Nietzsche Amor Fati and the Gay Science

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Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University 
of London, on 21 January 2013 at 5:30 p.m.
©2013 The Aristotelian Soc
Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013
VIII—NIETZSCHE, AMOR FATI AND THE GAY 
SCIENCE
TOM STERN
Amor fati—the love of 
seem to point towards a p
are seldom defined. On a
to love whatever it is that
perhaps especially) all sor
by looking closely at 
concept—in book four o
es in that book. I argue 
writes about amor fati in
exegetical and philosoph
of the term. I’ll argue
Nietzsche’s amor fati wit
and which copes better w
The Trouble with Amo
lives which we are pow
things should be met, w
Indeed, perhaps the mos
they cannot be met wit
ample, of certain kinds
most readers, Nietzsche
more: we should not me
befall us.
This, prima facie, is n
we can’t choose what w
‘love’ would be someth
less magical. Yet anothe
choose to love, there ar
though they have shaped
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
fate—is one of many Nietzschean terms which
ositive ethics, but which appear infrequently and
 traditional understanding, Nietzsche is asking us
 happens to have happened to us—including (and
ts of horrible things. My paper analyses amor fati
Nietzsche’s most sustained discussion of the
f The Gay Science—and at closely related passag-
that by ignoring the context in which Nietzsche
 The Gay Science, we are liable to ignore several
ical problems with the traditional understanding
 for a different interpretation which locates
hin the philosophical project of The Gay Science
ith the objections that plague the traditional view.
I
r Fati. There are horrible things about our
erless to change. Plenty of us think those
here possible, with dignity or even serenity.
t fearful things are fearful precisely because
h dignity or serenity; I am thinking, for ex-
 of mental deterioration. But, according to
’s concept of amor fati demands something
rely accept, but love the terrible things that
ot an attractive ideal. One problem is that
e love. Another: if we could choose to love,
ing different—simpler, perhaps, but much
r, and the most significant: even if we could
e plenty of things we would choose not to,
 us and formed part of our fate. Put simply:
TOM STERN146
©2013 The Aristotelian Soc
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doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013
fate isn’t lovable. Adorno is among the first to object in this way.
Amor fati looked too much like the pathetic love of the captive for
the bars of his cage: ‘It would be worth asking the question whether
there is any more reason to love that which befalls one, to affirm
what is, because it is, than to hold as true what one hopes for’
(Adorno 1951, §61, my translation). In other words: why admire
those who change their desires to fit what they believe (lovers of
fate), rather than those who change what they believe to fit what
they desire (wishful thin
ticular, amor fati looks 
Stockholm syndrome, t
experience when they f
Stockholm syndrome (if
because we would like 
for their ultimate, affir
objection as ‘the problem
There are plenty of r
This paper sees what we
earliest appearance (and
also its most emphatic s
rism of book four of The
For the new year. —I
I still have to think. S
one allows himself to
want to say what I 
crossed my heart—w
sweetness of the rest 
see what is necessary
will be one of those w
my love from now o
do not even want to 
negation! And, all in 
a Yes-sayer. (gs 276)
With the possible exce
cedes it, this is the only
1 Christopher Hamilton (2000) 
which a total affirmation would
one which Nietzsche could not 
2 Nietzsche’s works are cited b
References section below for bib
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
kers)? After the Second World War, in par-
utterly unconscionable—a bloated form of
he condition that some captives reputedly
all in love with their captors. Presumably
 there really is such a thing) is a ‘syndrome’
to treat the sufferers; we do not envy them
mative achievement.1 I’ll refer to this third
 of unlovable fate’.
easons, then, to be suspicious of amor fati.
 can make of it through a close reading of its
 the context of that appearance), which is
tatement. This occurs in the opening apho-
 Gay Science (gs), which I reproduce in full:
’m still alive; I still think: I must be alive because
um, ergo cogito: cogito, ergo sum. Today every-
 express his dearest wish and thoughts: so I, too,
wish from myself today and what thought first
hat thought shall be the reason, warrant, and
of my life! I want to learn more and more how to
 in things as what is beautiful in them—thus I
ho makes things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be
n! I do not want to wage war against ugliness; I
accuse the accusers. Let looking away be my only
all and on the whole: some day I want only to be
2
ption of the poem which immediately pre-
 direct reference to amor fati in the whole
attempts to construct a notion of affirmation according to
 be possible in spite of unlovable fate—but it’s a religious
have accepted.
y abbreviated title and section/paragraph number; see the
liographical details of translations used.
NIETZSCHE, AMOR FATI AND THE GAY SCIENCE 147
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book.3 It is a highly suggestive passage—lots of big, meaty notions:
thinking and being; necessity and beauty; not to mention love and
fate. An outsider to the idiosyncratic world of Nietzsche scholarship
might expect those who have tried to comprehend amor fati to take
this passage, to look at the book in which Nietzsche published it,
and to see what, if anything, he says in that book about these big,
meaty notions with which amor fati is evidently connected. That, in
any case, is the method of this paper.
