A Working Peace System - David Mitrany

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1 . A WorkingPeaceSystem
DAVID MITRANY
David Mitrany (7881J-7975)wasa Romanian-bornacademicwho
spentmost01his adultlífe in BritainandtheUnitedSlates.During
WorldWar11,Mitranythoughtseriouslyabouttheshapeof thepost-
warworldandhow lo preventfulurewars.Theresultof hisreflection
was a pamphlelentit/edA WorkingPeaceSyslem,whích he pub-
lishedin Londonin Ihesummerof 1943,Iwo yearsbeforetheendof
Ihe war.In Ihispamphlet,Milranyarguedfor a transforméflionof the
waypeoplelhinkaboutinternationalrelalions,particular/ythepre-
ventionof war.His "functionalalternalíve"aimedatwor/d,notEuro-
pean,unity.Nevertheless,il hada profoundeffeclon Europeanac-
livistsandear/yintegralionIheorists,especial/ytheneofunctionalísts
(seeChapters75and76). .
Milranysawthedivisionof Ihe worldínto "competingpolítical
units"as 'he rootof inlernationalconflict.A world federalgovern-
menl,heargued,wouldelíminalethesedivisionsbutwouldbeimpos-
sible to establíshgiventhemodern"disregardfor constítutionsand
pacts"andcontinuingnationalísm.Mitranycal/ed,instead,fora func-
tionalapproachthatwould"over/aypolíticaldivisionswitha spread-
ingwebof internationalactivitiesandagencies,in whichandthrough
whichtheinterestsandlifeofall thenationswouldbegraduallyinte-
grated." Functionalintegrationwouldbepragmatic,technocratic,and
flexible;it wouldcjelíberatelyblur distinctionsbetweennationaland
international,public andprivate,andpoliticalandnonpolitical.As
funclionalagencieswereformedandjoined,nationaldivisionswould
becomelessand lessimportant.Ullimalely,a centrala'uthoritymighl
coordinalethevariousagencies,butsuchagovernmentwouldnotbe
ReprintcdfromA WorkingPeaceSystem(QuadrangleBooks,1966).Copy-
right 1966byThe Societyfor a World ServiceFederation.Notesomined.
94 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACESYSTEM 95
necessarytosuccessfulintemationalre/ations,andmightnolbedesir-
abJe.HereMitranypartedwith manyotherfunctiona/ists(suchas
Monnet)and,he neofunctionalistswho believedfederalinstitutions
wereessentialtothesuccessof functionaJintegration.
andsettlementwhichstudentsof internationalaffairseall"peaceful
change."Buttheythemselves,takingtheformforthesubstance,all
tooonenthoughtof it mainlyasamatterofcbangingfrontiers.We
shallhavetospeakof thisagain,butwhatpeacefulchangeshould
mean,whatthemodernworld,sodoselyinterrelated,musthavefor
itspeacefuldeve1opment,is somesystemthatwouldmakepossible
automaticandcontinuoussocialaction,contin.uallyadaptedto
changingneedsandconditioRS,in thesamesenseandof thesame
generalnatureasanyothersystemof government.Itscharacter
wouldbethesamefor certainpurposeSjonlytherangewouldbe
new.It isinthatsensethattheLeague'sworkhasintruthbeeninad-
equateandineffectivc,asonemayreadilyseeif onereflectswhether
achangeof frontiersnowandthenwouldreaUyhaveledtoapl~ace-
fuIandcooperativeinternationalsociety..
A closefcderationis supposedto do justwhattheLeague
provedunabletodo,andinasetandsalidway.Buttobeginwith,
canwetakeasystemwhichhasworkedwellinonefieldandsimply
transplantit toanother,somuchwiderandmorecomplex?Federa-
tionshavestillbecnnationalfederationsjthejumpfrom.,pational
statestointernationalorganizationisinfinitelymorehazardousthan
wasthejumpfromprovincialunitstonationalfed~.rations.Noneof
theeiementsof neighborhood,of kinship,of historyarethereto
serveassteps.TheBritishEmpireisbounddoselybyoldtiesofkin-
shipandhistory,butnoonewouldsuggestthatthereis-amongits
partsmuchwillforfederation.Yetapattfromthismatterofwhether
thefederalideahasanygreatprospects,thereisthemoreimportant
questionwhetheritwouldhaveanygreatvirtuesintheinternational
sphere.lf theevilofconflierandwarspringsframthedivisionof the
worldintodetachedandcompetingpolitiealuliits,will it beexor-
cisedsimplybychangingorreducíngthelínesofdivision?Anypotit-
icalreorganizationintoseparateuDitsmustsooneror laterproduce
thesameeffectsjanyinternationalsystemthatis tousherin a new
worldmustproducetheoppositeeffectof subduingpoliticaldivi-
sion.AsfarasoneCilnsee,tbereareonlytWowaysofachievingthat
end.Onewouldbethroughaworldstatewhichwouldwipeoutpo-
líticaldivisionsforcibly;theotheristhewaydiscussedinthesepages,
whichwouldratheroverlaypolíticaldivisionswithaspreadingweb
of internationalactivitiesandagencies,inwhichandthroughwhich
theinterestsandlifeofallthenarionswouldbegraduallyintegrated.
Thatisthefundamentalchangetowhichanyeffectiveinternational
systemmustaspireandcontribute:to makeinternationalgovern-
mentcoextensivewithinternationalacrivities.A Leaguewouldbe
too looseto beableto do it; a numberof sectionalfederations
. THEGENERALPROBlEM
Theneedfor somenewkindof intemadonalsystemwasbeing
widelycanvassedbeforetheSecondWorldWar,.in themeasurein
whichtheLeagueofNationsfounditselffrustratedinitsattemptsto
preventaggressionandtoorganizepeace.Someblamedthisfailure
ontheirresponsibilityofsmallstateSjothersrathertheegoismof the
.GreatPowers.SrillothersimputedtheLeague'sfailuremoredirectly
toweaknessesin itsownconstitutionandmachinery:theproperin-
gredientswerethere,butthepoliticaldosagewasinadequate.lt was
especiallyamongthosewhoheldthisviewthattheideaofawidein-
ternarionalfederationbegantobeembracedasanewhope.
Federationse~medindeedtbeonlyaltemativetoaLeaguetried
sofarfor linking,togetheranumberofpolíticalunitsbydemocratic
methods.lt wouldmeanánassociationmuchodoserthanwasthe
League,andits adv6cacythereforetakesit for grantedthatthe
Leaguefailedbecauseit didnotgofarenough.In whatwaywould
federadongofurther?Federarionwouldbeamoreintensíveunionof
a lessextensivegroupjtheconstitutionaltieswouldbedoser.Sec-
ond,certainacrivitieswouldbemoredefinitelyanqactivelytiedto-
gether.Moredefinitecommonaerionis dearlytheendjtheformal
arrangementswhichthefederalistsputin theforefron.twouldbe
merelyanecessaryadjunct,toensurethereliableworkingof thefed-
eralundertakings.Andthatisasit shouldbefor,leavingformalar-
gumentsaside,it isplainthattheLeaguefailednotfromoverstrain
butfrominanition.It mighthavedonemoreaboutsanctions,but
thatwouldnothavebeenenough.Evenif theLeague'sactionfor
"security"hadbeenmorefearless,thatwouldnotbyitseUhavesuf-
ficedtogivevitalitytoaninternationalsystemthatwas-to lastand
grow.Toachievethatend,suchasystemmustinsomeimportantre-
spectstakeoverandcoordinateactivitieshitherto.controlledbythe
nationalstate,justasthestateincreasinglyhastotakeoveracdvities
whichuntilnowhavebeenearriedonbylocalbodies;andlikethe
state,anynewinternationalauthoritycouldunderpresentconditions
notbemerelyapoliceauthority.
