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134 Int. J. Sport Management and Marketing, Vol. 21, Nos. 1/2, 2021 
 
 Copyright © 2021 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil: the promised 
legacy was dribbled past 
Roberto Bondarik*, Luiz Alberto Pilatti and 
Diogo José Horst 
Department of Production Engineering, 
Federal University of Technology – Paraná, 
Av. Monteiro Lobato km 04, 
Campus Ponta Grossa – 84016-210, PR, Brazil 
Fax: +55(42)32204800 
Email: bondarik@utfpr.edu.br 
Email: lapilatti@utfpr.edu.br 
Email: diogohorst@gmail.com 
*Corresponding author 
Abstract: This work evaluates the legacy left by the 2014 FIFA World-Cup 
held in Brazil, demonstrating the differences between the proposed and actual 
costs, construction projects and investments. This documentary study used 
statistical data provided by the Brazilian Government and the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). The results were analysed 
through descriptive statistics. From the results, the magnitude of benefits was 
not fulfilled due to the failure to carry out all the projects and actions judged 
necessary and justified by the mega-event, even so, it brought some 
development for the country. 
Keywords: FIFA World Cup; financial management; economics; sports event 
management; Brazil. 
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Bondarik, R., Pilatti, L.A. 
and Horst, D.J. (2021) ‘The 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil: the promised 
legacy was dribbled past’, Int. J. Sport Management and Marketing, Vol. 21, 
Nos. 1/2, pp.134–147. 
Biographical notes: Roberto Bondarik holds a PhD in Production Engineering 
from the Federal Technological University of Paraná Graduated in History and 
Geography. He is currently a Full Professor at the Federal Technological 
University of Paraná. He is acting as a Professor and Researcher at the Cornélio 
Procópio Campus, since 1995. He has teaching experience in the areas of 
history, education, humanities and social sciences; conducts research and 
studies on the following themes: history, sociology and sport economics, 
military history and sociology, historical formation of the State of Paraná; 
production engineering and; education and technology. He is a member, in 
Cornélio Procópio, of the Municipal Council for the Defense of the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities. 
Luiz Alberto Pilatti is a Professor at the Federal Technological University of 
Paraná (UTFPR). He holds a PhD in Physical Education from the State 
University of Campinas (UNICAMP). He earned his Master in Education from 
the Methodist University of Piracicaba (UNIMEP). He holds a degree in 
Physical Education by the State University of Ponta Grossa (UEPG). Currently, 
he holds the position of Dean at UTFPR (2016–2020). It is linked to the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil 135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Postgraduate Programs in Production Engineering (PPGEP) and Science and 
Technology Teaching (PPGECT) at the Ponta Grossa Campus. Research 
Productivity Scholarship – CNPq, Brazil 
Diogo José Horst is a Post-Doctorate in Engineering and Mechanical Sciences 
from the Federal University of Santa Catarina, UFSC (2018-2020). He holds a 
PhD in Production Engineering from the Federal Technological University of 
Paraná, UTFPR (2017). He is a Master in Production Engineering from the 
Federal Technological University of Paraná, UTFPR (2013). He graduated in 
Mechanical Technology at the State University of Santa Catarina, UDESC 
(2010). He graduated in Biological Sciences at the Leonardo da Vinci 
University, UNIASSELVI (2009). He took part in the professional technical 
course in Industrial Electromechanics by the National Service for Industrial 
Learning, SENAI (2005). 
 