Love (1). In a recent ess
of amor fati to date, Bé
tation of the four loves
particularly agape and 
which responds (and ca
jects. Agape bestows pro
being loved just becaus
needs no training: it doe
forehand, because it is t
tage of her agapic readi
fate: fate becomes lovab
Conceptually, agapic 
It’s paradigmatically a d
plain how God could 
might wonder how hum
though, is exegetical. To
known the classical Gre
they are derived, there’s
guished between eros a
lines. Schopenhauer, N
understands them comp
has more to do with ma
3 The poet’s soul becomes ever h
4 There is no neat, uncontrovers
there are four in the first place. S
as a straight Latin translation o
5 Eros is selfish and world-af
(Schopenhauer 1969, vol. i, §67
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
II
ay, the most thorough and direct treatment
atrice Han-Pile (2011) employs an interpre-
 of antiquity: agape, eros, caritas, philia—
eros.4 On her understanding, eros is a love
n be trained to respond) to properties of ob-
perties upon its objects: they are worthy of
e they are loved. Consequently, agapic love
sn’t matter what the love object was like be-
ransformed by agape. The principle advan-
ng is that it solves the problem of unlovable
le, transformed by agape.
amor fati leaves us with plenty of concerns.
ivine (Christian) form of love meant to ex-
love something as disgusting as us; so we
ans could generate it. The main problem,
 begin with, though Nietzsche would have
ek and New Testament contexts from which
 no particular reason to think that he distin-
nd agape along these particular conceptual
ietzsche’s greatest philosophical influence,
letely differently, and, conventionally, eros
nia or delusion than training.5 Han-Pile pro-
ealthier, ‘frei im liebevollsten Muss’.
ial characterization of the four, nor is there agreement that
chopenhauer, for example, follows many in treating caritas
f the Greek, agape (1969, vol. i, §§66–7).
firming; agape (= caritas) is selfless and world-denying); gs 14 has eros as a ‘craving’.
TOM STERN148
©2013 The Aristotelian Soc
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doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013
vides just one quotation to suggest that Nietzsche ever thinks of love
in terms of (her) agape: eight years before he mentions amor fati,
Nietzsche speaks of a ‘love that can bestow’. But the full context of
this remark shows that love bestows something on the lover, not, as
the agapic reading would have it, on the beloved (Nietzsche 1983,
§6, pp. 162–3; Han-Pile 2011, p. 232).
Generally, though, Han-Pile takes her projections to be legitimate
because Nietzsche’s own pronouncements on love are so minimal
(Han-Pile 2011, pp. 224
to see an aphorism dev
Gay Science as the amor
It is called ‘One must le
aphorism, if taken to in
her preferred interpreta
her terms) erotic, not ag
love everything (says Ni
certain properties; indu
love. Far from bestowin
the object and trains he
loved object ‘gradually 
and indescribable beaut
ess is characteristic of 
gs 276, note that Nietz
achieve amor fati, which
learning of gs 334.6 N
some pieces of music, a
duce in us—no matter h
like the love that Nietzs
Other Gay Science a
love; two suggested fea
something requires n
Nietzsche tells us, ‘the 
and worthless’ (gs 14
something else, then lov
might think that loving 
6 David Owen (2009) briefly dis
context is the rather different on
7 The context of this remark is h
thy, when often enough it is the
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
–5). Her reader must find it odd, therefore,
oted to love in the very same book of The
 fati aphorism, which she does not mention.
arn to love’. As even the title suggests, this
form gs 276, would run directly counter to
tion, in that a love that can be learned is (in
apic. The content bears this out. We learn to
etzsche) as we learn to love music: detecting
lgence; habituation; fear of loss; enraptured
g, the listener learns to pick out features of
rself to appreciate and love them as the be-
casts off its veil and presents itself as a new
y’ (gs 334). On Han-Pile’s terms, this proc-
erotic love. Looking back to the start of
sche wants to ‘learn more and more’ how to
 certainly looks to connect it with the love-
ow the problem of unlovable fate returns:
nd surely some aspects of fate, do not pro-
ow patient and indulgent we are—anything
che describes.
phorisms supplement Nietzsche’s view of
tures complicate the picture. First, loving
ot-loving something else: to the lover,
rest of the world appears indifferent, pale
).7 If loving something means not-loving
ing everything looks impossible. Second, we
something requires distorting it, not seeing it
cusses the connection between gs 334 and gs 276, but the
e of ‘self-love’.
is claim that love has been treated as selfless and praisewor-
 greedy quest for new property.
