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COOPERAÇÃO FUNCIONAL
1. GOVERNANÇA GLOBAL SOBRE A SAÚDE
THOMAS, Caroline; WEBER, Martin. The Politics of Global Health Governance: Whatever Happened to “Health for All by the Year 2000”?
· The problems of GHG by considering the competing political projects that underpin respective GHG conceptions, the actors that represent, defend, and advance them, and the structures that frame debates and policy initiatives.
· In their varying hues, these actors have attempted to reintroduce the wider social concerns constitutive of a more integrated approach to health care, which would locate specific interventions within a broader project of socioeconomic transformation.
· The current slowdown and impending recessions may refocus and reinvigorate the politics of “re-embedding,” of redistribution, and of the protection of social and political achievements, rather than their erosion through their colonization with market rationalities.
· The 1970s: when the prospects for multilateralism were relatively strong and the UN system was the forum for the development of global governance.
· The late 1970s onward: when the institutional development of global governance occurred more noticeably through global economic institutions.
· With the period of détente in the bipolar world system and the relative decline of U.S. global hegemony, the UN provided a forum for the emergence of a coalition of postcolonial states that culminated in the formation of the G-77 and the proclamation of the need for an NIEO.
· The implications of the NIEO for GHG: its general thrust of integrating economic and social concerns means that the undeniable exacerbation of the global health crisis through economic inequality would have constituted a much smaller problem than what is currently experienced.
· The adoption by the WHO/WHA of the goals of the declaration to provide egalitarian health care on a global scale in accordance with a needs-based approach offers an important insight. It highlights the way in which UN governance at that historical juncture moved closer than ever to bridging the gap between declarative/symbolic global politics, on the one hand, and substantive policy development, on the other.
· The second phase of global governance discussed here is characterized by governance according to neoliberal principles.
· If the third world challenge to a crisis-ridden and crisis-inducing Northern economic hegemony drew its political force partly from the generality of its reform and transformation demands, the reassertion of Northern dominance proceeded via the piecemeal framing and reconstructing of economic reform proposals and packages along “Reagonomics” lines.
· Thus, disciplinary neoliberalism in global political economy became extended through institutions in which the political momentum created for the G-77 proved relatively powerless.
· The 1978 declaration of Alma Ata cemented the notion of health care as a universal human entitlement and thus as a good, access to which should not be determined by particular economic circumstances.
· The shape of PHC “is determined by social goals, such as the improvement of the quality of life and maximum health benefits to the greatest number.”
· The Alma Ata declaration affirmed the responsibility and the crucial role assumed by states and the international community in providing sustainable health care but complemented this affirmation with an explicit recognition of the significant contributions made by households and communities.
· Whereas the achievement of health as a human right as envisaged at Alma Ata required health to be seen as a public good,18 the neoliberal development orthodoxy of the 1980s and early 1990s interpreted it instead in terms of its privatization potential.
· The role of the market in determining entitlement to health increased, while the role of the state decreased.
· During the 1990s, there was a gradual realization that the process of economic globalization was accompanied by an increasingly pertinent uneven distribution of economic benefits.
· An increasing realization in official policy circles that a better balance had to be struck between the goals of economic growth and social and environmental goals, including health.
· WTO impacts on health across a variety of areas, from the general level of “trade creep” over public health concerns to the particular areas.
· The HIV/AIDS crisis - in a relatively short space of time, this disease has been transformed from a health issue into a security issue and most recently into a development issue.
· Policy has been framed in terms of the rights of corporations rather than the human right to health, Corporations are keen to uphold their patent rights, thus safeguarding profits (mostly accrued in the North) into the future.
· A key problem with these “partnerships” is that they are not based on substantive conceptions of equality that underpin, for instance, the health for all ideal, and that those in whose interests they are avowedly developed are in general excluded from their negotiation. For serious partnerships to develop, developing countries must be fully involved in deliberations with companies and UN organizations.
· The “Okinawa” agenda for GHG has been dominated by a limited set of actors who, albeit to differing degrees, have either encouraged and/or legitimated the continued disembedding of GHG from these wider concerns for social justice from which it is inseparable.
· Northern countries continue to hold on to advantageous subsidies and tariff barriers, the focus on trade liberalization distorts again the way in which the benefits of trade-led growth get distributed. The international focus on terms of trade and balance of trade distracts from an analysis of the global reproduction of inequality and immiseration.
· Insofar as momentum is building for sustained challenges to currently dominant modes in the formation of global governance, social movements can be seen as the sites at which politicization occurs; thus events such as the reiterative protest assertions in the context of global summits begin to take on features of a social movement.
· The twin roles of NGOs and (egalitarian) social movements in constructing a governance-relevant “complex multilateralism” in the more general sense is discernible in their persistence to promote more comprehensive conceptions of social justice, which address not only the distribution of health care, but also the conditions of health in general.
· Ultimately, the challenge of health is viewed by these actors as basically the challenge of socioeconomic equity and development from the local to the national, regional, and global level.
LEE, Kelley. Bridging the divide: global governance of trade and health
· Which institutions have the authority and capability to take action on trade and health matters, who participates in and who is excluded from making decisions, and who sets the agenda and defines policy
· WTO substantially changed the global trading system.