WereatizenowthattheLeaguefailedbecause,whateverthe
reasons,it couldnotfurtherthatprocessof cominuousadjustment
96 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 97
would.onthecontrary.betootighttobeweldediritosomethinglike
it.Thereforewhentheneedissogreatandpressing.wemusthave
thevisionto breakawayfromtraditionalpoliticalideas,whichin
moderntimeshavealwayslinkedauthoritytoagiventerritory.and
trysomenewway.thatmighttakeuswithoutviolencetowardthat
goal.Thebeginningscannotbeanythingbutexperimental;anewin-
temationalsYstemwill need.evenmorethannationalsystems.a
widefreedomofcontinuousadaptationin thelightofexperience.It
mustcareasmuchaspossibleforcommonneedsthatareevident.
whilepresumingaslittleaspossibleuponaglobalunitywhichisstill
onlylatentandunrecognized.AsthelateJohnWinantwellsaidina
lectureatLeedsin October1942:"Wemustbeabsoluteaboutour
principalends(justiceandequalityofopportunityandfreedom).rel-
ativeandpragmatieaboutthemechaniealmeansusedtoservethose
ends .
Theneed'forapragmatieapproachisallthegreaterbecausewe
aresoclearlyinaperiodof historiealtransition.Whenthestateit-
self.whateveritsformandconstitution.iseverywhereundergoinga
deepsocialandpoliticalsea-change.it isgoodstatesmanshipnotto
forcethenewinternationalexperimentsintosomesetfamiliarformo
which",aybeléssrelevantthemorerespectableit seems.buttosee
aboveall thatthese'experimentsgowithandfit intothegeneral
trendofthetime.
Whenoneexaminesthegeneralshapeof thetasksthatarefac-ingusooneis;tobeginwith.ledtoquestionwhetherordercouldbe
broughtintothembythedeviceof formalwrittenpacts.Whydid
wrinenconstitutions.declarationsof rights.andotherbasiccharters
playsuchagreatroleduringthenineteenthcentury?Thetaskofthat
time.followingtheautocraticperiodowastoworkoutanewdivision
of thesphereof authority.to determinenewrelationshipsbetween
theindividualandthestate.toprotectthenewdemocracy.Thesere-
lationshipsweremeanttobefixedandfinal.andtheyhadtoreston
generalprincipies.largelyofanegativecharacter.It wasnaturaland
properthatallthatshouldbelaiddowninformalrules.meanttore-
mainuntouchedandpermanent.In muchthesamewaythenewna-
tionstatewasinworldsocietywhatthenewcitizenwasinmunicipal
society;andwiththeincreasein theirnumber.theliberalgrowthin
internationaltradeandculturalandsocialintercourse.theresulting
intemationalrulesanda hostof wrinentreatiesandpactssought.
likethenationalconstitUtions.tofixtheformalrelationshipbetween
thesovereignindividualstatesandtheircollectivity;whichin this
casealsowasexpectedtobefixedandfinal.withinternationallaw
asagraduallyemergingconstitutionfor.thatpoliticalcosmos.
Viewedinthislight.theCovenantoftheLeagueisseentohave
continuedthatnineteenth-centurytradition.It wasconcernedabove
allwithfixinginadefinitewaytheformalrelationshipof themem-
berstatesandinameasurealsoofnon-members.andonlyin11very
secondarywaywithinitiatingpositivecommonactivitiesandaerion.
Thegreatexpectation.security.wasa vitalaction.buta negative
one;itsendwasnottopromotetheactiveregularlifeofthepeoples
butonlytoprotectitagainstbeingdisturbed.Broadlyonemightsay
thattheCovenantwasanattempttouniversalizeandcodifythetules
of internationalconductograduallyevolvedthroughpoliticaltreaties
andpacts.andtogivethemgeneralandpermanentvalidity.It was
ndtherunnaturalnorunreasonabletofollowupthatnineteenth.-cen-
turytrendandtrytosteadyintemationalrelationsbybringingthem
withintheframeworkof awrittenpactooneprovidedwithsetrules
for itsworking.Butwhenit.cametogoingbeyondthat.theLeague
'couldnotbemoreordomorethanwhatitsléadingmemberswere
readytobeanddo.andtheywerereadytodobutlinleinapo!;itive
way.Ir was indeedcharacteristicof thepost-Armisticeptriod
1918-19thateventhevictorshastenedtoundotheircommoneco-
nomicandothermachinery.suchastheAlliedShippingtontrol.
whichhadgrownandservedthemwellduringthewar.Andthatwas
ata timewhenwithineachcountrygovernmentactionandcontrol
werespreadingfast,causingmanya privateinternationalactivity
. alsotobecutdownorcutoff.Inotherwords.theincipientcommon
functions.aswellasmanyoldconnections.weredisbandedinthein-
ternarionalsphereattheverytimewhenacommonconstitutionwas
beinglaiddownforit.It wasthatdivorcebetweenlifeandformthat
doomedtheLeaguefromtheoutset.andnotanyinadequacyin its
writtenrules. .
Henceit ispertinenttoask:Wouldanotherwrittenpace,if ooly
moreelaborateandstringent.cometo gripsmorecIoselywiththe
problemsof ourtime?Letusbywayof a preliminaryanswernote
twothings:First.thelustydisregardforconstitutionsandpacts.for
settledrulesandtraditionalrights.isastrikingmarkof thetimes.In
thepressureforsochilchangenosuchformaltiesareallowedtostand
intheway.eitherwithintheseveralcountriesorbetweenthem.It isa
typicalrevolutionarymoodandpractice.If itdoesnotalwaystakethe
outwardformof revolution.thatis becausethegovernmentsthem-
selvesactasspearheadsof thetrend.andnotonlyincountriesruled
bydictatorships.Thosewholeadinthisrushforsocialchangepride
themselvesindeedontheirdisregardforformsandformalities.The
appealwhichcommunism.fascismoandnazismhadforyouthinpar-
ticularandforthemassesingeneralliesinnosmalldegreeinthatpo-
98 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 99
Ihicalieonoclasm.At thetumof thenineteenthcenturytheradical
massesweredemandingsenledrulesandrights,andNapoleoncould
playthetrumpcardof constitutionalnationalismagainsttheauro-
cratierulers.Nowthemassesdemandsocialactionwithoutregardto
established~rights,"andthetotalitarianleadershavebeenplayingthe
strongcardofpragmaticsocialísmagainstconstitUtionaldemocracy.
Thatuniversalpressureforsocialreform,in thesecondplace,
hasuuerlychangedtherelationof nationalismto internationalism,
inawaythatcouldbepromisingif rightlyused.Inconstitution-mak-
ingtherewasaparallelbetWeenthetwospheres,butnothingmore,
fortheybelongedpoliticallytodifferentcategories.Thenineteenth-
. centurynationalismrestedmainlyonculturalandothe{differential
factors,andthecreationofthenationstatemeantinevitablyabreak-
ingupofworld.unity.A cosmopolitanoutlookspreadrapidly,but
thenationsatthesametimebalkedatinternationalpoliticalorgani-
zationandcontrol,andtheycouldjustifytharrefusalbyseemingly
goodprincipie.At presenrthenewnationalísmrestsessentiallyon
social.factors;thesearenotonlyalikein thevariouscountries,thus
P!lradoxicallycreatinga bondevenbetWeentotalitariangroups,but
ohencannotmakeprogressin isolation.At manypointsthelifeof
thenationstateisoverflowingbackintothatcommonworldwhich
existedbeforetheriseof modernnationalism.At presentthelinesof
nationalandinternarionalevolutionarenotparallelbutconverging,
andthetWospheresnowbelongtothesamecategoryanddifferonly
indimensions.