NIETZSCHE, AMOR FATI AND THE GAY SCIENCE 149
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for what it is, not knowing too much about it: ‘“The human being
under the skin” is an abomination and unthinkable to all lovers’
(gs 59).8 Here, loving a person means ignoring her natural physiol-
ogy. In Swift’s words: Celia shits. Again, this looks uncomfortable
for the conventional picture of amor fati: if loving means being kept
in the dark about some things, then how can we love what is neces-
sary? Some necessary things may well be an abomination to lovers;
indeed, in this instance, Nietzsche is talking about the difficulty of
loving what is (physiolo
Necessity (1). What sor
want to know, because
them as beautiful. The
(what is necessary) is co
and necessity, which fall
or is it the universal fate
necessary, or is it merel
understood as necessary
pending on how I think
just my own fate migh
others who are significa
Pile attempts to avoid s
fati by suggesting that 
(Han-Pile 2011, p. 246
does, the whole of Nietz
peculiar move to mak
Nietzsche could hardly 
from others when it com
ter, can one mark off p
sary, one is a piece of 
whole …’ (ti, vi 8); or, 
top to bottom, one mo
come and will be. Tellin
rything should change, 
8 gs 276 allows, of course, for ‘
9 See, for example, Staten (1990
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
gically) necessary.
III
ts of features are ‘necessary in things’? We
 in gs 276 Nietzsche wants to learn to see
 person who is supposed to love her fate
nfronted with a set of questions about fate
 roughly into two groups. First: is it my fate
? Second: is everything to be understood as
y certain features of things which are to be
. The scope of what I must love will vary de-
 these questions should be answered. Loving
t be an easier prospect than loving that of
ntly less fortunate than I am.9 Thus, Han-
ome of the less appealing features of amor
I don’t have to love the suffering of others
). From her point of view—using, as she
sche’s oeuvre to present amor fati—this is a
e. In Twilight of the Idols (ti), at least,
be clearer that one can’t separate oneself off
es to making judgements; nor, for that mat-
articular features of oneself: ‘One is neces-
fate, one belongs to the whole, one is the
again: ‘the individual is a piece of fate from
re law, one more necessity for all that is to
g him to change means demanding that eve-
even backwards’ (ti, v 6). If so, to love my
looking away’.
, pp. 75–6).
TOM STERN150
©2013 The Aristotelian Soc
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doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013
fate without loving your suffering would be to fail to love what is
necessary in things—namely, the monolithic whole, of which I am
just a part. In the context of Twilight, this is even more troubling,
because Nietzsche also holds very explicitly that one cannot make
value judgements about life as a whole—that is the ground of his in-
terpretation of the death of Socrates, which sets the philosophical
work of Twilight in motion and would seem, at first glance, to rule
out amor fati without further ado (ti ii).10
Restricting ourselves 
tions, at least as regards
ties’, we are told empha
can’t separate the world
tal, because ‘accidental’
phized world—a world
commands, is an organ
death of God (expressed
to seeing the universe as
ties, as The Gay Scienc
can carve out (and love)
dental or contingent. It 
is loving everything—e
happens to me and ever
problem of unlovable fa
ignorant.
Beauty. The place of b
gs 276. Identify what is
someone ‘who makes th
ty-making prompts the 
another reading, Aaron 
tion to the ‘self-styling’
pens, Nietzsche dedicat
10 For a reading of this section i
11 It is surprising, therefore, to f
to learn to choose between wha
about the matter; it is up to tho
would fit with his claims about 
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
to The Gay Science, we find similar sugges-
 all being necessary: ‘there are only necessi-
tically (gs 109). Here, the point is that we
 into what is necessary and what is acciden-
 only really makes sense in an anthropomor-
 which intends certain things, gives certain
ism or a machine with a purpose. After the
 in the previous aphorism) we must get used
 simple necessity.11 If there are only necessi-
e has it, then there’s no reason to think we
 the necessary, while leaving behind the acci-
looks very much like loving what’s necessary
verything that has been and will be, that
yone else. But that does nothing to solve the
te, not to mention love as comparative and
IV
eauty in relation to amor fati is evident in
 necessary; see it as beautiful; hence, become
ings beautiful’. On Han-Pile’s reading, beau-
agapic reading, which we have rejected. On
Ridley’s (2007), this should direct our atten-
 approach advocated in gs 290. As it hap-
es an aphorism of book four to a discussion
n relation to Twilight as a whole, see Stern (2009).
ind Nietzschescholars telling us that Nietzsche requires us
t is and is not necessary in things, as though there is a fact
se scholars to give us an explanation of how such a view
global necessity. See, for example, Owen (2009).
NIETZSCHE, AMOR FATI AND THE GAY SCIENCE 151
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of how to make things beautiful—a discussion which, like his treat-
ment of love, finds no place in Han-Pile’s analysis nor in Ridley’s.12
One question we might have here is whether Nietzsche thinks that
beauty is something which inheres in things or whether he thinks
beauty is something we attach to things (or some combination). On
the model of love explored earlier, all lovers are like the listener, dis-
covering beauty in the object of their love (albeit they avoid discov-
ering everything). This strongly suggests, of course, that beauty is
there to be found. This
‘the world is brimming 
we fail to recognize as
things, and amor fati i
then it’s only possible
beautiful—here we face
On the other hand, if
something we can ‘add’
we could make fate b
Nietzsche’s central disc
the context of his accou
the non-artistic case. gs
artists’. It opens as foll
things beautiful, attracti
themselves I think they 
To distance oneself fr
longer sees and much
or to see things arou
tracted from their co
torts the view one h
glimpses, or to look 
the sunset, or to give 
ent. (gs 299, Nietzsc
The concluding remark 
want to do the same thi
So we make things b
moving the informative
12 Mathias Risse (2009, p. 227
mention of what is involved in ‘m
force of the connection is lost.