1 Introduction 
Soccer has gained world’s affection, originated in England, with the formal establishment 
of the Laws of the Game in 1863, it was propagated to other countries through the global 
investments and ventures of British companies during the British economic expansion 
(Hobsbawm, 1994; Brown, 2015; Franco Júnior, 2017). 
The launch of satellites, approximately 50 years ago, linked the world through images 
and made possible the emergence of the Sports Industry. Dribbling tricks, which could 
only be appreciated by bleacher audiences, now amazed the entire world. Television 
multiplied an audience of thousands of fans, creating an audience and a market of 
millions. Indeed, the marketed product is good, football fascinates, and the number of 
spectators grows exponentially around the world (Faure and Suaud, 1994; Houcarde, 
2002; Clayton, 2015). 
Moreover, billions of dollars flow into the negotiation of professional player contracts 
and the entertainment and media industries have football as their main product (Smit, 
2006; Kuper and Szymansky, 2009; Müller et al., 2017). 
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) is the sport’s global 
governing body and has as its main product the World-Cup, a competition among 
national teams held every four years in different countries and continents (Franco Júnior, 
2017). The FIFA World Cup is classified as a sports mega-event combining four 
characteristics: visitor attractiveness, mediated reach, high costs, and urban 
transformation (Müller, 2015b, 2016). 
The economic growth of the host country/cities and investments in tourism are also 
associated with this mega-event (Grix, 2013; Baade and Matheson, 2016). The 
tournament is a spectacle sold as a cultural product incorporating several other products 
and modes of consumption (Baudrillard, 1995; Bourdieu, 1983; Kuper and Szymansky, 
2009; Zimbalist, 2015). 
The need to commercialise sports mega-events successfully to governing bodies 
demands that consumer market expectations be provoked and stimulated, either by the 
expectation of greatness, quality of places and cities where games are held, or high level 
of athletes and teams, attracting target audiences and investors (Smit, 2006; Solberg and 
Preuss, 2007; Kuper and Szymansky, 2009; Silk and Manley, 2012; Müller et al., 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 136 R. Bondarik et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public attraction and media reach depend on adequate conditions of accommodation 
infrastructure, security, and transportation for tourists and spectators; efficient and 
effective data communication; and transmission systems providing satisfactory media and 
marketing coverage (Müller, 2015b). Furthermore, the mega-event must involve the local 
population and capture their interest (Müller, 2016). The participation and support of 
host-country residents reinforce the local government’s commitment to the FIFA World 
Cup, is considered not only an entertainment spectacle but also a phenomenon capable of 
influencing the country’s economic development (Genevois, 2002; Smit, 2006). 
Regarding the expected economic benefits, it should be noted that the FIFA World 
Cup, as every sports mega-event, is a ‘flash in history’. It lasts approximately one month, 
a period that causes economic impact and/or significant structural changes in the host 
country (Solberg and Preuss, 2007). 
Recognising this temporal brevity means understanding that other socio-economic 
factors related to the FIFA World Cup are important and should be considered before 
deciding to host the mega-event and to have government entities financing projects 
meeting the required conditions (Roche, 1994; Billing and Holladay, 2012). 
For example, Brazil had to adapt several sectors to the standards of the mega-event to 
host its 20th edition, including improvements in public safety, tourism, urban mobility, as 
well as the construction and renovation of stadiums and sports arenas (Zimbalist, 2015). 
To justify holding the 2014 FIFA World Cup, the Brazilian government presented a 
legacy of benefits to the country, seekingimprovements in transportation infrastructure 
such as airports and highways, urban mobility development aimed at faster and more 
comfortable transport conditions within the cities, and construction of modern sports 
arenas (Silk and Manley, 2014; Smith, 2014; Kassens-Noor, 2016). 
Investments and financing for urban mobility projects came exclusively from 
governmental sources (Chade, 2015). According to Halpern (2014), transformations in 
urban mobility can affect cities, bringing profound and lasting beneficial effects. With 
this intention, urban construction projects, which affected the daily lives of thousands of 
people in the host cities, were carried out in twelve Brazilian cities (Grix, 2013; Bailey 
et al., 2017; Meijers and Burger, 2017). 
