HURRELL, A. Security in Latin America. 1998

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Security in Latin America
Author(s): Andrew Hurrell
Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No.
3 (Jul., 1998), pp. 529-546
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
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 Security in Latin America
 ANDREW HURRELL
 This article provides an overview of recent trends in Latin American security
 but also seeks to probe and unsettle three of the common assumptions that
 underpin both academic analysis and recent policy debates. The first
 assumption is that the support and promotion of political democracy is not
 only a valued end in itself, but also one that will contribute towards regional
 stability and security. This view draws on the liberal academic claim that
 democracies do not fight each other and on the commonsense view that the
 military governments of the I970S with their harsh national security doctrines
 and their rhetoric of geopolitical struggle and conflict were self-evidently
 problematic for regional security.' In reality, democratic peace theory
 encounters many difficulties when applied to the region. It provides a very
 partial and often misleading guide to understanding the history of interstate
 conflict and cooperation in Latin America and therefore an incomplete
 foundation on which to ground future policy.
 The second assumption, which also reflects a deep-rooted strand of liberal
 thinking on international relations, is that economic liberalization and regional
 integration feed naturally and positively into the creation of a stable and secure
 regional order. In contrast to the strong claims of democratic peace theory, the
 links between economic interdependence and peace have always been more
 elusive and difficult either to demonstrate or to refute with any precision.The
 argument here is that, while there are certainly cases, most notably within
 Mercosur and the Southern Cone, where economic integration appears to have
 reinforced rapprochement between erstwhile rivals and assisted the creation of a
 more stable regional environment, at the same time successful economic
 regionalization can also be a significant potential problem for regional order
 and a source of negative security externalities which, if unmanaged, are likely
 to become more serious.
 I Democratic peace theory has become central, not just to debates in international relations theory but also to
 regional security analysis.Take, for example, Gerald Segal's claim:'By far the most important factor for inter-
 national security seems to be the emergence of pluralist (democratic) political systems', in 'How inisecure is
 Pacific Asia?', International Affairs 73: 2, I997, p. 235. For a good overview of the debate see Michael Brown,
 Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller, eds, Debating the democratic peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, I 996).
 International Affairs 74, 3 (i 998) 529-546 529
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 Andrew Hurrell
 The third assumption is that the agenda of regional security should be
 broadened to include issues such as drug trafficking, drug-related violence and
 criminality, migration and refugees, environmental degradation, and worsening
 public order in the face of different forms of internal violence. It is certainly
 the case that the most serious security problems and threats to regional order
 are domestic and transnational in nature. And yet the increasingly pervasive
 rhetoric of the new security agenda disguises or even obscures many complex
 and contested issues. Divergent understandings of the meaning, nature and
 implications of the new security agenda have important policy implications and
 are likely to impede effective regional responses.
 Since the end of the Cold War regional order and security have increasingly
 come to be defined in terms of the collective defence of democracy and the
 promotion of liberal economic reform and regional integration. These
 processes will, it is hoped, provide the foundations for the creation of a stronger
 sense of regional community and the establishment of a set of political
 structures within which specific security threats, both traditional (e.g. old-style
 border conflicts) and non-traditional (e.g. the privatization of violence, drugs,
 migration) can be tackled.2 I do not argue here that this liberal orthodoxy is
 wholly wrong. But I do suggest that it needs to be subjected to a much more
 critical analysis than has been common hitherto.
 This article concentrates on the nature of the regional security order in Latin
 America. Delimiting this region as a security entity is difficult and cannot be
 done by definitional fiat. On the one hand, recent writing has increasingly
 stressed the greater social and economic heterogeneity of Latin America today
 and the widening degree of differentiation in the kinds of security challenges
 facing governments.3 Thus it is obviously the case that problems of widespread
 social violence, drug-related criminality and insurgent challenges are more
 pressing and serious in the Andean region than in the Southern Cone. Even
 within large countries there is immense variation in the capacity of state
 structures to cope with new security challenges. On the other hand, as I will
 argue below, one of the results of regionalization and of economic integration
 is to make neighbours more vulnerable to instability across their borders and to
 increased levels of political interdependence.
 Some would like to resolve this issue by appealing to an objective or quasi-
 objective definition. Security complex theory argues that a regionally based
 security complex can be defined as a 'group of states whose primary security
 concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot
 realistically be considered apart from one another'.4 The hard side of strategic
 2 For a survey of such arguments see Mark Peceny,'The Inter-American System as a liberal "Pacific
 Union"', Latin American Research Review (LARR) 29: 3, I994.
 3 See e.g. Augusto Varas,'From coercion to partnership: a new paradigm for security cooperation in the
 Western hemisphere?', in Jonathan Hardyn, Lars Schoultz and Augusto Varas eds, The United States and
 Latin America in the iggos: beyond the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, I993).
 4 Barry Buzan, People, states and fear, 2nd edn (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1991), p. I go.
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 Security in Latin America
 interdependence (range of missiles, vulnerability to conventional attack, even
 material spillovers of refugees, drug related violence or insurgency) can perhaps
 be assessed in a reasonably objective way. But the degree to which states and
 social groups come to understand regional problems in security termsis the
 outcome of complex political processes and varying political construction. As I
 will argue, it is often specific combinations of state power and interests or the
 involvement of an NGO, rather than any objective measure of importance, that
 determines why certain issues achieve political salience; why some groups are
 able to achieve voice, exposure and perhaps protection while others suffer in
 silence.
 More importantly, it has always been very difficult to define a Latin American
 security complex in a way that excludes the United States. Historically, the
 United States has reacted in many different ways to insecurity in the region. It
 has never consistently opposed the use of force in the region. It has sometimes
 chosen to remain disengaged from international tensions (as with the conflicts
 between Peru and Ecuador in I939-4I and between Chile and Argentina in
 the I970s). On other occasions Washington itself has been willing to use
 military force, or to support or actively promote the use of force by others (as
 in Central America in the I98os). Equally, although it has sometimes promoted
 multilateral security arrangements, it has steadfastly resisted any institutional
 constraints that would curb its traditional unilateralism and hegemonic
 presumptions. Irrespective of the policy actually chosen, its very presence and
 the possibility of US action have always been factors in the minds of Latin
 American governments. It is in the nature of hegemony that actions and
 reactions will be influenced by expectations of what the United States may or
 may not do.The US role in the security of the hemisphere provides the perfect
 illustration of the old adage that intervention and non-intervention are two
 sides of the same coin.