· In view of the extended reach of the WTO, questions have intensified about its legitimacy and capacity to fairly balance the interests of diverse stakeholders.
· The ability to shape trade and health agreements crucially depends on the capacity of countries to meaningfully participate. Many low-income and middle-income countries do not have resources to sufficiently monitor or influence negotiations.
· Disparities between high-income and low-income countries are further shown by differences between the international institutions that deal with trade and public health.
· Observer status allows WHO to contribute to discussions but not be officially involved in making decisions.
· The restricted sharing of information between health and trade communities, and the scarcity of substantive monitoring and assessment of trade policies from a public-health perspective, remain barriers to coordinated action between the WTO and WHO.
· Concerns have been raised about the degree to which action to protect health canbe taken before there is complete scientific proof of a risk. Under environmental agreements, the precautionary principle supports action without full scientific evidence if there is risk of substantial adverse health outcomes.
· According to the sanitary and phytosanitary agreement, trade restrictions must be based on scientific evidence. Although exemptions are allowed when evidence is insufficient a precautionary principle that allows restrictions has not been written into the agreement.
· At present, over 250 regional and bilateral trade agreements govern more than 30% of world trade.10 A primary concern is that regional and bilateral trade agreements can include provisions that go beyond the WTO’s provisions. In many cases, these stricter rules have little flexibility to protect health.
· Protection of knowledge and genetic resources is another area in which regional and bilateral trade agreements could affect health. Several agreements ease restrictions on patenting life forms and the protection of plant varieties.
· The purposes of the Joint Food and Agriculture Organization/ WHO food standards programme are to protect the health of consumers, ensure fairness in food trade, and to promote the coordination of food standards by international governmental and non-governmental organisations. For member states, article 20 of the GATT allows governments to act on trade to protect the life or health of people, animals, or plants—provided that there is no discrimination or use of the agreement to disguise protectionism.
· However, expansion of the world trading system meant that health determinants and outcomes could be affected by trade in several ways. Further, the creation of the WTO required new forms of engagement by the public-health community such as participation in trade-related meetings, monitoring of trade negotiations and agreements, and interaction with trade lawyers. Moreover, this expanded trade and health agenda has encompassed different interests, values, and goals and as a result, there are now challenging policy issues to address. 
· In 2000, a small programme on globalisation, trade, and health was established to strengthen knowledge, develop analytical methods, and produce training materials for supporting member states in addressing trade and health issues.
· Although the remit of the globalisation, trade, and health programme has been to “achieve greater policy coherence between trade and health policy so that international trade and trade rules maximise health benefits and minimise health risks, especially for poor and vulnerable populations”, the real challenge has been to ensure health policy is appropriately represented.
· If WHO is to take a lead role, the involvement of WHO with the WTO Secretariat and its members should be substantively enhanced to enable more meaningful participation. WHO should become a permanent observer of the WTO’s general council, and dispute settlement panels should have equal participation of trade and health experts in appropriate cases.
· Of crucial importance is building incentives for collaboration into such cooperation agreements, in the form of funding and other resources.
· WHO needs to shift efforts from building their knowledge base to supporting member states to effectively participate in the governance of trade issues. Besides building analytical capacity within member states—which requires corresponding resources—WHO has to show political leadership in resisting powerful political and economic interests.
· Health interests could be actively represented in the design of revised legislation, and allowed to voice concerns and reservations with draft legislation through activities such as public workshops, public debates, and engagement with the media.
FRANK, Julio; MOON, Suerie. Governance Challenges in Global Health
· A trio of threats: first, the unfinished agenda of infections, undernutrition, and reproductive health problems; second, the rising global burden of noncommunicable diseases and their associated risk factors, such as smoking and obesity; and third, the challenges arising from globalization itself, such as the health effects of climate change and trade policies, which demand engagement outside the traditional health sector.
· Global health should be defined by two key elements: its level of analysis, which involves the entire population of the world, and the relationships of interdependence that bind together the units of social organization that make up the global population (e.g., nation states, private organizations, ethnic groups, and civil society movements).
· The notion of governance goes beyond the formal mechanisms of government and refers to the totality of ways in which a society organizes and collectively manages its affairs.5 Global governance is the extension of this notion to the world as a whole.
· The WHO is the only actor in the global health system that is built on the universal membership of all recognized sovereign nation states (though it is often identified only with its secretariat), and it therefore is central to the system.
· Health is increasingly influenced by decisions that are made in other global policymaking arenas, such as those governing international trade, migration, and the environment.
· The importance of these arenas is the reason why we prefer the term “global governance for health,” rather than the more restrictive notion of “global health governance,” which tends to focus only on entities specializing in health matters.
· Sovereignty can confound attempts at transnational coordination, rulemaking, and adjudication. These tasks become even more difficult given the highly unequal distribution of health risks and resources, the opposing interests of various actors, the diversity of cultures and histories, and the rapidly changing distribution of power among countries in the global system. In a context of deepening health interdependence, it becomes more urgent and yet more difficult for countries to agree on their respective responsibilities, obligations, rights, and duties, hampering effective responses to common health threats.
· Two types of accountability problems arise in the current context. 
· The first relates to the legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations, which are formally accountable to the governments of member states rather than directly to the people whose universal rights they are supposed to uphold.
