Care should be taken when writing down part numbers so that the analysis does not need to be revised 
when a minor modification of the part number (dash number) occurs. 
6.3.3 DATA SHEET A / ITEM DESCRIPTION 
The author should be aware of the fact that, normally, no other descriptive data will be supplied with the 
MSG-3 analysis. The recipient / reader of the analysis, therefore, must be able to understand the item under 
consideration in sufficient depth to critically appraise the analysis prior to the meeting. 
The Data Sheet A shall be used to list all modifications relevant to, and covered by, the analysis. For details 
refer to Chapter 3.5 in Section 3 of the PPH. 
The textual description should include a system overview (including reason for existence of system), 
functional description (operation in normal and any other mode) and information on indication, system 
interfaces, components, built-in tests and reference documentation (if applicable). 
Illustrations must be included in order to support the descriptive text. They must include a relevant system 
schematic or functional block diagram, views of the location of the LRUs and a view of each significant 
system component. Electrical diagrams should be included – where necessary – but care should be taken 
not to overload them with unnecessary details. 
If required, the description of the item should be expanded in order to cover items / issues necessary for a 
review of scheduled maintenance aspects. This may include information on indications, BITE monitoring, 
coverage by the CMS, classification of faults detected by BITE, etc. As far as possible, the list of relevant 
messages and warnings given to the operating crew (flight and cabin crew) should be provided. 
The Data Sheet A can be used to provide information on fault-tolerance characteristics of the design, e.g. 
functions that are fault-tolerant, degree of redundancy, repercussions of combinations of faults, detection 
and indicating of faults, etc. This should include information on the indication provided to the operating crew 
if the fault-tolerance characteristics have degraded to such a level that airworthiness is concerned. 
To define dedicated Model design in the Data Sheet A, put between brackets the applicability ex: (-800F) for 
paragraphs dealing only with this model. If necessary, supplemental pages dedicated to (-800F) may be 
used to facilitate showing the differences between (-800) and (-800F). 
 
Care should be taken to adequately describe and - if necessary - illustrate all components mentioned as 
failure causes on Data Sheet B. 
If a modification requires a major change to the Data Sheet A with repercussions on a large percentage of 
pages, a separate Data Sheet A can be established (with the applicability clearly indicated on both sets of 
sheets). 
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At the end of Data Sheet A, a section titled “Assumptions affecting the analysis” and a section “Closed 
Assumptions” shall be included. For details refer to Chapter 3.5 in Section 3 of the PPH. 
 
6.4 FAILURE ANALYSIS / DATA SHEET B 
6.4.1 GENERAL 
Experience has shown that MSI-analyses and the results of these analyses can vary considerably if different 
people use different approaches for the establishment of the same analysis. In addition, the Data Sheet B is 
that part of an MSI-analysis which decides the quality and the results of the analysis. If functions, functional 
failures and failure causes are neglected, incorrectly worded or wrongly assigned, even an excellent Level 
1/2 analysis cannot compensate these shortcomings. 
This guidance material for the establishment of Data Sheet B, i.e. for the development of functions, functional 
failures, failure effects, and failure causes, therefore, is intended to facilitate the development of a “correct” 
analysis, with as much consistency as possible and without restricting flexibility unnecessarily. 
When developing the Data Sheet B, it is essential to start with the functions and not with the failure causes 
(as in the case of a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis). If this is not observed, it can result in an analysis 
where complete functions are missing or where a failure cause is only covered once, even though the item 
might have different functions and different failure modes (e.g. a valve might have one or more electrical, 
and one or more mechanical failure modes). 
To include new Model in the Data Sheet B, put between brackets the applicability ex: (-800F) 
 
Functions (F) 
Function(s) - the normal characteristic actions of an item 
The list of functions should be complete and not be restricted to the main function(s). There are almost 
always secondary or minor functions that must be included on the Data Sheet B in order to provide a 
complete view of the item. 
The sequence of functions should be logical and correspond, for example, to the 
- Importance of a function, 
- Flow of air, sequence of mechanical signals, information flow, 
- Hierarchy of functions (control, warning, indication, monitoring) 
Similar functions may be grouped together under one function, as long as the functional failures are listed 
separately. 
Defining some functional failures may require a detailed understanding of the system and its design 
principles. For example, for system components having single element dual load path features, such as 
concentric tubes or back-to-back plates, the function of both paths should be analyzed individually. The 
degradation and/or failure of one path may not be evident. 
When listing functions, functional failures, failure effects, and failure causes, care should be taken to identify 
the functions of all protective devices. These include devices with the following functions: 
- To draw the attention of the operating crew to abnormal conditions, 
- To shut down equipment in the event of a failure, 
- To eliminate or relieve abnormal conditions which follow a failure, 
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- To take over from a function that has failed. 
Protective function statements should describe the protective function itself, and should also include the 
words "if" or "in the event of" followed by a brief description of the events or circumstances that would 
activate or require activation of the protection. For example, "To open the relief valve to atmosphere in the 
event of system X pressure exceeding 300 psi." 
With regard to fuel tank ignition prevention, the following functions shall be considered: 
- The ignition prevention function of the bonding system of the fuel tank system is to carry the electrical 
current generated in the event of lightning. 
- The ignition prevention function of the wire harness of the fuel tank system is to prevent electrical shorts 
and sparks from forming in and around the fuel tank, if wires external to the fuel tank chafe against a 
power wire. The wire harness includes the features that keep it separated from other objects in the fuel 
system that would cause contact and chafing. 
In order to help with the establishment of functions, every hardware item should be individually reviewed 
regarding its function(s) and whether they are already coveredby another function. 
Functions should be worded as follows: "To monitor…", "To generate signal for...", "To indicate...", "To 
warn...", "To detect...", "To shut off...", "To regulate...", etc. 
Functions specific to equipment required solely for maintenance purposes should be listed on Data Sheet B 
(without the associated functional failures, failure effects and failure causes) with a note stating that they are 
maintenance functions (for which no further analysis will be done). As failures of these functions have no 
repercussions on operational safety, there is no need to establish level 1 and 2 analyses for these functions. 
Functions used for both maintenance and operational purposes, however, need to be covered in the analysis 
with the associated level 1 and 2 analysis sheets. 
Functions are identified by a sequence number, starting with a “1”. 
6.4.2 FUNCTIONAL FAILURES (FF) 
Functional Failure(s) - Failure of an item to perform its intended function within specified limits 
For every function, there should be at least one functional failure; there is no function that cannot fail. 
Functional failures that are caused by a combination of independent failure causes need not be considered. If a 
function logically leads to such a functional failure, then this functional failure should be included on the Data 
Sheet B, but not in the Level 1/2 analysis. In this case, a note should be added to the Data Sheet B explaining 
the lack of Level 1/2 coverage. 
Important is not the number of functions, but the number of functional failures. For each functional failure - and 
not for each function - a Level 1 analysis must be established. 
The functional failure should be worded so that it is possible to understand it without having to read the 
function. 
For redundant systems/components, the loss of redundancy should be covered as a functional failure even if 
there is no impact on the normal operation of the aircraft. 
Statements like "incorrect indication", etc. should be avoided, as they do not allow a correct interpretation of 
failure consequences. Instead, statements like "pressure" or "temperature" "too high" or "too low" or "loss of 
indication" or "indicator shows full scale" should be used. 
When defining a function and its associated functional failures, one should not only consider the loss of the 
function (as defined) but also the spurious operation, i.e. untimely, unwanted exercising of the function. 
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For some failures, e.g. leakage of air or fluid, it may be necessary to consider both a major leak (an evident 
failure) and a minor leak (a hidden failure) that could, nevertheless, have some longer-term effects. The same 
applies to a partial loss of information or data; the functional failure should be worded so that segregation into 
evident and hidden failures can be made. 
Where functional failure effects are associated with another system (e.g. a function of system A is to provide 
inputs to system B), the Data Sheet B shall clearly identify the FF as being related to another MSI or ATA-
chapter. 
- If the other system is dealt with by the same MWG, then the group shall establish a consistent and 
traceable system of tracking these “internal” transfers. 
- If the other system is dealt with by a different MWG, then a transfer sheet may have to be raised for any 
supporting action by the other group or to inform the other group of the results of any subsequent Level 1 
analysis. 
As functional failures are always associated with a function, they are identified by a combination of the function 
reference (a number) and a letter (starting with an “A”). For example, the FF-identifier “2C” means that 
reference is made to the 3rd functional failure of function 2. 
6.4.3 FAILURE EFFECTS (FE) 
Failure Effect(s) - what is the result of a functional failure? 
Normally, there should exist one failure effect for each functional failure only. If more than one failure effect has 
been given for a functional failure, either the functional failure or the failure effect(s) are probably incorrectly 
defined. However, there can be exceptions to this rule, e.g. when the failure effect depends on the environment 
(ground/flight) or the aircraft configuration. For example, the effect of a plug-type door failure will depend on 
whether the aircraft is pressurized or not. (It is to be noted that the MSG-3 software tool (EMMAA) can only 
handle one failure effect per functional failure.) 
Failure effect statements should always include possible indications given to cockpit and/or cabin crew; this will 
allow an easier categorization into evident and hidden failures. 
Failure effects of functional failures that the subsequent analysis shows to be hidden (e.g. functional failures of 
fault-tolerant functions) should be worded such that information on the indication (or lack of indication) and the 
effect on the system (if any) is provided. For example, if the functional failure involves a loss / reduction of 
redundancy or another hidden effect or if the failure is detected by BITE (but not displayed to the crew), then 
this information should be included in the failure effect statement. 
The failure effect should not just be a differently worded repetition of the functional failure. The failure effect 
must always be referenced to the next higher level of the system and, if appropriate, to the aircraft as a whole 
(e.g. if the cabin pressurization fails, the FE-statement should address the question of what this means to the 
aircraft as a whole). 
The failure effect statement should not mention a possible failure cause (e.g. "loss of switch results in...") but 
can refer, if necessary, to the functional failure (e. g. "loss of control results in..."). 
As failure effects are always associated with a functional failure, they are identified by a combination of the 
functional failure reference and a number (starting with a “1”). For example, the FE-identifier “2C1” means that 
reference is made to the 1st (and only) failure effect of the 3rd functional failure of function 2. 
6.4.4 FAILURE CAUSES (FC) 
Failure Cause(s) - why the functional failure occurs 
Failure causes must be defined in such a way that an effective assessment of potentially applicable tasks can 
be made during Level 2 analysis: 
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- The failure cause should not just identify a component, but also its failure mode, e.g. mechanical or 
electrical fault, failing in open or closed position, open or short circuit, jammed linkage, contaminated 
orifice, broken housing, etc. 
- If it is already known that a possible task can only be done on the system level (e.g. operational check of 
system), then the failure cause can be worded accordingly. If, however, the possible task must be done on 
a single component, the failure cause must be described in more detail (see above). 
Consideration should be given to failure causes in other subsystems and/or ATA-chapters. It should be noted 
that in those cases where failure causes (FC) are associated with another system, the Level 2 analysis is 
likely to require transfer to, or advice from, another MWG for completion. If there is any doubt about the exact 
component in the other subsystem that can cause the functional failure to occur, components should not be 
listed and the subsystem should be stated instead. 
Normally, tubing and wiring should not be considered explicitly in the analysis as failure causes (as all 
tubing, wiring and components contained in an airplane zone will be covered by the zonal analysis). 
However, it is the working group’s responsibility to determine if this is applicable to the specific MSI being 
analyzed. 
Structural failures of parts of the primary structure do not have to be considered as failure causes in a systemsanalysis (door stops / hooks and similar items may have to be considered, though). 
As failure causes are associated with a functional failure/failure effect combination, they are identified by a 
combination of the functional failure/failure effect reference and a sequence number identifying the failure 
cause (starting with a “1”). For example, the FC-identifier “2C16” means that reference is made to the 6th failure 
cause of the 3rd functional failure (associated with failure effect 1) of function 2.
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6.5 CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE / LEVEL 1 ANALYSIS 
6.5.1 LEVEL 1 DIAGRAM 
The MSG-3 decision logic diagram facilitates the identification of the initial scheduled maintenance 
requirements through a categorization of the failure consequences associated with these tasks. 
There are four first level questions, identified as questions 1 to 4. As a result of answering these first level 
questions, the functional failure is assigned to one of five failure effect categories, identified as categories 5 
to 9. 
 
Figure 6.5.1 MSG-3 Level 1 Analysis Questions 
1) Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during 
the performance of normal duties ? 
5
2) Does the functional failure or secondary 
damage resulting from the functional failure 
have a direct adverse effect on operating 
safety ? 
6 7 9
4) Does the functional failure have 
a direct adverse effect on 
operating capability ? 
3) Does the combination of a hidden 
functional failure and one additional 
failure of a system related or back-
up function have an adverse effect 
on operating safety ? 
8
YES NO 
YES NO
YES NO 
YES NO
Safety Effects Operational Economic Safety Effects Non-Safety Effects
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6.5.2 LEVEL 1 QUESTIONS 
6.5.2.1 Question 1 - Evident or Hidden Functional Failure 
QUESTION 1: IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL FAILURE EVIDENT TO THE 
OPERATING CREW DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF NORMAL DUTIES? 
 
Definition of “Hidden Function”: 
1. A function which is normally active and whose cessation will not be evident to the operating crew 
during performance of normal duties. 
2. A function which is normally inactive and whose readiness to perform, prior to it being needed, will 
not be evident to the operating crew during performance of normal duties. 
Definition of “Operating Crew Normal Duties”: 
 - Operating Crew Qualified flight compartment and cabin attendant personnel who are on duty. 
 - Normal Duties Those duties associated with the routine operation of the aircraft, on a daily 
basis, to include the following: 
a) Procedures and checks performed during aircraft operation in accordance with 
the Aircraft Flight Manual. 
b) Recognition of abnormalities or failures by the operating crew through the use 
of normal physical senses (e.g., odor, noise, vibration, temperature, visual 
observation of damage or failure, changes in physical input force requirements, 
etc.). 
This question asks if the operating crew will be aware of the loss (failure) of the function during performance 
of normal operating duties. Question 1 must be asked for each functional failure of the item being analyzed. 
The intent is to segregate the evident and hidden functional failures. The operating crew consists of qualified 
flight compartment and cabin attendant personnel who are on duty. Ground crew is not part of the operating 
crew. Normal duties are those duties associated with the routine operation of the aircraft on a daily basis. 
If there is uncertainty about the frequency of use of certain systems, and assumptions are to be made, then 
the assumptions made must be recorded in the analysis for later verification. This applies equally to 
assumptions made concerning tests that are performed automatically by electronic equipment. 
Flight crew "normal duties" are described (in part) in the Regulatory Authority approved sections of the 
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) and must be accomplished by the flight crew. Working groups may consider 
these flight crew checks part of the operating crew's "normal duties" for the purpose of categorizing failures 
as evident in the MSG-3 analysis. It should be documented in the analysis whenever credit is taken for such 
flight crew checks. 
Since the approved AFM is not available during the initial MSG-3 analysis, working groups should document 
all Level 1 failure analysis that is based on flight crew checks assumed to be included in the AFM. Once the 
AFM is approved, all Level 1 analyses based on such assumptions must be verified to ensure that these 
checks are included in the approved AFM. Level 1 analysis must be redone for any assumed flight crew 
check not included in the approved AFM. System failures that are indicated to the operating crew when 
performing their normal duties shall be considered as evident. 
NOTE: Evidence of AFM tasks which are assumed in the MSG-3 Level 1 analysis submitted to the MRB 
must be available prior to the MRB Report approval; otherwise, the MSG-3 Level 1 analysis 
submitted to the MRB must be based on the assumption that these tasks are not part of the crew's 
normal duties. 
A "YES" answer indicates the functional failure is evident; proceed to Question 2. 
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A "NO" answer indicates the functional failure is hidden; proceed to Question 3. 
Additional Guidance 
In answering question 1, the loss of the function or the occurrence of the functional failure can be considered 
evident if 
- It is associated with a system that is operated at least once during a day’s operation, and 
- The loss of function/occurrence of failure can be detected by the crew. 
For the purpose of determining whether a failure is evident or hidden, it should be noted that it is only 
possible to take credit for tasks performed by the flight crew if these tasks are performed on the flight deck. 
Failures that can be detected during a walk-around, therefore, cannot be considered evident. 
See paragraph 4-7.1 “BITE, Monitoring, Tests and Failure Classes” for guidance on whether failures that 
have been detected by BITE (during continuous monitoring, POST or AST) can be considered evident for the 
purpose of MSG-3 analysis. 
System operational tests (initiated tests) carried out by the crew are not to be considered as forming part of 
the normal operating crew duties when answering question 1 unless they are part of the procedures laid 
down in the approved „Airplane Flight Manual“. 
The operating crew consists of qualified cockpit and cabin attendant personnel who are on duty and this 
does not include ground crew. However, if a functional failure is evident to ground personnel and the working 
group is certain that the failure is of such a nature that it will always be reported to the operating crew and 
rectified (e.g. if a cargo door cannot be closed), then the functional failure may be considered evident for the 
purpose of the MSG-3 analysis. 
When answering question 1, a walk-around check carried out by the crew (i.e. a check performed outside the 
flight deck) is not to be considered as forming part of the normal operating crew duties. Only actions carried 
out on the flight deck may be considered to form a part of the operating crew’s normal duties. 
6.5.2.2 Question 2 - Direct Adverse Effect on Safety 
QUESTION 2: DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OR SECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING 
FROM THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT ON 
OPERATING SAFETY? 
 
For a "YES" answer the functional failure must have a direct adverse effect on operating safety. 
Direct: To be direct, the functional failure or resulting secondary damage must achieve its effect by itself, not 
in combination with other functional failures(no redundancy exists and it is a primary dispatch item). 
Adverse Effect on Safety: Safety shall be considered as adversely affected if the consequences of the failure 
condition would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft and/or might cause serious or 
fatal injury to human occupants. 
Operating: This is defined as the time interval during which passengers and crew are on board for the 
purpose of flight. 
A "YES" answer indicates that this functional failure must be treated within the Safety Effects category and 
task(s) must be developed in accordance with paragraph 4-6.5.4.1. 
A "NO" answer indicates the effect is either operational or economic and Question 4 must be asked. 
 
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Additional Guidance 
When answering this question, the following is to be observed with regard to „adverse effect on operating 
safety“ and „serious injury to occupants“: 
According to ICAO Annex 13, a "serious injury" is an injury which is sustained by a person in an accident and 
which: 
- Requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within seven days from the date the injury 
was received; or 
- Results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes or nose); or 
- Involves lacerations which cause severe haemorrhage, nerve, muscle or tendon damage; or 
- Involves injury to any internal organ; or 
- Involves second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more than five percent of the body surface; 
or 
- Involves verified exposure to infectious substances or injurious radiation. 
6.5.2.3 Question 3 - Hidden Functional Failure Safety Effect 
QUESTION 3: DOES THE COMBINATION OF A HIDDEN FUNCTIONAL FAILURE AND ONE 
ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF A SYSTEM RELATED OR BACK-UP FUNCTION HAVE 
AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY? 
 
This question is asked of each hidden functional failure that has been identified in Question 1. 
The question takes into account failures in which the loss of the one hidden function (whose failure is 
unknown to the operating crew) does not of itself affect safety; however, in combination with an additional 
functional failure (system related or intended to serve as a back-up) has an adverse effect on operating 
safety. 
For hidden functions of safety/emergency systems or equipment, the additional failure is the event for which 
this function of the system or equipment is designed, and in these cases, a FEC 8 is to be selected. This 
applies irrespective of whether the function is required by regulation or is carried as an operator option. 
Definition of “Safety/Emergency Systems or Equipment”: 
A device or system that: 
- Enhances the evacuation of the aircraft in an emergency or, 
- If it does not function when required, results in a failure condition that might have an adverse effect 
on safety. 
If a "YES" answer is determined, there is a safety effect and task development must proceed in accordance 
with paragraph 4-6.5.4.4. 
A "NO" answer indicates that there is a non-safety effect and will be handled in accordance with paragraph 
4-6.5.4.5. 
Additional Guidance 
See item on “adverse effect on operating safety“ and „injury to occupants“ under paragraph 4-6.5.2.2. 
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Emergency equipment includes (but is not limited to) oxygen systems, fire protection equipment, emergency 
exits, floatation / emergency evacuation equipment, emergency lights, escape ropes and cabin emergency 
equipment like megaphone, first aid kit, flashlight, hand-held fire extinguisher, crash axe, protective breathing 
equipment (PBE) but also devices installed solely as the final means to maintain continued safe flight such 
as Ram Air Turbines, fire shut-off valves etc. 
When answering question 3, all possible failure combinations relevant to the functional failure must be 
considered. 
- In those cases where it is possible to identify the additional failure resulting in the most severe 
failure combination, the answer must clearly state this failure combination and the reason why 
safety is affected or not affected. 
- If there is no additional failure relevant to the functional failure, this must be stated in the 
analysis.Question 4 - Operational Effect 
QUESTION 4: DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT ON 
OPERATING CAPABILITY? 
 