 The remainder of this article is divided into four parts.The first gives a brief
 overview of the historic pattern of and recent trends in traditional interstate
 security, and considers the role of democracy and democratization in
 understanding this picture. The second section considers the various ways in
 which regionalization and economic integration may pose problems for
 regional stability. The third discusses some of the major issues that arise
 regarding so-called new security challenges.The conclusion draws out some of
 the implications of the analysis for the management of regional security.
 Patterns of interstate conflict
 For the first half-century following independence, the region was beset by
 persistent and widespread wars of state formation and nation-building, both
 internal and external. In this as in so many other ways, Latin America
 foreshadowed the pattern of subsequent post-colonial conflicts, and by no
 stretch of the imagination could be viewed as constituting a security
 53'I
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 Andrew Hurrell
 community or a zone of relative peace. However, from the late nineteenth
 century both the number and the intensity of interstate wars between Latin
 American states were remarkably low-despite the existence of large numbers
 of protracted and militarized border disputes, many cases of the threatened use
 of force and of military intervention by outside powers, high levels of domestic
 violence and political instability, and long periods of authoritarian rule. It is also
 worth highlighting the degree to which armed conflict came increasingly to
 revolve around limited border conflict: the use of force, not to seize large areas
 of territory or to 'win' in a Clausewitzian sense, but rather as a diplomatic
 instrument to push the matter at issue back on to the agenda and to facilitate
 the winning of concessions at the diplomatic negotiations that, as both sides
 knew, would inevitably follow. There was, then, a clear willingness to use force;
 but this was a limited conception of force within a strong diplomatic culture.
 Geographical constraints and limited resources and state capacities are
 significant factors in this pattern. But so too is the Latin American predilection
 for international law, not because it obviates conflict but because it helps
 provide a framework of rules for its management and limitation.
 In the I970S and early I98os, however, an increasing number of analysts began
 to question the somewhat rosy picture. Even if the region had been relatively
 pacific, commentators were predicting that South America was becoming more
 conflictual and more like the rest of the developing world.5 There was
 consensus, too, on the reasons for this pessimism. First, the struggle for natural
 resources had, it was argued, drastically increased the stakes of many historic
 border disputes: hydroelectric resources on the River Paran'a between Brazil
 and Argentina; access to off-shore oil, fishing and seabed minerals in the case of
 Chile and Argentina (and, in many Latin American minds, Britain and
 Argentina); access to oil once more in the border disputes between Peru and
 Ecuador,Venezuela and Guyana, andVenezuela and Colombia. Second, the re-
 emergence of superpower rivalry in the Third World had increased the stakes
 in and the ideological intensity of regional insecurity, above all in Central
 America.Third, many saw the overall decline of US hegemony and the virtual
 death by I982 of the network of multilateral bilateral security arrangements
 between the United States and Latin American States that constituted the
 Inter-American Military System as reducing the ability of Washington to
 maintain 'discipline' within its own sphere of influence. Finally, many noted the
 continued prevalence of extreme geopolitical thinking among the militaries of
 the Southern Cone and the fact that arms spending and the capabilities of
 national arms industries appeared to be increasing. Not only was the
 5 See e.g. Gregory F. Treverton, 'Interstate conflict in Latin America', in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos
 Rico, eds, The United States and Latin America in the 198os (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh
 Press, I986);Jack Child, Geopolitics and conflict in South America: quarrels among neighbours (New York:
 Praeger, i985); Michael Morris and Victor Millan, eds, Controlling Latin American conflicts (Boulder, CO:
 Westview, I983). For a more nuanced and sceptical view, see Walter Little, 'International conflicts in
 Latin America', International Affairs 63: 4, October I987.
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 Security in Latin America
 Falklands/Malvinas War of I982 a worrying sign that extreme forms of terri-
 torial nationalism had not disappeared, but the debt crisis that broke in I982
 led to the collapse of intraregional trade flows and the further erosion of the
 already stagnant economic integration schemes inherited from the integra-
 tionist wave of the 196os.
 From the perspective of the late I99OS we can identify subregions where dra-
 matic and positive developments have taken place alongside others in which
 significant problems persist. The most dramatic change was the move from
 geopolitical rivalry to cooperation between Brazil and Argentina that took
 place through the I980s, leading to the emergence of institutionalized eco-
 nomic and political cooperation in the form of Mercosur. Indeed by the early
 I99OS a reasonably stable security community had emerged based around the
 Brazil-Argentina rapprochement-a group of states within which 'there is real
 assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other phys-
 ically, but will settle their disputes in some other way';6 where there are
 dependable expectations of peaceful change; and where military force gradual-
 ly disappears as a conceivable instrument of statecraft.7In the security field, rapprochement involved confidence-building measures,
 arms control agreements with cooperative verification schemes (especially in
 the nuclear field), shifts in military posture and declining levels of rnilitary
 spending, as well as a security discourse that avoids the rhetoric of the balance
 of power and that contrasts sharply with the extreme geopolitical doctrines of
 the I960s and I970s. The successes in the field of cooperative security have
 mostly been of a negative (but still important) kind: relaxing tension; reducing
 threat perceptions via confidence-building measures and arms control regimes;
 preventing backsliding and the reappearance of balance of power discourses.
 There have been only rather modest steps towards the more active components
 of cooperative security, such as agreeing plans for joint action or for the
 construction of anything resembling a collective security system. But recent
 developments are emblematic of the degree of change: denser military
 exchanges and bilateral discussions; joint army and naval exercises; a gradually
 increasing salience of security-related issues within the framework of political
 cooperation within Mercosur; the decision by Argentina to give up its policy
 of 'empty provinces' under which, until the Ig80s, no valued economic
 activities, and few bridges or transport systems, were developed in the northern
 provinces as part of a geopolitical doctrine of strategic denial in the face of a
 Brazilian threat. Not only has such thinking disappeared, but increased
 infrastructural integration and ever-denser transborder ties have become a
 central part of the Mercosur project.
 6 Karl W Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell and Robert A. Kann, Political community in the North Atlantic Area: inter-
 national organization in the light of historical experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I997), p. 5.
 7 For a more detailed discussion see Andrew Hurrell,'An emerging security community in South
 America?', in Michael Barnett and Emanuel Adler, eds, Security communities (Cambridge: Cambridge
 University Press, September I998).
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 Andrew Hurrell
 Together, these developments represent a tremendously significant shift in the
 historic pattern of rivalry and geopolitical competition between Brazil and
 Argentina. Previous disputes have been settled; diplomatic, military and eco-
 nomic resources are no longer committed to opposing the other side; and the
 two countries are enmeshed in an increasingly dense process of cooperation
 and integration across a range of issues. Power and relative power have not
 wholly disappeared from the equation, especially to many in Argentina who
 fear that deep integration with Brazil is bringing excessive dependence.