Preparing the structural conditions necessary for a mega-event can be a long process, 
as was the case in Brazil. Infrastructure works were conducted into several areas 
considered essential for the games and would, allegedly, be catalysts of the economic 
development of the country (Müller, 2015a, 2016). 
However, a large number of projects planned at high costs remind problems of other 
sports mega-events. According to Müller (2015a) a ‘mega-event syndrome’ can be 
identified, whose most evident symptoms are the overpromising of benefits and legacies 
and the underestimation of project costs. To Zimbalist (2015) the exorbitant expenditures 
imposed, especially for countries with deficient infrastructure and public services, such as 
Brazil, and the false promises of great economic benefits no longer seduce local 
populations. 
The lack of a positive legacy can harm the image of the country and hamper the 
benefits of the tournament (Billing and Holladay, 2012; Baade and Matheson, 2016). The 
2014 FIFA World Cup was characterised by the media as highly problematic in terms of 
organisation, and FIFA feared that stadiums and other infrastructure projects would not 
be completed in time for the mega-event occurs (Moore, 2016). 
Having as object of study the preparation of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil and 
considering the differences between the costs, projects, and investments proposed and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil 137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
those effectively delivered, this study evaluates the legacy of urban mobility left by this 
sport mega-event. The urban mobility legacy studied here was listed by the Brazilian 
government as being essential for the success of the mega-event, having required the 
largest volume of investments, financed by Brazilian government entities, State banks, 
and other official development agencies. 
2 Methods 
In this documentary study, statistical data were gathered from the Ministry of Sports, the 
Brazilian Federal government, State governments, Federal District government, and 
municipal governments where the 2014 FIFA World Cup games were held. Information 
on planned, contracted, and executed expenditures were collected from the Transparency 
Portal of the 2014 FIFA World Cup (Brazilian Federal Government, n.d.). On the 
website, data is divided by categories of investments and projects for the mega-event, 
listed by host cities or nationwide. Projects and actions were summarised in the Matrix of 
Responsibilities, a commitment of cooperation between the Federal Government, State 
governors, the Federal District, and mayors of the host cities. The document was signed 
on January 13, 2010 defining the financial responsibilities of each governmental entity in 
the preparation of the 2014 FIFA World Cup (Ministry of Sports, 2014). Data on 
investments were collected for the period between January 13, 2010, and June 12, 2014, 
when the official opening of the tournament took place (Bondarik et al., 2020). 
The expenditures predicted in the Matrix of Responsibilities were converted from the 
Brazilian currency, the Brazilian Real (BRL) to the American Dollar (USD), according 
to exchange rates on the dates delimiting the studied period: January 13, 2010, 
1 BRL = 0.5733287 USD/1 USD = 1.74420001 BRL and June 12, 2014, 
1 BRL = 0.4483099 USD/1 USD = 2.2305999 BRL. The currency conversions were 
made using the currency table published by the Central Bank of Brazil (n.d.). 
Data related to the number of foreign and native travellers and tourists were provided 
by the Brazilian Ministry of Tourism (2016). Data on the numbers of spectators at the 
matches and the event’s revenue were provided by FIFA through a financial report 
(FIFA, 2014) and their annual congress report (FIFA, 2015). 
This study hypothesised that the budget planning underestimated public/governmental 
expenditures in actions and projects required by the mega-event, producing only part of 
the expected benefits, that is, the legacy of the event was overestimated. Budget planning 
was the independent variable and financial execution of the budget was the dependent 
variable. Data analysis was conducted using descriptive statistics. 
3 Results 
The expenditures predicted for the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil are shown in Table 1. 
Twelve sets of actions and projects (categories) are listed, based on the Matrix of 
Responsibilities, in areas considered strategic for the realisation of the mega-event, 
concerning investments of approximately USD 15.7 billion. 
Table 2 presents the investments that were contracted and approved for financing 
listed by the Brazilian Government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 138 R. Bondarik et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Planned expenditures for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and sources of financing 
 
