Michael Mahoney Constructivism and Dynamic Systems in Psychotherapy Processes

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Integral Constructivism and
Dynamic Systems in Psychotherapy
Processes
M I C H A E L J . M A H O N E Y , PH.D.
A N D R E M A R Q U I S , PH.D.
This article presents a brief overview of the metatheory of integral
constructivism, highlighting important convergences among construc-
tivist, dynamic systems, integral, object relations, self-psychology, and
intersubjective approaches to the practice of psychotherapy. The roles of
relationships, emotionality, and perturbations in the client–therapist bond
are emphasized. Complex nonlinear dynamics are inherent to life organi-
zation and to therapeutic process.
PROCESSES OF CHANGE HAVE BEEN A CENTRAL TOPIC OF HUMAN INQUIRYfor millennia. We have been particularly fascinated with under-
standing our own change processes and the roles we may play in directing
or facilitating change in ourselves and in others. Indeed, the practice of
psychotherapy presumes that people can and do change, and that they
can be offered valuable counsel in the process. Studies of human change
within and beyond psychotherapy have made it clear that complex
794
Michael J. Mahoney, Ph.D. is Professor of Psychology, University of North Texas
and Saybrook Graduate School and Research Center; author, Human Change Processes
and Constructive Psychotherapy.
Andre Marquis, Ph.D. is Assistant Professor of Psychology, Northeastern State
University, and serves as an officer of the University Student Outreach branch of the
Integral Institute.
Parts of this article were adapted from Mahoney (in press).
processes are involved (Mahoney, 1991). Our goal in this article is to
sketch the metatheory of integral constructivsm and to outline the rele-
vance of its dynamic systems approach for the practice of psychotherapy.
We begin with a brief synopsis of dynamic systems theory, which we
then relate to constructivism and integral psychology. To illustrate the
resonance of these perspectives with contemporary psychoanalytic the-
ory and practice, we emphasize their parallels with object relations, self
psychology, and intersubjective theory.
Dynamic Systems and Developmental Processes
Dynamic systems theory (DST) is actually a family of theories that
addresses the principled processes of emergent development in sponta-
neously self-organizing complex systems (Prigogine, 1980; Prigogine
and Stengers, 1984; Mahoney, 1991; Kauffman, 1993, 1995; Thelen and
Smith, 1994; Kelso, 1995; Haken, 1996; Mahoney and Moes, 1997;
Masterpasqua and Perna, 1997). Contemporary expressions of DST were
anticipated by a number of scientists and scholars interested in nonlinear
phenomena. A critical mass of interest gravitated around the topic of
chaos when it was shown that small differences in initial conditions often
led to substantially different trajectories of development in open systems.
Chaos is emotionally synonymous with disorder, and it turns out to be
one of the hottest topics in the emergence of new models and methods
in science. As Gleick (1987) put it, “Where chaos begins, classical
science stops. For as long as the world has had physicists inquiring into
the laws of nature, it has suffered a special ignorance about disorder. . . .
The irregular side of nature, the discontinuous and erratic side—these
have been puzzles to science, or worse, monstrosities” (p. 3). Postclas-
sical science, however—in its study of complexly dynamic self-organ-
izing systems—has changed all of that. Across disciplines ranging from
astronomy, nuclear physics, and molecular biology to medicine, econom-
ics, and political science, parallel themes of inquiry and discovery are
being reported. These themes reflect the emergence of a new view of
ourselves and our universe. Kauffman (1995), one of the leading propo-
nents of this new view, says:
We are entering a new era in which life will be seen as a natural
expression of tendencies toward order in a far from equilibrium
universe . . . the fate of all complex adapting systems in the
INTEGRAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 795
biosphere—from single cells to economies—is to evolve to a
natural state between order and chaos, a grand compromise be-
tween structure and surprise [p. 15].
According to Kauffman and other leading thinkers on dynamic systems,
we are now in search of a theory of emergence that acknowledges the
complex interplay between natural selection processes and the self-or-
ganizing tendencies and capacities of evolving complex systems (Thelen
and Smith, 1994; Kelso, 1995). As living systems, we literally exist on
the edge of chaos and it is our excursions into and through disorder that
serve as grist for the mills of our constructions of order. Palombo (1999),
among others, has rendered a view of ego emergence as an expression
of coevolution in the psychoanalytic process (see also Chamberlain and
Butz, 1998).
This new view of the relationship between order and disorder is
fundamentally relevant to our understanding of human adaptation and
our services as therapists. Order requires ongoing energy exchanges
across boundaries that both separate and connect the orderly system from
and with its contexts. Such order involves a form of organizational
(relational) integrity (wholeness) that exhibits continuity over space and
time. Among other things, this means that each person is always engaged
in active gestures of seeking a dynamic balance in their life. From this
perspective, a “disordered person” is one whose life circumstances
exceed his or her developed integrative skills.