In brief,thefunctionof thenineteenthcenturywastorestrain
thepowersof authority;thatledto thecreationof the"political
man"andlikewiseof the"políticalnation,"andto thedefinition
throughconstitutionalpactsof theirrelationto thewiderpolítical
group.TheCovenant(andtheLocamoandKelloggpacts)wasstill
of thatspeciesessentially,withthecharacteristicpredominanceof
rulesof the"thoushallnot"kind.Thefunctionofourtimeisrather
todevelopandc;oordinatethesocialscopeofiluthority,andthatcan-
notbesodefinedordivided.Internationallyitisnolongeraquestion
ofdefiningrelationsbetWeenstatesbutofmergingthetn-thework-
daysenseof thevaguetalkabouttheneedtosurrendersomepartof
sovereignty.A constitutionalpactcoulddoliulemorethanlaydown
certainelementaryrightsanddutiesforthemembersofthenewcom-
munity.ThecOmmunityitselfwillacquirea livingbodynotthrough
a wriuenactof faithbutthroughactiveorganicdevelopment.Yet
mereis in thisnofundamentaldisputeastogeneralprincipiesand
ultimateaims.Theonlyquestionis,whichisthemoreimmediately
practicableandpromisingway:whethera generalpolíticalframe-
workshouldbeprovidedformallyinadvance,onsometheoretical
partern,orlehtogrowbranchbybranchfromaétionandex~rience
andsofinditsnaturalbent. .
. THE FUNCTIONAl AlTERNATIVE
Canthesevitalobjectionsbemet,andtheneedsof peaceamIsocial
advancebesatisfied,throughsomeotherwayofassociatingthena-
tionsfor commonaction?Thewholetrendof moderngovemment
indicatessuchaway.Thattrendistoorganizegovernmentalongthe
linesof specificendsandneeds,andaccordingto.tbeconditionsof
theirtimeandplace,in lieuofmetraditionalorganizationontheba-
sisof asetconstitUtionaldivisionof jurisdictionandof rightsand
powers.In nationalgovernmentthedefinitionpf authorityandtbe
scopeof publicactionarenowinacontinuousflux,andart:deter-
minedlessbyconstitutionalnormsthanbypracticalrequircments.
Theinstancesaretoomanyandwellknowntoneedmentioning;one
mightnoteonlythatwhilegenerallythetrendbasbeentoward
greatercentralizationof services,andthereforeof authority;under
certainconditionstherev.crsehasalsooccurred,powersandduries
beinghandedoverto regionalandotberautboritiesfor thebetter
performanceofcertaincommunalneeds.Thesametrendis power-
fullyatworkintheseveralfederations,inCanadaandAustralia,and
especiallyin tbeUnitedStates,andin tbesecasesit is all themore
strikingbecausetbedivisionof authority!estsonwritteóconstitu-
tionswhicharestillinbeingandnominallyvalidinfull.Intemation-
ally,too,whilea bodyof law hadgrownslowlyandinsecurely
throughrulesandconventions,somecommonactivitieswereorga-
nizedthroughadhocfunctionalarrangementsandhave\Vorked
well.Theriseofsuchspecificadministrativeagenciesandla,,'5isthe
peculiartrait,andindeedtbefoundation,ofmodenigovemment.
A questionwhicbmightproperlybeaskedattbeoutsetincon-
sideringthefitnessof tbatmethodforinternationalpurposesisthis:Couldsuchfunctionsbeorganizedinternationallywithoutacompre-
hensivepoliticalframework?Letit besaid,first,thattbefunccional
methodassuchisneitherincompatiblewithageneralconstitUcional
frameworknor precludesits comingintobeing.It onlyfollows
Burke'swarningto thesheriffsofBristolthat"governmentisaprac-
ticaltbing"andtbatoneshouldbewareofelaboratingconstitutional
forms"for thegratificationof visionaries."In nationalstatesand
federationsthefunctionaldevelopmentisgoingaheadwithoutmuch
regardto,andsometimesinspiteof,theoldconstitucionaldivisions.
100 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 101
lEin thesecasestheconstitUtionismostconveniendyleftaside,may
notthemethodproveworkableintemationallywithoutanyimmcdi-
ateandcomprehensiveconstitutionalframework?lE,tociteBurke
again,it is "alwaysdangerousto meddlewithfoundations,"it is
doublydangerousnow.O~rpoliticalproblemsareobscure,whilethe
politicalpassionsoft~ t;m~al"ebUnding.Oneof themisfortunesof
theLeagueexperimentwas'thata newinstiturionwasdevisedon
whathaveprovedto beoutwompremises.Wemightalsorecollect
thatoftheconstitutionalchangesintroducedinEuropeahertheFirst
WorldWar,fineandwisethoughtheymayhavebeen,nonehassur-
vivedevenagenerarion.Howmuchgreaterwill thatriskof futility
beinEuropeaftertheSecondWorldWar,whenthesplitwithinand
betwc:ennarionswill bemuchworsethanin 1919?Weknownow
evenlessaboutthedarkhistoriealforceswhichhavebeenstirredup
bythewar,whilc:inmemeantimetheproblenisofourcommonsoci-
etyhavebeendistortedbyfierceideologieswhichwecouldnottryto
bringtoanissuewithoutprovokinganirreconcilabledogmaticcon-
flict.Evenif anaetionweretobetosomeextenthandicappedwith-
outa formalpoliticalframework,thefactisthatnoobvioussenti-
mentexists,andnoneis likelytoerystallizefor someyears,for a
cQmmonconstitutionalbond.
ln suehc;onditions;1oYpre-arrangedconstitutionalframework
wouldbetaken,whollyoutof theair.Wedonotknowwhat,if any-
thing,wiIJbe;neommon--exceptadesperatecravingforpeaeeand
for theconditionsof a tolerablenormallife.Thepeoplesmayap-
plauddeclarationsof rights,buttheywiIJeallforthesatisfaetionof
needs.Thatdemandforactioncouldbetumedintoahistorieoppor-
tunity.Againwemighttaketo heartwhathappenedto theU.S.in
1932-33andthinkof whatehancestheRooseveltadministration
wouldhavetohavehadtoaehieveunity,or indeedtosurvive,if in-
steadof takingimmediateremedialacrion'ithadbegunbyoffering
consriturionalrc:forms-thoughacommonsystemwasalreadyinbe-
ing.A timidstatesmanmightstillhaveteiedtowalkin theoldconsti-
tUtionalgrooves;Me.Rooseveltsteppedoverthem.Hegraspedboth
theneedandopportunityforcenmilizedpracticalaerian.Unemploy-
ment,thebankingcollapse,floodcontrol,andahundredotherprob-
lemshadtobedealtwjtbbynati()1)almeansif theyweretobedealt
, witheffectively,andwith,lastingresults. '
Tbesignificantpointin tbatemergencyactionwastbateaeh
andeveryproblemwastaekledasapracticalissuein itself.No at-
temptwasmadetorelateit toageneraltbeoryorsystemofgovem-
mentoEveryfunctionwaslefttogenerateotbersgraduaUy,liketbe
functionalsubdivisionof organiccells;andin everycasetheappro-
priateauthoritywaslefttogrowanddevelopoutof actualperfor-
mance.Yetthenewfunetionsandtheneworgans,takentogether,
havc:revolutionizedtheAmericanpolíticalsystem.Thefederalgov-
ernmenthasbecomeanationalgovemment,andWashingtonforthe
firsttimeis reallythecapitalof America.In theprocess,manyim-
provementsin,tbepersonnelandmachineryof governmentbave
comeabout,andmanyrestricrivestateregulationshavemeltedaway.