This question asks if the functional failure could have an adverse effect on operating capability: 
a) Requiring either the imposition of operating restrictions or correction prior to further dispatch; or 
b) Requiring flight crew use of abnormal or emergency procedures. 
Definition of “Operational Effects”: 
 Failure effects which interfere with the completion of the aircraft mission. These failures cause delays, 
cancellations, ground or flight interruptions, high drag coefficients, altitude restrictions, etc. 
This question is asked of each evident functional failure not having a direct adverse effect on safety. The 
answer may depend on the type of operation. 
The assessment of whether or not a failure has an effect on operating capability may require consultation of 
the MMEL and/or other documentation with operational procedures. As the documents necessary to assess 
the effect on operating capability are normally not available during the initial MSG-3 analysis, working groups 
should document all Level 1 failure analyses based on assumptions regarding question 4. Once the affected 
documents become available, all Level 1 analyses based on such assumptions must be verified. 
If the answer to this question is "YES", the effect of the functional failure has an adverse effect on operating 
capability, and task selection will be handled in accordance with paragraph 4-6.5.4.2. 
A "NO" answer indicates that there is an economic effect and should be handled in accordance with 
paragraph 4-6.5.4.3. 
Additional Guidance 
The operating capability is affected, if the flight crew has to refer to the „Abnormal Crew Check List“ or the 
„Emergency Crew Check List“. 
Functional failures affecting aircraft flight altitudes, landing and flight distances, maximum take-off weight, or 
the routine use of the aircraft, are considered to have an adverse effect on operating capability as well. 
Whenever reference is made to the MMEL in answering this question, the MMEL specific reference number 
should be included (if already available). After the MMEL has been finalized, the MMEL assumptions will be 
reviewed by Airbus for accuracy. 
6.5.3 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEVEL 1 ANALYSIS 
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When answering the Level 1 questions, care should be taken to provide a sufficiently detailed explanation to 
the answer provided. 
Experience has shown that only limited use can be made of standard sentences for the explanation of 
answers to Level 1 questions. It can be assumed that in all cases, the standard phrases need to be 
complemented by details specific to the functional failure under consideration. The following may be 
considered as a basis for the establishment of explanatory statements specific to the functional failure: 
Question 1: hidden / evident 
Yes: The failure will be evident to the flight crew because... 
No: The failure is not detectable by operating crew during normal duties because… 
Question 2: evident safety / evident non-safety 
Yes: The failure may have a direct adverse effect on operating safety because... 
No: The failure has no direct effect on operating safety because… 
Question 3: hidden safety / hidden non-safety 
Yes: The failure of.... combined with an additional failure of... may have an adverse effect on operating 
safety because... 
No: The failure in combination with any other additional failure does not have an adverse effecton 
operating safety because… 
No: The failure in combination with (additional failure or event to be specified) does not have an 
adverse effect on operating safety because… 
Question 4: evident operational / evident non-operational 
Yes: Operating capability is reduced because.... 
No: Operating capability is not reduced or impacted because… 
 
6.5.4 FAILURE EFFECT CATEGORIES (FIRST LEVEL) 
Once the analysts have answered the applicable first level questions, they are directed to one of the five 
Failure Effect Categories: 
a) Evident Safety (Category 5) 
b) Evident Operational (Category 6) 
c) Evident Economic (Category 7) 
d) Hidden Safety (Category 8) 
e) Hidden Non-Safety (Category 9) 
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6.5.4.1 Evident Safety Effects (Category 5) 
The Evident Safety Effect category must be approached with the understanding that a task is required to 
assure safe operation. 
All questions in this category must be asked. 
If no effective task(s) results from this category analysis, then redesign is mandatory. 
The following is the logic progression for functional failures that have Evident Safety Effects. 
LUBRICATION/SERVICING
INSPECTION/FUNCTIONAL CHECK
RESTORATION
TASK/COMBINATION MOST
EFFECTIVE MUST BE DONE
REDESIGN IS MANDATORY
DISCARD
5A
5B
5C
5D
5E
IS A LUBRICATION OR SERVICING TASK
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
IS AN INSPECTION OR FUNCTIONAL
CHECK TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF
FUNCTION APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
IS A RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE &
EFFECTIVE?
IS A DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES
OR TO REDUCE THE FAILURE RATE
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION OF
TASKS APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
NOYES
 
Figure 6.5.4.1 Functional Failures that have Evident Safety Effects 
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6.5.4.2 Evident Operational Effects (Category 6) 
A task(s) is desirable if it reduces the risk of failure to an acceptable level. 
Analysis of the failure causes through the logic requires the first question (Lubrication/Servicing) to be 
answered. Either a "YES" or "NO" answer of question "A" still requires movement to the next level; from this 
point on, a "YES" answer will complete the analysis and the resultant task(s) will satisfy the requirements. 
If all answers are "NO", then no task has been generated. If operational penalties are severe, a redesign 
may be desirable. 
The following is the logic progression for functional failures that have Evident Operational Effects. 
LUBRICATION/SERVICING
INSPECTION/FUNCTIONAL CHECK
RESTORATION
REDESIGN MAY BE DESIRABLE
DISCARD
6A
6B
6C
6D
IS A LUBRICATION OR SERVICING TASK
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
IS AN INSPECTION OR FUNCTIONAL
CHECK TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF
FUNCTION APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
IS A RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE &
EFFECTIVE?
IS A DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES
OR TO REDUCE THE FAILURE RATE
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
 
Figure 6.5.4.2 Functional Failures that have Evident Operational Effects 
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6.5.4.3 Evident Economic Effects (Category 7) 
A task(s) is desirable if the cost of the task is less than the cost of repair. 
Analysis of the failure causes through the logic requires the first question (Lubrication/Servicing) to be 
answered. Either a "YES" or "NO" answer to question "A" still requires movement to the next level; from this 
point on, a "YES" answer will complete the analysis and the resultant task(s) will satisfy the requirements. 
If all answers are "NO", no task has been generated. If economic penalties are severe, a redesign may be 
desirable. 
The following is the logic progression for functional failures that have Evident Economic Effects. 
LUBRICATION/SERVICING
INSPECTION/FUNCTIONAL CHECK
RESTORATION
DISCARD
7A
7B
7C
7D
IS A LUBRICATION OR SERVICING TASK
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
IS AN INSPECTION OR FUNCTIONAL
CHECK TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF
FUNCTION APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
IS A RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE &
EFFECTIVE?
IS A DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES
OR TO REDUCE THE FAILURE RATE
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
REDESIGN MAY BE DESIRABLE
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
 
Figure 6.5.4.3 Functional Failures that have Evident Economic Effects 
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6.5.4.4 Hidden Function Safety Effects (Category 8) 
The Hidden Function Safety Effect requires a task(s) to assure the availability necessary to avoid the safety 
effect of multiple failures. 
All questions must be asked. 
If there are no tasks found effective, then redesign is mandatory. 
The following is the logic progression for functional failures that have Hidden Function Safety Effects. 
LUBRICATION/SERVICING
INSPECTION/FUNCTIONAL CHECK
RESTORATION
TASK/COMBINATION MOST
EFFECTIVE MUST BE DONE
REDESIGN IS MANDATORY
DISCARD
8A
8C
8D
8E
8F
IS A LUBRICATION OR SERVICING TASK
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
IS AN INSPECTION OR FUNCTIONAL
CHECK TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF
FUNCTION APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
IS A RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE &
EFFECTIVE?
IS A DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES
OR TO REDUCE THE FAILURE RATE
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION OF
TASKS APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
NOYES
OPERATIONAL/VISUAL CHECK
8B
IS A CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ?
YES
NO
 
Figure 6.5.4.4 Functional Failures that have Hidden Function Safety Effects 
 
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6.5.4.5 Hidden Function Non-Safety Effects (Category 9) 
The Hidden Function Non-Safety Effect category indicates that a task(s) may be desirable to assure the 
availability necessary to avoid the economic effects of multiple failures. 
Movement of the failure causes through the logic requires the first question (Lubrication/Servicing) to be 
answered. Either a "YES" or "NO" answer still requires movement to the next level; from this point on, a 
"YES" answer will complete the analysis and the resultant task(s) will satisfy the requirements. 
If all answers are "NO", no task has been generated. If economic penalties are severe, a redesign may be 
desirable. 
The following is the logic progression for functional failures that have Hidden Function Non-Safety Effects. 
LUBRICATION/SERVICING
INSPECTION/FUNCTIONAL CHECK
RESTORATION
REDESIGN IS DESIRABLE
DISCARD
9A
9C
9D
9E
IS A LUBRICATION OR SERVICING TASK
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
IS AN INSPECTION OR FUNCTIONAL
CHECK TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF
FUNCTION APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
IS A RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE &
EFFECTIVE?
IS A DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES
OR TO REDUCE THE FAILURE RATE
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE?
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
OPERATIONAL/VISUAL CHECK
9B
IS A CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION
APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE ?
YES
NO
 
Figure 6.5.4.5 Functional Failures that have Hidden Function Non-Safety Effects 
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6.6 LEVEL 2 ANALYSIS 
Task development is handled in a similar manner for each of the five failure effect categories. For task 
determination, it is necessary to apply the failure causes for the functional failure to the second level of the 
logic diagram. 
There are six possible task resultant questions in the failure effect categories as follows: 
6.6.1 TASK SELECTION QUESTIONS 
6.6.1.1 Lubrication/Servicing (All Categories) 
QUESTION 5A, 6A, 7A, 8A, 9A: IS A LUBRICATION OR SERVICING TASK APPLICABLEAND 
EFFECTIVE? 
 
Any act of lubrication or servicing for the purpose of maintaining inherent design capabilities. 
Applicability Criteria 
The replenishment of the consumable must reduce the rate of functional deterioration. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Safety 
The task must reduce the risk of failure. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Operational 
The task must reduce the risk of failure to an acceptable level. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Economic 
The task must be cost-effective. 
Interval Selection Criteria (see paragraph 4-6.7 for additional guidance) 
The interval should be based on the consumable's usage rate, the amount of consumable in the storage 
container (if applicable) and the deterioration characteristics. 
Typical operating environments and climatic conditions are to be considered when assessing the 
deterioration characteristics. 
Additional Guidance 
Cleaning is a restoration task and should not be considered as a servicing task. 
The MSG-3 analysis is not intended to identify the complete list of lubrication tasks. Only those lubrication 
tasks which are applicable and effective (based on MSG-3 criteria) should be selected; however, all periodic 
lubrication tasks will be identified in the manufacturer’s MPD. 
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6.6.1.2 Operational/Visual Check (Hidden Functional Failure Categories Only) 
QUESTION 8B & 9B: IS A CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? 
 
An operational check is a task to determine that an item is fulfilling its intended purpose. The check does not 
require quantitative tolerances. This is a failure finding task. 
A visual check is an observation to determine that an item is fulfilling its intended purpose. The check does 
not require quantitative tolerances. This is a failure finding task. 
Applicability Criteria 
Identification of failure must be possible. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Safety 
The task must ensure adequate availability of the hidden function to reduce the risk of a multiple failure. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Economic 
The task must ensure adequate availability of the hidden function in order to avoid economic effects of 
multiple failures and must be cost-effective. 
 
Interval Selection Criteria (see paragraph 4-6.7 for additional guidance) 
Consider the length of potential exposure time to a hidden failure and the potential consequences if the 
hidden function is unavailable. 
Task intervals should be based on the need to reduce the probability of the associated multiple failure to a 
level considered tolerable by the MWG. 
The failure-finding task and associated interval selection process should take into account any probability 
that the task itself might leave the hidden function in a failed state. 
Additional Guidance 
When answering the 2nd and 3rd questions of the Level 2 analysis for FEC 8 and 9 (i.e. questions B and C), 
care should be taken to recognize the content of the task, particularly where BITE is concerned. 
• For example, if BITE is designed to verify system performance against defined parameters, then it is the 
question C (Functional check) that should be addressed even though, as far as the maintenance crew 
are concerned, it is only an operational test (as they are not taking quantitative measures). For such 
cases, the MWG should clearly identify the task as „Functional check of xxx by BITE“. 
• If, on the other hand, BITE can only detect a complete failure, the task is a failure-finding task and should 
be worded „Operational check of xxx by BITE“. 
The intent of the tasks resulting from questions 8B and 9B is to detect hidden functional failures, not a 
potential failure or degradation that can lead to a complete failure. Therefore, if test equipment (even 
measuring equipment) is used to detect a complete failure (as defined by the statement for the functional 
failure), then this is a failure-finding task that must be stated against question 8B/9B and not 8C/9C 
(functional check). 
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A visual examination of an item to detect a failure – not a potential failure – is to be considered a visual 
check – not an inspection. 
• Therefore, checking that a burst disc has not been ejected, checking that a pop-out indicator has not 
protruded or checking for signs of discharge (if no discharge is allowed at all) will always be considered a 
visual check and not an inspection. 
• Checking that a needle is in the green band, however, can be either a visual check or an inspection: If 
the needle is out of the green band and a maintenance action is required, then this must be considered a 
failure and the task a visual check. If, on the other hand, the needle is in the yellow band and this 
requires monitoring, then this can be considered a potential failure and the check an inspection. 
Visual checks resulting from the analysis may be considered candidates for coverage by the Zonal 
Inspection Program provided it has been determined that the intent of the failure finding task can be fulfilled 
by the general visual inspections which constitute the zonal program. The MWG should thus consider the 
failure cause (as defined on Data Sheet B), the type of visual failure finding task considered applicable and 
effective to detect the failure, the GVI (including the access requirements and the associated interval) that is 
performed as part of the zonal program and then decide if the zonal program can indeed cover the intended 
task. 
As an alternative, if the working group decides that a potential failure – instead of the failure – is to be found 
by the visual examination task, the visual check can be superseded by an inspection. If this is determined to 
be a GVI, the task can be considered a candidate for coverage by the Zonal Inspection Program. 
Visual checks associated with functional failures that have been categorized as safety related (i.e. FEC 8) 
cannot be considered covered by the zonal program and will always be retained in the systems and power 
plant program as dedicated tasks. 
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6.6.1.3 Inspection/Functional Check (All Categories) 
QUESTION 5B, 6B, 7B, 8C & 9C: IS AN INSPECTION OR FUNCTIONAL CHECK TO DETECT 
DEGRADATION OF FUNCTION APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? 
 
An inspection is: 
A. GENERAL VISUAL INSPECTION (GVI) 
A visual examination of an interior or exterior area, installation or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure 
or irregularity. This level of inspection is made from within touching distance, unless otherwise specified. A 
mirror may be necessary to enhance visual access to all exposed surfaces in the inspection area. This level 
of inspection is made under normally available lighting conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight 
or drop-light and may require removal or opening of access panels or doors. Stands, ladders or platforms 
may be required to gain proximity to the area being checked. 
or 
B. DETAILED INSPECTION (DET) 
An intensive examination of a specific item, installation or assembly to detect damage, failure or irregularity. 
Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at an intensity deemed 
appropriate. Inspection aids such as mirrors, magnifying lenses, etc. may be necessary. Surface cleaning 
and elaborate access procedures may be required. 
or 
C. SPECIAL DETAILED INSPECTION (SDI) 
An intensive examination of a specific item, installation, or assembly to detect damage, failure or irregularity. 
The examination is likely to make extensive use of specialized Inspection Techniques and/or equipment. 
Intricate cleaning and substantial access or disassembly procedure may be required. 
A functional check is a quantitative check to determine if one or morefunctions of an item performs within 
specified limits. 
Applicability Criteria 
Reduced resistance to failure must be detectable, and there exists a reasonably consistent interval between 
a deterioration condition and functional failure. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Safety 
The task must reduce the risk of failure to assure safe operation. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Operational 
The task must reduce the risk of failure to an acceptable level. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Economic 
The task must be cost-effective; i.e., the cost of the task must be less than the cost of the failure prevented. 
Interval Selection Criteria (see paragraph 4-6.7 for additional guidance) 
There should exist a clearly defined potential failure condition. 
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The task interval should be less than the shortest likely interval between the point at which a potential failure 
becomes detectable and the point at which it degrades into a functional failure. 
(If the specific failure data is available, this interval may be referred to as the P to F interval.) 
It should be practical to do the task at this interval. 
The shortest time between the discovery of a potential failure and the occurrence of the functional failure 
should be long enough for an appropriate action to be taken to avoid, eliminate or minimize the 
consequences of the failure mode. 
Additional Guidance 
When answering this Level 2 question, it is to be understood that the statement „…item performs within 
specified limits” does not imply a quantitative check. What is required, however, is that the task must be able 
to detect degradation, e.g. wear, seepage etc. and not just the complete failure. 
Similarly, the statement „...and there exists a reasonably consistent interval between a deterioration 
condition and functional failure“ does not mean that the task is only applicable if a quantitative figure can be 
quoted. If the MWG considers that the inspector can judge whether or not the degradation could lead to 
failure before the next check, then this aspect of the applicability criteria can be considered fulfilled. 
For a GVI to result from answering Level 2 questions 5B, 6B, 7B, 8C and 9C, it must be ensured that the 
task can detect degradation (leading to the associated functional failure). 
General Visual Inspections resulting from the analysis may be considered candidates for coverage by the 
Zonal Inspection Program providing that no special attention is required for the concerned item during the 
accomplishment of the zonal inspection. If the above condition cannot be met, then the GVI must remain in 
the Systems and Powerplant Program as an individual task with no transfer to the zonal program. 
General Visual Inspections associated with functional failures that have been categorized as safety related 
(i.e. FECs 5 and 8) cannot be considered covered by the zonal program and will always be retained in the 
Systems and Powerplant program as dedicated tasks. 
Whenever a GVI level is selected and some restrictions apply to the required ‘touching distance’, it must be 
highlighted. 
See item on BITE and its capability to verify system performance against defined parameters (first item 
under Additional Guidance for Operational/Visual Check). 
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6.6.1.4 Restoration (All Categories) 
QUESTION 5C, 6C, 7C, 8D, & 9D: IS A RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE FAILURE RATE 
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? 
 
That work necessary to return the item to a specific standard. 
Since restoration may vary from cleaning or replacement of single parts up to a complete overhaul, the 
scope of each assigned restoration task has to be specified. 
Applicability Criteria 
The item must show functional degradation characteristics at an identifiable age and a large proportion of 
units must survive to that age. It must be possible to restore the item to a specific standard of failure 
resistance. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Safety 
The task must reduce the risk of failure to assure safe operation. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Operational 
The task must reduce the risk of failure to an acceptable level. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Economic 
The task must be cost-effective: i.e., the cost of the task must be less than the cost of the failure prevented. 
Interval Selection Criteria (see paragraph 4-6.7 for additional guidance) 
Intervals should be based on the "identifiable age" when significant degradation begins and where the 
conditional probability of failure increases significantly. 
Vendor recommendations based on in-service experience of similar parts should also be taken into 
consideration. 
A sufficiently large proportion of the occurrences of this failure should occur after this age to reduce the 
probability of premature failure to a level that is tolerable. 
Additional Guidance 
In MSG-3, the term „restoration“ can refer to a variety of tasks aimed at restoring the item to a specific 
standard (ranging from cleaning to complete overhaul). Therefore, the exact type of restoration task must 
always be stated. Simply stating the task as „Restoration of xxx“ is not sufficient. 
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6.6.1.5 Discard (All Categories) 
QUESTION 5D, 6D, 7D, 8E, 9E: IS A DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES OR TO REDUCE THE 
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? 
 
The removal from service of an item at a specified life limit. 
Discard tasks are normally applied to so-called single celled parts such as cartridges, canisters, cylinders, 
engine disks, safe-life structural members, etc. 
Applicability Criteria 
The item must show functional degradation characteristics at an identifiable age and a large proportion of 
units must survive to that age. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Safety 
A safe-life limit must reduce the risk of failure to assure safe operation. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Operational 
The task must reduce the risk of failure to an acceptable level. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Economic 
An economic-life limit must be cost-effective: i.e., the cost of the task must be less than the cost of the failure 
prevented. 
Interval Selection Criteria (see paragraph 4-6.7 for additional guidance) 
Intervals should be based on the "identifiable age" when significant degradation begins and where the 
conditional probability of failure increases significantly. 
Vendor recommendations based on in-service experience of similar parts should also be taken into 
consideration. 
A sufficiently large proportion of the occurrences of this failure should occur after this age to reduce the 
probability of premature failure to a level that is tolerable. 
Additional Guidance 
Discarding an item at a “safe life limit” is established to avoid critical failures. A safe life limit is imposed on 
an item only when safety is involved and there is no observable condition that can be defined as a potential 
failure. In this case, the item is removed at or before the specified maximum age. This practice is most useful 
for simple items or for individual parts of complex items. For example, pyrotechnic devices in fire extinguisher 
bottles may have a limited shelf life, and turbine disks are subject to metal fatigue. 
Discarding an item at an “economic life limit” is established because the task is cost-effective in preventing 
non-critical failures. In some instances, operating experience may indicate that the scheduled discard of an 
item is desirable on purely economic grounds. Whereas the objective of a safe life limit is to avoid 
accumulating any failure data, the only justification for an economic life limit is cost-effectiveness. 
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6.6.1.6 Combination(Safety Categories Only) 
QUESTION 5E, 8F: IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION OF TASKS APPLICABLE AND 
EFFECTIVE? 
 