 Equally, thinking on security continues to be influenced by persisting foreign
 policy differences (for example, Argentina's determination to secure from
 Washington the (symbolic) status of special non-NATO ally, in marked contrast
 to Brazil's more independent stance vis-a-vis the United States). Nevertheless,
 the problem of Brazilian power is no longer understood in strategic, let alone
 mnilitary, terms and the idea of actively opposing Brazilian power has largely
 disappeared.
 If there is an emerging security community around the Mercosur countries,
 what are its boundaries? The most immediate issue concerns Chile. The long
 history of territorial conflict with Argentina and of the shared perception of
 territorial losses at the other's expense goes back to the early days of state for-
 mation in the I820S. In addition, Chile has long been part of the balance of
 power system in the Southern Cone, and balance of power thinking and, later,
 geopolitical analysis has become deeply ingrained in the mnilitary establishments
 of the two countries. A protracted arms race and the renewal of conflict over
 the islands in the Beagle Channel brought the two countries close to war in
 the I970s. However, since then, there have been many positive developments.
 Starting with the I984 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which settled the
 Beagle dispute, 23 out of the 24 outstanding border disputes have been settled
 (the 24th has been agreed by governments but is stuck in Argentina's congress).
 Chile has taken part in a number of arms control and confidence-building
 measures, notably the Mendoza Declaration of i99i on chemical and biologi-
 cal weapons, also signed by Brazil and Argentina. Contacts between the military
 establishments of Chile and other states have grown in frequency and density
 since i986, and in November I995 a memorandum of understanding on
 security affairs was agreed with Argentina. Diplomatic and political exchanges
 have flourished, and by I995 Chile had decided to shift its position on
 Mercosur to seek closer relations (although not membership), signing an
 association agreement in June I 996.
 And yet there remain grounds for hesitancy. Securing domestic political
 support for the delineation of historically contested boundaries has not been
 easy. While domestic disgrace, external defeat and severe economic stringency
 have forced the Argentinian military to rethink its roles, the Chilean military
 has retained a much more traditional conception of both its mission and the
 nature of regional international politics. It also has the political autonomy and
 resources to press for weapons modernization.This modernization programme
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 Security in Latin America
 (and the decision of the United States in August I 997 to lift its ban on selling
 high-technology weapons into the region) represents an important test of the
 new climate of regional confidence and security cooperation.
 Further to the north, it is very difficult to talk of anything resembling even a
 loosely knit security community. Historically, in this subregion balancing
 behaviour and threats of force have been common, and the possibility of using
 force as part of foreign policy has been taken for granted by the militaries of
 many South and Central American states. Since the late I98os it is possible to
 highlight positive developments: the success of regional pacification in Central
 America, involving confidence-building measures, regional mediation efforts
 and an active role for the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS) and the UN;
 the growth in the I98os of new forms of political association, especially in the
 form of the Rio Group; the spread of economic integration and cooperation
 agreements; and the reinvigoration of the OAS, and its actions in Peru,
 Guatemala and Haiti.8 Yet, even in terms of traditional interstate security,
 serious problems remain, most obviously in the war between Peru and Ecuador
 which flared up in early I995, but also between Venezuela and Colombia where
 traditional border tensions have been fed by guerrilla activity; drugs and illegal
 immigration.
 How should we explain these evolving patterns of interstate security?
 Interpretations follow predictable lines. Realists and neo-realists look to
 geopolitical location, to the varying degree of insulation from extraregional
 influences and to the hegemonic or policing role of, first, Britain and then the
 United States. Within the region, they highlight the emergence of relatively
 autonomous regional balances of power (for example between Brazil,Argentina
 and Chile), as well as other material factors which have worked to restrain
 conflict-the absence of transport links, borders that were geographically
 removed from centres of political and economic activity, and military
 technologies that made itextremely difficult to bring power to bear in
 offensive wars of conquest. Neo-Marxists and neo-dependency theorists see
 the international relations of the region as reflecting developments in global
 capitalism, with first Britain and then the United States intervening in and
 manipulating local relationships in pursuit of their economic interests.
 International society theorists and constructivists stress the extent to which a
 shared cultural and historical experience, particular patterns of state formation
 and ongoing international interaction all combined to produce a strong
 regional diplomatic culture a regional society of states which, although still
 often in conflict, conceived themselves to be bound by a common set of rules
 and shared in the workings of common institutions. Liberals look to shifting
 patterns of domestic politics, to the fortunes of democratization within states,
 8 For an assessment of regional initiatives see Carl Kaysen, Robert A. Pastor and Laura W Reed, Eds,
 Collective responses to regional problems: the case of Latin America and the Caribbean (Cambridge, MA:
 American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1994).
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 to the quality and level of interdependence among states, to the pacifying
 impact of the region's insertion into the global economy, and to the role of
 institutions in helping states to maximize common interests.
 To what extent do liberal views of the links between political democracy and
 regional peace stand up to scrutiny? Not very well at all. Political liberalism has
 long argued that different kinds of states are likely to behave in different ways
 and that democratic or republican states are likely to be more peaceful. Modern
 democratic peace theory advances three specific arguments: first, that
 democracies almost never fight each other and very rarely consider the use of
 force in their mutual relations; second, that democracies are still prone to fight
 with non-democracies (there are variations here, with some arguing that
 democracies are as war-prone as non-democracies in interactions involving the
 latter, while others assert that even here democracies are more pacific); and
 third, that, while well-consolidated democracies interact peacefully,
 democratizing regimes are as aggressive and war-prone as, if not more so than,
 other kinds of states.9
 Although a straightforwardly Kantian account provides only a very
 incomplete picture of the motivation for and development of rapprochement
 between Brazil and Argentina, this case does provide an important counter-
 example to the claim that democratizing states are war-prone.'0 For it was
 democratization, rather than democracy per se, that was central to the rapproche-
 ment between Brazil and Argentina in the mid-ig8os; this was not a case of a
 'democratic peace' between two well consolidated democracies. In this period,
 the shared interests and perhaps shared identities came rather from a common
 sense of vulnerability: the shared conviction that democracy in both countries
 was extremely fragile and that non-democratic forces were by no means out of
 the game (witness the nilitary rebellions in Argentina in April I987, January
 I989 and December I990). Especially in Argentina, this perception led to the
 overt use of foreign policy as a means of protecting fragile and newly established
 democracy. In part this reflected the close and very concrete link between con-
 flict resolution abroad and democratic consolidation at home the need to pro-
 mote regional pacification in order to deprive the nationalists of causes around
 which to mobilize opinion, to demand a greater political role, or to press for
 militarization and rearmament. Thus regional peace becomes central to the
 maintenance of successful civil-military relations at home. But it also reflected
 the perceived importance of building up the idea and the rhetoric of external
 support: the idea of a club of states to which only certain governments are
 allowed to belong and in which cooperation becomes the international expres-
 sion and symbol both of new democracies and of the end of old rivalries.