Morerecentlytherehasbeenheal"dthesignificantcomplaintthatthe
tiesbetweendtiesandtheirstatesarebecominglooser,whilethose
withthenationalgovernmentbecomeever~tronger.No onehas
workedtobringthisabout,andnowrittenactbaseitherprescribed
it or eonfirmedit. A greatconstitutionaltransformationhastbus
takenplacewithoutanychangesin theConstitution.Therehave
beencomplaints,butthematter-of-courseaccepraneehasbeenover-
whelming.Peoplehavegiadlyaceepted,theservieewhentheymight
havequcstionedthetheory.Theoneattemptatdirectconstitutional
rcvision,to increaseandliberalizethemembershipof theSupreme
Court,wasbittcrlydisputedanddefeated.Yetthatproposalinvolved
ineffectmuchlessofaconstitutionalrevolutionthanhast.!teexperi-
II\cntoftheTenncsseeValleyAuthority.Thefirstwouldnothaveen-
surcdanylastingehangein theworkingof theAmericangovero-
ment,whereasthesecondhasreallyintroducedintothepolitical
structureof theUnitedStatesanewregionaldimensionunknownto
theConstitution. ' &
ln manyof itsessentialaspects-theurgeneyof thematerial
needs,theinadequacyof theoldarrangements,thebewildermentin
outlook-thesituationattheendof theSecondWorldWarwiUre-
semblethatinAmericain 1933,thoughonawideranddeeperscale.
AndforthesamereasonsthepathpursuedbyMr.Rooseveltin1933
offersthebest,perhapstheonly,chancefor geninganewinterna-
tionallifegoing.It will besaidinevitablythatintheUnitedStatesit
wasrelarivelyeasytofollowthatUneofaerionbeeauseitwasin fact
oneeountry,withanestablísbedConstitution.Functionalarrange-
mentscouldbeaecepted,thatis.becausein manyfieldsthefederal
stateshadgrowniñ thehabitofworkingtogether.Thatisnodoubt
true,butnotthemostsignificantpointof theAmericanexperiment;
for thatUnewasfollowednotbeeausethefunctionalwaywasso
easybutbecausetheeonsritutionalwaywouldhavebeensodifficult.
Hencethelessonforunfederatedpartsof theworldwouldseemto
bethis:If theeonstitutionalpathhadtobeavoidedforthesakeofef-
fectiveactionevenin a federationwhichalreadywasaworkingpo-
líticalsystem,howmuehlesspromisingmustit beasastartingmode
whenit isamatterofbringingtogctherforthefirsttimeanumberof
.,
102 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACESYSTEM 103
varied,andsometimesantagonistic,countries?Butif tbeconstitu-
tionalapproacb,byitsverycircumspectness,wouldholdupthestart
oEaworkinginternarionalsystem,boldinitiativeduringtheperiod
oEemergencyat theendoEthewarmightsetgoinglastinginstru-
mentsandhabitsofacommoninternationalliEe.Andthoughit may
appearratherbritde,rhatEunctionalapproachwouldinEactbemore
solidanddeEínitethanaformalone.lt neednormeddlewithfounda-
tions;oldinstitutionsandwaysmaytosomeextenthamperrecon-
struction,butreconstructioncouldbeginbyacommonefEortwith-
outa fightoverestablishedways.Reconstructionmayin thisfield
alsoproveasurerandlesscostlywaythanrevolution.Astotbenew
ideologies,sincewe,couldnotpreventthemwemusttrytocircum-
ventthem,leavingit tOthegrowthofncwhabitsandintereststodi-
lutethemintime.OuraimmustbetocallEorthtothehighestpossi-
bledegreetheactiveforcesandopportunitiesEorcooperation,while
touchingaslittleasPossiblethelatentor activepointsoEdifference
andopposition. -
Thereis'oneotheraspectoEthepost-warperiodwhichhas
beenmuchdiscussedandhasa bearingon thispoint,andwhich
helpstobringoutthedifferenceinoudookbetweenthetwomethods
contrastedhere.Muchhasbeenheardofasuggestionthatwhenthe
warendswe~usthavefirstaperiodof convalescenceandthatthe
taskof permanentreorganizationwill onlycomeafterthat.It is a
usefulsuggestion,insofarasit mayhelptocIearupcertainpractical
problems.Butit couldalsobemisleadingandevendangerousif the
distinctionweretakentojustifyeitherputtingofftheworkof inter-
nationalgovernmentor differentiatingbetweentheagenciesby
which-chenewinternati'onalactivitiesareto beorganized,into
nursesforconvalescenceandmentorsfor thenewlife.A cIeandivi-
sionintimebetweentwosuchperiodsinanycaseisnotpossible,for
theperiodof co~valescencewill bedifferentEordifferentactivities
and.ends;but,aboveall,exceptEorsuchdirect-andexceptionalcon-
sequencesofrhewarasdemobilizationandtberebuildingof dam-
agedareas,th~needsofsocietywillbetbesameatonceaftertbewar
aslateron.Tbeonlydifferencewill bethepracricaloneofapriority
ofneeds,theki!1dofdifferencewhichmightbebroughtaboutbyany
socialdisturbance-anepidemicor anearthquakeor aneconomic
crisis-anddie-u~gencyoftakingaction.Fortherest,oneactionand
periodwill mergeintotheother,accordingto circumstances.Seed
andimplementswiUbeasurgentEorensuringthefoodsupplyofEu-
ropeandAsiaastheactUáldistributionoErelief,andindeedmoreur-gentif tbewarshouldendafteraharvest.Again,bothreliefandre-
constructionwill dependgreatlyonthespeedyreorganizatíonand
properuseoftransport,andsoon.
Bothcircumstancespointagainto theadvantageof a func-
tionalpracriceandtothedisadvantage,if nottheimpossibility.oEa
comprehensiveattemptatpoliticalorganization.To obtainsuEficient
agreementfor someformalgeneralschemewould,atbest,notbe
possiblewithoutdelay;atthesametime,acrion'forrelieEandrecon-
structionwillhavetostartwithinthehouraftertheceasefire.Theal~
ternativeswouldbe,if a comprehensiveconstitUtionalarrangement
is desiredandwaitedfor,eitherto puttheimmediateworkin the
handsoEtemporaryinternationalagenciesor to leaveit to theindi-
vidualstates.Theone,in fact,wouldprepareEortheother.Exceptin
mattetsof relief-thedistributionoffood,fuel,anddothingandalso
medicalhelp-ad ho, temporaryagenciescouldhavenoadequate
authorityor influence;allofwhatonemightcallthesociety-building
acrivities,involvingprobablyconsiderableplanningandreorganiza-
tionwithinandbetweentheseveralcountries,wouldfalluponthe
individualstatesagain,asin 1919,whentheycompetedandinter-
feredratherthancooperatedwitheachother.to thelossoE.¡:hemall.
