co managent framework

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Co-Management of Natural Resources: A Proposed
Framework
RYAN PLUMMER*
Department of Recreation and Leisure Studies
Brock University
500 Glenridge Avenue
St. Catharines, ON Canada, L2S 3A1
JOHN FITZGIBBON
Faculty of Environmental Design and Rural Planning
University of Guelph
Guelph, ON Canada, NIG 2W1
ABSTRACT / Co-management acknowledges pragmatic de-
velopments and progression of institutional choice theories in
natural resource management. This innovative concept em-
braces a pluralistic management approach based on the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity and creates opportunities for the reconcili-
ation of competitive property claims. This article reviews
definitions of co-management, distinguishes it from other
property rights regimes, and develops an organizational struc-
ture of the major elements involved. Synthesis of both experi-
ences and literature leads to the development of a conceptual
framework. Co-management is structured in terms of context,
components, and linking mechanisms. In concert, these ele-
ments offer insight into the practice of co-management, ad-
dress the shortcomings of institutional theories, and respond
to critical issues raised in related literature. The framework
contributes to natural resource management by acting as a
means of identification and evaluation for such arrangements,
as well as a systematic guide for future inquiries.
The emerging interest in the co-management of
natural resources is a blending of both practice and
theory. The 1990s ushered in significant changes as
natural resource managers faced pressures from a
broad array of issues. Government agencies, charged
with the task of managing resources, experienced re-
ductions in funding. Provincial cutbacks to environ-
mental agencies became common in Canada. Various
environmental departments in Ontario, Alberta, New-
foundland, and New Brunswick realized budget reduc-
tions of 30–60% (McKay 1997). In many countries,
government agencies, often under the guise of restruc-
turing, sought to devolve responsibilities pertaining to
resource management (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997,
Pinkerton 1999, Zimmerer 2000).
These worldwide phenomena became especially pro-
nounced in developing nations, where a minimum of
60 countries decentralized various parts of natural re-
source management (Ribot 2002). Although Edmunds
and Wollenberg (2001) and Ribot (2002) question the
motivation and nature of this devolution, the participa-
tion of people in the management process is increas-
ingly being demanded.
Devolution of responsibilities is not unique to re-
source management. An observable shift within gover-
nance models exists at an international level. Gover-
nance presently involves “the decision-making
structures, mechanisms and systems of administration
which influence the operation of management systems”
(Short and Winter 1999, p. 614). Emphasis previously
placed on a government regulatory control model is
shifting. This change is a consequence of privatization,
deregulation, and the devolution of responsibilities un-
der downsizing and contracting out (Glasbergen 1998,
Hall 1999). Concomitant with this direction is an em-
phasis on strengthening local involvement (Box 1998,
Delacourt and Lenihan 1999, Paquet 1999, Ribot
2002). This new direction has resulted in a movement
away from greater centralized control and towards the
practice of co-management (Kooiman 1993, Box 1998,
Delacourt and Lenihan 1999). Co-management is un-
derstood to involve “the sharing of power and respon-
sibility between government and local resource users”
(Berkes and others 1991, p. 12).
Intensifying the number of people involved in the
practice of resource management is not necessarily neg-
ative. Berkes and Folke argue “improving the perfor-
mance of natural resource systems requires an empha-
sis on institutions and property rights” (1998, p. 2).
Stressing these two elements presents significant chal-
lenges to both resource managers and theorists. A gen-
eral preponderance with ecological considerations con-
veys “ ... tools and approaches for such people
KEY WORDS: Co-management; Institutions; Institutional choice theory;
Common property; Environmental governance
Published online June 29, 2004.
*Author to whom correspondence should be addressed, email:
rplummer@brocku.ca
DOI: 10.1007/s00267-003-3038-y
Environmental Management Vol. 33, No. 6, pp. 876–885 © 2004 Springer-Verlag New York, LLC
management are poorly developed, and the impor-
tance of social science of resource management has not
generally been recognized” (Berkes and Folke 1998, p.