 9 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Synder, 'Democratization and the danger of war', International Security 20: I,
 Summer I995, pp. 5-38.
 IO For a strong Kantian account of Southern Cone international politics, see Philippe C. Schmitter,
 'Change in regime type and progress in international relations', in Emanuel Adler and Beverly
 Crawford, eds, Progress in postwar international relations (NewYork, NY: Columbia University Press, I99I).
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 Security in Latin America
 Elsewhere, however, the cases of Colombia and Venezuela and of Peru and
 Ecuador seem to support the thesis that domestically insecure liberalizing states
 in unstable neighbourhoods pose potential problems for regional security. But,
 much more importantly, Latin America is a critical case for the two sets of issues
 around which the democratic peace debate has come to revolve: the question
 of definitions, and the identification of plausible causal logics.
 Establishing the existence of a democratic peace has involved many argu-
 ments about definitions.What counts as war? How do you code democracies?
 Many of the most hotly contested issues find ready examples in Latin America
 -defining war in such a way as to excludes interventions by one democracy
 against another (as with US involvement in Allende's overthrow in Chile);
 defining war only in terms of actual fighting above a certain level of intensity
 (if you count militarized interstate disputes, then Latin America looks much
 more conflictual); looking only at international war and thereby neglecting the
 many difficult issues raised by civil wars and domestic violence."
 The second reason has to do with the processes and causal logics that might
 explain the democratic peace. There is quite general agreement that the struc-
 tural constraints of democratic institutions and of democratic politics can only
 with great difficulty be used to explain the existence of a separate peace exclu-
 sively between democracies. Hence much discussion has revolved around so-
 called normative explanations, based not on the role of democratic institutions
 in pushing actors towards pacific behaviour by affecting their instrumental
 calculus of interest, but rather on the process by which democratic norms work
 to shape the motivations, perceptions and practices of actors and the way in
 which 'democracies externalize their domestic political norms of tolerance and
 compromise in their foreign relations, thus making war with others like them
 unlikely.' "2
 Democratic politics, so claim the proponents of this explanation, foster a very
 different climate from authoritarian rule. Rule-governed change is a basic
 principle. The use of coercive force outside the structure of rules is proscribed.
 Trust, reciprocity and the rule of law are at the heart of democratic politics. And
 yet this thesis, positing the externalization of domestic democratic norms, is
 particularly difficult to apply convincingly to patterns of conflict in Latin
 America: first, because the fortunes of domestic democracy have fluctuated so
 widely while regional order has been relatively stable; and second, because of
 the striking contrast between frequently high levels of domestic disorder and
 social violence (even under democratic governments) and the relative degree
 of inter-state peace.
 " These issues are discussed very well in Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: a reappraisal of the theory that
 "democracies do not go to war witheach other"', Review of International_Studies 20: 3,July I994.
 I2 Steve Chan,'In search of democractic peace: problems and promise', Mershon International Studies Review
 4I, I997, p. 77.
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 Andrew Hurrell
 Economic integration and regional security
 As other articles in this issue demonstrate, the past decade has witnessed a very
 significant expansion of regional economic integration. Mercosur has proved
 far more successful and durable than many predicted, and is striving both to
 deepen the integration process among its members and to broaden its
 membership through association agreements with Chile, Bolivia and the
 Andean Pact. Following the historic shift in US trade policy that led to the
 creation of NAFTA, the process of hemispheric integration has moved
 progressively, if unevenly and ambiguously, forward with the Santiago summit
 setting the agenda for the next stage of negotiations.
 Beyond formal interstate integration agreements, it is also clear that
 regionalization has become an increasingly important phenomenon.'3
 Regionalization refers to the growth of societal integration within a region and
 to the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction involved
 in this trend. One element is economic. Although seldom unaffected by state
 policies, the most important driving forces for economic regionalization come
 from markets, from private trade and investment flows, and from the policies
 and decisions of companies. But another important element is societal and
 transnational: increasing flows of people, the development of multiple channels
 and complex social networks by which ideas, political attitudes and ways of
 thinking spread from one area to another, leading to the creation of a trans-
 national regional civil society.
 How do these processes interact with security? Liberals have traditionally
 argued that economic liberalization and increasing levels of interdependence
 promote peace: first, at the state level, by affecting material incentives and by
 pressing governments towards new forms of institutionalized cooperation; and
 second, by promoting increased societal integration which will lead social
 groups and political actors to develop new conceptions of interest, communi-
 ty and identity. More recent constructivist writing has taken this interpretation
 further. Institutionalized economic regionalism is important to security, not
 because the costs of fighting become too high according to some abstract mea-
 sure, but rather because it anchors and promotes processes of socialization and
 enmeshment through which definitions of interests and identities may shift,
 altering the values of members and the ways in which costs/benefits and ratio-
 nal action are construed. The positive mutual reinforcement between domestic
 social and political change in postwar Germany and the country's position in a
 strongly institutionalized process of integration provides the clearest example of
 this idea.
 Within Latin America, Mercosur represents the best case which can plausibly
 be taken to illustrate these liberal arguments. Here politics, economics and
 13 See Andrew Hurrell, 'Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics', Review of International
 Studies 2I, October i995.
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 Security in Latin America
 security have been continually intertwined (albeit in very different ways to the
 'twin-track' EC/NATO model), and the positive reinforcement between them
 has been and remains particularly important in sustaining the momentum of
 cooperation.
 In addition, there are various ways in which economic regionalism can be
 viewed as a means of managing potential security challenges. There is a widely
 shared sense that new security issues need to be tackled within the context of
 economic development because of 'the resistance of new security challenges
 to resolution via traditional security instruments'.'I4Thus regional and interna-
 tional financial institutions have increasingly come to grapple with political and
 security issues (for example in Central America), thereby adding 'peace condi-
 tionalities' to the ever-growing list of non-economic factors that influence their
 lending policies.