Yetit isvitalthatinternationalactivityshouldbefromtheoutsetin
thesamehandsandmoveinthesamedirectionafterthewaraslater;
otherwisethechaocesof buildingupaninternacionalsystemwould
begravelyprejudiced.It iscertainthatoneoEthechiefreasonsfor
thefailureoftheLeaguewasthatitwasgivenaformalauthorityand
promissorytasksfor thefuture,whiletheimmediate,urgent,and
mostwelcometasksoEsocialreconstrucrionandreformwereleftto
beattendedtobynationalagencies.Latereffortstoretrievethatmis-
takeonlyledtoaseriesof barreneconomicconferences,asbythat
timethepolicyofeachcountrywassethardinitsownmold.It isin-
evitablewithanyschemeof formalorganizarionthatthenational
statesshouldhavetore-startontheirown,ílndnaturalthereforethat
refugeshouldbesoughtin theideaof a periodoEconvalescence
whilethefull-fIedgedschemeisworkedoutandadopted.Butfunc-
rionalauthoritieswQuldnotneedsuchpolíticalhospitalizadon,with
itsarbitraryanddangerousdivision~fstages;theywouldmerely
vary,likeanyotheragencyanywhereandatanytime,theemphasis
of theirwork in accordancewiththechangingconditionof their
task,continuingtocontrolandorganizetransport,forinstance,after
theyhadrebuiltit, andin thesamewaytakingeachtaskin hand
withaplanandauthorityforcontinuingit.Tbesimplefactisthata1l
there-startingofagricultureandindustryandtransportwilleitherbe
done00somepre-arrangedcommonprogramor it will haveto be
104 DAVID MITRANY
done,for it couldnotwait,ondisjointedlocalplans;it willbedone
eitherbypre-establishedinternationalagenciesor it willhaveto be
donebylocalnationalagencies-andtheagencieswhichwill actin
thesupposedconvalescenceperiodwill alsobe.thosetogatherau-
thorityandaccepranceuntothemselves.
o TheBroadUnesofFunctíonalOrganizaríon
Theproblemol ourgeneration,putverybroadly,ishowtoweldto-
getherthecornmoninterestsofallwithoutinterferingundulywiththe
particularwaysofeach.It isaparallelproblemtothatwhichfacesus
innationalsociety,andwhichinbothsphereschallengesustofindan
alrernativetometotalitarianpanern.A measureofcentralizedplan-
Dingandcontrol,forbothproductionanddistributi~n,isnolongerto
beavoided,no'manerwhattheformof thestateorthedoctrineol its
constitution.Throughall thatvarietyof politicalformsthereis a
growingapproximationin meworkingol goveroment,withdiffer-
encesmerelyof degreeandof dctait.Liberaldemocracyneedsa re-
definitionofthepublicandprivatespheresofaction.ButastheUneof
separationisalwaysshiftingunderthepressureof freshsocialnceds
anddemands¡"it mustbeleftfreetomovewiththoseneedsandde-
mandsandcanootbefixedthroughaconstitUtionalre-instatement.
Theonlypossibleprincipieol democraticconfirmationisthatpublic
actionshouldbeundertakenonlywhereandwhenandinsofarasthe
needforcommonaedonbecomesevidentandisacceptedforthesake
. of thecomm~ng9Od.In thatwaycontrolleddemocracycouldyetbe
madethe'goldenmeanwherebysocialneedsmightbesj1tisfiedas
largelyandiusdyaspossible,whilestillleavingaswidea residueas
possibleforthefrel;choiceoftheindividual; "
Thatisfullyastruefortheinternationalsphere.It isindeedthe
onlywaytocombine,aswellasmaybe,internationalorganization
withnationalfreedom.Wehavealreadysuggestedthatnotallinter-
estsarecommonto all,andthatthecommoninterestsdonotcon-
.cernallcountriesin thesamedegree.A te¡:ritorialunionwouldbind
togethersomeinterestswhicharenotof commolJ,.conceroto the
group,whileit wouldinevitablycutasundersomeinterestsofcom-
monconceento thegroupandthoseoutsideit. Theonlywayto
av~idthattwice-arbitrarysurgeryistoproceed-bymeansofanatural
selection,bindingtogetherthos~interestswhicharecommon,where
theyarecommon,andtotheextenttowhichtheyarecommon.That
iunctionalselectionandorganizationof internationalneedswould
extend~andin a wayresume,aninternationaldevelopmentwhich
AWORKINGPEACE SYSTEM 105
hasbeengatheringstrengthsincethelatterpartof thenineteenth
century.Theworkoforganizinginternationalpublicservicesandac-
tivitieswastakenastepfurtherbytheLeague,initshealthanddrug-
controlwork,in itsworkforrefugees,in theexperimentswiththe
transferof minoritiesandtheimportantinnovationsof theLeague
loansystem,andstillmorethroughthewholeaedvityoftheILO (In-
ternationalLabourOrganisation).Butmanyotheractivitiesandin-
terestsin thepasthadbeenorganizedinternationallyby private
agencies-infinanceandtradeandproduction,etc.,nottospeakof
scientificandculturalactivities.In recentyearssomeof theseal:tivi-
tieshavebeenbroughtunderpublicnationalcontrolinvariouscoun-
tries;intotalitariancountriesindeedallofthem.Inameasure,there-
fore,thepresentsituationrepresentsa retrogressionfromtherecent
past:thenewtUrotowardself-sufficiencyhasspreadfromeconomics
tothethingsofthemind;andwhileflyingandwirelesswereopcning
uptheworld,manyold linksforgedbyprivateefforthavebeen
forciblysevered.It is unlikelythatmostof themcouldberesumed
nowexceptthroughpublicaction,andif theyaretooperateasfreely
astheydidinprívatehandstheycannotbeorganizedoth~ise than
onanondiscriminatingfunctionalbasis.
Whatwouldbethebroadlinesofsucha functionalorganiza-
tionof internationalacrivities?Theessentialprincipieisthatacrivi-
ticswouldbeselectedspecificaJlyandorganizedseparately-each
accordingtoitsnature,totheconditionsunderwhichit itlstooper-
ate,andto theneedsof themomentoIt wouldallow,therefore,all
freedomfor practicalvariationin theorgan.izationof theseveral
functions,aswellasin theworkingof aparticularfunctionasneeds
andconditionsalter.Letustakeasanexampletbégroupof func-
tionswhichfall undercommunications,onwhichtbesuccessof
post-warreconstructionwill dependgready.Wbatistheproperba-
sisfor theinternadonalorganizadonof raiJwaysystems?Clearlyit
mustbeEuropean,or rathercontinental,NorthAmerican,andso
on,asthatgivestbelogicaladministrativelimitofcoordination.A
divisionof theCominentintoseparatedemocraticandtotalitarian
unionswouldnotachievethepracticalend,aspoliticaldivision
would obstructthat necessarycoordination;while Britishand
Americanparticipationwouldmaketheorganizationmorecumber-
somewithoutanyaddedprofittothefunction.Asregardsshipping,
thelineof effectiveorganizationwhicbatoncesuggestsitselfis in-
ternational,or intercontinental,but not universal.A European
unioncouldnotsolvetheproblemof maritimecoordinationwith-
outthecooperationofAmericaandofcertainotberoverseasstates.