2).
Advancing theories concerning the commons and
institutional evolution directs attention to co-manage-
ment. Common pool resources refer to “a natural or
man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to
make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential
beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use” (Os-
trom 1990, p. 30). Property rights regimes are also
essentially related to discussions surrounding the com-
mons. Property rights regimes refer to ownership, con-
trol, users, and responsibilities pertaining to a particu-
lar resource (Burger and others 2001). Common
property resources may be generally classified as open-
access private property, state property, and communal
property (Bromley 1992).
Although common pool resources are historically
central to resource management, their applicability is
pronounced because of contemporary conditions.
Burger and others (2001) perceive the commons as
relevant and conceptually important because of ex-
panding spatial and temporal scales, increasing cogni-
zance of the resource, greater ecosystem effects, and
enhanced user differentiation. Hardin (1968) proposes
a conventional theory in which he contends that exter-
nal institutions are required because actors would de-
grade common resources out of self-interest. Decades
of empirical evidence documenting experiences of self-
regulation challenges the generalization of this en-
trenched idea (Berkes and Folke 1998, Ostrom 2001).
Political scientist Elinor Ostrom illustrates “a fully artic-
ulated, reformulated theory encompassing the conven-
tional theory as a special case does not yet exist” (Os-
trom 2001, p. 22). Ostrom (2001) understands that the
complex interactions of attributes, both of the resource
and resource user, are fundamental to theoretically
advancing commons institutions.
The social theory of institutional choice focuses on
the need for rules pertaining to resource use and allo-
cation. The conditions by which rules are followed are
defined as property rights regime (Klooster 2000). Har-
din’s (1968) contention of the rational choice perspec-
tive is reflected in government-based command and
control approaches (Symes 1997, Jentoft and others
1998).
Further argumentation, critical of rational choice
perspective, is increasing. Within social institutions, in-
dividual rationality is not a dominant strategy. All deci-
sions are embedded in and influenced by a social con-
text, and a greater breadth of rationale models is
required in social relationships (Ostrom 1998, Klooster
2000, Rudd 2000). Inherent in each of these claims is
theoretical justification toward moving away from ex-
ternal-based approaches initiating exploration of alter-
native strategies. Jentoft and others (1998) assert “ ...
stressing only the restraining elements of institutions,
one misses the extent to which institutions such as
co-management also enable and empower, provide li-
censes, and create opportunities” (p. 427).
Implementation of co-management is an innovative
response to challenges in practice and theoretical ad-
vancements. Case studies in co-management offer many
documented descriptive examples. These pertain to
specific natural resources including fisheries (Pinker-
ton 1989, Dubbink and van Vliet 1996, Pomeroy 1996,
Symes 1997, Klooster 2000, Castro and Nielsen 2001),
forestry (Thomson and others 1992), and agriculture
(Gilles and others 1992). Experiences of indigenouspeoples are also documented (Berkes 1989, Pinkerton
1989, Feeny 1992, Berkes and others 1991, Agrawal
1995, Notzke 1995, Silvern 1999).
The aforementioned descriptive accounts illustrate
critical issues requiring attention. The imprecise and
often indiscriminant use of terminology is immediately
apparent. Castro and Nielsen (2001) note a recent
trend towards the inclusive use of the term co-manage-
ment that renders it synonymous with collaboration,
partnership, and community-based management.
Co-management must also be distinguished from
other property rights regimes. Although bureaucracy
(state) and community regimes provide a basis for co-
management, Yandle (2003) argues the time has come
for a more integrative understanding. Most crucial is
the pervasive criticism that co-management lacks a the-
oretical basis (Mitchell 1989, Ostrom 1990, Ostrom
1992, Berkes 1997, Symes 1997, Jentoft and others
1998, Klooster 2000). A clear need exists to move be-
yond descriptive analysis to conceptual frameworks and
theoretical development (Taylor 1992, Carlsson 1997,
Berkes 1997).