 A further way of linking economic regionalism to security is through the
 idea of inclusion: extending the benefits of economic regionalism to potentially
 unstable areas and manipulating the criteria for admission to a regional
 grouping. Even if a security community has been created within a given
 region, security will depend crucially on what happens around the boundaries
 of that community. Hence the central strategic justification for EU
 enlargement, with its accompanying rhetoric about the impossibility of
 remaining an island of peace in a troubled sea. The idea here is to manipulate
 both the prospect of eventual membership and the creation of specific criteria
 for admission in order to lock surrounding states into policies that are deemed
 to promote stability: economic liberalization, protection of human rights and
 democracy, and changes in military structure and organization (through
 Partnership for Peace).
 This notion of security through inclusion can be applied to aspects of US
 policy towards Mexico in the process leading up to NAFTA. But the lack of a
 firm domestic consensus about the wisdom of NAFTA suggests that there is
 much more ambiguity here than in the European case. Moreover, at both the
 administrative and the political level there is deep ambiguity as to whether US
 interests would be best served by further inclusionary moves (especially outside
 the narrow economic sphere). Although Mercosur has developed as an
 explicitly political as well as economic grouping (similar to the EU but very
 different from NAFTA), its members have only begun to consider the
 management of political membership criteria (most notably in the case of
 Paraguay) and what may happen as the grouping extends northwards into
 politically far more troubled areas.
 Finaliy, economic regionalism is important to security management because
 it influences the ways in which security interests are defined and understood.
 14Janne E. Nolan, 'The concept of cooperative security', in janne E. Nolan, ed., Global engagement: coopera-
 tion and secuirity in the 2lSt century (Washingston, DC: Brookings Institution, I994), p. 4.
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 Higher levels of economic and societal interdependence increase the degree to
 which states are vulnerable to developments beyond their borders.The creation
 of formalized economic regionalism (as in the cases of NAFTA and Mercosur)
 both promotes further interdependence and dramatically increases the political
 stakes in the stability of one's neighbours. Increased integration is also likely to
 expand the range of involvement by non-governmental organizations acting
 within an increasingly dense regional transnational civil society. As is evident in
 many cases of social conflict in the region (Colombia, Mexico, Peru), NGOs
 and issue networks are deeply involved in domestic politics. In Central
 America, for example, human rights and development NGOs have become
 conduits for significant material and financial resources, as well as providers of
 both political legitimacy and international voice.They can therefore play a key
 role in influencing what sorts of issues come to be defined in security terms
 and their degree of regional political salience.Economic regionalism can, however, be much more directly implicated in
 the generation of insecurity. The liberalization of economic exchanges facilitates
 illicit flows of all kinds, especially when this liberalization forms part of a more
 general shift in power from the state to the market. Such illicit activities may
 then spill over into interstate relations. Within Latin America, the persistent
 tensions along the Colombian-Venezuelan border provide one example of
 how uncontrolled illicit flows can fuel interstate tensions.The recent concern
 in Uruguay and Paraguay caused by the potential spill over of Brazilian rural
 violence provides another example.
 Successful economic integration is likely to be socially destabilizing and
 promote processes of change that erode established identities, undermine estab-
 lished ways of conducting national politics and, perhaps most seriously, reduce
 state capacity and state coherence.The socio-cultural challenges of integration
 can threaten what has been termed'societal security', and there is no doubt that
 this has been one element in the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas. In addition, the
 very power of a dynamic and prosperous region can provoke disturbing
 changes in the social structures and political arrangements of neighbouring
 states (Mexico in this region; but consider also the cases of Slovakia or Turkey).
 Liberalization and integration can also erode the capacity of states to respond
 to security challenges, in three main ways. In the first place, economic
 liberalization can undermine established patterns of core-periphery or
 federal-state relations because of the degree to which the benefits of liberalization
 are unequally distributed. Second, the abdication of Latin American states of their
 older regulatory and redistributive roles may well make it far more difficult to
 forge durable alliances with those groups in civil society most affected by
 marginality, poverty and inequality. While repression and coercion may still be
 available options, the capacity of the state to coopt opposition and to buy off
 discontent has diminished dramatically. As Alan Knight has argued, what is novel
 about the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas is not the Zapatistas but rather the very
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 Security in Latin America
 different position of the Mexican state. ' 5 Third, economic integration erodes dis-
 tinctions between domestic politics and 'foreign' policy, drawing in external
 actors (both states and NGOs). The result is often a deeply problematic
 relationship between domestic attempts to manage and contain violence and a
 changing set of international and transnational pressures. This two-level dynamic
 has been central to the difficulties of managing social conflict in both Colombia
 and Mexico.
 Whether these negative features become serious clearly depends on how they
 are managed. The early theorists of regional integration understood that
 integration would produce tensions, but assumed that these would lead
 ultimately both to deeper integration and to the construction of effective
 regional institutions. The US-Mexico case underlines the difficulties with this
 rather cosy liberal logic. Clearly, deepening societal and economic
 interdependence has created a series of negative cross-border externalities
 (drugs, migration, environmental damage). But although there has been a
 gradual process of increased institutionalized cooperation, these problems have
 generated a good deal of political conflict. In the cases of drugs and migration,
 much of this conflict has been tied up with the degree to which militarization
 and securitization are appropriate policy responses. Indeed, the increased
 militarization of the border stands as a telling reminder of the wide range of
 unresolved policy conflicts.
 New security challenges
 As in other parts of the world, the terms of the security debate in Latin America
 have shifted dramatically over the past ten years. The Cold War discourse of
 communist subversion has disappeared and the classical geopolitical discourse
 of national security has mostly (but by no means entirely) receded into the
 background. There are increasingly common and increasingly strident
 arguments that security should be broadened to include drug trafficking, drug-
 related violence and criminality, migration and refugees, environmental
 degradation, and worsening public order in the face of different forms of
 internal violence.These new security threats, it is argued, derive not from state
 strength, military power and geopolitical ambition, but rather from state
 weakness and the absence of political legitimacy; from the failure of states to
 provide minimal conditions of public order within their borders; from the way
 in which domestic instability and internal violence can spill into the
 international arena; and from the incapacity of weak states to form viable
 building blocks of a stable regional order and to contribute towards the
 resolution of broader common purposes.
 IS Alan Knight, 'Political violence in postrevolutionary Mexico', mimeo I997, p. 24.