· The second type of problem is the lack of clear mechanisms for the accountability of non-state actors. (...) We lack effective institutions to govern the many powerful non-state actors that influence global health today.
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2. ORGANIZAÇÃO INTERNACIONAL DO TRABALHO
WILKINSON, Rorden; HUGHES, Steve. Labor Standards and Global Governance: Global Governance
· although calls for a substantive adherence to certain core labor standards supported by a punitive sanctioning mechanism the so called social clause have been largely unsuccessful, alternative strategies have emerged to ensure that the issue of worker rights remains central to future discourse on the role of global trade regulation
· WTO's engagement with civil society, the increasing convergence between WTO rules and regional bodies, and the activities of international labor provide the foundation for a critical mass of social pressure that might cause the issue to spill back into the WTO
· Labor's success, however limited, in lobbying for the European social chapter has acted to stimulate and organize its activities in other regions. The NAFTA side accord, the consultative arrangements on labor and social issues being developed in the Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur), the proposed social dimension to the Southern African Development Community, and the formal introduction of labor issues into Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forums attest to the importance of its regional strategy to labor's campaign.
· Although the ILO can benefitfrom accessing the macroeconomic data compiled by all three organizations, they may in turn benefit from the experiences of an intergovernmental organization that has a long history of dealing with representatives of civil society. Serious energies must therefore be directed at re embedding the ILO into the heart of global economic governance.
· Introducing a social dimension to the planning and monitoring activities of the Bretton Woods institutions offers a more synergetic way of developing the international labor standards regime.
· The monitoring and data gathering capabilities of the regime would strengthen the regulatory mechanisms currently employed by the ILO.
· Within the GATT, labor issues remained in the background until the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), when a brief and inconclusive discussion took place.
· Yet it was not until the advent of the Uruguay Round that momentum among the GATT's contracting parties started building for an examination of the issue.
· 5 core labor standards when engaged in the production of goods and services for trade. Such standards find expression in seven ILO conventions relating to freedom of association, collective bargaining, restrictions on the usage of child labor, prohibition of the usage of forced labor, and nondiscrimination in employment (enforced by recourse to the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism)
· The WTO's third ministerial meeting in Seattle was greeted by mass demonstrations across the world. So forceful was their protest that, in conjunction with the failure to agree on an agenda among member states, the Seattle meeting failed in its principal task the launching of the Millennium Round of trade negotiations.
· Any punitive enforcement mechanism could be used as a means of (1) eroding the comparative wage advantage of developing members, (2) enforcing a set of culturally incongruous values on societies wherein sociopolitical structures differ from those of the West, and (3) introducing elements of protectionism devised to offset any decline in comparative advantage encountered by Northern producers when engaged in competition with their Southern counterparts. In contrast, taking up the torch of core labor standards moved the issue away from these charges of institutionalized protectionism and neoimperialism toward a focus on providing workers with the wherewithal to claim an equitable share in the fruits of freer trade. 
· As its ministerial meetings had demonstrated, the WTO was not about to incorporate such a mechanism into its legal framework. But it was prepared to declare support for a commitment to core labor standards.
· Further developments have also added to this change in emphasis away from a punitive protection of worker rights to an acceptance of the language of core labor standards. One of the principal developments in the transition from GATT to WTO has been a movement into the adoption of certain rules directed at facilitating trade liberalization by governing so called trade-related areas.
· That said, the development of communications channels with civil society provides a forum where nongovernmental organizations and grassroots movements can air their concerns, of which the impact of trade liberalization on the position of workers is but one.
· However, there remain some significant problems with the WTO's engagement with civil society. First, the WTO narrowly defines civil society as nongovernmental organizations. Second, it does not differentiate between business and civil groups, merely requiring that they be non-profit making. Third, the WTO is selective in the NGOs that it engages with, thus ensuring that only those NGOs whose activities are "concerned with matters related to those of the WTO" are incorporated into the consultation process. And fourth, WTO relations with civil society are, as yet, fairly insubstantial. Indeed, NGO attendance at the Singapore ministerial meeting was not intended to set a precedent. And beyond Internet provisions and some participation in high-level symposiums, NGOs are not incorporated into the organization's structure, let alone its decision making processes
· Institutions of regional governance are governed by three main objectives: the provision of a social dimension to regional integration, the establishment of arrangements for labor consultation at different levels of the regionalist process, and the introduction into regional agreements of international instruments related to the activities of transnational corporations.
· Collaboration would offer a practical demonstration that dialogue between the institutions of global economic governance can produce a social dimension to the multilateral system that is an essential component to its sustainability and development.
· The activities of the international labor movement have reflected a desire to ensure that the architecture of global and regional economic governance has a tripartite structure.
· What may result then is a complex web of governance structures in the global economy converging around a particular set of rules. It is therefore not unreasonable to suppose that this process of convergence will be reciprocal, in that the increasing salience of worker rights in regional associations creates pressure for the issue to spill back into the WTO.
MUNCK, Ronaldo. Globalization and the Labour Movement: Challenges and Responses.
JARMAN, Jennifer. International Labour Organization.
· The Nobel Prize committee recognized the difficulty of improving employment standards in a complex global environment.