Purpose
This paper responds to the increasing importance of
co-management in practice, the shortcomings of con-
ventional commons and institutional choice theories,
and critical issues in co-management literature. Defini-
tions of co-management are initially explored, and the
approach is distinguished from other property rights
regimes. Components of co-management are gleaned
from existing literature. Synthesis establishes common-
alties across the range of co-management experiences,
leading to the development of a conceptual framework.
In contrast to theoretical frameworks that claim predic-
A Proposed Framework of Co-Management 877
tive capabilities, “ ... conceptual frameworks are orga-
nizational devices, used to structure a problem and to
identify its various parts” (Mitchell 1989, p. 28). Devel-
opment of such a framework assists the identification of
co-management in practice, fosters systematic examina-
tion of co-management (context, components, linking
mechanisms), and has heuristic value in organizing
future research.
Definitions of Co-Management
Central to definitions of co-management are the
distribution of rights and responsibilities pertaining to
a particular resource. The literature consistently calls
for these to be shared between the government and
local users. The sharing of both power and responsibil-
ity is central to the classical definition of co-manage-
ment by Berkes and others (1991) as presented in the
opening of this paper.
Although arguments for refinement and discern-
ment of terminology are proposed (Hersoug and oth-
ers 2000, Castro and Nielsen 2001), a strong rationale
exists to define co- management broadly. Berkes (1994)
asserts “it would be pointless to try to define the term
co-management more precisely because of the variety
of arrangements possible” (p. 18). Various typologies or
classification schemes identify the nature of the ar-
rangement based on integration between government
and resource users (Berkes and others 1991, Berkes
1994, Sen and Nielsen 1996).
Co-management is also distinguished as a type of
management system or rights regime. Berkes (1994)
views co-management as a bridge between government-
based systems (centralized authorities relying on scien-
tific information and regulatory mechanisms) and lo-
cal-level systems (decentralized entities relying on
traditional knowledge and self-regulation). Yandle
(2003), in her recent review of co-management, con-
firms this as an established common conceptualization.
She argues, however, for a more integrative under-
standing and conceptualizes co-management at the
nexus of bureaucracy-based, community-based, and
market-based systems. This more integrative under-
standing broadens co-management systems to include
all potential users of the resource. It also recognizes the
spectrum of community types (indigenous, traditional-
ethnic, residential-permanent, residential-semimigra-
tory, and in transit-migratory) identified by Faust and
Smardon (2001).
Central to both the definition and the rights regime
is a claim to property of natural resources that are
nonexclusive or held in common. These resources are
characterized as “a class of resources for which exclu-
sion is difficult and joint use involves subtractability”
(Berkes and Farvar 1989, p. 7). Government-based sys-
tems manage such resources on behalf of all citizens in
order to avoid the “tragedy of the commons.” Commu-
nity-based or local systems observe these resources as
communal, to be used in accordance with established
customs and traditions (Berkes 1994). Failure to recog-
nize communal claims frequently results in competing
claims for property by government-based and commu-
nity-based (indigenous) systems (Berkes 1994). Berkes
and Folke (1998) contend that recognition of jurisdic-
tions and roles are important aspects of institutions.
Aboriginal land claim settlements in Canada and
elsewhere, which formally contest property claims by
government, pursue co-management as a challenging
but tenable solution (Berkes and others 1991, Notzke
1995, Silvern 1999, Natcher 2001). Attention is drawn
toward the involvement of indigenous or local persons
to address fundamental issues of human rights and
conflicts (Zimmerer 2000, Castro and Nielsen 2001,
Faust and Smardon 2001). Yandle views these claims as
essential, asserting “ ... the foundation of a strong bun-
dle of property rights is necessary for the development
of a co-management regime” (Yandle 2003, p. 181).