A fascinating and promising theme emerges from recent discoveries
about the processes involved in spontaneous self-organization when a
complex self-organizing system is challenged beyond its current capaci-
ties to adapt. Without belaboring the technicalities, it appears that personal
transformations—significant and enduring personal changes—are often
preceded by brief or prolonged episodes of whole system disorganization.
Such disorganization may be an essential element in the emergence of
more adaptive, adequate, and complex forms of life organization. To
preview a theme that will be elaborated shortly, disorder and disorgani-
zation are not the enemies of developmental emergence (personal evolu-
tion); they may, in fact, be necessary prerequisites for the holistic change
necessary for a new level of functioning to emerge.
Not surprisingly, it is difficult to speak simply of complexity. Several
years ago one of the authors tried to describe the consensus about how
order emerges from chaos in systems like ourselves:
796 MICHAEL J. MAHONEY AND ANDRE MARQUIS
No matter how stable they are, dynamic systems are always under-
going perturbations (literally, “agitations” or “deviations”) that
reflect the complex interplay of internal self-organizing activities
and their ongoing exchanges with their local environments. So long
as these perturbations do not exceed the “balancing” capacities of
the system, it moves onward (through space and time) at the same
average level of organizational complexity that would have been
predicted by the second law of thermodynamics. But the perturba-
tions can get out of hand as a result of both inside and outside
dynamics. If the perturbations exceed a certain threshold (the
bifurcation point), a whole new level of principles is required to
account for the processes that emerge [Mahoney, 1991, p. 418].
Dewey (1934) made this point much more plainly and poetically more
than half a century earlier:
Life itself consists of phases in which the organism falls out of step
with the march of surrounding things and then recovers unison with
it—either through effort or by some happy chance. And, in a
growing life, the recovery is never mere return to a prior state, for
it is enriched by the state of disparity and resistance through which
it has successfully passed. . . . Life grows when a temporary falling
out isa transition to a more extensive balance of the energies of the
organism with those of the conditions under which it lives. . . . [If]
life continues and if in continuing it expands, there is a transforma-
tion of them into differentiated aspects of a higher powered and
more significant life. The marvel of organic, of vital, adaptation
through expansion (instead of by contraction and passive accom-
modation) actually takes place. Here in germ are balance and
harmony attained through rhythm. Equilibrium comes about not
mechanically and inertly but out of, and because of, tension [1934,
pp. 535–536].
Dewey was prescient in recognizing that development is never a simple
return to a prior state. It is always a “moving on,” if only because
movement (process) lies at the heart of both life and its changing
expressions. We survive the trials and tribulations of “falling out of step”
and losing our balance again and again, and each time we reach a new
center, the system incorporates and elaborates the previous centers. This
INTEGRAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 797
means that the “system as a whole thus shifts to a new, higher order, more
complex structural form whose parts are governed by a new set of
functional properties and characterized by a new set of statistical parame-
ters” (Brent, 1978, p. 380). What emerges, when circumstances permit,
is a transformation in the identity and functioning of the system. When
the system manages to wrestle order out of the disorder into which it was
thrown, the emerging system tends to be both more complex and more
capable. This is not to say that its increasing complexity does not involve
vulnerabilities, or that disorder is always followed by successful devel-
opmental reorganization. But the picture is full of more hope and poten-
tial than has been portrayed by pathology-based models of human
dysfunction.
Integral constructivism offers a view of disorder that respects the role
of ever-present cascades of disorganization in the living system’s dy-
namic and lifelong development. The resilience and resourcefulness of
the human system is much greater than is generally appreciated. More-
over, “growing pains”—ranging from mild discomfort to intense suffer-
ing—are more central to our development than most like to admit. From
the perspective of integral constructivism, allegedly strategic interven-
tions that seek to suppress quickly the pain of systemic disorganization
often carry a significant risk.