Since this is a safety category question and a task is required, all possible avenues must be analysed. To do 
this, a review of the task(s) that are applicable is necessary. From this review the most effective task(s) must 
be selected. 
Additional Guidance 
For a failure cause associated with a FEC 5, it is necessary to derive an applicable and effective task. No 
exceptions are allowed. 
Under exceptional circumstances, it may not be possible to derive an applicable and effective task for a 
failure cause associated with a FEC 8. 
• This would normally result in a request to initiate a redesign. If there is no redesign possible, it may be 
permissible to justify the lack of a task if the probability of the functional failure occurring is low enough 
for ISC acceptance. 
• If a failure detected by BITE is hidden for the purpose of MSG-3 analysis and the Level 1 analysis results 
in a FEC 8, the lack of a task may be justified by the fact that the failure becomes evident through ECAM 
and/or other means long before an applicable and effective task can be carried out at any reasonable 
interval. 
All Level 2 analyses for Failure Effect Categories 5 and 8 that do not result in a task must be brought to the 
attention of the ISC. 
6.6.2 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEVEL 2 ANALYSIS 
A single Level 2 form sheet may be used for the analysis of several failure causes if (1) the failure causes 
belong to the same functional failure and (2) all the answers and the explanations of the answers given on 
the sheet apply equally to all the referenced failure causes. 
If a task has been selected as applicable and effective, it is not necessary to state the exact task description 
as part of the answer to the selection question as long as the task description is provided on the Level 2 
sheet under “Task selected”. It is more important to justify why a task is, or is not, considered applicable and 
effective. 
When performing the Level 2 analysis, it is of utmost importance that particular attention is paid to the task 
applicability and effectiveness criteria of MSG-3. 
A task can only be selected if it complies with both applicability and effectiveness criteria. Whereas a task 
can be applicable but not effective, it is not possible that a task is effective but not applicable. 
It is to be noted that the cost-effectiveness of tasks is not to be taken into account if the failure cause is 
associated with a Failure Effect Category 6 (Operational). 
For all tasks selected during Level 2 analysis, the associated interval must be substantiated/justified. The 
statement shall also mention the reason why the predominant usage parameter was chosen and - where 
appropriate - what the secondary usage parameter is. This substantiation/justification needs to be written 
down on the Level 2 sheet and will be a critical parameter for later task combinations.All available vendor 
recommendations (VR) should be fully considered and discussed in the MWG meetings, but accepted only if 
they are applicable and effective according to MSG-3 criteria. If a vendor recommendation is not accepted 
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and the vendor states that the warranty support will be lost if the recommendation is not fully adopted, the 
issue is to be raised to the ISC. 
For FECs 6, 7 and 9, the logic can be exited once a task has been selected (after answering first the 
question on lubrication/servicing). If it can be justified, however, it is permissible to continue the analysis and 
select a more elaborate task in preference of a simpler task. 
For all failure causes associated with Failure Effect Category 6 that do not result in a task, special 
consideration is to be given to the fact that the cost of operational disruptions of the A380 aircraft can be 
significant. 
When tasks are transferred to the Zonal Working Group for a possible coverage by the Zonal Inspection 
Program, the statement by the systems group must always include a proposal for a task interval. The 
transfer sheet should also mention the zones in which the task is to be carried out as well as the access 
required and the task applicability. 
Where failure causes are associated with another system, the Level 2 analysis may require advice / support 
from another MWG (either for completion or for performance of the complete Level 2 analysis of the failure 
cause). If the whole Level 2 analysis is to be performed by the other working group, it is necessary to supply 
the group with the associated Level 1 analysis as well. 
When performing the MSG-3 analysis, national requirements may be taken into consideration. However, 
tasks should not be established only to fulfil a known regulatory requirement. Only those tasks shall be 
identified that fulfil the applicability and effectiveness criteria. In these cases, the tasks shall have their 
interval quoted in terms of a usage parameter and by a note or abbreviation identifying it as a possible 
National Requirement. 
For the purpose of determining tasks of potentially high frequency, it must be assumed that the flight crew is 
not allowed to carry out maintenance tasks. 
Generally, the MSG-3 analysis procedure is used to define on-aircraft maintenance tasks only; however, off-
aircraft tasks may be included if they satisfy the MSG-3 applicability and effectiveness criteria. It should be 
noted that most off-aircraft tasks are not performed on a scheduled basis but rather after the unit is removed 
from the aircraft for cause. It is not the intent of MSG-3 analysis to define all the ‘shop‘ type tasks required for 
components on the airplane; however in some instances, the only task that satisfies the applicability and 
effectiveness criteria is an off-aircraft task. For those tasks that will be accomplished off-aircraft, the wording 
of the task must make it clear that an off-aircraft task is involved (e.g. “Functional check of pack overheat 
switch (off-aircraft)” or “Remove pack overheat switch for functional check”). 
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6.6.3 MSG-3 TASK SELECTION CRITERIA 
APPLICABILITY EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA 
TASK 
CRITERIA SAFETY OPERATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LUBRICATION 
OR 
SERVICING 
The replenishment of the 
consumable must reduce 
the rate of functional 
deterioration. 
The task must 
reduce the risk of 
failure. 
The task must 
reduce the risk of 
failure to an 
acceptable level. 
The task must be 
cost effective. 
OPERATIONAL 
OR 
VISUAL CHECK 
Identification of failure 
must be possible. 
The task must 
ensure adequate 
availability of the 
hidden function to 
reduce the risk of a 
multiple failure. 
 Not applicable. The task must 
ensure adequate 
availability of the 
hidden function in 
order to avoid 
economic effects of 
multiple failures 
and must be cost 
effective. 
INSPECTION 
OR 
FUNCTIONAL 
CHECK 
Reduced resistance to 
failure must be detectable, 
and there exists a 
reasonably consistent 
interval between a 
deterioration condition and 
functional failure. 
The task must 
reduce the risk of 
failure to assure safe 
operation. 
The task must 
reduce the risk of 
failure to an 
acceptable level. 
The task must be 
cost effective; i. e., 
the cost of the task 
must be less than 
the cost of the 
failure prevented. 
RESTORATION The item must show 
functional degradation 
characteristics at an 
identifiable age, and a 
large proportion of units 
must survive to that age. It 
must be possible to restore 
the item to a specific 
standard of failure 
resistance. 
The task must 
reduce the risk of 
failure to assure safe 
operation. 
The task must 
reduce the risk of 
failure to an 
acceptable level. 
The task must be 
cost effective; i.e., 
the cost of the task 
must be lessthan 
the cost of the 
failure prevented. 
DISCARD The item must show 
functional degradation 
characteristics at an 
identifiable age and a large 
proportion of units must 
survive to that age. 
 The safe life limit 
must reduce the risk 
of failure to assure 
safe operation. 
The task must 
reduce the risk of 
failure to an 
acceptable level. 
An economic life 
limit must be cost 
effective; i.e., the 
cost of the task 
must be less than 
the cost of the 
failure prevented. 
 
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6.6.4 TYPICAL ANSWERS FOR LEVEL 2 ANALYSIS 
In order to maintain wording consistency throughout the MSG-3 analysis, the answers to Level 2 questions 
can in many cases be based on standard or typical default answers. The following sentences are typical 
examples of answers to the Level 2 questions; however they are only examples and further answers may be 
added. Moreover, each answer, although based on one of these sentences, may have to be tailored to the 
individual case under consideration. The working groups are reminded that, in all cases, it is their 
responsibility to ensure that each question will be answered with an appropriate explanation for both yes and 
no answers. 
Question A (Cat. 5/6/7/8/9): Lubrication or Servicing 
No: There is no applicable task because there is no consumable to replenish. 
No: A lubrication task is applicable but not effective because…(sentence to be completed) 
Yes: A lubricating task is applicable and effective because…(sentence to be completed) 
Yes: A servicing task (to be specified) is applicable and effective because…(sentence to be completed) 
Question B (Cat. 8/9): Operational or Visual Check 
No: A failure-finding check is not applicable because…(sentence to be completed) 
No: A failure-finding check is applicable but not effective because…(sentence to be completed) 
No: An operational check is applicable to detect the failure but not effective because it cannot ensure the 
availability of the hidden function. 
No: The task is applicable but not cost-effective based on the cost of the task vs. the economic effects of 
possible multiple failures. 
Yes: A failure-finding operational check of (to be specified) is applicable and effective because…(sentence to 
be completed) 
Yes: A visual check of (to be specified) is applicable as a failure-finding task and effective 
because…(sentence to be completed) 
Question B (Cat. 5/6/7) or Question C (Cat. 8/9): Inspection or Functional Check 
No: A task is not applicable because reduced resistance to failure is not detectable. 
No: There is no applicable task because there exists no reasonably consistent interval between a 
deterioration condition and the functional failure. 
No: An inspection (to be specified) is applicable but not effective because…(sentence to be completed) 
Yes: A functional check of (to be specified) is applicable and effective because…(sentence to be completed) 
Question C (Cat. 5/6/7) or Question D (Cat. 8/9): Restoration 
No. A task is not applicable because the item does not show degradation characteristics at an identifiable 
age. 
No: A task is not applicable because the item does not show degradation characteristics at an identifiable 
age and/or most of the units do not survive to that age. 
No: A task is not applicable because the item cannot be restored/repaired. 
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Yes: A cleaning task is applicable and effective because…(sentence to be completed). 
Question D (Cat. 5/6/7) or Question E (Cat. 8/9): Discard 
No: A task is not applicable because the item does not show degradation at an identifiable age. 
No: A task is not applicable because the item does not show degradation at an identifiable age and/or 
most of the units do not survive to that age. 
Yes A discard task is applicable and effective because…(sentence to be completed) 
Question E (Cat. 5) or Question F (Cat. 8): Task or Combination of Tasks 
No There are no tasks which are applicable and effective. 
Yes There is a task applicable and effective. 
Yes There is a combination of tasks (to be specified) applicable and effective. 
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6.7 TASK INTERVALS 
6.7.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTERVAL DETERMINATION 
As part of the MSG-3 logic analysis, the Maintenance Working Group has to determine the interval of each 
scheduled maintenance task that satisfies both the applicability and effectiveness criteria. The MWGs should 
select the most appropriate interval for each maintenance task based on available data and good 
engineering judgment. In the absence of specific data on failure rates and characteristics, intervals for 
systems tasks are largely determined based on service experience with similar systems/components. 
The information needed to determine optimum intervals is ordinarily not available until after the equipment 
enters service. In many cases previous experience with the same or a similar item serves as a guide. The 
difficulty of establishing "correct" intervals for maintenance tasks is essentially an information problem and 
one that continues throughout the operating life of the equipment. 
A task should not be done more often than experience or other data suggests simply because it is easily 
accomplished (doing tasks more often than necessary increases the chance for maintenance-induced errors 
and may have an adverse effect on reliability and safety). 
As part of the working group review of the analysis, substantiation/justification is to be provided for all 
intervals proposed/selected. This substantiation/justification information needs to be written down in the 
analysis and can be used as a basis for later task interval adjustments. 
6.7.2 SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
The manufacturer (when making an initial interval proposal) and the MWG (when reviewing this proposal) 
should consider the following in determining the most appropriate task interval: 
- Manufacturer’s tests and technical analysis, 
- Manufacturer’s data and/or vendor recommendations, 
- Customer requirements, 
- Service experience gained with comparable or identical components and subsystems, 
- 'Best engineering estimates'. 
For A380, Airbus has made a deliberate effort to specify minimum intervals for many types of tasks and for 
many individual tasks that have been known to be likely task candidates for MSG-3 analysis (for many of 
these tasks, 1,000 FH have been specified as minimum interval). These tasks and their associated task 
intervals have been laid down in various requirement documents (such as Top Level Aircraft Requirements 
(TLAR), System Requirement Documents (SRD), Purchaser Technical Specifications (PTS) and the 
Technical Design Directive TDD 20A007L (System Maintenance Concept)) and can thus be considered as 
validated requirements for all design activities (as long as the requirements have been formally accepted by 
the addressee). These design requirements will be considered as part – but not the only part - of the 
justification that Airbus is intending to provide to the working groups. 
In order to arrive at the 'best initial' maintenance interval for each task, each MWG must assess the interval 
based on all relevant data that is available. As part of this assessment, the MWG should consider answering 
the following questions in order to determine the most appropriate interval: 
- What service experience is available for common/similar parts/components/systems on other aircraft that 
defines an effective task interval? 
- What design improvements have been incorporated that warrant a longer interval between checks? 
- What task interval is recommended by the vendor/manufacturer based on test data or failure analysis? 
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6.7.3 TASK INTERVAL PARAMETERS 
Task intervals are established in terms of the measure of exposure to the conditions that cause the failure at 
which the task is directed. This exposure starts when the item under consideration is installed in the aircraft. 
For A380, all FEC 5 and 8 (safety related) tasks, as well as all FEC 6, 7 and 9 (non-safety related) tasks, 
must have their interval quoted in terms of the most appropriate usage parameter. 
The most widely used usage parameters are: 
- Calendar time 
- Flight hours 
- Flight cycles 
- APU hours/cycles. 
but others may be used as well (e.g. engine cycles). 
Task interval determination consists of identifying the correct usage parameter and its associated numerical 
interval. 
Note: The MSG-3 document states that both intervals expressed in usage parameters and/or letter 
checks are acceptable and may be used in line with specific procedures established for a given 
program. For A380, however, it has been decided that all intervals shall be expressed in usage 
parameters. 
Interval determination consists of the following steps: 
1. The first step is to define the predominant (governing) usage parameter(s). For many systems and 
power plant tasks, flight hours is the predominant usage parameter; however, for some tasks, flight 
cycles or calendar time may be the predominant usage parameter. Intervals may also be expressed in 
terms of more than one usage parameter. 
If the interval is expressed in a single usage parameter only, a secondary usage parameter may be 
stated where appropriate in the analysis. This information should be provided both on the Level 2 sheet 
(in the field “U.P.:” in the lower part of the form sheet) and on the Task Data sheet (in the field “Interval 
Justification”. 
2. The second step is to determine the interval in terms of the selected usage parameter subject to the 
criteria discussed below. 
For some tasks, it may be appropriate for the MWG to consider specifying an initial interval that is different 
from the repeat interval. 
6.7.4 TASK INTERVAL SELECTION CRITERIA 
In addition to these general guidelines, the following detailed recommendations should be considered: 
Lubrication/Servicing (failure prevention): 
The interval should be based on the consumable's usage rate, the amount of consumable in the storage 
container (if applicable) and the deterioration characteristics. 
Typical operating environments and climatic conditions are to be considered when assessing the 
deterioration characteristics. 
Operational Checks & Visual Checks (failure-finding): 
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Consider the length of potential exposure time to a hidden failure and the potential consequences if the 
hidden function is unavailable. 
Task intervals should be based on the need to reduce the probability of the associated multiple failure to a 
level considered tolerable by the MWG. 
The failure-finding task and associated interval selection process should take into account any probability 
that the task itself might leave the hidden function in a failed state. 
Inspections & Functional checks (potential failure finding): 
There should exist a clearly defined potential failure condition. 
(A “potential failure” is a defined identifiable condition that indicates that a degradation process is taking 
place that will lead to a functional failure.) 
The task interval should be less than the shortest likely interval between the point at which a potential failure 
becomes detectable and the point at which it degrades into a functional failure. 
(If the specific failure data is available, this interval may be referred to as the P to F interval.) 
It should be practical to do the task at this interval. 
The shortest time between the discovery of a potential failure and the occurrence of the functional failure 
should be long enough for an appropriate action to be taken to avoid, eliminate or minimize the 
consequences of the failure mode. 
Restoration and Discard (failure avoidance): 
Intervals should be based on the "identifiable age" when significant degradation begins and where the 
conditional probability of failure increases significantly. 
(“Conditional probability of failure” is the probability that a failure will occur in a specific period provided that 
the item concerned has survived to the beginning of that period.) 
Vendor recommendations based on in-service experience of similar parts should also be taken into 
consideration. 
A sufficiently large proportion of the occurrences of this failure should occur after this age to reduce the 
probability of premature failure to a level that is tolerable. 
6.7.5 "ACCESS-DEFINED" INSPECTION INTERVALS 
Occasionally, it is impossible to accomplish a task until a component/system is removed/displaced. 
In this case, the highest possible task interval commensurate with the inherent reliability characteristics of the 
item shall be selected. A note can be added to the task stating that the task should be carried out at the 
opportunity of the component giving access to the item being removed. 
As an alternative, a task may be given an access-defined interval in combination with another interval based 
on an appropriate usage parameter. 
Under no circumstances should a task be given an access-defined interval only. 
6.7.6 ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTERVAL SELECTION 
Working groups are requested to always select the highest possible interval in line with the inherent reliability 
characteristics of the equipment and not to put the emphasis on aligning these intervals with any fictitious 
letter checks. 
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APU hours/cycles may be considered as acceptable usage parameters for APU related tasks. 
During selection of the task interval, the potential for accidental damage should be duly taken into account. If 
accidental damage / corrosion is a failure cause for components such as actuator housings and actuator 
attachment points and an inspection has been selected as an applicable and effective task, it is possible to 
transfer the determination of the interval to the structures working group. Design details like materials, 
protections and installation features must be provided with the transfer sheet. 
All task intervals recommended by vendors should be fully considered and discussed in the MWG meetings; 
however, they should be accepted only if they are in agreement with the MSG-3 criteria and the experience 
of the working group members. 
If the vendor recommended interval for a task is known and accepted by the MWG, the interval can be 
quoted in the analysis as “VR”. However, it must be kept in mind that in this case, all changes to the interval, 
made subsequently by the vendor, are automatically “accepted” as well. As an alternative, the MWG can 
adopt the interval as recommended at the time of the meeting. In this case, however, any possible change of 
the vendor recommended interval would not be reflected in the analysis and the MRB Report. 
Task intervals may also change if an “alternate” component is introduced, that has a different manufacturer 
recommendation. If such is the case, Note #1 should be entered on the MRBR Interface Sheet against the 
affected task. (Also applicable to MSG-3 safety routes.) 
Note #1 
The task interval may change depending upon the manufacturer recommendations for an"alternate" 
component. Requires approval of operator's local airworthiness authority. 
Another scenario for a task interval change is based on specific operating or environmental conditions that 
have a significant impact on system performance. (eg. Cabin interior recirculation filter). Consequently the 
task interval may need to be adjusted accordingly. Under these circumstances,Note #2 applies. (Also 
applicable to MSG-3 safety routes.) 
Note #2 
The task interval may require adjustment, since specific operating or environmental conditions have a 
significant impact on system performance. Requires approval of operator's local airworthiness authority. 
 
6.8 SAMPLING 
Sampling is an examination of a specific number of items at defined intervals in order to confirm that there 
are no unexpected degradation characteristics. Non-sampled items may continue in service until sampling 
results highlight the need for additional scheduled maintenance. 
Sampling can be considered for tasks in the systems and power plant program if the characteristics of the 
task and the associated failure processes are such that a 100% - task accomplishment is not necessary and 
the results of the sample task are equally applicable to the non-sampled items. 
Details of the sampling program will have to be proposed by the MWG, accepted by the ISC and approved 
by the MRB. This must include information on affected aircraft, commercial issues and responsibilities for 
control and monitoring of the program. 
6.9 TASK SUMMARIES AND TASK DATA 
6.9.1 TASK SUMMARY 
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The purpose of the Task Summary sheet is to summarize tasks selected during Level 2 analysis, including 
their intervals and associated failure effect categories and failure cause references. 
It is not the purpose of the Task Summary sheet to combine tasks derived from Level 2 analysis so that they 
agree fully with the proposed MPP/MRB Report. Level 2 tasks selected for different failure causes should 
only be considered the same for the purpose of the Task Summary sheet if the task accomplishment 
procedures are identical and the intervals are compatible. 
For each task stated on the Task Summary sheet, all the failure cause references from which the task was 
derived and their associated failure effect categories must be given. 
The task numbers on the Task Summary sheet are normal sequence numbers, starting with “1” and 
continuing with “2”, “3”, etc. 
6.9.2 MRB REPORT INTERFACE 
The purpose of the MRB Report Interface sheet is to provide a version of the task summary that agrees – as 
far as task description and task interval is concerned – fully with the task details proposed for the MRB 
Report and to specify all additional data not derived from the analysis but required for the task section of the 
MRB Report. 
It is possible to combine tasks from the Task Summary sheet on the MRB Report Interface sheet in order to 
combine tasks that should be performed together for technical reasons and to bring the wording of tasks 
proposed for the MPP/MRB Report and those in the MSG-3 analysis in agreement with each other. 
- When combining tasks, consideration should be given to the following aspects of the tasks: 
o Are the task types (OPC, FNC, GVI, DET, etc.) the same? 
o Similarity of tasks, 
o Compatibility of intervals, 
o Failure effect categories 
- Tasks that have different Failure Effect Categories can be combined on the MRB Report Interface sheet 
if their intervals agree with each other. 
- When safety (5 or 8) and non-safety (6 or 7 or 9) tasks are combined, consideration should be given to 
the fact that the amount of data required to justify a later task interval escalation for a safety related task 
will be higher than for a non-safety task. Therefore, if the safety related part of a combined task is small 
or has little complexity in comparison with the non-safety part, it may be useful to keep the two tasks 
apart. 
- All tasks not affected by task combinations can be transferred from the Task Summary sheet to the MRB 
Report Interface sheet without change. 
- All task combinations must be approved by the ISC before integration into the MRBR proposal. The 
presentation to the ISC is to be done by means of the MWG Chair Report (see Appendix G). 
- The consolidation of similar tasks coming from different MSIs is not allowed at the level of the MSG3 
analysis. In order to give guidance to Maintenance Planning a statement could be included in the task 
description highlighting : 
 
 « X covers Y » 
 « X is covered by Y» 
At the level of the MRBR Interface Sheet when the tasks developed can be achieved in conjunction with 
another task the following wording should be included at the end of both task descriptions between brackets 
on a separate line : ( Task number XXX can be accomplished in conjunction with task number YYY) 
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All data required for the task part of the systems and power plant section of the MRB Report that did not 
originate from the MSG-3 analysis are to be added. 
The description and the interval of the tasks on the MRB Report Interface sheet should always agree fully 
with the statements in the associated MRB Report (this, of course, only applies after the first issue of the 
MRB report has been approved). 
The failure effect categories (FEC) stated on the MRB Report Interface sheet should be the most stringent of 
the evident categories (i.e. 5 or 6 or 7) and the most stringent of the hidden categories (i.e. 8 or 9) for the 
failure causes from which the task was derived. 
The task codes to be given for each task shall be 
- LUB for lubrication tasks 
- SVC for servicing tasks 
- OPC for operational checks 
- VCK for visual checks 
- FNC for functional checks 
- GVI for general visual inspections 
- DET for detailed inspections 
- SDI for special detailed inspections 
- RST for restoration tasks 
- DIS for discard tasks 
The MRBR Task number policy to be given to tasks not transferred shall be: 
- Task reference XXXXXX-EFYYY-ZZS where 
• XXXXXX is the MSI number 
• E is the Engine/APU/… manufacturer identification (where applicable, otherwise "0") 
• F is the engine type information when more than one engine from the same manufacturer is applicable to 
the program (where applicable, otherwise "0") 
• YYY is the sequential number 
• ZZ is for the technical solution applicable to the same task requirement 
S is for the source information (M for MSI, E for EZAP, H for L/HIRF) 
At the level of the MRBR Interface Sheet the only calendar usage parameter to be used is “MO” for Month. 
When a task has been transferred to the Zonal Working Group and has been accepted for inclusion into the 
Zonal Inspection Program, the Zonal Task reference must be added to the MRBR task reference column of 
the MRBR Interface Sheet next to the Task Summary Sheet (TSS) reference column. . All remaining 
columns should contain information relating to the (TSS) reference number. 
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( 
The applicability of the task must be stated in all cases. If the task is not applicable to all the series/models 
stated in the PPH, this must be made clear. Identify model A380-800F in the MRBR Interface Sheet, instead 
of using the Mod number, when the basic „Mod“ definition is analysed. 
 