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 Such views for an expanded security agenda rest on three core arguments.'6
 The first is that the critical question, 'Whose security?' can no longer be
 adequately answered exclusively in terms of the state in other words, that the
 referent object of security should include, below the state, individuals and other
 collectivities (minorities, ethnic groups, indigenous peoples) and, above the
 state, humanity at large (people in general, and not just the citizens of a partic-
 ular state) and also the biosphere on which human survival depends. The
 second is that any meaningful analysis of security must consider the importance
 of a much wider range of threats, including threats whose origin lies in
 environmental destruction, in economic vulnerability and in the breakdown of
 social cohesion. And the third is that responsibility for the provision of security
 rests not just on the state but on international institutions and on NGOs and
 civil society operating within an increasingly active transnational civil society.
 Even a cursory survey of the region would seem to suggest that a great deal
 of recent instability and insecurity should be understood in this way.The most
 pressing issues on the security agenda are internal or transnational rather than
 interstate. Significant parts of the region are beset by high levels of social
 violence which often has deep historical roots but is exacerbated by drug
 trafficking and drug-related criminality, by social inequality and
 marginalization, by migration and refugee flows, and by environmental
 degradation. In countries such as Peru, Colombia and Mexico there has been
 a marked decline in the capacity of the state and state structures to deal with
 these problems, as witnessed by the strikingly high levels of impunity, the
 existence of large areas where the writ of the state barely runs, and increased
 contamination of the state and military by drug-related corruption.
 The declining capacity of the state to enforce legitimate order has led to the
 privatization of violence as diverse social groups are increasingly able to
 mobilize armed force; but also to the privatization of security as social groups
 seek to protect themselves, whether through vigilantism, the formation of
 paramilitary groups or the purchase of security within an expanding
 commercial marketplace. Finally, while the end of the Cold War contributed to
 the negotiated end to political insurgency in Nicaragua, El Salvador andGuatemala, the post-Cold War period has seen a new generation of insurgency
 and political violence in the region-in Chiapas and Guerrero in Mexico and
 in the expanding activities of the FARC and ELN in Colombia.
 We should be somewhat cautious of interpreting these problems through the
 extreme and exaggerated categories of'failed states' and'coming anarchy' that
 are often applied to other parts of the developing world. There has not been a
 sudden move in the region away from the condition of secure and stable states.
 Latin American states, even relatively effective and efficient ones, have never
 16 For three important examples see Richard H. Ullmnan,'Redefining security', International Security 8,
 Summer I983;Jessica Tuchman Matthews, 'Redefining security', Foreign Affairs 68, Spring i989; and
 Emma Rothschild, 'What is security?', Dedalus, Summer I995.
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 Security in Latin America
 been particularly striking examples of Weberian rationality. Their struggle to
 assert effective territorial control, to secure a favourable balance of military
 power against challengers, and to develop efficient administrative structures was
 a long-drawn-out, uneven and contested process. Levels of violence have var-
 ied enormously across countries and across time. Within countries there has
 been great variation between regions or between national and provincial poli-
 tics. Moreover, in the history of state formation in Latin America distinctions
 between public and private violence were (and remain) hard to draw with any
 clarity. The power and authority of the state often depended on local political
 elites whose power in turn rested on their ability to use or threaten (and to
 offer protection from) physical violence, sometimes employing private gunmen
 or henchmen, at other times public officials.
 It is also important to underline the sheer complexity and multiplicity of
 violence. Both academic analysts and policy-makers are understandably
 attracted by neat categorizations. It is common to distinguish between political
 violence on the one hand ('planned, deliberate, carried out by organized groups
 of society against other groups') from individual violence on the other ('pur-
 poseless, random, individual violence').'I7Yet such a dichotomy misses out far
 too much and we clearly need further categories, in order to recognize the
 distinctness of, for example, political violence (civil wars and struggles between
 civilian and military groups; armed insurrection and revolutionary movements;
 terrorism); entrepreneurial violence (criminal organization whose key
 characteristic is the capacity to supply private protection or to use violence for
 profit); community violence (responses to lack of effective state power by
 communities to enforce social norms, seen most notably in the growing
 prevalence of vigilantism); and everyday individual-level criminal violence.
 Most internal conflict in Latin America is characterized by a multiplicity of
 different forms of violence which overlap and are superimposed on one
 another in complex ways which vary from place to place and from period to
 period.I8 Thus what may appear at one time as entrepreneurial violence or
 community violence can at another juncture take on a more overtly political
 character. Indeed, one of the most important policy issues facing governments
 is whether to legitimize an outbreak of social violence by treating it as a polit-
 ical act and attempting to draw its leaders into open political dialogue. This
 complexity, and the close coexistence of high levels of economic prosperity and
 successful democratic consolidation with social violence, marginality and
 human rights abuses, also make a nonsense of the view that the post-Cold War
 world can be neatly divided into zones of peace and zones of conflict. I9
 '7 Tina Rosenberg, Children of Cain: violence and the violent in Latin America (NewYork, NY: Morrow, I99I),
 p. I2; and similarly in David Keane, Reflections on violence (London:Verso, I996). Security analysts have
 concentrated overwhelmingly on what is taken to be political violence, a recent example being Michael
 Brown, ed., The international dimensions of internal conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, I996).
 I8 For a typology of the multiple violences that characterize recent Colombian politics, see Comisi6n de
 Estudios sobre la Violencia, Colombia: violencia y democracia, 4th edn (Bogota, Editorial Universidad
 Nacional, I 995), pp. 3 I-I 62.
 19 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The real world order: zones of peace/zones of turmoil (Chatham, NJ:
 Chatham House Publishers, I993).
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 Andrew Hurrell
 On closer inspection, however, this new security agenda turns out to be a
 good deal more ambiguous and contested than this picture would suggest.Why,
 after all, should these clearly serious and pressing problems be considered as
 security issues and, more particularly, as regional security issues? One answer is
 normative. As a simple matter of morality, it is argued, security is fundamentally
 about the promotion of human safety in the face of all kinds of existential
 threats. The difficulty with this argument is that large-scale group violence
 cannot be analysed in terms of the sum of individual insecurities. The use of
 coercive force and social violence between states or other social groups needs
 to be understood according to its own distinctive logic and, as such, remains at
 the heart of security analysis.20 In addition, the normative argument cannot tell
 us anything very useful about the politics of security: why only certain issues
 come to be viewed as security problems and what the consequences of those
 choices may be.
 A second answer also seeks objectivity, but of a material rather than a moral vari-
 ety. On this view, new security challenges should be viewed as regional security
 problems only where drugs, social upheaval, political violence or environmental
 destruction creates a negative physical externality that directly affects neighbour-
 ing states. What happens within states is regionally significant in security terms
 only if there are identifiable material linkages or externalities that impinge on
 neighbouring states.2I The difficulty, again, is that this fails to provide an accurate
 account of how the regional security agenda is actually constructed politically.