A definition of co-management is required that re-
flects the centrality of property rights and the breadth
of encompassed regimes. Co-management should be
understood as a type of property rights regime. Yandle’s
(2003) definition is instructive in this context and,
therefore, is adopted in this paper. She proposes that
“co-management can be thought of as a spectrum of
institutional arrangements in which management re-
sponsibilities are shared between the users (who may or
may not be community-based) and government ... ”
(Yandle 2003, p. 180).
Conceptualizing a Framework for
Co-Management
The preceding section explored definitions of co-
management and established claims to nonexclusive or
common property as its fundamental basis. Experiences
with alternative strategies for managing nonexclusive
or common property resources are described by many
names including collaboration, cooperation, and part-
nership. An inclusive approach is taken in this article to
derive a conceptual framework that is reflective of ex-
periences with co-management.
Ostrom (2001) observes that empirical generaliza-
tions are not possible in situations with such variance;
however, it is possible to derive elements (principles)
that portray these arrangements. In this manner, a
framework of co-management is conceptualized from
878 R. Plummer and J. FitzGibbon
synthesis of co-management literature. Figure 1 illus-
trates the proposed structure that brings together and
organizes co-management into context, components,
and linking mechanisms.
The context of co-management is given definition
through resource characteristics, claims of property
rights, and potential regimes. Co-management is al-
most solely associated with common pool resources.
Because of the seeming vastness of these resources, it is
difficult to stop users from deriving benefits from them
(Ostrom 1990). The nonexclusive or common nature
of these resources manifests in multiple claims to prop-
erty rights. These claims serve as a basis in challenging
the dominant property rights regimes, and also become
the impetus into the spectrum of potential institutional
arrangements at the nexus of bureaucracy, community,
and market-based approaches (Yandle 2003).
Within this context, three such components that are
consistently associated with co-management are pre-
conditions, characteristics, and outcomes. Precondi-
tions or antecedents provide the impetus to the co-management process. Characteristics are reliable
attributes repeatedly observed in co-management. Out-
comes are consequences that may be realized, though
evidence suggests mixed success as a result of co-man-
agement arrangements.
Component 1: Antecedents/Preconditions
The first component of co-management is the ante-
cedent or precondition. Berkes (1997) identifies this
component as fundamental. He states “very little schol-
arly work addresses, in my opinion, the key question:
When is co-management feasible?” (Berkes 1997, p. 6).
Although plausibility of co-management has not been
directly studied, efforts documenting conditions (re-
ferred to as preconditions, antecedents, and condi-
tions) that lead to “success” are evident in the literature
(Pinkerton 1989, Selin and Chavez 1995, Mitchell 1997,
Pomeroy and Berkes 1997, Ingles and others 1999).
Preconditions gleaned from these studies are presented
and described in Table 1.
The impetus for co-management (preconditions, ante-
cedents, and/or conditions) appears to originate from
either the external environment or the human dimen-
sion. Origin (Table 1) refers to the source of the precon-
ditions, antecedents, and/or conditions. External envi-
ronments appear to only be conditions to “successful”
co-management if they elicit or prompt a response from
people. The clear cutting of a forest along a river is an
example of an external event. People must internalize
meaning from the event (e.g., view it as a crisis) to elicit
actions, such as joining with others to call for change.
Figure 1. Conceptual framework of co-management.
A Proposed Framework of Co-Management 879
Antecedents identified as the human dimension ap-
pear to be direct precursors to co-management. Exam-
ples include the willingness of the local users to con-
tribute, opportunities for negotiation and external
support, common shared vision/presence of existing
networks, and leadership. Underlying each of these is
the notion of relationships among people. Pinkerton
(1989) documents the fundamental nature of social
relationships. She states “ ... it is important to remem-
ber that the successful operation of co-management
ultimately rests on the relationships among human ac-
tors which are supposedly nurtured by the formal insti-
tutions and informal arrangements which make these
relationships possible” (Pinkerton 1989, p. 29).