6.9.3 TASK DATA 
The purpose of the Task Data sheet is to provide procedural information for task accomplishment and 
additional task planning data. 
For every task listed on the MRB Report Interface sheet (not for every task on the Task Summary sheet), a 
Task Data sheet is to be established. 
The level of detail for the task procedure should be such that 
- The working group is able to get a clear idea of the steps necessary for task accomplishment 
(including tool and GSE requirements), and 
- The AMM-author can develop it into a detailed procedure that agrees with the intent of the working 
group. It is the responsibility of the MSG-3 analyst to send the task data sheet(s) to the appropriate 
Technical Data specialist. 
The planning data established for the Task Datasheet are intended to facilitate an efficient assessment of 
the task effectiveness during the working group review and shall not be used for other purposes without 
validation. The figures for “Elapsed Time” and “Manhours” shall be the ones for the actual task and not 
include access or preparation time. The description of the task procedure shall similarly be limited to the task 
itself. 
Under “Reason for Task” it is necessary to provide a brief statement on the intent/purpose of the task (e.g. 
“To detect wear-out of the…before it fails completely”). 
For all tasks listed on the MRB Report Interface sheet, the intervals proposed/selected shall be 
substantiated/justified. The statement shall also mention the reason why the predominant usage parameter 
was chosen and, where appropriate, what the secondary usage parameter is. If tasks were listed separately 
on the Task Summary sheet and have been combined on the MRB Report Interface sheet, the justification 
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on the Task Data sheet must be specific to the combined task. If a task is not combined with other tasks and 
simply transferred from the Task Summary sheet to the MRB Report Interface sheet, the justification used 
during Level 2 analysis can be used. In all cases, the substantiation/justification information needs to be 
written down on the Task Data sheet and can be used as a basis for later task interval adjustments. 
 
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7 SUPPLEMENTARY METHODOLOGIES 
7.1 BITE, MONITORING, TESTS AND FAILURE CLASSES 
7.1.1 BITE 
The maintenance of the avionics systems on A380 is primarily based on the failure detection capabilities of 
Built-In Test Equipment resident in all electronic and a large number of the electro-mechanical and 
mechanical equipment. Failure detection opportunities are provided through monitoring or testing 
techniques. For all faults or failures detected by BITE, failure messages will be created. These failure 
messages will be used to provide the necessary indications to the operating crew. 
Independent of the crew indications, the failure messages will also be sent to the Onboard Maintenance 
System (OMS). As part of the OMS, the Centralized Maintenance System (CMS) provides reports and 
interactive dialogues to the mechanic for LRU/LRM replacement or troubleshooting purposes. 
7.1.2 MONITORING 
Monitoring is a non-intrusive technique based on the comparison between actual signals and a model 
(physical hardware redundancy or theoretical software model). It is a continuous process during which the 
impulse for the monitoring or comparison is given on a cyclic basis. 
- The frequency of the monitoring is such that any detected failure can be considered evident (as long as it 
is indicated). 
- Failures detected during monitoring can be considered evident for the purpose of MSG-3 analysis if the 
failure is indicated to the operating crew within one day of the failure occurring. 
7.1.3 TESTS 
Testing is an intrusive technique where stimuli are generated to detect the faults. The tests can be activated 
automatically or manually. 
The following automatic tests exist for A380: 
- Power-On-Self-Test (POST) 
This test is carried out for all affected equipment on the aircraft when the electrical systems of the aircraft 
are powered up. For some types of equipment, the POST is carried out more frequently as the 
equipment is powered up electrically independently of the aircraft (e.g. during engine start or after 
component replacement). During the performance of a POST, the safety tests mentioned below are also 
activated. 
The time interval between two POSTs is thus dependent on the equipment. 
If the POST for a certain item of equipment is typically carried out during the power-up of the aircraft, 
then the interval between two POSTs is expected to be higher than one day. This means that failures 
detected during this type of POST must be considered hidden for the purpose of MSG-3 analysis. 
If a dedicated POST is carried out at least once per day (e.g. during engine start), then the failures 
detected during this dedicated POST can be considered evident for the purpose of MSG-3 analysis only 
if the failure is also indicated to the operating crew. 
- Safety Tests 
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Safety tests are tests performed automatically while the aircraft is on ground. The interrogation of the 
item concerned is not performed continuously but at some interval determined by System Safety 
Assessment. 
The time period between two safety tests is dependent on the item of equipment and may vary between 
16 FH and 1,000 FH. 
Whether a failure detected during an automatic test can be considered evident for the purpose of MSG-3 
analysis depends on the frequency of test performance and the failure class assigned to the detected 
failure (see below). Failures can only be considered evident for the purpose of MSG-3 analysis if the test 
is carried out at least once during a day’s operation and the failure is indicated to the operating crew. 
Manual tests are only enabled while the aircraft is on ground and are performed for the following reasons: 
- To confirm the presence of any failure reported by a failure message or to remove any ambiguity of a 
failure message 
- To check if the system is in full operating condition 
- To activate a safety test 
- To test a specific part of the system for aircraft dispatch 
- To test a specific function 
Manual tests are carried out by both flight/cabin crew and maintenance personnel. For the purpose of MSG-
3 analysis, failures detected during the performance of manual tests may only be considered evident if they 
are carried out by the operating crew at least once per day and the requirement for the test is laid down in an 
authority approved document. 
7.1.4 FAILURE MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION 
Any failure detected in a system during monitoring or by either a POST or Safety Test is covered by a failure 
message that can be used to trigger an indication to the operating crew (if there is a need for the failure to be 
indicated). 
These failure messages will also be transmitted to the Centralized Maintenance System. Failure messages 
received from several systems are used by the CMS to build a consolidated maintenance report for a given 
event. 
Failures detected within a system by various monitoring/testing functions have different severity on the 
unit/system and therefore have different levels of indication to the flight or cabin crew. The corresponding 
failure messages are therefore split into various classes depending on the consequences of the failure(s) 
that triggered them. 
Summary of Failure Classes 
Indication to Failure 
Class Definition Flight 
Crew 
Cabin 
Crew 
Reason for 
indication, 
Impact 
MMEL Rectification 
1 Any detected failure for which a flight deck effect is generated. 
- ECAM warning/ 
caution/advisory 
- Local warning flag on an 
instrument or EFIS or ECAM 
display unit (e.g. amber 
crosses on an ECAM system 
page) 
- Sound or lack of sound, etc. 
No 
Safety or 
airworthiness 
regulation 
involved; crew 
action required 
NO GO, 
GO IF 
or 
GO 
In accordance 
with MMEL 
2 
Any detected failure for which a 
cabin effect is generated and 
covered by an airworthiness 
No Yes 
Airworthiness 
regulation 
involved 
NO GO, 
GO IF 
In accordance 
with MMEL 
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POST 
or 
AST 
POST 
or 
AST 
Indication 
to crew 
Time period between opportunities 
for detecting a failure 
Time period between detection 
and indication of failure 
Should not be more than one day 
 in order to consider a failure evident in MSG-3analysis 
POST: Power-On Self-Test 
AST: Automatic Safety Test 
Occurrence
of
Failure
authority regulation or 
GO 
3 
Any detected failure for which a 
cabin effect is generated but with 
no airworthiness regulation 
involvement 
No Yes Passenger comfort GO 
In accordance 
with airline 
policy 
4 
Any detected failure for which 
neither a flight deck nor cabin 
effect is generated but that needs 
to be fixed within a certain time 
period (as determined by the 
results of the system safety 
assessment) 
No 
(At the end of the time period, 
a signal is transmitted to the 
FWS and this will result in an 
indication to the flight crew. 
The indication will stay present 
as long as the failure is 
detected.) 
Note: The indication to the 
flight crew is not given at the 
exact time determined by the 
SSA but at an earlier period 
fixed by operational 
considerations 
No 
Safety affected 
at the end of 
certain time 
period 
N/A 
Can be 
deferred for a 
certain time 
period in 
accordance 
with MMEL 
5 
Any detected failure for which 
neither a flight deck nor cabin 
effect is generated and without 
safety involvement or time 
limitation, but generating a flight 
deck or cabin effect when 
combined with one or several 
other failure(s) 
No 
(Possible flight deck/cabin 
indication when combined with 
one or several other failures) 
 
No 
Aircraft delays 
possible if 
combined with 
other failures 
N/A No fixed time for rectification
6 
Any detected failure for which 
neither a flight deck nor cabin 
effect is generated and without 
safety involvement or time 
limitation but having an impact on 
aircraft performance (economical 
consequences) 
No No 
Aircraft 
performance 
affected 
(economical 
consequences) 
N/A No fixed time for rectification
 
In order to consider a functional failure evident for the purpose of MSG-3 analysis, 
- the failure must be detected by either continuous monitoring or during the performance of dedicated 
POSTs or automatic safety tests and 
- must be indicated to the flight or cabin crew within one day of the failure occurring. 
 
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7.1.5 TREATMENT OF FAILURE CLASSES IN MSG-3 ANALYSIS 
 
Indication to 
Failure 
Class Flight 
crew 
Cabin 
crew 
Detection of failure by Frequency of testing 
Impact on 
MSI-analysis 
(evident/hidden) 
Continuous monitoring Continuous Evident 
POST Less frequent than once per day Hidden 
If at least once per day Evident 1 Yes No Dedicated POST 
or 
Automatic Safety Test 
If less frequent than 
once per day Hidden 
Continuous monitoring Continuous Evident 
POST Less frequent than once per day Hidden 
If at least once per day Evident 2 & 3 No Yes Dedicated POST 
or 
Automatic Safety Test 
If less frequent than 
once per day Hidden 
4 No No Total time period between two opportunities for detection and delayed indication to crew is more than one day Hidden 
5 & 6 No No ------------------------------------------- Hidden 
 
Note: For all functional failures associated with Failure Classes 1, 2 and 3, it must be ascertained that the 
indication is always noted by the crew and cannot be missed in normal operation. If one cannot be 
certain that the indication is always noted by the crew in normal operation, the functional failure needs 
to be treated as a hidden failure for the purpose of the MSG-3 analysis (irrespective of the failure class 
and the frequency of testing). 
 
7.1.6 TASK SELECTION BY MEANS OF THE CENTRALISED MAINTENANCE 
SYSTEM 
Maintenance tasks may be launched through the CMS in order to determine the status of a a system, sub-
system or component. If the result of the task is displayed by an indication system that has a sufficiently high 
Design Assurance Level (e.g. on ECAM), then the reliability of the task is assured. If the result of the task is 
presented through the CMS, the lower standard of software assurance used for the CMS introduces a 
potential for incorrect feedback and thus there is less confidence in the reliability of the result and hence the 
effectiveness of such a task. 
During application of MSG-3 logic, systems and powerplant MWGs may determine that a task that is both 
launched through CMS and confirmed successful through CMS is applicable. Selection of the task will 
depend on its effectiveness. If the only reason for questioning the effectiveness is associated with the Design 
Assurance Level 'E' software standard used for the CMS, then MWGs shall assume that the task is effective 
and select it. At the same time, an 'assumption' should be recorded that will need to be revisited prior to 
approval of the MRB Report. The MWG Chair shall forward details of such tasks to the ISC CoChair who 
shall ensure that accomplishment of all such tasks are included in the Validation and Verification (V&V) 
activity to be performed on the aircraft during the flight test phase. The V&V results will be used to confirm 
the effectiveness of the task and will allow the ISC to determine whether it is acceptable to include the task in 
the MRB Report. If the V&V results determine that the task is not reliable, the originating MWG shall be 
asked to revisit the MSI analysis to determine if an alternative task could be identified as applicable and 
effective. If an alternative task meets these criteria, this shall replace the task that relies on the CMS. If no 
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alternative task is identified, the MWG/ISC shall determine whether it is better to select a task that may not 
always be effective rather than select no task. 
It is anticipated that the highly redundant design will lead to most of the above mentioned tasks being 
developed using 'non-safety' logic (FEC 6, 7 or 9). If however the MSG-3 application results in a 'safety' 
category (FEC 5 or 8), then the MWG shall not select a task that is reliant on the CMS for confirmation of 
correct component function. In such situations, Airbus may be requested to revisit the design to determine if 
modification action is practicable to permit the presence of the concerned failure to be identified by an 
indication system that has a sufficiently high Design Assurance Level. If this is not practicable, or if the MWG 
consider an alternative task as reasonable, then the MWG shall select an alternative task. 
7.2 APPROACH FOR SYSTEMS WITH FAULT-TOLERANT FUNCTIONS 
7.2.1 PRINCIPLES OF FAULT-TOLERANCE 
For the purposes of MSG-3 analysis, a system that includes fault-tolerant function(s) is defined as one that is 
designed with redundant elements that can fail without impact on safety or operating capability. In other 
words, redundant elements of the system function may fail (fault), but the system function itself has not 
failed. For example, if a system function requires 3 elements in order to satisfy all certification and 
airworthiness requirements, and the aircraft is designed with 5 elements, any 2 of the 5 elements are 
considered fault-tolerant. Individually, and in some combinations, these faults may not be annunciated to the 
operating crew, but by design the aircraft may be operated indefinitely with the fault(s) while still satisfying all 
certification and airworthiness requirements. 
Consequently, this means that the implementation of fault-tolerant functions in the system design by the 
manufacturer enhances the in-service system availability. 
However, MSG-3 is only intended to be applied to each MSI's functional failure and failure cause for the 
purpose of maintaining the required inherent safety and reliability levels of the aircraft, not to maintain all the 
redundant elements of fault-tolerant system functions. While tasks that may be used to enhance in-service 
availability by identifying the faults of the fault-tolerant systems may be of operational or economic benefit toan operator, they are predetermined by design and are not always developed by use of MSG-3. These tasks 
should only be submitted for the subsequent MRB Report if they are derived from MSG-3 analysis. 
7.2.2 FAULT-TOLERANCE ON A380 
Fault-tolerant design is not a new concept on Airbus aircraft, but the A380 is designed in such a way that the 
faults affecting fault-tolerant functions can be detected/displayed by interrogation of the system BITE. The 
provisions to perform these interrogation tasks are fully integrated in the aircraft Centralized Maintenance 
System and some of these tasks are recommended by Airbus to be performed on a repetitive basis to 
ensure optimised systems availability. 
7.2.3 ANALYSIS METHOD 
The same analysis method is used for the analysis of all functions, including those that are fault-tolerant. 
When analyzing fault-tolerant functions, the following should be observed: 
- The aim of the analysis is to enhance the in-service availability (rather than maintain the inherent safety 
and reliability levels); 
- The Failure Effect Category for functional failures in fault-tolerant functions is, by definition, 9 (Hidden, 
Non-Safety); 
- The failure-finding method (systems interrogation) is already designed into the system. 
 
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During analysis of systems that contain fault-tolerant functions, the “normal” approach is to be followed as far 
as the identification of functions on Data Sheet B is concerned. For the subsequent level 1 and 2 analysis, 
the following applies: 
For functions that are not fault-tolerant, the standard MSG-3 analysis process is to be used. 
For functions that are fault-tolerant, the following adaptation of the standard process is to be used: 
The working group must decide whether the task already designed into the system is fulfilling the 
effectiveness criteria of MSG-3. The method of system interrogation is normally predetermined by 
design; however, alternative methods of achieving the desired in-service availability can be considered. 
The description of the task is to be specific enough to provide a direct link to the failure cause and 
should not be a generic task that, when carried out, will result in the identification of all failures/faults 
available in the OMS. 
7.3 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS 
7.3.1 PRINCIPLES OF INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS DESIGN 
 
Traditional aircraft systems are federated, with each system provided on a number of dedicated hardware 
units. These applications are physically separated from one another and MSG-3 analysis are therefore 
undertaken individually. 
“Integrated Modular Avionics” (IMA) is a term used to describe a set of generic, modular and integrated 
computers connected to a network. An important characteristic of the IMA is that the same computing 
modules are shared by several aircraft systems to run applications of differing safety and criticality levels. 
MSG-3 analysis has to take into account that the shared hardware can have functions, and be a potential 
failure cause, in several systems/ATA-chapters. 
7.3.2 INTEGRATED MODULAR AVIONICS FOR A380 
The ATA 42 system of A380 consists of a shared communication means, the “Aircraft Data Communication 
Network” (ADCN) and two kinds of Line Replaceable Modules (LRM) which compose the IMA: 
- the “Input / Output Modules” (IOM) which are gateways between various kinds of input/output 
signals (e.g. ARINC 429, CAN, discrete or analogue signals) and the ADCN, 
- the “Core Processing Input / Output Modules” (CPIOM) which execute the software of several 
aircraft applications and manage the input/output signals used by these applications. 
7.3.2.1 Aircraft Data Communication Network (ADCN) 
The ADCN is a communication network derived from the Ethernet industry standard to which specific 
services have been added in order to meet the requirements of avionics. It is a switched version of the 
Ethernet (which means that exchanges between subscribers are ensured by switches) and uses a “full 
duplex” - technology (which means that subscribers simultaneously transmit and receive data at 100 Mbits/s 
on twisted pairs). The acronym AFDX (Avionics Full DupleX switched Ethernet) represents the 
communication protocol whereas the acronym ADCN gathers the physical network with all its 
components. When the term “network” is associated with the acronym AFDX, the expression 
“AFDX network” has the same meaning as the acronym ADCN. However, in order to avoid any 
misunderstanding, only the acronym ADCN must be used in the MSG-3 analyses. 
The useful data (“payload”) conveyed in the “frames” will not be used by the ADCN but only by the 
recipients. 
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The frame is made up of two types of information: 
- the header with the network information data (used to convey the packet to the correct recipient), 
- the payload with the useful data (used by the applications to realize their aircraft functions). 
A switched Ethernet network is made up of network nodes, called switches, to which the subscribers 
(CPIOMs, IOMs and classical LRUs) are physically connected. 
For availability reasons, the ADCN system implements a full network redundancy by using two identical 
networks, called network A and network B. All subscribers have a connection to both networks, transmit the 
same frames across both networks simultaneously and receive the same frames from both networks. 
This network is composed of a harness, switches and a network BITE function (which allows the 
detection/localization of a network failure and the testing of the network). 
 
Figure 7.3.2.1 Redundancy principle of the ADCN 
7.3.2.2 Input/Output Modules (IOM) 
The A380 basic design principle is that the IOM architecture is fully redundant since it is composed of 4 pairs 
of fully redundant IOMs, which are all of the same type (IOM-A). 
Their function is the data conversion to allow data exchanges between the ADCN subscribers and 
equipment which has no ADCN connection (in particular ARINC 429 equipment, sensors, actuators, etc). 
The IOMs do not host aircraft system applications. 
7.3.2.3 Core Processing Input/Output Modules (CPIOM) 
From an MSG-3 point-of-view, there are eight differently configured CPIOM-types (CPIOMs A, B, C, D1, 
D3/4, E, F and G) that execute system application software and manage the related input/output control of 
the supported system applications. 
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The following table provides an overview of the applications hosted by the different types of CPIOMs (is 
subject to change). 
 
CPIOM 
Type 
Number 
per A/C 
Domain Hosted application ATA 
chapter 
Supplemental Cooling System 21 
Engine Bleed Air Supply System 36 
Pneumatic Air Distribution System 36 
CPIOM-A 4 Cabin & 
Pneumatic 
Overheat Detection System 36 
Ventilation Control System 21 
Avionics Equipments Ventilation System 21 
Cabin Pressure Control System 21 
Air Generating System 21 
CPIOM-B 4 Cabin & 
Pneumatic 
Temperature Control System 21 
Weight & Balance Backup Computation Function 31 
Flight Control Unit Backup Function 27 
Flight Control Data Concentrator Function 27 
CPIOM-C 2 Cockpit 
Flight Warning System 31 
CPIOM-D1 1 (+1) Cockpit Air Traffic Control Data Link Applications 46 
CPIOM-D3/4 1 (+1) Cockpit Avionics Communication Routing Function 23 
Electrical System BITE Function 24 
Electrical System Gateway Function 24 
Circuit Breaker Monitoring Function 24 
CPIOM-E 2 Energy 
Electrical Load Management Function 24 
FQMS 28 CPIOM-F 4 Fuel 
FQMS 28 
Landing Gear Extension & Retraction Control 
System 
32 
Braking Control System 32 
Brake Temperature Monitoring System 32 
Tyre Pressure Indication System 32 
Steering Control System 32 
CPIOM-G4 Landing Gear 
Oleo Temperature & Pressure Monitoring System 32 
 
Figure 7.3.2.3 Applications hosted by the different types of CPIOMs 
The CPIOM architecture is composed of: 
- the processing infrastructure (CPU, memory, …) which allows to execute multiple applications on 
the same computation resource. Isolation is achieved by means of spatial and temporal 
partitioning, i.e. segregation of memory and time slots allocated to various application parts (or 
partitions) by means of software and hardware mechanism. 
- the operating system which offers the basic and common services for all the hosted applications 
- the communication infrastructure which offers a communication mean that ensures the necessary 
inter-system segregation 
- the I/O infrastructure which receives/transmits data from/to the ADCN and from/to LRUs not 
connected to the ADCN (via ARINC 429 buses, CAN buses, discrete and/or analogue wiring,..) 
The redundancy requirement concerning CPIOM is primarily determined by the design and safety 
requirement of the hosted system applications. 
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7.3.3 MSG-3 ANALYSIS METHOD FOR A380 
7.3.3.1 Scope of IMA-Analysis 
As the A380 systems are designed with a high degree of integration, the interfaces between aircraft systems 
and the ATA 42 system must be clearly defined for the purpose of MSG-3 analysis. 
The IMA/ADCN related aspects of the MSG-3 analysis involve the ATA-chapter 42 and several other ATA-
chapters. 
1) The MSG-3 analysis for ATA 42 will comprise of the analysis of all IMA-functions that are not specific 
to one of the applications from the other ATA-chapters. This will include the functions of the ADCN 
network, IOMs and CPIOMs, but will exclude functions specific to system applications hosted within 
a CPIOM. 
2) The MSG-3 analyses of the other ATA-chapters (denoted as ATA XX) will cover all system functions, 
including the system functions realized by applications hosted within a CPIOM. 
 