Aviationandbroadcasting,a thirdexamplein thesamegroup,
"
106 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 107
eouldbeorganizedeffeetivelyonlyona ""iversalscale,withper-
hapssubsidiaryregionalarrangementsformorelocalserviees.Sueh
subsidiaryregionalarrangementseouldin faetbeinsertedatany
timeandatanystagewherethatmightproveusefulforanypartof
afunetion.Devolutionaeeordingtoneedwouldb~aseasyandnat-
uralascentralization,whereasif thebasisoforganizationwerepo-
líticaleverysuchchangein dimensionwouldinvolveanelaborate
constitutionalre-arrangement.Similarly,iteouldbeleftsafelytobedeterminedbypractiealconsiderationswhctheratthepointswhere
functionserosseachother--suehasrailandrivertransponin Eu-
ropeandAmeriea-thetwoaetivitiesshouldbemerelJeoordinated
orputunderonecontrol. '.
Thcscarerelativelysimpleexamples.The (unetionaleoordina-
tionof production,nade,snddistributionevidentlywould bemore
complex~ellpeciallyastheyhavebeen,builtupon.acompetitivebasis.
But theexperience'witf1intemationalcanels,with there-organiza.
rionof theshipping,cotton,andsteelindustriesin England,not to
speakof theevenwiderandmorerelevantexp~riencewitheconomic
coord~nationin thetwoworldwars-all showsthatthethingcanbe
doneandthatit hasalwaysbeendoneon slichfunetionallines.No
fixe~rule;is nee~ed;andno rigidpatternis ddirablefor theorgani-
zation.oftheseworkingfunctionalstrata. .
A 'certaindegreeof fixitywouldnotbeoutof place,however,in
regardto morenegativefunctions,especiallythoserelatedto lawand
order,butalsoto anyothersof a moreformalnaturewhicharelikely
to remainfairlystatic.Security,for instance,,couldbeorganizedon
an interlockingregionalbasis,and thejudicial functionlikewise,
witha hierarchyof courts,astheneedmayarise-the wideractingas
counsof appealfromthemorelocalcóuns.Yet,evenin regardto se-
curity,andin additionto regionalarrangements,theelasticityinher-
entin funcrional'organizationmayprovepracticableanddesirable,if
only in theperiodoi transition.Anglo-Americannavalcooperation
for thepolicingóf theseasmayproveacceptablefor a time,andit
wouldCUtacrossphysicalregions.Agreementon a mineralsanction
would of necessitymeancommonactionby thosecountrieswhich
control the~ain sources;and othersucheombinationsmightbe
foundusefulfor anyparticulartaskinhand.That isseeurityonlyfor
defense;securityarrangementswereconceivedusuallyon a geo-
graphicalbasisbecausetheyweremeantto preventviolenee,and
thatwouldstill bethetaskof sanetions,etc.,basedonsomeregional
devolution.Butin additionthereis a growingfunctionaldevolution
in thefieldof socialsecurityinconneetionwithhealth,withthedrug
andwhiteslavetraffic,with crime,etc.In all thatimponantfieldof
socialpolicingit hasbeenfoundthatcoordinationandeooperation
with thepolieeof othereountrieson functionallines,varyingwith
eachtask,wasbothindispensableandpracticable.Thereis no talk
andno attemptin all thisto eneroaehuponsovereignty,butonlya
detaehedfunetionalassociationwhich workssmoothlyand is al-
readyacceptedwithoutquestion. '
Howcverthatmaybe,in theficldof morepositiveactivefunc-
tions-eeonomic,social,cultUral-whieharevariedandeverchang-
ingin structureandpurpose,anydevolutionmust,like themainor-
ganization,followfunetionallines.Landtransport,ontheContinent
wouldneeda differentorganizationandagenciesshouldtherailways
aftera timebedisplaeedbyroads;andaChanneltunnelwoulddraw
Englandinto an arrangemen.tin whichsh¡;doesnot at presentbe-
long,withacorrespondingchangein thegoverningQrgan.
Herewe discovera cardinalvirtueof thefun<;t.ionalmethod-
whatonemightcall thevirtueof technicalself-determination.The
funetionaldime1ls;olls,aswehaveseen,determineitsappropriateor-
ga"s. Ir also revealsthroughpraeticethe natureoí the actionre-
quiredundergivenconditions,andin thatwaythepotIJersI,!eededby
. therespectiveauthority.The funetion,onemightsay,determinesthe
executiveinstrumentsuitableforitsproperactivity,andbythesame
processprovidesa needforthereformof theinstrumentatevery
stage.Thiswouldallowthewidestlatitudeforvariationbetween
functions,andalsoin thedimensionor organizationef thesame
functionasneedsandconditionschange.Notonlyisthereinallthis
noneedforanyfixedconstitutionaldivisionofauthorityandpower,
prescribedinadvance,butanythingbeyondtheoriginalformaldefi-
nitionof scopeandpurposemightembarrasstheworki.ngof the
practicalarrangements. .
o TheQuestionofWiderCoordfn.ation
Thequestionwill beasked,however,in whatmannerandtowhat
degreethevarious[unctionalagenciesthatmaythusgrowupwould
haveto belinkedtoeachotherandarticulatedaspartsof a more
comprehensiveorganization.It shouldbeclearthateachagency
couldworkbyitself,butthatdoesnotexcludethepossibilityof
someofthemorallbeingboundinsomewaytogether,if it shouldbe
foundneedfulorusefultodoso.Thatindeedisthetest.Asthewhole
senseof thisparticularmethodistoletactivitiesbeorganizedasthe
needforjointactionarisesandisaccepted,itwouldbeoutoí place
to laydowninadvancesomeformalplanforthecoordinationof
variousfunctions.Coordination,too,wouldin thatsensehaveto
.,
108 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 109
comeaboutfunctionally.Yetcertainneedsandpossibilitiescanbe
foreseenalreadynow,thoughsomeareprobableandothersonly
likely,anditmayhelptoroundoffthepicturejfweJookintothisas-
pectbriefly.
cordingto itsnature,itsauthorityor itsinfluenceto makeof suchor-
dersa meansadditionalto internanonalpublicworks,etc.,for deal-
ingwith periodsor poeketsof unemployment.Coordinationof such
a generalkind mayin somecasesamountalmostto arbitrationoE
differeneesbctWeenfunctionalagenciesjregionalboardsor councils
likethoseof thePan-AmericanUnionmightbeusedto adjustor ar-
bitrateregionaldifferences.
4. Beyondthis thereremainsthehabitualassumption,aswe
,~avealreadysaid,thatinternacionalactionmusthavesomeoverall
po/iticalauthorityaboveit. Besidesthefactthatsucha comprehen-
siveauthorityis notnow a practicalpossibility,it isthecentralview
of thefunctionalapproachthatsuchanauthorityis notessentialfor
our greatestandreal immediateneeds.The severalfunctionscould
beorganizedthroughtheagreement,givenspecificallyin eachcase,
of thenationalgovernmentschieflyinterested,with thegrantof the
requisitepowcrsandresourceSjwhereasit is clear,toemphasizethe
previouspoint,thattheycouldnot allow!iuchorganizationssimply
to beprescribedbysomeuniversalauthority,evenif itexisted.For an
authoritywhichhadthetitleto do sowouldin effectbehardlyless
thana worldgovernmentjandsuchastrongcentralorganismwould
inevitablytendto takeunto itselfrathermoreauthoritythanthat
originallyallottedto it, thiscallingin turn'for thechecksand bal-
anceswhich.areused.infederalsystems,butwhichwouldbedifficult
to providein anylooseway.If issuesshouldarisein anyafunctional
systemwhichwouldcal!eitherfor somenewdepartureor for there-
eonsiderationof existingarrangements,thatcouldbe doneonly in
councilby all thegovernmentsconceroed.Insofaras it maybede-
siredto keepalivesomegeneralviewof ourproblems,andperhapsa
generalwatchoverthepoliciesof theseveraljoint agencies,some
bodyof a representativekind, liketheLeagueAssemblyor thegov-
erningbodyof theILO, couldmeetperiodically,perhapselectedby
proportional representationfrom the assembliesof the member
states.Suchanassembly,in whichall thestateswouldhávea voice,
could discussandv.entilategeneralpolicies;as anexpressionof the
mindandwill of publicopinionjbut it couldnotactuallyprescribe
policy,asthismightturooutto beatoddswiththepolicyof govero-
ments.Any lineof aetionrecommendedby suchanassemblywould
haveto bepressedandsecuredthroughthepolicy-makingmachinery
of thevariouscountriesthemselves.