D
ir
ec
t f
in
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ci
ng
 (U
SD
) 
C
at
eg
or
y 
No
. p
ro
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ct
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d 
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tio
ns
 
Fe
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l 
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at
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Fe
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th
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l p
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irp
or
ts 
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9.
21
 
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2,
07
4,
18
8,
57
0.
86
 
3,
60
0,
82
5,
30
0.
07
 
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 C
en
tre
s 
20
 
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00
 
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00
 
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00
 
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00
 
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00
 
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Co
m
m
un
ic
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n 
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78
3,
96
9.
42
 
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00
 
0.
00
 
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3,
78
3,
96
9.
42
 
To
ur
ism
 
88
 
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00
 
88
,6
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,8
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.5
0 
1,
93
2,
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91
 
7,
40
8,
21
6.
34
 
74
3,
27
5.
94
 
0.
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98
,7
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,9
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.1
3 
St
ad
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m
s 
12
 
2,
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7,
71
0,
60
6.
10
 
0.
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1,
07
6,
97
5,
51
7.
13
 
0.
00
 
80
4,
55
2,
16
4.
71
 
73
7,
32
3,
64
1.
35
 
4,
80
6,
56
1,
92
9.
29
 
Co
m
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 In
sta
lla
tio
ns
 
(2
01
4 
FI
FA
 W
or
ld
 C
up
) 
12
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
25
3,
29
6,
61
9.
66
 
0.
00
 
16
,2
82
,5
35
.0
8 
61
,8
62
,1
66
.7
3 
33
1,
44
1,
32
1.
47
 
Co
m
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 In
sta
lla
tio
ns
 
(2
01
3 
Co
nf
ed
er
at
io
ns
 C
up
) 
06
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
99
,2
43
,1
97
.9
7 
0.
00
 
15
,4
79
,8
74
.9
0 
0.
00
 
11
4,
72
3,
07
2.
87
 
U
rb
an
 M
ob
ili
ty
 
44
 
2,
51
2,
72
7,
69
3.
49
 
14
,2
18
,5
51
.7
6 
1,
51
8,
73
1,
83
1.
91
 
95
5,
93
3,
98
7.
03
 
2,
23
5,
98
1.
93
 
0.
00
 
5,
00
3,
84
8,
04
6.
12
 
O
th
er
s 
09
 
0.
00
 
29
,5
19
,8
33
.0
5 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
29
,5
19
,8
33
.0
5 
Po
rts
 
06
 
0.
00
 
33
9,
06
6,
59
3.
18
 
3,
61
1,
97
0.
81
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
34
2,
67
8,
56
3.
99
 
Pu
bl
ic
 S
ec
ur
ity
 
42
 
0.
00
 
1,
03
0,
70
2,
61
3.
55
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
1,
03
0,
70
2,
61
3.
55
 
Te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
73
 
0.
00
 
31
5,
51
0,
29
5.
94
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
31
5,
51
0,
29
5.
94
 
TO
TA
L 
34
3 
4,
70
0,
43
8,
29
9.
59
 
3,
34
8,
08
6,
42
6.
04
 
2,
95
3,79
1,
78
8.
39
 
96
3,
34
2,
20
2.
80
 
83
9,
29
3,
83
2.
56
 
2,
87
3,
37
4,
37
8.
94
 
15
,6
78
,3
26
,9
28
.3
2 
N
ot
e:
 O
rig
in
al
 v
al
ue
s i
n 
Br
az
ili
an
 R
ea
l (
BR
L)
 w
er
e 
co
nv
er
te
d 
to
 A
m
er
ic
an
 D
ol
la
rs
 (U
SD
) 
So
ur
ce
: 
A
da
pt
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 P
or
ta
l o
f t
he
 2
01
4 
FI
FA
 W
or
ld
 C
up
 (B
ra
zi
lia
n 
Fe
de
ra
l G
ov
er
nm
en
t, 
n.
d.
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil 139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Sources of financing by institution 
 
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s (
U
SD
) 
In
sti
tu
tio
n 
Co
nt
ra
ct
ed
 
Ap
pr
ov
ed
 
Ca
ix
a 
Ec
on
ôm
ic
a 
Fe
de
ra
l 
1,
58
5,
26
8,
63
7.
39
 
1,
23
2,
46
4,
64
9.
88
 
Br
az
ili
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t B
an
k 
(B
N
D
ES
) 
2,
55
3,
40
8,
62
0.
32
 