Besides depathologizing disorder, an important contribution of com-
plexity studies to the conceptualization and practice of psychotherapy is
an appreciation for what are called “phase transitions” and the dynamics
of development. Phase transitions are those places in development where
a system suddenly changes course. Although therapists may not be able
to use the technical terminology of chaos and the sciences of complexity
to help patients conceptualize what they are experiencing and how it
reflects natural processes, we can use developmental metaphors that
convey some of that same message. Physical metaphors that invoke
bodily experiences are often helpful in reassuring patients: “growing
pains,” “molting,” and the like. Metaphors of journeying are also useful,
and patients can be encouraged to construct a description of where they
have been and where they now are. One of our patients, for example, was
very experienced in white water canoeing. When an unexpected life
event destabilized her, she described her transition into chaos in terms
of what she was familiar with: a slowly moving stream suddenly
becoming a torrent of unexpected rapids where she had little control and
was desperately struggling just to stay upright and off the rocks. This
798 MICHAEL J. MAHONEY AND ANDRE MARQUIS
metaphor helped her to regain some sense of familiarity with what she
was experiencing, and she felt reassured by realizing that—like river
rapids—the rapids in her psychological life were not likely to last forever,
and that they were likely to be followed by calm waters and opportunities
to rest.
Life challenges may lead to possibilities for learning and develop-
ment, but possibilities necessarily involve risks, and some risks result in
disaster or chronic dysfunction. People can easily become “stuck” in
disorder. Ordering processes can vary from flexibly stable to rigidly
over- or understabilizing. Psychological disorders tend to fall at the
extremes of this constructed dimension. Anxious hypervigilance and
hopeless disengagement reflect the extremes of the tension between fear
and hope, and impulse control disorders reflect the dynamics of oscillat-
ing among such extremes. Disorder, in the sense of diminished psycho-
logical functioning and well-being, becomes a lifestyle for these unfor-
tunate people, and they struggle for years—and sometimes lifetimes—in
the same painful patterns. This is where the empathic attunement and
flexible collaboration of the therapist is most important, and we shall
address these therapeutic strategies after we present an overview of
constructive metatheory.
Constructivism: An Outline
The verb “to construct” comes from the Latin construere, which means
to arrange or give structure. The ongoing nature of structuring (organiz-
ing) processes is the developmental heart of constructivism. Although it
can trace a legacy far back into written and oral history, constructivism
is a term that is just now making its way into the vocabulary of psychol-
ogy. It does not appear, as yet, in most dictionaries of psychology. If one
looks at the psychological literature over the past quarter-century, how-
ever, it is being used with increasing frequency. “Constructive” and
“constructivist” are being used, for example, to describe developing
perspectives in domains ranging from biology and brain science to
cognitive-behavioral, humanistic, and psychoanalytic psychotherapies.
There is considerable diversity in expressions of constructivism,
which is why we term it here a metatheory—a family of theories. The
family resemblance appears to be reflected, however, in a consensual
emphasis on five principle assertions about human experience and
development:
INTEGRAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 799
1. Human experiencing reflects continuous and primarily anticipatory
activity.
2. The ongoing activity of humans is primarily devoted to ordering
processes or the organizational patterning of experience; these ordering
processes are fundamentally emotional and tacit, and they are the es-
sence of meaning-making.
3. The organization of personal activity is fundamentally self-
referent or recursive, making the body a fulcrum of experiencing and
encouraging a deep phenomenological sense of selfhood or personal
identity.
4. Self-organizing capacities and creations of meaning are strongly
influenced by social-symbolic processes; persons exist in living webs of
relationships, many of which are mediated by language and symbol
systems.
5. Each human life reflects principles of dynamic dialectical devel-
opment; complex flows among essential tensions (contrasts) are reflected
in patterns and cycles of experiencing that can lead to episodes of
disorder (disorganization) and, under some circumstances, the reorgani-
zation (transformation) of core patterns of activity, including meaning-
making and both self- and social relationships.
These themes suggest a view of the person that is “integral,” in the sense
of embracing many of the apparent dualities that have traditionally
dominated psychology and philosophy (Wilber, 2000a).
Among the earliest recorded proponents of some form of constructiv-
ism are the Buddha, Lao Tzu, and Heraclitus. The Buddha emphasized
the role of minds and thinking in the creation and maintenance of our
experience of reality. Lao Tzu and Heraclitus believed that opposites
coexist and, infact, lead to and mutually define one another. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the major western proponents of
constructivism were Vico, Kant, and Vaihinger. Vico said that human
knowing involves an imaginative construction of order in experience,
and that knowledge must be understood as a process of construction that
takes place in social contexts. He maintained that our thinking expresses
metaphors of the body, and he suggested that fantasy, imagination,
mythology, and etymology are important resources for understanding
ourselves.
Kant emphasized the power of patterns in our thinking, and he
regarded ideas as regulative principles. Although these patterns place
800 MICHAEL J. MAHONEY AND ANDRE MARQUIS
limits on our knowing, Kant did not view us as prisoners of our minds.
He believed in both freedom and an autonomous will, and he related these
to an ethics of action. Kant believed that we participate in the construction
of a universal lawfulness, and that integrity and good will are essential
to that process.