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
 is echoed in another remark about beauty:
with beautiful things’ which, unfortunately,
 such (gs 339). If beauty is a property of
s seeing everything necessary as beautiful,
 if everything has the property of being
 the problem of unlovable (unbeautiful) fate.
 beauty is (contrary to gs 334 and gs 339)
 to things in perceiving them, then perhaps
eautiful. As with the discussion of love,
ussion of making things beautiful arises in
nt of art and then moves from the artistic to
299 is called ‘What one should learn from
ows: ‘What means do we have for making
ve, and desirable when they are not? And in
never are!’ The methods include:
om things until there is much in them that one no
 that the eye must add in order to see them at all,
nd a corner and as if they were cut out and ex-
ntext, or to place them so that each partially dis-
as of the others and allows only perspectival
at them through coloured glass or in the light of
them a surface and skin that is not fully transpar-
he’s emphasis)
is that artists merely do this with art, but we
ng with our own lives.
eautiful by distorting, misrepresenting, re-
 context, seeing only partially, fabricating,
) briefly connects gs 276 with gs 299; but he makes no
aking things beautiful’—namely distortion—and thus the
TOM STERN152
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and so on.13 And, at least according to gs 299, nothing is beautiful
in itself. For the reasons I have suggested, this latter claim doesn’t sit
terribly well with what Nietzsche has told us about love—namely,
that loving something is learning to detect and appreciate, amongst
other things, its beauty. But there it is: ‘in themselves I think they
[things] never are [beautiful]’ (gs 299).14 Commentators who think
amor fati means recognizing the beauty inherent in one’s fate must
explain how this should be reconciled not only with the problem of
unlovable fate, but also
scription of making bea
Tangle. We began with 
ence, noting that it emp
beautiful. We looked fo
might shed light on the
solve the problem of un
lems, which it may be h
(1) Loving require
isn’t beautiful.
(2) Loving require
fate means lovi
(3) Loving require
loved object; lo
what’s necessar
(4) Amor fati requ
beautiful mean
lovers of fate 
some distorted
13 See also gs 59.
14 See also gs 109. Note that N
against an agapic construal: ma
transforming through love; the 
15 Cf. Simon May’s claim that a
we each are, its necessity and its
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
, more pressingly, with Nietzsche’s own de-
utiful.15
V
the aphorism on amor fati in The Gay Sci-
loyed concepts like love, necessity, making
r other aphorisms in The Gay Science which
se concepts. We found plenty. But we didn’t
lovable fate; instead, we found more prob-
elpful to set out:
s recognizing the beauty in things, but fate
s preferring one thing to another, but loving
ng everything, altogether.
s ignorance about certain features of the be-
ving fate means loving what’s necessary; but
y is everything all at once.
ires making things beautiful; making things
s projecting, distorting and falsifying; but
are, one supposes, meant to love fate, not
 fantasy.
ietzsche’s remarks on beauty, if fed into gs 276, also count
king beautiful means distorting through presentation, not
object retains the qualities it always had.
mor fati ‘entails affirming … the “piece of fatefulness” that
 beauty’ (2009, p. 97).
NIETZSCHE, AMOR FATI AND THE GAY SCIENCE 153
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Taken together, this is a bit of a mess. We can either leave it there—
admit that no coherent notion of amor fati emerges—or we can
look further into what Nietzsche says, to make sense of these appar-
ent contradictions. In the remainder, I’ll make a case for a version of
the latter which addresses these concerns. What I want to emphasize
here is that the rival interpreter of gs 276 owes us an explanation of
how it relates to the other aphorisms we have explored—aphorisms
which explain ‘making beautiful’, ‘love’, ‘necessity’; aphorisms
which sit, in broad da
terms in Nietzsche’s pr
chooses to ignore these 
Necessity (2). Thus far, w
those features of the un
mankind: if we were to 
perception, we would fi
The Gay Science, plent
Such necessities are not
have it, ‘normatively str
is, necessary conditions
particular social institu
fact, they are surprising
all humans must do, if t
is: if we are to survive, 
cognitive abilities are ne
thinking, thinking mean
Nietzsche very clearly a
that there are ‘things’ at
of fate who seek for ‘wh
beautiful’).17 There app
broadly ‘evolutionary’: 
sions in order to survive
16 Ridley interprets amor fati’s ‘n
to one’s character; I discuss, bel
gs 290 in isolation from gs 10
out of one’s life, and both of wh
17 See gs 110, 111, 112, 121, 1
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
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ylight, alongside the appearance of those
esentation of amor fati. If a commentator
passages, she also owes us an explanation.