Component 2: Characteristics
Particular characteristics distinguish co-manage-
ment from other forms of natural resource manage-
ment. These characteristics are observed consistently
through the literature on collaboration and co-manage-
ment. More important is the effort by some researchers
to glean common characteristics across multiple cases
(Gray 1989, Pinkerton 1989, Sen and Nielsen 1996,
Meadowcroft 1998, Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Ta-
ble 2 summarizes characteristics frequently associated
with co-management.
It is important to observe from the co-management
literature that these common characteristics are not
Table 1. Preconditions of co-management
Antecedent or precondition Origin References
Real or imagined crisis External Pinkerton 1989, Selin and Chavez 1995, Mitchell
1997, Ingles and others 1999
Willingness for local users to contribute Human dimension Pinkerton 1989, Mitchell 1997
Opportunity for negotiation or simple
function
Human dimension Pinkerton 1989, Mitchell 1997, Pomeroy and
Berkes 1997
Legally mandated by government/broker
by third party/incentive
External Selin and Chavez 1995, Pomeroy and Berkes 1997
Leadership or energy center Human dimension Gray 1989, Selin and Chavez 1995, Wondolleck
and Yaffee 2000
Common vision/existing networks Human dimension Selin and Chavez 1995, Wondolleck and Yaffee
2000
Table 2. Characteristics of co-management
Characteristics Definition/description Key references
Pluralism Inclusion of diverse interests and/or
input (participants) into the process.
Mitchell 1986, Lang 1986, Pinkerton 1989,
Sen and Nielsen 1996, Glasbergen 1998,
Meadowcroft 1998, Stankey and others
1999, Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000
Communication and
negotiation
Exchange of information between two or
more parties through dialogue that
leads to consensus or shared
understanding.
Gray 1989, Daniels and Walker 1996,
Mitchell 1997, Meadowcroft 1998,
Driessen 1998, Stankey and others 1999,
Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000
Transactive decision-making Decisions are made through dialogue
involving pluralistic inputs and
multiple knowledge systems.
Gray 1989, Pinkerton 1989, Sen and
Nielsen 1996, Meadowcroft 1998,
Enevoldsen 1998, Stankey and others
1999, Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000,
Castro and Nielsen 2001
Social learning Mutual gaining of knowledge by actors
through sharing values, developing
strategies, implementing actions, and
reflecting upon feedback.
Gray 1989, Pinkerton 1989, Selin and
Chavez 1995, Mitchell 1997, Driessen
1998, Stankey and others 1999,
Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000
Shared action/commitment The commitment and/or undertaking of
a series of events by actors.
Gray 1989, Pinkerton 1989, Sen and
Nielsen 1996, Berkes 1997, Ingles and
others 1999, Stankey and others 1999,
Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000
880 R. Plummer and J. FitzGibbon
mutually exclusive. Pluralistic actors, for example, are
an essential element to many of the characteristics as-
sociated with co-management. Characteristics may also
take a diverse number of forms. Berkes and others
(1994) describe seven different levels of communica-
tion and negotiation that may occur.
The interrelated nature of these characteristics and
the range of potential forms are foreshadowed by Yan-
dle’s (2003) definition. In concert, these characteristics
provide a guide for recognizing and classifying prac-
tices purporting to be co-management. They serve as
indicators of an underlying process through which they
operate.
Component 3: Outcomes
Co-management is often associated with specific out-
comes. The term “outcome” refers to a product, or
products, that accrue as a consequence of co-manage-
ment. As Castro and Nielsen (2001) assert, “a major
justification for co-management is the belief that in-
creased stakeholder participation will enhance the effi-
ciency and perhaps equity of the intertwined common
property and resource management and social systems”
(13, p. 231). Features frequently used to justify or pro-
mote a co-management regime include enhanced
means of decision-making, broad-based legitimization,
and increased capacity. Although empirical research
regarding consequences is nascent, work is calling into
question the usually predominately positive results as-
sociated with co-management.