· The ILO is of interest as a possible model of how to create international policy in other complicated policy domains; for instance, in the development of conditions for progress around minimal standards for environmental issues at the international level.
· Declaration of Philadelphia: several important principles: that labor is not a commodity, that freedom of expression and association are essential to progress, that poverty is dangerous to prosperity, and that all human beings, regardless of race, creed, or sex have a right to pursue material well-being in conditions of freedom and dignity, economic security, and equal opportunity
· Labor is not to be treated merely as another factor of production but is accorded basic rights, freedom of expression affirms the political right to speak about conditions of work, and freedom of association affirms the basic right to form a trade union to organize collectively to improve working conditions
· Regular participation and joint decision making by the most important parties – employers, governments, and workers – involved in labor regulation. The participation of these relevant parties is structured into decision- and policy-making so that outcomes require input and compromise from all; no party is left out and no party speaks or acts on behalf of another. It is a fundamentally democratic structure.
· Advocates of this structure suggest that the fact that differences are built into the organization ensures that its debates are truly representative of a spectrum of views and that the solutions and recommendations which it produces are more relevant to the complex reality of employment issues.
· The tripartite structure, however, has also produced some of the ILO’s most significant disputes.
· Given the complexity of addressing many employment issues, the ILO provides technical assistance, particularly to countries lacking resources or experience in developing and implementing employment protections.
· Much of the ILO’s early focus was on developing Conventions relevant to the issues that were emerging on the agendas of the early industrializing nations. These included the critical issues of health and safety, social welfare, hours of work, and equal terms for men and women performing the same type of work
· During the late 1990s, Director-General Juan Somavia launched an initiative to designate a small number of the Conventions as “core” standards. This became the ILO Declaration on FundamentalPrinciples and Rights at Work (1998). The four key areas are: freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labor; effective abolition of child labor; and elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
· ILO is nevertheless working consistently to bring countries together to improve our understanding of the problems, to provide data and expertise with which to inform those problems, and to provide a system which produces debates and the setting of employment standards that can be agreed upon by a substantial majority of its members, as it has been doing for over 90 years
· One of the most important issues, and one that has been contentious since its very inception, has been the fact that while the ILO’s mandate is to create international employment standards, it does not have any mechanisms or power to enforce these standards. Many of the Conventions passed have not even been ratified, let alone implemented or enforced, by its member countries. Critics of this approach argue that the ILO is a “soft” organization, because countries can breach or ignore Conventions without suffering any meaningful repercussions, and that approaches based on such voluntary action inevitably result in very little progress
· Without an enforcement mechanism, the ILO can only serve as an organization attempting to establish moral or symbolic leadership through the setting of norms that have been widely discussed and agreed upon by member states, and in collaboration with the representatives of the tripartite players within each country
· Recessions pose enormous challenges to any attempts to improve standards for workers. Furthermore, previous extended recessions have led to major conflicts such as World War II, the very type of conflict that gave birth to this organization. Unions, governments, and employers struggle to preserve employment in the face of declining production, and rights that have been hard-won are challenged in the face of simple job creation.
· The ILO has had to proceed in a manner that recognizes national sovereignties, ideological differences in approaches to the protection of employment, and differences in the types of challenges facing different regions of the world at different points in time. At the same time, its continued existence is based on the premise that there are shared gains from setting minimal standards and from sharing information and developing solutions to collective problems.
· It is up to the tripartite representatives to affect public policy in different countries so that the Conventions have more chance of being adopted by countries.
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3. ACNUR
BETTS, Alexander et al. UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection. Oxon: Routledge, 2012.
· Refugees are people who have suffered human rights violations and who have fled across the borders of their home countries to seek protection elsewhere.
· Following a number of precedents before and during the Second World War, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created in 1950 to protect refugees and find a solution to their plight. It was initially created as a temporary organization with the sole responsibility of addressing the needs of refugees in Europe who had been displaced by the Second World War. Over time, however, its geographical focus was extended beyond Europe, and it has subsequently become a prominent international organization with a global focus.
· the Office was conceived to work with states to ensure refugees’ access to protection. In other words, those outside of their country of origin and with a well-founded fear of persecution would be assured of certain clearly defined rights.
· it was mandated to ensure that refugees would have access to durable solutions and would either be reintegrated within their country of origin or permanently integrated within a new country.
· The centerpiece of the regime is the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention), which provides a definition of who qualifies for refugee status and sets out the rights to which all refugees are entitled.
· States created UNHCR not only for altruistic reasons, but also to promote regional and international stability. Moreover, states sought to create a regime to support functions which serve their interests, such as sharing the costs of granting asylum and coordinating policies regarding the treatment of refugees.
· UNHCR has consequently been in an ambiguous position of, on the one hand, representing states’ interests and being dependent upon donor state funding, and, on the other hand, needing to influence states in order to persuade them to fulfill their humanitarian obligations towards refugees.
· Refugees have been identified as a spill-over of conflict, at both a regional and global scale. Refugees have also been perceived as a burden on local and national economies, and have been blamed for increased pressures on social cohesion and national identity.
· The Cold War, post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras - the Office has faced the challenge of upholding the regime and ensuring its own institutional survival, while adapting its work to meet the opportunities and constraints posed by the changing context of world politics. In response, UNHCR’s core mandate has undergone a number of changes, and the scope of its work has been expanded over time under the authority of the General Assembly.