Figure 7.3.3.1 Simplified schematic of MSG-3 analysis aspects for IMA 
7.3.3.2 Consideration of ADCN and IOMs 
ATA 42 analyses 
The ADCN and the IOMs are completely analyzed within ATA 42 and do not have to be addressed in the 
other ATA-chapters, as they provide shared resources only, without hosting any dedicated functions of the 
systems in the other ATA-chapters. 
As part of the analysis in ATA-chapter 42, also the redundancy of the ADCN and IOMs will be analyzed. 
ATA XX analyses 
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Within the analyses of the other ATA-chapters, all the functions will be analyzed as usual, with level 1 and 
level 2 analyses. As part of these analyses, the functions of the ADCN and IOMs do not have to be 
considered as they are completely covered in ATA 42. 
Due to the redundancies provided by the ADCN and the IOMs (ref. to § 4-7.3.2.1 and 7-7.3.2.2), no single 
failure cause involving the ADCN components and/or the IOMs exists which can result in a functional failure 
of the other ATA-chapters. Therefore, the ADCN components and IOMs do not have to be considered as 
failure causes in the ATA XX analyses. 
NOTE: 
As described before, all the IOMs are fully redundant. In the general case, each equipment connected to one 
IOM is also connected to the associated redundant IOM. Nevertheless, in some rare particular cases, 
equipment will use only one IOM without using the associated redundant IOM. 
With regard to the MSG-3 analysis, the system design architecture involving IOMs will have to be clearly 
described in the Data Sheet A of the ATA XX analyses in order to clearly identify if the equipment is 
connected to only one IOM or a pair of IOMs. In this case the IOMs may be considered as failure causes in 
the ATA XX analyses. 
7.3.3.3 Consideration of CPIOMs 
ATA XX analyses 
Within the ATA XX analyses, all the functions specific to a certain application will be analyzed as usual. As 
part of these analyses, the IMA-functions do not have to be considered, as they will be completely analyzed 
within ATA 42. 
Nevertheless, as the CPIOMs execute system application software and manage the related input/output 
control, the complete or partial failure of the CPIOM which hosts the application currently analysed may 
appear as a failure cause in the ATA XX analyses. 
The redundancy provided by other CPIOMs must be taken into account in the ATA XX analyses. 
If a functional failure in an ATA XX analysis can be caused by another subsystem – in which another CPIOM 
may be a likely, but not necessarily the only, failure cause – the other CPIOM should not be listed as a 
failure cause in the ATA XX analysis but the other subsystem. It is to be noted that either an internal transfer 
(if handled within the same MWG) or a transfer to another group needs to be raised. 
For standardization purposes, the statements for the CPIOM failure causes in the ATA XX analyses shall 
contain the following information: 
1) Type of CPIOM (e.g. CPIOM - A) 
2) Input/Output involved (e.g. ADCN) 
3) Application involved (e.g. FCDC), 
To 1): The types of CPIOMs to be considered are: CPIOM – A, CPIOM – B, CPIOM – C, CPIOM – D1, 
CPIOM – D3/4, CPIOM – E, CPIOM – F and CPIOM – G. 
To 2): When identifying the “Input/Output involved” as part of the failure cause statement of a CPIOM, the 
following abbreviations shall be used: 
“ACDN” for data received and/or transmitted through the ADCN, 
“CAN” for data received and/or transmitted via CAN bus, 
“A429 input” for data received through an ARINC429 input bus, 
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“A429 output” for data transmitted through an ARINC429 output bus, 
“DSI” for data received through a discrete signal input wire, 
“DSO” for data transmitted through a discrete signal output wire, 
“ANA input” for data received through an analogue signal input, 
“ANA output” for data transmitted through an analogue signal output, 
“AUDIO” for data transmitted through an audio output, 
“CO” for data transmitted through a constant output, 
“SIO” for data received or transmitted through a special input or output. 
It is possible that several I/O types can be involved in the same functional failure. In this case, all I/O 
types must be stated in the failure cause. 
To 3): The ATA XX analyses shall quote the affected application to allow identification of those hardware 
items internal of the CPIOM, which would result in a loss of this application. 
Using the examples above, a typical Failure Cause should read as follows: 
“CPIOM-A: ADCN, FCDC”. 
and NOT as follows: 
“CPIOM-C: ADCN, FCDC (refer to MSI 42-11-03)”, 
“CPIOM-C: AFDX, FCDC”, 
“CPIOM-C: ADCN, FCDC application”, 
 
ATA 42 analysis 
The different types of CPIOMs host different system applications; therefore, the various types of CPIOMs 
have to be covered by separate analyses. 
All the CPIOM functions not specifically allocated to one hosted system application will be analyzed within 
the ATA 42. 
As the CPIOM can supply, control or monitor several applications from different ATA-chapters on the same 
hardware platform, the analysis has to consider both, the possibility of losing all applications associated with 
this CPIOM, as well as the redundancy provided by other CPIOMs. 
The links between the CPIOM functional failures and the involved ATA XX functional failures will be created 
by reviewing all ATA XX analyses where the CPIOMs appear as failure cause. The result of this review will 
be presented in a “Consequences-of-Failure Matrix”, which will be a part of the CPIOM analysis (Data Sheet 
A). 
This matrix will include for each type of CPIOM: 
 
The hosted system applications, 
The CPIOM functional failures, 
The means of detection for each CPIOM functional failure (Automatic SafetyTest, POST, continuous 
monitoring, manual test), 
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The associated ATA XX functional failures, failure effects, FEC and task(s) derived from the ATA XX 
analyses where the CPIOM was a failure cause. 
This “Consequences-of-Failure Matrix” will permit, for each CPIOM functional failure, to define the failure 
effect(s) and to elaborate the level 1 and level 2 analyses. 
In order to allow the establishment of the “Consequences-of-Failure Matrix” for each CPIOM and the 
elaboration of the corresponding ATA 42 CPIOM analyses, all the MSG-3 analyses involving at least one 
CPIOM as a failure cause have to be sent as early as possible by the ATA XX analyst to the ATA 42 analyst. 
During the subsequent working group review process, a Transfer sheet must be raised by the responsible 
system working group for each issue of an ATA XX MSI involving CPIOMs as a failure cause in order to 
transfer the details of the functional failure analysis to MWG-4 (and ATA 42) for consolidation and to ensure 
a full traceability. 
When carrying out the level 1 analysis for a “complete” failure of a certain type of CPIOM in ATA 42, all ATA 
XX analyses where the CPIOM appears as a failure cause are to be considered and the “combined” effect of 
all these functional failures occurring together is to be determined. When answering the four level 1 
questions for the “combined failure”, the following rules are to be observed: 
 
1st level 1 question (is failure hidden or evident?): 
 If all the FECs of the ATA XX functional failures involving a certain type of CPIOM as a failure cause 
are either 8 or 9, then all the functional failures were considered hidden and the combined failure is 
hidden as well. The answer to the first question is thus a “No”. 
 If one of the FECs of the ATA XX functional failures involving the CPIOM as a failure cause is 5, 6 or 
7, then at least one functional failure has been considered evident and the combined failure can be 
considered evident as well. The answer to the first question is thus a “Yes”. 
2nd level 1 question (is the evident failure safety related?) 
 If all of the FECs of the ATA XX functional failures involving the CPIOM as a failure cause are either 
6 or 7 or 8 or 9 (but not 5), then all the original functional failures were considered to have - by 
themselves - no direct adverse effect on operating safety (this is correct even in the case of the 
FF(s) resulting in FEC 8 because the FEC 8 was the result of combining a hidden failure with 
another failure). However, the combined result of several functional failures occurring at the same 
time has to be individually assessed and is not simply the most severe effect of the individual 
functional failures originating from the different ATA XX chapters. 
Note: All cases shall be reported by the MWG-4 chair to the ISC for consideration where a NO 
answer is given to the 2nd level 1 question and one or several ATA XX functional failures with 
FEC 8 had to be considered. 
 If one of the FECs of the ATA XX functional failures involving the CPIOM as a failure cause is 5, 
then the combined failure has a direct adverse effect on operating safety as well and the answer to 
this question has to be a “Yes”. 
3rd level 1 question (is the hidden failure safety related?): 
 If all the FECs of the ATA XX functional failures involving the CPIOM as a failure cause are 9, then 
all the original hidden functional failures, even in combination with other failures, were considered to 
have no adverse effect on operating safety. However, the combined result of several of these 
functional failures occurring at the same time has to be individually assessed. 
 If one of the FECs of the ATA XX functional failures involving the CPIOM as a failure cause is 8, 
then the combined failure has an adverse effect on operating safety as well and the answer to this 
question has to be a “Yes”. 
4th level 1 question (has the evident failure operational repercussions?): 
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 If all of the FECs of the ATA XX functional failures involving the CPIOM as a failure cause are either 
7 or 8 or 9 (but not 6), then the combined result of several of these functional failures occurring at the 
same time has to be individually assessed. 
 If one of the FECs of the ATA XX functional failures involving the CPIOM as a failure cause is 6, 
then the combined failure has an adverse effect on operating capability as well and the answer to 
this question has to be a “Yes”. 
 
 
 
 
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Figure 7.3.3.3 (1) Flow chart for the assessment of combined CPIOM failures 
by means of Consequences-of-Failure Matrix 
 
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Figure 7.3.3.3 (2) Failure Effect Categories as a result of combining several functional failures having one or 
more FECs 
 
 
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8 ANALYSIS ADMINISTRATION 
8.1 CHANGE CONTROL 
The way to indicate the changes from the previous issue to the current issue will depend on the type of 
report pages of the analysis: 
Heading page MSI 
The changes can only affect the MSI issue number and the MSI issue date therefore the changes will not be 
indicated on the sheet. 
No revision bar. 
List of effective pages 
Changes on this sheet are evident due to the mention of the issue date for each listed pages therefore the 
changes will not be indicated on the sheets. 
No revision bar. 
List of Revisions 
As the changes are evident they will not be pointed out on the sheet. 
No revision bar. 
History of change 
As the changes are evident they will not be indicated. 
No revision bar. 
Data sheet(s) A Component Data: 
The changes on these pages will be recorded in History of Change and will be indicated by means of 
revision bars in the right part of the sheet (inside the template frame). 
One revision bar for each new or updated component. 
Data sheet(s) A System description: 
The changes on these pages will be recorded in History of Change and will be indicated by means of 
revision bars (device included in “ M.S. Word”) in the right part of the sheet (inside the template frame) 
Data sheet B: 
The changes on these pages will be recorded in History of Change and indicated by means of revision bars 
in the right side of each column. 
1 revision bar for each new or updated F 
1 revision bar for each new or updated FF 
1 revision bar for each new or updated FE 
1 revision bar for each new or updated FC. 
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Level 1 sheets: 
The changes on these sheets will be recorded in History of Change and indicated by means of revision bars 
in the right part of the sheet (inside the template frame). 
1 revision bar for each new or updated answer. 
 
Level 2 sheets: 
The changes on these sheets will be recorded in History of Change and indicated by means of revision bars 
in the right part of the sheet (inside the template frame). 
One revision bar for each new or updated answer, comment. 
One revision bar for each new or updated MSG Task. 
MRB Report Interface Sheet: 
The changes on these sheets will be recorded in History of Change and indicated by means of revision bars 
in the right part of the sheet (inside the template frame) 
One revision bar for each new or updated MRB Task. 
MRB Task data: 
The changes on these pages will be recorded in the history of change, the changes in the procedure will be 
indicated by means of a revision bar covering the whole procedure in the right partof the sheet (inside the 
template frame) 
8.2 APPLICABILITY CONTROL 
The aircraft family name stated in the top left-hand corner of the form sheets is “A380”. 
The statement in the “Applicability” field in the bottom line of the form sheets should be: 
- “All models on cover sheet” (if all aircraft models mentioned on the Cover sheet are covered) or 
- “A380-800” (if all 800 model aircraft of the passenger version are covered) or 
- “A380-840” (if applicable to passenger aircraft with RR Trent 970 engines only) or 
- “A380-860” (if applicable to passenger aircraft with Engine Alliance GP7270 engines only) or 
- “A380-800F” (if all 800 model aircraft of the freighter version are covered) or 
- “A380-840F” (if applicable to freighter aircraft with RR Trent 970 engines only) or 
- “A380-860F” (if applicable to freighter aircraft with Engine Alliance GP7270 engines only) or 
- The modification number or 
- Any other suitable differentiation. 
8.3 PAGE NUMBERING 
Page numbering of the MSG-3 analysis is as follows: 
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Cover sheet ⇒ No page number 
List of Effective Pages (LEP) ⇒ Page 1.p (Note 1) 
List Of Revisions (LOR) ⇒ Page 2. p (Note 1) 
History of Changes sheet ⇒ Page 3. p (Note 1) 
Data sheet(s) A, 
including Component Data sheet(s) ⇒ Page 4. p (Note 1) 
Data sheet B ⇒ Page 5. p (Note 1) 
Level 1 sheets ⇒ Page 6.F.L (Note 1) (Note 2) 
Level 2 sheets ⇒ Page 6.F.L.p (Note 1) (Note 2) 
Task Summary sheet ⇒ Page 7. p(Note 1) 
MRB Report Interface sheet ⇒ Page 8m. p (Note 3) 
Task Data sheet ⇒ Page 9m.T. p (Note 3) (Note 4) (Note 1) 
Note 1: The number (p) is the sequential page number (starting at 1). 
Note 2: The number (F) appears in the L1/L2 page numbering and corresponds to the function number. The 
number (L) is the L1 or L2 sequential number for relevant function starting at “1” (L1 and L2 being sorted by 
Functional Failure for L1 and Failure Causes for L2). 
For each function, the L1/L2 page numbering re-starts at 1 as follows: 
Example: 
-For function 2 L1: 6.2.1 , for the L2: 6.1.2.1, if the Level has 2 pages: 6.1.2.2 
 
Note 3: (m) is the MRBR sequential number (if there is only one MRBR report it will be the letter “a”) 
8.4 NOTE 4: THE NUMBER (T) IS THE TASK NUMBER (FROM THE MRB REPORT 
INTERFACE SHEET).ISSUE DATES 
The issue date of the Cover sheet, the List of Effective Pages, the List Of Revisions and the History of 
Changes will always show the latest issue date of all pages, i.e. they reflect the current issue date of the 
analysis. 
All pages of the Data Sheet A (including Component Data sheet(s)) shall have the same issue date. This rule 
also applies to the List of Effective Pages, the List Of Revisions, the History of Changes, Data Sheet B, Task 
Summary sheet, MRB Report Interface sheet and to the different Task Data sheets. This means that all the 
pages of each of these different types of form sheets will have the same issue date; however, this does not 
mean that all these page types will have the same issue date. 
All pages of the Level 1 and 2 analysis will have their own individual issue dates. New Level 1 and 2 analysis 
pages that are first introduced with a certain issue of the analysis will receive the latest issue date (i.e. the 
one that corresponds to the issue date of the analysis). 
8.5 ISSUE NUMBER 
Revision control of the analysis is achieved by means of the issue date only and not by the issue number. 
Where used, the issue number is only intended to allow a simple and unambiguous identification of the latest 
issue of the analysis. Therefore, the issue number shall only be shown on the Cover sheet and the List of 
Revisions. 
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Whenever a part of the analysis is revised, the issue number on the Cover sheet is increased by one. The 
List Of Revisions (LOR) does not have its own issue number but will display the issue number of the analysis 
in the part of the form sheet where the revision details are provided. 
8.6 DIGITAL VERSIONS OF THE ANALYSIS 
As the analyses will be distributed to the participants of the MRB process in a digital format, the following 
procedure for saving the analysis files in a PDF data format should be adhered to: 
The complete analysis is to be saved as a single PDF-file (Portable Data Format – “xxx.pdf”). In order to 
ease reading of the analysis, the table of content should be arranged as follows: 
 
HHiissttoorryy ooff CChhaannggeess 
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For a consistent identification of all analysis files, the denomination of files should be done as follows: 
Example: MSI_XX-YY-ZZ_iss_01-A380.pdf 
 
 
 
 
Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Part 4 Part 5 Part 6 
MSI XX-YY-ZZ iss 01 A380 .pdf 
“MSI” as a 
fixed term to 
identify all MSI 
analysis files 
MSI-reference (6 
digit ATA-number) 
with a separator "-" 
between each 2-digit 
block (e.g. 78-31-00, 
29-21-00) 
“iss” as a 
prefix for the 
issue number 
of the analysis 
Issue number of 
the analysis (two 
digits to avoid the 
case of "iss 10" 
coming before "iss 
2" in the windows 
classification) 
“A380” as the 
aircraft program 
reference 
Format (file 
extension) of data 
file using usual 
conventions: 
(*.pdf) 
In order to facilitate the sorting of file names and to improve the readability of an extensive list in a 
windows pop-up, it is necessary to have an underscore (“_”) between parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and to have a 
hyphen (" - ") between parts 4 and 5. 
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9 MWG ANALYSIS REVIEW PROCEDURE 
9.1 WORKING GROUP REVIEW 
The working group review of an ATA-chapter will be conducted in the following sequence: 
1. System Presentation: Presentation of design features for a complete ATA-chapter to familiarize WG 
members and advisors with the overall system design in order to be fully prepared for the review of the 
MSI selection. 
2. Review of MSI Selection: Presentation, review, discussion and eventually agreement on the content of 
the MSI selection per ATA-chapter, i.e. items for which an MSI analysis will be prepared/presented and 
those items which will not be covered by an analysis. 
3. Review of MSI Analysis (per analysis): Presentation of design details, review, discussion and eventually 
agreement on the content of each MSI analysis, including maintenance tasks proposed to the ISC for 
inclusion in the MPP. 
4. Summary: Review of transfers to other MWGs - including Zonal MWG, closed open items from previous 
meetings, new open items for further working group discussion, items to be raised for ISC consideration 
and decision. All assumptions made in the analysis or as part of the analysis review that could not be 
verified as correct/true need to be tracked as open items. 
Upon acceptance of the MSG-3 analyses by the MWG members, the MWG chairperson will present the 
results of the analyses to the ISC & MRB for review and approval/acceptance. At that time, any conflicts, 
concerns expressed by the MRB advisor(s) and open points that cannot be resolved by the MWG shall be 
brought to the ISC's attention. Level 2 analyses for Failure Effect Categories 5 and 8 that do not result in a 
task must be brought to the attention of the ISC as well. 
The aircraft manufacturer will retain all approved MSG-3 analyses and documents as a historical file. 
The MSG-3 analysis and the system safety assessment processes are completely separated and it is not 
necessary to enforce compatibility between tasks originated from MSG-3 analysis and system safety 
assessment; therefore, the working groups should not be influenced by tasks and task intervals possibly 
available in a preliminary formwhen the working group meeting takes place. 
9.2 TRANSFERS BETWEEN SYSTEM WORKING GROUPS 
Where failure causes belong to another MSI or system, it is to be ensured that full traceability for all 
subsequent analysis and the ensuing results is provided. 
1. If the other system is dealt with by the same MWG, then the group shall establish a consistent and 
traceable system of tracking these “internal” transfers. 
2. If the failure cause belongs to a system or ATA-chapter that is under the responsibility of another 
working group, the Level 2 analysis may require advice / support from the other MWG (either for 
completion or for performance of the complete Level 2 analysis of the failure cause) and in this case, a 
transfer sheet is to be written to request support from the other group. 
- If the whole Level 2 analysis is to be performed by the other working group, it is necessary to 
supply the group with the associated Level 1 analysis as well. 
- Normally, the results of the analysis performed by the other group are incorporated in the analysis 
of the group that raised the transfer sheet. 
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- If the failure cause is of such a general nature that it does not make sense to incorporate the 
results of the Level 2 analysis, the other group must be formally requested to assume 
responsibility for the results of any further work. 
o If the request is agreed by the other group, the responsibility for the item and the results of any 
further analysis is transferred to the other group. 
o If the request is not answered positively or not answered at all, the originating group retains the 
responsibility for the item. 
 