2,
37
9,
39
2,
17
3.
88
 
Ba
nc
o 
do
 N
or
de
ste
 
45
4,
66
4,
16
7.
86
 
33
0,
77
8,
24
8.
20
 
Ba
nc
o 
do
 B
ra
sil
 S
.A
. 
41
,1
10
,0
17
.8
3 
41
,1
10
,0
17
.8
3 
Ba
nc
o 
do
 E
sta
do
 d
o 
Es
ta
do
 d
o 
Ri
o 
G
ra
nd
e 
do
 S
ul
 S
.A
. (
BA
N
RI
SU
L)
 
41
,1
10
,0
17
.8
3 
41
,1
10
,0
17
.8
3 
To
ta
l 
4,
67
5,
56
1,
46
1.
23
 
4,
02
4,
85
5,
10
7.
62
 
So
ur
ce
: 
A
da
pt
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 P
or
ta
l o
f t
he
 2
01
4 
FI
FA
 W
or
ld
 C
up
 (B
ra
zi
lia
n 
Fe
de
ra
l G
ov
er
nm
en
t, 
n.
d.
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 140 R. Bondarik et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Planned, contracted, and executed expenditures and executed percentages in 
concerning to planned values 
 
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s (
U
SD
) 
Ca
te
go
ry
 
No
. o
f 
pr
oj
ec
ts 
an
d 
ac
tio
ns
 
Pl
an
ne
d 
C
on
tr
ac
te
d 
Ex
ec
ut
ed
 
Ex
ec
ut
ed
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s (
%
) 
A
irp
or
ts 
30
 
3,
60
0,
82
5,
30
0.
07
 
4,
33
9,
46
4,
96
1.
11
 
3,
38
5,
45
6,
44
3.
87
 
94
.0
0%
 
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 C
en
tre
s 
20
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
00
.0
0%
 
Co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
01
 
3,
78
3,
96
9.
42
 
2,
95
8,
84
5.
34
 
1,
59
8,
41
3.
93
 
42
.2
4%
 
To
ur
ism
 
88
 
98
,7
31
,9
83
.1
3 
6,
56
8,
54
0.
07
 
4,
35
5,
78
7.
92
 
04
.4
1%
 
St
ad
iu
m
s 
12
 
4,
80
6,
56
1,
92
9.
29
 
3,
79
1,
73
6,
35
9.
61
 
2,
93
3,
22
6,
20
6.
37
 
61
.0
2%
 
Co
m
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 In
sta
lla
tio
ns
 (2
01
4 
FI
FA
 W
or
ld
 C
up
) 
12
 
33
1,
44
1,
32
1.
47
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
00
.0
0%
 
Co
m
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 In
sta
lla
tio
ns
 (2
01
3 
Co
nf
ed
er
at
io
ns
 C
up
) 
06
 