VI
e have taken ‘what is necessary’ to indicate
iverse which are necessary independently of
sneak behind the veil of human thought and
nd them waiting for us. But we also find, in
y of discussion of what is necessary for us.
 merely, as Ridley (2007, pp. 207–8) would
uctured constraints’ upon our actions—that
 for certain kinds of projects, arising from
tions like language or artistic practice.16 In
 and completely general claims about what
hey are to survive at all. The basic message
we must use our cognitive abilities; but our
cessarily entwined with error. Living means
s erring. This, after all, is the book in which
nd repeatedly considers it an error to think
 all (which poses a challenge to those lovers
at is necessary in things’ or to ‘make things
ear to be two main motivations. The first is
we are ‘wired’ to draw certain false conclu-
. The second looks straightforwardly meta-
ecessity’ in the light of gs 290’s remarks about giving style
ow, a tension in this passage. In any case, it isodd to read
7 and gs 299—both of which speak of making an artwork
ich firmly connect that process with error.
89, 228, 335; see also gs 58, 157.
TOM STERN154
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physical: the world is a permanently changing ‘flux’, but in order to
navigate through it we fabricate, simplify and falsify; little argument
is given, but Nietzsche is presumably drawing on his Schopenhaue-
rian inheritance.18 Whatever the motivations, this is clearly his view
and it isn’t meant to be taken lightly: insight into the errors at the
core of our cognition threatens to be ‘utterly unbearable’ (gs 107).
No doubt the Nietzsche of The Gay Science holds it as evident that
such errors are necessary for human survival. But as yet this merely
adds a further complica
analysis of love, beauty
bility; to cap it all: if we
tort the world through 
it’s likely that whatever
case be a distortion, no
any attempt to understa
grapple with its insisten
this last complication o
untangled.
Love (2). There is one 
love in a way that migh
mocks the ‘realists’—th
the world really is as
“reality”’. Given the sco
“reality”’, it’s unlikely 
amor fati; indeed, they 
seems, is twofold: first,
face value, as though (i
penhauer) the cloud the
nition; second, they take
sober and unemotional
for; but the ‘lovers of “
18 See esp. Schopenhauer (1969
ences.
19 See Schopenhauer (1969, vol.
these as errors. The next aphori
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
tion to the picture above: not only does the
 and necessity make loving fate an impossi-
 are to survive, we must manipulate and dis-
the employment of our cognitive powers, so
 we take to have happened to us will in any
t a neat representation of reality. No doubt
nd the amor fati of The Gay Science must
ce on error. Most shy away. Oddly enough,
ffers us a clue as to how the knot might be
VII
further place in which Nietzsche speaks of
t connect it to amor fati: in gs 57, Nietzsche
ose who (falsely, for Nietzsche) think that
 it appears to them—for their ‘love of
rn that Nietzsche pours upon the ‘lovers of
that they are the successful embodiment of
are amor fati gone wrong. Their mistake, it
 they take their perceptions of the world at
n Nietzsche’s example, perhaps from Scho-
y see is real and independent of human cog-
 their contemplations and perceptions to be
.19 Amor fati is something Nietzsche longs
reality”’ are to be mocked; their mistake, it
, vol. 1, §§13 and 30), though there are important differ-
i, §35). We have already seen why Nietzsche might think of
sm, for example, offers some familiar grounds. 
NIETZSCHE, AMOR FATI AND THE GAY SCIENCE 155
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seems, is to misunderstand both what the world is like and how
they necessarily stand in relation to it.
Commentators have a tendency, when quoting gs 276, to leave
out the opening sentences. In doing so, they cut out the one, solitary
specific ‘necessity’ that gets mentioned in that section—the ‘muss’,
which connects thinking and being (‘ich muss noch leben, denn ich
muss noch denken’). The point is, as we know, a very familiar one
from The Gay Science: to be alive, we have to think; but to think is
to err—and we don’t ge
in gs 189, that to be a ‘
are. Taking this ‘muss’ s
necessary for us means 
represent, simplify and m
earth, they must, mor
Nietzsche is saying, the
who loves that. If this is
it does bear upon our pr
standing of ‘what happ
erroneous way in wh
Nietzsche should not be
sufferings never really 
point is just that comin
faculties err must com
products. To be unawar
that we must love things
how we distort in appr
ridiculed in gs 57, not 
clear that some of the er
just what counts as ‘ne
sary means paying atten
gest on the basis of th
demand to love thy can
ing to terms with what 
ever your attitude towa
by the (suspect) manner
If we connect these r
20 gs 335 ends by encouraging u
who holds certain moral views 
isolated and repeated (i.e. that t
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
t any choice about that. Hence we are told,
thinker’ is to make things simpler than they
eriously, my suggestion is that loving what’s
loving that we get it wrong—that we mis-
isconstrue. If human beings are to walk the
e or less constantly, be in error. What
n, is that he wants to be the kind of person
 the intended object of Nietzsche’s love, then
oblem of unlovable fate: for our very under-
ens to us’ has already been modified by the
ich we stand towards the world. Now,
 read as telling us that our terrible fates and
happened, or that we invented them. The
g to terms with the fact that our cognitive
e first, prior to dealing with their suspect
e of our falsification of the world—to think
 as they appear to be, to pay no attention to
ehending—is to be those lovers of ‘reality’
gs 276’s lovers of fate. Indeed, since he is
rors we make are liable to mislead us about
cessary’, paying attention to what is neces-
tion to our errors.20 Amor fati, I would sug-
is reading, is not a personal theodicy—a
cer: it is, rather, the hope for a way of com-
is necessary for us, namely our error. What-
rds what happens to you, it is conditioned
 in which you conceive of such things.