9.3 ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF SYSTEMS MWG ACTIVITY 
For each ATA-chapter, the MWG chairperson must maintain the following lists: 
- A list of transfer sheets established by the group (including the status of the replies received) 
- A list of transfer sheets received from other working groups (including the status of the replies given) 
- A list of open items (including non-verified assumptions and items for ISC consideration) 
- A list of items of concern for ISC and/or MRB (unless included in the open items list) 
The MWG chairperson must maintain the MSG-3 Analysis Status List up-to-date. This Status List is shown in 
Appendix B. 
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10 INTERFACE WITH TYPE CERTIFICATION PROCESS 
In addition to those tasks and intervals established through MSG-3 analysis, scheduled maintenance tasks 
may arise within the JAR/FAR 25.1309 certification process. They are designated as Certification 
Maintenance Requirements. 
A Certification Maintenance Requirement (CMR) is a required periodic task, established during the design 
certification of the airplane as an operating limitation of the type certificate. CMRs are a subset of the tasks 
identified during the type certification process. CMRs usually result from a formal, numerical analysis 
conducted to show compliance with catastrophic and hazardous failure conditions. A CMR is intended to 
detect safety significant latent failures that would, in combination with one or more other specific failures or 
events, result in a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition. 
It is important to note that CMRs are derived from a fundamentally different analysis process than the 
maintenance tasks and intervals that result from MSG-3 analysis. The process for coordinating MSG-3 
derived tasks with CMRs is described in detail in AMJ 25-19 (JAA) and AC 25-19 (FAA) and involves a 
Certification Maintenance Coordination Committee (CMCC) that may influence the MWG's task decision. 
As the two processes are completely separated and it is not necessary to enforce compatibility between 
tasks originated from MSG-3 analysis and system safety assessment, the working groups should not be 
influenced by tasks and task intervals available in a preliminary form when the working group meeting takes 
place. 
In addition to those tasks and intervals designated as CMR’s, scheduled maintenance tasks may arise from 
the SFAR88 System Safety Review process. These are designated as Fuel Airworthiness Limitation Items 
(Fuel ALI’s). The process for deriving Fuel ALI’s is described in detail in AC 25.981b (FAA) and 
INT/POL/25/12 (JAA) 
 
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SECTION 5: STRUCTURE ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The primary objective of the scheduled structural maintenance is to maintain the inherent airworthiness 
throughout the operational life of the aircraft in an economical manner. The structural maintenance tasks 
developed as part of the scheduled structural maintenance are used to satisfy aircraft type certification and 
Maintenance Review Board requirements. 
This section contains guidelines (including policy, logic, and detailed procedures) for developing scheduled 
maintenance tasks for the A380 aircraft structure. 
2 PRINCIPLES 
2.1 GENERAL 
Guidelines herein described are designed to relate the scheduled maintenance tasks to the consequences of 
structural damage remaining undetected, being each structural item assessed in terms of its significance to: 
- Continuing airworthiness, 
- Susceptibility to any form of damage, and 
- Degree of difficulty involved in detecting such damage 
Once this is established, scheduled structural maintenance can be developed which can be shown to be 
effective in detecting and preventing structural degradation throughout the operational life of the aircraft due 
to: 
- Accidental Damage (AD), 
- Environmental Deterioration (ED), and 
- Fatigue Damage (FD) 
 
2.2 MAIN PRINCIPLES 
According to MSG-3 Document, the scheduled structural maintenance tasks and intervals are based on an 
assessment of: 
- Structural design information, 
- Service experience with similar structure, 
- Fatigue and damage tolerance evaluations, and 
- Pertinent test results. 
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2.3 AIRCRAFT STRUCTURE DEFINED 
The A380 structure MSG-3 analysis procedure will only be dealing with the aircraft structure. It is therefore 
necessary to clearly define what it is considered to be “aircraft structure” for the purpose of structure 
scheduled maintenance program development. 
Aircraft structure consists of all loads carrying members including wings, fuselage, empennage, engine 
mountings, landing gear, flight control surfaces, and related points of attachment. The actuating portions of 
items such as landing gear, flight controls, doors, etc. will be treated as systems components and will be 
analysed as described in the Systems/Powerplant Analysis Procedure Section of this PPH. Attachment of 
the actuators to the airframe will be treated as structure. 
Some other structure related classification/categorisation and associated definitions are also provided for 
reference. The basic categorisation is made according to the consequences of their failure to aircraft safety: 
A Structural Significant Item (SSI) is any structural detail, element or assembly whose failure could affect 
the structural integrity necessary for the safety of the aircraft. 
Other Structure is that which is judged not to be a Structural Significant Item. It is defined both externally 
and internally within zonal boundaries. 
A Principal Structure Element (PSE) is an element that contributes significantly to the carrying of flight, 
ground, or pressurisation loads, and whose integrity is essential in maintaining the overall structural integrity 
of the airplane. 
Other standard qualification of the aircraft, which is also basic for establishing and developing the structure 
scheduled maintenance procedure, is as follows: 
An item is judgedto be Damage Tolerant if it can sustain damage and the remaining structure can 
withstand reasonable loads without structural failure or excessive structural deformation until the damage is 
detected. 
Safe Life structure is that which is not practical to design or qualify as damage tolerant. Its reliability is 
protected by discard limits, which remove items from service before fatigue cracking is expected. 
Regarding structure composition, mechanical/physical properties, damage related behaviour and for the 
purpose of the scheduled structural maintenance tasks development, it is also necessary to identify which 
structural items cannot be considered as metallic and are to be treated as non-metallic: 
A Non-metallic structure is any structural material made from fibrous or laminated components bonded 
together by a medium. Materials such as graphite epoxy, boron epoxy, fibreglass, kevlar epoxy, acrylics and 
the like are non-metallic. Non-metallic includes adhesives used to join other metallic or non-metallic 
structural materials. 
Within the A380 structure MSG-3 analysis, for each Structural Significant Item (SSI), metallic and/or non-
metallic structure will be identified for the purpose of structural maintenance requirements development. In 
particular, although “Glare” is a hybrid material, it will be considered as metallic for the purposes of A380 
MSG-3 analysis. 
2.4 DAMAGE SOURCES DEFINITION 
According to ATA MSG-3 document, the damage sources identified below are to be taken into account for 
the selection of maintenance tasks. For the purpose of the structural maintenance tasks development, a 
definition of each damage source is provided: 
Accidental Damage (AD): Physical deterioration of an item caused by contact or impact with an object or 
influence, which is not a part of the aircraft, or by human error during manufacturing, operation of the aircraft, 
or maintenance practices. 
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Environmental Deterioration (ED): Physical deterioration of an item's strength or resistance to failure as a 
result of chemical and/or thermal interaction with its climate or environment. 
Fatigue Damage (FD): The initiation of a crack or cracks due to cyclic loading and subsequent propagation. 
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DATE : June 2006 
 
 
3 BASIC ANALYIS PROCEDURE 
3.1 DESCRIPTION 
The basic process to be followed when developing the scheduled maintenance tasks is mainly based on the 
systematic evaluation of the various damage sources which have been mentioned in paragraph 5-2.4 and by 
taking into account the various structure categories defined in paragraph 5-2.3. 
A. The initial step is the identification of the Significant Structure, which implies a systematic review of 
the complete AIRCRAFT STRUCTURE in order to determine those structural items that fall into that 
category or can be treated as “other structure”. 
B. All items categorised as “Other Structure” will be considered in the Zonal Analysis. 
C. All metallic structure identified as Significant Structure will be sequentially subjected to the 
ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE ANALYSIS and the ENVIRONMENTAL DETERIORATION (and CPCP) 
ANALYSIS. 
D. In addition, every metallic structural item identified as Significant Structure, must be further 
categorised as SAFE-LIFE or DAMAGE-TOLERANT. 
E. For every metallic SAFE-LIFE item, the relevant Life-Limits are defined as a result of the ”Fatigue 
(safe-life) Evaluations” performed by the manufacturer to comply with FAR/JAR 25.571. These limits 
are published in the Airworthiness Limitation Section of the Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness. 
F. Every metallic DAMAGE-TOLERANT item will follow the FATIGUE DAMAGE ANALYSIS, which is 
based on the ”Damage Tolerance Evaluations” performed by the manufacturer to comply with 
FAR/JAR 25.571. 
G. All non-metallic structure identified as Significant Structure will be subjected to the ACCIDENTAL 
DAMAGE ANALYSIS and the ENVIRONMENTAL DETERIORATION (“Aging”) ANALYSIS. 
It must be noted that, in some cases, a single portion of the Significant Structure analysed (SSI) contains 
‘metallic’ and ‘non-metallic’ materials. If this is the case, each type of material will follow its own type of 
analysis. 
 
 
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3.2 BASIC FLOW CHART 
AIRCRAFT 
STRUCTURE 
SIGNIFICANT
STRUCTURE 
OTHER 
STRUCTURE 
Definition of 
SAFE LIFE 
LIMITS 
FATIGUE 
DAMAGE 
ANALYSIS 
ACCIDENTAL 
DAMAGE 
ANALYSIS 
ED/CPCP 
ANALYSIS 
ACCIDENTAL 
DAMAGE 
ANALYSIS 
ED (“Aging”) 
ANALYSIS 
To be considered
by Zonal WG 
Significant? 
Metallic or 
Non 
Metallic? 
SAFE LIFE 
STRUCTURE
DAMAGE 
TOLERANT
STRUCTURE
METALLIC 
STRUCTURE 
NON METALLIC 
STRUCTURE 
Safe Life or 
Damage 
Tolerant? 
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3.3 DOCUMENTATION PROCESS 
A systematic and sequential top-down process to document the complete MSG-3 structure analysis has 
been defined in other to allow a comprehensive approach to identify: 
- Aircraft Structure, 
- Significant Structure, 
- Significant Structure Dossier, and 
- Significant Structure Item 
Although each of these steps are defined in the following paragraphs, the illustration shown below is 
intended to serve as a reference to facilitate the understanding of the analysis process and associated 
‘documentation levels’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATA 
BREAKDOWN 
SIGNIFICANT 
STRUCTURE 
SELECTION 
SIGNIFICANT 
STRUCTURE 
DOCUMENTATION 
& SSI 
MANAGEMENT 
SIGNIFICANT 
STRUCTURE 
ITEM 
DEFINITION 
SSI MSG-3 
ANALYSIS 
SSI 
REQUIREMENTS 
CONSOLIDATION 
SIGNIFICANT 
STRUCTURE 
REFERENCE 
SIGNIFICANT 
STRUCTURE 
DOSSIER 
SIGNIFICANT 
STRUCTURE 
ITEM 
DOSSIER 
SSI 
REQUIREMENTS 
MRBR 
STRUCTURE 
SECTION TASKS 
‘AIRCRAFT’ LEVEL
‘SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURE DOSSIER’ LEVEL
‘SSI’ LEVEL
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4 DETAILED PROCEDURAL STEPS 
4.1 SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURE SELECTION. 
STEP 
No. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
1.1 ADMINISTRATIVE 
DATA 
- Establishment of data for administrative pages 
of Significant Structure Selection (i.e. Cover 
Sheet, List of Revisions, List of Effective 
pages, etc.) 
OAM 5-5.1 STR01 
STR02 
STR03 
 
 
1.2 STRUCTURE 
SELECTION LIST 
ESTABLISHMENT 
- Identification of the ATA breakdown for every 
A380 aircraft ATA Chapter to ensure that the 
complete aircraft is covered and facilitate the 
Identification of the Significant Structure. 
OAM 5-5.2 STR04 
 
1.3 IDENTIFICATION OF 
THE SIGNIFICANT 
STRUCTURE 
- Full identification of the aircraft significant 
structure to determine which structural items 
will be subjected to a full MSG-3 analysis. 
OAM 5-5.2 STR04 
 
1.4 “Other Structure” 
IDENTIFICATION 
- Identification and listing of “other structure”. OAM 5-5.2 STR04 Covered by Zonal 
Analysis 
 
4.2 DOCUMENTATION OF SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURE. DOSSIER. 
STEP 
No. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
2.1 ADMINISTRATIVE 
DATA 
- Establishment of data for administrative pages 
of Significant Structure Dossier (i.e. Cover 
Sheet, List of Revisions, List of Effective 
pages, etc.), and Effective SSI Analyses within 
the Dossier 
OAM 5-6.1 STR05 
STR06 
STR07 
STR08 
 
 
 
2.2 SIGNIFICANT 
STRUCTURE 
DOCUMENTATION 
- Summary of all relevant information concerning 
the Significant Structure and related to the 
MSG-3 analysis (design principles, design 
details, working environment, accessibility 
conditions, etc.) to be provided to WG 
members in order to allow a comprehensive 
SSI identification and analysis. 
OAM 5-6.2STR10 
 
4.3 STRUCTURE SIGNIFICANT ITEMS (SSI) IDENTIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT 
STEP 
Num. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
3.1 SSI SELECTION - Identification and listing of individual SSIs to 
ensure that an appropriate area of analysis is 
selected for the purpose of the MSG-3 
analysis. 
OAM 5-7.1 
5-7.2 
N/A 
 
3.2 SSI ANALYSIS 
MANAGEMENT 
- Establishment of a SSIs MSG-3 analysis 
management list to provide a full picture of the 
content, applicability, status, interaction and 
relationship between all SSIs within one 
Significant Structure Dossier and allow an 
adequate tracking of each individual SSI MSG-
3 analysis. 
OAM 5-7.3 STR11 This step is to be 
completed after the 
accomplishment of 
the SSI Analysis 
 
3.3 SSI DIAGRAMS - Illustrated description of the SSIs defined 
indicating their location and boundaries. 
OAM 5-7.4 STR12 
 
 
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DATE : June 2006 
 
 
4.4 SSIS MSG-3 ANALYSIS 
STEP 
Num. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
4.1 ADMINISTRATIVE 
DATA 
- Establishment of data for administrative pages 
of Significant Structure Item (SSI) Analysis (i.e. 
Cover Sheet, List of Revisions and List of 
Effective Pages). 
OAM 5-8.1 STR13 
STR14 
STR14a 
 
 
4.2 SSI 
DOCUMENTATION 
- Provide specific data and information related to 
the SSI MSG-3 analysis (zone, access, 
materials, protections, detailed illustration, etc.) 
to WG members required to further proceed 
with the SSI MSG-3 analysis. 
OAM 5-8.2 STR15 
STR16 
STR17 
 
 
4.3 SSI 
ACCIDENTAL 
DAMAGE ANALYSIS 
(Metallic items) 
- Evaluation of metallic structure regarding 
Accidental Damage likelihood and associated 
damages. 
- Determination of the possible impact of 
Accidental Damages on subsequent 
Environmental Deterioration and Fatigue 
Damage MSG-3 analysis for scheduled 
structural requirement determination. 
OAM 5-8.3 
5-8.4 
STR18 
 
4.4 SSI 
ACCIDENTAL 
DAMAGE ANALYSIS 
(Non-metallic items) 
- Evaluation of non-metallic structure regarding 
Accidental Damage likelihood and associated 
damages. 
- Determination of the possible impact of 
Accidental Damages on subsequent Aging 
Deterioration Analysis for scheduled structural 
requirement determination. 
- Determination of the possible impact of 
Accidental Damages on structure strength 
reduction in order to define (if required) 
suitable scheduled inspection requirement. 
OAM 5-8.3 
5-8.5 
STR19 
 
4.5 SSI 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
DETERIORATION + 
CPCP ANALYSIS 
(Metallic items) 
- Evaluation of metallic structure regarding 
Environmental Deterioration. 
- Evaluation of metallic structure regarding 
CPCP expectations. 
- Determination of suitable scheduled 
maintenance requirement to address 
Environmental Deterioration concerns and with 
the aim to control corrosion to Level 1 or 
better. 
OAM 5-8.6 STR20 
 
4.6 SSI 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
DETERIORATION 
-“Aging”- ANALYSIS 
(Non-metallic items) 
- Evaluation of non-metallic structure regarding 
Environmental Deterioration. 
- Determination of suitable scheduled inspection 
requirement to address long-term deterioration 
with regard to operating environment. 
OAM 5-8.7 STR21 
 
4.7 SSI 
SAFE-LIFE LIMIT 
ANALYSIS 
(Metallic, 
Safe-life items) 
- Fatigue evaluation of Safe-Life items. 
- Determination of Life Limits. 
OAM 5-8.8 N/A Life Limits 
determination are 
part of the JAR/FAR 
25.571 requirements 
and will not be 
quoted in the MSG-3 
Analysis. 
 
4.8 SSI FATIGUE 
DAMAGE ANALYSIS 
(Metallic, Damage 
Tolerant items) 
- Evaluation of metallic Damage Tolerance 
structure regarding Fatigue Damage. 
- Determination of suitable scheduled inspection 
requirements to address Fatigue Damage 
deterioration to be proposed to be included in 
the MRBR. 
OAM 5-8.9 STR22 
STR23 
STR24 
STR25 
Airworthiness 
Limitation Items 
(ALIs) requirements 
resulting from the 
JAR/FAR 25.571 will 
not be proposed to 
be included in the 
MRBR. 
 
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4.5 SSI REQUIREMENTS CONSOLIDATION 
STEP 
Num. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 - 
5.1 COMPLETE SSI 
SCHEDULED 
MAINTENANCE 
REQUIREMENTS 
SUMMARY LISTING 
- For the complete Significant Structure under 
evaluation (Dossier), a compilation and listing 
of every scheduled maintenance requirement 
for each individual SSI. 
OAM 5-9.2 STR26 
 
5.2 DETERMINATION OF 
SSI REQUIREMENTS 
PROPOSED TO BE 
COVERED BY GVI 
ZONAL 
INSPECTIONS 
- For the complete Significant Structure under 
evaluation (Dossier), an identification of every 
General Visual Inspection requirement which is 
proposed to the Zonal WG to be covered by 
the Zonal Inspections. 
- Extracted from the complete SSI Requirements 
Summary. 
OAM 5-9.3 STR26 
 
5.3 SSI TASKS 
PROPOSED FOR ALI 
CANDIDATES 
DETERMINATION 
- For the complete piece of Significant Structure 
under evaluation (Dossier), an identification of 
every scheduled inspection requirement which 
is proposed to be ALI candidate. 
- Extracted from the complete SSI Requirements 
Summary. 
 
OAM 5-9.4 STR26 
 
5.4 SSI REQUIREMENTS 
CONSOLIDATION 
- For the complete Significant Structure under 
evaluation (Dossier), an identification of every 
scheduled maintenance requirement which is 
proposed to be fully consolidated into a unique 
scheduled maintenance task in order to avoid 
redundant tasks. 
- Extracted from the complete SSI Requirements 
Summary. 
OAM 5-9.5 STR27 
 - 
5.5 MRBR INTERFACE 
DATA 
ESTABLISHMENT 
- For the complete Significant Structure under 
evaluation (Dossier), a compilation and listing 
of every consolidated scheduled inspection 
requirement which is proposed to be part of the 
Maintenance Program Proposal. 
OAM 5-9.7 STR28 
 
5.6 TASK DATA - Establishment of task procedure and basic planning data for the proposed MRBR Task. 
OAM 5-9.8 STR29 
 
4.6 PREPARATION FOR REVIEW. 
STEP 
Num. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO
PPH 
REF. 
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
6.1 DISPATCH OF 
ANALYSIS 
- Distribution of complete MSG-3 Structure 
analysis package to all MWG members and 
advisors prior to a working group meeting in 
accordance with paragraph 2-5.3 of the PPH. 
OAM 2-5.3 N/A Intent is to allow 
MWG members and 
advisors an 
adequate time frame 
to review all data 
from the 
manufacturer 
 
6.2 INTERNAL REVIEW - Review of analysis package provided by 
manufacturer as preparation for the WG 
meeting 
OP
AA 
2-2.3 
2-5.3 
N/A 
 
 
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DATE : June 2006 
 
 
4.7 MAINTENANCE WORKING GROUP REVIEW. 
STEP 
Num. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO 
PPH 
REF.
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
7.1 MWG REVIEW OF 
SIGNIFICANT 
STRUCTURE 
SELECTION 
- Presentation, review, discussion and 
eventually agreement on the content of the 
Significant Structure Selection per ATA-
chapter. 
MWG 5-12 STR01 
STR02 
STR03 
STR04 
 
 
7.2 REVIEW OF 
SIGNIFICANT 
STRUCTURE 
DOSSIER 
- Presentation, review, discussion and 
eventually agreement on the content of each 
Significant Structure dossier including related 
SSI Analysis. 
MWG 5-12 STR05 
to 
STR28 
 
 
7.3 WORKING GROUP 
ADMINISTRATION 
- Decision on: 
- Transfers to other MWGs, including Zonal 
MWG 
- Open items for further WG discussion 
- Items to be raised for ISC consideration and 
decision. 
MWG 5-12 --- 
 
7.4 REWORK OF 
ANALYSES 
- Update of the analysis in accordance with the 
decisions of the WG. 
MWG 5-12 A/R 
 
4.8 INDUSTRY STEERING COMMITTEE REVIEW. 
STEP 
Num. STEP DESCRIPTION WHAT WHO 
PPH 
REF.
MSG-3 
FORM REMARKS 
 
8.1 ISC REVIEW OF 
SIGNIFICANT 
STRUCTURE 
SELECTION- Review and eventual agreement on the 
Significant Structure Selection List presented 
by the MWG. 
ISC 2-2.2 STR01 
STR02 
STR03 
STR04 
 
 
8.2 REVIEW OF 
STRUCTURE 
ANALYSIS RESULTS 
- Review, discussion and eventual approval of 
tasks selected by WG, including task 
description, interval and other data necessary 
for MRBR coverage. 
ISC 2-2.2 A/R 
 
8.3 REWORK OF 
ANALYSES 
- Update the analysis in accordance with the 
decisions of the ISC (as required). 
OAM 5-8
5-9 
A/R Intent is to keep the 
analysis in 
agreement with the 
content of the MRB 
Report 
 
8.4 MPP PROPOSAL - Establishment of the Draft of the Structure 
Section of the MRB Report. 
ISC 2-2 N/A 
 
 
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5 PROCEDURE FOR IDENTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURE 
In order to enable an appropriate MSG-3 analysis of the aircraft structure a systematic and sequential 
process for reviewing the complete aircraft structure has to be established. This process consists of: 
- Identification of all aircraft structure. 
- Identification of “Other Structure”. 
- Identification of the Significant Structure and the relevant Dossier that covers the analysis. 
The following paragraphs provide guidelines to perform the aircraft’s significant structure selection by filling 
in the related form sheets. 
5.1 ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 
The A380 Structures MSG-3 Analysis Form Sheets STR01, STR02 and STR03 are intended to allow 
monitoring of the revision status and of the scope/applicability of the Significant Structure Selection 
documentation. 
5.1.1 COVER SHEET 
The cover sheet must state the applicability of the documentation and the issue date. 
The issue date on the cover sheet must always reflect the latest status of the documentation. This means the 
cover sheet will always show the latest issue date occurring in the document. 
Whenever a part of the document is revised, the issue date of the Cover sheet is revised as well. 
5.1.2 LIST OF REVISIONS 
The List of Revisions is intended to provide an overview of all issues (revisions) of the document, including 
the reasons for the reissue. 
The statement under ”Reason for Revision“ must contain a summary of changes made against the previous 
issue. 
The author and a supervisor must sign the master copy of each issue of the document. It is not necessary to 
show the actual signatures in the digital version of the document dispatched to the MWG/ISC members and 
advisors. The aim is to ensure that the document complies with the general quality standards of Airbus and 
the procedures laid down in the PPH. 
Whenever a part of the document is revised, the issue date of the List of Revisions is revised as well. 
5.1.3 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES 
The List of Effective Pages (LEP) is to state the following information for each page of the printed/PDF 
version of the document: 
- Page identifier (page number) 
- Designation of page 
- Applicability of page 
- Issue Date of page 
Whenever a part of the document is revised, the issue date of the List of Effective Pages is revised as well. 
A380 POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 
 
 
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5.2 SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURE SELECTION PROCESS 
The A380 Structures MSG-3 Analysis Form Sheet STR04 is the basic form to be used to perform and 
document this step. 
The following is a summary of the process and the associated type of information to be included: 
5.2.1 ATA REFERENCE. DESCRIPTION. 
The complete A380 aircraft is broken-down into relevant ATA chapters according to A380 ATA Breakdown. 
All ATA-chapters from 21 to 80 should be considered and the assessment documented in this step (even if 
no structure analysis is needed for a given ATA-chapter). 
The significant structure selection process should follow a top-down approach, being the A380 ATA 
breakdown, at four-digit level (e.g. 53-26-00), a basic reference that could initially be considered as adequate 
to: 
- Identify the complete aircraft structure, 
- Select and allocate structural items to the appropriate level and, 
- Identify the “other structure”. 
However, variations to this level are acceptable in order to either simplify the selection process or enable a 
structure breakdown, which permits the selection and identification of the structural items at an adequate 
level. 
It will be acceptable, for example, to limit the basic four digits A380 ATA breakdown reference list for the 
purpose of Significant Structure Selection/Identification at a level that permits to identify, categorise and 
manage all items covered by such reference (e.g. 53-26-00). 
A further breakdown (e.g. 55-26-48) is required to be performed in order to identify specific items that are to 
be excluded from the higher level of analysis. 
EXAMPLE: 
ATA Reference 55-26-48: “Elevator. Hoist Points”. 
Due to the fact that the higher ATA reference level (55-26-00: Elevator Attach fittings) includes this item and 
it is considered to be as “other structure” whereas the rest of the ‘Elevator attach fittings’ are considered as 
“significant structure”, this item should be listed and identified separately. 
For ‘typical’ systems related ATA chapters, the two-digit level (e.g. 22-00-00) should be considered adequate 
to establish that no structure (significant or other structure) within this ATA-chapter is considered for analysis. 
5.2.2 PSE STATUS 
In order to facilitate the identification of the Structural Significant Items, for each of the lowest ATA 
references selected, the information of whether or not the item has been classified as a Principal Structural 
Element by the manufacturer is to be provided. 
A Structural Significant Item (SSI) may or may not contain a Principal Structural Element (PSE). All Principal 
Structural Elements (PSEs) are considered as significant structure. 
 