· In this process of adaptation and expansion, UNHCR has had little material power of its own and has faced the constraints of being dependent upon the voluntary contributions of key donor states and reliant upon host governments for permission to initiate operations on their territory.
· In response to the changing interests and priorities of states, UNHCR has also faced the task of facilitating international cooperation to ensure the protection of refugees and to find solutions to their plight.
· UNHCR’s ability to fulfill its mandate has repeatedly relied upon being able to establish partnerships with other actors within and beyond the UN system.
· The Office has therefore faced the question of how to reconcile its normative agenda with the realpolitik of changing circumstances.
· On the one hand, ignoring the interests of states runs the risk of UNHCR becoming sidelined or irrelevant. On the other hand, adapting its mandate in accordance with the short-term interests of states has risked undermining its moral authority and the humanitarian principles upon which this moral authority is based.
HUYSMANS, Jef. The European Union and the Securitization of Migration. Journal of Common Market Studies, v. 38, n. 5, p. 751-777, 2000.
· economic and financial globalization, the rise of poverty, the deterioration of living conditions in cities, the revival of racist and xenophobic parties and movements, the estrangement of the electorate from the political class, and the rise of multiculturalism. 
· In this setting migration has been increasingly presented as a danger to public order, cultural identity, and domestic and labour market stability; it has been securitized.
· Although the social construction of migration as a security question is contested it results from a powerful political and societal dynamic reifying migration as a force which endangers the good life in west European societies.
· how is migration connected to representations of societal dangers and how is the development of a common migration policy implicated in making this connection?
· The key development has been the technocratic and politically manufactured spillover of the economic project of the internal market into an internal security project.
· The explicit privileging of nationals of Member States in contrast to third-country nationals and the generally restrictive regulation of migration sustains a wider process of delegitimatingthe presence of immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. EU policies support, often indirectly, expressions of welfare chauvinism and the idea of cultural homogeneity as a stabilizing factor.
· a powerful theme through which functionally differentiated policy problems, such as identity control and visa policy, asylum applications, integration of immigrants, distribution of social entitlements, and the management of cultural diversity are connected and traversed. Discourses and governmental technologies reifying immigrants, asylum-seekers, refugees and foreigners as a dangerous challenge to societal stability play a prominent – though not exclusive – role in connecting these different issues.
· The Europeanization of migration policy has made a distinct contribution to this development. It has directly securitized migration by integrating migration policy into an internal security framework, that is, a policy framework that defines and regulates security issues following the abolition of internal border control.
· The construction of the internal security field, the restrictive migration policy, the privileging of nationals of Member States in the internal market, and policies supporting, often indirectly, expressions of welfare chauvinism and the idea of cultural homogeneity as a stabilizing factor feed into the negative politicization of immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees as an illegitimate presence and scapegoat.
· negative rendering of migration at the European level further bolsters domestic political spectacles in which migration is often easily connected to security-related problems such as crime and riots in cities, domestic instability, transnational crime and welfare fraud.
· the Europeanization of migration policy fosters the securitization of migration it sustains a radical political strategy aimed at excluding particular categories of people by reifying them as a danger
· the Dublin convention is heavily overdetermined by a policy aimed at reducing the number of applications. Making it impossible to submit applications for asylum in different Member States reduces the chances of being accepted, which obviously will deter some refugees from seeking asylum in western Europe
· In the 1980s migration increasingly was a subject of policy debates about the protection of public order and the preservation of domestic stability. These debates also represented migration as a challenge to the welfare state and to the cultural composition of the nation. A key theme running through these debates was that migration is a danger to domestic society
· It affects the way in which migration is rendered problematic when the police and the related departments in the Ministry of Home Affairs take a prominent role in the regulation of migration. For the police it is part of their profession to produce security knowledge. They have a professional disposition to represent and categorize a policy concern in a security discourse and to propose security measures to deal with it. As a result, immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees are framed as a security problem which is different from an approach by means of a policy which emphasizes that asylum is a human rights question and/or which proposes human rights instruments to deal with the issue.
· Security policy is a specific policy of mediating belonging. It conserves or transforms political integration and criteria of membership through the identification of existential threats. In security practices the political and social identification of a community and its way of life develop in response to an existential threat. The community defines what it considers to be the good life through the reification of figures of societal danger such as the criminal, the mentally abnormal, and the invading enemy.
· The European integration process is involved in the development of and the struggle against the representation of migration as a cultural danger. Three themes are central. The first is the cultural significance of border control and the limitation of free movement. The second is the question of integration or assimilation of migrants into the domestic societies of the Member States. The third is the relationship between European integration and the development of multicultural societies.