Equity and Efficiency of Decision-Making
One outcome frequently associated with co-manage-
ment is enhanced decision-making. Decisions made
within a co-management framework are recognized for
efficiency and promoting equity (Sen and Nielsen
1996, Enevoldsen 1998, Castro and Nielson 2001).
Those who have a stake and are involved in formulating
the decision essentially reduce the amount of time
required for consultation, negotiation, and potential
confrontation. Pinkerton (1999) describes cases of
salmon fisheries in British Columbia, Canada where
facilitated processes have eliminated intersectoral con-
flicts and thwarted legal battles. Equity is promoted
because all those with a stake have access and influence
decision-making. Pluralistic inputs and multiple sys-
tems of knowledge contribute to successful outcomes.
Meadowcroft defines pluralism as “the potential in-
put to policy-making of a wide variety of social actors”
(Meadowcroft 1998, p. 24). Mitchell (1986) employs
similar ideas with slightly different terminology relating
to integrated resource management. Pluralism en-
hances decision-making because of the breadth of in-
terests, organizations, and individuals involved (Lang
1986, Mitchell 1986, Mitchell 1997, Meadowcroft 1998,
Stankey and others 1999). Ultimately, upon reaching a
decision, all those affected by the decision will be in
agreement (orunderstand and accept), and the need
for further consultation will be reduced.
Decision-making is also strengthened by the integra-
tion of nonscientific knowledge systems. Berkes and
others (1991) recognize the integration of these sys-
tems to be the hallmark of co-management. Different
types of knowledge systems include local knowledge,
indigenous knowledge, scientific knowledge systems,
and social science information (Savory 1988, Freeman
1989, Carley and Christie 1993, Grubb and others 1993,
Mitchell 1997, Haila 1998). Recognizing the potential
contributions from all knowledge systems enhances de-
cision-making regarding the natural resource (Free-
man 1989, Reigier and others 1989, Carley and Christie
1993, Sefa Dei 1995, Mitchell 1997).
Outcomes may also fail to promote either efficien-
cies or equity. Jentoft cautions that “participation en-
tails a more cumbersome decision-making process
which brings less flexibility and more bureaucracy; that
is fueling problems that co-management is supposed to
solve” (Jentoft 2000, p. 146). The issues of representa-
tion are particularly controversial because either too
little or too much equity may result in creating or
escalating conflicts (Castro and Nielsen 2001). Castro
and Nielsen caution that “one needs to have realistic
expectations about the contributions and viability of
indigenous knowledge, as well as the ability of diverse
resource users to solve collective-action problems” (Cas-
tro and Nielsen p. 237).
Legitimization of Actions
Legitimization involves the legal standing (legal or
nonlegal) of an organization. Needham (1993) under-
stands legitimization to involve credibility of objectives,
responsibility, and authority of an organization. It also
may involve legality and morality, subjectivity and ob-
jectivity, and premise and outcome (Jentoft 2000).
An outcome of co-management is enhanced credi-
bility of objectives and responsibility of organizations
(both legal and nonlegal standing) (Carley and
Christie 1993, Meadowcroft 1998, Jentoft and others
1998, Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, Karlsen 2001). Le-
gal and policy implications of a co-management frame-
work are addressed in fisheries management with inter-
est in quotas, compliance, and regulations (Dubbink
and van Vliet 1996, Pomeroy 1996, Symes 1997,
Klooster 2000, Castro and Nielsen 2001). Noble (2000)
captures the essence of the legal and policy implica-
A Proposed Framework of Co-Management 881
tions in stating “ideally, co-management systems con-
sider institutional arrangements in fisheries manage-
ment as a way of decentralizing resource management
decisions and improving participatory democracy and
compliance” (Noble 2000, p. 69).