In The Philosophy of “As If,” Vaihinger argued that the primary
purpose of mind and mental processes is not to portray or mirror reality,
but to serve individuals in their navigations through life circumstances.
Vaihinger’s principle of “functional fictions” would later form a corner-
stone of Adler’s theory of individual psychology.
Later developments in constructivism included Bartlett’s (1932) clas-
sic work on reconstructive processes in memory. At about the same time,
Piaget began his series of influential studies on children’s cognitive
development. Drawing on the dynamic view of learning described by
Herbart (1776–1841), Piaget described knowing as a quest for a dynamic
balance between what is familiar and what is novel. This balancing act
is accomplished by the coordination of processes of assimilation and
accommodation. Piaget emphasized that we organize our worlds by
organizing ourselves, and this theme of self-organization pervades con-
structive views of human experience.
A powerful theoretical presentation of constructivism was offered by
Hayek (1952), who showed that “much that we believe to know about
the external world is, in fact, knowledge about ourselves” (pp. 6–7)—that
is, knowledge about our patterns of organizing ourselves and our worlds.
Another major event in the emergence of constructivism was the publi-
cation of Kelly’s (1955) theory of “constructive alternativism,” better
known as “personal construct theory,” which emphasized both possibil-
ity and pattern in the self-organization of personality. He went on to
elaborate an original theory of personality built around the concept of
constructs. For Kelly, constructs (organizing processes) were dichoto-
mous (either/or) in structure and exhibited dynamic (ever-changing)
aspects (e.g., in their permeability and relative tightness and looseness).
Kelly translated his theory into a novel approach to psychotherapy in
which the role of the therapist is to challenge skillfully the patient’s ways
of construing self, others, the world, and their possible relationships.
Kelly’s work has stimulated substantial research on personality and
psychotherapy.
Constructive influences continued to increase throughout the second
half of the twentieth century, and it is the focus of numerous books
INTEGRAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 801
(Watzlawick, 1984; Ford, 1987; Guidano, 1987, 1991; Anderson, 1990,
1997; Mahoney, 1991; Neimeyer and Mahoney, 1995; Sexton and Grif-
fin, 1997; Franklin and Nurius, 1998; Hoyt, 1998; Neimeyer and Raskin,
2000). The increase in its recent visibility has sometimes made construc-
tivism seem like a new development, when in fact it has been emerging
for centuries. There are now two international journals devoted to con-
structivism, and in 1996, the Society for Constructivism in the Human
Sciences was formed to encourage and communicate developments in
theory, research, and practices that reflect an appreciation for “human
beings as actively complex, socially embedded, and developmentally
dynamic self-organizing systems.”1
There are diverse expressions of constructivism in contemporary
approaches to development and mental health services. Some emphasize
a cognitive-behavioral legacy, others the existential-humanism, psycho-
analytic, or transpersonal. Our approach includes aspects of each of these
legacies. Within the transpersonal (spiritual) traditions, Wilber’s (1998,
1999, 2000) “integral psychology” approach is particularly appealing.
Working from a uniquely comprehensive view, integral psychology
embraces the categorical dualisms of internal versus external, individual
versus collective, and scientific knowledge versus spiritual wisdom.
Wilber also adopts a developmental approach to human experience and
incorporates the insights of major contributions in developmental, thera-
peutic, and higher potential psychologies. This approach is called integral
because of its emphasis on a sufficiently comprehensive view to embrace
the unity of principles and processes that are apparent in wide diversities.
We see important convergences among constructivist, dynamic systems,
integral, intersubjective, and self psychology approaches. These conver-
gences are illustrated in the following discussions of relationships,
emotionality, and the processes by which perturbations may be trans-
formed into significant personal development.
Honoring Emotionality and Relationships
As noted in the second theme of constructivism, emotions are viewed as
powerful self-organizing processes in human adaptation. Emotions serve
1Journal of Constructivist Psychology and Constructivism in the Human Sciences
(Web site, http://orgs.unt.edu/constructivism/society.htm; e-mail, constructivism1@
hotmail.com).
802 MICHAEL J. MAHONEY AND ANDRE MARQUIS
critical roles in directing attention, shaping perceptions, organizing mem-
ory, developing a healthy sense of selfhood, and motivating active
engagement with the learning that life relentlessly requires. The most
intense emotions are usually generated in (intersubjective) relationships
with others, particularly with those others whom Kohut and the intersub-
jective theorists might conceptualize as serving selfobjects functions
(Kohut, 1971, 1977; Stolorow and Atwood, 1992; Schore, 1994). This
suggests that how emotions are handled in psychotherapy is central to
the patient’s optimal reorganization of experience, and thus, to “success-
ful outcome.” As psychoanalytic, constructive, and integral theorists
have increasingly attested, the experience and regulation of emotions is
learned in human relationships and is central to the achievement of
coherent and valued sense of self.