emarks with Nietzsche’s claims about mak-
s to study what is necessary. It opens by mocking someone
as necessary by assuming, erroneously, that actions may be
here are ‘things’).
TOM STERN156
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ing beautiful, we can’t help but notice a certain similarity between
what Nietzsche thinks artists do to make things beautiful and what
we all do anyway, in error, to survive. What is necessary, I’ve said, is
misconstruing, distorting, simplifying and falsifying; what artists do
is just that, but knowingly, with a purpose; and, following his de-
scription of this artistic activity, Nietzsche demands that we do the
same for our own lives. What seems to be called for, then, is a kind
of second-order distortion in relation to the necessary first-order
distortion. We cope wit
erroneous practices to m
There is a further sec
mate Gratitude to Art’
tion. It opens as follows
Had we not approve
untrue, the insight in
en to us by science—
tion of cognitive and
(gs 107)
Science teaches that ou
error—something whic
hard to bear; what artis
mire. Error can’t be all 
are deliberate error-ma
why Nietzsche holds th
conditions of existence
structure is very similar,
tistic errors, ‘it is no lon
the river of becoming—
(gs 107).
The final part of gs 1
ance scientific insight in
error. With art, we can l
mands. More often tha
asks: ‘How then could w
a condition for our exis
condition for the existen
ognize this, that they m
recognize both of these 
with them. What we ha
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
h our immersion in error by using just those
ake this error beautiful.
tion of The Gay Science—called ‘Our Ulti-
—which certainly supports this interpreta-
:
d of the arts and invented this type of cult of the
to general untruth and mendacity that is now giv-
the insight into the delusion and error as a condi-
 sensate existence—would be utterly unbearable.
r thinking is bound up inextricably with
h Nietzsche obviously finds shameful or
ts provide us with is a kind of error we ad-
bad, if some of our most admirable figures
kers. From our discussion so far, it’s clear
at the errors of artists and our erroneous
 are so closely linked. But although their
 our attitude is completely different: with ar-
ger eternal imperfection that we carry across
we then feel that we are carrying a goddess’
07 calls on ‘us’ to recognize our need to bal-
to error with artistic use andglorification of
augh or cry at ourselves, as the situation de-
n not, he thinks, it demands laughter. He
e possibly do without art and the fool?’ It is
tence that we are bound up in error; it is a
ce of those Nietzsche admires that they rec-
ake it beautiful, and, furthermore, that they
conditions and find a way to come to terms
ve here, I am suggesting, is both amor fati
NIETZSCHE, AMOR FATI AND THE GAY SCIENCE 157
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and a ‘gay science’.21
The biggest interpretative leap I have made is to equate what’s
‘necessary’ in amor fati with the cognitive errors that evidently con-
cern Nietzsche in The Gay Science—a move that is suggested by
gs 276 and fits well with passages like gs 107 or gs 335. This
yields a picture of amor fati as follows: what Nietzsche wants to
learn to love and make beautiful is the error that conditions our
existence—the connection between thinking and living alluded to at
the start of gs 276. Wh
tion of these errors at a
beautiful.22 As it happen
unlovable fate and the 
attention away from th
find inherent beauty in 
the problem of unlovabl
rything that happens to 
to love those distortions
thought and life; to do s
in a partial and distorte
compatibility between lo
tifying (distorting).
A Comparison with Be
guided this discussion 
scholars are far too rel
different books to cons
particular interests. Sinc
unquestioned method in
worth paying attention 
amor fati, it results in t
Science being cut out, in
lished notes, his autob
21 On Nietzsche’s hope for a fut
gs 113.
22 By way of analogy, think of T
and wants to keep dreaming no
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
at he recommends is the artistic appropria-
 second-order level—to make these errors
s, this reading works against the problem of
four concerns identified above. It takes our
e unpalatable thought that we must love or
all the horrible things that befall us, contra
e fate and (1). We are not asked to love eve-
us, contra (2) and (3). Instead, we are asked
 and partialities that are conditions for our
o, we must make them beautiful, treat them
d manner; hence, contra (4), there’s no in-
ving our fate (which is to distort) and beau-
VIII
yond Good and Evil. A thought that has
deserves its place in the open. Nietzsche
axed about picking and choosing from his
truct a version of Nietzsche that suits their
e this is overwhelmingly the prevailing and
 contemporary Nietzsche scholarship, it is
to how it might lead us astray. In the case of
he relevant connecting passages of The Gay
 favour of passages from Nietzsche’s unpub-
iography, Zarathustra’s speeches, or apho-
ure in which art and science are inseparably combined, see
he Birth of Tragedy’s dreamer who knows he is dreaming
netheless.