 
 
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5.2.3 SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURE SELECTION 
Taking into account the information provided in paragraph 5-5.2.2 and the definitions provided in paragraph 
5-2.3, it is required that each of the items covered by the lowest ATA references selected be categorised as: 
- <Significant Structure>., or 
- <Other Structure>. 
Based on the result of this assessment, each one of the lowest ATA references must be identified with an ‘X’ 
either in the ‘Significant Structure’ column or in the ‘Other Structure’ column. 
For ‘typical’ systems related ATA-chapters (e.g. 22-00-00), a dash ‘-‘ in both columns will indicate that no 
structure analysis is performed within the concern ATA-chapter. 
For all other non-lowest ATA references, these columns will remain blank. 
5.2.4 SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURE ATA REFERENCE 
For each of the lowest ATA references selected which has been categorised as “Significant Structure” 
(marked with an ‘X’ in the ‘Significant Structure column’) a reference must be assigned for identification and 
tracking purposes. 
If the lowest ATA Reference identified is a 2, 3 or 4-digit level (e.g. 53-10-00) and considered Significant 
Structure, then it becomes the Significant Structure ATA Reference. If considered not Significant Structure, 
then a dash “-“ must be entered. 
If the lowest ATA Reference identified is a 5 (or more) digit level (e.g. 53-11-10) and considered Significant 
Structure, then in the Significant Structure ATA Reference column either the relevant ATA Reference is 
entered or up to the 4 digits ATA Reference that covers the item can be entered. If considered not Significant 
Structure, then a dash “-“ must be entered. 
EXAMPLE: 
ATA Reference 55-11-18: “THS Spars”. 
This element is considered to be as “Significant Structure”. 
The “Significant Structure ATA Reference” assigned for identification will be 55-11-00 (Horizontal Stabiliser). 
The list of all relevant Significant StructureATA References and associated ATA descriptions will become 
the SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURE LIST, which will be provided to the ISC for review. 
There will be only one single Significant Structure Identification List, which will cover all aircraft ATA chapters 
in order to ensure a complete coverage of the aircraft structure. 
It should be understood that the Significant Structure identification level defined will not be the lowest 
analysis level. Further breakdown for each Significant Structure identified will have to be performed in order 
to facilitate the MSG-3 analysis. 
5.2.5 SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURE ANALYSIS DOSSIER REFERENCE 
The result of the list described in paragraph 5-5.2.4 is the compilation of “what” has to be analysed 
(Significant Structure ATA Reference). The following step is to identify “where” (Significant Structure Analysis 
Dossier) the significant structure is actually analysed. 
Every Significant Structure ATA Reference defined will have -at least- one Significant Structure Analysis 
Dossier that will cover the complete MSG-3 structure analysis of this portion of the structure. The Dossier’s 
reference will be a four-digit number with the following layout: 
XX.Y# 
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The following rules are to be considered as guidelines for assigning this number: 
(A) The first three-digits (XX.Y) are to be taken from the relevant “ATA Reference”. 
(B) The fourth digit (#) is a sequential number (1-9) to allow the creation –if needed- of several Dossiers 
that will cover the complete analysis of the relevant Significant Structure. 
5.2.6 APPLICABILITY/REMARKS 
Any item covered by the selection list that is not applicable to all models/versions/variants is to be clearly 
identified in the column "Applicability / Remarks". 
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6 SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURE DOSSIER DOCUMENTATION 
6.1 ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 
The A380 Structures MSG-3 Analysis Form Sheets STR05, STR06, STR07, and STR08 are intended to 
allow monitoring of the revision status and of the scope/applicability of the Significant Structure Dossier 
documentation as well as the status of the SSI Analyses included in the Dossier. 
6.1.1 COVER SHEET 
The cover sheet must state the applicability of the Dossier and the issue date. 
The applicability of the analysis shall be stated with reference to the aircraft models to which the analysis 
applies (see paragraph 3-3.2 for the basic aircraft design standards to be covered by MSG-3 analysis). It is 
not necessary to list all modifications covered by the analysis on the cover sheet; however, if an analysis is 
specifically established to cover a certain modification, this should be stated. The applicability statement on 
the cover sheet may thus be one of the following possibilities: 
- “A380-800” (if all 800 model aircraft of the passenger version are covered), or 
- “A380-840” (if applicable to aircraft with Rolls-Royce Trent 970 engines only), or 
- “A380-860” (if applicable to aircraft with Engine Alliance GP7270 engines only). 
- “A380-800F” (if all 800 model aircraft of the freighter version are covered), or 
- “A380-840F” (if applicable to aircraft of the freighter version with Rolls-Royce Trent 970 engines only), 
or 
- “A380-860F” (if applicable to aircraft of the freighter version with Engine Alliance GP7270 engines only). 
The issue date on the cover sheet must always reflect the latest status of the Dossier. This means the cover 
sheet will always show the latest issue date occurring in the Dossier. 
Whenever a part of the Dossier is revised, the issue date of the Cover sheet is revised as well. 
6.1.2 LIST OF REVISIONS 
The List of Revisions is intended to provide an overview of all issues (revisions) of the Dossier, including the 
reasons for the reissue. 
The statement under ”Reason for Revision“ must contain a summary of changes made against the previous 
issue. 
The author and a supervisor must sign the master copy of each issue of the Dossier. It is not necessary to 
show the actual signatures in the digital version of the document dispatched to the MWG members and 
advisors. The aim is to ensure that the document complies with the general quality standards of Airbus and 
the procedures laid down in the PPH. 
Whenever a part of the Dossier is revised, the issue date of the List of Revisions is revised as well. 
6.1.3 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES 
The List of Effective Pages (LEP) is to state the following information for each page of the printed/PDF 
version of the document: 
- Page identifier (page number) 
- Designation of page 
- Applicability of page 
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- Issue Date of page 
Whenever a part of the Dossier is revised, the issue date of the List of Effective Pages is revised as well. 
 
6.1.4 LIST OF EFFECTIVE SSI ANALYSES 
The List of Effective SSI Analyses is to state the following information for each SSI Analysis contained in the 
relevant Dossier: 
- SSI Number 
- SSI Title 
- Applicability of the SSI Analysis 
- Issue Number of the SSI Analysis 
- Issue Date of the SSI Analysis 
This information is taken from the SSI Analysis Cover Sheet. No additional reference to individual pages 
contained in the SSI Analysis is required, as it would be adequately covered by the relevant SSI Analysis 
administrative data. 
6.2 SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURE ANALYSIS SUPPORTING DATA 
An adequate level of information has to be provided regarding the structure to be analysed in order to ensure 
a sufficient knowledge for performing and/or assessing the MSG-3 analysis. 
The A380 Structures MSG-3 Analysis Form Sheet STR10 is the form to be used to perform and document 
this step. 
The following is a summary of the type of information to be included, taking into account that specific 
additional data will have to be provided as part of the MSG-3 analysis performed at a lower level (SSI): 
6.2.1 LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION 
A detailed and complete description of the Significant Structure covered by the relevant Dossier must be 
provided, as well as means to clearly identify its location and boundaries. 
Diagrams, sketches, drawings or pictures should be widely used to support the location and description of 
the Significant Structure. As far as possible, 3D colour drawing should be used to illustrate the location, 
dimensions and boundaries of the Significant Structure under analysis, together with reference data, detailed 
views, etc. 
6.2.2 MAIN DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
The structural arrangement and main design principles applied to the concerned Significant Structure should 
also be described. Information such as assembly and manufacturing process main principles is to be 
provided, supported where applicable by illustrated information. 
Information on new design principles applied should also be provided, as applicable. 
The Supporting Data Sheet shall be used to list all modifications relevant to, and covered by, the analysis. 
6.2.3 MATERIALS OF MAIN STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS 
One of the key data to be taken into account to perform the MSG-3 analysis is the type of material used to 
manufacture the structural assembly. At this “description level” it is requested to provide a generic 
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identification of the structure materials: metallic/non-metallic, type of metallic material (aluminium series, 
titanium, steel, etc), type of non-metallic material (CFRP monolithic, sandwich, thermoplastic, etc.). 
When analysing specific SSIs, the detailed material designation will be provided (e.g. 2024 T42). 
 
6.2.4 PROTECTIONS APPLIED TO MAIN STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS 
A description of the basic paint and Temporary Protection System (TPS)schemes used for the structural 
components should be given in order to have a generic approach of the level of protection provided during 
the manufacturing and assembly process, as well as an idea of main areas of concern regarding 
environmental deterioration. 
Drawings and sketches showing areas of TPS application should be provided. 
As part of the protection concept, those elements installed, as a basic and specific protection for direct 
effects of lightning strike -if applicable- should be described. 
6.2.5 ACCESSIBILITY CONDITIONS 
In order to evaluate the inspectability conditions, maintenance performance conditions and difficulties 
associated to possible scheduled inspections, a basic description and identification of specific access 
panels, maintenance doors, floor panels, etc. should be provided. 
The information contained in the “A380 Zone, Access, Panel and Door Identification” (ZAPDI) document is 
the basis for the data to be included. Additional pictures and drawings can be used. 
6.2.6 DRAINAGE PROVISIONS 
In certain areas, one of the main features to be incorporated into the design for environmental deterioration 
prevention is an adequate drainage system (structure drainage paths, drain holes, drain valves, etc.). A 
special paragraph within the Significant Structure data should be used to describe this drainage system, 
taking into account that specific system devices (e.g. drain valves) will systematically be reviewed by the 
relevant System MWG and treated as Maintenance Significant Items (MSIs). 
MWG-5 will mainly take care of the drain system that is integral part of the structure, such as drain paths and 
drain holes in skins. 
6.2.7 ENVIRONMENT AND OPERATING CONDITIONS 
As part of the analysis, it should be evaluated the environment and operating conditions of the concerned 
Significant structure. Some basic information is to be provided, such as: 
- If extreme temperatures are expected in the zone. 
- Definition of pressurised and un-pressurised areas. 
- Identification of cargo/passenger/utility areas. 
- Identification of frequent maintenance areas. 
- Identification of lightning strike susceptibility areas. 
- Fuel tank areas. 
- Etc. 
6.2.8 EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS INSTALLED IN ITS AREA OF INFLUENCE 
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Related to environment and operating conditions mentioned above, it is required that those main systems 
elements that could have some impact on the relevant Significant Structure be identified and allocated. 
Items such as hydraulic actuators, accumulators, batteries, etc are candidates for this exercise, as their 
normal associated operating environment or failure could have an impact on environment resistance 
behaviour of the concerned Significant Structure. 
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7 SSI IDENTIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT 
7.1 SSI SELECTION 
According to MSG-3 document guidelines, every structural significant item must undergo a sequential and 
systematic analysis regarding its susceptibility to the various damage sources: 
- Accidental Damage (AD), 
- Environmental Deterioration (ED), and 
- Fatigue Damage (FD) 
 
Taking into account that the final objective of the process is to obtain suitable scheduled maintenance tasks, 
experience and engineering judgement advice that whatever structural portion of the aircraft is selected for 
this systematic analysis, the consideration in one single analysis of two (or more) damage sources to which 
the area under analysis shows quite different behaviour, should be avoided. 
EXAMPLE: 
The significant structure of the fuselage under evaluation is assessed as damage tolerant. 
The MSG-3 author selects as the area of analysis (SSI) the complete external upper fuselage skin. 
Regarding ED, this could be an effective selection as the ED behaviour of the complete item is similar and 
homogeneous, thus resulting in a maintenance requirement that is equally applicable to the complete area 
under analysis. 
However, regarding AD, there are specific areas like “passenger door surrounds” which are more susceptible 
to be damaged than the rest of the area under analysis. 
A unique analysis of the complete area would lead to a penalising scheduled requirement for the fuselage 
skin not in the vicinity of the passenger door surrounds. 
Therefore, at least two individual analyses should be performed by taking into consideration different areas. 
Additionally, if we consider also FD, passenger door corners are the areas more susceptible to fatigue 
cracking. Therefore, a further detailed identification of this area should be done in order to adequately 
allocate the FD level of analysis. 
Such basic example shows the importance of an adequate SSI identification. The key input for a good 
selection is the experience, engineering judgement and a full knowledge of the MSG-3 analysis procedures, 
which are later on described in the PPH. However, a basic internal procedure can be put in place in order to 
facilitate the final selection by the MSG-3 author: 
[A] Split the Significant Structure concerned into “Damage Tolerant” or “Safe-Life” items. 
[B] Split the Significant Structure concerned into External and Internal areas. 
[C] Select “large areas” with similar environment and/or accessibility/inspectability conditions. 
[D] Identify specific areas of concern regarding Environmental Deterioration. 
[E] Identify specific areas of concern regarding Accidental Damage. 
[F] Identify specific areas of concern regarding Fatigue Damage. 
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It must be clearly understood that it is acceptable (and in certain cases recommended) to have an 
“overlapping“ of the SSI boundaries, so that -for example- very specific FD related areas are covered by 
“large areas” for the ED analysis. When this is the case, the SSI Management List described in paragraph 5-
7.3. provides the appropriate information in order to facilitate the tracking of the whole process. 
The initial step is to identify that portion of the structure that must be treated as “Safe-Life”. These elements 
are candidates for individual SSI definition. 
Then, a basic group of SSIs can be obtained from step [C] and, if no specific area of concern regarding ED is 
identified, the Environmental Deterioration Analysis can be performed after step [D]. 
Taking into account that AD will normally have an effect on ED analysis, it would be logical to further identify 
and analyse those areas initially considered as likely to be accidentally damaged in order to obtain specific 
scheduled maintenance requirements. This is the step [E]. 
Fatigue Damage concerned areas identification -step [F]- is a direct extract from the Fatigue and Damage 
Tolerance evaluations as required by FAR/JAR 25.571. A manufacturer’s internal review process is in place 
to adequately identify these areas by means of a trade-off analysis that would optimise inspection 
requirements versus calculation effort. 
7.2 SSI NUMBERING 
Every Structural Significant Item (SSI) will be identified with an eight-digit number. 
XX.Y#.S@@@ 
 
The following rules are to be considered as guidelines for assigning this number: 
(A) The first four-digits (XX.Y#) are to be in accordance with the relevant Significant Structure Analysis 
Dossier Reference assigned in paragraph 5-5.2.5. 
(B) The fifth digit is always an ‘S’ to indicate that it is dealing with an SSI. 
(C) The last three digit (@@@) is a sequential number within the Significant Structure Analysis Dossier. 
7.3 SSIS ANALYSIS MANAGEMENT 
Due to the close relationship existing between SSIs, it is necessary to establish a “controlling” document that 
could clearly show this relationship as well as -additionally- allow the tracking of everySSI analysis 
accomplishment. 
The A380 Structures MSG-3 Analysis Form STR11 will be the basic form to be used to perform and 
document this step. 
The data included in this list is an extract from the information contained in the relevant SSI Analyses as 
performed by following the guidelines described in paragraph 5-8.The following criteria/rules have to be used 
when filling up the relevant fields included in the form sheet: 
7.3.1 NUMBER 
This field must be in accordance with the one included in the SSI Documentation (See paragraph 5-8.2.1). 
7.3.2 DESCRIPTION 
This field must be in accordance with the one described in the SSI Documentation (See paragraph 5-8.2.3). 
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7.3.3 APPLICABILITY 
This field must be in accordance with the one described in the SSI Documentation (See paragraph 5-8.2.2). 
7.3.4 DESIGN CONCEPT 
A basic information to be provided is the design concept applicable to the relevant SSI. According to the 
definitions included in paragraph 5-2.3., one of the following options is to be chosen: 
- <DT>. Meaning that the complete structure covered by the SSI falls in the “Damage Tolerant” category. 
- <SL>. Meaning that the complete structure covered by the SSI falls in the “Safe-Life” category. 
7.3.5 TYPE OF MATERIAL 
This field must be in accordance with the one described in the SSI Documentation (See paragraph 5-8.2.7). 
One out of the following three (3) options is to be chosen: 
- <MET>. For ‘Metallic’ SSI. 
- <NOM>. For ‘Non-Metallic SSI. 
- <M&N>. For ‘Metallic and Non-Metallic’ SSI. 
7.3.6 ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE (AD) ANALYSIS 
Concerning the applicable SSI AD analysis status as of the relevant issue date, one of the following options 
is to be selected: 
- <INCLUDED>. Meaning that the relevant AD analysis for the concerned SSI is applicable and it is 
included in the SSI Dossier. 
- <COVERED BY>. Meaning that the relevant AD analysis for the concerned SSI is applicable and 
includes the reference to the other SSI(s) Analysis Dossier. If this is the case, those SSI references 
have to be listed. 
7.3.7 ENVIRONMENTAL DETERIORATION (ED) AND CPCP ANALYSIS 
For the applicable SSI ED/CPCP analysis status of the relevant issue date, one of the following options is to 
be selected: 
- <INCLUDED>. Meaning that the relevant ED/CPCP analysis for the concerned SSI is applicable and it 
is included in the SSI Dossier. 
- <COVERED BY>. Meaning that the relevant ED/CPCP analysis for the concerned SSI is applicable and 
includes the reference to the other SSI(s) Analysis Dossier. If this is the case, those SSI references 
have to be listed. 
- <N/A>. Meaning that the relevant SSI is fully made of non-metallic structure and therefore there is no 
specific metallic ED/CPCP analysis to be performed. 
7.3.8 AGING DETERIORATION (AG) ANALYSIS 
For the applicable SSI Aging Deterioration analysis status of the relevant issue date, one of the following 
options is to be selected: 
- <INCLUDED>. Meaning that the relevant AG analysis for the concerned SSI is applicable and it is 
included in the SSI Dossier. 
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- <COVERED BY>. Meaning that the relevant AG analysis for the concerned SSI is applicable and it is 
includes the reference to the SSI (s) Analysis Dossier. If this is the case, those SSI references have to 
be listed. 
- <N/A>. Meaning that the relevant SSI is fully made of metallic structure and therefore there is no 
specific metallic AG analysis to be performed. 
7.3.9 FATIGUE DAMAGE (FD) ANALYSIS 
For the applicable SSI FD analysis status of the relevant issue date, one of the following options is to be 
selected: 
- <INCLUDED>. Meaning that the relevant FD analysis for the concerned SSI is applicable, it is included 
in the SSI Dossier and the applicable Fatigue and Damage Tolerant Data is available within the dossier. 
- <PENDING>. Meaning that the relevant FD analysis for the concerned SSI is applicable but the 
applicable Fatigue and Damage Tolerant Data is not available yet. The FD analysis sheets are not 
included in the SSI Dossier. 
This “pending status” would be the most likely status for the vast majority of the SSI Fatigue Damage 
analysis for the initial issue of the MRB Report, as the complete Fatigue and Damage tolerant analyses will 
not be available when the aircraft enters into service. 
- <COVERED BY>. Meaning that the relevant FD analysis for the concerned SSI is applicable and 
includes the reference to the other SSI (s) Analysis Dossier. If this is the case, those SSI references 
have to be listed. 
- <N/A>. Meaning that for the relevant SSI there is no need for FD analysis due to one of these reasons: 
(a) The SSI is fully composed by “Safe-Life” items, or 
(b) The SSI is fully made of non-metallic structure. 
7.3.10 REMARKS 
Any note, clarification or relevant remark should be included here. 
7.4 SSI DIAGRAMS 
In addition to the SSI Management List, and in order to provide a full picture of the SSIs arrangement, it is 
necessary to develop as part of the analysis, a set of diagrams including the “mapping” of the SSI’s 
boundaries. 
The A380 Structures MSG-3 Analysis Form Sheet STR12 will be the form used to perform and document 
this step. 
It should be limited to schematically show the borderlines and interaction of the SSIs. More detailed views of 
the SSI will be provided within the SSI Data Sheet. 
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8 SSI ANALYSIS 
8.1 ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 
The A380 Structures MSG-3 Analysis Form Sheets STR013, STR14 and STR14a are intended to allow 
monitoring of the revision status and of the scope/applicability of the Significant Structure Item Analysis 
documentation. 
8.1.1 COVER SHEET 
The cover sheet must state the applicability of the documentation and the issue date. 
The issue date on the cover sheet must always reflect the latest status of the analysis. This means the cover 
sheet will always show the latest issue date occurring in the analysis. 
Whenever a part of the document is revised, the issue date of the Cover sheet is revised as well. 
A List of Effective Pages is also part of the Cover Sheet, which provides for each page of the analysis: 
- The Page Number, and 
- The Issue Number 
8.1.2 LIST OF REVISIONS 
The List of Revisions is intended to provide an overview of all issues (revisions) of the analysis, including the 
reasons for the reissue. 
The statement under ”Reason for Revision“ must provide detailed explanations of changes made against the 
previous issue. 
Whenever a part of the document is revised, the issue date of the List of Revisions is revised as well. 
8.1.3 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES 
The List of Effective Pages (LEP) is to state the following information for each page of the printed/PDF 
version of the document: 
- Page identifier (page number) 
- Designation of page 
- Applicability of page 
- Issue Date of page 
Whenever a part of the SSI Analysis is revised, the issue date of the List of Effective Pages is revised as 
well. 
8.2 SSI DOCUMENTATION 
Apart from the information and data included as part of the overall Significant Structure description, each 
individual SSI must include specific data in accordance with the A380 Structures MSG-3 Analysis Form 
Sheets STR15, STR16 and STR17. 
The following criteria/rules have to be used when filling up the relevant fields included in the form sheets: 
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8.2.1 NUMBER 
This number must be in line with the SSI Numbering guidelines described in paragraph 5-7.2. 
 