In contrast to many other perspectives on human experiencing, inte-
gral constructivism and intersubjectivity do not view emotions as either
enemies or epiphenomena. Emotional experiences are the foundations of
personal realities, and this fact warrants a respect for individual phe-
nomenology in the process of life counseling that is reminiscent of
Kohut’s emphasis on empathy, or “vicarious introspection,” as the foun-
dation of therapeutic processes. It is neither the intensity of the emotions,
the nature of the drives, nor the ensuing conflicts between a child and its
caregivers/selfobjects that influences whether or not the child will suc-
cessfully navigate the phases of development. Rather, it is the manner in
which a preemerging selfobject functions, attunes, attends, and relates to
a child’s experience of emotions and the intersubjective bond—the
self–selfobject bond—that best accounts for a child’s developmental
trajectory (Kohut, 1984). And this applies just as readily to adult patients
and psychotherapists as to children and caregivers. As Basch (1984)
wrote, people are crippled not by emotion in and of itself, but by “the
anticipationof reexperiencing the devastating, potentially disintegrating
disappointment of early empathic failures if they dare once again reach
for emotional fulfillment” (p. 10).
The centrality and import we assign to the therapist’s attending to
patients’ emotional blocks, difficulties in verbalizing their emotions, or
both, as well as to disruptions in the therapeutic relationship, stem from
our belief that the articulation and integration of affective experiences,
especially those that are phenomenologically disruptive or discrepant, is
a developmental imperative. Atwood and Stolorow (1984) state this
clearly:
INTEGRAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 803
A requirement for the child’s attainment of the capacity to synthe-
size affectively contrasting experiences of self and others is the
presence of a holding, containing selfobject who, by virtue of firmly
integrated perceptions, is able reliably to accept, tolerate, compre-
hend, and eventually render intelligible the child’s intense, contra-
dictory affective states as issuing from a unitary, continuous self.
When a parent, in contrast, must perceive the child as “split” . . .
then the development of the child’s integrative capacity will be
severely impeded as affectively discrepant experiences of self and
others become enduringly sequestered from one another in con-
formity with the parents’ fragmentary perceptions [p. 76].
Thus, children whose caregivers fail to provide selfobject functions will
not integrate opposing affective experiences, and will experience them-
selves as lacking a cohesive, unitary, continuous self. This readily
accounts for Kohut’s (1984) choice of terminology—“disorders of the
self.” Optimal self-development requires that children not only be al-
lowed to express their affective experience, but that such expression not
be experienced by them as threatening to their caregivers. Children also
require the assistance of their caregivers in learning to make sense of, or
assign meaning to, what they are experiencing affectively.
Affects are initially experienced simply as bodily sensations (Krystal,
1988; Stolorow and Atwood, 1992; Fosha, 2000). In order for such
sensory feelings to develop into emotions, the child must learn to
articulate symbolically the direct bodily feeling. It appears that children
cannot do this on their own. They need their caregivers to help them
identify and then label their feelings. In the absence of this facilitating
intersubjective context, several different derailments of optimal affect
integration can occur. If children do not receive assistance in the domain
of symbolic articulation/verbalization, they will continue to experience
affects primarily as bodily sensations, with the mind/body split thus being
perpetuated and even intensified. In these instances, people are literally
alexithymic (Krystal, 1988). If caregivers try to help the child articulate
feelings but the “child regularly perceives that his affective experiences
are intolerable or injurious to a caregiver, then the symbolic articulation
of affect may become blocked or ‘dispersed’ (McDougall, 1989) in order
to safeguard the needed tie” (Stolorow and Atwood, 1992, p. 43). Later
in life, when such people anticipate that their articulated feelings will
either be ignored, rejected, or harmful to an important relationship, they
804 MICHAEL J. MAHONEY AND ANDRE MARQUIS
revert to relatively archaic and primarily somatic experiences and ex-
pressions of affect. Intersubjective systems perspective has corroborated
our experiences of working with such individuals. When the therapist is
perceived as an accepting, attuned, and affect-articulating presence,
patients’ emotional blocks diminish, and they allow the disavowed parts
of themselves to reemerge for the renewed developmental opportunities
that may be available to them.