· Some argue that, in addition to cultural criteria, racism also plays a role in the regulation of inclusion and exclusion of migrants. While nationalism is a cultural discourse, racism is a biological discourse that unifies a community 
· A policy of integration may be part of progressive multiculturalism, which supports the integration of immigrants by granting them political rights as a means to create a genuinely multicultural society. But emphasizing the need to integrate immigrants can also directly or indirectly confirm a nationalist desire for a culturally homogeneous society, identifying immigrants as the obstacle to a successful realization of this desire
· As a result of successive economic recessions and the rise in unemployment since the early 1970s, the struggle over the distribution of social goods such as housing, health care, unemployment benefits, jobs and other social services has become more competitive. Scarcity makes immigrants and asylum-seekers rivals to national citizens in the labour market and competitors in the distribution of social goods. This has resulted in an increasingly explicit assertion of welfare chauvinism, or the privileging of national citizens in the distribution of social goods
· political struggle in which immigrants, asylum-seekers, foreigners and refugees are constructed as scapegoats to remedy declining political legitimacy. In the present political context, expressions of welfare chauvinism thus facilitate a connection between the socioeconomic questioning of migration as a financial and economic burden to challenges to the political identity of welfare states and their governments.
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4. AIEA
ALGER, Justin; FINDLAY, Trevor. Strengthening Global Nuclear Governance. Issues in Science and Technology, v. 27, n. 1, 2010.
· International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
· Global governance needs to be prepared to address the challenges of the array of developing countries seeking nuclear energy
· three broad milestones that must be accomplished before a state is considered ready for nuclear power: (1) ready to make a knowledgeable commitment to a nuclear program, (2) ready to invite bids for the first nuclear power plant, and (3) ready to commission and operate the first nuclear power plant.
· the recent drop in the price of oil and international financial turmoil will probably make even these states wary of committing to expensive projects such as a nuclear power reactor.
· The IAEA’s milestones document includes a comprehensive list of hundreds of infrastructure targets, including physical infrastructure, for aspiring nuclear states to meet before they should commission a nuclear plant.
· A country’s ability to run a nuclear power program safely and securely depends on its capacity to successfully and sustainably plan, build (or at least oversee construction of), and manage a large and complex facility and its associated activities.
· Because of the low probability of an influx of developing countries into the nuclear business, the risk to the current global governance system is less than what it otherwise would have been. Despite this, global governance needs to be prepared for the handful of developing states that might succeed in acquiring a nuclear energy sector; those that may make the attempt, however ill-advised; and those that seriously consider the option and need assistance in doing so.
· Currently, all of the developing countries seeking nuclear energy lack the requisite national laws and regulations, agencies and practices, trained and experienced personnel, and appropriate safety culture to safely host a nuclear plant. None has the capacity to manage nuclearwaste, except that currently resulting from medical or research applications.
· No country is able to buy two critical components: a ready-made safety culture and a robust independent regulator.
· States are more secretive, often understandably, about nuclear security than about nuclear safety. International cooperation and transparency are therefore constrained. Heightened fears of nuclear terrorism have led to improvements in the global regime since 9/11.
· Although legally binding in respect to their broad provisions, both agreements leave detailed implementation up to each party. International verification of compliance and penalties for noncompliance are unknown, as are requirements for peer review.
· From the outset of the nuclear age, it was feared that states would seek to acquire civilian nuclear energy as a cover for a nuclear weapons program. The result is the evolution of an international nonproliferation regime based on the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its safeguards system.
· the regime still suffers from its original central contradiction: Some states have accorded themselves the right to retain nuclear weapons apparently in perpetuity, whereas all others are under the legally binding obligation never to acquire them.
· The most urgent task is for the IAEA to bring all states into all of the nuclear governance regimes for safety, security, and nonproliferation as soon as possible, to inform them of their rights and responsibilities, and to assist them with implementation and compliance. The IAEA is also well positioned to provide expanded advisory services to help new entrants plan their programs from the ground up so as to ensure that they have in place the best possible regulatory, safety, and security measures, are fully compliant with nuclear safeguards, and have the necessary infrastructure and personnel. The IAEA is able, for instance, to assist states in conducting feasibility studies, which it has done for the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Jordan.
· The ideal outcome would be for the IAEA to quietly use the new interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as leverage to convince states to put in place all of the prerequisites for a safe, secure, and proliferation-resistant enterprise.
· To be able to continue functioning effectively, the IAEA’s member states, essentially the Western countries, will need to increase the agency’s budget to meet the ever-increasing demands placed on it, as well as ensuring that it is equipped with modernized facilities, up-to-date technology, and expert human resources. But the global governance system also needs to be able to discourage states when nuclear energy appears not to be an appropriate choice
· Developing countries will need to be convinced that strengthening nuclear global governance is not a plot by the developed world to deprive them of the benefits of nuclear energy, but rather an important way of ensuring that nuclear energy is used in a safe, secure, and peaceful manner, to the benefit of everyone. The fact that some developing countries, notably China, India, and South Korea, are entering the reactor sales business will help because such states and their industries will be eager to avoid a disaster arising from their product. But in the longer term, the sting will be taken out of nuclear energy politics only by the resolution of the perceived inequality resulting from the most advanced nuclear energy states also being the ones in possession of nuclear weapons.
DAWOOD, Layla; HERZ, Monica. Nuclear governance in Latin America. Contexto Internacional, v. 35, n. 2, 2013.
· The term “nuclear policy” refers to the creation of national and multilateral rules and public policies involving nuclear technology. It includes policy choices with respect to the development of nuclear weapons, the adherence to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the construction of nuclear power plants, the investment in nuclear technology (in order to control the uranium enrichment cycle and to improve the construction of reactors, for example), the mapping of, prospecting for, and use of uranium deposits, and the international trade of uranium.