TOM STERN158
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risms from later works, like Beyond Good and Evil (bge). This
would be unobjectionable if his views about some of the key notions
associated with amor fati (in The Gay Science) were not subject to
change in the coming years. As it happens, they were.
A brief look at Beyond Good and Evil will have to suffice. It ex-
hibits many of the same thoughts we found in The Gay Science,
none of which fit well with the conventional picture of amor fati:
the horror of thinking as erring (bge 16, 39); love as selective, igno-
rant, erroneous and de
distorting or falsifying
change. In our first disc
clude that all is necessa
deanthropomorphized u
is permitted, where its 
anthropomorphic proje
Nietzsche adds necessi
(bge 21). The later view
just what would it mean
what is necessary in thin
is necessary?
A more significant ch
tistic view of life. The G
nects it positively with a
a highly critical descript
beautifying it: it is chara
gious ways of thought—
call our everyday fabric
hypocritically (bge 59, 
ceitful, erroneous, beau
knowledge: affirming a
‘no’ belongs to the latte
latter—the nay-sayer a
and lover—with whom
the aphorism which con
task: ‘to translate man
made of Nietzsche’s pur
clear from this section: t
ing him from various s
cluster of beautifying, f
in The Gay Science but
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
ceptive (bge 67, 163, 269); beautifying as
 (bge 59, 230). There are also signs of
ussion of necessity, we saw Nietzsche con-
ry because the ‘accidental’ has no place in a
niverse. One might wonder why ‘necessity’
opposite—the accidental—is dismissed as
ction. Indeed, in Beyond Good and Evil
ty to the proscribed list, for this reason
, then, is that nothing is strictly necessary:
 (following the conventional reading) to ‘see
gs’, if there aren’t really things and nothing
ange occurs in Nietzsche’s attitude to the ar-
ay Science praises this and, in my view, con-
mor fati. But Beyond Good and Evil offers
ion of turning one’s life into an artwork, of
cteristic, Nietzsche tells us, of negative, reli-
the product of pessimism, of spoiled life; to
ations ‘artistic’ is to speak deceptively and
192). Elsewhere he contrasts falsifying, de-
tifying activity with that of the seeker after
nd loving belong to the former, but saying
r. In contrast to The Gay Science, it is the
nd seeker of knowledge, not the yea-sayer
 Nietzsche clearly identifies himself. This is
cludes with the statement of a Nietzschean
 back into nature’. A great deal has been
ported naturalism, but one thing should be
ranslating man back into nature means free-
upernatural ideals, notably the conceptual
alsifying and affirming which were glorified
 now, as we have seen, are viewed in a sus-
NIETZSCHE, AMOR FATI AND THE GAY SCIENCE 159
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pect, religious light. Looking back, we might find the seeds of this
conflict in The Gay Science. After all, gs 107 commends art for
making a ‘goddess’ out of error; and yet the very next aphorism is
the first place in which Nietzsche proclaims the death of God, de-
manding that we combat his influence. In ridding ourselves of God,
we may, in the end, have defeated the Error-Goddess, Art, who was
hiding in his shadows all along.
The Trouble with Amo
One, familiar enough to
vealing our errors, appe
with the world despite 
Whether we conclude t
or that the errors of life
lized. And for reasons o
its purported cousin, th
book four of The Gay
equates eternal recurre
must confront the prob
elsewhere, is that the et
tion (Stern 2011, esp. pp
Yet if there is one gui
tion between passivity a
we make our lives, to w
Stoics—with whom am
by dividing sharply bet
what isn’t. Once that lin
responsibility on the co
perfect indifference. Fo
most sharply, what’s be
ference to us—though f
lent plan. If Epictetus
particular (apparent) mi
only because they may 
ference, rather as Hecto
to fighting Thersites. Fo
was total control over w
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
IX
r Fati (Revised). Plenty of concerns remain.