What some therapists fail to appreciate is that for many patients, the
revival of a relatively archaic self–selfobject bond (with its accompany-
ing idealizing and mirroring needs) with the therapist is an absolutely
necessary prerequisite to resumption of development. Patients whose
caregivers fail to provide selfobject functions will seek (transferential)
relationships within which they feel held and contained, needing the
therapist to recognize, tolerate, and affirm the validity of their intense
and often contradictory feelings (Atwood and Stolorow, 1984). When a
therapist interprets these needs as merely intrapsychic and pathologically
resistant (failing to recognize that resistance is always a function of the
intersubjective matrix), the therapist has effectively repeated the trau-
matic psychological injuries of early life. The traditional analytic atti-
tudes of neutrality and abstinence can be particularly dangerous for those
whose early caregivers were perceived as emotionally malattuned and
unresponsive.
An integral, constructive approach to psychotherapy involves an
invitation to use the therapeutic relationship as a safe and secure base in
which and from which the patient, with the help of the therapist’s
sustained empathic attunement and inquiry, can learn to explore and
experiment. Precious little strengthens the bond between patient and
therapist more effectively than the therapist’s extending his inquiry into
(a) disruptions or perturbations of the self–selfobject bond or (b) realms
of experience that the patient perceives, even if tacitly, as threatening to
the therapist (Stolorow, Brandchaft, and Atwood, 1987; Orange, At-
wood, and Stolorow, 1997). Attending to such perturbed ruptures in the
therapeutic bond, which patients experience as threatening to their sense
of self-esteem, cohesion, and integrity, affords the patient the opportunity
to integrate disruptive affective states, rather than rigidly sequestering
those parts of themselves. These therapeutic efforts echo those of Kohut
(1971, 1977, 1984) and Stolorow and colleagues (1987, 1992) in that
consistently inquiring into the patients’ experience of ruptured self–
selfobject bonds illuminates not only their unconscious organizing
INTEGRAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 805
principles and the past traumas they replicate, but also and more impor-
tantly, their expectations as to how their therapists will react and respond
in such situations. These endeavors simultaneously mend the cracks in
the bond. However, before a disrupted bond can be mended, it must first
be established.
Intersubjective Consolidation
In order for therapy to be maximally effective, an affectional bond
between the patient and therapist must be established, with the therapist
serving selfobject functions for the patient. Despite the fact that a
patient’s early self–selfobject bonds may have been experienced as
affective shackles (as occurs with a child’s selfobjects either reject or
ignore vital emotional states accompanying the child’s self-differentia-
tion ), it is precisely such a bond in treatment that can liberate the patient
from archaic patterns of self-organization. This is more likely to occur
when the therapist provides an intersubjective milieu that prizes the
patient and all of the emotionality that inevitably accompanies the
process of self-development (Stolorow et al., 1987). Such (transferential)
relationships, in which patients’ developmentally thwarted needs are
reactivated, simultaneously make patients vulnerable to old trauma:
The patient struggles to contact and express the selfobject needs
and related negative affects that he disavowed or repressed in the
face of the frustration of these needs by his caretakers in childhood
and that he now fears may be responded to in the same way by his
analyst. The patient not only fears rejection and retaliation from the
analyst, and that he will experience the frightening affects with
which these are associated, he also wants to preserve his sense of
the analystas a good or idealized figure, which he desperately needs
to internalize in order to shore up a self that is weakened and injured
by selfobject failure [Bacal and Newman, 1990, p. 265].
This peculiar mixture of potentials either to shackle one to, or to free
one from, ossified patterns of self-experience recalls the delicate balance
of assimilation and accommodation that is so vital to all learning.
Patients’ current patterns and configurations of experience—all the ways
they expect the therapist to be and to respond—represent the unconscious
structures into which the therapist is assimilated. For many patients,
806 MICHAEL J. MAHONEY AND ANDRE MARQUIS
feedforward processes are so dominating that their anticipatory, trans-
ferential expectations diminish the likelihood of experiencing novelty,
even when, “objectively,” the experience is quite unfamiliar. Ideally, the
therapist’s consistency and devotion to the empathic stance will be
perceived as sufficiently novel to demand that patients also accommo-
date—that is, break up or disintegrate their older patterns of structurali-
zation so that these patterns may be reorganized, synthesized, and inte-
grated into “newly expanded and reflectively conscious structures” of
their subjective worlds (Atwood and Stolorow, 1984, p. 60). We believe
that such an “experience near” approach not only avoids the “experience
distant” “empiricide” (Kohut, cited in Masek, 1989, p. 184) of the neutral,
abstinent analyst, but also provides a secure crucible “in which one can
safely and easily be in bits and pieces without the feeling of falling apart”
(Winnicott, cited in Epstein, 1995, p. 206).