· Considering the current situation of relations among the Latin American countries and the mechanisms of nuclear governance, one can observe three main trends: the existence of cooperative projects for technological development; the collective and consistent compliance to the non-proliferation mechanisms created before the end of the Cold War, as well as mechanisms that ensure safety against accidents; and difficulties in coordinating positions towards new mechanisms aimed at reinforcing governance in this area, combining non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism.
· Considering that, despite international suspicions, Iran claims not to have the intention of producing nuclear weapons and that it has the right to make peaceful use of nuclear technology, it is possible to infer that the position assumed by Brazil is consistent with the claim, shared by the Latin American countries, that the peaceful use of nuclear technology is an internationally established right (see Chart 2 appendix) and, therefore, should not be threatened by unilateral or multilateral initiatives.
· although there is considerable convergence among Latin American countries in relation to acceptance of rules, norms and principles which comprise the mechanisms of nuclear governance, there is no automatic alignment among those countries with respect to the most recent proposals of modification and strengthening of this normative, regulatory framework.
· Latin American countries have significant participation in the multilateral organizational framework designed to guarantee the operation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Latin American countries also have unequal but considerable participation in the initiatives promoted by the American government against new perceived threats derived from the association between weapons of mass destruction and terrorism in the 2000s.
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5. FAO
WHITE, Philip. The role of UN specialised agencies in complex emergencies: A case study of FAO. Third World Quarterly, v. 20, 1999.
· Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), which has a mandate covering matters related to food security, dietary adequacy and the development of agriculture including crops, livestock, fisheries and marine produce, and forestry and primary forest products.
· First, as a `development’ agency within the UN system, it has not historically organised itself around humanitarian assistance objectives.
· Second, in consequence, FAO has tended to remain outside the `club’ of UN agencies most prominent in emergenciesÐ UNDP, UNHCR, WFP and UNICEFÐ and to have a low profile in DHA/OCHA and its mechanisms for emergency response coordination.
· Third, however, FAO has recently undergone a major awakening with respect to its role in emergencies. A main trigger for this was ECOSOC Resolution 1995/56 (July 1995): `Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations’
· FAO’ s capabilities in the food and agriculture sectors do demonstrate its potential for being a significant player in complex as well as in other emergencies, particularly with regard to early warning and information, impact assessment and short-, medium- and long-term rehabilitation/recovery of livelihoods and institutions.
· In the food sector, emergencies may arise from problems of food security, food quality or food safety which threaten the nutritional well-being of significant groups of the population. In the agricultural sector, the concern is with disasters which threaten agricultural production and livelihoods in such a way as to constitute, exacerbate or prolong emergencies.
· FAO’s goal in emergencies can be summarised as one of defence of people’s nutritional status and agricultural livelihoods against disaster impacts.This entails support for: levels of food production; national and local availability of safe, nutritionally adequate food; access to these available food supplies on the part of affected population groups, households and individuals; proper utilisation of food (quality and safety in storage, processing and preservation, and preparation).
· FAO now draws attention to the preventative character of many of its regular Field Programme activities in reducing the vulnerability of agricultural communities to disaster. These activities include support for improvements in production technologies for and diversification of crops and livestock, rangeland, forest, watershed and water management, coastal fishing practices nutrition education, on-farm storage, cereal reserves, and so on.
· FAO provides technical assistance for developing disaster preparedness strategies and action plans.
· The 1996 World Food Summit has asked FAO to coordinate the development of a consolidated information system on hunger and chronic vulnerability. With the collaboration of other partners within and without the UN system, the Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping System (FIVIMS) initiative sets out to maintain and improve existing information to suit the purpose of monitoring food insecurity and vulnerability to shocks which can include many of the effects of conflict.
· FAO’ s revitalised Emergency Coordination Group (ECG) is its mechanism for ensuring that its response to emergencies is well integrated across disciplines and along the `relief±development continuum’. Its function is to ensure timely, coherent and coordinated action in response to early warnings of an emergency and to forge effective linkages between relief and post-disaster rehabilitation and recovery programmes.
· There is no doubt that rehabilitative interventions in complex emergencies have taken forms that have not always been appropriate to the prevailing political, military or humanitarian context.
· The distinction between `relief’ and `rehabilitation’ is not always clear and the range of activities falling within the rehabilitation umbrella is wide, but clearly the balance of resource allocation needs to be one which ensures that current survival needs are actually met. Moreover the programming of all interventions, including relief, must be sensitive to their political implications and their effect on the con ̄ ict, and the implementation of those programmes must be flexible enough to allow for adjustment or withdrawal as circumstances warrant.
· What is required in addition to political judgement is a reasonable chance that benefits of such programmes will not quickly be wiped out by conflict. Early rehabilitation of the kind delivered by FAO, emphasising livelihood support and training, is particularly likely to be able to meet these conditions in complex emergencies and has done so.
DE CASTRO, Josué. Geografia da Fome. Rio de Janeiro: Edições Antares, 1984. - 8 edição 
· O fundamento moral que deu origem a esta espécie de interdição baseia-se no fato de que o fenômeno da fome, tanto a fome de alimentos como a fome sexual, é um instinto primário e por isso um tanto chocante pura uma cultura racionalista como a nossa, que procura por todos os meios impor o predomínio da razão sobre o dos instintos na conduta humana.