11
4,
72
3,
07
2.
87
 
8,
75
0,
84
1.
26
 
12
,0
55
,2
02
.2
7 
10
.5
0%
 
U
rb
an
 m
ob
ili
ty
 
44
 
5,
00
3,
84
8,
04
6.
12
 
3,
05
8,
74
2,
15
1.
50
 
1,
71
5,
02
1,
52
6.
56
 
34
.2
7%
 
O
th
er
s 
09
 
29
,5
19
,8
33
.0
5 
24
,6
38
,5
26
.8
1 
2,
15
2,
71
5.
47
 
07
.2
9%
 
Po
rts
 
06
 
34
2,
67
8,
56
3.
99
 
22
5,
61
5,
02
8.
45
 
21
2,
98
3,
45
1.
87
 
62
.1
5%
 
Pu
bl
ic
 S
ec
ur
ity
 
42
 
1,
03
0,
70
2,
61
3.
55
 
89
9,
74
0,
06
9.
89
 
64
5,
21
6,
29
0.
15
 
62
.5
9%
 
Te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 
73
 
31
5,
51
0,
29
5.
94
 
11
5,
84
9,
30
8.
63
 
89
,5
04
,5
27
.4
3 
28
.3
6%
 
TO
TA
L 
34
3 
15
,6
78
,3
26
,9
28
.3
2 
12
,4
74
,0
64
,6
32
.6
7 
9,
00
1,
57
0,
56
5.
84
 
57
.4
1%
 
So
ur
ce
: 
A
da
pt
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 P
or
ta
l o
f t
he
 2
01
4 
FI
FA
 W
or
ld
 C
up
 (B
ra
zi
lia
n 
Fe
de
ra
l G
ov
er
nm
en
t, 
n.
d.
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil 141 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the comparison between planned expenditures and those contracted and 
executed. Executed expenditures are inferred to represent projects that were partially or 
totally completed. 
Table 4 presents the values to be invested in urban mobility projects, totalling a little 
over USD 5 billion. Contracted (USD 3 billion) and executed (USD 1.7 billion) values 
are also presented. Executed expenditures are inferred to represent projects completed or 
not. 
Table 4 Projects and actions in the urban mobility category with planned, contracted, and 
executed expenditures and executed percentages in concerning to planned values 
Host City 
No. of 
projects 
and actions 
Expenditures (USD) Executed 
expenditures 
(%) Planned Contracted Executed 
Belo 
Horizonte 
07 810,320,131.11 504,677,803.17 313,201,737.88 38.65% 
Brasília 01 31,103,081.98 24,308,882.89 16,612,404.57 53.41% 
Cuiabá 03 978,385,426.55 714,051,335.31 399,915,118.79 40.87% 
Curitiba 10 302,135,354.83 154,326,212.74 95,745,227.82 31.68% 
Fortaleza 06 373,764,318.74 284,075,615.57 62,713,619.34 16.77% 
Manaus 00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00% 
Natal 02 254,585,460.81 145,450,334.64 111,164,040.26 43.66% 
Porto 
Alegre 
02 9,574,589.29 14,932,567.63 5,976,145.25 62.41% 
Recife 07 588,886,816.60 453,573,664.61 229,883,063.69 39.03% 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
03 1,293,834,438.77 763,345,734.93 479,810,168.95 37.08% 
Salvador 02 11,237,242.52 0.00 0.00 0.00% 
São Paulo 01 350,021,184.65 0.00 0.00 0.00% 
Total 44 5,003,848,045.86 3,058,742,151.50 1,715,021,526.56 34.27% 
Source: Adapted from the Transparency Portal of the 2014 FIFA World Cup 
(Brazilian Federal Government, n.d.) 
Table 5 shows the volume of visitor arrivals in Brazil per month in the years 2013 and 
2014. The months of June and July are highlighted in the table as they represent the 
period in which the 2014 FIFA World Cup took place. 
Table 6 shows the number of travellers and tourists who moved between the host 
cities during the sports mega-event. According to the United Nations World Tourism 
Organisation, tourists are those who travel from their place of residence for leisure 
purposes for more than one day and less than a year, whereas travellers are those who 
travel to other places for leisure purposes for less than one day, that is, without an 
overnight stay (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 142 R. Bondarik et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Tourist arrivals in Brazil in numbers of people per month in 2013 and 2014 
Month 
Year 
2013 2014 
January 758.573 580.616 
February 548.577 535.096 
March 650.651 329.779 
April 407.970 389.943 
May 348.137 349.819 
June 350.025 1,018.876 
July 534.130 717.769 
August 407.349 401.094 
September 286.228 373.555 
October 455.918 414.408 
November 479.527 467.114 
December 586.257 851.783 
Total 4,066.216 4,540.509 
Source: Adapted from the 2015 Statistical Yearbook of Tourism 
(Brazilian Ministry of Tourism, 2016) 
Table 6 Brazilian tourists and travellers during the 2014 FIFA World Cup 
State of origin/departure Number of travellers 
São Paulo 858.825 
Rio de Janeiro 260.527 
Bahia 220.021 
Minas Gerais 204.425 
Other states 1,512.599 
TOTAL 3,056.397 
Source: Adapted from Thomé (2014, July) 
Table 7 shows the attendance to the 2014 FIFA World Cup matches, showing the host 
cities, stadiums and their capacity of spectators, the number of football matches, and the 
average attendances. 
Table 8 shows FIFA’s revenue from 2011–2014 from sales of TV broadcasting rights 