Jentoft (2000) asserts that legitimacy, as an outcome
from co-management, may lead to disappointment for
three reasons. He challenges the assumption that in-
creased legitimization comes with greater compliance
by identifying myriad nonnormatively based factors that
prompt compliance of resource users. Legitimacy in-
creases with scale. Potential conflicts also exist between
internal (direct participants) and external (those out-
side the process) types of legitimacy. Zimmerer (2000)
similarly recognizes that existing power relations are
often overlooked or not addressed.
Capacity
Within co-management, another associated out-
come is greater capacity at the local level. This is the
ability of a citizen and/or communities to exercise
self-determination. Actions that are locally controlled
characterize empowerment, community development,
a bottom-up approach, and capacity building (McGuire
and others 1994, Poole 1997, Eade 1997, Chaskin
2001).
Research approaches capacity from decentralization
and/or subsidiarity, decentralizing decision-making to
the most appropriate level (Carley and Christie 1993,
Sen and Nielsen 1996, Mitchell and Shrubsole 1997,
Jenoft and others 1998, Pomeroy and others 2001,
Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Capacity refers to en-
hancing the abilities of local citizens, resource manage-
ment, and effective use of resources. Local people are
given the opportunity to be involved in all aspects of the
resource.
Jentoft and others view developing capacity as a
defining outcome and observe “in none of these new
models is the focus on Leviathan, ie more heavy-
handed control by government. Instead they share the
perception that resource users must become involved
in the management process, that they must be allowed
to participate in regulatory decision making, imple-
mentation and enforcement” (Jentoft and others 1998,
p. 423). Pinkerton (1999) illustrates the potential for
co-management to be a vehicle for applying adaptive
management principles and fostering stewardship.
Although increased capacity and empowerment are
frequently cited as desired outcomes of co-manage-
ment, documented literature exists to the contrary.
Berkes (1994) notes that few such agreements between
government and native groups in Manitoba have re-
sulted in any appreciable sharing of power. Castro and
Nielsen, concerning themselves with Canada and Asia,
observe “in practice the result may not be power shar-
ing, but rather a strengthening of the state’s control
over resource policy, management, and allocation. In-
stead of contributing to local empowerment, such ar-
rangements may further marginalize indigenous com-
munities” (Castro and Nielsen 2001, p. 230).
Linking Mechanisms
As conventional theories of commons and institu-
tional choice are being recognized as a special case,
attention is currently directed to the importance of
both relationships and the social context in which prop-
erty rights regimes function (Ostrom 1998, Klooster
2000, Rudd 2000). The three components of co-man-
agement described in this article are consistent with
this new direction. The preconditions presented in Ta-
ble 1 influence social relationships or shape social con-
text. The essence of social relationships or interactions
is inherent in every characteristic associated with co-
management. These are shown in Table 2. Decision-
making, legitimacy, and capacity also shape the socio-
political landscape in which regimes are embedded.
Linking the three components is the process of so-
cial interaction through which they operate. Any ele-
ment of these three components may be either an input
or consequence. For example, a shared or common
vision assists in decision-making and may ultimately
enhance legitimization. Natural resource management
literature recognizes this process of interaction as col-
laboration. Barbara Gray (1985, (1989) is identified for
systematically analyzing and theoretically refining this
mechanism (Selin and Chavez 1995, Meadowcroft
1998, Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000).
Gray perceives collaboration as an emergent inter-
organizational process, emphasizing its dynamics and
mutable characteristics. Gray illustrates this interorga-
nizational process “ ... as a mechanism by which a new
negotiated order emerges among a set of stakeholders”
(Gray 1989, p. 228). Negotiated order theory is the
cornerstone of Gray’s (1985, Gray’s 1989) approach.
Negotiated order theory “emphasizes the fluid, contin-
uously emerging qualities of the organization, and the
changing web of interactions woven among its mem-
bers. It suggests members of an organization must con-
stantly work at order” (Day and Day 1977, p. 132).