 It is misleading to claim that violent internal conflict 'almost always affects
 and involves neighbouring states, thereby undermining regional stability'.22
 Historically Latin America is distinctive in that high levels of domestic violence
 and social conflict have coexisted with a relatively low level of interstate wars.23
 It is also the case that much serious domestic violence-even very large-scale
 social conflict such as the violencia in Colombia-has remained largely
 contained within national borders. In this respect the region is more fortunate
 than most other parts of the developing world. State structures are more secure
 and durable. Ethnic cleavages are less menacing although not entirely absent,
 especially in the Andean republics and Central America. And the stability of
 borders is not called into question by nationalist or secessionist movements. But
 where internal violence has spilled over, whether during or since the Cold War,
 it has not been solely the result of'material externalities'.
 20 It is this, rather than the problem of conceptual fuzziness, that represents the most serious problem with
 expanded notions of security. For a recent discussion see Lawrence Freedman,'International security:
 changing targets',Foreign Policy I I0, Spring i998.
 2I For a thorough elaboration of this view see David Lake, 'Regional security complexes: a systems
 approach' in David A. Lake and Patrick Morgan, eds, Regional orders: building security in a new world
 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, I997).
 22 Michael Brown, 'Introduction', in Brown, ed., The international dimensions of internal conflict, p. 3.
 23 Indeed, Malcolm Deas suggests that there may in fact be a link between levels of domestic violence and
 interstate conflict, and that Colombians were able to continue fighting among themselves precisely
 because of the absence of external enemies. See Malcolm Deas, 'Canjes violentos: reflexiones sobre la
 violencia', in M. Deas and F Gaitan Daza, eds, Dos Ensayos expeculativos sobre la violencia en Colombia
 (Bogata: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1995), pp. 20-I.
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 Security in Latin America
 Without neglecting either normative commitments or the importance of mate-
 rial forces, security analysis needs to be very aware of the variety of ways in which
 security threats are defined and constructed.Take, for example, the claim that drug
 trafficking has become the most serious threat to the national security of the
 region.This can mean many different things that need to be separated out analyt-
 ically: first, a very traditional challenge to state security because of the size of the
 illicit drug economy or because of the violence to which the drug trade gives rise;
 second, an equally traditional challenge to regime security because of the corrosive
 impact of the drug trade and drug economy on traditional political structures;
 third, a challenge to societal security because of the erosion of trust and cooperation
 within both political institutions and civil society; and fourth, a challenge to human
 security because of the worsening conditions of social order and, all too common-
 ly, because of the erosion of human rights by governments and militaries intent on
 suppressing drug production and the drug trade. The nature of the response will
 vary greatly according to the particular kind of security that is being emphasized.
 We also need to take great care in unravelling precisely how problems come
 to be treated as security problems; how they are'securitized' to use Ole Waever's
 inelegant but rather useful term.24 Here the critical point is that the actors
 involved in the process of securitization may be wholly distinct from the
 objects of security. An issue becomes a security issue because a particular group
 or institution has successfully forced it on to the security agenda, not because
 it is in some objective sense important or threatening. The process of threat
 creation (the 'how') is therefore a central part of the explanation (the 'why').
 Finally, the successful translation of an issue into a security issue is important
 because the language of security is far from innocent and has important
 political implications. Security is often used in order to highlight the
 importance of an issue and to build political support-as is clearly the case with
 the 'war on drugs' in the United States.Yet, while liberals are themselves often
 attracted by this strategy (as in the case of environmental security), they are all
 too aware that securitization can often lead to calls for militarization and for
 the adoption of distinctly illiberal policies. Thus, drawing Latin American
 militaries into the 'war against drugs' or into the provision of public order
 carries with it a very high risk of repeating the human rights abuses and
 brutality of the past, not least because militaries are much more likely than
 police forces to think in terms of enemies.
 Conclusion
 The absence of clear links between political democracy and regional order does
 not mean that the region is ripe for conflict. As indicated earlier, there are many
 other factors which can be used to explain the history of relative interstate peace.
 But it does mean that the mantra of democracy and democracy promotion
 24 Ole Waever,'On securitization and desecuritization', in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., On security (New York,
 NY: Columbia University Press, I995).
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 cannot be seen as an alternative to the effective management of regional securi-
 ty. Equally, while economic integration may bring many benefits, it also poses a
 series of challenges that have not been sufficiently addressed and which, if
 unmanaged, could become more serious in the years ahead. Regionalism is an
 extremely complex process made up of not one but a series of competing logics
 -logics of economic and technological transformation and societal integration;
 logics of power-political competition; logics of security; and logics of identity,
 community and sovereignty.There is no reason at all to suppose that these logics
 automatically tend towards social or regional stability, especially given the weak-
 ness of regional institutions and the fragility of many states.
 In terms of interstate security, the challenges facing the region include the
 development of more effective collective responses to old-style border conflicts
 which may be exacerbated by weakened state capacities, uncertain domestic
 politics and the destabilization of border regions as a result of processes of
 regionalization. In the Southern Cone the need is to protect what has been
 gained over the past decade from disagreements over foreign policy, from external
 shocks (e.g. the resumption of US sales of sophisticated weapons) and from the
 strains that will accompany the technological modernization of armed forces.25
 In terms of the new security agenda, developing regional responses will be a
 far more difficult enterprise, for three reasons. First, because, below the level of
 rhetoric, there is very little consensus as to what the new security agenda means
 or implies. The emphasis placed on these new security issues is uneven and
 varies considerably across the region, reflecting wide differences in state
 interest, in civil-military relations, and in historical experiences and traditions.
 Moreover, the idea of an expanded security agenda is itself intrinsically
 complex and contested, and a great deal hangs on the ways in which core
 concepts are understood and employed politically. Second, because unlike
 traditional threats which press allies together, problems such as drug-related
 criminality, migration and terrorism tend to undermine regional consensus
 because of the enormous difficulties of defining state interests and, especially,
 deciding upon the appropriate role for the use of military force. And third,
 because of the two factors which together condition the politics of security in
 the Americas. On the one hand, deeper and denser interdependence across the
 region is increasing levels of mutual vulnerability, and any effective regional
 order will consequently impinge very deeply on how societies are organized
 domestically. But on the other, the region is still marked politically by
 inequalities of power-between Brazil and its neighbours within South
 America, but, much more importantly, between the United States and the rest
 of the hemisphere. It is this combination of interdependence and inequality
 that makes regional security management so difficult.