and licensing of products and brands. Total amounts include the revenue from the 2014 
FIFA World Cup in Brazil. The 2014 FIFA Financial Report, from which data was 
gathered, was presented during the 65th FIFA Congress, held in Zurich, Switzerland, at 
May 28 and 29, 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil 143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Host cities,stadium capacity, number of matches, and total and average attendance 
No. City Stadium Capacity No. of matches 
Total 
attendance 
Average 
attendance 
1 Rio de Janeiro Maracanã 74.689 7 519.189 74.170 
2 Brasília Nacional 69.432 7 478.218 68.317 
3 São Paulo São Paulo 62.601 6 375.593 62.599 
4 Fortaleza Castelão 60.348 6 356.896 59.827 
5 Belo Horizonte Mineirão 58.259 6 345.350 57.350 
6 Salvador Fonte Nova 51.708 6 300.674 50.112 
7 Porto Alegre Beira Rio 42.991 5 214.969 42.994 
8 Recife Pernambuco 42.583 5 204.882 40.976 
9 Cuiabá Pantanal 39.859 4 158.717 39.679 
10 Manaus Amazônia 39.118 4 160.167 39.542 
11 Natal das Dunas 38.958 4 158.167 39.542 
12 Curitiba Baixada 38.533 4 156.991 39.248 
 TOTAL 619.079 64 3,429.873 53.592 
Source: Adapted from Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(2014) 
Table 8 FIFA’s revenues from 2011–2014 and revenues from the 2014 World Cup 
Category Revenue (USD) 
TV broadcasting rights – total 2.484 million 
TV broadcasting rights – 2014 FIFA World Cup 2.428 million 
Marketing rights – total 1.629 million 
Marketing rights – 2014 FIFA World Cup 1.580 million 
Hospitality rights 185 million 
Licensing rights 115 million 
TOTAL 5.271 billion 
Source: Adapted from Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(2015) 
4 Discussion 
The projects and actions required to provide the infrastructure conditions for the 2014 
FIFA World Cup were conducted mainly by the Brazilian Federal Government, and 
State, Federal District, and host-cities Governments (Table 1). Governments participated 
through direct investments and transfers predicted in their budget planning, totalling USD 
15.7 billion (Table 1). The Federal Government participated with about USD 8 billion, 
almost 51% of the total planned expenditure. Investments of about USD 4.6 billion were 
also made by state-owned banks and economic development agencies; the Federal 
Government’s Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) was responsible for USD 2.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 144 R. Bondarik et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
billion or 55% of the amount (Table 2). The values predicted in 2010 suffered subsequent 
modifications, with the addition or exclusion of projects and values (Table 3). 
The values effectively invested in projects for the 2014 FIFA World Cup represented 
a percentage far below that which had been planned, in all categories. Of the total values, 
obtained by the sum of planned investments in all categories, a little more than 
USD 9 billion (57% of the planned values) was spent and considered executed, leaving 
out a total of USD 6.7 billion (43%), which was cancelled or suspended. These 
unallocated resources (Table 3) do not provide the basis for qualitatively evaluating or 
enlisting the reasons that led to the partial execution of projects predicted in the Matrix of 
Responsibilities in 2010. 
Even with just about half of the projects and actions deemed necessary for the 
tournament execution, the success of the event was not impaired and neither its sports 
results. 
A transfer of priorities occurred for the execution of projects, given the high costs and 
the impossibility to fully comply what had been planned in 2010 (Table 1), only projects 
directly related to the games and the displacement of people between host cities were 
carried out, such as works on stadiums and airports (Moore, 2016). 
Visitors, tourists, and spectators of the 2014 FIFA World Cup were able to travel 
between host cities without problems. Data on the number of foreign tourists (Table 5) 
show that more than 600 thousand people travelled to Brazil. The number of Brazilians 
who travelled within the country to watch the tournament exceeded three million 
(Table 6). Investments in airports favoured the displacement of such large numbers of 
people; projects and actions in this category were almost completely executed, USD 3.38 
billion of the USD 3.6 billion initially planned, totalling 94% (Table 3). 
FIFA reported that 3.5 million spectators were present in the 64 games of the 2014 