Once the patient’s transference has “clicked into place,” the intersub-
jective experience is explored, and the therapist offers interpretations, or
constructions of experience. More important than the “objective correct-
ness” of interpretations is the manner in which they are communi-
cated—expressions of optimal responsiveness that patients experience
as restoring self-cohesion and resilience. Broadly defined, interpreting
transference involves investigating, understanding, and communicating
to the patient her experience of her therapist—which is unconsciously
and recurrently organized via preestablished patterns (Stolorow et al.,
1987). The interpretation of transference follows two basic steps: under-
standing and explaining (Kohut, 1984). “It bears stressing” wrote Kohut,
“that the analyst’s essential activities in each of these positions—not only
the first one—are based on empathy” (1984, p. 176).
Each time the patient receives an interpretation that does not “feel
right,” he or she experiences anxiety regarding whether or not the
therapist (unlike the patient’s caregivers) will recognize his mistake and
process it with the patient, thus transforming a potentially traumatic
experience into a “development-enhancing structure-building optimal
frustration” (Kohut, 1984, p. 207). No therapist can avoid offering
erroneous interpretations to patients. However, provided that the thera-
pist recognizes the patient’s (sometimes subtle, sometimes severe) re-
treats, and responds appropriately, such “errors” constitute “optimal
failures.” Kohut wrote that such failures occur hundreds of times in good
therapy, with each “attended-to failure” resulting in the patient’s en-
hanced resiliency and the firming of self structure and self-esteem.
INTEGRAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 807
Change occurs not through isolated rational interpretations, but
through an intersubjective experience—with the therapist serving as the
patient’s selfobject: “Interpretations are not disembodied transmission
of insight about the analytic relationship. They are inherent, inseparable
components of that very bond, and their therapeutic action derives from
the intersubjective matrix in which they crystallize” (Stolorow et al.,
1987, p. 101). It was in this context that Kohut argued that “even though
the content of the interpretation was wrong, the interpretation itself was
still right” (1984, p. 94). Although sounding paradoxical, Kohut’s pro-
nouncement underscores the primacy of empathic attunement, not “ob-
jective correctness.” He (1984) proceeded to clarify that what was
“correct” about the interpretation was the
simple but, I believe, profoundly human message, expressed with
human warmth, that the patient heard. . . . And I am convinced
furthermore—to make my point from the opposite direction—that
the analyst could have spoken the same words without the patient’s
wholesome response to the interpretation if she had failed to
transmit her correct empathic perception of the patient’s devastated
state [p. 94].
Our perspective on “resistance” is quite similar. Like transference,
“resistance” involves the patient’s self-protective organization, and fre-
quently an experience that too much of their core is changing too quickly.
They may fear that their needs and emotions will be met by the therapist
in a manner similar to those experienced in the traumatic responses of
their early selfobjects (Kohut, 1984; Stolorow et al., 1987; Bacal and
Newman, 1990). Following this conceptualization, resistance can be
viewed as the result of the patient’s not experiencing the therapist as a
selfobject. Therefore, “resistance” is not merely an intrapsychic function
of the patient, but, rather, a product of the intersubjective field between
them—with the therapist’s actions always playing a role (Stolorow et al.,
1987). It is here that the therapist’s “affective competence”—the capacity
to handle, “deal with,” metabolize, and facilitate one’s own and others’
affective (relational) experience—becomes paramount (Fosha, 2000).
Unless the therapist is able to know empathically the patient’s experience
of impending fear or danger—which results in the patient’s felt need to
enlist resistance—analysis of resistance will be therapeutically useless.
Consequently, the patient’s feeling understood in a moment of great fear
808 MICHAEL J. MAHONEY AND ANDRE MARQUIS
(re)establishes the selfobject bond—creating the image of an object (the
therapist) that is not a repetition of the patient’s past parental imagoes.
Important at such junctures is the therapist’s ability to shift perspectives,
so that his “aspect blindness” (Wittgenstein, 1953) not ensnare him in
the traps of reductionism and objectivism.
Coemergence of New Order in Patient and Therapist
In dynamically developing systems, change is pervasive, multiply deter-
mined, and distributed. This translates into an insight that is more
commonly recognized among analytic practitioners—namely, that the
patient is not the only person changed by the process of psychotherapy
(Bugental, 1978; Mahoney, 1991; Kantrowitz, 1996; Palombo, 1999).
Patient change is certainly and appropriately the primary focus, but it
emerges out of a human relationship that changes both participants
developmentally. Not all of these changes are positive or progressive, of
course. Our focus here is on the patient’s developmental process, but
psychotherapy practitioners are wise to appreciate the risks of their work
and the priority of self-care in their lives (Radeke and Mahoney, 2000).