8.2.2 APPLICABILITY 
This field must show the information related to the A380 aircraft models/variants to which the relevant SSI 
analysis isapplicable. The term ‘All’ in this field means that the applicability of the SSI analysis is the same 
as the applicability stated in the Cover Sheet of the Significant Structure Dossier to which it belongs. 
8.2.3 DESCRIPTION 
The description must precisely describe the boundaries of the item/area under analysis. Physical boundaries 
such as stringers, frames, ribs, etc. should be preferably used, whereas other type of data such as “stations” 
should be avoided, as they are not easy to identify on the aircraft. 
As a generic rule, the description should follow a top-down approach. This means that it should start by 
highlighting the Significant Structure ATA reference generic description and then followed by the item, item 
boundaries, side of the item (if applicable) and specification of the item if more than one can be referred to. 
Where applicable, explicit reference to the items that are covered can be added for clarification purposes. 
EXAMPLES: 
Trimmable horizontal stabiliser, front spar, forward face from rib 3 to end rib, LH/RH. 
Centre fuselage, external skin, from frame 20 to frame 56 and between lower deck floor level and upper deck 
floor level, LH/RH. 
Outer wing, spar box, internal structure, from rib 24 to rib 37, including front spar aft face and rear spar 
forward face, LH/RH. 
8.2.4 ZONE(s) 
Based on the “A380 Zone, Access, Panel and Door Identification” (ZAPDI) document, the aircraft zone(s) 
where the SSI is located must be listed. 
Each zone is defined by a three (3)-digit number and its definition follows detailed rules described in the 
A380 ZAPDI. The zone number definition is based on a “top-down” approach, starting from “Major Zones”, 
which are broken down into “Major Sub-Zones” and then into “Zones”. 
The number provided in this field should be in accordance with the highest zone level. 
The zone must be quoted in accordance with the zone from which the maintenance task is performed. 
As a generic rule, it must be taken into account that a “Major Zone” number (i.e. 200) will always be assigned 
when the associated SSI Access is stated as “None”, meaning that the area is an “external” area. 
EXAMPLE: 
If the “Major sub-zone number” 530/630 is able to adequately identify the location of the SSI under 
evaluation, there is no need to further break down these numbers up to the relevant “zone number”: 
531/532/533/631/632/633. 
8.2.5 ACCESS 
Based on the “A380 Zone, Access, Panel and Door Identification” (ZAPDI) document, the aircraft access 
panel that needs to be removed/open to adequately perform the SSI maintenance task must be highlighted. 
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Each access is defined by a three (3)-digit number followed by two (2) letters, in accordance with the A380 
ZAPDI. 
Where appropriate, generic access such as ‘floor panels’ or ‘lining’ may be quoted instead of specific panel 
numbers. 
The wording “NOTE D1” is used to specify that the insulation must be displaced as required to complete the 
required inspection. 
In addition to the access/door panels, some other items which need to be removed/displaced to perform the 
task shall be highlighted (e.g. “bolt removal”, “blankets to be displaced”, “sealant to be removed”, etc.). 
Similarly to the SSI Zone(s), in some cases, this data should be completed when the relevant task had been 
defined. 
8.2.6 DESIGN CONCEPT 
A basic information to be provided is the design concept applicable to the relevant SSI. According to the 
definitions included in paragraph 5-2.3., the SSI must be categorized either as ‘Damage Tolerant’ or ‘Safe-
Life’. 
8.2.7 TYPE OF MATERIAL 
In order to further proceed with the analysis and ensure that the appropriate type of analysis is performed, 
the information related to the kind of materials existing within the relevant SSI is to be provided. 
According to the definitions given in paragraph 5-2.3, the SSI must be categorized either: 
- ‘Metallic’: Meaning that the complete structure covered by the SSI is made of metallic material. Note that 
“Glare” must be considered as metallic material. 
- ‘Non-Metallic’: Meaning that the complete structure covered by the SSI is made of non-metallic material. 
- ‘Metallic and Non-Metallic’: Meaning that the SSI contains both, metallic and non-metallic material. 
8.2.8 PART DESCRIPTION AND IDENTIFICATION 
A complete list of all individual structural parts is to be provided in order to identify exactly which structural 
parts are covered by the concerned SSI and to show material properties, which will be used within the SSI 
analysis by the MSG-3 author. 
It is expected that parts such as “stringers”, “skin”, “frames”, “ribs”, “plates”, etc. will be included in this list. A 
sequential identification number will be given to each part in order to facilitate the identification in the 
illustrations provided in the follow on analysis sheets. 
If it is considered that a failed attaching and/or connecting element such as a pin, a bolt or a fastener could 
affect the structural integrity necessary for the safety of the aircraft, these elements are also to be listed as 
an item of the related SSI. 
8.2.9 PART MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION 
In accordance with the relevant documentation, an identification of the standard material from which the part 
is made is to be provided. 
For metallic materials, the identification should allow a correct allocation within the relevant “corrosion rating 
lists” in order to facilitate the rating assignment. 
The list of structural parts must also include those itemsthat, even not being part of the SSI, are to be 
considered for a possible interaction with the SSI’s structural parts (e.g. galvanic corrosion). In this case, 
these items are to be included with a note clearly stating that they are “interactive” or “adjacent” parts. 
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8.2.10 PART PROTECTION 
For every structural part, the information related to the protection scheme is to be provided. It should include 
the basic protection (CAA, “primer”, paint, etc.) as well as -if applicable- the type of Temporary Protection 
System (“corrosion inhibiting compound”, “water repellent fluids”) that is applied in production. 
NOTE: For those parts where Airbus identifies that the protection scheme provided in the drawings is 
systematically replaced by an alternative one during the assembly process, it will be highlighted in the SSI 
Data Sheet and the impact is to be assessed. 
8.2.11 ILLUSTRATION 
Apart from basic diagrams showing the location and boundaries of the SSI, an adequate illustration should 
be provided for identification of those structural parts identified under paragraph 5-8.2.8. As far as possible, 
every reference number given in the list should appear in the illustration. 
Detailed views and cross-sections for showing specific details should be considered. 
8.3 SSI ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE ANALYSIS - METALLIC AND NON-METALLIC 
MATERIALS 
Each individual SSI Accidental Damage Analysis is to be performed in accordance with the A380 Structures 
MSG-3 Analysis Form Sheets STR18, and/or STR19 
8.3.1 BASIC CONCEPTS 
In order to have a common and clear understanding of what an Accidental Damage means regarding 
scheduled maintenance requirements identification, it is necessary to provide a definition of this term: 
An Accidental Damage is a physical deterioration of an item caused by contact or impact with an object or 
influence which is not a part of the aircraft, or by human error during manufacturing, operation of the aircraft, 
or maintenance practices. 
The Accidental Damage is characterized by the occurrence of a random discrete event that may reduce the 
inherent level of residual strength. Sources of such damage include ground and cargo handling equipment, 
foreign objects, erosion from rain, hail, lightning, runway debris, spillage,freezing, thawing, etc., and those 
resulting from human error during aircraft manufacture, operation or maintenance that are not included in 
other damage sources. 
The same sources of accidental damage as those considered for metallic materials are to be considered for 
non-metallic material such as composites. The consequence of a damage may not be readily apparent and 
may include internal damage, e.g., disbonding or delamination. 
Although the same accidental damage sources will be considered for both metallic and non-metallic 
materials, the associated analysis will be treated independently, due to the different material behaviour 
regarding this kind of damage. 
The whole Accidental Damage MSG-3 analysis is based on the fact that appropriate actions are taken 
whenever an accidental event is noticed (ground handling damage, runway debris damage during walk-
around inspection). Large size accidental damage, such as that caused by engine disintegration, bird strike 
or major collision with ground equipment, will be readily detectable and no maintenance task assessment is 
required. 
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 DATE : June 2006
 
8.3.2 ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE ANALYSIS. METALLIC VERSUS NON-METALLIC 
Metallic and non-metallic material can be defined within the same SSI. However, although the same 
accidental damage sources will be considered for both metallic and non-metallic materials, the associated 
analysis will be treated independently, due to the different material behaviour regarding this kind of damage. 
The AD analysis on metallic materials is based on the assessment of these damages regarding their impact 
on: 
- The degradation of Environmental Deterioration resistance, and on 
- The Fatigue behaviour (crack initiation) 
Therefore, no maintenance requirement will be directly selected from this AD analysis but within the 
subsequent ED and FD analysis. 
The AD analysis on non-metallic materials is based on the assessment of these damages regarding their 
impact on the structure strength reduction caused. If any scheduled inspection requirement is deemed 
necessary, it will directly be derived from this AD analysis. 
8.3.3 ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE SOURCES LIKELIHOOD 
A complete review of the Accidental Damage sources listed below is to be performed for the whole SSI in 
order to determine if the relevant source is “LIKELY” or “UNLIKELY” to be present in the area during normal 
operation of the aircraft: 
(a) Ground Handling Equipment. 
(b) Cargo Handling Equipment. 
(c) Aircraft Maintenance. 
(d) Aircraft Operation. 
(e) Runway Debris. 
 
(f) Weather effects (, hail, lightning strike etc.) 
(g) Manufacturing Defects. 
(h) Others. 
This evaluation should be made based on experience with similar aircraft in similar operation. The term 
“likely” should not be confused with the term “possible”, so that very isolated cases of accidental damage 
occurrence in certain areas should lead to select “unlikely” when the damage source is evaluated. This is 
specially the case when the damage source is linked to a special type of operation (i.e.: cargo operation). 
Other relevant technical information such as the areas defined by the manufacturer regarding lightning strike 
probability should also be taken into account. 
Associated to each damage source selected as “likely”, a brief description of the type of damage must be 
included (“small dent”, “paint scheme deterioration”, “scratches”, etc.). 
 
8.3.4 ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE SELECTION 
Once the complete list of accidental damage sources has been assessed (paragraph 5-8.3.3), it is necessary 
to identify the predominant accidental damage expected by determining: 
[A] The type of damage considered, such as “dents”, “paint deterioration”, “scratches”, etc. 
[B] The location of the damage, when it is limited to a specific portion of the SSI under evaluation. 
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[C] The size of the expected damage, when it can be evaluated, should correspond to the initial accidental 
damage expected and should be mainly based on experience. 
8.4 SSI ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE ANALYSIS - METALLIC 
Each individual Accidental Damage Analysis to be performed on a metallic portion of a SSI must be done in 
accordance with the A380 Structures MSG-3 Analysis Form Sheet STR18. 
8.4.1 ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENTAL DETERIORATION 
For metallic structures, whenever an Accidental Damage has been selected, at least a degradation of the 
paint scheme is produced and therefore, an impact on the Environmental Deterioration behaviour of the SSI 
under analysis must be taken into account. 
For those materials such as “Titanium” or “Corrosion Resistant Steel” in some areas no paint scheme is 
applied.Therefore, no degradation of this protection is made when the accidental damage is inflicted and in 
this case “NO” must be answered when the question related to AD impact on ED is asked. 
If some impact on ED is expected, a “YES” must be answered when the question related to AD impact on 
ED is asked. 
This “input” is automatically taken into consideration when performing the relevant ED analysis. 
8.4.2 ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE IMPACT ON FATIGUE DAMAGE 
For metallic structures, when the type, size and location of the damage considered is such that some initial 
fatigue crack is produced and the fatigue and damage tolerance characteristics can be significantly affected, 
a further fatigue and damage tolerance evaluation has to be performed by the manufacturer, so that they 
take into account this parameter when determining fatigue related scheduled inspections. 
This procedure will be further explained in paragraph 5-8.9.4.1. 
If some impact on FD is expected, a “YES” must be answered when the question related to AD impact on FD 
is asked. This “input” is automatically taken into consideration when performing the relevant FD analysis. 
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REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 5 - PAGE: 5-29
 DATE : June 2006
 
8.4.3 ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE ANALYSIS FOR METALLIC STRUCTURES FLOW-
CHART 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SSI 
METALLIC PARTS 
Accidental Damage 
Sources Likelihood 
Assessment 
Determine predominant 
damage source TYPE, 
LOCATION and SIZE 
LIKELY? 
END 
Impact 
on ED? 
Damage to be 
considered on 
ED/CPCP Analysis 
ED/CPCP 
ANALYSIS 
Impact
on FD?
Damage to be 
considered on
FD Analysis 
FATIGUE 
DAMAGE 
ANALYSIS
END 
NO
YES 
YES YES
NO NO
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SECTION 5 - PAGE: 5-30 REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02
DATE : June 2006 
 
 
8.5 SSI ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE ANALYSIS – NON-METALLIC 
Each individual Accidental Damage Analysis to be performed on a non-metallic portion of a SSI must be 
done in accordance with the A380 Structures MSG-3 Analysis Form Sheet STR19. 
8.5.1 ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE IMPACT ON AGING DETERIORATION 
When the damage selected is considered as a candidate for having any impact on the Aging Deterioration 
process of the non-metallic structure (see paragraph 5-8.7.1) it must be highlighted. 
8.5.2 NON-METALLIC STRUCTURES DESIGN AND INSPECTION PHILOSOPHY 
Non-metallic structures are designed according to the “no-damage growth” design philosophy which is 
substantiated by the appropriate calculations and testing. 
This means that, although non-metallic structures may experience in-service accidental damages (impacts) 
leading to a sudden reduction of their strength capability, no significant further strength reduction will occur 
during the operational life of the aircraft due to the direct effect of such damage. 
The following graphs show this behaviour: 
 
Depending on the energy and shape of the object creating the impact it may not necessarily result in a 
visible mark (it may be only an internal deterioration). This fact is also taken into account during the design, 
testingand the accidental damage assessment. 
The consequence of an accidental damage (visible or not visible) is a reduction of the static strength and 
stiffness of the concerned item. For those damages reducing the static strength below the ultimate load, 
inspection intervals should be established in such a way that the resulting level of safety is acceptable and 
not lower than that which is expected from a damage tolerant metallic structure. 
8.5.3 INSPECTION LEVEL AND INTERVAL DETERMINATION 
Based on the selected accidental damage type, location and size, the appropriate level of inspection is to be 
established. Levels of inspections definitions are provided in the Glossary of this PPH. 
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REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 5 - PAGE: 5-31
 DATE : June 2006
 
In addition, the manufacturer determines the Static Strength Reduction (SSR) associated with the damage 
considered. The information is transferred to the table shown below which categorised the severity of the 
damage by comparing the residual static strength level in the damaged structure with the one corresponding 
to the “limit load” case and establishes a relationship between the Static Strength Reduction Rating and the 
Inspection Interval to be applied: 
 
Static Strength Reduction (SSR) Residual 
Static 
Strength 
(x “limit load”) Severity of Damage SSR Rating 
Basic 
Inspection 
Interval 
NEGLIGIBLE 0 N/A 
VERY SLIGHT 1 12 years 
SLIGHT 2 6 years 
MODERATE 3 Note 1 
1.5 
 
Reducing 
static 
strength 
 
1.1 SEVERE 4 Note 2 
Note 1: For all inspection intervals below 6 years, a written remark 
must be provided, justifying the figure that is ultimately determined. 
Note 2: Damage must be obvious during walk-around. 
In selecting the interval, not only the residual strength associated with the assumed damage should be 
considered, but also the probability of occurrence of this damage per flight (or time unit). For a given strength 
reduction due to an accidental damage, the more often it may occur, the sooner it should be detected. 
If the damage is likely to occur more than once during the basic inspection interval, the severity of damage 
has to be reassessed to consider multiple accidental damage impact. The inspection interval must be 
revised to be in line with damage considered. 
 
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DATE : June 2006 
 
 
8.5.4 ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE ANALYSIS FOR NON-METALLIC STRUCTURES FLOW-
CHART 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SSI 
NON-METALLIC PARTS
Accidental Damage 
Sources Likelihood 
Assessment 
Determine predominant 
damage source TYPE, 
LOCATION and SIZE 
LIKELY? END 
Impact 
on SSR?
Determine 
Inspection 
LEVEL, SSR and 
BASIC INTERVAL
“Aging” 
ANALYSIS 
END 
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
Impact on
AGING? 
Damage tobe 
Considered on
AGING 
Analysis 
More than once
during BASIC
INTERVAL? 
YES
YES
NO
Re-assess 
BASIC 
INTERVAL 
AD ANALYSIS 
NON-
METALLIC 
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REFERENCE: 95A.1689/02 SECTION 5 - PAGE: 5-33
 DATE : June 2006
 
 
8.6 SSI ENVIRONMENTAL DETERIORATION AND CPCP ANALYSIS - METALLIC 
Each individual SSI Environmental Deterioration and CPCP Analysis is to be performed in accordance with 
the A380 Structures MSG-3 Analysis Form Sheet STR20. 
8.6.1 BASIC CONCEPTS 
The following is a reminder of the definition of the Environmental Deterioration as well as the Corrosion 
Prevention and Control Program (CPCP) objective and expectations: 
Environmental Deterioration (ED) is a physical deterioration of an item's strength or resistance to failure as 
a result of chemical and/or thermal interaction with its climate or environment. 
Assessments are required to cover corrosion, including stress corrosion, and deterioration of non-metallic 
materials. Stress corrosion cracking in a given environment is directly dependent upon the level of sustained 
tensile stress that may result from heat treatment, forming, fit-up, or misalignment. 
A Corrosion Prevention and Control Program (CPCP) is a program of maintenance tasks implemented at 
a threshold designed to control an aircraft structure to Corrosion Level 1 or better. 
A Corrosion Prevention and Control Program (CPCP) should be based on the ED analysis, assuming an 
aircraft operated in a typical environment. 
8.6.2 ED/CPCP ANALYSIS GENERIC PROCEDURE 
The ED/CPCP MSG-3 analysis will start with an Environmental Deterioration (ED) analysis of the concerned 
SSI based on a rating system followed by a further CPCP analysis to ensure that final ED/CPCP selected 
task meet the CPCP expectations. 
The ED analysis consists of a systematic review and evaluation of those parameters that could influence the 
corrosion behaviour of the concerned SSI. The evaluation is performed by means of a Rating System that 
includes the assignment of individual ratings for each characteristic and combination’s matrices that are 
capable of providing inspection intervals for each particular combination of ratings. 
This rating system for the A380 aircraft is based on the experience gained with previous Airbus programs as 
well as on relevant lab tests performed for new materials, being the figures quoted as ED inspection intervals 
‘Top Level Aircraft Requirements’ taking into account during the design. 
The CPCP analysis consists of an assessment of the resulting ED inspection requirement in conjunction with 
available in-service experience with similar structure design/location -where applicable- in order to 
consolidate a unique ED/CPCP requirement, which is able to achieve CPCP expectations. 
8.6.3 ED ANALYSIS. SELECTION OF MATERIAL 
The application of the above mentioned Rating System will be performed on that material included in the SSI 
that would lead to the “worst” result after applying the Rating System. 
Normally, the SSI includes a number of different parts and materials/protections that could generate different 
ED maintenance requirements after application of the Rating System. The MSG-3 author is therefore 
requested to perform internal evaluations and trade-off analyses in order to conservatively select the most 
appropriate material, which will be shown to the working group for discussion. 
NOTE: Independently of the material selected for the application of the Rating System, the Galvanic 
Corrosion rating shown in the ED/CPCP analysis sheet will be the “worst” of those that could be found in the 
entire SSI. 
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During this “trade-off” analysis, it could be determined that certain parts of the SSI selected have a quite 
different (worse) corrosion properties compared to the rest of the parts which forms the SSI. This could be an 
argument for selecting more specific SSIs. 
8.6.4 ED ANALYSIS. INSPECTION INTERVAL DETERMINATION. RATING SYSTEM 
DESCRIPTION. 
Once the appropriate part/material has been selected, the Rating System has to be applied. 
The Rating System comprises the assignment of values to several corrosion’s related characteristics of the 
material, environment and protections of the part under evaluation and its combination in order to obtain an 
Environmental Deterioration Inspection Interval. 
The sequence/procedure of this Rating System is as follows: 
[A] Rating of the selected material to the various kind of corrosion, including: 
- Potential Type of Corrosion. 
- Stress Corrosion. 
[B] Rating of the Environment. 
[C] Rating of the Protection. 
[D] Consideration of the Accidental Damage Analysis. 
8.6.4.1 Potential Type of Corrosion Rating 
Some other types of corrosion could also be present in the material throughout the operational life of the 
aircraft. A brief description of each of these potential types of corrosion is provided below: 
• Intergranular corrosion 
It is characterised by a preferential attack