FIFA World Cup (Table 7). The number of spectators at each match was not reported, but 
in its 2011–2014 financial report (FIFA, 2015), FIFA cited revenues of almost 
USD 5.3 billion from the mega-event (Table 8). The income came from sales of the 
Confederations Cup and 2014 FIFA World Cup TV broadcasting rights, marketing rights, 
hospitality rights, and licensing rights. The revenue exclusively originated from the 2014 
FIFA World Cup amounts to approximately USD 4 billion (Table 8). 
However, the success of the tournament and FIFA’s financial gains (Moore, 2016) 
did not reflect the results of project execution (Table 1). Comparing the values that had 
been predicted in the Matrix of Responsibilities to those that were contracted and 
executed (Tables 1 and 3) within the category of urban mobility, expected to be the 
greatest legacy of the 2014 FIFA World Cup, it can be seen that urban mobility received 
the highest amounts of investments, more than USD 5 billion, surpassing that which 
would be destined to the construction and adaptation of stadiums and sports arenas, 
estimated at USD 4.8 billion (Table 1). 
The category of urban mobility was identified as having the greatest capacity to 
generate a perceptible impact on host cities, a concrete legacy of transformations in urban 
planning and notable improvements in the life quality of the population (Shin, 2014; 
Bailey et al., 2017). 
Among the host cities of the 2014 FIFA World Cup (Table 4), only Brasília and Porto 
Alegre had project execution rates higher than 50%, with 53.41% and 62.41%, 
respectively. Contrary to what happened in other locations, in Porto Alegre, contracted 
values were higher than planned, but this did not lead to the complete execution of the 
projects. In Cuiabá, Mato Grosso, 40.87% of the projects were executed. In Curitiba, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil 145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
capital of Paraná State, 31.68%. Fortaleza – Ceará, reached the lowest execution rate of 
all cities, 16.77%. Natal – Rio Grande do Norte, fulfilled 43.66% of the contracts, and 
Recife, capital of Pernambuco State, executed 39.03%. Rio de Janeiro, where seven 
matches and also the final match of the tournament were held (Table 7), executed 37.08% 
of the planned urban mobility actions and projects. The cities of Salvador and São Paulo 
did not have any contracted projects, so none was executed in these capitals. 
In June 2014, 34.27% of the planned projects of the urban mobility category had been 
executed (Table 4); this did not mean that the construction works were in operation or in 
conditions of use. The two most emblematic examples of suspension of executed projects 
and problematic developments occurred in Cuiabá and Belo Horizonte. In Cuiabá, the 
construction of a light rail transit (LRT) line with 22 kilometres of extension, connecting 
the city to its neighbour Várzea Grande, was interrupted, and the contracts were 
investigated by the State Legislative Assembly (Leite, 2016). In Belo Horizonte, during 
the FIFA World Cup, a bridge, which was part of a series of works aimed at improving 
local urban mobility, collapsed over vehicles. Two people died on-site and 21 were 
injured. Errors in the planning of the project or during its execution seemed to be the 
cause of the collapse (Portela, 2014). 
As many of the projects on urban mobility were not completed or contracted due to 
the lack of money or irregularities, the magnitude to which the planned expenditures were 
underestimated is not clear (Tables 1 and 4). No qualitative information on the status of 
each project was made public in the Transparency Portal of the 2014 FIFA World Cup; 
the only data available are the costs of the projects and if they were partially or totally 
paid for. The initial promises of works, shown by theplanned expenditures in Tables 1 
and 4, clearly demonstrate that the benefits and legacy of the FIFA World Cup in Brazil 
were overestimated. 
5 Conclusions 
Despite achieving great success as a spectacle, the legacy of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in 
Brazil was not delivered as promised in 2010. Despite the budget planning foreseeing the 
application of governmental resources, for unknown reasons, only part of the funding was 
provided. Many construction works were not completed, and about 34% of the predicted 
actions were effectively paid. 
Disclosure statement 
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). 
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