1. Withinthesamegroupof funetionsprobabJytherewould
havetobecoordinationeithersimpJyfor teehnicalpurposesor for
widerfunctionalends,andthiswouldbethefirststagetowarda
widerintegration.Totakeagainthegroupconcernedwithcommuni-
cations-rail,road,andaírtransportinEuropewouldnccdtechnical
eoordina.tionin regardto timetables,connections,etc.Theymay
needaJsoawiderf,mctionalcoordinationif thereistobesomedis-
tributionofpassengerandfreighttrafficforthemosteconomicper-
formance-whetherthatisdonebyasuperiorexecutiveagencyorby
somearbitralbody,perhapsonthelinesof theFederalCommerce
Commissionin America.Seaandair trafficacrosstheAtlanticor
elsewhe¡-e,thoughseparatclyorganizcd,probablywouldalsobenefit
froptasimilar,typeoEcoordination.Again,variousmineralcontroJs,
if theyshouldbeorganizedseparatcly,wouldneedsomecoordina-
tion,thoughthisarbitrarygroupingof "minerals"wouldbelessto
thepointtha.tthecoordinationofspecifiemínc(alsandotherprod-uc"tswithpossibJesubstitutes-ofcrudeoi!withsynthetkoiJ, oí
cruderubberwithsyntheticrubber,andsoon.
2.Thenextdégreeorstagemightbe,if founddesirable;theco-
ordinationofseveralgro,!psoffúnctionaJaj;encies.Forinstance,the
communications'agencies.maynotonlyworkoutsomemeansofaCt-
ingtogetherinthedistributionoí ordersforrollingstock,ships,etc.,
buttheycóuldors~ouldworkin thisthroughanyagenciesthatmay
havecome,into.beingfor controlling'materialsandproduction,or
throughsomeintermediaryagencyasa clearinghouse.Thereis no
needtoprescri~anyparteroinadvance,orthatthepatteroadopted
inonecaseshouldbefollowedinaJltheothers.
3.Thecoór(Jinationofsuchworkirigfunctiorialagencieswith
anyinternationalplannÍ1tgagentieswouldpresenta thirdstage,and
onetharbringsouts'omeinterestingpossibilities,shouTdtheideasfor
aninternationalinvestmt:rltboardor aninternationaldevelopment
commission,asanadvisory'organ,cometo fruition.Onecansee
howsuchadevelopmentcommissionmighthelptoguidethegrowth
of functionalagenciesintothemostdesirablechanne1s,andcould
watchtheirinter-re1ationsandtheirrepercussíons.Andaninvest-
mentboardcouldguide,for instance,th~dis.rri,butionof ordersfor
ships,materials,etc.,notonlyaccordingtothebesteconomicusebut
aJsoforthepurposeof ironingoutcyclicaltrends.It coulduse,ac-
These,then,aretheseveraltypesandgradesof coordination
whichmightdevelopwiththegrowthof funaionaJactivities.But
thereis,finally,inthepolíticalfieldalsotheproblemofsecurity,ad-
110 DAVID MITRANY A WORKlNG PEAa SysrEM 111
mitredlyacrucíalproblem,loronirsbeingsolvedeffecrivelythesuc-
cessfulworkingof theotheractivitieswilldependoAt thesametime,
rhegeneraldiscussionof functionalorganizationwill haveservedto
bringourrhetcueplaceandproportionofsecurity,assomethingin-
dispensablebutalsoassomethingincapablebyitseUol achievingthe
peacefulgrowthof aninternationalsociety.It is in facta separate
funcrionliketheothers,notsomethingthatsrandsinsternisolation,
overridingall theorhers.Lookingat it in thisway,asa practical
function,shouldalsomakeit cIearthatwewouldnotachievemuch
if wehandleditasaone-sided,limitedproblem-arpresentrooolten
..summedupin "Germanaggression."Germanaggressionwasapar-
ticularlyvidousoutgrowthofabadgeneralsystem,andonlya radi-
calandgeneralchangeofthesystemitsellwillprovidecontinuousse-
curityforaU.In thiscasealsoit wouldbeusefultolaydownsome
formalpledgesandprincipiesasaguidinglíne,butrhepracticalor-
ganizationwouldhaveto foJ)owfuncrional,perhapscombinedwith
regional,lines.Thatis4111themorenecessaryasweknowbetternow
howmanyelemenrsbesidesthepurelymilitarycnterintorhemaking
of security.Thevariouslunctionalagenciesmighr,in iact,playan
imponantrolein thatwideaspectofsecurity¡theycouldbothwatch
overandchecksuchrhingsasthebuildingofsrraregicrailwaysorthe
accumulationof straregicstoc~sin metalsor grains.Possiblythey
couldevenbeused~veryproperlyandeffecrively,asalirstlineofac-
tionagailJstthreateningaggression,by.the1rwirhholdingservices
fromthosewhoarecausingrhetrouble.Theycouldapplysuchpre-
ventivesanctionsmoreeffectivelyrhanif thisweretowaituponrhe
agreementaridacrionoí anumberol separategovernments¡andthey
coulddosoaspartoftheirpracticalduries,andthereEorewithlessol
thepoliticalreacrionscausedbypolíticalacrio~.
voiceincontrol,tharwouldbereallytoharkbaektotheoutlookof
políticalsovereignty.In no functionalorganizationsofarhavethe
parriesinterestedhadashareincontrolas"byright"of theirsepa-
rareexistence-neitherthevariouslocalauthoritiesin theLondon
TransportBoard,northesevenstatesconcemedin theTVA [Ten-
nesseeValleyAuthority].An in anycase,in thetransitionfroID
powerpoliticstoa functionalorderwecouldbeweUsatisfiedif me
conrrolofthenewinternationalorgansansweredtosomeofthemer-
itsofeachcase,leavingit toexperienceandtomematuringofanew
outlookfaprovidein timethenecessarycorrectives.
. THROUCiH FUNCTIONAL ACTION
TO INTERNATlONAL soclrn
D Representation;nCootrpls
Oneaspectlikelyto becJpse1yexaminedis that.ofthestructureof the
Eunctional~ontrols,¡lndhereagaintheinitial diEficultywill bethat
we shallhave.'tobreakawayfromattractivetraditiotialideasif we
areto work out theissueonits merits.It is n~tin (henatureof rhe
methodthatrepreSenrittionon thecontrollingbodiesshouldbedem-
ocraticin a politicafsense,full andequalior aU.Id~allyit mayseem
thatall functionsshouldbeorganizedona worldwidescaleandthat
all statesshóuldhavea voicein control.Yet theweightoi realityis
on thesideof makingthe jurisdicrionoEthe variousagenciesno
wider thanthe mosteffectiveworking limits oEthefunction¡and
whileit is understandablethatall countriesmightwishtohavea
o TheWayofNaturalSelection
Onecannotinsisttoomuchthatsuchgradualfunctionaldevelop-
mentswouldnotcreatea newsystem,howeVerstrangetheymight
appearin thelightofourhabitualsearchforoaunifiedformalorder.