 Nietzsche scholars, is that scientists, in re-
ar to be granted some truthful engagement
the error that necessarily enmeshes us all.
hat the ‘truths’ of science aren’t that secure
 aren’t that necessary, the picture is destabi-
f space, we haven’t connected amor fati with
e eternal recurrence, which also appears in
 Science. Obviously, anybody who simply
nce with a standard reading of amor fati
lems given above. My thought, expressed
ernal recurrence has a rather different func-
. 76–9).
ding line for this discussion, it is the interac-
nd activity in human life: to what extent do
hat extent do they just happen to us? The
or fati is frequently connected—responded
ween what’s completely in our control and
e is drawn, it makes sense to locate ethical
ntrolledside and to confront all else with
r those, like Epictetus, who draw this line
yond our control is a matter of strict indif-
ate is admirable, of course, as God’s benevo-
 commends a positive attitude towards
sfortunes like suffering or bereavement, it is
be celebrated as a nobler test of Stoic indif-
r would (en principe) prefer fighting Achilles
r Stoics, a key element on the ‘active’ side
hat you believe. In the thought-experiment
TOM STERN160
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in which his philosophical interlocutor is progressively tortured—a
thought-experiment of which Epictetus is understandably if perhaps
overly fond—the interlocutor can always keep control of what he
believes to be true, though he controls little else: I can’t force you to
believe that 2+2= 5; so your beliefs are really yours; hence I can
judge you for them.23 If faulty cognition could be imposed, then the
whole Stoic structure would crumble, not least because those who
happened to be right would be on a par with those who happened
to be wealthy or powe
were taught to ignore.
For Nietzsche, amor f
—namely, with the ide
that they belong firmly o
to that. The response he
a paradigmatic combina
tively confronts the giv
whatever beautifying m
tells Socrates, is the chi
we find, preserved, the 
sive? Do we create the b
or an active affirmer of 
Nietzsche equivocates
ist, gs 299) and lover (
and manipulated. Presu
superior position both 
rors, and to the scientis
ing secret. But either w
beautify and falsify our 
are aware of such effor
old problem for Nietzsc
Birth of Tragedy (bt): 
fords room for manoeu
in which being ‘aestheti
spective which enjoys t
which the former, how
(bt 5). This is how the t
23 ‘2+2=5’ is promoted, in Orw
obvious falsehoods are dissemin
Truth on Senate House in Lond
for pointing out what is hopefu
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
rful—the sorts of contingent things Stoics
ati begins with just that destructive thought
a that cognitive errors are forced upon us,
n the ‘passive’ side. It is up to us to respond
 prescribes, artistic self-beautification, seems
tion of passive and active. Love of fate ac-
en fact of our inadequate cognition with
eans are available—a love that, as Diotima
ld of Poverty and Resourcefulness. Yet here
same problem in miniature: Active or pas-
eauty or do we find it? Is the lover deluded
her discovery?
. His lover of fate is both beautifier (the art-
the art-lover, gs 334): that is, manipulator
mably, the lover of fate is meant to be in a
to the everyday person, ignorant of her er-
t, who reveals and is shamed by the horrify-
e aren’t aware of our successful efforts to
errors—hence we are like the former; or we
ts—hence we are like the latter. This is an
he, with which he explicitly struggles in The
there, the Schopenhauerian framework af-
vre between an everyday, human perspective
cized’ confers little benefit, a universal per-
he spectacle, and an artistic perspective in
ever fleetingly, connects with the latter
ragic Greeks become active rather than pas-
ell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, by the Ministry of Truth, where
ated as though they are true. Orwell based the Ministry of
on, where this talk was delivered. Thanks to William Stern
lly a coincidence.
NIETZSCHE, AMOR FATI AND THE GAY SCIENCE 161
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doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013
sive sufferers. By The Gay Science, the absence of Schopenhauer’s
framework makes the division even less clear: in places Nietzsche
seems to flicker between the perspective of the self-beautifier and
the observing other, active and passive, saying little about how they
relate or where the benefit lies (gs 209; also gs 107, 299).
Finally, though, the amor fati on offer is a peculiar kind of ‘love
of necessity’. We may be able to respond to (4) above by showing
that technically amor fati needn’t rule out the love of fantasy. But
the sentiment remains: t
a love of an artistic repr
tified by manipulation. 
should prefer amor fat
looks like wishful think
Adorno, Theodor 1951: M
Gemes, Ken, and Simon M
tonomy. Oxford: Oxfor
Hamilton, Christopher 200
Life’. Ethical Theory an
Han-Pile, Béatrice 2011: ‘
Philosophy, 19, pp. 224
May, Simon 2009: ‘Nihilis
pp. 89–106.
Nietzsche, Friedrich 1968:
The Anti-Christ. Transl
ed as ‘ti’.)
——1983: Schopenhauer a
by R. J. Hollingdale. Ca
——1999: The Birth of T
24 My thanks, first of all, to the 
Raymond Geuss for their helpfu
iety
Society, Vol. cxiii, Part 2
.00349.x
his is not a love of necessity at all, but rather
esentation of one particular necessity, beau-
We originally asked, with Adorno, why we
i to wishful thinking; what we have here
ing after all.24
Department of Philosophy
University College London
Gower Street
London wc1e 6bt
uk
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	VIII - Nietzsche, Amor Fati and The Gay Science - Tom Stern
	I. The Trouble with Amor Fati
	II. Love (1)
	III. Necessity (1)
	IV. Beauty
	V. Tangle
	VI. Necessity (2)
	VII. Love (2)
	VIII. A Comparison with Beyond Good and Evil
	IX. The Trouble with Amor Fati (Revised)
	References