Trist (1983) has termed this process of negotiation
as joint appreciation. Joint appreciations occur when
individuals/organizations share appraisals (both facts
and values) of a situation, and arrive at a shared view
that prompts formation of temporary order. This be-
comes a normative framework. These agreements rep-
882 R. Plummer and J. FitzGibbon
resent collectively constructed responses, often by those
with diverse interests. Theses may result in creating
environmental pressure that often becomes formally
institutionalized (Gray 1989).
In summary, all three components of co-manage-
ment are interconnected through the underlying
mechanismof collaboration. Elements within each
component both influence and are influenced by this
emergent interorganizational process as indicated with
bidirectional arrows in Figure 1. Normative agreements
reached by stakeholders through joint appreciation “ ...
represent a nascent institutional form whose legitimacy
as an institution is still being negotiated” (Gray 1989, p.
230). The underlying emergent interorganizational
process represents the mechanism by which co-manage-
ment is realized, explains the dynamic nature of these
agreements, accounts for the myriad forms within this
type of institutional arrangement, and explicates the
range of outcomes.
Future Directions
This paper integrated knowledge gained from expe-
riences with co-management and developed a concep-
tual framework that organizes the context, compo-
nents, and linking mechanisms of co-management.
Such a framework is valuable to both practice and
theory.
Because such agreements are increasingly used in
the practice of managing resources, the proposed
framework offers a means for their systematic identifi-
cation. Characteristics of co-management (Table 2) are
particularly instructive because they indicate the pres-
ence of underlying processes. More broadly, the pro-
posed framework may also be placed into a rubric for
differentiating among the spectrum of possible co-
management arrangements. Beyond being a means of
identification, the proposed framework provides in-
sights for those entering into co-management.
The very foundations upon which these agreements
are based (claims to property rights) are frequently
contested and fraught with conflict (Castro and Nielsen
2001). The emergent interorganizational process itself
is not straightforward or necessarily expedient in prac-
tice. Joint appreciation being collectively constructed is
timely in practice. Although co-management is often
initiated to achieve admirable outcomes, experience
reveals that expectations should be tempered. Co-man-
agement arrangements often result in disappointments
necessitating greater equity and efficiency in decision-
making (Jentoft 2000, Castro and Nielsen 2001), en-
hanced legitimization (Jentoft 2000), and increased
capacity (Berkes 1994).
The proposed framework responds to shortcomings
associated with conventional commons institutions,
and social choice theories as it moves away from a
rational approach. Co-management is embedded in the
broader social context of property rights, and at the
intersection of existing property rights regimes. Co-
management also responds to the call by Berkes and
Folke (1998) as it clearly focuses attention on institu-
tions and property rights, as well as highlighting the
fundamental contributions of social science. As an
emergent interorganizational process, co-management
represents a distinct departure from conventional ap-
proaches. Normative agreement reached through a dy-
namic and negotiated process represents the potential
to realize institutional opportunities as called for by
Jentoft and others (1998).
In conceptualizing co-management, an organiza-
tional structure is proposed that facilitates the system-
atic investigation of theory as identified by Berkes
(1997), Jentoft and others (1998), and Klooster (2000).
Complexity inherent in these institutional arrange-
ments has largely been investigated using reductionism.
That is, investigations have focused on one particular
aspect of co-management. Although these studies are
critical in developing this conceptual framework, a
clear need exists to move towards explanatory and ul-
timately predictive relationships.
The conceptual framework directs specific attention
to the holistic and process qualities of co-management
by acknowledgement of the social context and the na-
ture of the resources concerned. It also raises the pro-
file of co-management as a social process. Modeling
such a process presents a considerable challenge to
those conducting research in this area. Only by gaining
knowledge of both the salient and subtle details of
developing joint appreciation can success and disap-
pointments be explained.
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