Theywouldmerelyrationalizeanddevelopwhatisalreadythece.In
aUcountriessocialactivities,in the",idestsenseof theterm,areor-
ganizedandreorganizedcontinuallyin thatway.SufbecauseoEthe
legalisticstruetureof thestateandof ourpoHti~1outlook,which
treatnárionalandinternationalsocietyas'twodiíferentworlds,so-
cial nature;soto speak,hasnothadaéhanceso far to takeits
course.Oursocialactivitiesarecutoffarbitrárilyatthelimitofthe
s.tateand,if atall, areallowedto belinkedto thesameactivities
acrosstheborderonlybymeansofune.ertainandcrampingpolitical
ligatures.Whatishereproposedissimplymatthesepolítiealampu-
tationsshouldeease.Wheneverusefulornecessarytheseveralactivi-
tieswouldbereleasedtofunedonasoneunitthroughoutthelength
oi ebeirnaturalcourse.Nadonalproblemswouldthenappear,and
wouldbetreated,.aswhattheyare-the localsegmentsoí general
problems.
o Epilogue
Peaeewill DOtbesecuredií weorganizetheworldby whatdividesit.
But in the measurein which suchpeace-buildingactivitiesdevelop
and sueceed,onemighthopethat themerepreventioDoí conflict,
112 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACESYSTEM 113
crucialasthatmaybe,wouldin timefal!toa subordinatepl:.cein
theschemeofintern:.tion:.1things,whilewewouldturotowbatare
therealt;1sksof ourcommonsociety-theconquestof povertyand
of diseaseandof ignorance.Thestaysof politicalfederationwcre
neededwhenlifewasmorelocalandinternation:.l.activitiesstill
loose.Butnowoursocialinterdependenceis all-pervasiveandall-
,embracing,andifit besoorg:.nizedtbe'políticalsidewillalsogrow
aspartofit.Theelementsofafunctionalsystemcouldbegintowork
withouta generalpolíticalauthority,buta polític:.1autboritywith-
out.activesocialfunctionswouldremainal1emptytemple.Society
willdevelopbyourlivingit,notbypolicingit.Norwoulda~ypolít-
icalagreementsurvivelongunderec;onomicco~petition,buteco:.
nomicuriificationwouldbuildupthefoundationforpolíticalagrec-
ment,evenif ir didnotDlakeit sUpCrfluou$.In anycase,asthings
are,thepolitical\vayistooambitious.Wecannotstartfromanideal
planebutmustbepreparedto makemanyattemptsfrommany,
poims,andbuildtbingsandmendtbingsaswegoalong.Theessen-
tialthingistbatweshouldbegoingtogether,in thesamedirection,
andtbatwegetintostepnow.
wouldcreateincreasinglydeepandwidestrataofpeace-nottbefor-
biddingpeaceof analliance,butonetbatwouldsuffusetheworld
witha fertileminglingofcommonendeavorandachievemeot.
Tbis isnotanargumentagainstanyidealof formalunion,if
thatshouldproveapossibleultimategoal.It is,aboveall,apleafor
thecreationnowof theelementsof anactiveinternacionalsociety.
Amidstthetragedyof waronec~nglímpseal$othepromiseof a
broaderoutlook,ofamuchdeeperundecstandingof theissuesthan
in 1918.It is becausetbepeoplesarereadyforactionthattheycan-
notwait.WehavenomeansandnostandingtoWQ.rkoutsomefine
constitutionandtryto imposeit in timeupontbeworld.Butwedo
bave"the.standingandthemeanstopreparefor immediatepractical
. 'action.Wedonotknowwbittwillbethesentiiitentsofthepeoplesof
Europeandof .othercontinentsat theend'of thewar,butwedo
knowwhattheirneedswili be.Any'políticalschemewoúldstarta
disputation;01lYworkingarrangementwouldraiseahopeandmake
forconfidenceandpatience.. .
Thefunctionalwaymayseemaspidtlessso.lution-andsoit is,
inthescnsethatitdetachesfromthespiritthethingswhichareofthe
body.No advantagehasac~ruedto anyonewheneconomicand
othersocialactivitiesareweddedto fascistorcommunistor other
politicalide~logies;theirprogenyhasalways'beeocoofusionand
conflictoLettl!esethingsappearquitestarklyforwhatther.are,prac-
tica.1householdtasks,aoditwillbemoredifficulttomak&!'theminto
thehous~holdidolsof "nationalinterest"and"nationalQonor."The
ideologicalmovementsoEourtime,becauseof theirindiscriminate
zeal.,havesometimesbeencomparedto religiousmovements.,They
maybe,butat theircorewasnota promiseof lifehereafter.The
thingswhicharetrulyof thespirit-andthereforepersonaltothein-
dividualandtothenation-wiUnotbelesswingedforbeingfreedin
"theirturnfromthatworldlyballast.Heocetheargumentthatop-
posesdemocracyto totalirarianismdoesnotcallmerealissue.It is
muchtoosimple.Societyisevecywhereintcavailbecauseit isevery-
whereintransidon.ltsproblemafteracenturyoflaissezfairephilos-
ophyistosiftaoew,inthelightofneweconomicpossibilitiesandof
newsocialaspirations,whatisprivatefromwhathasto bepublic;
andiothelatterspherewhatislocalandnadonalfromwhatiswider.
Aodfor thattaskof broadsocialrefinementa morediscriminating
instrumentis neededthantheoldpolíticalsieve.In mewordsof a
statementbytheAmericanNationalPolicyCommittee,"Partof the
daringrequiredisthedaringto fiodnewformsandtoadoptthem.
Wearelostif wedogmaticallyassumethattheproceduresof thepast
constitutetheonlytrueexpressionofdemocracy."
Cooperatiol1forthecommongoodis thetask,bothfor thesakeoE
peaceand of abetteelife, a!ld for that it is essentialt~t certain inter-
estsandactivitiesshouldbetakenoutof thetnoo,j'of competition
andworkedtogether.Butir isnotessentialtomakethatcooperation
fasttoaterritorialauthority,andindeeditwouldbesenselesstodo
sowhenthenumberof thoseactiviriesis limited,whiletheirrangeis
theworld."Ecooomicareasdonotalwaysrunwithpoliticalareas,"
wrotetheNew YorkTimes(February26,1943}incommentingon
theAlaskaHighwayscheme,andsuchcross-countcycooperation
wouldsimplymakefrontierslessimportant."Applytbisprincipieto
cerrainEuropeanareasandthepossibilitiesare.dazzling."If it be
saidmatallthatmaybepossibleinwarbuthardlyinpeace,thatcan
onlymeanthatpracticallythethingis possiblebutthatwedoubt
. whetherin normaltimestherewouldbethepolítical~iII todo it.
Now,apartfromeverythingelse,thefunctionalmethodstandsoutas
asolidtouchstoneiothatrespectoPromissorycovenantsandchartecs
mayremainaheadstonetounfulfilledgoodinteotions,butthefunc-
tionalwayisactionitselfandthereforeaninescapabletestof where
westandandhowfarwearewillingtogoinbuildingupanewinter-
nationalsociery.It isnotapromisetoactinacrisis,butitselftheac-
tionmatwill avoidthecdsis.Evecyactivityorganizedin thatway
wouldbea layerof peacefullife;anda sufficieotadditionof th<'"111