The trajectory of a patient’s development during and after successful
psychotherapy cannot be captured by a simple linear model. Even with
the best available methods for modeling complex nonlinear systems, the
particulars cannot be predicted. Some patterns are more likely to emerge
than others, of course, and these reflect the principles operative in
dynamic systems. Oscillations, for example, are common in the devel-
opment of new skills and often apparent in the restructuring of core
ordering processes. A patient who enters therapy in the throes of an
intense contraction may require a longer interval of intersubjective
holding before risking expansions into new patterns.Exploratory behav-
ior is suppressed in the presence of strong negative affect, and such affect
is frequently a motivation for entering therapy. The emergence of novel
patterns may be signaled by shifts in dream content and process
(Palombo, 1999). Oscillations are often apparent in the therapeutic
relationship as well, and not simply on the patient’s “side” of that
dynamic. This is why we have emphasized the critical role of the
therapist’s consistent empathic presence and affective competence.
Perturbations in the therapeutic bond are rich sources of opportunity
for development, but only when these perturbations are negotiated in
ways that honor and encourage the patient’s emotional experience and
INTEGRAL CONSTRUCTIVISM, DYNAMIC SYSTEMS 809
competence (Stolorow et al., 1987; Fosha, 2000; Safran and Muran,
2000). We are here reminded of what Kegan (1982) termed “the danger-
ous recruitability” that is inherent in optimal psychotherapy:
What the eye sees better the heart feels more deeply. We not only
increase the likelihood of our being moved; we also run the risks
that being moved entail. For we are moved somewhere, and that
somewhere is further into life, closer to those we live with. They
come to matter more. Seeing better increases our vulnerability to
being recruited to the welfare of another. It is our recruitability, as
much as our knowledge of what to do once drawn, that makes us of
value in our caring for another’s development. . . . And why is it
so important to be recruitable? The answer is that a person’s life
depends . . . on whether he or she moves someone in this way [pp.
16–17, italics added].
To what degree are we, as professional helpers, willing to be vulnerable
to the unforeseen consequences that such vulnerable recruitability en-
tails? And to what degree are we practicing a life-wisdom, rather than
merely accumulating information and mechanically repeating tech-
niques? Pondering such questions is a vital component of professional
helping.
An integral constructivist approach rests upon phronesis—the practi-
cal wisdom of the therapist’s being—rather than techne—the type of
knowledge involved with production, crafts, and machinery. Extrapolat-
ing from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Gadamer’s Truth and
Method, Orange and colleagues (1997) posit that the notion of therapeu-
tic practice based upon technique is misguided, erroneous, and “seriously
harmful” (p. 19). Not only does the tyranny of technique do violence to
the individuality of the patient by encouraging in the therapist an attitude
of knowing what to expect in advance, it also is teleologically associated
with the product, as opposed to a teleonomic, phenomenological trust in
the process. And here enter the particulars that obscure the simple
patterns, rendering more uncertainty to our endeavors than most would
like to acknowledge. As Hoffman noted, our work
requires an underlying tolerance of uncertainty and with it a radical,
yet critical kind of openness that is conveyed over time in various
ways including a readiness to soul-search, to negotiate, and to
810 MICHAEL J. MAHONEY AND ANDRE MARQUIS
change . . . some things are always left in the dark. One might say
that one of the contexts of our actions is always the context of
ignorance of contexts. And yet, act we must [Hoffman, cited in
Moore, 1999, p. 122].
Psychotherapy, like life, involves complex processes. We have attempted
to convey some of the broad strokes that we have repeatedly encountered
in our experiences with our patients’ life-murals. These patterns, or
“orienting generalizations” (Wilber, 2000b, vol. 6), are never a simple
function of the patient’s intrapsychic world, but are rather coarticulated
in the intersubjective field that emerges between patient and therapist.
We are thus in favor of supplanting traditional conceptions of transfer-
ence and countertransference with the more complex, reciprocal idea of
“cotransference” which acknowledges that “the emotional history and
psychological organization of patient and analyst are equally important
to the understanding of any clinical exchange” (Orange et al., 1997, p. 9).
Conclusion
Our brief sketch of the psychotherapy process has emphasized the
dynamic and fundamentally intersubjective nature of human develop-
ment. We have incorporated an integral view of constructivism that can
embrace theoretical and disciplinary diversity. As this special journal
issue reflects, dynamic systems theories have substantial relevance for
the conceptualization and practice of psychotherapy. There is also a
dynamic complementarity to this assertion that has been touched upon
by Palombo (1999) and others—namely, that intensive longitudinal
studies of psychological development (such as in psychoanalysis) offer
invaluable opportunities for refining theories of dynamic systems. We
therefore look forward to the convolution of creative dialogue between
such theories and psychoanalytic inquiry.
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