· Quanto à fome, foram necessárias duas terríveis guerras mundiais e uma tremenda revolução social — a revolução russa — nas quais pereceram dezessete milhões de criaturas, dos quais doze milhões de fome, para que a civilização ocidental acordasse do seu cômodo sonho e se apercebesse de que a fome é uma realidade demasiado gritante e extensa, para ser tapada com uma peneira aos olhos do mundo.
· Ao lado dos preconceitos morais, os interesses econômicos das minorias dominantes também trabalhavam para escamotear o fenômeno da fome do panorama espiritual moderno. É que ao imperialismo econômico e ao comércio internacional a serviço do mesmo interessava que a produção, a distribuição e o consumo dos produtos alimentares continuassem a se processar indefinidamente como fenômenos exclusivamente econômicos — dirigidos e estimulados dentro dos seus interesses econômicos — e não como fatos intimamente ligados aos interesses da saúde pública.
· Tendo-se evidenciado, dentro de um critério rigorosamente científico, o fato de que cerca de dois terços da humanidade vivem num estado permanente de fome, começa a mudar a atitude do mundo.
· A demonstração mais efetiva da mudança radical da atitude universal, em face do problema, encontra-se na realização da Conferência de Alimentação de Hot Springs, a primeira das conferências convocadas pelas Nações Unidas para tratar de problemas fundamentais à reconstrução do mundo de após-guerra. Nesta conferência reunida em 1943, e que deu origem à atual Organização de Alimentação e Agricultura das Nações Unidas — a FAO — quarenta e quatro nações, através dos depoimentos de eminentes técnicos no assunto, confessaram, sem constrangimento, quais as condições reais de alimentação dos seus respectivos povos e planejaram as medidas conjuntas a serem levadas a efeito para que sejam apagadas ou pelo menos clareadas, nos mapas mundiais de demografia qualitativa, estas manchas negras que representam núcleos de populações subnutridas e famintas, populações que exteriorizam, em suas características de inferioridade antropológica, em seus alarmantes índices de mortalidade e em seus quadros nosológicos de carências alimentares, a penúria orgânica, a fome global ou específica de um, de vários e, às vezes, de todos os elementos indispensáveis à nutrição humana.
· Obter uma visão panorâmica de conjunto, visão em que alguns pequenos detalhes certamente se apagarão, mas na qual se destacarão de maneira compreensiva as ligações, as influências e as conexões dos múltiplos fatores que interferem nas manifestações do fenômeno. Para tal fim pretendemos lançar mão do método geográfico, no estudo do fenômeno da fome. Único método que, a nossa ver, permite estudar o problema em sua realidade total, sem arrebentar-lhe as raízes que o ligam subterraneamente a inúmeras outras manifestações econômicas e sociais da vida dos povos. Não o método descritivo da antiga geografia, mas o método interpretativo da moderna ciência geográfica.
· É dentro desses princípios geográficos, da localização, da extensão, da causalidade, da correlação e da unidade terrestre, que pretendemos encarar o fenômeno da fome.
· Analisar os hábitos alimentares dos diferentes grupos humanos ligados a determinadas áreas geográficas, procurando, de um lado, descobrir as causas naturais e as causas sociais que condicionaram o seu tipo de alimentação, com suas falhas e defeitos característicos, e, de outro lado, procurando verificar até onde esses defeitos influenciam a estrutura econômico-social dos diferentes grupos estudados.
· Francisco Bulnes: “A humanidade, de acordo com uma severa classificação econômica, deve ser dividida em três grandes raças — a raça do trigo, a raça do milho, e a raça do arroz. Qual delas é indiscutivelmente superior?”
· Bertrand Russell: “nunca houve momento histórico no qual o concurso do pensamento e da consciência individuais fosse tão necessário e importante para o mundo como em nossos dias”. E mais ainda “que todo homem, qualquer homem comum, poderá contribuir para a melhoria do mundo”. É com esta mesma crença na obra de cooperação de cada um, de coparticipacão ativa na busca de um mundo melhor, que planejamos esta obra abordando o tema da fome em sua expressão universal, mostrando com que intensidade e em que extensão o fenômeno se manifesta nas diferentes coletividades humanas.
· Mesmo quando se trata da pressão modeladora de forças econômicas ou culturais, elas se fazem sentir sobre o homem e sobre o grupo humano, em última análise, através de um mecanismo biológico: através da deficiência alimentar que a monocultura impõe, através da fome que o latifúndio gera, e assim por diante.
· Caracterizando o tipo de alimentaçãoe os variados tipos de fome que tem sofrido a nossa gente, estamos certos de que faremos refletir nessas características biológicas, com maior exatidão do que através do estudo de quaisquer outras manifestações de natureza ecológica, o grau de adaptação e ajustamento dos diferentes grupos regionais de nossas populações às variadas zonas geográficas do país. E são exatamente as expressões dessas variadas formas de adaptação que dão relevo à fisionomia cultural de uma nação. É por isso que julgamos ser este volume, até certo ponto, uma tentativa de interpretação biológica de determinados aspectos da formação e da evolução histórico-sociais brasileiras.