 25 The Falklands/Malvinas question provides a good example of where the economic development of
 natural resources may well come to strain the delicate process of confidence-building that has been
 developed through the i99os: not just because a large-scale development of oil reservesraises the
 material stakes involved in interstate bargaining, but also because development will affect the lifestyles
 and 'societal security' of the islanders and because regionalization processes will inevitably open new
 patterns of interaction with the mainland.
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	Contents
	p. 529
	p. 530
	p. 531
	p. 532
	p. 533
	p. 534
	p. 535
	p. 536
	p. 537
	p. 538
	p. 539
	p. 540
	p. 541
	p. 542
	p. 543
	p. 544
	p. 545
	p. 546
	Issue Table of Contents
	International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No. 3 (Jul., 1998) pp. 505-743
	Front Matter [pp. ]
	Abstracts [pp. ]
	Erratum: Militarism and Human Rights [pp. ]
	International Nuclear Relations after the Indian and Pakistani Test Explosions [pp. 505-528]
	Security in Latin America [pp. 529-546]
	A Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2005? [pp. 547-561]
	The Brazilian Economy: Recent Developments and Future Prospects [pp. 563-575]
	The Brazilian Policy of Sustainable Defence [pp. 577-585]
	From Civil War to 'Civil Society': Has the End of the Cold War Brought Peace to Central America? [pp. 587-615]
	Towards Rapprochement? Anglo-Argentine Relations and the Falklands/Malvinas in the Late 1990s [pp. 617-630]
	Book Reviews
	International Relations and Organizations
	Review: untitled [pp. 631-632]
	Review: untitled [pp. 633]
	Review: untitled [pp. 633-634]
	Review: untitled [pp. 634-635]
	Review: untitled [pp. 635-636]
	Review: untitled [pp. 636-637]
	Review: untitled [pp. 637]
	Review: untitled [pp. 637-638]
	Review: untitled [pp. 638-639]
	Review: untitled [pp. 639]
	Review: untitled [pp. 639-640]
	Review: untitled [pp. 640-641]
	Review: untitled [pp. 641-642]
	Review: untitled [pp. 642-643]
	Review: untitled [pp. 643]
	Review: untitled [pp. 643-644]
	Review: untitled [pp. 644-645]
	Review: untitled [pp. 645]
	Review: untitled [pp. 646]
	Security and the Military Dimension
	Review: untitled [pp. 646-647]
	Review: untitled [pp. 647-648]
	Review: untitled [pp. 648-649]
	Politics, Social Affairs and Law
	Review: untitled [pp. 649-650]
	Review: untitled [pp. 651]
	Review: untitled [pp. 651-652]
	Review: untitled [pp. 652-653]
	Review: untitled [pp. 653-654]
	Ethnicity and Cultural Politics
	Review: untitled [pp. 654]
	Review: untitled [pp. 654-656]
	Review: untitled [pp. 656-658]
	Review: untitled [pp. 658]
	Political Economy, Economics and Development
	Review: untitled [pp. 658-659]
	Review: untitled [pp. 659-660]
	Review: untitled [pp. 660-661]
	Review: untitled [pp. 661-662]
	Review: untitled [pp. 662]
	Review: untitled [pp. 663]
	Review: untitled [pp. 663-664]
	Review: untitled [pp. 664-665]
	Review: untitled [pp. 665-666]
	Review: untitled [pp. 666]
	Review: untitled [pp. 666-667]
	Energy and Environment
	Review: untitled [pp. 667-668]
	Review: untitled [pp. 668]
	Review: untitled [pp. 668-669]
	Review: untitled [pp. 669]
	Review: untitled [pp. 669-670]
	History
	Review: untitled [pp. 670-671]
	Review: untitled [pp. 671-672]
	Review: untitled [pp. 672-673]
	Review: untitled [pp. 673-674]
	Review: untitled [pp. 674]
	Europe
	Review: untitled [pp. 675-676]
	Review: untitled [pp. 676-677]
	Review: untitled [pp. 677]
	Review: untitled [pp. 678]
	Review: untitled [pp. 678-679]
	Review: untitled [pp. 679-680]
	Review: untitled [pp. 680-681]
	Review: untitled [pp. 681]
	Review: untitled [pp. 681-682]
	Review: untitled [pp. 683]
	Review: untitled [pp. 684]
	Review: untitled [pp. 685]
	Review: untitled [pp. 685-686]
	Review: untitled [pp. 686]
	Review: untitled [pp. 686-688]
	Review: untitled [pp. 688]
	Review: untitled [pp. 688-689]
	Review: untitled [pp. 689-690]
	Review: untitled [pp. 690-691]
	Review: untitled [pp. 691-692]
	Russia and the Former Soviet Republics
	Review: untitled [pp. 692-693]
	Review: untitled [pp. 693-694]
	Review: untitled [pp. 695]
	Review: untitled [pp. 695-696]
	Review: untitled [pp. 696]
	Review: untitled [pp. 697]
	Middle East and North Africa
	Review: untitled [pp. 697-698]
	Review: untitled [pp. 698-699]
	Review: untitled [pp. 699-700]
	Review: untitled [pp. 700-701]
	Review: untitled [pp. 701-702]
	Review: untitled [pp. 702-703]
	Review: untitled [pp. 703]
	Review: untitled [pp. 703-705]
	Review: untitled [pp. 705]
	Review: untitled [pp. 706]
	Sub-Saharan Africa
	Review: untitled [pp. 706-707]
	Review: untitled [pp. 707-708]
	Review: untitled [pp. 708-709]
	Review: untitled [pp. 709-710]
	Asia and Pacific
	Review: untitled [pp. 710]
	Review: untitled [pp. 710-711]
	Review: untitled [pp. 711-712]
	Review: untitled [pp. 712-713]
	Review: untitled [pp. 713-714]
	Review: untitled [pp. 714]
	Review: untitled [pp. 714-715]
	Review: untitled [pp. 715-716]
	Review: untitled [pp. 716]
	Review: untitled [pp. 716-718]
	Review: untitled [pp. 718-719]
	North America
	Review: untitled [pp. 719]
	Review: untitled [pp. 720]
	Review: untitled [pp. 721]
	Review: untitled [pp. 721-722]
	Review: untitled [pp. 722-723]
	Latin America and Caribbean
	Review: untitled [pp. 723-724]
	Review: untitled [pp. 724-725]
	Review: untitled [pp. 725-726]
	Review: untitled [pp. 726]
	Review: untitled [pp. 726-727]
	Review: untitled [pp. 727-728]
	Review: untitled [pp. 728-729]
	Other Books Received [pp. 731-739]
	Back Matter [pp. ]